WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT by C

WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT By C. G. D. ONSLOW https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms ROBABLY the most consistent feature of the policy of Pthe three Western powers—the United States, Great Bri- tain, and France—towards the defeated Germany, from the time of Potsdam until a few months ago, was the emphasis on the need for the disarmament and demilitarization of the Germany of the future; and when it was decided, in 1949, to establish the Federal Republic of Western Germany, this policy was endorsed once more. In June 1949, the Foreign Ministers of the three powers met in Paris, and on the twentieth of that month the High Com- mission charter was signed. At a second meeting held early in November of the same year, also in Paris, it was agreed that , subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at certain wider powers should be granted to the Federal Repub- lic through the High Commissioners. Nevertheless when, on November 22, the definitive Occupation Statute, sometimes known as the Petersberg agreement, came to be signed by Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the new Republic, and by the 11 Jul 2017 at 10:29:32 three High Commissioners at the Petersberg Hotel in Bonn, , on the headquarters of the High Commission, it contained the following significant clause: III. The Federal Government further declares its earnest determi- nation to maintain the demilitarization of the Federal territory and to endeavor by all means in its power to prevent the re-creation of armed University of Basel Library . forces of any kind. To this end the Federal Government will co-operate fully with the High Commission in the work of the Military Security Board. This would seem categorical enough; but at the same time it must be mentioned that the subject of German rearmament had begun to be actively debated in the press on both sides of the Atlantic. Although the only immediate outcome of these https:/www.cambridge.org/core discussions was to be a reiteration of former policy on the part of the Western powers, they are nevertheless interesting, as https://doi.org/10.2307/2008892 Downloaded from . WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT 451 providing the first signs of a change in public opinion with regard to the arming of Germany. The curiosity of the press seems originally to have been aroused by the second Paris meeting of the Foreign Ministers. It was stimulated by reports, mentioned in the New York Times of November IS that "staff officers of a number of West https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms European countries have been discussing the difference that the raising of even five German divisions would make to the defense of Europe, on the thesis, apparently, that without German divisions there just are not enough troops in the West to hold the Russians," and by reference to the changed situa- tion that might arise were the Russians to withdraw their forces of occupation from East Germany. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, since his return from Paris, had frequently been asked at press conferences whether the question of German rearmament had been discussed at the Foreign Ministers' meeting, and as frequently he had denied that it had. On November 16, he repeated this denial and the following day President Truman confirmed it; but for some reason these statements do not ap- , subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at pear to have been considered as specific or categorical. The London Times reported that "words like 'gendarmerie' and 'internal security' and phrases like 'forces adequate to hold the Rhine' were beginning to be heard" in the United States, although the "evasions" of the President and Mr. Acheson 11 Jul 2017 at 10:29:32 were regarded in Britain less as foreshadowing an early change , on in American policy than as reserving America's freedom of decision for the day when circumstances might have altered. Meanwhile, various public figures contributed their private opinions on the question. In a speech at Boston, General Lucius D. Clay, former commander of the United States University of Basel Library . forces in Germany, suggested that a composite military force, to include German infantry, might be formed for the defense of Western Europe. In Paris, Senator Thomas of Oklahoma, in an interview with the correspondent of he Monde, expressed his view that a German force was necessary for the defense of the West, and said that "several divisions of German troops should be armed by the United States without Germany her- https:/www.cambridge.org/core self being permitted to manufacture arms." British and French opinion, however, remained hostile to https://doi.org/10.2307/2008892 Downloaded from . 452 WORLD POLITICS the idea. M. Teitgen, the French Minister of Information, stated that "it must be realized that France could not remain part of a security system that encompassed German rearmament." The French Assembly's defense debate at the end of November confirmed the view that Germany must remain ex- cluded from the Atlantic Pact and that the reconstitution of https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms an armed force on her territory must be forbidden. In the course of this debate, Foreign Minister Robert Schuman said that "to rearm Germany would be to invite conflicts for which the French government wished to assume neither risks nor re- sponsibility." Many Frenchmen, indeed, seemed to be as uneasy at the prospect of an inadequately defended no-man's-land on their eastern flank as they were at the idea of a resuscitated German army. One deputy, M. Pierre Cot, went so far as to maintain that there were only two hypotheses—either the Germans must be enabled to defend themselves or they must be defended by the French; but in answer, M. Schuman made the assertion, significant in the light of later developments, that the present danger vis-a-vis Germany lay in the economic , subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at sphere and that the only solution to that danger was to be found in an economic organization on the European scale. On the American side, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, arriving in Europe for the Paris meeting of the Atlantic Pact 11 Jul 2017 at 10:29:32 Defense Ministers, stated at Frankfurt: "President Truman , on has said that the United States has no intention to rearm Ger- many: that is official United States policy, with no hedging and no dodging." But the New York Times now pointed out that the following important question remained unanswered: "How," it asked, "does the United States expect to defend Western Europe, which now includes Berlin, against a min- University of Basel Library . imum of 175 Russian divisions without drawing upon Ger- man manpower?" At this point the German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, allowed himself to be drawn into the discussion. Hitherto, virtually his only contribution had been a statement made on November 22 that "I do not want a German army." But on December 3, in an interview with a correspondent of the https:/www.cambridge.org/core Cleveland Plain Dealer, he went on record with a pronounce- ment to the effect that "Germany should contribute to the de- https://doi.org/10.2307/2008892 Downloaded from . WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT 453 fense of Europe in a European army under the command of a higher European headquarters." This interview appears to have caused something of a sen- sation, and in the course of the next few days Dr. Adenauer was repeatedly called upon to explain precisely what he meant. This he attempted to do, at press conferences and at meetings of https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms his party, particularly at the C.D.U. congress at Koenigswinter on December 9. The gist of these various statements may be summarized as follows. Dr. Adenauer emphasized that he remained fundamentally opposed to the rearmament of the German Republic: "I have always taken the view," he said, "that the security of West Germany was a matter for the occupying powers"; but the Allies must realize that Germany is not a desert but a thickly populated country and that it would be a fatal mistake to leave Germany defenseless against possible aggression from the East. In regard to the "people's army" being formed in East Germany, it was necessary to say to the Allies: "You cannot leave us without protection." , subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at The Allies must ask themselves which was the greater danger—the threat from Russia or the possibility of a German contingent in a European army for the defense of Europe. If, he added, our people are forced to take a hand at some unforeseen time in the defense of Europe, then we could only 11 Jul 2017 at 10:29:32 do so on the basis of equal rights and within the framework of , on a European army: "I should be in favor, not of an independent Wehrmacht, but of a German contingent in such a European force; I should be opposed to Germans being accepted into, or recruited for, a non-German contingent, or to their serving as mercenaries." The reception accorded to these explanations, both within University of Basel Library . Germany and without, was distinctly cold. The following week all parties of the Bundestag were unanimous in repudiat- ing any idea of rearmament, while in allied circles Dr. Adenauer's temerity in continuing to discuss the subject after he had apparently been advised to steer clear of it seems to have earned him a rebuke from the High Commission. In other quarters the Chancellor was censured for resorting to "news- https:/www.cambridge.org/core paper diplomacy," and it was felt that he had been profiting from the occasion to send up a few trial balloons.

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