Reviving Realism in the Canadian Defence Debate 34Prelims 1 10/1/08, 4:37 PM 34Prelims 2 10/1/08, 4:37 PM Reviving Realism in the Canadian Defence Debate Philippe Lagassé Assistant Professor Graduate School of Public and International Affairs University of Ottawa and Paul Robinson Associate Professor Graduate School of Public and International Affairs University of Ottawa Centre for International Relations, Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario, Canada 2008 34Prelims 3 10/1/08, 4:37 PM Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Lagassé, Philippe Reviving realism in the Canadian defence debate / Philippe Lagassé & Paul Robinson. (Martello papers 1183-3661 34) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-1-55339-240-8 1. Canada—Military policy. 2. Canada—History, Military—21st century. 3. Canada—History, Military—20th century. I. Robinson, Paul,1966- II. Queen’s University (Kingston, Ont.). Centre for International Relations III. Title. IV. Series. UA600.L44 2008 355'.033571 C2008-905741-4 © Copyright 2008 34Prelims 4 10/1/08, 4:37 PM Martello Paper Series The Queen’s University Centre for International Relations (QCIR) is pleased to present the latest in its series of monographs, the Martello Papers. Taking their name from the distinctive towers built during the nineteenth century to defend Kingston, Ontario, these papers cover a wide range of topics and issues in foreign and defence policy, and in the study of international peace and security. Even in times of war, defence policy has rarely been a prime item for national debate in Canada. Over the past decade, however, the air-war over Kosovo, the events of September 2001, the intervention in Iraq and, of course, Canada’s critical and costly role in the Afghanistan mission have engaged the political class, the media and the public in an intense national discussion over the means and ends of national defence. Much of the run- ning has been made by those who argue that, at least from the early 1990s on, governments have spent, and done, far less than necessary to sustain the Canadian Forces. The price we pay for this negligence is a military establishment debilitated almost to the point of collapse, a loss of respect among our major allies, and a measurable incapacity to defend the country and advance its interests abroad. This case has been made eloquently and effectively, to the point that, over the past five years, the CF have witnessed a marked increase in their financial resources, including major new capital acquisitions, and under- gone a far-reaching transformation in doctrine and command structures. Yet, as Philippe Lagassé and Paul Robinson point out in this paper, for the CFs’ most avid supporters this is not enough, and indeed may never be, 34Prelims 5 10/1/08, 4:37 PM vi Philippe Lagassé and Paul Robinson given the tendency of perceived threats – and the missions they generate – to expand to exceed the resources available. In their critique of the way Canada’s recent defence debate has been framed, the authors begin by reminding us of the classic realism that has underpinned Canadian foreign and defence policy for much of its history. From King through Chretien, they insist, Canadian governments have in fact been remarkably successful in making the fine adjustments needed to match means and ends, power and interests. Applying those same realist precepts to assessing Canada’s current security environment, they argue, does not support claims for further increases in the military budget, al- though it certainly calls for some reordering of how the projected $18 B are to be spent. Proceeding from a comprehensive definition of national secu- rity and an appreciation of the importance of well-equipped and well-trained armed forces, their paper deploys a crisp cost-benefit analysis to sort through the claims made on behalf of the CF for further spending and grander visions. Its aim is to turn Canada’s national defence debate in a new and more fruit- ful direction. We are, as always, grateful to the Security and Defence Forum of the Department of National Defence, whose ongoing support enables the Cen- tre to conduct and disseminate research on issues of importance to national and international security. As is the case with all Martello Papers, the views expressed here are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre or any of its supporting agencies. Charles C. Pentland Director, QCIR August 2008 34Prelims 6 10/1/08, 4:37 PM Reviving Realism in the Canadian Defence Debate vii Contents 1. Introduction ........................................................................................ 1 2. The Realist Perspective ...................................................................... 7 3. From King to Chrétien: Realism in Canadian Defence Policy ........ 13 Golden Age or Golden Exception? 1945-1957 ......................... 14 Holding Steady, Seeking Efficiency: 1958-1968....................... 17 Retreat and Return: 1969-1984 ................................................. 23 Big Dreams, Bigger Debts: 1984-1993 ..................................... 28 The Fundamentals Were Sound: 1994-2003 ............................. 32 4. Still Not Enough? Canadian Defence Since 2003 ........................... 41 Stuck in the Means/End Gap ..................................................... 42 Capabilities ................................................................................ 43 Missions/Tasks .......................................................................... 48 Economic Constraints................................................................ 53 5. A Realist Critique of the Contemporary Canadian Defence Debate .............................................................................................. 55 The Case For, And Against, Greater Defence Spending ........... 56 Models of Defence Planning ..................................................... 58 Measuring Defence Expenditure ............................................... 59 National Interests ....................................................................... 60 34Prelims 7 10/1/08, 4:37 PM viii Philippe Lagassé and Paul Robinson The International Security Environment and Threats to Canadian Interests ..................................................................... 69 6. Building A Canadian National Security Strategy ............................ 87 Opportunity Costs...................................................................... 88 The Inefficiency of Defence Spending and the Need for Reform ....................................................................................... 89 Survival Interests ....................................................................... 93 Protection of Life and Property ................................................. 93 Economic Prosperity and Relations with the United States ...... 97 Sovereignty ................................................................................ 99 International Stability .............................................................. 101 Influence .................................................................................. 103 National Pride and Honour ...................................................... 105 Values ...................................................................................... 106 Expeditionary Missions and Capabilities ................................ 107 7. Conclusion ..................................................................................... 111 Notes ..................................................................................................... 115 34Prelims 8 10/1/08, 4:37 PM Reviving Realism in the Canadian Defence Debate 1 1. Introduction Since the 2003 American-led invasion of Iraq, there has been a resurgence of realist thinking about defence policy in the United States. Fuelled by a belief that the Iraq war was driven not by any realistic appraisal of Ameri- ca’s national interests but rather by an idealistic faith in America’s ability to transform the world, this realist resurgence has questioned Washing- ton’s reliance on armed force and sustained foreign interventions to defeat transnational terrorist groups and halt the horizontal proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These realist critiques have been forwarded by some of the United States’ most respected foreign and defence policy scholars. Barry R. Posen has recommended that Washington adopt a for- eign policy of restraint, one that seeks to shape international developments rather than control them.1 Richard K. Betts has called for modest reduc- tions in American defence spending, a cautious approach to interventions and threat assessments, and an appreciation of the opportunity costs asso- ciated with prioritizing apparent defence needs above other sources of national power, such as a strong diplomatic corps and a healthy economy.2 John Mueller has highlighted the counterproductive consequences of over- reacting to terrorist threats.3 Andrew J. Bacevich has warned of a worrisome American “tendency to see international problems as military problems and to discount the likelihood of finding a solution except through military means.”4 Of the Iraq war itself, Bacevich has asked the most realist of questions: “But how exactly do these sacrifices serve the national interest? What has the loss of nearly 4,000 U.S. troops and the commitment of about $1 trillion – with more to come – actually gained the United States?”5 And, proving that realism crosses