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The Militarized Worldview and China's Use of Force, 1949

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The Militarized Worldview and China's Use of Force, 1949 THE TAMING OF THE RED DRAGON: THE MILITARIZED WORLDVIEW AND CHINA’S USE OF FORCE, 1949-2010 BY XIAOTING LI DISSERTATION Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2014 Urbana, Illinois Doctoral Committee: Professor John Vasquez, Chair Professor Paul Diehl Associate Professor Carol Leff Associate Professor Xinyuan Dai Abstract This dissertation explores the impact of China’s integration into the international society upon its propensity to use force in interstate disputes. Drawing on various insights from international relations theory, I argue that China’s proverbial violence proneness—that is, its propensity to use force—was historically a product of its militarized or Hobbesian worldview, developed during Mao’s reign, when Beijing acted as a challenger against the international system. Due to this worldview, the challenger tends to overestimate the threats to its security, and places a premium on preparing for and engaging in violence against real or perceived enemies. Since Mao’s death, however, China has been increasingly integrated into the international system. As a result, Beijing has experienced a Lockean turn in its worldview, which now sees cooperation and compromise as the main themes of international relations. This ideational transformation reduces the erstwhile challenger’s dependence on force as an instrument of foreign policy, and softens its predilection for violence accordingly. Using both large-N statistical analysis and detailed case studies, I demonstrate that this evolution of China’s militarized worldview, rather than its increasing relative power, played the foremost role in driving Beijing’s resort to force between 1949 and 2010. Theoretically, this dissertation thus challenges the conventional wisdom of realist theory that sees states’ relative capabilities as the primary source of their security behaviors. Instead, it highlights the role of worldviews in shaping states’ perceptions of their security situation, defining their security interests, and regulating their security behaviors. The findings of this dissertation also attest powerfully to the importance of a strategy of constructive engagement with China. ii Acknowledgments I thank all my dissertation committee members for their positive encouragement and timely guidance in the writing process. It was a great pleasure to work with these very fine people in the last six years. My thanks go foremost to John Vasquez and Paul Diehl, whose classes on international conflict broadened my intellectual horizons greatly and provided me with the necessary methodological training before writing this dissertation. I also benefit, needless to say, from the classes taught by other faculty members at the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois, who are both distinguished scholars and innovative teachers. My fellow graduate students, especially Christina Alvarez, Evangeline M. Reynolds, Gennady Rudkevich and Konstantinos Travlos, are a source of warm and collegial support. I will always cherish the memories of our time together. I also thank the Department’s staff, especially Brenda Stamm, for their efficient and tireless professional service, without which it would have been impossible to pursue my studies and research smoothly during the past six years. Finally, my heartfelt thanks to my parents, Henian Li and Aiping Ding, whose moral and intellectual guidance proves invaluable at every critical juncture in my life. I love you forever, Mom and Dad! iii TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………………..1 CHAPTER 1: THE CHALLENGER IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: FROM THE MILITARIZED WORLDVIEW TO THE LOCKEAN WORLDVIEW………………………..21 CHAPTER 2: MAO’S CHINA AND THE MILITARIZED WORLDVIEW………………….52 CHAPTER 3: DENG XIAOPING AND THE LOCKEANIZATION OF THE CHINESE WORLDVIEW…………………………………………………………………………………102 CHAPTER 4: PATTERNS OF CHINA’S USE OF FORCE, 1949-2010: A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF THE DATA……………………………………………………………...145 CHAPTER 5: THE MILITARIZED WORLDVIEW AND CHINA’S USE OF FORCE: A SYSTEMATIC TEST OF COMPETING HYPOTHESES………………………………….....179 CHAPTER 6: THE MILITARIZED WORLDVIEW AND CHINESE INTRANSIGENCE: THE SINO-SOVIET RUPTURE, AND THE 1967 HONG KONG CRISIS………………......226 CHAPTER 7: THE LOCKEAN WORLDVIEW AND CHINESE FLEXIBILITY: TAIWAN AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA………………………………………………………………291 CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………358 BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………………369 iv Introduction In 1994, James Rosenau, former president of the International Studies Association in the United States, expressed concern with a peculiar blind-spot in the discipline of International Relations (IR). “A great deal is known about China, its history, resources, and culture, and much is also grasped about the dynamics of IR, but how the two go together, how they account for the collective role played in global life by a quarter of the world’s population, is far from clear” (Rosenau 1994: 528). In his opinion, one possible way of connecting China to international relations theory is to research how the giant nation’s integration into the international system helps to change its behavior: “For all its uniqueness, China has long been an actor in the international system and has thus been subject to the same dynamics and controls that are inherent in the system and that condition all states” (Ibid., 524). With Rosenau’s suggestion in mind, this study examines one of the most crucial and controversial issues in contemporary international relations—that of China’s rise and its impact on international security. Indeed, since Mao Zedong’s famous announcement in October 1949 that “China has stood up,” a specter has haunted international politics—the specter of a rising China poised to destabilize the world order. In the 1950s and 1960s, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was often seen as the Red Dragon, irreconcilable and mordantly aggressive, with the pronounced goal of transforming the world through revolution and violence. Since the early 1990s, the dragon is alleged to have reawakened from its slumber, reviving old fears of an implacable “China threat.” Will the PRC become a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system, or will it use its burgeoning power aggressively and turn into a source of global and regional tension? This question, known as “whither China” (Zoellick 2005), has attracted growing attention from the media, policy, and scholarly communities nowadays. 1 In essence, to ask “whither China” is to ask whether and to what extent an erstwhile challenger state,1 after years of integration into international society, has acquired a stake in the stability of the international system,2 as well as in the peaceful resolution of disputes. Theoretically, there are two approaches, one materialist and the other ideational, to the question. Following the first approach, we may concentrate on exploring the material incentives that help to increase or decrease a challenger’s propensity to settle disputes by violent means. Prime examples of the material incentives usually include the concerned state’s relative power position, its economic and trade linkages with the outside world, or its associations with international governmental organizations. Exogenous in origin, these incentives may alter the once challenger’s cost-benefit analyses and compel it to think twice before resorting to force. Alternatively, we may proceed with the second approach and investigate the beliefs and ideas that motivate a challenger to adopt a cooperative or conflictual position toward international society. These beliefs and ideas are often grouped into three categories, including identity, strategic culture, and norms.3 Endogenous in origin (with the exception of norms), these ideational factors cause a challenger to interpret its security situation and national interests in particular ways, especially regarding the prospects for managing disagreements and conflicts without the use of force. The varying interpretations, in turn, give rise to different behaviors. 1 In this study, I define the challenger as a state that not only contests actively the legitimacy of the existing international order, but seeks to revise or overthrow it through diplomatic maneuvers or military actions. 2 Conceptually, the international society and the international system may not be one and the same thing (see Bull 1977[1995]: 9-15). However, Hedley Bull himself regarded the modern international system as an international society (Bull 1977[1995]: 15, 39-41). Thus, in this study, I use the two terms interchangeably. 3 For a pithy discussion of these three concepts, see Friedberg (2005: 34). For empirical studies of the role of ideas in shaping states’ security interests and policies, see, among others, Johnston 1995; Legro 1995; various authors in Katzenstein 1996; Rosen 1996; Kier 1997; Berger 1998; Hopf 2002; Legro 2005; Johnston 2008. 2 I believe, however, that the material and ideational determinants of behavior are linked together through social interaction between states in the international system. Conceptually, like human society, the existence of international society fosters stability, security, and manageability of disputes without recourse to war. Thus, integrating into this propitious social environment will likely change the normative characteristics of an erstwhile challenger in the long run. At the outset, for example,
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