Foreign Military Intervention and Democratization: a Comparative

Home , 1960 in Japan, Consortium, Denazification, Emil Carlebach, Hanns Martin Schleyer, New Order (Nazism)

Foreign Military Intervention and Democratization:

A Comparative Analysis of Germany, Japan, Italy and South Korea

A Dissertation Submitted to the

Graduate School

of the University of Cincinnati

in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)

in the Department of Political Science

of the College of Arts and Sciences

Edmond Cata

M.A. University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Nebraska, 2002

B.A. University of Tirana, Albania, 1997

2012

Committee Chair: Dr. Dinshaw J. Mistry, Ph.D.

Abstract

This dissertation examines the relationship between foreign military intervention and democratization. It focuses on the conditions that contribute to the democratization of the occupied countries and looks at the cases of Germany, Italy, Japan and South Korea. These countries are similar in that they all experienced military foreign intervention, have been non- democratic regimes prior to military intervention and became democracies after the intervention.

The analysis aims to shed light on what conditions were conducive or not to the democratization of Germany, Japan, and Italy and South Korea.

Using the inductive research method and secondary data analysis this work finds that while military intervention in Germany, Italy, Japan and South Korea was an important factor in deposing non-democratic regimes, it was not the only important and conducive condition to democratization. While the goals, policies and commitment of the occupying power were important to democratization, the changes in political culture of the occupied elites and population and the character of security environment were also two other important conditions.

The comparative analysis shows that when the goals, policies and commitment of the occupying force were oriented toward democratization, when the occupied elites and population moved toward a political culture displaying democratic patterns and behavior, and when the security environment was not characterized by wars or where the security threat was high but addressed by the external power, these conditions were both conducive for and contributed to democratization. The analysis finds these conditions in the cases of Germany, Japan and Italy but not in South Korea. The absence of such conditions in the case of South Korea may explain why

South Korea did not democratize under the US military occupation and when it occurred, it took more than four decades.

Edmond Cata

iii

Acknowledgements

Writing of this dissertation would not have possible without the support of a number of people to whom I feel deeply indebt and thankful. The seeds of this dissertation were sown in one of the classes that I took with Professor Richard J. Harknett. The paper I wrote for his class helped me lay the foundations of my research. The discussion on political culture originates in one of the classes I took with Professor Laura D. Jenkins. The discussions in her course helped me clarify a number of issues linked to it. I owe the progress and completion of dissertation work to Professor Dinshaw J. Mistry. During the 2 years of work, Professor Mistry helped me with his guidance, patience, and readiness to respond to any question I had regardless of our communication in distance. I thank Professor Mistry for helping me go through various issues and refinements that made my dissertation work better. I‘m also grateful to Barbara A. Bardes and Joel D. Wolfe. The start of my dissertation would not have been possible without their support. I thank them for standing by me and giving me strength in the most difficult moments of my life. I will always be grateful and indebt to Sara and Velesin Peculi, Vjollca and Agim Medja, Nexhmije Cata, Mimoza and Agim Halilaj, Fatmir and Lavdije Berberi, Sokrat and Persefoni Hoda, Kaliopi and Vladimir Pulaj, and Ervin Medja. They showed up and supported me in the most difficult moments of my life, helped me cope with difficult times and gave me courage when I was about to loose it, believed in me and invested time and money to enable me to finish my doctoral studies. Without them I would not have completed my doctoral studies A special person I owe the completion of this dissertation is my mother Sakije. During all those long days and nights of work she was always there for me, doing everything that allowed me to focus on my work. My concerns became hers! My joy became her joy! This dissertation is hers as much as it is mine! My thanks also extend to Kathleen Imholz and Lauren Ashley Matus for their help in refining my style of expression in English. The last person I want to thank is Prunela for the support and courage she had given to me since 2010 on my way toward finishing both my dissertation work and doctoral studies.

Table of Contents

Abstract ………………………………………………………………………………………….. ii

Acknowledgements ……………………………………………………………………...... iv

List of Tables ………………………………………………………………………………….. xii

List of Figures …………………………………………………………………………………. xiv

Chapter One-Introduction ……………………………………………………………………….. 1

1.1 Why Study this Topic ……………………………………………………………….. 2

1.2 Literature Review and the Study of Democratization ……………………………… 3

1.3 Three Groups in the Debate …………………………………………………………. 6

1.3.1 Skeptics ………………………………………………………………….. 6

1.3.2 Optimists ……………………………………………………………….. 9

1.3.3 Middle Ground Scholars ……………………………………………… 10

1.4 Cases and Method ………………………………………………………………….. 14

1.5 The Organization of the Study and Some Findings ……………………………….. 15

Chapter Two-The Theory of Democratization ………………………………………………... 20

2.1 Intervention and Democratization ………………………………………………… 20

2.1.1 Intervention Goals ………………………………………………………. 20

2.1.2 Occupation Policies ……………………………………………………… 23

2.1.3 Intervener‘s Commitment ………………………………………………. 27

2.2 The Security Environment and Democratization ………………………………… 32

2.2.1 Internal Security ………………………………………………………… 33

2.2.2 External Security ………………………………………………………… 36

2.3 Political Culture and Democratization …………………………………………….. 41

2.3.1 Values and Beliefs ……………………………………………………….. 41

2.3.2 Behavior and Attitudes …………………………………………………... 42

2.3.3 Political Participation …………………………………………………… 43

2.3.4 Civil Society ……………………………………………………………... 44

2.3.5 Institutional Culture and Patterns ……………………………………….. 45

2.3.6 Social Change ……………………………………………………………. 46

2.3.7 Direction of Change ……………………………………………………… 47

2.4 Dependent Variable Democratization ……………………………………………… 48

2.4.1 Pace of Democratization ……………………………………………….... 49

2.4.2 Character of New Regime ……………………………………………….. 51

2.5 Independent Variable Foreign Intervention ……………………………………….. 59

2.5.1 Intervention Goals ……..…………………………………………………. 60

2.5.2 Occupation Policies ……………………………………………………… 61

2.5.3 Intervener‘s Commitment …………………………………...... 62

2.6 Independent Variable Political Culture ……………………………………………. 65

2.6.1 Values and Beliefs ………………………………………...... 66

2.6.2 Behavior and Attitudes …………………………………………………... 68

2.6.3 Political Participation ……………………………………………………. 69

2.6.4 Civil Society ……………………………………………………………… 71

2.6.5 Institutional Culture and Patterns ………………………………………… 72

2.6.6 Attitude toward Social Change ………………………………………….. 73

2.7 Independent Variable Security Environment ……………………………………… 74

2.7.1 Internal Security Environment …...………………………………………. 75

2.7.1.1 Ethno-Religious Structure ………………………...... 75

2.7.1.2 Legitimacy of Authority ………………………...... 76

2.7.1.3 Power Structure and Exercise …………………...... 76

2.7.1.4 Rights and Liberties …………………………………………… 77

2.7.2 External Security Environment ………………………………………….. 77

2.7.2.1 National Interests ………………………………………………. 78

2.7.2.2 Foreign Policy ………………………………………………….. 78

2.7.2.3 View on Sources of Security and Stability ……...... 79

2.7.2.4 Management of Neighborly Relations …………………………. 80

2.8 Interaction among Independent Variables …..…………………………………….. 81

2.8.1 Interaction between Military Occupation and Security Environment …… 81

2.8.2 Interaction between Military Occupation and Political Culture ………… 85

2.9 Looking Ahead ……………………………………………………………………. 88

Chapter Three-Germany …………………………………………………………………….... 90

3.0 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………….. 90

3.1 The Allied Occupation of Post-1945 Germany …………………………………… 91

3.1.1 Occupation Goals ……………………………………………………….. 93

3.1.2 Occupation Policies …………………………………………………….. 96

3.1.3 Occupation Commitment ……………………………………………..... 111

3.2 Political Culture Dynamics in Post-1945 Germany ……………………………... 117

3.2.1 Values and Beliefs …………………………………………………….. 117

3.2.2 Attitudes and Behavior ………………………………………………... 123

vii

3.2.3 Institutional Culture and Patterns ……………………………………….. 129

3.2.4 Political Participation …………………………………………………… 132

3.2.5 Civil Society …………………………………………………………….. 137

3.2.6 Attitude toward Change ………………………………………………… 140

3.3 Security Environment and Post-1945 Germany ………………………………….. 141

3.3.1 Internal Security Environment ………………………………………….. 141

3.3.2 External Security Environment ……………………………………….... 142

3.3.2.1 Conceptualization of National Interests …………………….... 143

3.3.2.2 The Character of Foreign Policy ……………………………… 146

3.3.2.3 View of Sources of Security and Stability ………………….... 151

3.3.2.4 Management of Neighbor Relations ………………………….. 154

3.4 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………….. 158

Chapter Four-Japan …………………………………………………………………………… 160

4.0 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………….. 160

4.1 The Allied Occupation of Post-1945 Japan ……………………………………..... 162

4.1.1 Occupation Goals ……………………………………………………….. 164

4.1.2 Occupation Policies …………………………………………………….. 167

4.1.3 Occupation Commitment ……………………………………………...... 180

4.1.4 Attitudes of Japanese toward Occupation ……………………………..... 185

4.2 Political Culture Dynamics in Post-1945 Japan ..…………………………………. 187

4.2.1 Values and Beliefs ……………………………………………………… 187

4.2.2 Attitudes and Behavior ……………………………………………….... 191

4.2.3 Institutional Culture and Patterns ………………...... 195

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4.2.4 Political Participation …………………………………………………… 199

4.2.5 Civil Society …………………………………………………………….. 202

4.2.6 Attitude toward Change ………………………………………………… 204

4.3 Security Environment and Post-1945 Japan ..…………………………………….. 206

4.3.1 Internal Security Environment ………………………………………….. 207

4.3.2 External Security Environment ………………………………………..... 207

4.3.2.1 Conceptualization of National Interests …………………….... 208

4.3.2.2 The Character of Foreign Policy ……………………………… 212

4.3.2.3 View of Sources of Security and Stability ………………….... 219

4.3.2.4 Management of Neighborly Relations ……………………….. 221

4.4 Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………... 224

Chapter Five-A Comparative Assessment and Conclusions …………………………………. 225

5.0 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………….. 225

5.1 Democratization: Similarities and Variations across the Cases ………………….. 226

5.1.1 Germany and Japan …………………………………………………….. 226

5.1.2 Italy and South Korea …………………………………………………... 228

5.2 Foreign Occupation: Similarities and Variations across the Cases ……………..... 229

5.2.1 Germany and Japan …………………………………………………….. 230

5.2.2 Italy ……………………………………………………………………... 231

5.2.2.1 Occupation Goals ……………………………………………... 231

5.2.2.2 Occupation Policies …………………………………………... 232

5.2.2.3 Occupation Commitment …………………………………….. 233

5.2.3 South Korea …………………………………………………………….. 236

5.2.3.1 Occupation Goals …………………………………………….. 236

5.2.3.2 Occupation Policies ……………………………………...... 237

5.2.3.3 Occupation Commitment ……………………………………... 241

5.3 Political Culture: Similarities and Variations across the Cases …………………... 243

5.3.1 Germany and Japan ……………………………………………………... 243

5.3.2 Italy ……………………………………………………………………... 245

5.3.3 South Korea …………………………………………………………….. 247

5.4 Security Environment: Similarities and Variations across the Cases ………...... 250

5.4.1 Internal Security Environment ……………………………………...... 250

5.4.2 External Security Environment ……………………………………...... 251

5.4.2.1 Germany and Japan …………………………………………… 251

5.4.2.2 Italy …………………………………………………………… 254

5.4.2.3 South Korea …………………………………………………... 258

5.5 Conclusions …………………………………………………………………...... 260

5.5.1 Military Occupation …………………………………………………….. 261

5.5.2 Political Culture ………………………………………………………… 262

5.5.3 Security Environment …………………………………………………... 265

5.5.4 Interacting Factors ……………………………………………………… 266

5.5.5 Contribution of this Study ……………………………………………… 268

Appendix 1: A comparison of Pre-1945 and Post-1945 Regimes in Germany …………...... 270

1.0 Post-1945 Germany, Change and Democratization ………………………………. 270

1.1 Post-1945 Germany: From a Nazi to a Democratic Regime ……………………... 271

1.1.1 Constitutional Framework ……………………………………………… 272

1.1.2 State and Government …………………………………………………... 272

1.1.3 Institutional Culture and Approach to Power …………………………... 273

1.1.4 Political Rights and Political Participation ……………………………... 275

1.1.5 Electoral System and Party Politics …………………………………….. 275

1.1.6 Media and Civil Society ………………………………………………… 278

1.1.7 Governance and Policy-Making ………………………………………... 280

1.1.8 Economic System and Development …………………………………… 281

1.2 Post-1945 Germany: A Consolidated Democracy ……………………………….. 281

Appendix 2: Democratization, Military Occupation, Political Culture, Security in Germany .. 283

Appendix 3: A Comparison of Pre-1945 and Post-1945 Regimes in Japan ………………….. 286

3.0 Post-1945 Japan, Change and Democratization ………………………………….. 286

3.1 Post-1945 Japan: From a Militarist to a Democratic Regime …………………….. 286

3.1.1 Constitutional Framework ……………………………………………… 288

3.1.2 State and Government ………………………………………………… 289

3.1.3 Institutional Culture and Approach to Power ………………………….. 291

3.1.4 Political Rights and Political Participation ……………………………... 292

3.1.5 Electoral System and Party Politics …………………………………….. 292

3.1.6 Media and Civil Society ………………………………………………… 295

3.1.7 Governance and Policy-Making ………………………………………... 296

3.1.8 Economic System and Development …………………………………… 298

3.2 Post-1945 Japan: A Consolidated Democracy …………………………………… 298

Appendix 4: Democratization, Military Occupation, Political Culture, Security in Japan ….. 300

Appendix 5: A Comparative Assessment of Germany, Japan, Italy and South Korea ………. 303

List of Tables

Table Page

2.1 Dynamics of Polity Scores for Germany, Japan, Italy and South Korea ..……. 55

3.1 List of the Allied Goals toward Germany during 1941-1949 Period ….……... 95

3.2 Number of Occupation Troops in Germany ………………………………….. 112

3.3 US Assistance to Germany for the Period 1946-1952 ………………………... 115

4.1 List of the Allied Goals toward Japan during 1941-1949 Period ……………. 166

4.2 Number of Occupation Troops in Japan ……………………………………… 181

4.3 US Assistance to Japan for the Period 1946-1965 ………………………….... 184

5.1 Independent Variables and Outcome during the Period 1945-1950 ……….... 225

5.2 The Character and Pace of Change in Germany and Japan ………………….. 225

5.3 The Level of Internal Political Stability and Security during 1945-1955 ….... 251

A1.1 Regime Score and Change in Germany for the Period 1933-2011 …………… 270

A1.2 Germany‘s Party System during the Period 1919-1944 ……………………… 277

A1.3 Germany‘s Party System during the Period 1945-2011 ……………………… 278

A1.4 Daily Newspapers Founded in post-1945 Germany …………………………. 279

A3.1 Regime Score and Change in Japan for the Period 1869-2010 …………….... 287

A3.2 Prime Ministers in Japan for the Late Meiji Period 1885-1912 ……………… 290

A3.3 Party System and Electoral Support in Japan during the Period 1946-2000 …. 294

A3.4 The Japanese Governments During the Taisho Era 1912-1932 ……………..... 297

A3.5 The Japanese Governments During the Showa Era 1932-1945 ……………..... 297

A5.1 Similarities and Differences of Democratization in Germany and Japan …….. 303

A5.2 Regimes Features Before and After 1945 in Germany and Japan …………..... 304

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A5.3 Regime Change and Democratization in Germany and Japan ……………….. 305

A5.4 Regime Types, Change and Democratization in Italy ……………………...... 306

A5.5 Regime Types, Change and Democratization in South Korea ……………….. 307

A5.6 Similarities and Differences in Occupation of Germany and Japan ………….. 308

A5.7 Similarities and Differences of Occupation Goals in Germany and Japan …… 309

A5.8 Similarities and Difference of Occupation Policies in Germany and Japan ….. 311

A5.9 Similarities and Differences of Commitment in Germany and Japan ……….. 314

A5.10 Similarities and Differences of Political Culture in Germany and Japan …….. 315

A5.11 Features of Pre-1945 Political Culture in Germany and Japan ……………….. 316

A5.12 Features of Post-1945 Political Culture in Germany and Japan ……………… 318

A5.13 Features and Dynamics of Changes in Political Culture of Italy …………….. 321

A5.14 Features and Dynamics of Changes in Political Culture of South Korea …….. 322

A5.15 Similarities and Differences in Security Environment in Germany and Japan.. 325

A5.16 Similarities and Differences in National Interests in Germany and Japan …… 326

A5.17 Similarities and Differences in Foreign Policy in Germany and Japan ……..... 327

A5.18 Similarities and Differences in Sources of Security in Germany and Japan ..... 329

A5.19 Management of Neighborly Relations in Germany and Japan ……………….. 330

A5.20 Features and Dynamics of Security Environment in Italy …………………..... 331

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List of Figures

Figure Page

A2.1 Democratization and Military Occupation in Postwar Germany……………….283

A2.2 Democratization and Political Culture in Postwar Germany…………………...284

A2.3 Democratization and External Security Environment in Postwar Germany…...285

A4.1 Democratization and Military Occupation in Postwar Japan…………………..300

A4.2 Democratization and Political Culture in Postwar Japan……………………….301

A4.3 Democratization and External Security Environment in Postwar Japan……….302

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Chapter 1

Introduction

There have been several military interventions by states in other countries. Within a decade, some interventions resulted in the establishment of democracy (such as in Germany,

Japan, and Italy, after the World War II), some did not (Haiti after the intervention in the early

1990s), and others displayed a mixed record of democratic outcomes (Bosnia and Kosovo after the international interventions there in the 1990s). The outcomes of some recent such cases (the interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya in the 2000s) are still too early to assess. These military interventions have led to a debate over the relationship between democracy and the use of force.

The debate over the variations in outcomes of democratization clearly raises some questions. What can explain the differences in democratization, and the nature of the resulting regime, in cases of imposed democracies? Does democratization depend solely on what the intervener does and to what degree? Or does it reflect the influence of other endogenous and exogenous forces?

This work contributes to the debate by focusing not on whether democracy can be imposed by military force, but on the conditions that helped democratization in some prominent cases of military intervention. It thus examines how three factors assisted the democratization: the goals, policies and commitment of the foreign intervener, the security environment, and the political culture in the occupied state. The study focuses in some detail on the cases of post

World War II West Germany (which is referred to as ―Germany‖ in this study, except when it is specifically contrasted with East Germany) and Japan. Its conclusions briefly examine whether the findings from these cases can be generalized to the cases of Italy and South Korea.

1.1 Why Study This Topic.

Exploring these questions is intriguing for two reasons. On the scholarly level, there is a strong disagreement among scholars about whether democracy can be imposed by military intervention, since there are cases of interventions that were successful in implanting democracy and those that were unsuccessful. Scholars viewing the imposition of democracy as impossible highlight the unsuccessful cases, but also focus predominantly on the role of endogenous forces in explaining the reasons for the lack of success. Scholars viewing the imposition of democracy as possible mention the successful cases, but they focus mostly on the role of the intervening power to explain their case. The debate has also paid attention to the role and influence of conditions and factors accompanying intervention which has given way to a middle ground that considers endogenous and exogenous forces as acting and exerting influence in combination with each other rather than separately. Yet, more work needs to be done in identifying the factors and conditions, endogenous or exogenous, influencing democratization by occupation. This is what this work aims to do.

Thus, this study helps to ascertain whether the democratization in cases of foreign intervention is a matter only of linearity and timing, and of what the foreign intervener does or does not do; or whether it also rests on the influence of some specific conditions and factors, endogenous or exogenous, acting separately or in combination.

On a policy-making level, a better understanding of the conditions and factors influencing interventions aiming at implanting democracy in other countries helps create a better idea about the costs of such an undertaking and the chances for success. In the process of deciding to intervene or not, there are two questions policymakers have to wrestle with: one is whether intervention would lead to more democracy or more political instability, the other is the

2 extent, depth and cost of commitment. As Stephen Walt notes in a brief article about the case of

Libya in March 2011, the issue of intervention becomes, to a large extent, an issue of commitment.1 Should the commitment fail to match up to the intention, even the best conditions for turning a country into a democracy may result in a failure. Thus, clarifying whether the conditions are conducive or not to democratization by force, and whether conditions invite a long and costly intervention, may be of great help to a decision-maker. This work, however, does not focus on whether democracy can or cannot be imposed by force but on the conditions that influence democratization in successful cases of democratization.

1.2 Literature Review and the Study of Democratization.

While the literature on democratization is large and growing three observations can be made about it. First, scholars now accept that transition to democracy could be the result of not only endogenous but also exogenous forces. Second, scholars point to various factors and variables helping democratization, but they agree that there is a threshold that marks the completion of democratization. Third, scholars agree that external powers can influence democratization but there is no consensus about the democratization whose transition was brought about by external powers.

Most of the literature focuses on identifying factors that are endogenous rather than exogenous to democratization because scholars have viewed the rise of, transition to and consolidation of democracy mostly as a result of endogenous forces. Scholars have examined six major groups of factors.2 Within these groups, scholars emphasize a number of variables: 1) state

1 Walt, Stephen M. ―Social Science and the Libyan Adventure,‖ Foreign Policy Magazine, March 24-30, 2011. 2 These groups consist of 1) geopolitical-historical factors, 2) economic development, 3) social composition, 4) political culture, 5) mediation structures, and 6) the political system. See Berg-Schlosser, 3 formation timing,3 2) class structure,4 3) economic development,5 4) ethno-linguistic-religious- regional cleavages,6 5) parties, social movements, interest groups,7 6) power distribution, government stability, observation of rights, bureaucracy efficiency, military involvement,8 7) electoral system, institutions, logic of collective action, pacts9 and 8) values, beliefs, attitudes, participation, legitimacy and decision-making style.10 There are scholars who bring in the

Dirk., De Meur, Gisele. ―Conditions of Democracy in Interwar Europe: A Boolean Test of Major Hypothesis,‖ Comparative Politics, April 1994, pp. 253-279; De Meur, Gisele., Berg-Schlosser, Dirk. ―Conditions of Authoritarianism, Fascism and Democracy in the Interwar period,‖ Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 29, No 4, August 1996, pp. 423-468; 3 Tilly, Charles. Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984; Tilly, Charles. Coercion, Capital, and European States AD 990-1990, Cambridge, Mass: Basil Blackwell, 1990; Rokkan, Stein. "Dimensions of State Formation and Nation Building," in Tilly, Charles (eds.) The Formation of National States in Western Europe, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975; Hagtvet, Bernt., Stein, Rokkan. ―The conditions of Fascist victory,‖ in Larsen, Stein U., Hagtvet, Bernt et.al. (eds.) Who Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism, Bergen: Universitets Forlaget, 1980, pp. 131-152. 4 Moore, Barrington. Social Origin of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Beacon Press, Boston, 1966; Stephens, J. D. ―Democratic transitions and breakdown in Western Europe 1870-1939: A test of Moore‘s Thesis,‖ American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 94, 1989, pp. 1019-1077; Stephens, D., Rueschemeyer, E. H., Stephens, J. D. Capitalist Development and Democracy, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992. 5 Lipset, Seymour Martin. Political Pan: The Social Bases of Politics, New York, Doubleday, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1981; Vanhanen, Tatu. The Emergence of Democracy, Helsinki, Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1984. 6 Lijphart, Arend. Democracies, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984. 7 Hermens, Ferdinand. Democracy or Anarchy? A Study of Proportional Representation, Paris: University of Notre Dame, 1941; Sani, Giacomo., Sartori, Giovanni. "Polarization, fragmentation and competition in Western democracies," Acta Politica, Vol. 12, 1985, pp. 346-377; Luebbert, Gregory M. "Social foundations of political order in interwar Europe," World Politics, Vol. 39, 1987, pp. 449-479; Luebbert, Gregory M. Liberalism, Fascisma and Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimesi in Interwar Europe. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991; Linz, Juan J. ―Political space and Fascism as a late-comer,‖ in Larsen, S. U., Hagtvet, Bernt., Myklebust, J. P. (eds) Who Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism, Bergen: Universitets Forlaget, 1980, pp. 153-189. 8 Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968; Dahl, Robert A. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971, p. 206; Dahl, Robert A. Democracy and Its Critics, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989. 9 North, Douglass C. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press, 1990; Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and Theory of Groups. Harvard University Press, 1965; Karl, Terry Lynn. ―Dilemmas of democratization in Latin America,‖ Comparative Politics, Vol 23, No. 1, October 1990, pp. 1-21. 10 Almond, Gabriel., Verba, Sidney. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Countries, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963; Pye, Lucian W. ―Introduction: Political culture and political development,‖ in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba eds. Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965; Lehman, Edward. ―On the 4 influence of the ―external environment‖, such as colonialism, ideology, market integration, economic dependency, but they view it as having a secondary influence.11 Democratic peace scholars look at the role of the community of democratic states and how it contributes to peace, or how it could be expanded, but do not specifically focus on intervention as an exogenous source of democratization. The expansion of a democratic community is viewed as possible, but through a transnational track of trade and commerce, economic development, or through transnational educational, scientific or social exchanges, but not through war.12 In short, exogenous forces either have drawn no significant attention as causes of democratization, or have been viewed as being supplemental to endogenous factors as causes of democratization.

In the real world, however, the twentieth century witnessed numerous attempts to implant democracy through foreign intervention: Germany, Japan (1945), Grenada (1983), Panama

(1989), Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1995), and Kosovo (1999). Interventions in Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003) sparked a powerful debate about whether democracy can be brought about and imposed by intervention, putting the issue of imposed democracy at the center of attention. This debate tackles three issues: first, whether exogenous sources are less, equal to, or more influential than endogenous ones; second, whether conditions underlying the imposition of

concept of political culture: A theoretical reassessment,‖ Social Forces Vol. 50, March 1972, pp. 361- 370; Granato, J., Inglehart, R., Leblang, D. ―The effect of cultural values on economic development: Theory, hypotheses, and some empirical tests,‖ American Journal of Political Science Vol. 40, No. 3, August 1996, pp. 607-631; Inglehart, Roland., Welzel, Christian. Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 11 Linz, Juan J. ―Political space and Fascism as a late-comer,‖ in Larsen, S. U., Hagtvet, Bernt., Myklebust, J. P. (eds) Who Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism, Bergen: Universitets Forlaget, 1980, pp. 153-189; Rosecrance, Richard. The Rise of The Trading State, New York, Basic Books, 1986. 12 Doyle, Michael W. Ways of War and Peace, New York, NY: Norton, 1997; Doyle, Michael W. ―A liberal view: Preserving and expanding the liberal Pacific Union‖, Paul T.V., Hall, John A. (eds) International Order and the Future of World Politics, Cambridge University Press, 1999. 5 democracy have a contextual or general character and third, whether installation of democracy is possible by military means. The debate divides scholars into three major groups.13

1.3 Three Groups in the Debate

1.3.1 Skeptic Scholars

One group in the debate, which can be considered as the skeptics, emphasizes the primacy of endogenous sources and the specific character of conditions behind the cases of successful democratization.14 Their arguments can be summarized in five main points.

First, democratization should be viewed as a process of struggle and accommodation between forces within society rather than something achieved by a foreign fiat.

Second, Germany and Japan should be viewed as specific and not replicable cases in their success for several reasons: 1) it was Germany and Japan that initiated the World War II, 2) the occupying power had the right to install a new regime,15 3) the post-defeat psychological state of the population and leadership was favorable, 4) the occupying force committed to democratization, and 5) the allied forces had the freedom to impose their own concept on government, institutions and policies.16

13 Downes, Alexander B., Monten, Jonathan. ―FIRced to be free: Foreign imposed regime change and democratization,‖ Paper submitted to APSA 2010, pp. 1-54. 14 Lowenthal, Abraham. ―The United States and Latin American democracy: Learning from history,‖ in Abraham Lowenthal., Exporting Democracy: Themes and Issues. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991; Bellin, Eva. ―The Iraqi intervention and democracy in comparative historical perspective,‖ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 4, 2004-05; Bengio, Ofra. ―Exporting democracy: What have we learned from Iraq?‖ Dissent, Symposium, Spring 2007, pp. 42-43. 15 Archibugi, Daniel. ―Exporting democracy: What have we learned from Iraq?‖ Dissent, Symposium, Spring 2007, pp. 40-42. 16 Bellin, Eva. ―The Iraqi intervention and democracy in comparative historical perspective,‖ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 4, 2004-2005. 6

Third, the imposition of democracy is not possible because of the role and influence of five factors: 1) the motives behind the actions of intervention leaders,17 2) domestic, military, and economic interests,18 3) the intentions of the intervener, 4) security concerns,19 and 5) the existence of ethically contradictory and politically ineffective factors.20

Fourth, the effect of intervention on democracy is either negative21 or insignificant during the ensuing twenty-year period.22 The best way to promote democracy is not through intervention but through persuasion, economic incentives, discussions, negotiations, and reconciliation.23 Using various sets of data, some note that military interventions by liberal states like Great Britain, France, and the United States, have only very rarely played a role in democratization since 1945.24 Others argue that US interventions since World War II led to stable democracies within ten years in less than three percent of the cases.25 Still others note that

17 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce., Downs, George W. ―Intervention and democracy,‖ International Organization, Vol. 60, No. 3, 2006, pp. 627-649. 18 Karl, Terry Lynn. ―Dilemmas of democratization in Latin America,‖ Comparative Politics, Vol. 23, No. 1, October 1990, pp. 1-21; Stephens, D., Rueschemeyer, E. H., Stephens, J. D. Capitalist Development and Democracy, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992. 19 Easterly, William., Satyanath, Shanker., Berger, Daniel. ―Superpower interventions and their consequences for democracy: An empirical inquiry,‖ NBER working paper series, No. w13992, Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2008. 20 Archibugi, Daniel. ―Exporting democracy: What have we learned from Iraq?‖ Dissent, Symposium, Spring 2007, pp. 40-42. 21 Kegley, C. W., Hermann, M. G. ―Putting Military Intervention into the Democratic Peace: A Research Note.‖ Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 30, No 1, 1997, pp. 78-107. 22 Downes, Alexander B., Monten, Jonathan. ―FIRcedto be free: Foreign imposed regime change and democratization,‖ paper submitted to APSA 2010, pp. 1-54. 23 Archibugi, Daniel. ―Exporting democracy: What have we learned from Iraq?‖ Dissent, Symposium, Spring 2007, pp. 40-42. 24 Pickering, Jeffrey., Peceny, Mark. ―Forging democracy at gunpoint,‖ International Studies Quarterly Vol. 50, No. 3, 2006. 25 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce., Downs, George W. ―Intervention and democracy,‖ International Organization, Vol. 60, No. 3, 2006, pp. 627-649. 7 the US and Soviet interventions during the Cold War generally led to significant declines in democracy.26

Fifth, interventions, when they damage infrastructural power, lead to a civil war.

Interventions tend to end up in a civil war when they oust and replace the existing ruler with a wholly new imposed government because of the disruption in state power. Interventions risk ending up in civil war, especially in cases of defeat in inter-state war or in countries that are poor and ethnically heterogeneous.27

These arguments, however, suffer from a broad definition of intervention, bias in case selection, and inability to explain successful cases of intervention. They leave unanswered a number of questions. If interventions by liberal states did not play a role in democratization after

1945, was it so because they intervened with an intention to democratize and failed, or was it so perhaps because their intervention intentions were not clearly and specifically linked to democratization? Data may show that only three percent of US interventions after WWII ended up in democracy, but was it so because in the other ninety-seven percent of the cases the United

States either did not aim at all at democratizing or aimed at it but failed? Or could it be that US interventions, while aiming to install democracy, might have been negatively influenced by other factors and conditions? It would seem true that interventions during the Cold War led to declines of democracy, but was this so because all of the interventions aimed at democratization and failed despite their aim? Or, could the explanation be that the intervening power intervened not necessarily for democratization purposes but for other purposes? Or, even that the interventions led to a decline of democracy because other factors, such as security concerns, were more

26 Easterly, William., Satyanath, Shanker., Berger, Daniel. ―Superpower interventions and their consequences for democracy: An empirical inquiry,‖ NBER Working Paper Series, No. w13992, Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2008. 27 Downes, Alexander B., Monten, Jonathan. ―FIRcedto be free: Foreign imposed regime change and democratization,‖ Paper Submitted to APSA 2010, pp. 1-54. 8 important in their influence than other conditions, democratization itself included? Piec and

Reiter‘s argument emphasizing the negative influence of damaged infrastructural power, which, instead of doing a service to positions that view democratization as impossible by force and foreign intervention, may serve to identify other conditions, such as infrastructural power and the domestic security and their role and influence upon intervention itself, thus helping make the case that intervention alone, on its own, may not prove to be a sufficient condition to guarantee a priori the implantation and consolidation of imposed democracy.

1.3.2 Optimist Scholars

A second group in the debate, which could be considered the optimists, builds upon the role of power and the primacy of exogenous sources. Their views can be summarized in four main points.

First, the intervening power can do better than the endogenous forces in bringing about democracy because the power superiority enables it to do three things linked and important to the democratization: 1) overthrow the regime, 2) enforce the restructuring of socio-economic structures and social relations,28 and 3) provide economic assistance, security, and stability.29

28 Smith, Tony. "In defense of intervention," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 6, 1994; Diamond, Larry. ―What went wrong in Iraq,‖ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 5, Sept-Oct 2004. 29 Stradiotto, Gary A. ―Democratizing Iraq: Regime transition and economic development in comparative perspective,‖ International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 21, No. 2, June 2004; Byman, Daniel. ―Constructing a democratic Iraq: Challenges and opportunities,‖ International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer 2003, pp. 47-78; Krepinevich, Andrew F. "How to win in Iraq," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, Sept-Oct 2005. 9

Second, democratization involves the same elements in every society, regardless of culture, economics, and religion. Conditions in successful cases are replicable and intervention needs only to create them to turn a country into a democracy.30

Third, the intentions of the intervener, domestic politics and commitment do play a role, but the imposition of democracy by intervention is possible and does not need the fulfillment of preconditions or prerequisites.31

Fourth, the effect of intervention on democracy is positive, especially when the intention is democratization of the occupied country, domestic politics calculations are discounted, and commitment to economic reconstruction is strong.32

The arguments of the second group, however, suffer from reliance only on successful cases, inability to explain failures, and lack of comparison between occupied countries and those that are not occupied.

1.3.3 Middle Ground Scholars

A third group in the debate can be considered the conditional scholars. This group assigns to the endogenous and exogenous forces a reciprocal influencing role and their arguments can be summarized into a few main points.

30 Stradiotto, Gary A. ―Democratizing Iraq: Regime Transition and Economic Development in Comparative Perspective,‖ International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 21, No. 2, June 2004. 31 Ibid. 32 Meernik, James. ―United States military intervention and the promotion of democracy,‖ Journal of Peace Research, Vol 33. 1996, pp. 39-402; Peceny, Mark. Democracy at the Point of Bayonets, University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999; Kegley, C. W., Hermann, M. G. ―Putting military intervention into the democratic peace: A research note,‖ Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 30, No 1, 1997, pp. 78-107; Stradiotto, Gary A. ―Democratizing Iraq: Regime transition and economic development in comparative perspective,‖ International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 21, No. 2, June 2004. 10

First, democratization is an interaction of the endogenous and exogenous forces and factors,33 reflecting where, when, how, and by whom it is promoted.34 It depends on the commitment of the intervening power in democratic reconstruction of the occupied country and the commitment to democratization by the endogenous government, elites and population.35

Second, the conditions underlying the imposition of democracy are contextual rather than general. The imposition of democracy is possible, but the ability of an intervener to succeed depends on some ―pre-intervention prerequisites‖ linked to the occupied country, and ―post- intervention conditions‖ linked to the foreign intervention. Imposed democracy could be strong or weak, depending on the presence or absence of some specific conditions.36 Pre-intervention endogenous prerequisites linked to the occupied country include factors from all groups: - from the group of economic factors: 1) the degree of development,37 2) wealth,38 3) inequality39 and

33 Behabib, Seyla. ―Exporting democracy: What have we learned from Iraq,‖ Dissent Forum, Spring 2007, pp. 44-46. 34 Cohen, Mitchell. ―Exporting democracy: What have we Learned from Iraq?‖, Dissent, Forum, Spring 2007, pp. 50-52; 35 Carothers, Thomas. ―Democracy without illusions,‖ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1, Jan-Feb 1997; Carothers, Thomas. ―Promoting democracy, and fighting terror,‖ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1, Jan-Feb 2003. 36 Enterline, A., Greig J. M. ―Beacons of hope? The impact of imposed democracy on regional peace, democracy and prosperity,‖ Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Peace Science Society (International), Ann Arbor, Michigan, 2003. 37 Bellin, Eva. ―The Iraqi intervention and democracy in comparative historical perspective,‖ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 4, 2004-2005. 38 Enterline, A., Greig, J. M. ―Beacons of Hope? The impact of imposed democracy on regional peace, democracy and prosperity,‖ Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Peace Science Society (International), Ann Arbor, Michigan, 2003; Downes, Alexander B., Monten, Jonathan. ―FIRced to be free: Foreign imposed regime change and democratization,‖ Paper Submitted to APSA 2010, pp. 1-54. 39 Engermann, S., Sokoloff, K. ―Factor endowments, institutions, and differential paths of growth among new world economies: A view from economic historians of the United States,‖ in Stephen Haber (eds) How Latin America Fell Behind, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1997; Easterly, W. ―Inequality does cause underdevelopment: insights from a new instrument,‖ Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 84, No. 2, 2007, pp. 755-776; Easterly, W., Levine, R. ―Tropics, germs, and crops: the role of endowments in economic development,‖ Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2003; Satyanath, S., Subramanian, A. ―The political economy of nominal pathologies,‖ IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 54 No. 3, 2007, pp. 419-453; Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge UK, 2005. 11

4) endowment with natural resources, agriculture‘s share in GDP;40 from the group of social factors: 1) the social structure, 2) ethnic and religious composition and identity; 41 from the group of political factors: 1) the political culture, attitude of elites and leaders and mentality and behavior,42 2) leadership selection,43 3) political system and institutions and power sharing;44 and from the group of historical factors: 1) the prior experience with democracy,45 2) external environment and internal border disputes46 and 3) colonial tradition. Post-intervention exogenous conditions linked to intervention include: economically, assistance and development;47 politically, the commitment of both sides48 as well as government and party system models;49

40 Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge UK, 2005. 41 Byman, Daniel. ―Constructing a democratic Iraq: Challenges and opportunities,‖ International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer 2003, pp. 47-78; Bellin, Eva. ―The Iraqi intervention and democracy in comparative historical perspective,‖ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 4, 2004-05; Enterline, A., Greig J. M. ―Beacons of hope? The impact of imposed democracy on regional peace, democracy and prosperity, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Peace Science Society (International), Ann Arbor, Michigan, 2003; Downes, Alexander B., Monten, Jonathan. ―FIRced to be free: Foreign imposed regime change and democratization,‖ Paper submitted to APSA 2010, pp. 1-54; Mauro, P. ―Corruption and growth,‖ Quarterly Journal of Economics, V. 110, No. 3, 1995, pp. 681-712; Easterly, W., Levine, R. ―Africa‘s growth tragedy: policies and ethnic divisions,‖ Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, No. 4, 1997, pp. 1203-1250; Easterly, W., Levine, R. ―Tropics, germs, and crops: the role of endowments in economic development,‖ Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2003; Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, Sergio. ―Fractionalization,‖ Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2003, pp. 155-194. 42 Byman, Daniel. ―Constructing a democratic Iraq: Challenges and opportunities,‖ International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer 2003, pp. 47-78; Bellin, Eva. ―The Iraqi intervention and democracy in comparative historical perspective,‖ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 4, 2004-2005. 43 Easterly, William., Satyanath, Shanker., Berger, Daniel. ―Superpower interventions and their consequences for democracy: An empirical inquiry,‖ NBER Working Paper Series, No. w13992, Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2008. 44 Bellin, Eva. ―The Iraqi intervention and democracy in comparative historical perspective,‖ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 4, 2004-2005; Byman, Daniel. ―Constructing a democratic Iraq: Challenges and opportunities,‖ International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer 2003, pp. 47-78. 45 Byman, Daniel. ―Constructing a democratic Iraq: Challenges and opportunities,‖ International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer 2003, pp. 47-78; Bellin, Eva. ―The Iraqi intervention and democracy in comparative historical perspective,‖ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 4, 2004-2005. 46 Byman, Daniel. ―Constructing a democratic Iraq: Challenges and opportunities,‖ International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer 2003, pp. 47-78. 47 Krepinevich, Andrew F. "How to win in Iraq," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, Sept-Oct 2005. 48 Carothers, Thomas. ―Democracy without illusions,‖ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1, Jan-Feb 1997; Carothers, Thomas. ―Promoting democracy, and fighting terror,‖ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1, Jan-Feb 12 socially, changes in social structures,50 the attitude of intervener,51 and the mentality of elites; and militarily, the provision of security.52

Overall, the arguments of the third group, while deserving credit for viewing endogenous and exogenous forces together, tend to emphasize the role and influence of only some combinations of factors in imposed democracy such as the joint influence of intervention- economic conditions, or intervention-religious/ethnic composition. These explanations, however, are incomplete.

The explanation emphasizing the joint influence of intervention and economic conditions implies that pouring enormous amounts of money into an occupied country suffices to make imposed democracy flourish, however the provision of economic assistance does not guarantee success.53 Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq received equal or larger aid per capita than Germany and Japan, but Haiti failed whereas the others are struggling in their path for democratization.

The explanation emphasizing the negative effect of the joint factor of intervention and ethnic/religious structure implies that neither the intervener nor the imposed democracy have any chance of succeeding when the intervention occurs in a society with a religious-ethnic structure

2003; Byman, Daniel. ―Constructing a democratic Iraq: Challenges and opportunities,‖ International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer 2003, pp. 47-78; Byman, Daniel. ―Constructing a democratic Iraq: Challenges and opportunities,‖ International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer 2003, p. 72-74; Bellin, Eva. ―The Iraqi intervention and democracy in comparative historical perspective,‖ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 4, 2004-05; Bengio, Ofra. ―Exporting democracy: What have we learned from Iraq?‖ Dissent, Symposium, Spring 2007, pp. 42-43; Dobbins, James. et al, “America’s Role in Nation- Building: From Germany to Iraq,” Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2003. 49 Krepinevich, Andrew F. "How to win in Iraq," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, Sept-Oct 2005. 50 Byman, Daniel. ―Constructing a democratic Iraq: Challenges and opportunities,‖ International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer 2003, pp. 47-78. 51 Carothers, Thomas. ―Democracy without illusions,‖ Foreign Affairs, Volume 76, No. 1, Jan-Feb 1997; Carothers, Thomas. ―Promoting democracy, and fighting terror,‖ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1, Jan-Feb 2003; 52 Krepinevich, Andrew F. "How to win in Iraq," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, Sept-Oct 2005. 53 Krepinevich, Andrew F. "How to win in Iraq," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, Sept-Oct 2005; Downes, Alexander B., Monten, Jonathan. ―FIRced to be free: Foreign imposed regime change and democratization,‖ APSA, 2010, pp. 1-54. 13 of multiple groups. Yet, Bosnia and Kosovo, while ethnically and religiously heterogeneous, can be shown to have made progress toward democracy under the presence of foreign intervention.

This work, thus, takes a conditional perspective because it looks at endogenous and exogenous factors, but it emphasizes a combined set of factors different from those emphasized by conditional scholars. It examines the role of foreign occupation, the security environment, and political culture in just a few cases of democratization, as noted below.

1.4 Cases and Method.

This study examines, in some detail, the cases of Germany and Japan and also undertakes a very brief examination of Italy and South Korea. It uses Alexander George‘s structured focused method of analysis, where a similar set of questions and factors is analyzed for each case.54

These cases were chosen because they display both common and different features. They have in common four features. All of them: 1) were non-democratic prior 1945, 2) experienced military foreign intervention, 3) became democracies through imposition after intervention, and

4) faced the same security problems. Yet, they differ in two aspects: 1) geographical location and culture (Europe, Asia), and 2) dynamics of their democratization. This sample minimizes a culture-related bias and serves well the purpose of the work, which, in looking at democratization, aims at identifying what conditions present in all cases or specific to each case positively or negatively influenced the variance in democratization. Comparison among cases and between of the democratization stages within each country helps create a better idea about the conditions underlying the democratization. Each country provides a good case to observe the dynamics of change not only as change in quality, from Nazification to de-Nazification

54 George, Alexander L., Bennett, Andrew. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005.

(Germany), from militarization to demilitarization (Japan), from fascism to de-fascism (Italy), from militarized occupation to militarized democratization (South Korea), but also as change in degree: transition to democracy by 1945 and democratization by 1950 in Germany, transition to democracy by 1948 and democratization by 1960 in Japan, transition to democracy by 1945 and democratization by 1950 in Italy, and transition to democracy by 1955 and democratization by

1990 in South Korea.

Thus, this case-study based analysis, by relying on government documents, archival records, media reports, academic papers and interviews with various representatives and officials from media, civil society, and government, and by using a comparative approach, comes to identify the way and degree that intervention, the security environment, and political culture influence democratization.

1.5 The Organization of the Study and Some Findings

This study is organized as follows. The next chapter provides the theoretical framework.

Chapter three analyses the case of Germany. It is argued that in the case of Germany, democratization was quick because of the conditions underlying it and making it possible combined the role and influence of four elements: 1) a clear democratization goal on the part of the allied forces led by the US, 2) broad, deep, and sustained military, economic and financial policies and commitment by the US, 3) a security environment which, while critical at specific moments to internal and external political stability of the new Germany, did not involve military conflicts and war; and finally, 4) the willingness and readiness of German individuals, society, and authorities to embrace a new political culture reflecting democratic values, practices and behavior. A deep, clear, and long commitment by the US facilitated the preservation of security

15 and the change of political culture by the Germans. The security environment, which did not involve major military confrontations and war on German territory between the Allied forces and

Soviet troops, helped the US focus its efforts substantially on the democratization agenda rather than shifting it excessively to security. The willingness of the Germans to change their political culture and embrace democratic values and behaviors helped make the US commitment and engagement easier and less costly.

Chapter four, in its analysis of Japan, makes the same argument as in case of Germany.

Japan did democratize about as quickly as Germany and the conditions present during the democratization in Japan show similarities to those in Germany: 1) The US was clearly committed not only to demilitarizing Japan but also to changing Japanese political culture, 2) US commitment to Japanese social reconstruction and democratization was broad in depth, extensive in length of time, and characterized by full and sustained political, economic, financial and military support, 3) Japan‘s security environment accompanying the process did not experience any major domestic or international conflict or war, and 4) the Japanese people themselves showed a strong willingness to embrace new democratic values, behaviors and practices.

Chapter five makes a comparative analysis of the foreign military occupation, the security environment, and the political culture in the cases of Germany and Japan. It also undertakes a first cut at generalizing the findings by analyzing whether they also apply in the cases of Italy and South Korea.

In the case of Italy, democratization, with slight differences, showed similar patterns with those observed in Germany and Japan. Democratization was quick; the occupying forces tackled all the problems and aspects that were influential to the democratization, the political culture changed toward a democratic character and the security environment appeared conducive to

16 democratization. The case of Italy differed from those of Germany and Japan in terms of the way the US dealt with the negative influence of the communist threat on the political culture and the security environment. The post-1945 political culture, while inclined to embrace democratic values and political behavior, did suffer from the heritage of the pre-fascist era, the culture of fragmentation, political clientelism and apathy and affiliations of significant segments of the society with the communist ideology. The post-1945 security environment, externally, did not involve a direct military threat. Yet, domestically, it did face the threat of the ascendance of the communist forces. In both situations, the US invested its resources against the communist threat both during and after the end of the official occupation.

In the case of South Korea, democratization was much slower than in Germany, Japan and Italy because of the negative influence that the security environment had on the role of the foreign military intervention, the change of the character of political culture and the democratization itself. In South Korea, democratization took more than forty years. The US military forces did not pay attention to installing a democratic regime in South Korea and did not engage in changing the political culture of South Korean elite and society. Nor did the US make any effort to tackle and change the authoritarian political behavior of the South Korean leadership and elite. Facing the threat of the communist takeover of Korea, the US focused on and engaged in dealing mostly with security problems. It cooperated with the South Korean military elite in spite of the authoritarian character of its political culture, remained silent toward authoritarian behavior of the Korean leadership and elites and neglected the democratic orientation and demands coming from the South Korean social groups and citizens. The US committed itself to make sure that South Korea did not fall under the influence of the Soviet

Union, did not unify as a state under the communist rule of North Korea and that the new South

Korean regime survived. Moreover, in Korea, unlike Germany, Japan and Italy, the threats and conflicts escalated into war. This, by itself, set back any attempts at democratization.

The above analysis then leads to three observations about the democratization. First, democratization might not be a linear process but has its ups and downs. The timing of the democratization reflects the interplay and combination of both exogenous and endogenous factors. It also depends, to a large extent, on the interaction between the foreign military occupation, the political culture and the security environment.

Second, democratization can be quick when the intervening power pursues goals, policies, and commitments clearly oriented to democratization, the character of political culture changes toward democratic values, behaviors and patterns and the security environment is favorable.

Third, democratization can be slow when the occupying power gives excessive priority to the security concerns generated by the external international environment to the neglect of democracy and when the domestic elites or the population, separately or jointly struggle in their embrace of the democratic values, beliefs, practices, institutions, and government.

Thus, the impact of the foreign intervention was similar and positive in its influence and effects in cases of Germany, Japan and Italy but it was different and negative in its influence and effects in the case of South Korea.

This work also observes and highlights the importance and the positive influence of three interactions observed in the cases of Germany, Japan and Italy.

The first is between the foreign intervention and political culture. In this interaction, the occupying power engages to change the political culture of the occupied elites and population.

The change of the domestic political culture toward democratic values and behavior makes it easier for the occupying power to succeed in democratizing the occupied country.

The second interaction is between the foreign intervention and security environment. In this interaction, the security environment is favorable to peace and stability in the country. This makes it easier for the occupying power to focus substantially on managing, in depth, all the aspects involved in democratization.

The third interaction is between the political culture and security environment. In this interaction the security environment is favorable to peace and stability. It allows and makes it easier for both the occupation authorities and the occupied elites and population to deal with and tackle the vestige of non-democratic values and behavior and change the political culture toward democratic values, behaviors and practices. This, in turn, makes it easier for the success of democratization.

Chapter 2

The Theory of Democratization

This study looks at how three factors influence democratization: 1) the goals, policies and commitment of the occupying force, 2) the security environment, and 3) the political culture.

2.1 Intervention and Democratization.

The intervening power influences democratization in several ways, through its goals, policies and commitment, all reflecting the interplay of politics, economics, security and interests behind the actions of the intervener.55

2.1.1 Intervention Goals

The character of goals is one way that the intervening power influences democratization.

Military intervention scholars identify various types of goals: nation-building and state-building, aiming at creating national identity and establishing state institutions;56 humanitarian goals and human rights, aiming at stopping conflict between internal groups, producing a political settlement and protecting human rights;57 peacekeeping and peace enforcement in civil wars, aiming at stopping conflict, reaching a peaceful settlement and encouraging power sharing

55 This work singles out the military occupation for two reasons. First, the influence of the foreign intervention relies on the use of force. Second, it is significantly distinguished from other exogenous factors because the later may influence democratization but indirectly whereas the use of force enables foreign intervention to influence democratization directly. 56 Dobbins, James. et al, “America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq,” Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2003; Dobbins, James. et al, “The UN’s Role in Nation-Building from the Congo to Iraq,” Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2005. 57 Byman, Daniel. ―Constructing a democratic Iraq: Challenges and opportunities,‖ International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer 2003, pp. 47-78; Schmidt, John R. ―Can outsiders bring democracy to post- conflict states?‖ Orbis, Winter 2008, pp. 107-122. 20 among ethnic groups;58 security-related goals, aiming to address concerns over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, drug trafficking or protecting allies from internal disorder;59 or goals linked to other geopolitical and strategic interests, aiming at defending economic interests, securing access to markets or energy resources,60 changing leadership or regimes,61 and democratization.62

While interventions for democratization represent only one subset, they draw a significant amount of both skepticism and criticism. The essence of democratization consists of establishing a democratic state and government, law and order and political stability;63 designing or remodeling multiethnic, secular, and democratic political and economic institutions, government, bureaucracy and the political system; holding democratic elections; and

58 Horowitz, Donald. Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985; Maynes, Charles William. ―Relearning intervention,‖ Foreign Policy, Vol. 98, No. 2, Spring 1995, pp. 96-113; Kaufman, Chaim. ―Possible and impossible solutions to ethnic civil wars,‖ International Security Vol. 20, No. 4, Spring 1996, pp. 136-175; Schmidt, John R. ―Can outsiders bring democracy to post-conflict states?‖ Orbis, Winter 2008, pp. 107-122; Walter, Barbara F. The International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict, ed. Michael Brown Cambridge, MA: 1996; and ―The critical barrier to civil war settlement,‖ International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3, Summer 1997, pp. 335-364; Walter, Barbara F., Snyder, Jack. Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. 59 Albright, Madeleine. "Use of Force in a Post-Cold War World", speech held in the National War College on September 23, 1993; Smith, Tony. "In defense of intervention," Foreign Affairs Vol. 73, No. 6, 1994; Maynes, Charles William. ―Relearning intervention,‖ Foreign Policy, Vol. 98, No. 2, Spring 1995, pp. 96-113; Evans, Ernest. "El Salvador's lessons for future U.S. interventions," World Affairs Vol. 160, No. 1, 1997. 60 Karl Lyn, Terry. ―Dilemmas of democratization in Latin America,‖ Comparative Politics Vol. 23, pp. 1-23; Rueschmeyer, D., E. H. Stephens, and J. Stephens. Capitalist Development and Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. 61 Maynes, Charles William. ―Relearning intervention,‖ Foreign Policy, Vol. 98, No. 2, Spring 1995, pp. 96-113; Schmidt, John R. ―Can outsiders bring democracy to post-conflict states?‖ Orbis, Winter 2008, p. 114; Will, George F. ―Then what?‖ The Washington Post, March 9, 2011, Section Editorial Copy, Pg. A23; Rosenblum, Jonathan. ―America's Libyan intervention: Conundrums as far as the eye can see,‖ Jerusalem Post, March 25, 2011, Section Opinion, p. 36. 62 Meernik, James. ―United States military intervention and the promotion of democracy,‖ Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33 November 1996, pp. 391-402; Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce., and George W. Downs. ―Intervention and democracy,‖ International Organization, 2006, Vol. 60, No. 3, pp. 627-649; Peceny, Mark. Democracy at the Point of Bayonets. University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999; Pickering, Jeffrey., Peceny, Mark. ―Forging democracy at gunpoint,‖ International Studies Quarterly Vol. 50, No. 3, 2006, pp. 539-560. 63 Smith, Tony. "In defense of intervention," Foreign Affairs Vol. 73, No. 6, 1994; Ottaway, Marina., Lieven, Anatol. ―Rebuilding Afghanistan,‖ Current History, March 2002, p. 135. 21 democratizing endogenous political culture.64 It also requires the intervening power to provide domestic and international security and economic and financial assistance.65 Skeptics neglect the importance and role of the nature of the intervener‘s goal because they view all interventions as being no different in terms of goals.66 But the burden of ―tasks‖ that the democratization goal involves, and the possibility of failing have made various critics raise the issue of the character of intervention goals. While they do not take a position entirely against interventions, they distinguish between ―idealistic‖ reasons and reasons of ―national interests.‖ In their view, the goals of intervention reflect, to a large extent, national interests.67

Given the importance of the character of intervention goals, this study joins the finding of optimists and conditional scholars that the character of goals is an important factor that influences whether or not the occupied country is to become a democracy.68 This study builds on the premise that democratization depends on whether the intervention aims at installing democracy or has other purposes. The history of US military interventions shows either a lack of clarity of the intervention goals or a ―split personality‖ reflecting the clash between the realist side, where autocratic rulers who guarantee non-democratic stability to fulfill American economic and security interests are befriended, and the Wilsonian/Neo-Reaganite side, favoring

64 Ottaway, Marina., Lieven, Anatol. ―Rebuilding Afghanistan,‖ Current History, March 2002, p. 135; Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce., and George W. Downs. ―Intervention and democracy,‖ International Organization, 2006, Vol. 60, No. 3, pp. 627-649. 65 Ottaway, Marina., Lieven, Anatol. ―Rebuilding Afghanistan,‖ Current History, March 2002, p. 135; Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce., and George W. Downs. ―Intervention and democracy,‖ International Organization, 2006, Vol. 60, No. 3, pp. 627-649. 66 Mesquita, Bruce., George W. Downs. ―Intervention and democracy,‖ International Organization, 2006, Vol. 60, No. 3, pp. 627-649. 67 Mearsheimer, John., Walt, Stephen. ―An unnecessary war,‖ Foreign Policy,” January / February 2003, pp. 51-55; Kissinger, Henry A. James A. Baker III. ―The grounds for U.S. intervention,‖ The Washington Post, April 10, 2011, p. A17; Will, George F. ―Then what?‖ The Washington Post, March 9, 2011, Section Editorial Copy, p. A23 68 Meernik, James. ―United States military intervention and the promotion of democracy,‖ Journal of Peace Research, November 1996, Vol. 33 pp. 391-402; Peceny, Mark. Democracy at the Point of Bayonets, University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999. 22 enforced democratization around the globe.69 Thus, the extent to which the intervening power associates its goals with democratizing the occupied country greatly influences whether democratization succeeds or fails, and whether it is quick or slow.

2.1.2 Occupation Policies

Occupation policies constitute the second way the intervening power influences democratization. The importance of policies to democratization arises through their character,70 the areas they cover,71 and their policy of administering power.72

The character of the policies of the intervening state becomes important in two ways. One way is whether or not they are tailored to democratization. Policies may or may not connect themselves to democratization. For example, policies associated with state-building, nation- building, and humanitarian goals and peacekeeping, while they could well become part of a democratizing agenda, are neither identical with democratization policies, nor can they alone necessarily make for democratization. Their essence is achieving political stability, i.e. building peaceful relations and cohabitation among groups and creating a sense of national identity, order

69 Will, George F. ―Then what?‖ The Washington Post, March 9, 2011, Section Editorial Copy, p. A23; Rosenblum, Jonathan. ―America's Libyan intervention: Conundrums as far as the eye can see,‖ Jerusalem Post, March 25, 2011, Section Opinion, p. 36; Carothers, Thomas. Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004, p.64. 70 Etzioni, Amitai: ―A self-restrained approach to nation-building by foreign powers,‖ International Affairs, 2004; Ottaway, Marina. Lieven, Anatol.: ―Rebuilding Afghanistan,‖ Current History, March 2002; Carother, Thomas. ―The end of the transitional paradigm,‖ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2002. Levitsky, Steven. Way, Lucan A. ―Elections without democracy: The rise of competitive authoritarianism,‖ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 2, April 2002. 71 Schmidt, John R. ―Can outsiders bring democracy to post-conflict states?‖ Orbis, Winter 2008, pp. 107- 122; Stradiotto, Gary A. ―Democratizing Iraq: Regime transition and economic development in comparative perspective,‖ International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 21, No. 2, June 2004; Krepinevich, Andrew F. "How to win in Iraq," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, Sept-Oct 2005. 72 Watts, Stephen. ―Democracy by force: Norms, resource constraints, and coalition-building.‖ Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, HI 1-5 March 2005. 23 and stable government.73 While, however, stability is a condition for democracy, it is not sufficient for democratization. Democratizing is not only about policies focused on order and stability; it requires more than that.74

The other consideration is whether or not an intervening state‘s policies, when geared toward democratization, embody the depth and breadth required for the achievement of this goal.75 If they are not characterized by proper depth and breadth, policies can produce illiberal democracies or a hybrid regime.76 In the democratization context, most of these policies tend to deal with institutional change and sometimes they suffer from a lack of understanding of how change occurs outside institutions. They risk failing whenever they lack depth and breadth.

A number of conditions may contribute to the failure of an intervening state‘s policies to build democracy.77 One condition is when policies for democratizing are confused with those for state-building. Another condition is when policies focus on institutional change but overlook the real needs of the new regime. A third condition is when intervention policies take the transition from autocracy toward democracy for granted and are shaped by the belief that democratization moves ahead only in the sequence, opening-breakthrough-consolidation, and cannot move backward. A fourth condition is when elections are viewed only as a way that gives a democratic face to a new regime, without considering that they may perpetuate the status-quo or move the new regime toward autocracy. A fifth condition is when it is believed that economic, social,

73 Etzioni, Amitai. ―A self-restrained approach to nation-building by foreign powers,‖ International Affairs, 2004, p. 1. 74 Ottaway, Marina. Lieven, Anatol. ―Rebuilding Afghanistan,‖ Current History, March 2002, p. 135. 75 Carother, Thomas. ―The end of the transitional paradigm,‖ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2002. 76 Levitsky, Steven. Way, Lucan A. ―Elections without democracy: The rise of competitive authoritarianism,‖ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 2, April 2002, p. 52. 77 Carother, Thomas. ―The end of the transitional paradigm,‖ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2002, pp. 14-20. 24 political, institutional conditions, while part of the issue, are not major determinants of a new regime‘s character.

Under the above conditions, intervention policies may lead to hybrid regimes that are dysfunctional democracies characterized by authoritarianism competing with formal democratic institutions. Hybrid regimes are characterized by a deadlock of conflicting powers and interests, a blurred line between the executive and legislative, the lack of a system of checks and balances, an overlap of political and personal power circumventing parliament or the judiciary, deliberately and chronically damaged rule of law, informal political processes, and critical periods of instability which both reflect and are used to justify non-democratic decisions and practices. In this context of competitive authoritarianism, formal democratic institutions are viewed as means of obtaining and exercising political authority. Incumbents very often and to a great extent do not hesitate to violate rules. Massive electoral fraud, abuse of state resources, restricted media access for the opposition, and harassment of the political opposition and their supporters are typical for this kind of regime. When the intervening state‘s policies fail or neglect to embody and convey a democratic mindset and standards, this is where an intervention effort may end up.78

The areas covered by an intervening state‘s policies are important to democratization in that they show whether the intervener is committed to setting the occupied country on the path of democratizing or has other objectives.79 Policies may be limited to a few areas or extended to include many aspects of the functioning of the state and society. They can range from provision

78 Levitsky, Steven. Way, Lucan A. ―Elections without democracy: The rise of competitive authoritarianism,‖ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 2, April 2002, p. 52. 79 Schmidt, John R. ―Can outsiders bring democracy to post-conflict states?‖ Orbis, Winter 2008, p. 121 25 of humanitarian assistance to socio-economics, political institutions, government, governance, rule of law, or security.80

Humanitarian policies usually involve the provision of basic services such as food and shelter, or assisting displaced populations return to their homes. Socio-economic policies focus on stabilization of the economy and the country‘s economic life, economic issues and financial assistance to promote growth and improve economic conditions and physical infrastructure, and they deal with demographic factors.81

Policies focusing on political institutions, government, governance and rule of law are oriented toward promoting democratic institutions, creating a political system, parties, and

NGOs, conducting elections, providing expertise in drafting constitutions and legal codes, temporarily assuming the functions of government, installing interim host-nation administrations, fighting corruption and organized and violent crime, providing expertise and assistance in reconstituting criminal justice systems, and performing policing and related criminal justice functions in circumstances where indigenous capabilities are absent or broken down.

Domestically, security policies involve enforcing ceasefires between ethnic, religious or socio-economic groups, disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating combatants, or training and mentoring military forces. Internationally, they involve dealing with outside threats and relations.

Overall, the areas that are covered by democratization policies matter because democratizing involves more than just dealing with some areas such as humanitarian issues, socio-economic issues and stability. It also involves dealing with political and security aspects

80 Schmidt, John R. ―Can outsiders bring democracy to post-conflict states?‖ Orbis, Winter 2008, pp. 107- 122; Stradiotto, Gary A. ―Democratizing Iraq: Regime transition and economic development in comparative perspective,‖ International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 21, No. 2, June 2004; Krepinevich, Andrew F. "How to win in Iraq," Foreign Affairs. Vol. 84, No. 5, Sept-Oct 2005; 81 Ibid. 26 ranging from restructuring constitutional rule to remaking the government model, the party system and the army, the status of former regime officials, and changing elite mentality.82

Policy administering is important to democratization through the cost of the policies, their implementation and who is in charge of this implementation. It shows whether policies are short-term or long-term in their duration, whether they are continuous or sporadic, and whether they are part of a larger framework or ad-hoc adjustments to a situation. The higher the costs of intervention policies, the higher is the likelihood the intervener will try to decrease them by compromising the quality of the new regime and institutions. The intervener might enter into power-sharing arrangements with local leaders, promise them political power regardless of their background and agenda, and legitimize and institutionalize the first post-conflict elections regardless of their fairness. Policy costs might make the intervening power move toward legitimizing a ―competitive oligarchy,‖ the lowest-cost form of intervention, which while not democratic, represents a lasting outcome, is economically viable, with low-intensity violence and allows the intervener to disengage.83 For all the above reasons, the character of the intervening state‘s policy, the range of areas it covers, and the administration of the policy, significantly influences prospects for democratization.

2.1.3 Intervener’s Commitment

The intervener‘s commitment is the third way an intervening state influences democratization. Viewed as one factor among the most important ones influencing the

82 Smith, Tony. "In defense of intervention," Foreign Affairs Vol. 73, No. 6, 1994; Krepinevich, Andrew F. "How to win in Iraq," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, Sept-Oct 2005. 83 Watts, Stephen. ―Democracy by force: Norms, resource constraints, and coalition-building,‖ Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, HI 1-5 March 2005. 27 outcome,84 the importance of commitment is expressed in three ways: the size of military commitment, the duration of military occupation, and the resources made available to normalization and reconstruction of the occupied country.

Also, the number of the military troops committed to administrating and governing the occupied country‘s territory is important in two ways: first, for keeping domestic order, stability and security,85 and second, for preserving international security.86 While some question the idea that military size matters and is an important factor for democratization,87 an argument can be made that a larger number of troops stationed in the occupied country can increase prospects for stability in the country, and consequently, also improve chances of achieving democratization.88

The duration of military occupation is important in four ways: guaranteeing long-term stability, creating capabilities for governance, helping economic recovery and reconstruction, and making it possible for change to take place fast.89 The length of stay of military troops in the occupied country can affect stability, governance, and economic recovery both positively and

84 Carothers, Thomas. ―Democracy without illusions,‖ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1, Jan-Feb 1997, p. 95; Bellin, Eva. ―The Iraqi intervention and democracy in comparative historical perspective,‖ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 4, 2004-05, p. 601; Krepinevich, Andrew F. "How to win in Iraq," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, Sept-Oct 2005, p. 98. 85 Krepinevich, Andrew F. "How to win in Iraq," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, Sept-Oct 2005, p. 98; Carothers, Thomas. “Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion,” Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004, pp. 3-25. 86 Byman, Daniel. ―Constructing a democratic Iraq: Challenges and opportunities,‖ International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer 2003, p. 72-74. 87 Archibugi, Daniele. ―Exporting democracy: What we have learned from Iraq,‖ Forum, Dissent, 2007, pp. 40-41. 88 Bellin, Eva. ―The Iraqi intervention and democracy in comparative historical perspective,‖ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 4, 2004-05, p. 602. 89 Diamond, Larry. ―What went wrong in Iraq,‖ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 5, Sept-Oct 2004, pp. 36- 37; Stradiotto, Gary. ―Democratizing Iraq: Regime transition and economic development in comparative perspective,‖ International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 21, No. 2, June 2004, p. 3; Bellin, Eva. ―The Iraqi intervention and democracy in comparative historical perspective,‖ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 4, 2004-05, p. 607; Carothers, Thomas. ―Promoting democracy, and fighting terror,‖ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1, Jan-Feb 2003, pp. 90-96. 28 negatively.90 The duration of the occupation is important to democratization because for changes to take place, a military presence is needed for at least three years.91 While some scholars would even question whether one can talk about changes taking place, a military presence, in general, has proven to be an important factor of influence on democratization.92

Resources are important to democratization through three relationships: 1) the size and state of the occupied country, 2) goals, and 3) policies. The amount of resources required for reconstructing an occupied country depends first of all on the occupied country‘s size. More resources are required in larger, poorer, and more complex and chaotic states and even greater resources are needed in situations of intense and destructive conflict. In these cases the role of resources in reconstruction will be more important.93 The amount of resources allocated by the intervening state determines whether or not the intervening state is in position to achieve its goals. It is also important to look at whether or not the resources match the goals of the intervening state. The amount of resources made available reflects the scope of the policies.94

The greater the areas covered by intervention policies, the larger is the amount of resources needed to match the policies and make them work.

One problem that arises with the commitment of the intervener is the areas it views as worthy of resources. This is related to how much money the intervener is willing to spend.

Should the resources be limited to security, the political system, and the economy? Or should

90 Bellin, Eva. ―The Iraqi intervention and democracy in comparative historical perspective,‖ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 4, 2004-05, pp. 604-605, p. 607; Evans, Ernest. "El Salvador's lessons for future U.S. interventions," World Affairs Vol. 160, No. 1, 1997, pp. 53-54. 91 Meernik, James: ―United States military intervention and the promotion of democracy,‖ Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33, No. 4, November 1996, pp. 391-402. 92 Downes, Alexander B., Monten, Jonathan. ―FIRced to be free: Foreign imposed regime change and democratization,‖ APSA, 2010, pp. 1-54; Dobbins, James. et al, “America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq,” Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2003. 93 Schmidt, John R. ―Can outsiders bring democracy to post-conflict states?‖ Orbis, Winter 2008, pp. 117- 120. 94 Ibid. p. 108, 117, 121. 29 they include other areas, such as political culture and behavior, civil society, and social issues?

While all these areas are important and interrelated the neglect of any of them may render the intervention unsuccessful.95

In general, providing security requires that resources cover issues such as the emergence of insurgency, a breakdown of law and order, conflict control and management, and deterrence of meddling neighbors. Reconstruction of the political system and institutions requires resources to cover designing constitutions and legal codes, shoring up government institutions, establishing and financing candidates, political parties, campaigns and the media, and organizing elections.96

Assisting the economy requires resources to restore infrastructure, reform institutions and make market mechanisms work.97 Covering all these areas requires making enormous resources available. Extending resources to cover the reconstruction of political culture increases the amount of funds needed to even higher levels. Changing political culture requires resources to deal with elite structure, mentality and behavior, ethnic, religious and factional animosity, political inclinations of dominant tribes and their sources of power and legitimacy, and social reforms pertaining to women, children, education and work.98 Because dealing with political

95 Carothers, Thomas. “Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion,” Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004, p. 3; Carothers, Thomas. ―Democracy without illusions,‖ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1, Jan-Feb 1997, p. 95. 96 Schmidt, John R. ―Can outsiders bring democracy to post-conflict states?‖ Orbis, Winter 2008, p. 117; Byman, Daniel. ―Constructing a democratic Iraq: Challenges and opportunities,‖ International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer 2003, pp. 50-54, 72-74; Carothers, Thomas. “Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion,” Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004, pp. 3-8. 97 Schmidt, John R. ―Can outsiders bring democracy to post-conflict states?‖ Orbis, Winter 2008, p. 117; Byman, Daniel. ―Constructing a democratic Iraq: Challenges and opportunities,‖ International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer 2003, p. 49; Schmidt, John R. ―Can outsiders bring democracy to post-conflict states?‖ Orbis, Winter 2008, pp. 119-122. 98 Krepinevich, Andrew F. "How to win in Iraq," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, Sept-Oct 2005, pp. 92- 94; Carothers, Thomas. “Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion,” Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004, pp. 3-4; Byman, Daniel. ―Constructing a democratic Iraq: Challenges and opportunities,‖ International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer 2003, pp. 74-76. 30 culture, civil society and social issues is very costly, there is always a possibility that the intervener may neglect or not cover all areas with the resources they require.99

The other problem linked to commitment is related to how resources are used.100

Resources can be used not only to restructure the political system and institutions, hold elections, and advance democratic agenda but can also be used to intervene in democratic processes. They can be used covertly to funnel of large amounts of money to a preferred candidate, party, group, local media or campaigns, to engage specific NGOs, to bribe or buy out potential opponents, to manipulate the electoral outcome; to influence the new government to work in the intervener‘s interests, to appoint key governmental officials, or to eliminate individuals with attitudes going against the intervener‘s goals. The use of resources to intervene in the outcomes of democratic processes to bring about a particular political outcome preferred by the intervener is questionable in terms of legitimacy and it could also trigger opposition to the intervener‘s protégés, make it difficult or impossible for the intervener‘s preferred politicians to maintain popular support, and cause the endogenous population to become disillusioned with elections and lose faith in democracy itself as well as in the intervener.101

Whether intervention succeeds in installing democracy depends, to a large extent, on perceptions and ideas that endogenous elites and the population create about the tactics used by the intervener.102 It is true that democracy creates spaces for abusive and manipulative practices, or for the rise of demagogues. It is also true that democratic processes and elections are important to democracy. But it is also truer that when democratic processes are distorted, when

99 Schmidt, John R. ―Can outsiders bring democracy to post-conflict states?‖ Orbis, Winter 2008, p. 122. 100 Bellin, Eva. ―The Iraqi intervention and democracy in comparative historical perspective,‖ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 4, 2004-05, p. 601. 101 Carothers, Thomas. ―Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion,” Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004, p. 71. 102 Behabib, Seyla. ―Exporting democracy: What we have learned from Iraq,‖ Forum, Spring 2007, pp. 44-46. 31 elections are bought or extorted, the outcome might be the installation and rise of autocratic, totalitarian or traditional regimes hiding their legitimacy behind the intervener‘s support.

Finally, related to the goals and policies of the occupier, scholars have noted that a military occupation can be of two types. In a security occupation, the intervener seeks to mainly address its immediate security objectives and does not seek to remake the political or economic system of the occupied country. In a comprehensive occupation, the intervener aims to create a certain political and economic system in the occupied country – this is closer to but not necessarily the same as nation-building.

2.2 The Security Environment and Democratization

Security is an important factor to democratization for two reasons: 1) it takes primacy over politics, economics and ideology and 2) it consists of two faces, one internal and the other external.103 A favorable or unfavorable security environment greatly influences the perceptions

103 Security is selected because it is a variable that is influenced by other factors, exerts its own influence and consists of two dimensions, one internal and the other external. As dependent factor, it is influenced by factors acting in both the domestic and international realms. Domestically it is influenced by the character of relations among ethnic, religious, minority and societal groups, the character of relations between various groups and state, the access to economic and power resources and the balance between the rights and obligations. Internationally it is influenced by states‘ national interests and security concerns, distribution of economic power and resources, relations with its neighbors and other states and disputes, conflicts and wars. As a dependent variable, the security environment could take two forms: stable or unstable. As an independent factor, the security environment, either internal or external, may influence the political stability, goals and policies pursued by government and the character of government and regime. Internal security influences the political stability, whether a country is characterized by stability or instability. External security influences the government priorities, that is, whether government policies give priority to security concerns or respect for political, civil, economic and social rights or economic development. It also influences the character of the regime, whether the government is democratic or non-democratic. The threats, conflicts and wars generated by external security tend to make governments make security their first priority at the expense of the respect for political, economic and social rights. This, in turn, influences the character of the regime and consequently, democratization itself. In the context of democratization, depending on whether it is characterized by stability or instability, the security environment can produce favorable and unfavorable conditions to democratization regardless of whether it is internal or external. A security environment favorable to democratization implies a situation, either domestically or internationally, characterized 32 of, as well as the intentions and behavior of actors, the character of the regime and consequently, democratization itself. It is closely linked to such phenomena as unrests, strife, war, domestic instability and secession which are observable especially in new democracies.104 Security influences democratization in two ways: internally and externally.

2.2.1 Internal Security

Security is important to democratization through its domestic face.105 The essence of domestic security is the preservation of order and stability. It is important to democratization because on the one side it reflects the character of domestic politics, the political system, the government, and governance, and on the other side, it influences their stability. In the context of military occupation, internal security influences democratization through the approach that the external power takes in managing four aspects.

mostly by peace, where the state and government are able to pursue their goals and policies without much trouble. A security environment unfavorable to democratization implies a situation, either domestically or internationally, characterized by tensions, threats, conflicts and wars, where the state and government face difficulties and challenges in sticking or advancing with their goals and policies. Military occupation is a factor that can influence whether the security environment, in its internal or external dimensions, is characterized by stability or instability and consequently, whether it generates favorable or unfavorable conditions to democratization. 104 Mansfield, Edward., Snyder, Jack. ―Democratization and the dangers of war,‖ International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1995, p. 5; Ward, Michael D., Gleditsch, Kristian S. ―Democratizing for peace,‖ American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 1, 1998, pp. 51-61; Fearon, James D. ―Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes,‖ American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 4, 1994, pp. 577-92; Snyder, Jack. From Voting to Violence, New York: W.W. Norton, 2000. 105 Juan Linz, in studying breakdown or consolidation of new democratic regimes, not only gives a special influencing role to security, but he also distinguishes between domestic and international security, viewing them both as important. Domestic security is linked to revolutionary attempts new social movements extra-state coercive forces militias, popular demonstrations, widespread strikes, acts of violence and terror, sub-cultural minority conflicts. International security is linked to nationalist sentiments and war. 33

One aspect relates to the management of ethnic and religious structure and relations.106

The extent to which ethnic and religious composition is heterogeneous or homogeneous in a given country, and the degree to which groups are able to overcome their differences, greatly influences whether ethnic and religious relations are peaceful or conflicting, but also affects stability, and consequently, the chances of democratization.

The second aspect relates to the sources and degree of legitimacy.107 Whenever the legitimacy of power, especially in heterogeneous states and societies, derives not from free will but from coercion, fear, prejudice or, ill-timed or ill-prepared elections, the result is neither democracy nor stability but the revival of autocracy and large-scale violent strife.

The third way concerns the distribution of power and the way it is controlled and exercised.108 This includes the way power is distributed between the army, the policy-makers,

106 Lijphart, Arendt. Democracy in Plural Societies, New Heaven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977; De Meur, Gisele., Berg-Schlosser, Dirk. ―Conditions of authoritarianism, fascism, and democracy in interwar period,‖ Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4, August 1996, p. 441; Etzioni, Amitai. ―A self- restrained approach to nation-building by foreign powers,‖ International Affairs, 2004, p. 4; Bellin, Eva. ―The Iraqi intervention and democracy in comparative historical perspective,‖ Political Science Quarterly, Volume 119 Number 4, 2004–05 pp. 595-608; Linz, Juan J. ―Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes‖ in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Palsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 3, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1973, pp. 330–333; Bates, Robert. ―Modernization, ethnic competition, and the rationality of politics in contemporary Africa,‖ in State Versus Ethnic Claims; African Policy Dilemmas, eds. D. Rothchild and V. Olorunsola Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 457-484; Horowitz, Donald. Ethnic Groups in Conflict Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985; Kaufman, Chaim. ―Possible and impossible solutions to ethnic civil wars,‖ International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4, Spring 1996, pp. 136-175; Mueller, John. ―The banality of ‗ethnic war‘,‖ International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1, Summer 2000, pp. 42-70; Walter Barbara F., Snyder, Jack. Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. 107 Berg-Schlosser, Dirk. ―How to analyze political culture,‖ Paper presented to workshop “West European political cultures in a comparative perspective,” European Consortium for Political Research, Paris, April 1989; Berg-Schlosser, Dirk., Rytlewski, R. (eds.) Political Culture in Germany, London, Macmillan, 1993; De Meur, Gisele., Berg-Schlosser, Dirk. ―Conditions of authoritarianism, fascism, and democracy in interwar period,‖ Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4, August 1996, p. 456; Diamond, Larry. ‖Building democracy after conflict: lessons from Iraq,‖ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 16, No. 1, January 2005, pp. 9-23. 108 Etzioni, Amitai. ―A self-restrained approach to nation-building by foreign powers,‖ International Affairs, 2004, p. 4; Ahmed, Salman. ―No size fits all,‖ Foreign Affairs, January/February 2005; Byman, Daniel. ―Democracy and military intervention: Challenges and opportunities,‖ International Security, Summer 2003 pp. 47-76; Smooha, Sammy., Hanf, Theodore. ―The diverse modes of conflict-regulation in 34 and the judiciary; whether it is controlled by one group, a few groups alternating control, or many groups, and whether it is exercised in an abusive manner or checked. All these factors influence whether groups in society feel included or excluded and recognized or suppressed politically. This, in turn, influences whether societal differences are resolved peacefully or by war, whether majority rule ends up in the tyranny of majority groups, whether or not power is shared, both vertically and horizontally, among all groups constituting the society, and last, whether or not the country, its political system, government and governance are characterized by internal stability.109

The fourth way is the approach and management by the external power of rights and liberties.110 The fact of whether or not rights are respected, whether or not various social groups are given space for political participation, and whether or not the rights for voting, language usage, holidays, jobs in the public administration and access to institutions and policy-making are approached selectively or equally to all individuals or groups greatly influences domestic stability.

deeply divided societies," International Journal of Comparative Sociology, Vol. 33, No. 1-2, January 1992, p. 33. 109 Kaufman, Chaim.―Possible and impossible solutions to ethnic civil wars,‖ International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4, Spring 1996, p. 137; Stephen Van Evera, ―Hypotheses on nationalism and war,‖ International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 Spring 1994, pp. 23-36; Horowitz, Donald. Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, p. 291; Brogan, Patrick. The Fighting Never Stopped: A Comprehensive Guide to World Conflicts Since 1945, New York: Vintage, 1990, pp. 227-234; Lijphart, Arend. ―The power sharing approach,‖ in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, a Joseph Monteville, eds., New York: Lexington, 1990, p. 494. 110 Byman, Daniel. ―Democracy and military intervention: challenges and opportunities,‖ International Security, Summer 2003, pp. 47-76; Horowitz, Donald. Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, pp. 167-176, 395-440; Horowitz, Donald. ―Making moderation pay,‖ in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, a Joseph Monteville, eds., New York: Lexington, 1990, pp. 451-476; Weiner, Myron. Sons of the Soil, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978, pp. 7-10; Etzioni, Amitai. ―A self-restrained approach to nation-building by foreign powers,‖ International Affairs, 2004, p. 4; Smooha, Sammy., Hanf, Theodore. ―The diverse modes of conflict-regulation in deeply divided societies," International Journal of Comparative Sociology, Vol. 33, No. 1-2, January 1992, p. 33. 35

In short, the extent to which the domestic security environment is stable or unstable does reflect the actions taken by external power and it does influence whether it is favorable or unfavorable to democratization. Whenever domestic security is characterized by conflict and instability, stabilization takes priority to democratization.111

2.2.2 External Security

Security is also important to democratization through its external face. The essence of this face is the preservation of the state and its regime and the advancement of interests in the context of inter-state relations and politics. This face is important because the way states behave not only shapes the foreign policies and attitudes of other states, it also influences their domestic politics and stability and the existence of regime.112 In the context of democratization the external face of security is important to democratization in two ways.

One way is through the conceptualization of national interests and foreign policies pursued by both the occupied country and the intervening power.113 The conceptualization of national interests shapes the goals, role and actions of the intervening power and the occupied country‘s regime. The way a state conceptualizes national interests and foreign policy and approach security, politics, economics and ideology may sometimes reflect a realist perspective, at other times an idealist one, and sometimes a mixture of the two. As the history of the US has shown, shaping national interests and foreign policy in purely "realist" or "idealist" terms is not

111 Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, London, Yale University Press, 1968, pp. 1-29, 196. 112 Gourevitch, Peter. ―The second image reversed: the international source of domestic politic,‖ International Organizations, Vol. 32, No. 4, Autumn 1978, pp. 881-912. 113 Kissinger, Henry A., Baker III, James A. ―The grounds for U.S. intervention,‖ The Washington Post, April 10, 2011, p. A17. 36 an easy task, and thus the choice between one or the other tends to be a false one.114 Yet, there is a marked distinction between them.

A realist conceptualization of national interests and foreign policy, in general, shows sensitivity to the balance of power, security concerns, economic competition and geopolitics.

While they do not exclude the pursuit of ―pragmatic idealism,‖ they hold security as the number one priority.115 The pursuit of economic interests is also important, since it is closely linked to state power. The gains, access to markets, control over energy resources and possession of advanced technology all influence state capabilities.116 Yet, these concerns come second when competition for security reasserts itself.117 The pursuit of non-security goals, such as the promotion of democracy, can also serve national interests and security because they channel nationalist energies in a positive direction, provide constitutional government and stability, and

114 Kissinger, Henry A., Baker III, James A. ―The grounds for U.S. intervention,‖ The Washington Post, April 10, 2011, p. A17. 115 Morgenthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York, Knopf, 5th edition, 1978; Waltz, Kenneth. Theory of International Politics, Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979; Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Norton 2001; Gilpin, Robert G. War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981; Krasner, Stephen. ―State power and the structure of international trade,‖ World Politics, Vol. 28, pp. 317-347; Nau, Henry R. Trade and Security: US Policy at Cross Purposes, Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1995; Schweller, Randall. ―Realism and the great power system: Growth and positional conflict over scarce resources,‖ pp. 28-68 in Kapstein Ethan B. and Mastanduno, Michael (eds.) Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War, New York: Columbia University Press; Kissinger, Henry A. ―Diplomacy,‖ New York, Simon and Schuster, 1994; Mearsheimer, John. ―Back to the future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,‖ International Security, Vol. 15, pp. 7-57. 116 Grieco, Joseph M. ―Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: A realist critique of the neWest liberal institutionalism,‖ pp. 116-142 in Baldwin, David A. (eds.) Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993; Snidal, Duncan. ―Relative gains and the patterns of international cooperation,‖ pp. 170-208, in Baldwin, David A. (eds.) Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993; Powell, Robert. ―Absolute and relative gains in international relations,‖ pp. 209-233, in Baldwin, David A. (eds.) Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993; Brooks, Stephen G. Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization and the Changing Calculus of Conflict, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005; Kirshner, Jonathan. ―The changing calculus of conflict?‖ Security Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4, Oct-Dec 2007, pp. 583-597. 117 Mastanduno, Michael. ―A realist view: Three images of the coming international order,‖ in T. V. Paul and John A. Hall eds. International Order and the Future of World Politics, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 23. 37 create conditions for better neighborly relations.118 But non-security goals get along only sometimes with security goals, as long as they do not conflict with them. If there is a conflict, security trumps all other goals.119 Security comes before the promotion of democracy because the latter might be too costly.120

An idealist conceptualization of national interests and foreign policy shows sensitivity to the promotion of freedom, human rights, and democracy itself. While it recognizes the importance of security, it does not view the relationship between security, economics and ideology as being organized in a hierarchical way.121 Rather than a difference between security concerns and economic interests, or security goals and ideological differences, idealists see an overlap and exchange among the three of them.122 A foreign policy conceptualizing national interests and security in such a way conceives of the advancement of national interests through a combination among institutions, free markets and democracy. National interests and security goals are better taken care of and advanced when they are detached by viewing them as defined only by power and security concerns and to be pursued in the context of open and liberalized markets, cooperation and democratic institutions.123

118 Smith, Tony. "In defense of intervention," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 6, 1994, pp. 35-36. 119 Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W. W. Norton & Company, 2001, p. 46. 120 Kissinger, Henry A. and James A. Baker III. ―The grounds for U.S. intervention,‖ The Washington Post, April 10, 2011, p. A17. 121 Kissinger, Henry A., Baker III, James A. ―The grounds for U.S. intervention,‖ The Washington Post, April 10, 2011, p. A17; Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W. W. Norton & Company, 2001, p. 46. 122 Mittelman, James H., Johnston, Robert: ―The Globalization of organized crime: The courtesan state and the corruption of civil society,‖ Global Governance, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1999, pp. 103-127; Brooks, Stephen G. Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization and the Changing Calculus of Conflict, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005; Kirshner, Jonathan. ―The changing calculus of conflict?‖ Security Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4, Oct-Dec 2007, pp. 583-597; Smith, Tony. "In defense of intervention," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 6, 1994, pp. 35-36. 123 Keohane, Robert O., Nye, Joseph. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston, Little Brown, 1977; Kahler, Miles. Regional Futures and Transatlantic Economic Relations, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1995; Nye, Joseph S. ―What new world order?‖ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, pp. 83-96, 1992; Nau, Henry R. Trade and Security: US Policy at Cross-Purposes, Washington. DC: 38

The way that the intervening power conceptualizes national interests and foreign policy matters because it influences whether or not the occupation is oriented toward making the occupied country a democratic one; it also influences the chances and prospects of the occupied country‘s democratization. Conditions that affect democratization include whether the intervening state is driven by the primacy of power and security concerns; and whether the status-quo and new regime in the occupied country are viewed to be responding to security concerns of the intervening power and serving them well.

The second way that external security is important to democratization is through the management of relations with neighboring countries and differences in regime type.124 This involves how both the intervening power and the occupied country view sources of security and stability and the way they manage interstate relations. The view of sources of security and stability reflects two lessons from democratic theory:125 1) democratic regimes tend to be less militaristic than authoritarian states; and 2) relations between democracies tend to be especially pacific and they rarely go to war against each other. The implication for democratization is the potential for practicing two different types of foreign policies. One is democratic, driven by the desire for peace, stability, and economic prosperity, the advancement of interests through the

AEI Press; Krugman, Paul. ―Competitiveness: A dangerous obsession,‖ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, pp. 23- 33, 1994; Mastanduno, Michael. ―A realist view: Three images of the coming international order,‖ in T. V. Paul and John A. Hall eds. International Order and the Future of World Politics, Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 22-24. 124 Bruce Russet. ―Installing democracy,‖ Commonwealth, December 3, 2004; Doyle, Michael. "An international liberal community," in Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton (eds.) Rethinking American Security: Beyond the Cold War to New World Order, New York: W.W. Norton, 1991; Lake, David A. "Powerful pacifists: Democratic states and war," American Political Science Review, March 1992; Russett, Bruce. Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. Smith, Tony. "In defense of intervention," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 6, 1994. 125 Russett, Bruce. Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993; Doyle, Michael. "An international liberal community," in Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., Rethinking American Security: Beyond the Cold War to New World Order, New York: W.W. Norton, 1991; Lake, David A. "Powerful pacifists: Democratic states and war," American Political Science Review, March 1992. 39 pursuit of peaceful neighborly relations, the creation of economic opportunities and respect for free market rules and institutions, and the management and resolution of conflicts through a win- win game. The other type, non-democratic, is driven by a predisposition for the pursuit of aggressive policies, the advancement of interests at the expense of others, and conflict management through a win-lose game. Democracies are pacific among themselves but do not hesitate to engage in war with non-democratic regimes when the latter generate threats or challenges.126

The management of neighborly relations and differences in regime type is important to democratization in three ways. First they influence whether the occupied country and its neighbors are likely to live in peace or engage in conflicts. Second, they influence whether the behavior and goals of the intervening power will focus on democratization or on preserving the existence of the occupied country. Third, they also influence whether the occupied country‘s new regime will engage in democratization. It is important to note that external military threats enable autocratic rulers to justify their governing methods and policies, allowing them to play the nationalist card and claim to be defender of the nation, suppress political opponents and individual rights, and distract public attention from their failings.127 Thus, democratization depends on and reflects the extent to which the external security is favorable or unfavorable to the occupied country‘s new regime. When external security is characterized by conflicts it may threaten the existence of the regime. As a consequence, the preservation of the regime takes priority to the character of regime. In the context of democratization by foreign occupation, when facing external threat, both the intervening power and the occupied country‘s new regime tend to

126 Peceny, Mark., Beer, Caroline C., Sanchez-Terry, Shannon. ―Dictatorial peace?‖ The American Political Science Review, Vol. 96, No. 1, March 2002, pp. 15-26. 127 Carothers, Thomas. ―Why dictators aren‘t dominos,‖ Foreign Policy and Carnegie Endowment Special Report, 2003, p. 60. 40 be more concerned with the security and survival of the new regime than with the character of the regime and government. This, in turn, affects the prospects and timing of democratization.

2.3 Political Culture and Democratization

Political culture is viewed by many scholars as important to democratization as prior experience with democracy or economic development:128 it is very influential to regime change, to transition and to the consolidation of democracy.129 Political culture exerts its influence on democratization in several ways.

2.3.1 Values and Beliefs

128 Political culture is singled out because it is influenced by other factors and it exerts its influence as well. As a dependent factor, it is influenced by family, educational system, media, social organizations and religious institutions. It may be influenced by military occupation as well. It may take two forms: one democratic, characterized by behavior and practices that accept the legitimacy of leadership and institutions, trust in political class and leadership, show tolerance toward diversity of opinions and are driven by spirit of cooperation in resolving problems and the other can be non-democratic, reflected in behavior and practices that do not accept the legitimacy, rules, processes and outcomes and show distrust, intolerance and non-cooperative attitudes. As an independent factor, political culture can influence the democratic or non-democratic character of leadership, functioning of political institutions, system, government and society. It is an important influencing factor because the political institutions and government may be designed along the democratic principles but if the actors that populate and run them are not driven by democratic values, beliefs, behavior and attitudes then institutions and government may be democratic in paper but in reality they may render dysfunctional and not democratic. This is the case of post-colonial states and societies after the British and French granted them independence. This is also the case of Albania, a former Communist country that started the transition to democracy in the 1990s but twenty years later continues to remain a country in transition because of the non-democratic character of political behavior and practices that characterized the Albanian political elites and population as well. 129 Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991; Linz, Juan J., Stepan, Alfred. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996; Diamond, Larry. Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1999; Almond, Gabriel., Verba, Sidney. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Countries, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963; Pye, Lucian W., Verba, Sidney. Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965; Lane, Ruth. ―Political culture: Residual category or general theory?‖ Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 25, Issue. 3, October 1992, pp. 362-387. 41

First, political culture is important to democratization through the character of the values and beliefs held by individuals and society.130 Values refer to what is viewed as acceptable or unacceptable, right or wrong, whereas beliefs refer to what individuals, groups, and society as a whole accept as true or false.131 Both are important elements that shape the character of political culture.132

Values and beliefs reflect how people view and what they think about government, liberty, equality, civic duty and participation, as well as individual responsibility. The nature of the values held by individuals, and whether the dominant set of values and beliefs reflect a positive or negative character, greatly influences political behavior, at individual, group, and societal levels. Values also influence what motivates people, how groups are organized, how it is decided who gets what, when and how, and what roles each person assumes.133 Consequently, the issue of whether people have values and beliefs critical of their government, and whether they are active citizens in the public sphere, viewing themselves as individuals with both rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis society, have a large effect on democratization.

2.3.2 Behavior and Attitudes

Second, political culture is important to democratization through the forms of political behavior and attitudes that characterize the individual, group and society. Political attitudes reflect whether people enter into a socio-political relationship based on tolerance or hatred,

130 Rokeach, Milton. ―Change and stability in American value systems, 1969-1971,‖ Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 38, Issue 2, July 1974, pp. 222-238. 131 Inglehart, Ronald. Human Beliefs and Values: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook: Political Religious, Sexual, And Economic. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998. 132 Almond, Gabriel., Verba, Sidney. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Countries, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963. 133 Lane, Ruth. ―Political culture: Residual category or general theory?‖ Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 25, Issue. 3, October 1992, pp. 362-387. 42 whether they have a cooperative or violent predisposition, an obedient or disobedient mindset, a sense of participation or exclusion, and a spirit of trust or distrust.134 Political behavior reflects cognition, feelings and evaluations about the self and the other, and relationships between individuals, groups, society, and institutions.135 Political attitudes and behaviors are important to political culture because they express directly its character.136 The political culture can be characterized by parochial or active, massive or elite participation forms, traditional, moralistic or individualistic mindset, and attitudes predisposed for coalitions or conflicts.137

It should be also noted that a number of behavioral and attitudinal factors affect whether society operates on a basis of trust or distrust, hierarchy or egalitarianism, the promotion of liberty or coercion, and individualism or group orientation: the perceptions of legitimacy in the political leadership and institutions; the acceptance of the rules, the process and the outcome; the trust in leadership; tolerance toward other opinions and diversity; and a mindset of cooperation or conflict in dealing with others or resolving problems.138 The manner in which society operates influences prospects for democratization.

2.3.3 Political Participation

134 Welzel, Christian., Inglehart, Ronald. ―Emancipative values and democracy: Response to Hadenius and Teorell,‖ Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 41, No. 3, Fall 2006, pp. 74-94. 135 Dalton, Russell J. ―Citizen attitudes and political behavior,‖ Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 33, No. 6/7, Aug-Sept 2000, pp. 912-940. 136 Almond, Gabriel., Verba, Sidney. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Countries, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963. 137 Elazar, Daniel J. American Federalism: A View from the States, New York, Harper and Row, 1966; Lijphart, Arendt. ―Consociational democracy,‖ World Politics, Vol. 21, No. 2, January 1969, pp. 207-225. 138 Pye, Lucian W., Verba, Sidney. (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965. 43

Third, political culture is important to democratization through channels, processes, and forms of political participation.139 The participation channels include political parties and interest groups.140 The processes involve the electoral process and the alignment and realignment of voters,141 and the forms of participation include voting, lobbying and protesting.142

Political participation reflects through its diversity of opportunities, forms and actors whether the political system is characterized by democratic or non-democratic features. The issue of whether the political system allows or creates the conditions for the formation, existence, and functioning of parties and interest groups; whether it is characterized by legitimate electoral processes, and whether it is characterized by peaceful or violent, or peaceful as well as violent forms of participation, all influence not only whether political consciousness develops at the individual, group, and society levels, but also whether the society is democratic or not, and when it is democratic, the degree of democratization.

139 Barber, Benjamin. Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. 140 Lijphart, Arendt. Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977; Duverger, Maurice. Political Parties, Methuen, London, 1954; Eldersveld, Samuel. Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964; Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and Theory of Groups, Harvard University Press, 1965; Walker, Jack. ―Three modes of political mobilization,‖ pp. 170-181, in Alexander, Robert M. The classics of interest group behavior, Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006; Rothenberg, Lawrence. Linking Citizens to Government, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992. 141 Powell, Bingham G. Elections as Instruments of Democracy, New Heaven, Yale University Press, 2000; Rokkan, Stein. Citizens, Elections, Parties. Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1970; Katz, Richard S. Democracy and Elections, New York, Oxford University Press, 1997; Lipset, Seymour Martin., Rokkan, Stein. ―Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments,‖ pp. 1-33, 50-56, in Lipset and Rokkan (eds.) Party Systems and Voter Alignments, New York, Free Press, 1967. 142 Niemi, Richard., Weisberg, Herbert. (eds.) Classics in voting behavior, Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993; Carmines, Edward., Stimson, James. ―The two faces of issue voting,‖ American Political Science Review, Vol. 74, No. 1, April 1980, pp. 78-91; Wright, John. ―PAC contributions, lobbying, and representation,‖ Journal of Politics, Vol. 51, No. 3, Aug 1989, pp. 713-729; Austen-Smith, David., Wright, John. ―Counteractive lobbying,‖ American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 1, Feb 1994, pp. 25-44; Tarrow, Sydney G. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, Cambridge. U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998; Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970. 44

2.3.4 Civil Society

Fourth, political culture is important to democratization through the degree of development of social capital and civil society.143 Social capital refers to the existence of social networks which aim at building social trust and norms, facilitating coordination and cooperation among individuals and groups in society, and making the society in general more vibrant.144

Civil society refers to social organizations existing in the space between the individual and the state, acting independently of the state, while aiming to provide solutions to conflicts through diversity, deliberation, cooperation and restraint.145 Representing important elements of democracy, social capital and civil society influence democratization by influencing whether society operates on trust and cooperation.

2.3.5 Institutional Culture and Patterns

Fifth, political culture is important to democratization through institutional culture and patterns.146 The latter reflect the ability, degree, and practices among the ruling elites and leaders to work together within institutions and to deal with problems in society.147 Institutional culture

143 Hyden, Goran. ―Civil society, social capital, and development: Dissection of a complex discourse,‖ Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 32, No. 1, April 1997, pp. 3-30; Edwards, Bob., Foley, Michael W., Diani, Mario (eds.) Beyond Tocqueville: Civil Society and Social Capital Debate in Comparative Perspective, Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2001. 144 Putnam, Robert. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993. 145 Schmitter, Philippe C., Karl, Terry Lyn., ―What democracy is….and is not,‖ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 2, Issue 3, 1991, pp. 75-88; Hefner, Robert W. Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia, Princeton University Press, 2000. 146 Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968; Migdal, Joel. Strong Societies and Weak States: State Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World, Princeton, Princeton University Press 1988; Schmitter, Philippe C., Karl, Terry Lyn., ―What democracy is….and is not,‖ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 2, Issue 3, 1991; 147 Samuel P. Huntington in The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, and Philippe C. Schmitter in ―The consolidation of democracy and representation of social groups,‖ American Behavioral Scientist, Mar-June 1992, Vol. 35, Issue 4/5, pp. 422-450, view institutionalized culture and practices as the ability of principal political elites to work 45 and patterns among the ruling elite and leadership influence whether institutions serve as a medium that channels and balances political forces or serve as a tool for generating and maintaining a personalistic rule, whether they are diverse and representative, whether their decision-making process operates on the basis of rationality or individual preferences, and whether they are open to change and transformation.148 The tradition of institutional culture and patterns has a major influence on whether or not the society is politically stable and whether or not the new democratic regime is a functioning one.

2.3.6 Social Change

Sixth, political culture is important to democratization through the character of its relationship with social change. Culture, as a broad category, is either resistant to change or changes very slowly.149 Political culture can be also characterized by openness or resistance to change.150 The kind of attitude that individuals, groups, and society each displays vis-à-vis social and political change greatly affects political structures, the rise of democracy or the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, as well as the character, survival, breakdown, or viability of

together to deal with the problems confronting their society, to refrain from exploiting those problems for their own immediate or political advantage rather than a factor on its own. Larry Diamond in ―Three paradoxes of democracy,‖ pp. 111-123, Guillermo O‘Donnell in ―Delegative democracy,‖ pp. 94-110, and Marc F. Platner in ―The democratic moment,‖ pp. 36-48, in Diamond Larry and Marc F. Plattner (eds), The Global Resurgence of Democracy, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, c1996, argue that the institutional behavior and practices can be characterized by patterns reflecting either the balance of forces that come out of institutions after their establishment or by patterns that produce a personalistic rule. 148 North, Douglass. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press, 1990. 149 Pye, Lucian W. ―Introduction: Political culture and political development,‖ Chapter 1, in Pye, Lucian W., Verba, Sidney (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965. 150 Diamond, Larry. Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1999; Cohen, Mitchell. ―Exporting democracy: What have we learned from Iraq?‖ Forum Dissent, Spring 2007, pp. 50-52. 46 democracy.151 Any regime change to a large extent reflects the political culture of the domestic elite, its behavior, competition,152 disposition to make pacts and compromises,153 acceptance or rejection of new democratic rules,154 and the internal crisis between old and new values.155

2.3.7 Direction of Change

Seventh, political culture is important to democratization because of the direction its internal dynamics and transformation might take. While political culture certainly can change, the direction of change can neither be taken for granted, nor will it inevitably be in the democratic direction. It could embrace democratization as much as it might resist it and become an obstacle to democracy and its consolidation.156 Political culture with a negative influence may not necessarily be an insurmountable obstacle.157 Still, political culture affects democratization, regardless of whether democracy has been endogenously or exogenously induced, because of the

151 Berg-Schlosser, Dirk., De Meur, Gisele. ―Conditions of democracy in interwar Europe: A Boolean Test of major hypothesis,‖ Comparative Politics, April 1994, pp. 253-279; De Meur, Gisele., Berg- Schlosser, Dirk. ―Conditions of authoritarianism, Fascism, and democracy in interwar period,‖ Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 29, No 4, August 1996, pp. 423-468; Berg-Schlosser, Dirk. ―Conditions of authoritarianism, Fascism and democracy in inter-war Europe: A cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis,‖ International Journal of Comparative Studies, Vol. 39, No. 4, 1998, pp. 335-377. 152 O‘Donnell, Guillermo., Schmitter, Philippe C., Whitehead, Laurence. (eds.) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986; Munck, Gerardo L., Leff, Carol Skalnik. ―Modes of transition and democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in comparative perspective,‖ Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 3, April 1997, pp. 343- 362. 153 Karl, Terry Lynn., Schmitter, Philippe C. ―Modes of transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe,‖ International Social Science Journal, Vol. 43, No. 2, 1991, pp. 269-284. 154 Munck, Gerardo L., Leff, Carol Skalnik. ―Modes of transition and democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in comparative perspective,‖ Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 3, April 1997, pp. 343-362. 155 Share, Donald., Mainwaring, Scott. ―Transitions through transaction: Democratization in Brazil and Spain,‖ in Selcher, W. (eds.) Political Liberalization in Brazil: Dynamics, Dilemmas, and Future Prospects. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986. 156 Diamond, Larry. ―What went wrong in Iraq,‖ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 5, Sept-Oct 2004, pp. 34- 56 157 Belin, Eva. ―The Iraqi intervention and democracy in comparative historical perspective,‖ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 4, 2004–05, pp. 595-608. 47 active and influencing role that values and beliefs, behavior and attitudes, among the elites and the population, play in the process of democratization.158 Whether the political culture is driven by trust or distrust, and a predisposition for cooperation or conflict, influences three relations that are important to democratization: among domestic elites and population, between the occupying troops and the occupied population, and between predisposition for preserving the status-quo and embracing the change.159 Consequently, democratization depends on whether the intervening power fails to change or neglects to try to change the political culture of the occupied population.160

2.4 Dependent Variable: Democratization

In this work, the dependent variable, democratization, is defined as the process of moving from a non-democratic or weak democratic regime to a full and strong democratic regime. It refers to the process of getting democratic under the military foreign occupation and staying democratic for at least the first few years after the end of the military occupation.

Democratization could vary in terms of its pace, i.e., how quick or slow it is, and the strength of the democratic character of the new regime, i.e., whether the new established regime is a weak or strong democracy.

158 Archibugi, Daniel. ―Exporting democracy: What have we learned from Iraq?‖ Forum Dissent, Spring 2007, pp. 40-42; Stradiotto Gary A. ―Democratizing Iraq: Regime transition and economic development in comparative perspective,‖ International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 21, No. 2, June 2004, pp. 3-36. 159 Byman, Daniel. ―Democracy and military intervention: Challenges and opportunities,‖ International Security, Summer 2003 pp. 47-76; Krepinevich, Andrew F. "How to win in Iraq," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84. No. 5, Sept-Oct 2005. 160 Share, Donald., Mainwaring, Scott. ―Transitions through transaction: Democratization in Brazil and Spain,‖ in W. Selcher, eds. Political Liberalization in Brazil: Dynamics, Dilemmas, and Future Prospects. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986; Carothers, Thomas. ―Promoting democracy and fighting terror,‖ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 3, Jan-Feb 2003, pp. 84-99. 48

2.4.1 Pace of Democratization

The first issue pertains to how fast or slow is the shift from an authoritarian regime or a weak democracy to a strong democracy. Some tie the pace to the existence of conditions prior to and after intervention.161 Others link it to the degree, scope, and length of commitment on the part of the intervening power.162

It is important to look at the length of time characterizing the shift to strong democracy for three reasons. First, the pace of democratization can vary considerably: it could be quick, slow, or stagnant. Second, the democratization process could take either a positive or a negative direction. The essence of transition is the ending of an old established regime and the beginning of a new one. However, the process itself is characterized by vulnerability and the durability or, persistence of particular authority patterns. Third, because the process of shifting from a non- democratic to a democratic regime may not necessarily develop in a linear way, democratization could instead be characterized by advances and setbacks.163

In measuring the length of time and direction of democratization this study relies on the parameters used by the Polity Project. In terms of the pace, on a scale of 21 points of change (-10 to +10), the Polity Project distinguishes three types of change: quick (by six points or more, taking place in three years), slow (by three to five points, taking place in three years), stagnant or no change (by zero points). In terms of the direction of change, the Polity Project distinguishes two types of change: in a positive direction and in a negative direction. Positive changes consist

161 Linz, Juan., Stepan, Alfred. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996; Bellin, Eva. ―The Iraqi intervention and democracy in comparative historical perspective,‖ Political Science Quarterly, Vol.119 No. 4, 2004–05 pp. 595-608. 162 Stradiotto, Gary A. ―Democratizing Iraq: Regime transition and economic development in comparative perspective,‖ International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 21, No. 2, June 2004, pp. 3-36. 163 Marshall, Monty G., Gurr, Ted Robert., Jaggers Keith. ―Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009: Dataset Users‘ Manual,‖ Polity IV, Center for Systemic Peace, 2010, pp. 30-31, 33-36; http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 49 of any increase in the polity score and include three subtypes of change: major (by three points or more), minor (by two points), and just positive (by one point only). Negative changes consist of any decrease in the polity score and include two subtypes of change: negative (by one point only), and adverse (by two or more points).

Thus, in this study, democratization is quick when a country moves to a strong democracy in between three and ten years, and it is slow if it takes longer than ten years. The democratization is considered to be in a positive direction when it is characterized by changes called either positive (increase of polity score by one point), minor (increase of polity score by two points), major (increase of polity score by three points or more), and radical (change of polity score by up by twenty points). Democratization goes in a negative direction when it is characterized by changes called either negative (decrease of polity score by one point) or adverse

(decrease of polity score by two points or more).

Since the democratization might not always be linear but may be characterized by advances and setbacks, this study expects to find democratization alternating between weak autocratic, weak democratic, and strong democratic features as expressed in the presence of partial, weak, unconsolidated democratic regimes and full, strong, consolidated democratic regimes. Whether the pace of democratization is quick, slow, or stagnant; whether the direction of change is positive or negative, and whether the democratization is characterized by a linear shift or alternation between advances and setbacks, all reflect the durability and persistence of patterns and practices related to the dominant culture of authority and power. Under such conditions, in this study the normal length of democratization is expected to vary between three

(at least) and ten (at most) years.164

164 Huntington, in his ―Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century,” 1991, pp. 266-267, elaborating on the consolidation of democracy, argues that a democracy could be considered as 50

2.4.2 Character of New Regime

The second issue pertains to the strength of the democratic character of the new regime.

A foreign power might change a regime, but even so, the democratic features displayed by the new regime might be weak or strong or even non-existent.

The strength of the democratic character of a new regime can be looked at in various ways. One way is to look at its political and civil rights and electoral procedures.165 This includes the rights to express, organize, vote, run for office, and obtain information, and the quality of the electoral process, participation and selection processes. Another way is to look at power and authority.166 This view focuses on the ways power is distributed and exercised. A third way could be to look at situational and institutional conditions.167 In this view there are six situational conditions, consisting of economic prosperity, general stability, ethnic harmony, agreement on the rules of the game, effective institutions, and popular contentment, and five institutional conditions, consisting of free elections and officials held accountable by citizens, an effective and independent judiciary, a depoliticized bureaucracy, constitutional guarantees for basic rights, and a free press.

Regardless of differences in the ways of measuring how democratic a regime is, what is important is to identify the threshold marking the distinction between a weak, non-consolidated democracy and a strong, consolidated one. Some link democratization to a specific level of per

consolidated if it passes a ―two-turnover test‖, i.e., if there have been at least two peaceful rotations of power between the party/parties in power and the party/parties in opposition. 165 Dahl, Robert. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971; Bollen, K. A. ―Issues in the comparative measurement of political democracy,‖ American Sociological Review, No. 45, 1980, pp. 370-390; Bollen, K. A., Jackman, R. W. ―Economic and non-economic determinants of political democracy in the 1960s,‖ Research in Political Sociology, No. 1, 1985, pp. 27- 48. 166 Marshall, Monty G., Jaggers, Keith. Polity IV Project, 2010, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm; 167 Ramet, Sabrina: ―Balkan pluralism and its enemies,‖ Orbis, Fall 1992, Vol. 36, Issue 4, pp. 547-565. 51 capita GDP,168 others link it to the legitimacy and performance of institutions,169 or to the internalization of new democratic norms and political culture,170 the development and quality of civil society, political stability, and the rule of law.171 In determining the threshold distinguishing between unconsolidated and consolidated democratic regimes, this study relies on measures and indicators used by Freedom House and Polity IV. Both establish two dividing lines in trying to match democracy as meaning and as practice: one is between non-democracy and democracy; the other is between weak and strong democracies.

Freedom House, in a rating scale of 1 (lowest) to 7 (highest), distinguishes five regime types:172 democratic (consolidated, semi-consolidated), hybrid (transitional), and authoritarian

(semi-consolidated, consolidated). It distinguishes them by using indicators and a scoring system that measure changes in eight areas: 1) political rights and civil liberties, 2) national governance,

3) the electoral process, 4) civil society, 5) media, 6) local governance, 7) the judicial framework and independence, and 8) corruption. Based on these areas, Freedom House identifies three thresholds.

168 Przeworski, Adam., Limongi, Neto., Papaterra, Fernando., Alvarez, Michael M., ―What makes democracies endure?‖ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1996, pp. 39-55; Przeworski, Adam., Alvarez, Michael., Cheibub, Jose., Limongi, Fernando. Democracy and Development: Political institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000; Przeworski, Adam. ―Democracy as an equilibrium,‖ Public Choice, Spring 2005, Vol. 123, pp. 253–273; Lipset, Seymour Martin. ―Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy,‖ American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, Issue 1, March 1959, pp. 69-105. 169 Diamond, Larry. Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1999; Huntington, Samuel P. Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 170 Rustow, Dankwart. ―Transition to democracy: Toward a dynamic model,‖ Comparative Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1970, pp. 337-363; Diamond, Larry. Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1999. 171 Linz, Juan., Stepan, Alfred. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. 172 Freedom House. ―Freedom in the world‖ and ―Nations in transition,‖ Survey and Methodology, http://www.freedomhouse.org. 52

The first is between strong/consolidated and weak/semi-consolidated democracies. A consolidated democracy is a regime scoring between 1.00-2.50 points. It is a democracy that is strong, liberal and free, with best policies and practices adhering to basic human rights standards, democratic norms, and the rule of law. A semi-consolidated democracy is a regime scoring between 3.00-4.00 points. It is an electoral democracy but a weak one, partly free, with many policies and practices adhering to basic human rights standards, democratic norms, and the rule of law, but with some weaknesses in defense of political rights and civil liberties.

The second threshold distinguishes hybrid regimes which combine features from semi- consolidated democratic and authoritarian regimes. Such a regime scores between 4.00-5.00 points. It is, typically, an electoral democracy, partially free, with many policies and some practices adhering to basic human rights standards, democratic norms and the rule of law, but while it meets certain minimum democratic standards its potential for sustainable, liberal democracy is unclear.

The third threshold distinguishes between semi-authoritarian and authoritarian regimes. A semi-consolidated authoritarian regime scores between 5.00-6.00 points. Such a regime is not free, and many policies and practices adhering to basic human rights standards, democratic norms, and the rule of law are absent. It attempts to mask authoritarianism with a limited respect for the institutions and practices of democracy, but it fails to meet even the minimum standards of electoral democracy. A consolidated authoritarian regime scores between 6.00-7.00 points.

Such a regime it is not free but closed, ruled in a dictatorial way, with most or all policies and practices adhering to basic human rights standards, democratic norms, and the rule of law absent.

It is characterized by the existence of few or no political rights and civil liberties. There is severe government oppression, sometimes in combination with civil war, and freedom of expression or

53 association is stifled. Violation of basic rights is widespread. National governance is neither democratic nor accountable to the public. An authoritative and functioning central government is lacking.

Polity Project, on a rating scale from -10 (lowest) to +10 (highest), distinguishes three types of regimes: institutionalized autocracies, institutionalized democracies, and anocratic polities.173 It distinguishes regimes by using indicators and a scoring system measuring changes in three aspects of power and authority: 1) participation modes expressed in competitive and regulated forms; 2) recruitment practices expressed in open, competitive, and regulated forms; and 3) exercise of power, expressed in the presence or absence of constraints, and in relations having the character of parity or subordination. Based on authority and power patterns, Polity IV identifies two thresholds.

The first is between autocratic and democratic polities. Autocratic regimes score between

-10 and 0 points. Democratic regimes score between 0 and +10 points. The second threshold distinguishes between weak/partial and strong/full institutionalized democratic polities.

Weak/partial institutionalized democracies score between 0 and +6 points. They are democracies that, in general, display authority patterns of unconsolidated institutions and procedures, and are not always internally coherent, open, competitive, and are limiting in terms of participation, recruitment, and the exercise of power. Participation is based on transitional and factional forms of competitiveness, and unregulated, sectarian, and restricted forms of regulation.

Recruitment is regulated by transitional and election practices, and competitive elections. The exercise of power and power relations are based on constraints that are either unlimited or are slight to moderate. Relations tend to be ones of subordination, with the executive displaying and having greater power than other government bodies, agencies, or groups.

173 Marshall, Monty G., Jaggers, Keith. Polity IV, 2010 http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 54

Strong, full institutionalized democracies score between +6 and +10 points. They are democracies that, in general, display authority patterns based on institutions and procedures that are internally coherent. Participation is unrestricted, open, and fully competitive, recruitment is elective, and the exercise of power and power relations are characterized by substantial constraints, parity and subordination.

In identifying whether an exogenously imposed democracy is a weak, unconsolidated or strong, consolidated democratic regime, this study relies on parameters, measurements, and scores used by Freedom House and the Polity Project. It assesses the foreign imposed regime as a consolidated democracy when an evaluation of rights and liberties, national governance, electoral process, civil society, media, local governance and judicial framework, as measured by

Freedom House, produces a score between 1 and 2 points, and when an evaluation of authority patterns, as measured by Polity IV, produces a score between 6 and 10 points.

What variations do Germany, Japan, Italy, and South Korea display in terms of the kinds of pace, direction, character, and democratic features accompanying their dynamics of change and democratization? Using data from the Polity Project, Table 2.1 sets out two elements: 1) the year of their occupation and the respective polity score and 2) the year of democratization and the respective polity score. As the data show, the cases differ in terms of their underlying dynamics.

Table 2.1 Dynamics of Polity Scores for Germany, Japan, Italy and South Korea

Year Polity Score Year Polity Score of occupation in occupation year of consolidation of democracy in consolidation year Germany 1945 -9 1949 +10 Japan 1945 +1 1952 +10 Italy 1945 +2 1948 +10 S. Korea 1945 +1 1988 +6

Germany‘s change is quick, positive, linear, and radical. It took only four years to shift from a non-democratic to a democratic regime, and the change was not only positive and linear

(from non-democratic to democratic and without bumps, advances and setbacks), but also radical

(the polity score increased by nineteen points, from a score of -9 to +10).

By 1949 Germany displays features of a full democracy. It has embraced and is practicing respect for individual rights and beliefs; it has embarked on a new model of governance based on a new democratic constitution, institutions and authority based on broad legitimacy, and a government that is efficient and effective in advancing its policies; it has transformed the electoral process along the lines of a new legal democratic framework, party system, and forms of participation; it has created the conditions for civil society and the media to grow, develop capacities, sustain themselves, and be active participants and factors in social and political life; it is practicing local governance based on decentralization of power, development of local governing, management capacities, transparency and accountability; it has reconstructed the judicial system so as to protect and provide equal treatment to its citizens and keep corruption under control; and it has changed the culture of authority and power from patterns of authoritarianism, political apathy, elite domination, and the exercise of unconstrained power to patterns of authority and exercise of power characterized by openness, competition, and institutional constraints.

In Japan the change is also quick, positive, and linear. In eight years, through a positive attitude toward democracy, without any bumps or setbacks, Japan (its polity score moved upward by +9 points) became a full democracy. It embarked on respecting individual rights and beliefs, practicing a new model of central and local governance based on a democratic constitution and democratic institutions and authority, with a government that is efficient and

56 effective in advancing its policies, shaping a democratic electoral process, party system, and participation. Its civil society, media, and judicial system resumed an active role in advancing the protection and equal treatment of its citizens. Patterns of authority and the exercise power became based on openness, competition, and institutional constraints.

In Italy the change is also quick, positive, and linear. The occupation of Italy by allied forces accelerated change that had started in 1943-1944 by domestic actors. Within three years,

Italy became a democracy. It is characterized by a full restoration of individual political rights and civil liberties; by a model of central and local governance based on a new constitution, republicanism, legitimate institutions and authorities; decentralized power; by an electoral process open to a democratic legal framework, a functioning party system, competition, and participation; and by a judicial system based on protection and equal treatment of the citizens.

There is an increase in the role and diversity of civil society and media whereas the patterns of authority and power are characterized by openness, competition, and constraints.

South Korea shows a different dynamic of democratization. The change has been slow, not linear but characterized by multiple advances and setbacks. In 1945 South Korea displayed features of a weak democracy (with a polity score of 1 point) but it became a full democracy only by 1987 (with a polity score of 6 points). The slow pace of change is expressed in the disproportion between the required type of change and the length of time taken for the change.

The type of change South Korea was expected to make represented a ―relatively major‖ change

(the polity score had to improve upward only by five points), a less difficult and easier task compared to the changes required in cases of Germany, Japan and Italy. Nonetheless, it took 43 years to happen because of the bumps it experienced. Until becoming a full democracy South

Korea experienced many changes, major and minor, positive and negative.

It went through two periods of radical negative changes, from 1960-1961 (polity score decreased by fifteen points) and 1971-1972 (polity score decreased by twelve points), two periods of major negative changes, between 1948-1949 (polity score decreased by four points), and 1980-1981 (polity score decreased by three points), and two periods of minor negative changes, from 1951-1952 and 1972-1973 (polity score decreased by one point). It also experienced two periods of radical positive changes, during 1958-1959 (polity score increased by

12 points) and 1962-1963 (polity score increased by 10 points), and two periods of major changes, during 1986-1987 (polity score increased by six points) and 1987-1988 (polity score increased by five points).

Democratization in South Korea is characterized by alternation between regimes with strong and weak autocratic or democratic features. Strong autocratic regimes appear in three periods: 1961-1962 (polity score of -7 points), 1972 (polity score of -9 points), and 1973-1980

(polity score of -8 points). They are characterized by a failure to respect individual freedoms, rights, and liberties, national governance based on force rather than legitimacy, absence of a democratic electoral process, civil society and media, a judicial system at the service of the ruling elite, a high level of corruption, and patterns of authority and power characterized by practices of restriction, suppression, repression, and unconstrained exercise of power.

Weak autocratic regimes appear in South Korea in three periods: 1949-1951 (polity score of -3 points), 1952-1958 (polity score of -4 points), and 1981-1986 (polity score of -5 points).

They are characterized by the respect of few rights and freedoms, mostly in the area of economic activity, an electoral process restricted to a small number of elite circles, national and local governance reflecting and advancing the interests only of those few elite circles, civil society and

58 media suppressed and under strict control, a discriminatory judicial system, a high level of corruption, and the unconstrained exercise of power and authority.

Weak democratic regimes appear in South Korea in three periods: 1945-1948 (polity score of 1), 1963-1971 (polity score of 3), and 1987 (polity score of 1). They display a few democratic features which are either limited in some areas or underdeveloped.

Strong democratic regimes appear only in two periods: 1959-1960 (polity score of eight points), and the 1987-1989 period and onward (polity score moves from six to ten points). The latter shows no difference from regimes in Germany, Japan, and Italy in terms of respect for political rights and civil liberties, national and local governance, the electoral process, civil society and media, the judicial framework, the corruption situation, and patterns of authority and the exercise of power. What can explain this variation? An answer can be found in the analysis of three independent variables this work introduces and proposes to be taken into the consideration.

2.5 Independent Variable: Foreign Military Intervention.

In general, intervention is defined as the use of military force by one state to defeat, occupy, or remove the leader of another sovereign state.174 Intervention for democratization has three elements in common with intervention as a general practice: 1) the use of force, 2) the targeting of another sovereign state, and 3) the imposition of changes. It is, however, distinct from other types in four elements: 1) the intervening power is a democratic state or coalition of states, 2) the goal includes not only leadership change but also the installation of democracy, 3) the targeted state retains independence after regime change, and 4) the intervening state assumes

174 Downes, Alexander B., Monten, Jonathan. ―FIRCed to be free: Foreign imposed regime change and democratization,‖ Paper submitted to APSA 2010, pp. 20-23. 59 responsibility for assisting the democratic development of the government and institutions of the occupied country. As an independent variable, this study measures the influence of foreign intervention in three ways.

2.5.1 Intervention Goals

One way is the goals set out by intervening power. In general, the goals of intervention aiming at democratization consist of establishing a new order and fostering the new democratic government and political system.175 Specifically, this study looks at the goals and measures them in terms of whether or not they include designing and remodeling the government and bureaucracy, reconstructing the political system and institutions, creating conditions for a new electoral system and political culture, and providing both economic-financial assistance and security.176

In Germany, the intervention goals, as defined by the JCS 1067 document, clearly showed their orientation toward restructuring Germany along the lines of genuine liberal democracy.177 In Japan, the intervention goals, as defined by the Potsdam Declaration stressed demilitarization and democratization.178 In Italy, while the Allied Forces did not intend to govern the country, the intervention goals consisted not only of liberating it but also democratizing it. In

175 Smith, Tony. "In defense of intervention," Foreign Affairs Vol. 73, No. 6, 1994; Ottaway, Marina., Lieven, Anatol. ―Rebuilding Afghanistan,‖ Current History, March 2002, p. 135. 176 Ottaway, Marina., Lieven, Anatol. ―Rebuilding Afghanistan,‖ Current History, March 2002, p. 135; Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce., Downs, George W. ―Intervention and democracy,‖ International Organization, 2006, Vol. 60, No. 3, pp. 627-649. 177 Glees, Anthony. Reinventing Germany: German Political Development Since 1945, Berg, Oxford, Washington D.C. 1996, pp. 57-61. 178 Wayne C., Piotrowski, Harry. The World Since 1945: A History of International Relations, Lynne Rienner Publisher, Boulder, Colorado, 1990, p. 48; Gordon, Andrew. A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 229; The document is ―Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender,‖ and could be found available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html. 60

South Korea, the orientation of the intervention goals toward containment of communism rather than toward democratization reflected the 1950 North-South conflict, the NSC-68 document, and

Acheson‘s statement of January 1950.179

2.5.2 Occupation Policies

The second way is the policies pursued by the intervening power. In general, policies of intervention aiming at democratization cover political, economic, social, military, and security conditions, and avoid producing a hybrid regime.180 Specifically, this study looks at intervention policies and measures them in terms of the areas covered and the philosophy behind administration of the policies. In other words, the study is interested in whether policies are limited to a few areas or extend to include 1) politically, the promotion of a democratic constitution, political system, institutions, actors and processes, government, administration, governance, and judicial system, establishment of the rule of law and fighting corruption and crime;181 2) economically, stabilization of the economy and economic life, provision of economic and financial assistance, promotion of economic growth and opportunities, and improvement of infrastructure;182 and 3) in security, dealing with disarmament, demobilization,

179 Wayne C., Piotrowski, Harry. The World Since 1945: A History Of International Relations, Lynne Rienner Publisher, Boulder, Colorado, 1990, pp. 59-62; Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981. 180 Carother, Thomas. ―The end of the transitional paradigm,‖ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2002, pp. 14-20; Levitsky, Steven. Way, Lucan A. ―Elections without democracy: The rise of competitive authoritarianism,‖ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 2, April 2002, p. 52. 181 Schmidt, John R. ―Can outsiders bring democracy to post-conflict states?‖ Orbis, Winter 2008, pp. 107-122; Stradiotto, Gary A. ―Democratizing Iraq: Regime transition and economic development in comparative perspective,‖ International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 21, No. 2, June 2004, pp. 3-36; Krepinevich, Andrew F. "How to win in Iraq," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, Sept-Oct 2005. 182 Stradiotto, Gary A. ―Democratizing Iraq: Regime transition and economic development in comparative perspective,‖ International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 21, No. 2, June 2004 pp. 3-36; Krepinevich, Andrew F. "How to win in Iraq," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, Sept-Oct 2005. 61 reintegration, training and mentoring military forces as well as dealing with outside threats.183

Also of concern is, whether the policies have a high or low implementation cost, whether the occupation authorities are in charge or they have invited endogenous actors to participate in administration and implementation of policies, and whether the duration of policies is short or long-term, continuous or sporadic, part of a larger framework or merely ad-hoc adjustments.184

In Germany, the policies included the political, economic, financial, military, and security areas, known as the so-called five ―D‖s: demilitarization, de-Nazification, disarmament, democratization and decentralization.185 In Japan, demilitarization and democratization were accompanied by policies tackling economic, political, social, financial, military, and security issues.186 In Italy, the occupation policies primarily covered the security, military, and economic areas but they extended, to a lesser extent, to the political arena as well. In South Korea, the occupation policies focused almost exclusively on security. They did extend to include the economic area but did not touch the political or social areas.

2.5.3 Intervener’s Commitment

The third way is the commitment displayed by the intervening power. In general, commitment has to do with the readiness on the part of the intervening power to maintain the political, economic, financial, and military burden required for democratization imposed by force

183 Smith, Tony. "In defense of intervention," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 6, 1994; Krepinevich, Andrew F. "How to win in Iraq," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, Sept-Oct 2005. 184 Watts, Stephen. ―Democracy by force: Norms, resource constraints, and coalition-building,‖ Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, HI 1-5 March 2005. 185 Glees, Anthony. Reinventing Germany: German political Development since 1945, Berg, Oxford, Washington D.C. 1996, p. 29. 186 Gordon, Andrew A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003. 62 whether over short or long period of time.187 Specifically, this study looks at the intervener‘s commitment and measures it in terms of the number of military troops, the duration of the military occupation, and the resources made available. In other words, the study examines whether the number of military troops dealing with issues pertaining to politics, the economy, and military and security affairs is small or large; whether the duration of the military presence and policies dealing with long-term stability, governance capabilities, economic recovery and reconstruction, is short or long; and whether or not the resources committed to implementing policies and dealing with various issues of democratization and reconstruction are sufficient.188

Whether the number of military troops is small or large depends on and is seen to be proportional to the size of the occupied country, the goals to be achieved, and the policies to be implemented in relation to domestic and external security.189 Troops are considered sufficient if the numbers are at or below the ratio of 1 soldier for every 500 people, and insufficient if they are above it.190 Duration is considered short if it is less than three years and long if it lasts beyond three years.191 Resources committed are considered sufficient if they cover all intervention goals and policies, including not only moneys spent for dealing with security issues such as

187 Bellin, Eva. ―The Iraqi intervention and democracy in comparative historical perspective,‖ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 4, 2004-05, p. 602; Dobbins, James. et al, “America’s Role in Nation- Building: From Germany to Iraq,” Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2003; Schmidt, John R. ―Can outsiders bring democracy to post-conflict states?‖ Orbis, Winter 2008, pp. 117-120. 188 Diamond, Larry. ―What went wrong in Iraq,‖ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 5, Sept-Oct 2004, pp. 36- 40; Stradiotto, Gary. ―Democratizing Iraq: Regime transition and economic development in comparative perspective,‖ International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 21, No. 2, June 2004, p. 3; Bellin, Eva. ―The Iraqi intervention and democracy in comparative historical perspective,‖ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 4, 2004-05, p. 607; 189 Krepinevich, Andrew F. "How to Win in Iraq," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, Sept-Oct 2005, p. 98; Carothers, Thomas. “Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion,” Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004; Byman, Daniel. ―Constructing a democratic Iraq: Challenges and opportunities,‖ International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer 2003, p. 72-74. 190 Byman, Daniel. ―Democracy and military intervention: Challenges and opportunities,‖ International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer 2003 p. 74. 191 Meernik, James: ―United States military intervention and the promotion of democracy,‖ Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33, No. 4, November 1996, pp. 391-402. 63 insurgency, breakdown of law and order, conflict control and management, as well as deterrence of meddling neighbors, and political issues such as designing the constitution and government institutions, financing candidates, parties, media, electoral campaigns and elections, but also providing funding for economic and development issues such as physical infrastructure and institutional and market reforms, as well as social issues such as changing elite structure, mentality, and behavior, developing civil society and media, and social reforms pertaining to women, children, education and work.192

In Germany, the intervening power committed a large number of troops, stayed for a long period of time, and invested abundant human, economic, and financial resources.193 In Japan, the

US number of military troops was slightly smaller than in Europe, but they stayed for a long period of time and invested sufficient human and economic resources.194 In Italy, Allied Forces committed considerable resources, stayed three years and helped Italy‘s reconstruction. In South

Korea, the commitment of the US was mostly identified with its enormous military size, the long duration of stay, and resources used only for security and economic purposes.195

In this study, the intervening power, as an independent variable, influences whether or not the new regime becomes democratic, whether the democratization is quick or slow and

192 Schmidt, John R. ―Can outsiders bring democracy to post-conflict states?‖ Orbis, Winter 2008, p. 117- 122; Byman, Daniel. ―Constructing a democratic Iraq: Challenges and opportunities,‖ International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer 2003, pp. 49, 50-54, 72-76; Carothers, Thomas. “Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion,” Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004, pp. 3-8; Krepinevich, Andrew F. "How to win in Iraq," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, Sept-Oct 2005, pp. 92-94. 193 Downes, Alexander B., Monten, Jonathan. ―FIRCed to be free: Foreign imposed regime change and democratization,‖ Paper submitted to APSA 2010, pp. 5-6. 194 Dobbins, James. et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2003, pp. 150-158; Downes, Alexander B., Monten, Jonathan. ―FIRCed to be free: Foreign imposed regime change and democratization,‖ Paper submitted to APSA 2010, pp. 5-6; McWilliams, Wayne C., Piotrowski, Harry. The World Since 1945: A History of International Relations, Lynne Rienner Publisher, Boulder, Colorado, 1990, pp. 48-50. 195 Ward, Robert E. ―Japan: The continuity of modernization,‖ in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 52-53; 64 whether the new democracy displays strong, moderate, or weak features. In the context of democratization by occupation, some scholars look at the effects of intervention upon a country‘s democratization in close connection with the political stability or economics of the occupied country or changes in its social structures and relations.196 This study, however, looks at the effects of military intervention on democratization in conjunction with two other variables, the political culture of the occupied country and security.

2.6 Independent Variable: Political Culture

Political culture in general is considered to consist of four elements:197 1) values and beliefs held by individual, groups and society about liberty, equality, civic duty, participation, individual responsibility, trust, and tolerance, 2) civil society, expressed in networks building trust and cooperation among people and groups, 3) institutional development, reflected by the ability of institutions to encompass diversity and function on a basis of rationality, and 4) political participation reflecting the participation of citizens through such channels as parties, interest groups, electoral processes, realignment, voting, lobbying, and protesting.

As an independent variable, the political culture of a country can display democratic or non-democratic features. When its character is democratic, it is characterized by democratic

196 Byman, Daniel. ―Constructing a democratic Iraq: Challenges and opportunities,‖ International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer 2003, pp. 74-76; Krepinevich, Andrew F. "How to win in Iraq," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84. No. 5, Sept-Oct 2005, pp. 92-94; Stradiotto, Gary. ―Democratizing Iraq: Regime transition and economic development in comparative perspective,‖ International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 21, No. 2, June 2004; Smith, Tony. "In defense of intervention," Foreign Affairs Vol. 73, No. 6, 1994; Diamond, Larry. ―What went wrong in Iraq,‖ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 5, Sept-Oct 2004, pp. 36-37. 197 Almond, Gabriel., Verba, Sidney. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Countries, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963, Chapter 1; Reisinger, William M. ―Renaissance of a rubric: Political culture as concept and theory,‖ International Journal of Public Opinion Research, Vol. 7, No. 4, Aug 1995, pp. 328-353; Pye, Lucian W. ―Introduction: Political culture and political development,‖ in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba eds. Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965. 65 values and beliefs on liberty and equality, civic duty and individual participation and responsibility. It also reflects patterns of behavior and attitudes that are based on trust, tolerance and cooperation. In addition, it is associated with social relations that are characterized by acceptance of diversity, inclusiveness, representativeness and rationality, and political participation carried on through many political parties and interest groups and characterized by a healthy and fair electoral process and voting, freedom to lobby, protest and realign.

When the character of political culture is non-democratic, it is associated with values and beliefs that accept oppression and coercion. It also reflects patterns of behavior and attitudes characterized by acceptance of herd mentality, parochial and passive attitudes distrust and hatred.

In addition, it is associated with social relations that are characterized by non-representative, exclusionary, selective and elitist practices that advance the interests of the few; political participation lacks social networks, parties and interest groups and is characterized by a dysfunctional electoral process, voting that is only a façade, political clientelism, loyalty only to a leader or a group and individuals and groups deprived of the right to protest, realign or lobby for their interests.

As an independent variable, political culture can be measured both qualitatively, that is, whether it is democratic or non-democratic, and quantitatively, that is, whether it shows a low, medium, or high degree of internalization in either the democratic or non-democratic form. This study focuses at six ways to look at whether the political culture is non-democratic or democratic in its character, and whether the political culture displays a low, medium, or high degree of internalization.

2.6.1 Values and Beliefs

One way is the character of values and beliefs. In general, values and beliefs refer to what individuals and people hold as acceptable or unacceptable, right or wrong, true or false.198

Specifically, this study looks at what views people hold about government, liberty, equality, civic duty, participation and individual responsibility.

By the 1950s, in Germany, one could observe a rapid shift from non-democratic to democratic values and beliefs.199 In Japan, elites and the population, individuals and society, had moved to embrace and internalize democratic values and belief in liberty, equality, free speech, freedom of religion, human rights, and especially, the rights of women, young people, and children.200 In Italy, society did not find it difficult to return to democratic values and beliefs, even through the shadows of the pre-fascist and fascist heritage continued to be present, and significant challenges and problems were ahead.201 In South Korea, the shift from non- democratic to democratic values and beliefs did not mark a significant change. This shift occurred only in the 1980s and through an increasing clash between old Confucian and Shaman values and beliefs and new western, democratic values.202

198 Rokeach, Milton. ―Change and stability in American value systems, 1969-1971,‖ Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 38, Issue 2, July 1974, pp. 222-238; Inglehart, Ronald. Human Beliefs and Values: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook: Political Religious, Sexual, and Economic, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998. 199 Kendall L. Baker, Russell J. Dalton, Kai Hildebrandt, Germany Transformed: Political Culture and New Politics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England 1981, pp. 6-7; Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Countries, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963. 200 Koikari, Mire. ―Exporting democracy? American women, ‗feminist reforms‘, and politics of imperialism in the U.S. occupation of Japan 1945-1952,‖ in Frontiers, 2002, Vol. 23, No 1. 201 LaPalombara, Joseph. ―Italy: Fragmentation, isolation, alienation,‖ in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 297-322. 202 Hong, Yo-sup. Korea’s self-identity, Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1973; Helgesen, Geir. Democracy and Authority in Korea: the Cultural Dimension in Korean Politics, Surrey, United Kingdom: Curzon Press, 1998, pp. 151-160, 179-185; Kim, Sungmoon. ―Civil society and political action in democratized Korea: Revamping democratic consolidation form a participatory perspective,‖ New Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 4, December 2006, p. 529; Cotton, James. ―From authoritarianism to democracy in South Korea,‖ Political Studies, 1989, Vol. 38, p. 246. 67

2.6.2 Behavior and Attitudes

The second way is behavior and attitudes. In general, behavior and attitudes refer to the way individuals view their relationships with one another, diversity, the resolution of problems, and the character of processes and outcomes.203 Specifically, they are measured by tolerance or intolerance toward other opinions and diversity, whether there is a predisposition to be cooperative or violent, obedient or disobedient, trusting or distrusting, whether or not there is acceptance of and respect for the rules, process, outcome, legitimacy, and institutions, and whether participation is parochial, subject, or participant, individualist or group oriented, and involving masses or limited to elites.

By the 1950s, in Germany, the behavior and attitudes among the elites and the population had shifted from intolerance, aggressiveness, predisposition for conflict, violence, hatred, racism, dogmatism, and unconditional obedience toward tolerance, a sense of responsibility, constructive criticism, trust, and civic and peaceful attitudes.204 In Japan, behavior and attitudes among the elites and the population had shifted from nationalism, unconditional sacrifice and loyalty, aggressiveness, and a militarized mindset toward pacifism and peaceful pursuits, to a mindset of

203 Lijphart, Arendt. ―Consociational Democracy,‖ World Politics, Vol. 21, No. 2, January 1969, pp. 207- 225; Dalton, Russell J. ―Citizen attitudes and political behavior,‖ Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 33, No. 6/7, Aug-Sept 2000, pp. 912-940; Pye, Lucian W., Verba, Sidney. (eds.) Political culture and political development, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965; Elazar, Daniel J. American Federalism: A View from the States, New York, Harper and Row, 1966; Welzel, Christian., Inglehart, Ronald. ―Emancipative values and democracy: Response to Hadenius and Teorell,‖ Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 41, No. 3, Fall 2006, pp. 74-94. 204 Glees Anthony, Reinventing Germany: German political Development since 1945, Berg, Oxford, Washington D.C. 1996, 1-14; Baker, Kendall L., Dalton, Russell J., Hildebrandt, Kai. Germany Transformed: Political Culture and New Politics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England 1981 p. 21; Berg-Schlosser, Dirk., De Meur, Gisele. Conditions of democracy in interwar Europe: A Boolean Test of major hypothesis, Comparative Politics, April 1994, pp. 253-279; De Meur, Gisele., Berg-Schlosser, Dirk. ―Conditions of authoritarianism, Fascism, and democracy in interwar period,‖ Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 29, No 4, August 1996, pp. 423-468; Lehnert, D., Megerle, K. (eds.) Fragmented political culture between integration and polarization, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990; Olick Jeffrey K., Levy, Daniel. ―Collective memory and cultural constraint: Holocaust myth and rationality in German politics,‖ American Sociological Review, December 1997, Vol. 62, pp. 925-928. 68 cooperation, and accountability.205 In Italy, individuals and the society continued to be discontented with the government, institutions, and leadership, distrustful and lacking confidence, even though the system had created opportunities of participation for everyone.206 In

South Korea, the shift from non-democratic to democratic behavior and attitudes took place only in the 1990s and it followed a long struggle between the ruling elite and the older and younger generations.207

2.6.3 Political Participation

The third way is political participation. In general this refers to channels such as political parties and interest groups, processes such as elections, voter alignment and realignment, and forms such as voting, lobbing or protesting.208 Specifically, this study looks at whether or not

205 Ward, Robert E. ―Japan: The Continuity of Modernization,‖ in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 33-52; Gordon, Andrew. A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 181-198. 206 Tarchi, Marco. ―Italy: Early crisis and Fascist takeover,‖ in Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Jeremy Mitchell (eds) Conditions of Democracy in Europe, 1919-1939: Systematic Case Studies, Macmillan Press LTD, London, 2000, pp. 300-301; 319-320; Morlino, L. Come Cambiano i Regimi Politici, Milan: Angeli, 1980 pp. 302-311; Gentile, E. Storia del Partito Fascista 1919-1922: Movimento e Milizia. Bari, Laterza, 1989; Lapalombara, Joseph. ―Italy: Fragmentation, isolation, alienation,‖ in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 296; Gentile, E. Storia del Partito Fascista 1919-1922: Movimento e Milizia. Bari, Laterza, 1989; Pierpaolo Luzzato-Fegiz, Il Volto Sconosciuto dell’Italia: Dieci Anni di Sondaggi, DOXA, Milan, 1956, p. 419; Spreafico, Alberto., LaPalombara, Joseph. (eds.) Elezioni e Comportamento Politico in Italia, Milan 1963. 207 Hong, Yo-sup. Korea’s Self-identity, Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1973, pp. 32-36; Kim, Kwang- ok. ―A study on the political manipulation of elite culture: Confucian culture in local level politics,‖ Korean Journal, Vol. 28, No 11, Seoul, 1988, p. 10; Helgesen, Geir. Democracy and Authority in Korea: the Cultural Dimension in Korean Politics, Surrey, United Kingdom: Curzon Press, 1998, p 107, 136; Kim, Kwang-ok. ―A study on the political manipulation of elite culture: Confucian culture in local level politics,‖ Korean Journal, Vol. 28, No 11, Seoul, 1988, p. 10. 208 Lijphart, Arendt. Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977; Duverger, Maurice. Political Parties, Methuen, London, 1954; Eldersveld, Samuel. Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964; Barber, Benjamin. Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984; Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and Theory of Groups, Harvard University Press, 1965; Walker, Jack. ―Three modes of political mobilization,‖ pp. 170-181, in Alexander, Robert M. 69 participation is realized through parties, interest groups, and fair electoral processes; whether participation is marked by alignments and realignments, and whether participation is peaceful or violent.

By the 1950s, in Germany, changes in political participation have been marked by the reestablishment of a multiparty system and an increase of the support for democratic institutions.209 In Japan, changes in political participation took the form of massive and active participation in politics, the decline of support for non-democratic leaders, internalization of democratic civic norms and behaviors, and the increased support for democratic regime, institutions, and practices.210 In Italy, changes in political participation were characterized not only by a rapid increase in the number of political parties, but also by associations taking

The Classics of Interest Group Behavior, Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006. Rothenberg, Lawrence. Linking Citizens to Government, Cambridge University Press, 1992; Powell, Bingham G. Elections as Instruments of Democracy, New Heaven, Yale University Press, 2000; Rokkan, Stein. Citizens, Elections, Parties, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1970; Katz, Richard S. Democracy and Elections, New York, Oxford University Press, 1997; Lipset, Seymour Martin., Rokkan, Stein. ―Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments,‖ pp. 1-33, 50-56 in Lipset and Rokkan (eds.) Party Systems and Voter Alignments, New York, Free Press, 1967; Niemi, Richard., Weisberg, Herbert. (eds.) Classics in Voting Behavior, Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993; Carmines, Edward., Stimson, James. ―The two faces of issue voting,‖ American Political Science Review, Vol. 74, No. 1, April 1980, pp. 78- 91; Wright, John. ―PAC contributions, lobbying, and representation,‖ Journal of Politics, Vol. 51, No. 3, Aug 1989, pp. 713-729; Austen-Smith, David., Wright, John. ―Counteractive lobbying,‖ American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 1, Feb 1994, pp. 25-44; Tarrow, Sydney G. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, Cambridge. U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998; Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970. 209 Glees, Anthony. Reinventing Germany: German Political Development since 1945, Berg, Oxford, Washington D.C. 1996, 1-14; Sani, Giacomo., Sartori, Giovanni. ―Polarization, fragmentation and competition in Western democracies,‖ Acta Politica, Vol. 12, 1985, pp. 346-377; Baker, Kendall L., Dalton, Russell J., Hildebrandt, Kai. Germany Transformed: Political Culture and New Politics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England 1981, pp. 6-7, p. 44. 210 Dore, Ronald P. ―The Legacy of Tokugawa Education, Conference,‖ Paper submitted to Conference on Modern Japan, January 1962, pp. 40-54; Moore, Barrington Jr. Social Origin of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, Beacon Press, Boston, 1966, pp. 300- 301; Gordon, Andrew. A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 203. 70 political sides, riots, demonstrations, political assassinations, and extreme polarization.211 In the

1950s in South Korea the main characteristics of political participation were the pursuit of policies of ruthless suppression and political elimination. Political participation became massive only during the 1980s.212

2.6.4 Civil Society

The fourth way is civil society. In general, this refers to the existence and degree of development of social networks and civic organizations which build social trust and norms, facilitate coordination and cooperation, make the society more vibrant, and provide solution to conflicts.213 Specifically, this study looks at whether the political culture reflects a society where social networks and civic organizations are absent, small in number or flourishing; and whether they are independent of or dependent on state policies and practices..

By the 1950s in Germany democratization went hand-in-hand with the reemergence of social capital and civil society with a large number of public and civic organizations, all independent of the state and trying to work out and move German society beyond its

211 Morlino, L. Come Cambiano i Regimi Politici, Milan: Angeli, 1980 pp. 302-311; LaPalombara, Joseph. ―Italy: Fragmentation, isolation, alienation,‖ in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 296; Luzzato-Fegiz, Pierpaolo. Il Volto Sconosciuto dell’Italia: Dieci Anni di Sondaggi, DOXA, Milan, 1956, p. 419. 212 Kim, Dong-Choon. ―The great upsurge of South Korea‘s social movements in the 1960s,‖ Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2006, p. 621. 213 Hyden, Goran. ―Civil society, social capital, and development: Dissection of a complex discourse,‖ Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 32, No. 1, April 1997, pp. 3-30; Edwards, Bob., Foley, Michael W., Diani, Mario (eds.) Beyond Tocqueville: Civil Society and Social Capital Debate in Comparative Perspective, Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2001; Putnam, Robert. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993; Schmitter, Philippe C., Karl, Terry Lyn., ―What democracy is….and is not,‖ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 2, Issue 3, 1991, pp. 75-88; Hefner, Robert W. Civil Islam: Muslims and democratization in Indonesia, Princeton University Press, 2000. 71 cleavages.214 In Japan, there was a rapid growth in the number of public and civic organizations.

In Italy, there was a move from a society of social, urban, and rural cleavages, political conflicts, polarization, and fragmentation, with few public, civic organizations and independent of state toward a re-vitalization of civil society and civic organizations.215 In the 1950s, in South Korea, civil society faced suppressive policies. It grew and became an important factor only by the

1990s, when civil society and organizations increased in number and acted independently and regardless of repressive policies of the state.

2.6.5 Institutional Culture and Patterns

The fifth way is institutional culture and patterns. In general, this refers to the tradition of developing institutions that are representative, diverse, rational, and open.216 Specifically, this study looks at whether or not political culture reflects the traditions of institutions that are diverse, representative, rational, and open to change and transformation.

In the 1950s, in Germany, institutional patterns moved toward the decentralization of power horizontally and vertically, representation of all social groups and strata, openness to change and adaptability, and managing problems, issues, decision-making, and crisis without resorting to authoritarian methods and attitudes. In Japan, institutions opened themselves up to radical change and transformation and moved to distributing power among numerous

214 Baker, Kendall L., Dalton, Russell J., Hildebrandt, Kai. Germany Transformed: Political Culture and New Politics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England 1981, pp. 6-7. 215 Tarchi, Marco. ―Italy: Early crisis and Fascist takeover,‖ in Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Jeremy Mitchell (eds) Conditions of Democracy in Europe, 1919-1939: Systematic Case Studies, Macmillan Press LTD, London, 2000, p. 294-299. 216 Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968; Migdal, Joel. Strong Societies and Weak States: State Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World, Princeton, Princeton University Press 1988; Schmitter, Philippe C., Karl, Terry Lyn., ―What democracy is…and is not,‖ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 2, Issue 3, 1991; North, Douglass. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press, 1990. 72 institutions, turning themselves into representatives of all Japanese groups and society.217 In

Italy, while institutions contained reminiscences of the pre-war tradition of ―partitocrazi,‖ they moved back to distributing power among many institutional centers and coalition governments became frequent.218 In 1950s, in South Korea, the institutional patterns moved away from colonial heritage but remained authoritarian. The institutional patterns changed only by the

1990s, when multiple power centers emerged, institutions became representative of all social groups, and decision and policy making processes became democratic.219

2.6.6 Attitude toward Social Change

The sixth way is the attitudes toward social change. In general, this refers to openness or resistance to change, as well as the direction of change.220 Specifically, this study looks at whether political culture reflects an individual and a society resistant or open to change and whether the individual and the society are inclined toward negative or positive changes.

In the 1950s, in Germany, both the elites and the population embraced change toward democratic values and practices willingly and eagerly. In Japan, change took a positive direction

217 Glees, Anthony. Reinventing Germany: German political Development since 1945, Berg, Oxford, Washington D.C. 1996, p. xxi. 218 Almond Gabriel A., Verba, Sidney. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Countries. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1963, Chapter 4. 219 Kim, Dong-Choon. ―The great upsurge of South Korea‘s social movements in the 1960s,‖ Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2006, p. 621-625; Kihl, Young Whan. Transformign Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform and Culture, Armonk, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 2005; Kim, Bun-woong. ―Korean political tradition and democratic elitism,‖ Korea Journal, Vol. 17, No. 10; Park, Sangsop. ―Obstacles to democracy: Some peculiar features of Korean political society,‖ Conference paper, Stockholm: Center for Pacific Asia Studies, Stockholm University; Helgesen, Geir. Democracy and Authority in Korea: the Cultural Dimension in Korean Politics, Surrey, United Kingdom: Curzon Press, 1998, p 5; Ekbladh, David. ―How to build a nation,‖ The Wilson Quarterly Winter 2004, p. 621; Ahn, Chung-si. ―Political culture and political socialization of the post-war generation in South Korea‖, Korea Journal, Vol. 28, No 5, Seoul, 1988, p. 9. 220 Diamond, Larry. Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1999; Cohen, Mitchell. ―Exporting democracy: What have we learned from Iraq?‖ 2007, Forum Dissent, Spring 2007, pp. 50-52. 73 toward internalizing democratic values and practices even though it took place through a clash between resistant and reluctant elites and an embracing and willing populace. In Italy, the changes reinforced the positive direction that half of the country took since 1943, leaving behind fascism and returning to democratic values and practices. In South Korea, the elites embraced the end of the colonial tradition but resisted giving up authoritarian patterns. The changes occurred only in the 1990s and went through the clash between resistant, authoritarian elites and a supportive, democratically-minded population, primarily the young generations and students.

2.7 Independent Variable: Security Environment

The security environment, in general, refers to the situation accompanying a state or government while it pursues and advances its goals and policies. As an independent variable it is characterized by four features: 1) it has two faces, one internal and the other external, 2) it involves and reflects the influence of domestic politics, the national interests, foreign policies, management of interstate relations and military capabilities, 3) it influences both domestic and international, and 4) it may exert a positive or negative influence.221

As an independent variable, the security environment, either internal or external, may exert a positive or negative influence on democratization depending on its stable or unstable character. It influences the perceptions, intentions and behavior of actors and forces, political stability, the character of the regime and consequently, democratization itself. It exerts a positive influence when it is characterized mostly by peace and the state and government are able to pursue their goals and policies without much trouble. It exerts a negative influence when it is characterized by tensions, threats, conflicts and wars and the government faces difficulties and

221 Nye, Joseph S. ―Redefining national interests,‖ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 4, July-August 1999, pp. 22-35; Gourevitch, Peter. ―The second image reversed: the international source of domestic politics,‖ International Organizations, Vol. 32, No. 4, Autumn 1978, pp. 881-912. 74 challenges in sticking or advancing with their goals and policies. In its role as an independent variable, the distinction between internal and external faces is more conventional rather than a clear cut one. Yet, domestic security influences more the political stability, whereas international security influences more the existence and the character of the regime.

2.7.1 Internal Security Environment

The influence of internal security on political stability can be measured in four ways: 1) the ethno-religious structure, 2) the legitimacy of authority, 3) the model of power structure and exercise, and 4) the state of rights and liberties.

2.7.1.1 Ethno-Religious Structure of the Occupied Country

One way of influence is through the ethnic and religious structure of the occupied country. Depending on the heterogeneous or homogeneous character, this factor influences whether the occupied country is characterized by stability or instability. Countries with heterogeneous structure tend to be less stable than those with homogenous structure. Whether a country is stable or not it is measured by the number and intensity of conflicts as measured by

Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946-2008 (MEPV) of Center for Systemic Peace.222 For the intervener, the task of democratization is potentially easier in a country with a homogeneous rather than a heterogeneous population because the potential for conflict is lower in the former than in the later.

222 Center for Systemic Peace, ―Major episodes of political violence 1946-2008 (MEPV),‖ in Armed Conflicts and Intervention (ACI) Datasets, 2008, in www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm. The data cover annually interstate, societal and communal warfare magnitude scores for independence, interstate, ethnic and civil violence and warfare. The scores reflect neighboring countries and regional context. 75

Germany, Japan, Italy and Korea are characterized by mostly homogenous populations.

From this point of view, the internal security environment that occupying forces had to deal with was conducive to democratization

2.7.1.2 Legitimacy of Authority in the Occupied Country

The second way of influence is through the legitimacy of authority. The legitimacy reflects the broad or narrow basis of support that government enjoys from all societal, ethnic and minority groups. Countries with contested legitimacy are less stable than those where the legitimacy is not contested. The legitimacy is measured by the constitutional opportunities created for various groups, the access to and representation that various groups have in political institutions, government and policy-making.

Under the auspices of the occupying powers, Germany, Japan and Italy wrote new constitutions that guaranteed the representation of all ethnic, religious and societal groups thus creating the conditions for the legitimacy of the new government and regime. In Korea the legitimacy of government and regime remained disputed because the access to government and policy-making was limited to few old elites whereas other societal groups were deprived of it.

2.7.1.3 The Model of Power Structure and Exercise

The third way of influence consists of the model of power structure and exercise.

Countries with power distributed and exercised among multiple centers of power tend to be more stable than those where power is concentrated into and exercised by few individuals or groups.

The model of power structure and exercise is measured looking at whether the occupied country,

76 whether federal or unitary model of governance, is characterized or not by division of power between various branches of government and a mechanism of checks and balance.

In Germany, Japan and Italy the power structure was reconfigured both vertically and horizontally by distributing and balancing the power horizontally among the executive, legislative and judiciary and vertically between the federal, state and local levels of government so to create a new balance of power between them and eliminate the concentration of power into the hands of the few elite circles. In Korea, the model of power structure and exercise remained undefined and concentrated mostly at the hands of the US military government or the old Korean elites.

2.7.1.4 Rights and Liberties

The fourth way of influence is through the approach of rights and liberties. Countries that respect rights and liberties tend to be more stable than countries that do not respect them. The state of rights and liberties is measured by the legal protection that is offered for guarantee of their exercise and the degree of participation of various groups in social, economic and political affairs of the country.

In Germany, Japan and Italy the new constitutions contained legal provisions that guaranteed the exercise of rights. In the case of Korea, occupation authorities and endogenous elites were concerned more with security than the guarantee of political, civil, economic or social rights.

2.7.2 External Security Environment. The influence of external security on the character of the regime is measured in four ways: 1) the conceptualization of national interests, 2) the character of foreign policy, 3) the

77 view on sources of security and stability and 4) the management of interstate relations and differences in regime type.

2.7.2.1 Conceptualization of National Interests

One way of influence is through the conceptualization of national interests of both the occupied country and the intervening power. National interests represent an open-ended, changing concept, yet the concept is at the basis of the foreign policy pursued by a state.223 The analysis here focuses on whether the conceptualization of national interests reflects a realist/pragmatist or liberal/idealist view.

In Germany, Japan and Italy postwar external security was characterized by a re- conceptualization of national interests. All these countries redefined their national interests in harmony with US national interests and in terms of democratic realism. In Korea, the national interests reflected the competition between the Soviet Union and United States and a strong ideological dimension.

2.7.2.2 The Character of Foreign Policy

The second way it influences democratization is through the character of the foreign policy. Depending on the international context and developments, a state‘s foreign policy may change its priorities;224 however, it is always driven by a set of fundamental assumptions. The analysis here focuses on whether the foreign policy is driven by power and security concerns only, a combination of security, geopolitical and economic interests or, in addition to security

223 Nye, Joseph S. ―Redefining national interests,‖ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 4, July-August 1999, p. 22; Trubowitz, Peter. Defining the National Interests: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1998. 224 Carter, Ashton B., Perry, William J. Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1999. 78 and economic interests, includes other concerns of an ideological nature, such as democracy, freedom and human rights, whether the foreign policy is democratic in character, i.e., is driven by a desire for peace, stability, economic prosperity, peaceful accommodation of interests and peacefully resolution of conflicts or whether it is non-democratic, i.e., driven by aggressive policies, disregard of the interests of others, and solving conflicts through war.

In Germany, Japan and Italy, postwar external security is characterized by a foreign policy greatly influenced by the US as the intervening power. All these countries conceptualized their foreign policy in terms of democratic realism and conducted it as a part of a broader liberal and democratic order led by the US.225 In Korea, foreign policy reflected competition between the Soviet Union and United States and was defined in terms of power balance: 1) give priority to security, 2) contain and keep out the Soviet influence and 3) preserve the regime regardless of its authoritarian character.226

2.7.2.3 The view of Sources of Security and Stability

The third way that external security influences democratization is through the view of sources of security and stability and interstate relations.227 This indicator stands on the basis of the way that states construct and conduct interstate relations. This work focuses on the way that the occupied country and intervening powers analyze the international security and politics, on the sources they identify as the ones that influence peace, stability and conflict, and whether they view any external threat to the existence of the new regime and the democratization itself.

225 Flanagan, Scott C., Richardson, Bradley M. ―Politics in Japan,‖ Chapter 12, p. 297, in Almond, Gabriel A., Bingham, Powell G. Jr., (eds.) Comparative politics today, a worldview. Harper Collins Publishers, 1992, pp. 297-348. 226 Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 1: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1981, p. 431, pp. 267–381. 227 Edelstein, David M. ―Occupational hazards: Why military occupations succeed or fail,‖ International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1, Summer 2004, pp. 61–62. 79

In Germany, Japan, Italy and Korea the postwar external security environment is characterized by a similarity between these countries and the US on the sources of security and stability. All of them viewed the rise of the Soviet Union as a threat to their security and existence and all of them viewed the US as the guarantor of their stability and existence.

2.7.2.4 Management of Neighborly Relations and Differences in Regime Type

The fourth way is the management of neighbor relations and differences in regime type.

Depending on the context of the power balance, level of threat, and the attitudes of the leadership, the differences in regime type could be managed by either peaceful or military means. The analysis here focuses on whether the differences in regime type between the occupied country and neighboring states are managed through peaceful or conflicting relations and whether disputes are resolved through negotiations or by the use of force.

In Germany, Japan and Italy the postwar external security environment is characterized by similarity between these countries and the US as the intervening power in terms of the management of relations with neighboring countries and differences in regime type. The main characteristic of this element is the peaceful approach of relations and differences with other states.228 In Korea, the postwar external security is characterized by differences in the way in which the US and Korean elites viewed and managed both the relations with neighbor states and differences in regime type. The US approach was driven by the desire to maintain the status-quo and manage relations and problems through peaceful ways. The Korean leadership approach of

228 Ward, Robert E. Japan’s Political System, Englewoods Cliffs. N.J. Prentice Hall, 1978; Flanagan, Scott C., Richardson, Bradley M. ―Politics in Japan,‖ Chapter 12, p. 298, in Almond, Gabriel A., Bingham, Powell G. Jr., (eds.) Comparative politics today, a worldview, Harper Collins Publishers, 1992, pp. 297-348. 80 neighborly relations and problems with regime differences between North and South was driven by the desire for conflict, use of force and war.

Measured this way, the security environment, as an independent variable influences through its internal and external dimensions whether or not the new regime and government of the occupied country democratizes quickly or slowly, and whether the development and internalization of democracy is weak, moderate or strong.

2.8 Interaction among Independent Variables

Democratization is influenced by military occupation, security environment and political culture, but other important influences to democratization are two joint interactions between independent variables: 1) between military occupation and the security environment and 2) between military occupation and the political culture. Besides their individual influence on democratization, the independent variables also affect the influencing power and impact each other in a mutual way: the military occupation influences security and political culture, the security environment influences military occupation, and the political culture influences military occupation.

2.8.1 Interaction between Military Occupation and Security Environment

The interaction between military occupation and security is mutual: 1) military occupation influences whether the influence of security environment on democratization is positive or negative and 2) the favorable or unfavorable character of security environment influences whether the intervening power advances or neglects the agenda of democratization.

The intervener does influence whether the security environment exerts a positive or negative influence on democratization in two ways: 1) it influences internal security by establishing and maintaining domestic stability and 2) it influences external security by countering the external security threat, and by shaping the character of national interests, foreign policy, view of sources of security and stability, and management of interstate relations of the occupied country. Whenever the intervener succeeds to maintain domestic stability and the occupation is characterized by harmony between the occupying power and the occupied country in terms of national interests, foreign policy, sources of security and stability and management of interstate relations and differences in regime type, security can exert a positive influence on democratization and the later is more likely to occur than when the two conditions are absent.

This work argues that an intervener can address security concerns to influence democratization in a positive way under two conditions: 1) internally, when the intervener restructures the entire political system and maintains political stability and 2) externally, when the intervener is able to manage the external threats without resorting to war and it also shows readiness to guarantee the preservation of new regime. In such a context, what an intervener does in terms of external security is more important than what it does in terms of internal security because the ability of an intervening power to use force enables it to internally restructure political institutions so as the new regime respects political rights and embraces democratic standards and practices but externally it may not necessarily determine the character of interstate relations. In other words, while internally the creation of favorable security conditions depends directly on what the intervener does, externally, the creation of favorable security conditions depends not only on what the intervener does but also on what other states do.

The security environment does influence whether the intervener advances or neglects the agenda of democratization in two ways: 1) internal security does so through the stable or unstable character of political stability which reflects the ethno-religious structure of the population and practices of legitimacy, power exercise and rights and liberties, and 2) external security does so through the threats, conflicts and war. Whenever the security environment is characterized internally by political stability and externally by absence of armed conflicts or wars, the occupation power is more likely to advance the agenda of democratization and democratization is more likely to occur than when the two conditions are absent.

This work argues that addressing security can help an intervener to influence democratization in a positive way under two conditions: 1) internally, when the population of the occupied country is to a large degree homogenous and the country enjoys political stability and

2) externally, when the new regime may have to deal with threats but these threats do not escalate into an armed conflict or war. In such a context, the external sources of instability are more important than internal sources because internally, given the ability of intervener to use force, change the regime, restructure the political system and impose a democratic framework, the internal sources of instability may be managed easier than those external. In other words, while internally the intervener may be able to manage resolve a crisis in a peaceful way, externally, even though intervener may want to resolve a crisis in a peaceful way, the crisis may escalate from a threat to an open armed conflict or war precisely because its resolution does not depends entirely on intervener‘s hand but involves other states as well.

During 1945-1950, the relationship between military occupation and security environment in Germany, Japan and Italy appeared conducive to democratization for five reasons: 1) the US, as the main intervening power restructured the entire political system and

83 regime of these countries so that it created the conditions for a democratic framework and domestic political stability, 2) the homogeneous character of their population and the democratic framework of their political systems created the conditions for the ensuing internal political stability, 3) the US also influenced the re-conceptualization of the national interests, foreign policy, view of sources of security and stability and management of interstate relations and differences in regime type in all three countries on the basis of democratic realism, peaceful practices and along the lines of a broader liberal and democratic order, 4) all these countries did not engage into open armed conflicts or war with their neighbors and the threats they faced never escalated into a war, in part because of 5) the US, which showed its readiness to fend off any military attack against these countries. In Korea the relationship between the military occupation and security environment influenced democratization in a negative way because it was driven and influenced by competition for power and influence between the Soviet Union and United

States. This shaped not only the character of US foreign policy in Korea, but also domestic political development. The priority that was given to security concerns and regime survival over the character of regime and the respect of political and economic rights contributed to the emergence of an authoritarian rather than a democratic regime.229

Thus, what the occupying power does or does not do with regard to security, whether the security environment is stable or unstable, greatly influences whether democratization occurs slowly or quickly and whether the new regime becomes democratic or not. Because the external security environment may be more influential on the intervener‘s influencing power than internal

229 Nye, Joseph S. ―Redefining national interests,‖ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 4, July-August 1999, p. 34; Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 1: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1981, p. 431, pp. 267–381; Matray, James I. ―Hodge Podge: American occupation policy in Korea, 1945–1948,‖ Korean Studies, Vol. 19, 1995, pp. 23-25; Oh, Bonnie B.C. ―Introduction,‖ p. 9, in Oh (eds.), Korea Under the American Military Government 1945–1948, Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002. 84 security, this work puts more emphasis and looks more in detail on the external dimension of security than on the internal one.

2.8.2 Interaction between Military Occupation and Political Culture

The interaction between military occupation and political culture is two ways: 1) military occupation affects whether the influence of the political culture of the occupied elites and population is positive or negative on democratization and 2) the character of political culture influences whether the intervening power succeeds or fails in advancing democratization.

In the context of interaction between military occupation and political culture one question that arises is when and how can political culture be shaped externally. The intervener does influence whether political culture exerts a positive or negative influence on democratization by what the occupying power does to root out old non-democratic values and beliefs, behavior and attitudes, institutional practices and forms of participation and to instill new democratic ones. Whenever the occupying power engages in changing political culture it is more likely that the influence of political culture will not undermine the influencing power of the intervener, will not generate a negative influence to democratization and the democratization itself may have better chances to succeed than when the occupying power does not engage in changing the political culture of the occupied elites and population.

This work argues that an intervener can make security to influence democratization in a positive way under these conditions: 1) when in terms of values and beliefs, the occupying power engages in changing the way that the elites and population view right and liberties, government and authority, individual responsibility, socio-political institutions and the freedom of others; 2) when in terms of behavior and attitudes, the occupying power engages in cultivating trust,

85 respect for rules, processes, outcomes and institutions and the criteria on which the elite and population evaluate government and leadership; 3) when in terms of institutional behavior and development, the occupying power engages in creating a democratic institutional framework and democratic governing, policy and decision-making practices and in restructuring power distribution and exercise; 4 ) when in terms of political participation, the occupying power creates conditions for the rise of healthy interests and channels of participation, and 5) when in terms of civil society, the occupying power encourages the creation, development and consolidation of healthy civic forums and organizations, media and public sphere. In other words, political culture may exert a positive influence on democratization not only when the elites and population of the occupied country choose to embrace the new, democratic political culture but also when the occupying power engages in orienting the political culture of the elites and population toward democratic standards.

In such a context, what an intervener does with regard to political culture is as important as the regime change itself because while the ability of intervening power to use force enables it to restructure political institutions and government, the latter can be functioning and democratic only if the elites and population embrace new democratic values and the behavior reflects the internalization of new democratic habits and patterns.

Political culture does influence whether the intervener succeeds or fails in advancing democratization depending on whether the elites and the population of the occupied country resist or embrace the new democratic values and behavior. Whenever political culture of the elites and population is characterized by the embrace of change and the shift toward the internalization of democratic values and beliefs, behavior and attitudes, institutional practices and political participation, the occupying power is more likely to succeed in democratization of

86 the occupied country than when both the elites and population, individually or jointly, resist the change and embrace of new democratic orientation.

This work argues that political culture increases, or does not undermine, the influence of the occupying power under two conditions: 1) when both the elites and the population from the very beginning embrace new democratic values and behavior and 2) when either the elites, or the population, from an initial reluctance move toward fully embrace of new democratic values and behavior.

In such a context, what the occupied elite and/or population choose to do, to resist or embrace new democratic orientation, is as important to democratization as the regime change because of the important role and influence that political culture exerts on behavior of individual, groups and leadership and on functioning of political institutions, system and government.

During 1945-1950, the relationship between military occupation and political culture in

Germany, Japan and Italy appeared conducive to democratization for six reasons: 1) the US did engage in cleansing any value and belief, behavior and attitudes, institutional practices and participation forms that were associated with previous non-democratic political culture and in instilling new values and believes on rights and liberties, government and authority and individual responsibility through creating a democratic constitutional framework that was based on democratic principles and guarantees, 2) the US did restructure the entire political system and institutional framework by democratizing the model of distribution and exercise of power, the governing style and policy and decision-making practices, 3) the US did engage developing within the institutional system behavior and attitudes based on trust, respect for rules, processes, outcomes and institutions, 4) the US did engage in creating conditions for the creation and development of new interest and channels of political participation, 5) the US did support the rise

87 and development of new democratic civic forums, organizations, media, and public sphere, and

6) both the elites and the population in these countries, in general, embraced the new democratic values and beliefs, behavior and attitudes, institutional practices and political participation. In cases of Germany and Japan, occupying authorities used some arguably democratic means to shape a more democratic political culture. They kept a strict control on communication, speech, protest, selective jailing of political prisoners and strategic release of war criminals, reeducation programs and curriculum rewriting and they also cleansed the public sphere from any element linked to the non-democratic past. In Korea, the relationship between military occupation and political culture exerted a negative influence on the influence of the occupying power and democratization itself for two reasons: 1) the US was concerned more with the security and preservation of the new postwar regime in Korea than with fashioning the political culture toward democratic values, practices and standards and 2) the postwar elites in Korea bitterly resisted and refused to embrace orientation of their political culture toward democratic values, practices and standards.

Thus, what the occupying power does or does not do with regard to changing the political culture, and the resisting or embracing attitude of the elites and population toward new democratic values and practices greatly influence whether democratization occurs slowly or quickly and whether the new regime becomes or not democratic. Even though the political culture may change slowly, it exerts a considerable influence on both the intervener‘s influencing power and democratization itself, this work views it to be an important factor that deserves to be looked at in detail.

2.9 Looking Ahead.

This chapter has discussed the concepts of military occupation, political culture and the security environment and their impact on democratic consolidation. It has also discussed the interaction between the independent variables and their influence on democratization. The next chapters review how thee factors influenced consolidation in Germany, Japan, Italy, and South

Korea.

Chapter 3

Germany

3.0 Introduction

Post-1945 Germany differed from pre-1945 Nazi Germany in many ways. Its polity score moved upward by 19 points: from -9 during the Nazi era 1933-1944 to 0 during the early years of the Allied Occupation 1945-1949 to +10 from 1949 onward. Its constitution and government democratized, the party system changed from a single to a multiparty system and the media changed toward multiple channels of information (see Appendix 1, Tables A1.1 on regime scores, A1.2 and A1.3 on party system and A1.4 on the character of media).230 This chapter examines the role of the Allied Powers, the security environment and political culture in the democratization of post-1945 Germany. It argues that these factors, separately and in combination, helped the democratization of postwar Germany.

The next section of this chapter looks at the Allied occupation of postwar Germany. This section notes that the Allies‘ goals, policies and commitment all helped democratization of

Germany. The following section discusses how political culture shaped democratization. It notes that the changes in political culture that took place in Germany helped democratization through two dynamics: 1) the transformation of values and beliefs, behavior and attitudes, institutional behavior and development, political participation and civil society from authoritarian to democratic and 2) the commitment of both the Allied Forces and the German elite and population to the democratization of political culture. It also notes that the shift from an authoritarian to a democratic political culture was initiated by the Allied Powers, but was

230 Appendix 1 discusses the difference between Nazi Germany and post-1945 Germany in terms of the constitutional framework, state and government, institutional culture and practices of power, political rights and participation, electoral system and party politics, media and civil society, governance and policy-making and economic system and development. 90 embraced and advanced further by German elites in particular, and by the population in general.

The shift toward a democratic political culture helped Germany become a democratic regime in

1949 and it also helped Germany not to backslide in authoritarian practices during the 1960s and

1970s when the strength of democracy was put to test by various events.

The final section notes that democratization of postwar Germany was also positively affected by four security-related issues — the congruence of US and German national interests, the pursuit of democratic realism in foreign policy, the way Germany viewed the international environment and the way it managed the relations between West and East Germany.

Democratization of Germany started in 1945 and by 1949 Germany had become democratic. As defined in Chapter 2, democratization by occupation is the process of moving from a non-democratic or weak democratic regime to a full and strong democratic regime, getting democratic during the occupation years, and staying democratic for at least the first few years after the end of the military occupation. In initiating it, the foreign power does not merely change the occupied country‘s leadership, but dismantles all old non-democratic government and political institutions, establishes a new democratic constitutional framework, state and government, law and order, designs new democratic political, economic and social institutions, holds democratic elections and democratizes endogenous political culture.

3.1 The Allied Occupation of Post-1945 Germany

The Allied occupation of Germany officially started on May 8, 1945 and ended on May

5, 1955 when the General Treaty entered in force and the Federal Republic of Germany was granted sovereignty.231 It lasted ten years. From 1955 and onward, the US continued its military

231 On 8 May 1948, the representatives of Wehrmacht, Allied Expeditionary Forces, French and Soviet High Command signed the German Instrument of Surrender. The instrument marked the official surrender 91 presence in West Germany through more than fifty military bases.232 The occupation is characterized by two important moments: 1) in 1949, Germany‘s polity score became +10, that is, it became a democratic regime and 2) on May 5, 1955 Germany regained its sovereignty abolished on June 5, 1945.

After World War II, the Allies‘ goals of the change of the political regime, demilitarization of Germany, democratic transformation of German society, transformation of the German economy and transformation of the governance; the Allied policies of establishing a democratic Constitution and creating a democratic model of government, political institutions and political culture as well as the policies of demobilization, disarmament, denazification, economic reconstructing and decentralization of governance; and a strong Allied commitment in terms of number troops, duration of occupation, and economic and financial resources invested, all helped democratization of Germany during 1945-1949.

There is a close relationship between goals, policies, and commitment (see Appendix 2,

Figure A2.1). The goal of regime change necessitated policies focusing on a democratic constitution, model of government, political institutions and political culture. The goals of demilitarization and transformation of German society, economy and governance necessitated the pursuit of policies of demobilization, disarmament, denazification, economic reconstructing

of Germany and the end of the World War II. See the Instrument of Surrender, Reims, May 7, 1945. During 1945-1949, West Germany was administered by the Allied Forces through ten Military Governors. After the establish of the FRG on May 1949, the Military Governors were replaced, on September 1, 1949, by eight High Commissioners whose powers rested between those of a military governor and an ambassador. The Commissioners continued to exert their powers until May 5, 1955 when the General Treaty entered in force and the RFG was granted back the sovereignty. 232 Military presence differs from the military occupation in that the foreign army gives the authority and the control of territory back to the domestic government but continues to maintain its military presence through the military bases spread throughout the country once held occupied. The US presence in West Germany continued through the military bases for Land, Air and Navy forces. The bases were intended to serve as forward posts in any war against the Soviet Union. The US has closed some of them but it continued to maintain most of them even as the Cold War ended. The US plans to maintain its bases until 2015 when many of them are scheduled to be closed. 92 and decentralization of governance. Yet the character, scope and the depth of policies needed were dependent on and reflected the level of commitment in terms of number of troops and duration of engagement, especially in terms of human, economic and financial resources made available by the US.

3.1.1 Occupation Goals.

An analysis of ten of the most important documents covering the period 1941-1948 identifies five major goals set forth by the Allied Forces toward Germany: demilitarization, transformation of the German society, change of the political regime, transformation of the

German economy and transformation of the model of governance.233

Table 3.1 lists the major documents issued by the Allied Forces. As one can see, the agenda of Allied Forces contains the change of Germany‘s political regime as a prominent goal.

The goal shows up in at least six major documents, explicitly or implicitly, since at least the

February 1945 Yalta Conference.234 This was three months before the Allies formally took

233 These documents are from: The Atlantic Charter (1941), Teheran Conference (1943), Morgenthau Memorandum (1944), Yalta Conference (1945), Directive JCS 1067 (1945), Potsdam Declaration (1945), James F. Byrnes Speech Restatement on Policy of Germany (1946), Directive JCS 1779 (1947), Occupation Statute of Germany (1949), and Petersberg Agreement (1949). Demilitarization aimed at dismantling all German military infrastructure and capabilities; denazification aimed at purging Nazi ideology as a mindset and practice; democratization aimed at restoring a democratic constitution, government and political institutions; decentralization aimed at establishing a federal model with powers divided between federal, Lander, and local governments; disarmament aimed at disarming and disbanding the Nazi army and military; economic restructuring aimed at reviving the German economy along the principles of the free market, free competition, and democratic economic institutions; and deindustrialization aimed at dismantling or diminishing the productive capacities of German industries, turning Germany into an agriculture-based economy oriented toward peaceful productive economic activities. 234 For the Yalta Agreement, Potsdam Declaration, James F. Byrnes September 6, 1946 Speech ―Restatement of Policy on Germany,‖ Directives JCS 1067, Directive JCS 1779 see Germany 1947-1949: The story in documents, US Department of State, Office of Public Affairs, 1950; For the Petersberg Agreement see Documents on Germany under occupation, 1945-1954, London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1955, pp. 439-442; ―Explicitly‖ means there is a detailed, specified articulation of elements constituting the democratization process; ―implicitly‖ means the reference to democratization is 93

Germany under administration after its surrender on May 8, 1945. The goals included the change of political regime not because it sounded good or because it represented a general task,235 rather, the change of the political regime was viewed by the Allied Powers as the only way to help

Germans rebuild their lives, to revive Germany‘s own constitutional traditions and to return

Germany to Western values and practices.236 Directive JCS 1779, the US administration of

Germany from 1947 and onward, explicitly expressed the need to create a democratic German state, government, political institutions and political culture, identifying and supporting the new pro-democratic leadership and elites.237

The goals of demilitarization of Germany, transformation of the German society and transformation of the model governance are three other goals that were heavily articulated. This emphasis can be explained by the West‘s imperative to completely eradicate militarism as a way of thinking among Germans.238 The West feared Prussian militarism, the Junkers‘ lust for war, the fighting capabilities of the German Wehrmacht, and the militaristic character of the Third

Reich power.239 The Allied Powers viewed militarism and Nazism as the major sources of

Germany‘s warmongering and the two most important obstacles to a peaceful Germany.240

made only in general terms. James L. Payne in ―Did the United States create democracy in Germany?‖ The Independent Review, Vol. 11, No. 2, Fall 2006, pp. 218-219 argues that the US war against Germany did not include a goal of democratization because Directive JCS 1067 made no mention of such goal. 235 Zink, Harold. The United States in Germany 1944-195, Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1957, p 326; Jarausch, Konrad H. After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 130. 236 NYT. ―Germans warned fate is their own,‖ and ―Statements by Eisenhower and Montgomery,‖ August 7, 1945. 237 Glees, Anthony. Reinventing Germany: German political Development since 1945, Berg, Oxford, Washington D.C. 1996, pp. 57-61; Peterson, Edward N. The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory, Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1977, pp. 138-173. 238 Gimbel, John. The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, Stanford, 1968; Peterson, Edward N. The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory, Detroit, 1978; Berger, Thomas U. Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan, Baltimore, 1998. 239 Middleton, Drew. ―Reich‘s Staff Seen as Uncurbed Peril,‖ NYT, May 10, 1945; Middleton, Drew. ―Germans Start to Disband Army,‖ NYT, May 12, 1945. 240 NYT. ―Big Four Issue Code to Bar German Rise,‖ September 26, 1945. 94

Table 3.1 List of Allied Goals toward Germany during 1941-1949 Period Goals Listed Number of Documents Expressing The Duration of the Emphasis on the as Emphasized Allied Powers Goals Goal Expressed in 10 documents 1941-1949 period (9 years) 1. Atlantic Charter, item 8 1. 1941 - Atlantic Charter 2. Teheran Conference, paragraph 3, 7; 2. 1943 - Teheran Conference, 3. Morgenthau Memorandum item 1; 3. 1944 - Morgenthau Memorandum Demilitarization 4. Yalta Conference Section II, ―Declaration of 4. 1945 - Yalta Conference of liberated Europe‖, items a, b, c, d, pp. 2-3; Germany 5. JCS 1067, Part I, item 7; 5. 1945 - JCS 1067 6. Potsdam Agreement, Section A, item 3(i); 6. 1945 - Potsdam Agreement 7. James F Byrnes, Restatement of Policy on Germany, 7. 1946 - James F Byrnes Speech 8. JCS 1779 III-4 p. 34 8. 1947 - JCS 1779 9. Occupation Statute of Germany 9. 1949 - Occupation Statute 10. Petersberg Agreement, Item III, p. 2 10. 1949 - Petersberg Agreement Expressed in 6 documents 1944-1947 period (4 years) 1. Morgenthau Memorandum item 5; 1. 1944 - Morgenthau Memorandum 2. Yalta Conference Section II, ―Declaration of 2. 1945 - Yalta Conference Transformation liberated Europe‖, items a, b, c, d, pp. 2-3; of 3. JCS 1067 Part I, item 6; 3. 1945 - JCS 1067, German Society 4. Potsdam Agreement Section A, item 4, Nazi law 4. 1945 - Potsdam Agreement abolishment; 5 justice to Nazi criminals; 6 cleansing of administration from Nazi officials; 7 clean education system from Nazi ideology; 5. James F Byrnes, Restatement of Policy on Germany; 5. 1946 - James F Byrnes Speech 6. 1947: JCS 1779 Section IV, item 9, p. 35; 6. 1947 - JCS 1779 Expressed in 6 documents 1945-1949 period (5 years) 1. Yalta Conference Section II, ―Declaration of 1. 1945 - Yalta Conference; liberated Europe‖, items a, b, c, d, pp. 2-3 2. Potsdam Agreement Section A, items 9(i) 9(iv) 2. 1945 - Potsdam Agreement; democratic governance; 9(ii) democratic party Change system; 9(iii) representative institutions; 10 of (freedoms and liberties); Political 3. James F Byrnes, Restatement of Policy on Germany 3. 1946 - James F Byrnes Speech; Regime 4. JCS 1779 Section II, item 3, the policy of the United 4. 1947 - JCS 1779 States toward Germany, p. 33; Section IV item 5; p.34; item 6-c p. 35; Section IV, item 8 political parties; 12-d Rule of Law; Section VI, item 22, political culture values; item 23, education; p. 40; 5. Occupation Statute of Germany; 5. 1949 - Occupation Statute; 6. Petersberg Agreement Item V, p. 2 freedom, liberty, 6. 1949 - Petersberg Agreement; tolerance, humanity; denazification, prevent any reviving of totalitarianism, authoritarianism; Expressed in 5 documents 1944-1947 Period (4 years) Transformation 1. Morgenthau Memorandum, item 6; 1. 1944 - Morgenthau Memorandum; of 2. JCS 1067 Part I, section 3c 2. 1945 - JCS 1067 Governance 3. Potsdam Agreement Section A, item 9; 3. 1945 - Potsdam Agreement 4. James F Byrnes, Restatement of Policy on Germany; 4. 1946 - James F Byrnes Speech 5. JCS 1779 Section IV, item 6c federalization, p. 35; 5. 1947 - JCS 1779 Expressed in 5 documents 1944-1949 Period (6 years) 1. Morgenthau Memorandum, item 3 1. 1944 - Morgenthau Memorandum 2. Potsdam Agreement Section B, items 11, 12, 13, on 2. 1945 - Potsdam Agreement demilitarization, civilization, decentralization, de- Transformation cartelization, competition; of 3. JCS 1067 Part I, item 4, Part 2, item 16, no economic 3. 1945 - JCS 1067 German rehabilitation, recovery, or strengthening; Economy 4. James F Byrnes, Restatement of Policy on Germany; 4. 1946 - James F Byrnes Speech 5. JCS 1779 Section V, item 15-c rebuild German 5. 1947 - JCS 1779 economy, p. 37; establish economic institution, free- market economy in Section V, item 21, p. 39; 6. Petersberg Agreement Item VI p. 2, on 6. 1949 - Petersberg Agreement decartelization, de-monopolization 95

Directive JCS 1779 makes explicit reference to cleansing the public sphere, education system, media, public forums and political activities from antidemocratic, authoritarian and nationalist ideas.241

The goal of transformation of the German economy was expressed, elaborated and modified in various documents. Initially, it was expressed in the Morgenthau Memorandum and

Directive JCS 1067 which served as a defining framework of the policies pursued by the Allied

Occupation until 1947.242 The goal underwent a modification. The initial documents defining the goals were in 1946 by US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes in a speech in Stuttgart and in 1947 were replaced by Directive JCS 1779. This document not only corrected some previous orientations but also served as a framework for the provision of the economic-financial assistance and security through the Marshall Plan and US-led Allied military Forces.

3.1.2 Occupation Policies.

The policies of the Allied Occupation during 1945-1949 all helped democratization of postwar Germany. They reflected the Allies‘ goals and when grouped along each goal, one can distinguish overall ten major policies.

First, reflecting the goal of regime change, the Allies‘ policies consisted of actions in four main areas: 1) the constitutional framework, 2) the model of government, 3) the political institutions, and 4) the political culture.243

241 Glees, Anthony. Reinventing Germany: German political Development since 1945, Berg, Oxford, Washington D.C. 1996, pp. 57-61; Peterson, Edward N. The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory, Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1977, pp. 138-173. 242 NYT. ―Germany stripped of industry by big three: economy mapped,‖ August 3, 1945; Report of the US Military Governor, ―Control of IG Farben,‖ September 1945. 243 The efforts here aimed at writing a democratic constitution that would guarantee respect for political rights and civil liberties and lay out the principles for a democratic government, equal distribution of power, and a new definition of rights and obligations. Designing a new democratic model of government 96

On the constitutional framework, some scholars argue that the Basic Law, the post-1945

Constitution of Germany was a product of the Germans rather than of the Allied Powers.244 The active participation of German elites in the formulation of the Basic Law is undeniable, but so is the US involvement.245 The new constitution, to be democratic, required keeping in mind four premises: 1) to create and serve as an ethical foundation for the provisional structure of the

Federal Republic by invoking the moral precepts of natural law and the sanctity of human life; 2) to combine a revived Germany‘s own constitutional traditions based on self-government, professional bureaucracy and federalism with the new Western-imported models based on basic rights and constitutional courts, 3) to preserve Weimar‘s positive aspects while avoiding its main previous mistakes, also taking into account the errors of the Nazi past, 4) to firmly guarantee political rights and civil liberties and freedoms, and 5) to create a political framework that would guarantee a stable government.

With respect to such premises, in July 1948, the US put forward the Frankfurt documents, an important catalyst toward working out a democratic constitution, and the Allied Western advisors pressed, both formally and informally for federalism and a guarantee of basic rights.

Even scholars who view the Basic Law and Lander Constitutions as a German elite product do and preparing the Germans for it involved redefining two sets of power relations: one between the executive, legislative, judiciary, and the president; and the other between the federal, land, and local governments. The creation of democratic political institutions involved reviving the party system, putting together a new electoral system and campaigning practices, and encouraging new political leadership within German society. The transformation of political culture involved denazification, the revival of democratic media, civil society, interest groups and the public sphere, the reform of the educational system, and making Germans as individuals and society shift toward embracing new democratic values and behavior. Peterson, Edward N. The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory, Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1977, pp. 138-173. 244 Michael Ignatieff in ―Who are Americans to think that freedom is theirs to spread?‖ New York Times Magazine, June 26, 2005, p. 45, views the Basic Law as a US product whereas Harold Zink in The United States in Germany 1944-1955, Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1957, p. 186 and Eugene Davidson in The Death and Life of Germany, New York: Knopf, 1959, p. 237 view both the Basic Law at the Federal level and the Constitutions at the Lander level as a product of German elites. 245 Spevack, Edmund. Allied Control and German Freedom: American Political and Ideological Influences on the Framing of the West German Basic Law, Münster, 2001. 97 not deny the role of the US and Western advisors in the process of writing the Basic Law.246 The resulting constitution avoided both Weimar‘s mistakes and the sources of political and government instability by establishing a parliamentary system of government based on a weakened president, a strengthened Chancellor, the possibility of a vote of no confidence in the

Chancellor and a five percent threshold for parties to take seats in parliament.247 The Basic Law eventually proved to be successful. The Federal Republic and strong chancellor it envisaged helped cement democracy and a growing sense of satisfaction among Germans with the Federal

Republic.248

With regard to the model of government, the new model needed to reflect five principles: representative institutions, power divided and balanced, policy-making efficiency, ability to stand and function even in time of crisis and self-governance.249 The Allies policies undertook the redefinition of power relations and sources of authority in two dimensions: 1) horizontally, between branches of the federal government and 2) vertically, between the Federal, Lander, and local governments.

Following these principles, at the level of federal government, the Allied Powers redefined power relations and sources of authority between the legislative, executive, judiciary and the institution of president, restructured the legislative into two houses with the Bundestag,

246 Zink, Harold. The United States in Germany 1944-1955, Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1957, p. 180. 247 Jarausch, Konrad H. After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 114, pp. 135-136. 248 The surveys for the twenty-fifth and fiftieth anniversaries of the Federal Republic‘s found a growing sense of satisfaction among Germans with the Federal Republic; See Merkl, Peter H. (eds.), The Federal Republic of Germany at Fifty: The End of a Century of Turmoil, Houndmills, 1999; Jarausch, Konrad H. After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 114, pp. 135-136. 249 Margaret L. Anderson, in Practicing Democracy: Elections and Political Culture in Imperial Germany, Princeton, 2000; Jarausch, Konrad H. After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 131-132. 98 the lower house, directly elected and the Bundesrat, the upper house, filled by appointments.250

The Allies also oversaw policy-making and intervened in replacing the officials whenever they deemed policies to be too conservative.251 At the Lander and local level of government, the

Occupation Administration reconstituted states as administrative units, appointed their officials from among Weimar politicians, members of the resistance and technical experts, and established close bureaucratic cooperation between the US and German staffs.252 The resulting government model proved itself democratic, stable and efficient in meeting all the tests of power transfer and economic policies, enabling self-government at the local level and the management of various crises ranging from political extremism to terrorism.

With regard to political institutions, the Allies‘ policies were guided by two principles: 1) making sure of their democratic character and 2) giving the fullest support to all parties, groups and individuals embracing democratic values and principles. Some scholars suggest that post-

1945 German parties were the product of German elites rather than creations of the Allied

Administration and that the US occupation forces became an obstacle rather than a supporting force for the creation of new parties by behaving improperly and arbitrarily.253

250 Based on the restructuring of power relations, there was an increase in the power of the Bundestag and Chancellor, a decrease in the power of the President, and a set of decision-making procedures enabling the executive, legislative and president keep a check on each other. 251 Such a situation occurred, for example, in Bavaria with the Schäffer cabinet being replaced with the more liberal Hoegner government. See Kathleen McLaughlin, ―Schaeffer is ousted by Patton: Pro-Nazi leaders seized in raid,‖ NYT, September 30, 1945. 252 Boehling, Rebecca. ―US military occupation, grass roots democracy and local German government,‖ in Jeffrey M. Diefendorf (eds.) American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany 1945–1955, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 281–306. 253 Eugene Davidson in The Death and Life of Germany, New York: Knopf, 1959, p. 93, 95-96, brings as an example the creation of the CDU by a group of thirty-five German political leaders in Berlin two weeks before US military forces even reached the city. On their own, they drew up a declaration of principles, rejecting Nazi ideas such as the primacy of the state and asserting the importance of individuals and families; Harold Zink in The United States in Germany 1944-1955, Princeton, N.J. 1957, pp. 336-337 maintains that the Americans did not officially authorize the formation of parties in Berlin until August 1945, more than a month after the four main ones had been formed; that US occupation troops harassed and delayed the formation and functioning of political parties by practicing cumbersome 99

While the military administration might have been reluctant to open the door to the formation and activity of political parties right away, this could be explained by the fear that those parties were not truly democratic. The denazification process aimed at eliminating any form of activity or set of symbols resembling those characterizing the Nazi regime and the fear of the ability of Communist influences to penetrate the new German parties.254 Parallel with prohibiting neo-Fascist organizations or screening new political parties, the US occupation authorities worked for an electoral system and campaign that would be fair and open to all democratic forces. The party system resulting from such a cautious approach builds on the participation of many regional and national political parties, but is dominated by center-right and center-left parties such as the CDU and the SDP. In the absence of extreme right parties, the conservative, right-leaning voters joined middle class parties whereas the defeated Communist parties looked for a way to become competitive.255

With regard to political culture, the Occupation Administration was committed to and helped foster a democratic political culture. The policy focused on rooting out previous authoritarian values and instilling new democratic ones through four elements: 1) denazification,

2) reforming the education system, 3) intensifying social interaction between Germans and occupation forces and 4) increasing cultural exchange between Germany and other democratic

licensing process and banning the use of party symbols, armbands, and parades; in Bavaria, they banned a democratic monarchist party. 254While the US and Soviet Union had different understandings of democracy in meaning and practice, both sides spoke about a new democratic German society as a way to compensate for the realities of Nazi Germany. The Soviet Union took the lead in transformation of German politics by creating a ―united front‖ consisting of the Communist (KPD), Social Democrats (SPD), Christian Democrats (CDU) and Liberals (LDPD). On 12 June 1945 the KPD called for ―creation of the democratic rights and freedoms,‖ a new government freely elected, a ―new democratic republic.‖ The language thus was democratic but the reality called for prudence. 255 NYT. ―Eisenhower bars Nazis from polls,‖ October 13, 1945; Rogers, Daniel E. Politics after Hitler: The Western Allies and the German Party System, Houndmills, 1995; Jarausch, Konrad H. After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 135. 100 countries. Overall, while the occupation policy has been criticized as confusing and questionable in its influence on democratizing German values, minds, and behavior, the outcome of the

Allies‘ efforts was that German individuals and society developed values, attitudes and behavior consistent with western democratic societies.256

Second, reflecting the goal of demilitarization of Germany, during 1945-1949 the Allies pursued the specific policies of disarmament and demobilization, which both helped the democratization of Germany.

The Allies pursued demilitarization out of security concerns and Allied policies aimed to disarm and demobilize the German military forces both physically and mentally.257 The implementation started with the abolition of German sovereignty on June 5th, 1945 and the establishment a four-power military government by the Allied Control Council to carry out the complete disarmament of Germany.258

Disarmament aimed at the confiscation of military equipment, demolition of fortifications, the establishment of control over military installations and the cessation of further

256 Payne, James L. ―Did the United States create democracy in Germany?‖ The Independent Review, Vol. 11, No. 2, Fall 2006, pp. 216-217; Jarausch. Konrad H. After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 127-129. 257 The Potsdam Agreement asked a Military Security Board to take an inventory of possible war industries so as to destroy purely military plants, monitor factories that could be used to produce war materials and lift controls on harmless industrial concerns geared toward peaceful production. On September 25, 1945, the Allied Control Council decreed the dissolution of all German land, naval, and air forces, the SS, SA, and the Gestapo, along with all of their organizations, staffs and institutions. In a second proclamation, the Allied Control Council called for the final dissolution and irrevocable destruction of the military as an institution; it also decreed a series of socio-cultural restrictions: All kinds of military training, military propaganda and military activity were forbidden to the German people, including organizations for the maintenance of traditions, veterans‘ groups, and similar associations. On May 1946 the US government proposed a disarmament treaty for Germany preventing any rearmament for another twenty-five years. The agreement was reached in October 1946. See Ziemke, Earl F. The US Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944 –1946, Washington, 1975, p. 291; Jarausch, Konrad H. After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 24. 258 NYT. ―Allies to Reject Doenitz Regime,‖ May 18, 1945, NYT. ―Allies Take Control of Reich, Impose 1937 Borders, Stern Terms,‖ June 6, 1945; OMGUS, ―Report of the Military Governor,‖ No. 1, August 1945, Introduction. 101 arms production.259 Demobilization aimed at searching for and capturing war criminals, detaining generals, field officers and SS members, securing military records, destroying Nazi military organizations of SA, Nazi Motor Corps, National Labor Service or, Todt Organization, and screening all prisoners before their release.260

Intended or not, the Allied policy of disarmament and demobilization had a significant effect on the democratization of Germany. This effect was reflected not only during 1945-1949, but also after the end of occupation during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s when German democracy was put to test by various events. By 1946, military organizations had dissolved entirely, disarmament was complete and military facilities had been demolished.261 By the 1950s,

Germans recommenced their civilian lives, started to think as civilians and opened a debate over defense and military politics.262 For the Germans, what started as a physical demilitarization turned into a mental demilitarization.263 This demilitarization was expressed as an anti-militarist

259 According to OMGUS, ―Report of the Military Governor,‖ No. 1, August 1945, Materials on ―Disarmament,‖ ―Demobilization of German Air Force,‖ and ―Naval Disarmament and Demobilization,‖ US troops alone took out some 46 million bullets, 24 million small artillery shells, 2.59 million gas masks, 709,000 hand grenades, 82,000 rifles and pistols, 148,000 landmines, 34,000 rockets, 1,842 ships, and 420 airplanes; They also rendered unusable fortified sites (bunkers, launching pads for rockets, anti- aircraft positions, mine fields; took over barracks, troop exercise grounds, airfields, ports and supply depots of the army, navy and air forces and recovered all workshops, research institutes and technical documents. 260 NYT. ―War Crime Trials Near, Wright Says,‖ June 1, 1945; NYT. ―German Staff to Be Kept in Exile,‖ June 22, 1945; NYT. ―US Counts Link Germans in a Conspiracy against the Laws of Civilization,‖ October 19, 1945. 261 Smith, Jean Edward. (eds.) The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany 1945–1949, Bloomington, 1974, p. 966. 262 The SPD (German Social Democratic Party) demanded a complete outlaw of war, whereas the CDU (Christian Democratic Party) advocated in favor of developing a national defense. The Basic Law, in Article 26, paragraph 1, declares unconstitutional all acts tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for a war of aggression. 263 Jarausch, Konrad H. After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 24; Schwarzschild, Leopold. ―Occupy Germany for Fifty Years,‖ NYT, July 8, 1945. 102 culture opposing the 1950-1960s rearmament attempts and the 1970-1980s deployment of intermediate nuclear forces in Europe.264

Third, reflecting the goal of transformation of German society, Allied policy consisted of denazification. Bureaucratic in its essence, the policy focused on four aspects: 1) eliminating the influence of Nazi ideology, 2) banning and dissolving the Nazi party and organizations; 3) purging and removing Nazis from administrative posts; and 4) punishing high-level Nazi functionaries and war criminals.265

Denazification focused on repudiating nationalism, removing the nation as a reference point, and developing the notion of a ―post-national‖ nation.266 It went on to ban uniforms, emblems, medals, decorations, weapons, ammunition, explosives, maintain of military sites and traditions, the glorification of war, military schools, clubs, associations, memorials, monuments, posters, placards, statutes, schools and libraries. It undertook the cleansing of German publishing houses, research institutions and libraries of books advocating violence, military training and war ideas.

Documents, however, show that the implementation of denazification went through two stages, leading some to call the policy a failure or as having little success and not succeeding in the complete elimination of all Nazis.

264 Berger, Thomas U. Cultures of antimilitarism: National security in Germany and Japan, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998, p. x; Mushaben, Joyce M. From Post-War to Post-Wall Generations: Changing Attitudes toward the National Question and NATO in the Federal Republic of Germany, Boulder, 1998, p. 171. 265 Jarausch, Konrad H. After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 49; NYT. ―Hard Policy Fixed for Ruling Reich,‖ May 17, 1945. 266 The first military guidelines of denazification were issued by the Allied Council on July 7, 1945; On October 15, 1945 the Allied Council issued the second law demanding dissolution and disappearance of the Nazi Party, organizations, institutions and groups, and the elimination from public life of prominent Nazis. On March 5, 1946, the Allied Council promulgated the law for the liberation from National Socialism and militarism. Denazification became less strict in 1947 and came to an end in early in 1948. 103

The initial policy, applied during the 1945-1947 period, reflected the mindset of

Directive JCS 1067 and was oriented only toward denazification and reforming the educational system. It epitomized the policy of ―non-fraternization‖ and isolated military bases.267 To achieve liberation of Germans from Nazi ideology and mindset, the occupation authorities undertook a cleansing of books, libraries, media and the public sphere from Nazi ideas and values and reforming the German educational system along the lines of the American model.268

The driving feature was the en masse purging of the Nazis. Thirteen million Germans were asked to fill out a detailed autobiographical questionnaire, without which they could not get a job. By

July 1945 the Nazi Party had dissolved, eighty thousand Nazi leaders had been arrested, and seventy thousand Nazi activists were dismissed from positions in the civil service.269 The total number of affected persons was 3,660,648.270 Denazification extended to media, schools and

267 According to Directive JCS 1067, Americans were not to engage in any kind of friendly, normal intercourse with Germans. The guiding rules were ―Don't shake hands!‖ ―Don't fraternize!‖ Police arrested more than a thousand Americans who did not follow the rule. The policy was abandoned definitively by 1947. To keep military and civilian personnel isolated from the Germans, military bases were surrounded by barbed wire and created what was known as "Little Americas." See Eugene Davidson in The Death and Life of Germany, New York: Knopf, 1959, pp. 54-55, p. 156, p. 276; 268 Harold Zink, in The United States in Germany 1944-1955, Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1957, pp. 200-207 hold that reforms in the educational system, undertaken during 1945-1947 by H. B. Wells, the president of Indiana University, and Alonzo Grace, a former commissioner of education in Connecticut, did not mark any significant success because of inconsistent principles, platitudes and a divergent point of view underlying the reforms and reform-makers, lack of knowledge of German mentality and problems and personal power politics and struggle. 269 OMGUS, ―Denazification during the First Month,‖ in Report of the Military Governor, No. 1, August 1945. 270 There were 5 categories of guilt: 1) Chief Nazis, 2) Nazis (activists, militarists, beneficiaries), 3) Lesser Nazis (probation group), 4) Nominal followers and 5) Exonerated. Screening and classifying went through a questionnaire of 131 questions. Of those interrogated, 1,667 resulted as chief culprits, 23,060 were incriminated in a major way, and 150,425 were less incriminated. Of Nazi members, 4.8% qualified and were punished as hard core Nazis; 27.2% (995,874) were found to be nominal members; 33.2% (1,213,873) were completely exonerated; 358,317 were amnestied; 782,803 were not charged; and 124,629 turned out not to be classified. The sanctions ranged from up to ten years in a work camp, confiscation of property and exclusion from public office to cancellation of pensions and losing one‘s right to vote. 104 culture. Primary and secondary schools were purged of Nazi teachers who were replaced by democratic pedagogues. Nazi newspapers, radio programs, and films were forbidden.

The modified policy, applied after the issuance of Directive 1779 in 1947, reflected the criticism for being slow, lacking knowledge of local culture and language skills and never achieving general acceptance.271 It transferred denazification into the hands of German review boards, ended the non-fraternization practices, and moved toward cultural reorientation of

Germans and media toward Western values.272 The modification of this policy helped democratize German society in three ways: 1) it developed interactive social, cultural and ideological relations between the occupied population and the Allied Forces, 2) it facilitated the conveyance of Allies democratic values, beliefs, ideas and lifestyle to the occupied population and 3) it made it easier for young children and people to dismiss the fear and resentment toward the Allied Forces, get to them know better and to embrace the Allies‘ democratic values and lifestyle.

Overall, despite the criticism it faced, the denazification policy helped turn German individuals and society toward embracing democracy. Initially, from 1945 onward it made

Germans distance themselves from the Nazi Party, its leadership and organizations and the

271 The Protestant Church, Council of Evangelical Churches criticized the policy as too strict and counterproductive; the Swiss daily Newspaper newspaper Die Tat denounced it as logical nonsense, judicial perversity and moral perfidy, because it rested on the assumption of collective guilt. See Payne, James L. ―Did the United States Create Democracy in Germany?‖ The Independent Review, Vol. 11, No. 2, Fall 2006, pp. 214-216; Montgomery, John D. Forced to Be Free: The Artificial Revolution in Germany and Japan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957, p. 23, 69, 66, 81; Davidson, Eugene. The Death and Life of Germany. New York: Knopf, 1959, p. 276; Herz, John H. ―The fiasco of denazification in Germany.‖ Political Science Quarterly, December 1948, pp. 569-594. 272 This policy led to sending young Germans to US universities to learn about democracy, to a massive increase and spread of the influence of American movies, newspapers, books and technology, to the creation of the US-German friendship committee and to an increase of mutual economic, scientific and technological exchanges between the US and Germany. 105 ideology of National-Socialism.273 Nazism was no longer tolerated in the public sphere and radical nationalism had been renounced.274 From mid-1947 onward it made Germans, especially the young population, tie themselves closer to Western values and beliefs.

Fourth, reflecting the goal of transformation of the German economic model of development, Allied policy pursued two different approaches: 1) from 1945 to mid-1947 it pursued deindustrialization and 2) from mid-1947 onward it pursued restructuring.275

The policy of deindustrialization during 1945-1947 was radical in its approach: force

Germany to behave peacefully by altering the German economy through deindustrialization, dismantlement, decartelization and reparations.276 Directive JCS 1067 was the best embodiment of this policy. Actions undertaken during 1945-1947 reflected this approach.277

273 Germans started auto-denazification initially by taking down the portraits of Hitler, cleaning off the bookshelves, and removing party insignia and membership lists. 274 Michael Hayse in Recasting German Elites: Higher Civil Servants, Business Leaders and Physicians in Hesse between Nazism and Democracy, 1945–1955, New York, 2003; Konrad H. Jarausch in After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 49, 54, 62. They say that denazification had little success because of three things: 1) it changed methods over the time; 2) interrogators lacked the language skills and knowledge of local culture and 3) condemning all 6.5 million Nazi Party members was unrealistic objective it had an unrealistic objective that was simply impossible to accomplish. 275 The de-industrialization group included Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, banker Bernard M. Baruch, and Senator Harvey Kilgore. This group was for pursuing a punitive policy, destroying Germany‘s ability to wage war through a comprehensive deindustrialization. The restructuring group included business circles and the military government. The group, pragmatic and moderate in character, argued that punishing the Germans was not good economics. Transforming Germany back into an agricultural economy would ruin the country, make American taxpayers pay the price, undermine the recovery of the European economy and run against the US interest in free trade. See NYT. ―Baruch Urges Plan for Foe in Defeat,‖ June 1, 1945; Middleton, Drew. ―US to Push Curb on Reich Industry,‖ NYT, July 1, 1945; Trussell, C. P. ―Reich War Power Declared Strong,‖ NYT, July 10, 1945; Ellis, Howard S. ―Letter to the editor,‖ NYT, June 9, 1945; Baldwin, Hanson W. ―Occupation and Peace,‖ NYT, July 11, 1945; NYT. ―European Reconstruction,‖ July 12, 1945. 276 Gimbel, John. The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military 1945-1949. Stanford University Press, California, 1968; 277 James L. Payne in ―Did the United States Create Democracy in Germany?‖ The Independent Review, Vol. 11, No. 2, Fall 2006, pp. 211-213. He describes Directive JCS 1067 and the deindustrialization as a policy of punishment deliberately oriented toward wrecking the German economy and intended not to provide ordinary relief but to inflict economic privation on the Germans. 106

Implementation of the policy started with the prosecution of economic policy makers and prominent industrialists and continued with ―trust busting,‖ which included seizing and breaking up large companies and prohibiting cartels, syndicates and trusts.278 The Allies placed limits on

German industries, froze the production of steel, machine tools and chemicals, reduced the production of textiles and shoes to depressed levels, and deliberately dismantled and destroyed hundreds of plants and factories. German workers had to pay for the occupation.279 The economy was dominated by low buying power, the black market and no legitimate demand. This policy led to an economic crisis and generated conflicts between the occupation authorities and German politicians, workers and commentators.280

The economic crisis and the September 6, 1946 speech of US Secretary of State James F.

Byrnes mark the turning point in Allied economic policy.281 The new policy moved away from

278 Fritz Sauckel and Albert Speer were prosecuted for slave labor; Walther Funk for pillaging occupied territories; Hjalmar Schacht for making financial war preparations; Gustav Krupp for producing weapons. Sauckel was hanged, Speer and Funk received life sentences, Schacht received a full acquittal, whereas Krupp was released due to ill health. In early September 1945, to destroy the coal syndicate in the Ruhr region and hold its leaders personally responsible for their part in war production, British troops arrested forty leading industrialists, including Otto Springorum. In December, they incarcerated another group of eighty-four iron and steel industrialists, who had supported and profited enormously from Hitler‘s conduct of the war. In July-August 1945, the Inter-Allied Commission for the Decentralization of the German Economy started the confiscation of large assets. On July 24, the Allied seized and broke up IG Farben into the Bayer, Höchst, and BSAF companies; the coal and steel industries were carved up into twenty-three independent steel producers and dozens of collieries. In the financial industry, Germany‘s three largest banks were transformed into separate companies; electric giants Siemens and Bosch under a more liberal leadership managed to avoid restructuring. In February 1947 the Law No. 56 of the Allies Administration prohibited all forms of agreements or joint ventures whose purpose or effect consists of promoting monopolistic control. See NYT. ―Forty Industrialists in Ruhr Arrested,‖ September 7, 1945; NYT. ―British Seize Ruhr Industrialists as Allies investigate six trusts,‖ February 12, 1945; NYT. ―Ruhr trusteeship urged as war curb,‖ December 21, 1945. 279 Zink, Harold. The United States in Germany 1944-1955. Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1957, p 253; Davidson, Eugene. The Death and Life of Germany. New York: Knopf, 1959, pp. 85-86, p. 255, p. 261; James L. Payne in ―Did the United States Create Democracy in Germany?‖ The Independent Review, Vol. 11, No. 2, Fall 2006, pp. 211-213. 280 The 1945-1947 crisis was characterized by slow delivery of raw materials, unreliable energy supplies, industrial production only at 50 to 55 percent of its prewar level, a famine winter, with the failure to revive mining, extract additional coal or produce more steel and fertilizer. 281 In his speech, Byrnes criticized the previous policy and the failure of the Allied Control Council to enable Germany to function as an economic unit. He criticized the deindustrialization policy and stated 107 extensive deindustrialization and tight Allied control toward structural transformation, restoration of a free market economy and the gradual recovery of the German economy.282 This modification was complemented by the efforts made by Germans themselves. The Germans attempted to restore economic relations with foreign partners, especially in the context of

European trade promoted by the European Recovery Program of the Marshall Plan, even though they were under the tight control of the occupation authorities.

The effects of the modified Allies economic policy and the efforts made by the Germans themselves were felt in significant improvement of the living standards from mid 1947 onward.283 During the 1950s the West German economy grew by 8.2 percent per year. The 1960s produced what was dubbed as the ―German economic miracle.‖

Some attribute it to the ability of the Allies not to adhere strictly to the initial policy but to modify it when needed and to the inclusion of Germans in dealing with economic matters and giving them a say.284 Others attribute the success of economic policy to what German political leadership did for Germany or the potential inherited by Nazi Germany.285 Yet, there are still

that the goals of the United States were to demilitarize and denazify Germany but not to raise artificial barriers to the efforts of the German people to resume their economic development. 282 Jarausch. Konrad H. After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 79. 283 Among the most important effects were the abolition of food coupons and rationing, the elimination of hunger, the collapse of black market, the blossoming of shop windows, the increase of buying power and the return to regular employment. 284 On July 25, 1947, a bi-zonal economic council met in Frankfurt and offered German politicians an active say in the nationwide recovery of their own economy. See Jarausch, Konrad H. After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 83. 285 Among German leaders, the most important in contributing to the economic miracle include Chancellor Ludwig Erhard for embracing the free market philosophy, Chancellor Kiesinger, foreign minister Brandt, minister of economics Schiller and finance minister Strauß, for the 1967 Law for Stability and Growth, combining competition with planning and establishing cooperation between labor, management and the government. Included in Germany‘s inherited potential are the productive capacity of the war economy and its ability to be converted to civilian, peaceful, consumer purposes; the functioning state of many war factories, plants and machinery; the technical skills of engineers, the marketing knowledge of management and the manpower of the soldiers returning home. In addition to the potential inherited from the pre-war period, other post-war factors include the introduction of new 108 others who link the success of the Allied economic policy to the Marshall Plan.286 What is important is that, in overall analysis, the Allies‘ modified economic policy after mid-1947 eliminated the negative effects of the initial economic policy and contributed positively in the process of democratization. The modified policy helped democratization in three ways: 1) it did not allow development of resentment and anti-Allies feelings among the elite and population, 2) it created a basis for political stability and a stable government and 3) it created the condition for the rise of new middle class as the guarantor of the democracy.

Fifth, reflecting the goal of transformation of the governance model, Allies policy consisted of decentralization. From 1945-1949 the Allied Forces governed directly but through a decentralized system. Between May 8, 1945 and September 1, 1949, West Germany was administered by five US, three British and two French Military Governors. The five US military governors were Dwight D. Eisenhower, George S. Patton, Joseph T. McNarney, Lucius D. Clay and Clarence R Huebner. The three British military governors were Bernard Law Montgomery,

William Sholto Douglas and Brian Hubert Robertson. The two French military governors were

Jean de Lattre de Tassigny and Marie Pierre Koenig. On May 23, 1949, the Allied Forces in

West Germany established the Federal Republic of Germany. From September 2 to May 5 1955, the military governors were replaced by eight US, British and French High Commissioners whose powers were somewhere between those of a governor and those of an ambassador. The

machines, the extent of self-exploitation, the rapid accumulation of capital by businesses through tax exemptions and the consistent application of free trade policy. See Nicholls, Anthony James. Freedom with Responsibility: The social market economy in Germany, 1918-1963, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 151. 286 Some view the Marshall Plan as an important factor in helping the mining industry and energy sector, and in creating a positive psychological climate, but it is much less important than the liberalization of the general economic framework. See Nicholls, Anthony James. Freedom with Responsibility: The social Market Economy in Germany, 1918-1963, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 390–397; James L. Payne in ―Did the United States create democracy in Germany?‖ The Independent Review, Vol. 11, No. 2, Fall 2006, p. 214. 109 four US High Commissioners were John J. McCloy, Walter J. Donnelly, Samuel Reber and

James Bryant Conant. The three British High Commissioners were Brian Hubert Robertson,

Ivone Kirkpatrick and Frederick Hoyer Millar. The French High Commissioner was Andre

Francois-Poncet.

Upon official surrender of Germany on May 8, 1945, the Allied Expeditionary Force declared itself as the supreme authority vested with legislative, judicial and executive powers within the occupied territory, suspended Nazi Courts and educational institutions and ordered all officials and public employees to remain at their posts until further notice. The US troops took under their control Bavaria and Hessen in South Germany and Baden-Wurttemberg, Bremen,

Bremerhaven and Frankfurt am Main in Northern Germany. The British troops took under their control Hanover, Brunswick, Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony and Rhine-

Westphalia. The French troops took under the control Baden-Baden. The Allied Expeditionary

Force issued three ordinances. The first defined nineteen crimes against the Allied Forces punishable by death, the second established military government courts whereas the third made

English the official language of military government. In addition, the Allied Forces issued laws related to the establishment and maintenance of the military government control and those dealing with National Socialism and Nazi organizations.287

To summarize, Allied policies linked to the goals of changing the political regime, demilitarizing Germany, and transforming German society, economy and governance, all contributed to democratization of Germany. They did so by modifying policies when they did not work, creating a democratic political system, guaranteeing stability, pushing for

287 USFET, General Board, Study No. 85, legal Phases of Civil Affairs and Military Government, 15 May 46, in Hist Div, Hqs, ETO, 97-USF 5-03.0; Ziemke, Earl F. ―The US Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944–1946,‖ Army Historical Series, Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1990, p. 84. 110 democratization of values and behavior and creating an economic system favorable to democratization.

3.1.3 Occupation Commitment

The positive influence of Allied policies was also reinforced by the Allies‘ commitment to their policies. The Allies committed a considerable number of troops over a long period of time and who were backed by considerable resources in postwar Germany. All these helped the implementation of policies that contributed to democratization.288

The Allies committed a large number of military troops to the occupation of Germany.289

On May 8, 1945, the US had 3,077,000 troops in Europe. In Germany the US had 1,622,000 men or one soldier for every 40 people in the population. The number of troops dropped to 614,000 in

December 1945 and to 230,000 in September 1946.290 The number of troops averaged 164,000 from 1947-1949 and was estimated to be as low as 97,820 soldiers in 1949.291 Even so, the

288 Downes, Alexander B., Monten, Jonathan. ―FIRCed to be free: Foreign imposed regime change and democratization,‖ Paper submitted to APSA 2010, pp. 5-6. 289 The size of the military occupation troops is calculated based on the standard ―1 soldier for every 450- 500 people.‖ This value is based on the study of 841 instances of military intervention in the period 1958- 1997 by Meernik and Brown. In their study they found that the average number of the military troops engaged in a military operation was 14,776 soldiers; the highest number of troops engaged was 253,347; See James, Meernik. Brown, Chelsea. ―The short path and the long road: Explaining the duration of US military operations,‖ Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 44, No. 1, January 2007 p. 69; Ziemke, Earl F. ―The US Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944–1946,‖ Army Historical Series, Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1975, pp. 334–335, 339–341; Quinlivan, James T. ―Force requirements for stability operations,‖ Parameters, Vol. 24, No. 4, Winter 1995–1996, pp. 59–69; Byman, Daniel. ‖Democracy and military intervention: Challenges and opportunities,‖ International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer 2003, p. 74; Dobbins, James. et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2003, p. 149. 290 Ibid., Ziemke, p. 422. 291 Due to massive redeployment and repatriation of the US troops back home, no exact figures exist for the number of US soldiers in Germany for the period 1947-1949. As Tim Kane states in his 2004 study ―Troop deployment dataset, 1950-2003,‖ financed by Heritage Foundation, the figures of the US troops in Germany, 97,820 in 1950 and 176,000 in 1951, in the absence of exact data are only approximate estimate. 111 number was sufficient to maintain stability.292 After 1950, as Table 3.2 shows, the number of occupation troops stayed above 200,000 soldiers, or one soldier for at least 296 people.

Table 3.2 Number of Troops in Germany

Period Number of Troops Germany’s Population Population/Troops Ratio 1945 1,622,000 64.700.000 1 soldier / 40 people 1946* 230,000 65,000,000 1 soldier / 283 people 1947-1949* 165,000 67,000,000 1 soldier / 406 people 1950-1955 204,003 69,285,500 1 soldier / 340 people 1956-1960 237,615 70,400,000 1 soldier / 296 people 1961-1965 256,197 74,381,000 1 soldier / 290 people 1966-1970 223,727 76,995,000 1 soldier / 345 people 1971-1975 216,362 78,519,000 1 soldier / 363 people 1976-1980 231,044 78,299,000 1 soldier / 340 people 1981-1985 251,996 78,044,000 1 soldier / 310 people 1986-1990 245,189 78,547,000 1 soldier / 320 people 1991-1995 120,879 80,819,000 1 soldier / 670 people 1996-2000 62,667 82,038,000 1 soldier / 1,310 people

Note: The figures represent the average values for both, the occupation troops and the German population. Calculations are made using two sets of data. * The data and calculations are approximate values. Sources: For the number of military troops, data were obtained from the US Department of Defense, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, Statistical Information Analysis Division, (SIAD), ―Military personnel historical Reports: Active duty military personnel by regional area and by country,‖ at www,dior,whs,mil/mmid/military/history/309hist,htm For the population size, data were obtained from the US Census Bureau, International Programs, at http://www,census,gov/population/international/data/idb/country,php

The US also contributed military troops for the postwar management of Germany. To this end, an Occupational Troop Basis of 404,500 soldiers and a Liquidation Force of 337,000 soldiers were created. To deal with guarding the property, the US military government created a body of 100,000 soldiers. To deal with security and order, a constabulary force of 38,000 was created. For the management of civilian affairs the US had trained and prepared 8,000 officers.293

292 Memo, Headquarters, ETOUSA, for Gen Eisenhower, sub: Strength of the U.S. Forces, 30 April 1945, in USFET SGS 320.3/2; Ziemke, Earl F. ―The US Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944–1946,‖ Army Historical Series, Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1990, p. 320. 293 Ziemke, Earl F. ―The US Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944–1946,‖ Army Historical Series, Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1990, pp. 62-73; Harmon, Ernest N. Combat Commander: Autobiography of a Soldier, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1970, pp. 279–294; Snyder, James M. ―The Establishment and Operations of the United States Constabulary: 3 October 1945 – 30 June 1947,‖ United States Constabulary, Historical subsection C-3, 1947; Gott, K, D, ―Mobility, vigilance, and justice: The US Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1953,‖ in Global War on Terrorism, Fort Leavenworth Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005, Occasional Paper 11, p. 10. 112

Just as significantly, the occupation of Germany by the Allied Powers lasted for about eleven years.294 Compared to other military operations of the 20th century, the occupation of

Germany is among the longest in duration.295 In addition, US troops continued to stay in

Germany even after the occupation ended and West Germany was recognized as sovereign.296

294 Germany surrendered unconditionally on May 7-8, 1945. On June 5, 1945 the US, Britain, and Soviet Union assumed supreme authority over Germany, took all the powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal, or local government or authority and divided Germany into four zones with each power administering a sector whereas Berlin was to be governed by an inter-Allied authority. The official end of the military occupation is 5 May 1955. See US Department of State [DOS], ―Occupation of Germany: Policy and Progress 1945–46,‖ Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, Pub. 2783, 1947, p. 8, 79-80. 295 In a study of 228 cases of the use of force, military operations and occupations, Meernik and Brown found that most of the military operations were characterized by a short duration. Of the 228 cases, 56.5% (129) finished within one month, 24.5% (56) lasted 31 to 90 days, 11% (25) lasted 91-180 days, 3% (7) lasted more than 180 days but less than a year, and only a little less than 5% of the cases (11) lasted longer than one year; see Meernik, James., Brown, Chelsea. ―The short path and the long road: Explaining the duration of US military operations,‖ Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 44, No. 1, January 2007 p. 73. See also Dobbins, James. et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2003, p. xix, 149. 296 The occupation ended officially on 5 May 1955 with the entry into the force of the General Treaty. The US, France, and Britain declared the end of military occupation and recognized the Federal Republic of Germany as a sovereign state. Occupation zones ceased existing and the high commissioners were replaced by normal ambassadors. Yet, military troops continued to stay on German soil beyond May 1955. The Federal Republic of Germany was allowed the right to rearm, establish a military force of up to a half-million men and resume the manufacture of arms. It also become a full-fledged member of NATO; yet, it was not a full, complete and unrestricted sovereignty. The origin of the Federal Republic of Germany goes back to three moments: 1) the US-British decision to create, by January 1, 1947, under a uniform administration the so-called ―Bizone‖, later the Trizone after inclusion of the French zone; 2) the Berlin blockade by the Soviet Union during June 1948-May 1949, and 3) its official creation by the US, Britain, and France on May 23, 1949; German sovereignty developed gradually, first by the replacement of military governors with civilian high commissioners, and second by Germany‘s becoming in 1949 a member of NATO. Yet, even after 1949, Germany did not receive complete sovereignty until the end of the Cold War and German reunification in 1989 and 1990, respectively. Despite the grants of general sovereignty in 1955, full and unrestricted sovereignty under international law was not enjoyed by any German government until after the reunification of Germany in October 1990. The provisions of the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, known as the "Two-plus-Four Treaty," granting full sovereignty to Germany, did not become law until 15 March 1991, after all of the participating nations had ratified the treaty. See Dobbins, James. et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2003, p. 13; The US Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946, CMH Pub 30-6, US Army Center of Military History, http://www.history.army.mil/catalog/pubs/30/30-6.html; American Military History, Vol. 2, CMH Pub 30- 22, Chapter 9, US Army Center of Military History, http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/030/30- 22/index.html 113

In terms of resources, the Allied Powers committed economic and financial resources in the security, military, political, economic and social areas, but this assistance during 1946-1949 reflects two approaches.297 The initial economic assistance in 1946-1947 consisted largely of food aid. It reflected the view that Germans should be given as much food as needed just to survive, avert starvation and prevent massive outbreaks of disease. Further, it reflected the belief that the German economic infrastructure, though damaged, was not destroyed, and some sectors, such as the coal, iron and steel industries and some manufacturing in the Western zones, were instead relatively intact and could work; therefore, Germany had to be responsible for its own economic recovery and should pay reparations. This period also reflected the Allied goals of demilitarization, denazification, deindustrialization, and democratization.298 As the data in Table

3.3 show, the aid consisted mostly of Government Aid and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) and UNRRA.

Table 3.3 US Assistance to Germany for the Period 1946-1952

GERMANY 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 TOTAL Total Economic Grants 195.8 298.3 234.4 810.6 579.4 393.1 90.7 2,602.3 Total Economic Loans 0 0 615.9 447.0 154.0 0 16.9 1,233.8 USAID Predecessor Grants 0 0 0 406.0 290.0 402.5 75.1 1,173.6 USAID Predecessor Loans 0 0 0 200.0 0 0 16.9 216.9 Food Grants 0 0 0 0 0 0 17.5 17.5 GARIOA Grants 192.7 297.8 232.3 404.6 289.4 -9.4 -1.9 1,405.5 GARIOLA Loans 0 0 399.0 247.0 154.0 0 0 800.0 UNRRA Interim Grants (aid) 3.1 0.5 2.1 0 0 0 0 5.7 US Surplus Property Loans 0 0 216.9 0 0 0 0 216.9 Military Aid Grants 0 0 0 0 0 259.7 202.7 462.4 TOTALS 195.8 298.3 850.3 1,257.6 733.4 652.8 310.3 4,298.5 Note: Figures are in Millions of Current Year Dollars. Totals may not add due to rounding Source: U.S. Agency for International Development. U.S. Overseas Loans & Grants Database, at http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/detailed.html

297 Glees, Anthony. Reinventing Germany: German Political Development since 1945, Berg, Oxford, Washington D.C. 1996, p. 60; Peterson, Edward N. The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory, Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1977, pp. 138-173. 298 Bark, Dennis L., and Gress, David R. From Shadow to Substance: 1945-1963. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989. pp. 132-133. Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. Historical Context of Stability and Reconstruction Operations: Germany after World War II. A report prepared under an interagency agreement with the US Army Training and Doctrine Command Futures Center, December 2005. pp. 29-31. 114

The economic assistance from 1947 and onward was modified in three respects. First, it recognized the need for economic recovery and the reconstruction of Germany, thus moving beyond deindustrialization and guaranteeing merely a minimum survival. Second, it increased the sources of economic assistance through the Marshall Plan and supplemental funds for infrastructure reconstruction alongside GARIOA and UNRRA. Third, the amount of money poured into Germany increased. While a detailed breakdown of funds into specific areas is difficult, some simplified and rounded up figures do help create an idea about the scope and breadth of economic assistance to Germany.299 The money the US poured into Germany every year accounted for a substantial percent of the US federal budget.300 In 1946, the US, alone or through the IMF, the IBRD, and UNRRA, poured in $195.8 million. In 1952, the amount increased to $310.3 million. During the period of 1946-1952, US assistance in grants and loans totaled $4.3 billion.301

Washington allocated even more resources under the Marshall Plan that began in 1948.

For the period from 1948-1952, the Marshall Plan represents 33% of the total US aid, and $1.4

299 There are several reasons: 1) the costs are covered under different categories and in different ways; 2) the funds for assistance to democracy, government, education, humanitarian relief, security, reconstruction, building and development of political and social welfare institutions were either covered by occupation forces or not maintained in separate accounts; 3) assistance was either not provided, or was paid for by Germany in the form of payments toward US occupation costs, or was done by occupation troops; 4) the funds are aggregated according to accounts, not purposes; 5) the amounts paid in reparations were not offset; 6) the amounts paid by Germany for feeding and housing of occupation troops were not accounted for; 300 Sa'Adah, Anne. ―Regime change: Lessons from Germany on justice, institution building, and democracy,‖ The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50, No. 3, Transitional Justice June 2006, p. 317- 318; see The Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); 301 Converted into 2005 dollars, they are equivalent of $29.3 billion dollars. See calculation by Serafino, Nina., Tarnoff, Curt., Nanto, Dick K. in ―US Occupation Assistance: Iraq, Germany and Japan Compared,‖ Congressional Research Service Report for Congress Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, March 2006. 115 billion was spent, of which 84% was in grants, and 16% in loans.302 46% of its funds went for food and 40% toward industrial inputs such as raw materials, semi-finished products, cotton, metals, chemicals, petroleum, petroleum products, machinery, vehicles, and tobacco.303 After

1947 the funds for the reconstruction of economic infrastructure represented 33% of total US assistance and consisted of financing countries to carry out their recoveries largely on their own.304 Overall, Germany received $12.6 billion in the first two years of the occupation.305

The economic and financial resources that the US provided, especially from mid-1947 and onward, helped Germany‘s economic recovery and growth; this economic growth, as noted previously, created a favorable environment for democratization. While some scholars question whether the US economic policies and the Marshall Plan were indeed key factors to Germany‘s economic recovery, there was a significant improvement of the German economy during 1950s-

1960s known as the ―German economic miracle‖.306

302 Converted into 2005 dollars, these Marshall Plan funds are the equivalent of $9.3 billion dollars as calculated by Serafino, Nina., Tarnoff, Curt., Nanto, Dick K. in The Marshall Plan: Design, Accomplishments, and Relevance to the Present, Table II in CRS Report RL 97-62, January 6, 1997. 303 This breakdown is drawn from Table B-4 of that report. The US Congress, Thirteenth Report to Congress of the Economic Cooperation Administration for the Quarter Ended June 30, 1951; House Document No. 249, 82nd Congress, 1st session, Washington, D.C.: US Govt. Print Office, p. 114, in House Documents, Vol. 37, 1951. 304 Serafino, Nina., Tarnoff, Curt., Nanto, Dick K. ―US Occupation Assistance: Iraq, Germany and Japan Compared,‖ Congressional Research Service Report for Congress Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, March 2006. 305 Dobbins, James et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2003. pp. 156-159; 306 Some argue that contribution of the Marshall Plan was relatively small; there is no correlation between the amount of aid per capita and production increase from 1948 to 1951; Germany received less money than other countries on a per capita basis, economic policies pursued by the Germans were more important than the Marshall Plan and reconstruction depended on the availability of qualified personnel, an institutional structure capable of coordinating efforts and distributing resources and sufficient resources, all of which Germany had. See Wexler, Imanuel. The Marshall Plan Revisited: The European Recovery Program in Economic Perspective. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983; Milward Alan S. ―Was the Marshall Plan Necessary?' Diplomatic History, 1989, Vol. 13, Spring, pp. 231-53; Esposito, Chiarella. America's Feeble Weapon: Funding the Marshall Plan in France and Italy, 1948-1950. Westport Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1994; Payne, James L. ―Did the United States create democracy in Germany?‖ The Independent Review, Vol. 11, No. 2, Fall 2006, p. 214; Sa'Adah, Anne. ―Regime change: 116

To summarize, the goals, policies and resource commitment of the Allies, all contributed to the democratization of Germany during 1945-1955. The goals and resources committed determined the scope and depth of policies, whereas policies helped the democratization of postwar Germany.

3.2 Political Culture Dynamics in Post-1945 Germany

Two observations can be made about the role of the political culture to democratization of Germany from 1945-1955. First, the character of values and beliefs, the behaviors and attitudes of the population, the institutional behavior and development, the political participation and civil society changed from authoritarian to democratic. Second, the shift from authoritarian to democratic, while initiated by the Allied Powers, was embraced and further advanced by the

German elites and by the population in general. These dynamics contributed to a positive influence of political culture on democratization of postwar Germany during the early years of the occupation, especially in the mid-1950s, when Federal Republic of Germany was established, and in the early 1960s and onward. The positive influence of political culture can be shown in a number of ways. Figure A2.2 in Appendix 2 shows the ways that changes that occurred in the political culture helped democratization.

3.2.1 Values and Beliefs

The change of values and beliefs is one way that indirectly contributed to the democratization of postwar Germany during the period from 1945-1949 through the influence

Lessons from Germany on justice, institution building and democracy,‖ The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50, No. 3, Transitional Justice June 2006, p. 316; Maddison, Angus. The World Economy: Historical Statistics, Paris: OECD, 2003; Stern, Susan. Marshall Plan 1947-1997: A German View, at http://www.germany-info.org/relaunch/culture/history/marshall.html. 117 they exerted on the change in behaviors and attitudes. Values and beliefs represent the basis on which the elites and the population construct, in general, their behavior and attitudes. They are also reflected in the actions at the level of individual, social groups, political institutions, government and state. The change of values and beliefs among the elites and the population from

1945-1949 helped democratize postwar Germany in two major ways: 1) directly, it influenced the democratization of behavior and attitudes among the individuals and groups and 2) indirectly, through its influence on behavior and attitudes, it influenced the development of a democratic institutional behavior and development. Values and beliefs, thus, were important to democratization of the postwar character of political culture and German democracy. In addition, the change of values and beliefs made it easier for the Allies to advance the agenda of creating and developing a democratic political regime.

What is important about this change is the rapid increase in the proportion of the German population embracing the democratic values and beliefs. Between 1945 and 1955, the year when the occupation ended, twenty-five percent of the German population had learned and internalized new democratic values. During the 1960s and the 1970s, this number increased to 47%.307 Two things make this trend important: 1) the democratization of political culture was not easy because of the damage caused by National Socialism and 2) the positive character of the trend.

Germany started its democratization in 1945 after inheriting a set of authoritarian values and beliefs. Two features characterize this change of values and beliefs. First, the shift from an authoritarian to a democratic character occurred in six main ways: 1) the view of the others, 2) individual rights and liberties, 3) government and authority, 4) the political and social institutions, 5) individual responsibility and participation in public affairs and 6) the attitude

307 Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR; Ann Arbor, Michigan), the Zentralarchiv fur empiriche Sozialforschung (ZA; Cologne) and Zentrum fur Umfragen Methoden and Analysen (ZUMA; Mannheim) conducted a study surveying German political culture from 1953-1976. 118 toward social change. Second, the shift reflects the efforts made by the Allies and by the

Germans themselves, especially the role played by the new, postwar emerging elite.

With regard to the perceptions of others, before 1945 the Germans believed in discrimination, racial superiority and intolerance toward other opinions and diversity, especially toward Jews and non-Germans. These beliefs were expressed in the hatred of anti-Semitism racism, and aggressive and conflict-prone attitudes. After 1945, the defeat by the Allies shattered their notion of German superiority and forced them to show greater tolerance toward others. This change was easier among the younger than the older population. During the period from 1945-

1955, the change of the view toward others was important to the democratization of postwar

Germany in two major ways: it helped the change of behavior and attitudes toward others and it also helped develop the predisposition of trusting rather than distrusting the others.

With regard to individual rights and liberties, before 1945 the Germans did not believe in individual liberty but accepted collective discipline and practices of violence and political intimidation. After 1945, the embrace and respect of individual rights and liberty and equality was among the first elements that characterized the democratization. Such a shift during the period from 1945-1955 was propelled by the spirit behind the Basic Law that called for guaranteeing the human rights of freedom, equality and fraternity.

With regard to government and authority, before 1945 the Germans believed in unconditional submission and obedience to the government, the authority and the leader. They trusted in and gave blind support to Hitler.308 After 1945, they gradually developed a more

308 Baker, Kendall L., Dalton, Russell J., Hildebrandt, Kai. Germany Transformed: Political Culture and New Politics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England 1981, pp. 3-5, pp. 6-7; Glees, Anthony. Reinventing Germany: German Political Development since 1945, Berg, Oxford, Washington D.C. 1996, pp. 1-14, p. 26. 119 critical view toward the government, authority and leadership.309 The change started in 1945, intensified during the subsequent ten years, and became a constant component characterizing the relationship between the Germans and their government through the 1960s and beyond.

With regard to political and social institutions, before 1945 the Germans accepted their authoritarian, indoctrinated, exclusive, unrepresentative, centralized character as something normal. Political institutions reflected the culture of power centralization, skewed representation, centralized control, authoritarian decision-making, indoctrination, irrationality and a warlike orientation. They were controlled by the military circles and the bureaucracy and practiced the exclusion of non-German groups and the conduct of powerful propaganda and indoctrination.

Social institutions also reflected the culture of an authoritarian and militarist mindset and of indoctrination and control. The family, the educational system and the media were dominated by the ideology of National Socialism. From the family and the school system to civil and military public services and communities, none of these channels propagated compromise, and all inspired militarism, exclusion and an authoritarian mindset and were characterized by social, cultural, class and religious cleavages.310

After 1945 the Germans actively participated in the creation of political and social institutions away from authoritarian and exclusive patterns and indoctrination, toward institutions that were more democratic, representative, inclusive and tolerant. This change took a strong push during 1945-1955 with the creation of the new political institutions within the Basic

Law. It was taken further during the 1960s and the 1970s when German society and democracy faced a number of problems related to governance and democracy.

309 Baker, Kendall L., Dalton, Russell J., Hildebrandt, Kai. Germany Transformed: Political Culture and New Politics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England 1981, pp. 6-7, pp. 28-30, p. 36; 310 Ibid., pp. 3-5; 120

The changes that took place in terms of values and beliefs about political rights, civil liberties, government and authority, and political and social institutions were important to the democratization of postwar Germany in two major ways: they helped the change in behavior and attitudes toward the rules, processes, outcomes and institutions and also helped the development of new standards of evaluation of the government and leadership.

With regard to individual responsibility to participate in public affairs, before 1945 the

Germans believed in local loyalty and passivity over activism. Individual participation in the public sphere reflected the absence of a developed civil society, the control of the Nazi Party over the existing channels of participation, and their dependence on the state. The lower and upper classes that occupied and dominated the public sphere did not work toward helping the building of social trust and norms, facilitating coordination and cooperation, providing solution to conflicts through diversity, deliberation, cooperation and restrain but embraced the Nazi ideology and the militarization agenda.

After 1945, especially during 1945-1946, the Germans felt detached and lacked the desire for participation. During 1946-1948, however, the population moved increasingly to gaining a new sense of civic duty, individual responsibility and active participation.311 Basic Law created opportunities for participation releasing the individual from authoritarian tutelage and affording him greater opportunities for self-realization. This revival of the sense of active participation was expressed in the first 1949 general elections and was developed further in the 1950s and onward.312

311 Almond, Gabriel A., Verba, Sidney. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963. 312 Baker, Kendall L., Dalton, Russell J., Hildebrandt, Kai. Germany Transformed: Political Culture and New Politics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England 1981, pp. 6-7, pp. 28-30, p. 36; 121

With regard to attitudes toward social change, before 1945 the Germans had an adverse attitude toward the Weimar Republic and refused to accept it as legitimate.313 They did show the willingness to change but channeled this will toward the acceptance and support of Nazi ideology, leadership and agenda.314 After 1945, the Germans again embraced the change, this time willingly and toward democracy.

The shift toward democratic values and beliefs was not easy but it reflected the efforts of the Allied Forces and the Germans themselves. The Allies contributed to this shift in four major ways: 1) their physical presence, 2) the influence of American art, economic dynamism, self- government and pop culture on the German population and youth, 3) personal encounters, educational and cultural exchanges, and 4) the introduction of Germans to western concepts on the role and relations between the state and individual, rights, freedom, liberties, and property.

The Allies invited elites to become part of the emerging democratic system: they engaged many bureaucrats, reestablished social networks, and paid attention to German religious institutions.

The Germans also did their own part in this process. Three things were important to this change during the period from 1945-1949: 1) the CDU appeal to human dignity and the

313 Glees, Anthony. Reinventing Germany: German Political Development since 1945, Berg, Oxford, Washington D.C. 1996, pp. 1-14; Baker, Kendall L., Dalton, Russell J., Hildebrandt, Kai. Germany Transformed: Political Culture and New Politics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England 1981 p. 21; Berg-Schlosser, Dirk., De Meur, Gisele. Conditions of democracy in interwar Europe: A Boolean test of major hypothesis, Comparative Politics, April 1994, pp. 253-279; De Meur, Gisele., Berg-Schlosser, Dirk. ―Conditions of authoritarianism, Fascism, and democracy in interwar period,‖ Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 29, No 4, August 1996, pp. 423-468; Lehnert, D., Megerle, K. (eds.) Fragmented Political Culture Between Integration and Polarization, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990; 314 Moore, Barrington Jr. Social Origin of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, Beacon Press, Boston, 1966, pp. 433-453; Glees, Anthony. Reinventing Germany: German Political Development since 1945, Berg, Oxford, Washington D.C. 1996, 1-14; Berg-Schlosser, Dirk., De Meur, Gisele. ―Conditions of democracy in interwar Europe: A Boolean test of major hypothesis,‖ Comparative Politics, April 1994, pp. 253-279; De Meur, Gisele., Berg-Schlosser, Dirk. ―Conditions of authoritarianism, Fascism, and democracy in interwar period,‖ Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 29, No 4, August 1996, pp. 423-468; Lehnert, D., Megerle, K. (eds.) Fragmented Political Culture Between Integration and Polarization, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990; 122 foundations of Western Christian culture, 2) the acceptance by the Catholic Church, progressive intellectuals and practical businessmen that democracy and Christian values could get along and

3) creation of the opportunities for young people, like Helmut Kohl, to actively participate in democratic politics. This new basis of democratic values and beliefs helped Germany and

Adenauer in the 1950s and onward to deal successfully with the extra-parliamentary movements and extremist groups and keep Germany democratic.

3.2.2 Behavior and Attitudes

The change of character of behaviors and attitudes during the years 1945-1949 is another factor that indirectly contributed to the democratization of postwar Germany through changes it brought in institutional functioning and development. These changes are reflected in the way and character of the functioning of the government and political institutions. The latter can be democratic only if the behaviors and attitudes characterizing the actors populating and making them work are also democratic. The change of behaviors and attitudes contributed in two ways:

1) directly, they influenced the strengthening of the democratic character and functioning of the government, political institutions and state, 2) indirectly, they helped democratization of the postwar political culture and German democracy. In addition, the change of the character of attitudes and behavior made it easier for the Allied Forces to create and develop a political regime of democratic government, political institutions and state.

Two things make the change important. First, the change of attitudes and behaviors toward civic, peaceful and democratic patterns occurred despite the obstacles that accompanied the change. The latter started in 1945, intensified from 1945-1949 and strengthened even further from the 1950s onward. Second, the change of attitudes and behaviors moved from initially

123 being limited to some segments of the German population, especially among young Germans, during 1945-1949, toward encompassing more segments of the population and society by the

1950s.315

Germans started the change of behavior and attitudes facing five obstacles that echoed the influence of pre-1945 patterns of Nazi dictatorship and the military defeat. The first consisted of the persisting patterns of authoritarian thinking and behavior. Distrust, outright skepticism, rejection of government and the habit of non-participation kept dissatisfaction and political apathy alive.316 The second obstacle consisted of the retreat of Germans into their own private life, the fight for survival and their struggle with the dilemma of whether they should view the new imposed regime as an onerous obligation or opportunity.317 Except for a few young people who joined the emerging parties and actively participated, most Germans, disappointed with the

Nazis, and confused about which party to trust, did not want anything to do with politics, and persisted in maintaining ―a without-me attitude.‖ The third obstacle was a mixture of resentment, fear and hope toward foreign occupation and military government: Germans did lament being occupied and forced to reshape their patterns of behavior. The fourth obstacle was the dilemma of choosing between the Western model of the free world and the Eastern model of socialist humanism. Both Soviet and American models promised democracy, but the realities in practice differed. The fifth obstacle consisted of the identity crisis following the defeat. The majority of

315 Olick, Jeffrey K., Levy, Daniel. ―Collective memory and cultural constraint: Holocaust myth and rationality in German politics,‖ American Sociological Review, December 1997, Vol. 62, pp. 925-928; Glees, Anthony. Reinventing Germany: German Political Development since 1945, Berg, Oxford, Washington D.C., 1996, p. 66; Baker, Kendall L., Dalton, Russell J., Hildebrandt, Kai. Germany Transformed: Political Culture and New Politics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England 1981, p. 6, 6-7, 37. 315 Baker, Kendall L., Dalton, Russell J., Hildebrandt, Kai. Germany Transformed: Political Culture and New Politics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England 1981, pp. 6-7. 316 Almond, Gabriel A., Verba, Sidney. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Princeton, 1963. 317 OMGUS, ―Political Situation,‖ 1–2, Report of the Military Governor, No. 1, August 1945. 124

Germans displayed a fractured identity to the point that high-school graduates rejected any identification as Germans.318

Two features characterize the change of behavior and attitudes from authoritarian toward democratic patterns. First, the shift was reflected in four main respects: 1) the attitude toward others, 2) the predisposition for showing trust or distrust, 3) the attitude toward the rules and institutions and 4) the evaluation of government and leadership. Second, the shift reflected the efforts of both the Allied Forces and Germans themselves.

With regard to attitudes toward others, before 1945 Germans were characterized by intolerance, hatred, and violence toward others. After 1945, they became more tolerant toward diversity and the opinions of others.319 The Basic Law helped this change by offering crucial protection for nonconformist individuals and critical groups. By the late 1940s, appreciation of the importance of freedom of opinion and human rights had grown stronger. Polls also show an abandonment of association with the ideology of National Socialism. While at the beginning of

1945, more than 50% of Germans viewed National Socialism as a good idea carried out poorly, between the summer of 1945 and fall of 1946 rejection of the extremes of National Socialism and Communism tripled from 22% to 66%.320 The framework created by the Basic Law became important not only during the 1945-1949 period but also during the 1960s and the 1970s when the German government, leadership and society had to deal with a diversity of social movements, opinions and demands.

318 Jarausch, Konrad H. After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 66, 130. 319 Olick, Jeffrey K., Levy, Daniel. ―Collective memory and cultural constraint: Holocaust myth and rationality in German politics,‖ American Sociological Review, December 1997, Vol. 62, pp. 925-928; Glees, Anthony. Reinventing Germany: German Political Development since 1945, Berg, Oxford, Washington D.C. 1996, p. 66. 320 Merritt Anna J., Merritt, Richard L. Public Opinion in Occupied Germany, p. 39, 178–179, 286, 294, 307, 314; Merritt Anna J., Merritt, Richard L. Public Opinion in Semi-sovereign Germany, p. 43, 57, 61, 71, 75, 116, 123–124, 147, 150, 154. 125

With regard to a predisposition for showing trust or distrust, before 1945, Germans had shown trust to the leadership of Hitler and distrust toward non-Germans. After 1945, they had to deal with their disappointment with Hitler and Nazi Regime. There was an increase of trust in government, but not in individual leaders. While a minority continued to call for strong leadership, most put their faith in the people, not the experts, and preferred self-government.321

However, they did develop trust in new arising German leaders, as expressed in the acceptance of the values of Adenauer, Erhard and Schumacher. From 1945-1949 the Germans saw in

Adenauer the leader untainted by Nazi past and crimes.322

With regard to attitudes toward the rules, processes, outcomes and institutions, before

1945 the Germans got accustomed to violation of the rules and institutions, obedience to the will of Hitler and Nazi party rather than the law and disrespect for fair rules and procedures. After

1945, the attitude changed toward the respect for new democratic rules, procedures, outcomes and institutions. The Germans accepted the division of power, vertically and horizontally, among several level and branches of government, as specified by the Basic Law. From 1949-1955, when the Allies replaced military governors with high commissioners and invited Germans to participate in governance, the Germans started to practice the respect for the rules, the processes and institutions and exercise of power.

With regard to evaluation of government and leadership, before 1945 the Germans were characterized by a high regard and evaluation of the authoritarian leadership and government.

After 1945, the change in evaluation of the government and leadership is characterized by two

321 Merritt Anna J., Merritt, Richard L. Public Opinion in Occupied Germany, p. 39, 178–179, 286, 294, 307, 314; Merritt Anna J., Merritt, Richard L. Public Opinion in Semi-sovereign Germany, p. 43, 57, 61, 71, 75, 116, 123–124, 147, 150, 154. 322 Olick, Jeffrey K., Levy, Daniel. ―Collective memory and cultural constraint: holocaust myth and rationality in German politics,‖ American Sociological Review, December 1997, Vol. 62, pp. 925-928; Glees, Anthony. Reinventing Germany: German Political Development since 1945, Berg, Oxford, Washington D.C., 1996, p. 66. 126 trends. One is the reevaluation and change of the view for their previous historical leaders and government. For instance, there was a decline of the positive evaluation for Bismarck and Hitler.

In 1951, three years before the end of the occupation, only 35% of the population had a positive evaluation for Bismarck and 10% for Hitler. In 1964, 9 years after the end of the occupation, the positive evaluation for Bismarck went down to 18%, for Hitler to 3%. The Germans also moved to recognize the responsibility of genocide committed by Germans against Jews and accepted the payment of reparations.323 The second trend is the increase of the positive evaluation for the new democratic Republic and satisfaction with the democratic government established in 1945.324

The evaluation moved from the skepticism that characterized Germans during 1945-1947, to the embrace in 1949 of the Federal Republic established by the Allies. In 1953, two years before the end of the occupation, 50% of Germans showed a positive evaluation for the Federal Republic.

In 1964, nine years after the end of the occupation, the percentage of Germans that had a positive evaluation for the Federal Republic increased to 75%.325

The shift in behaviors and attitudes reflected the efforts of the Allied Forces and the

Germans themselves. The Allies contributed to this shift through three major ways: 1) the change of initial policies, 2) the invitation of Germans to participate in government and 3) the encouragement and increase of exchanges between West and Germans. The Allied policies of collective guilt charges, bureaucratic denazification, reeducation, and other punitive actions were

323 Olick, Jeffrey K., Levy, Daniel. ―Collective memory and cultural constraint: holocaust myth and rationality in German politics,‖ American Sociological Review, December 1997, Vol. 62, pp. 925-928; Glees, Anthony. Reinventing Germany: German Political Development since 1945, Berg, Oxford, Washington D.C., 1996, p. 66. 324 Merritt Anna J., Merritt, Richard L. Public Opinion in Occupied Germany, p. 39, 178–179, 286, 294, 307, 314; Merritt Anna J., Merritt, Richard L. Public Opinion in Semi-sovereign Germany, p. 43, 57, 61, 71, 75, 116, 123–124, 147, 150, 154. 325 Baker, Kendall L., Dalton, Russell J., Hildebrandt, Kai. Germany Transformed: Political Culture and New Politics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England 1981, p. 6-7, 37. 127 of concern to many Germans. But, the Allies moved away from such policies, started to be pragmatic and deferred to suggestions made by German leaders; further, they invited Germans to cooperate and compromise at the municipal level. The French high culture, the civilized English lifestyle and the US culture of political influence, economic success and consumer-oriented habits did influence the emergence of new patterns of behavior and attitudes among Germans.

The Allies tried to convey Western ideas and attitudes through engaging German public figures, intellectuals and experts. The US, especially, tried to be as adaptive as it could in conveying

American culture and values.326 The Allies efforts made it easier for Germans to change their behavior and attitudes.

The Germans themselves contributed to the change of the attitudes and behaviors in three major ways: 1) by adjusting their view of the Allies, 2) by establishing, developing and intensifying social exchanges and economic relations with the West, and 3) choosing the West as the social, economic, political model to emulate. In 1945, being a defeated and occupied country,

Germans viewed the Allied Forces with a mixture of fear and hope. During the period from

1945-1947, Germans soon began to admire them, and oriented themselves toward Western

European countries, the US, and their cultures. Their admiration for the Allies increased especially during the 1948 crisis over Berlin between the US and the Soviet Union. During 1945-

1949, the Germans started to develop and increase the contacts, commerce, cooperation and tourist exchanges with the US, France, Netherlands, Belgium and other countries once occupied by them. Germans also began to look at US values, attitudes and behaviors as a model to be followed both by German elites and by the population. The increased contacts with other

European countries and the orientation toward the Western model of lifestyle and thinking,

326 Smith, Jean Edwards. The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany, 1945-1949, Indiana University, 1975; Berghahn, Volker R. America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy, Princeton University Press, 2001. 128 helped Germans move away from nationalistic prejudices toward friendship and respect, and begin to think of themselves as an integral part of Western Europe and develop their own liberal tradition and spirit.

3.2.3 Institutional Culture and Patterns

The change of institutional culture and patterns is a third element contributing to the democratization of postwar Germany. Institutional culture and patterns reflects the values and beliefs, and behaviors and attitudes among the political elites, individual leaders or political groupings, at the level of political institutions, government and state. The character of values and beliefs as well as the attitudes and behaviors that drive the elites is reflected in the way that political institutions are organized and function, the way power is distributed and exercised, the style of governing, the ability of government and leadership to adapt to various social and political developments and the practices of policy and decision-making.

The change in functioning of political institutions helped democratization in two major ways: 1) it reshaped the relations between the citizens and the government on a democratic basis that reflected the wishes and interests of German society and generated political stability and 2) it made it easier for the Allied Forces to advance their agenda of democratization and end the occupation of Germany.

The change in functioning of political institutions is important for two reasons. First, the change, to a large extent, depends on and reflects the willingness among the elite to change the values and beliefs and behaviors and attitudes standing on the basis of their actions. Second, the change makes the government and governance more democratic and responsive to the demands and dynamics. In the case of postwar Germany, this change was important for two reasons: 1)

129 because of the negative influence of the authoritarian tradition inherited by Nazi Germany and 2) because of the need for a radical change in the functioning of political institutions, government and state.

Germany started its democratization in 1945 inheriting a strong tradition of authoritarian patterns. The change is characterized by two elements. First, the new institutional functioning builds on the embrace and practice of new democratic patterns in five major aspects: 1) the character of political institutions, government, and state 2) the approach of power, 3) the style of governance, 4) the adaptability to the management of various situations and crisis and 5) the patterns of policy-making and decision-making. The second element consists of the role played by the Allied Forces and the German elite themselves. The Allied Forces established the legal and institutional framework that facilitated the democratization of the institutional tradition whereas the German elites embraced such a framework and moved toward developing a new tradition of institutional functioning.

With regard to the character of political institutions, government and state, before 1945 while Germany held elections and the majority of Germans participated in voting, the government lacked a genuine representative character because of repressive and suppressive practices. After 1945, starting with the 1949 elections and onward, the government changed its representative character from a pseudo to a genuine one. 327

With regard to approach to power, before 1945 the Germans viewed the centralization of power at the hands of Hindenburg and Hitler as a normal reality and practice. After 1945, the constitutional framework of the Basic Law guaranteed the distribution of power among many centers and the exercise of power through a system of checks and balances. At the federal level,

327 Glees, Anthony. Reinventing Germany: German Political Development since 1945, Berg, Oxford, Washington D.C. 1996, p. xxi; 130 while the Chancellor enjoyed significant powers, his powers were checked by the Federal

Bundestag. In addition, a system of decentralized power regulated the relations between the

Federal, Lander, and local levels of government. 328

With regard to style of governance, before 1945 it was characterized by lack of attention to the interests and demands from various social groups. The governance was driven by and reflected the interests of the Junkers and the upper militarist classes. After 1945, especially after

1949, when the Federal Republic was created and the German elites took over the governance, the later and other institutions opened toward listening to all social groups and strata and including their interests in the policy-making process. 329

With regard to adaptability to various situations, before 1945 the institutional culture was characterized by rigidity and discipline. Hitler refused to acknowledge the heavy defeat of the

Wehrmacht in Stalingrad and contrary to the suggestion by his general he insisted on attacking the Soviet troops. Hitler refused to acknowledge the dire situation even as both the Soviet and

Allied troops were entering Berlin. After 1945, the German government and other institutions moved to become open to change and adaptability to new situations, social demands and pressures. From 1949-1955 they adopted to the rise of the tension between West and East

German states. During the 1960s and the 1970s they showed flexibility to both domestic and international crises.330

With regard to policy and decision-making practices, before 1945 they were driven by authoritarian methods and practices. After 1945, German political institutions moved toward managing problems, issues, decision-making and crisis without resorting to authoritarian methods and attitudes. This change was initiated in 1945, developed further during 1945-1949

328 Ibid. 329 Ibid. 330 Ibid. 131 under the military government and governors, and was intensified during 1949-1955, as German elites became part of the military government and was observed especially during the 1960s-

1970s.331

The change in the tradition of the functioning of political institutions, government and state reflected the efforts of both the Allied Forces and the German elites themselves. The Allied

Forces helped this change in three major ways: 1) by creating a democratic legal and institutional framework, 2) by providing security and stability and 3) by incorporating gradually the new arising German political elite to the management of new democratic government and state. The new arising German elite contributed to the change of tradition of institutional functioning and development in two ways: 1) by changing the values and beliefs and behavior and attitudes on the basis of their actions and 2) by accepting to play according to new democratic rules and practices.

3.2.4 Political Participation

The change of character of the political participation is a fourth factor important to the democratization of postwar Germany. During 1945-1949, especially from 1950 onward, it helped democratization in three ways. First, participation helped the development of a diverse and democratic character of politics. It became open to all Germans, from all walks of life, which effectively ended the Nazi practices of exclusion and discrimination. Second, it contributed to the fairness of the electoral processes and competition and the public distillation of political ideas. It served for the consolidation of trust in the CDU and Adenauer‘s leadership, both strong defenders of the Western model of democracy. Third, it helped Germans to accept, absorb, develop and practice political participation along the democratic standards and parameters. In

331 Ibid. 132 addition, the change in the character of political participation made it easier for the Allied Forces to succeed in creating and developing a new democratic German society and political system.

Two things make important the role and influence of this change. One is the extent of the participation. In 1945, defeated and occupied as Germans viewed themselves, they either did not think about participating in politics or were reluctant. After 1945, only a few groups and a small segment of the population actively participated in political life. During 1946-1949, however, the number of people participating in politics started to increase. As new political forces emerged and asked Germans for their vote, the participation marked a significant increase after 1949 elections and onward.332 The second element is the diversity of positions and perspectives that accompanied the increase of political participation. During the Nazi era, Germans did participate in political life and activities shaped and organized by Nazi regime. However, they were not allowed and they did not express views different from those propagated and held by the Nazi regime.

Germans started democratization in 1945 inheriting a tradition of suppression and indoctrination of political participation that was typical for the Nazi regime. The change is characterized by two features. First, the change occurred in three main elements: 1) the channels of political participation, 2) the revival of the interest for participation in politics and 3) the alignment of the electorate. Second, the change was initially pushed by the Allied Forces and was taken further by German elites and the population themselves.

With regard to channels of political participation, before 1945 the participation of

Germans in politics reflected the fragmented character of the party system and the rise of the

Nazi party. Germans had no option but to follow the Nazi Party, be its member and defend the

332 Merritt Anna J., Merritt, Richard L. Public Opinion in Occupied Germany, p. 39, 178–179, 286, 294, 307, 314; Merritt Anna J., Merritt, Richard L. Public Opinion in Semi-sovereign Germany, p. 43, 57, 61, 71, 75, 116, 123–124, 147, 150, 154. 133 views of the Nazi Party and ideology of National Socialism. Political activities, the electoral process and voting were either suppressed or fraudulent.333 After 1945 the channels of political participation multiplied and the multiparty system was revived. The CDU and the SPD emerged as the two main political forces that channeled participation in politics of Germans. The system opened up to political competition among parties, groups, ideas and perspectives.

With regard to revival of the interest for participation in politics, before 1945, the rise of the Nazi party and ideology, the practices of intimidation and imposition of the Nazi will and overall indoctrinated environment that surrounded Germans, made many Germans embrace Nazi politics. There were, however, a small number of Germans that either expressed disagreement with Nazi politics, as Adenauer did, or retreated in apathy and non-participation. After 1945, in the immediate months following the occupation, disillusioned with the results of Nazi politics and the fate of Nazi regime, shattered psychologically by the military defeat and occupation and fearing the Allied Forces the majority of Germans remained reluctant to engage in politics. The interest in participation started to change and increase gradually during the period from 1946-

1949 even though in 1948, one year before the first general elections, only 40% of the population showed interests in participation in politics or advocated democracy as the preferred form of government.334 From 1945-1949, the Germans, gradually but steadily, started to move from apathy and non-participation to active citizenship. While a discrepancy between the practice of voting and inner reservations against democracy continued to exist, there was also an increase in political participation expressed in involvement in politics by working in a campaign, lobbying

333 Glees, Anthony. Reinventing Germany: German Political Development since 1945, Berg, Oxford, Washington D.C., 1996, pp. 1-14; Sani, Giacomo., Sartori, Giovanni. ―Polarization, fragmentation and competition in Western democracies,‖ Acta Politica, Vol. 12, 1985, pp. 346-377. 334 Merritt Anna J., Merritt, Richard L. Public Opinion in Occupied Germany, p. 39, 178–179, 286, 294, 307, 314; Merritt Anna J., Merritt, Richard L. Public Opinion in Semi-sovereign Germany, p. 43, 57, 61, 71, 75, 116, 123–124, 147, 150, 154. 134 and questioning government and leadership. In 1953, two years before the end of the occupation, the number of Germans participating in or getting involved in politics increased to 50%.335 The trend toward an increasing interest in participation in politics was intensified even after the official end of the military occupation. It continued after the 1960s when Germans increased their participation in politics through membership in various organizations or participation in various protests. The participation took massive proportions as expressed in the popular movement against rearmament, which gathered between four to five million signatures with the help of churches, unions, and intellectuals.336

With regard to electorate alignment, before 1945 such a process was either suppressed or fraudulent.337 The majority of Germans aligned with the Nazi Party whereas those who refused to do so were either kept under strict surveillance and sent to concentration camps or eliminated physically. After 1945, there was a revival of the dynamics of alignment and realignment of the electorate. The process of realignment became more evident after the creation of new political parties, as the later started to appeal to Germans for their vote. In the 1949 elections the SPD and the CDU shared the same percentage of the electorate whereas Communist and Nazi parties collected 7.5% of votes. In the 1953 elections, the electorate alignment shifted to the right, toward the CDU, giving the latter a clear victory. In 1957, two years after the end of the occupation, the electorate aligned in its major part with the CDU, giving to the CDU an absolute

335 Baker, Kendall L., Dalton, Russell J., Hildebrandt, Kai. Germany Transformed: Political Culture and New Politics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England 1981, p. 44; Almond, Gabriel A., Verba, Sidney. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Princeton, 1963. 336 Merritt Anna J., Merritt, Richard L. Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The OMGUS Surveys, 1945–1949, Urbana, 1970; Merritt Anna J., Merritt, Richard L. Public opinion in semi-sovereign Germany: The HICOG Surveys, 1949–1955, Urbana, 1980. Jarausch. Konrad H. After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 38. 337 Glees, Anthony. Reinventing Germany: German Political Development since 1945, Berg, Oxford, Washington D.C. 1996, 1-14; Sani, Giacomo., Sartori, Giovanni. ―Polarization, fragmentation and competition in Western democracies,‖ Acta Politica, Vol. 12, 1985, pp. 346-377. 135 majority and putting the SPD in opposition. The Communist and Nazi parties did not even make it into the parliament.338

The change of the character of political participation reflected the role of the Allied

Forces and the Germans themselves. The Allies helped democratization of the political participation in three ways: 1) by assisting in and creating a party system along democratic standards, 2) by encouraging Germans to participate in politics and 3) by showing strong support for pro-Western forces such as Konrad Adenauer and CDU. Germans contributed to democratization of political participation in two ways: 1) by throwing away the fear, apathy and reluctance to participate in politics and 2) by choosing to give their support to pro-Western and pro-democratic forces.

3.2.5 Civil Society

The revival of civil society is the fifth element important to the democratization of postwar Germany. It reflected the readiness of the Germans to fill the space between the individual, the government and state, speak on behalf of the interests of the individual and the public, protect the individual from the government and state and serve as a watchdog of the performance and activity of the government and state. It helped democratization of postwar

Germany in two major ways: 1) by serving as a check on the actions of government, and 2) by providing a medium for various individuals and groups express their views, advance their cause or pressure the government to take actions that otherwise it would not have taken. In addition, the revival of civil society made it easier for the Allied Forces to advance the agenda of democratization.

338 Baker, Kendall L., Dalton, Russell J., Hildebrandt, Kai. Germany Transformed: Political Culture and New Politics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England 1981, pp. 6-7. 136

Two elements make the revival of civil society important to the democratization of postwar Germany. One is the readiness of the Germans to move away from the authoritarian format of relations between the individual and the government and state. The other element is the readiness to model the new civil society along the democratic standards of Western democracy.

Germany started its democratization in 1945 inheriting a reality of a strongly indoctrinated society. The change of the character of the relations between the German state and

German society is characterized by two dynamics. First, the revival and civil society occurred in three main dimensions: 1) the number and activity of civic organizations, 2) the media and 3) the public sphere. The second dynamic reflects the combined efforts of the Allies and the Germans themselves in reviving the civil society.

With regard to civic organizations, before 1945 they either were absent, or the few ones that existed were either suppressed or became identical with the Nazi party, ideology and state.

After 1945, civic organizations are characterized by three dynamics. One is the increase of their number and diversity. During 1945-1949, a number of organizations, such as the ―Action

Committee against the Fifth Column,‖ the ―Task Force Against Inhumanity,‖ the ―Federation of

Free Jurists,‖ or the ―Eastern Office of the SPD‖ emerged as active and powerful voices within

German society.339

The second dynamic is the development of a civil society independent from the state.

Most of civic organization, from 1950s and onward, during the last years of the occupation and after its end, grew critical to government and leadership. They became a strong critic to

Adenauer about the way he had managed the Spiegel Affair, involving his Minister of Defense

339 Baker, Kendall L., Dalton, Russell J., Hildebrandt, Kai. Germany Transformed: Political Culture and New Politics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England 1981, pp. 6-7. 137

Franz-Joseph Strauss, and forced Adenauer to declare in 1962 his resignation and retreat from the political life.340

The third dynamic is the engagement of civil society on various issues of interest for

German society and democracy. During 1945-1949 the new civic organizations that emerged aimed at moving German society beyond cleavages.341 During the 1950s some organizations focused on defending the free constitutional state, based on the rule of law whereas other organizations such as the ―Working Group for German Understanding‖ focused on defending the interests of German workers and social groups by publishing appeals against the Western approval of the Schuman Plan, the signing of the General Treaty and the plans of the EDC. Other organizations served as a barrier against political extremism of the left and warned against the penetration of the Federal Republic by some 200 Communist front organizations steered and financed by Communists. On August 17, 1956 the Federal Constitutional Court declared the

Communist Party as unconstitutional.

With regard to the media, before 1945 it was dominated by Nazi ideology, it served the

Nazi aggressive and militarist agenda and lacked the freedom of expressing views and analysis different from those of Nazi propaganda. After 1945 the revival of a pluralist media is characterized by three developments. One is the gradual increase in the number of media outlets.

During 1945-1949 the Allies kept a strong control on the rise and development of new media channels. However, upon the reception of the Allies permission, the new German media emerged and developed. By the early 1950s, the opinions in leading outlets such as Die Zeit, Der

Spiegel, Panorama and Konkret, began to grow more liberal. By exposing scandals and leveling

340 Ibid. 341 Ibid. 138 criticism at the government they served as a counterweight to the government‘s attempts to manipulate the German public.

With regard to the public sphere, before 1945 it was manipulated and dominated by Nazi propaganda. After 1945, there is a revival of the public sphere. This revival, while less observable during 1945-1949, became an important element of German society during the 1950s, especially during the 1960s, when German democracy and government faced a number of challenges. It was accompanied by two characteristics. One is the increasing number of intellectuals and public voices participating in the public life and shaping the public debate. The second characteristic is the growing spirit of criticism and debate on issues linked to German democracy. Intellectual circles, like the famous ―Group 47,‖ publicly analyzed the shortcomings of postwar German individuals and society and spoke out and defended human rights. In the

1960s notions of social self-determination, civic freedom, conditions for democracy, Germany‘s modernization deficits and democratization as a process were at the center of attention.342

The revival and development of an open and active civil society was a result of efforts made both by the Occupation Authority and by the Germans themselves. The Allied Forces influenced and helped the emergence or reconstitution of new democratically oriented civic organizations, media and public sphere in three ways: 1) by establishing the control over organizations, media and public sphere to cleanse them of Nazi ideas, practices and culture and not allow the emergence and spread of non-democratic ideas, 2) by orienting new German elites and population toward Western ideas, values, mindset, practices and culture and 3) intensifying exchanges between the Germans and the West. The Allied Forces moved toward turning individual encounters into solid acquaintanceships, transforming informal networks into bilateral

342 Habermas, Jürgen. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, MIT Press, 1991; Dahrendorf, Ralf. Society and Democracy in Germany, W.W. Norton & Co. 1979. 139 organizations and allowing Germans to become members of American clubs and associations such as "Atlantic Bridge,‖ "Rotary,‖ ―Lions‖ or ―Kiwanis.‖ The US succeeded not only in cultivating sympathy for the ―American way of life‖ in Germany, but also in helping them construct their own civil society and public sphere.

The Germans contributed to the democratization of the civil society in two major ways:

1) by orienting themselves toward and absorbing the Western spirit and mindset and 2) by giving support to the new civic society and public sphere and turning them into an intermediary channel of communication between the German society and the German state.

3.2.6 Attitude toward Change

The willingness to embrace the democratic change is the sixth factor important to the democratization of postwar Germany. It reflected the effect of the military defeat and occupation but it helped democratization through the readiness and openness of the German elites and the population to embrace the political change and social transformation.

The attitude toward change was important to the democratization of postwar Germany for two reasons. First, it was not an easy process, especially for Germans of the older generation.

The change itself is not a result of a simple, one-way direction; instead, it represents a controversial, long-term process. Second, a process of change started in 1945 but it depended not only on what the Allied Forces wanted to do but also on how German elites and the population would react. The Allied Forces imposed their own roadmap for postwar Germany, but it was up to Germans to decide whether to embrace or resist the change.

Initially, under the psychological shock of the defeat, some resisted the change. Germans viewed the military government with suspicion. However, by the end of the 1940s Germans

140 definitively embraced the change and democratization. By 1953, the approval for the government stabilized at the level of 70% for the entire German population.343

To summarize, political culture helped the democratization of postwar Germany through changes that occurred in values and beliefs, behavior and attitudes, institutional functioning and development, political participation and civil society. The changes that took place reflected not only what the Allied Forces did, but also what the German themselves did.

3.3 Security Environment and Post-1945 Germany

The security environment, internal and external, during 1945-1949 was, in general, stable. This helped democratization in these years.

3.3.1 Internal Security Environment

Postwar Germany‘s internal security environment was characterized by stability and this helped democratization.344 Two factors contributed to stability: 1) the homogeneous character of the German population and 2) the role played by the Allied Forces. The homogeneity of the

German population helped the internal stability by not creating conditions for conflict among various ethnic, religious or minority groups. The Allied Forces helped the internal stability by establishing a democratic constitutional framework that 1) recognized political rights and

343 Gienow-Hecht, Jessica C. E. ―Shame on US? Academics, cultural transfer, and the Cold War: A critical review,‖ Diplomatic History, Vol. 24, 2000, pp. 465–494; Gienow-Hecht, Jessica C. E. Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945–1955, Baton Rouge, 1999. 344 The Center for Systemic Peace, in ―Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946-2008,‖ provides data for the security environment of Germany reflecting the activity of both external and internal factors related to security. CSP measures the level of threat to security from 1 (loWest) to 10 (highest). 0 denotes no evidence of threat to security. For Germany, the level of threat to security ranges between 2 and 0, that is, the level of threats to postwar Germany security ranges between low or absent. See www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm 141 liberties for all individuals and group, 2) restructured the model of power distribution and exercise and 3) created a democratic government and model of governance and policy-making.

This in turn helped the Allied Forces to successfully advance the agenda of democratization and the fast pace of democratization.

3.3.2 External Security Environment

The external security environment for post-war Germany was conducive to democratization for a few reasons. One was there was no war or major military confrontation on

German territory. Still, the possibility of military conflict with the Soviet block was significant.

Clearly, the series of Berlin crises, and a heavily armed central front in Europe, are examples of an external security threat. The US had huge security concerns with the Soviet Union. The efforts on the US to standup a German government that was counter to the East German one, to

German remilitarization under a civil-military that was democratic in nature, and to Germany‘s joining the democratic alliance were all part of the response to the security threat and also helped democratization. Thus, the military threat was real but it was addressed and such a security environment could be considered as conducive to - or at least not hurting - democratization.

Democratization of postwar Germany was also helped by the positive influence of four other elements related to external security: 1) the congruence of US and German national interests, 2) democratic realism in foreign policy, 3) the congruence of US and German view of international security and sources of stability and 4) the similar approach of relations between

West and East Germany and differences in regime type.

These elements, as shown in Appendix 2, Figure A2.3, helped the creation of a favorable security environment in two major ways. The compatibility of national interests helped the

142 pursuit of similar foreign policies. The similarity in the view of sources of international security and stability in postwar Europe helped the similar conceptualization and management of relations between West and East Germany. In turn, the similarity in the four aspects helped create a favorable environment for democratization of post-war Germany.

3.3.2.1 Conceptualization of National Interests

The character of national interests was one among four security factors important to the democratization of postwar Germany. National interests stand on the basis of the foreign policy that is conducted by a state. While from 1945 until 1949 Germany was run by the Allied military government and one can hardly speak of national interests, with the creation of the Federal

Republic in 1949, Germany re-defined and developed a new set of national interests. The re- conceptualization reflected the military defeat and occupation of Germany and was expressed in two dimensions: 1) the similarity in definition of national interests between the postwar Germany and the US and 2) the similarity in the positions taken by postwar Germany and the US. German leaders viewed their national interests very similarly to the way in which Washington would have liked them to view their national interests. This meant that Germany was not in any fundamental conflict with the US on its basic national interests.

The re-conceptualization of national interests during 1945-1955 helped democratization of postwar Germany in two major ways: 1) directly, it helped the construction of a foreign policy driven by democratic realism and 2) indirectly, it helped creation of a favorable security environment.

143

The positive effect of the redefinition of national interests was expressed in their orientation toward integration into Western Europe, commitment to the Western Alliance, membership in NATO, and service as a West-East bridge.345

Before 1945, Germany defined its national interests on the basis of ―continental realism‖ where three things mattered most: political power, military capabilities and territorial expansion and control.346

After 1945, given the defeat in World War II, the US occupation, the rise of the

Communist threat, and being at the frontline of the Cold War, Germany changed the definition of its national interests from a Germany-centered and a nationalist framework to a Europe-centered and supranational framework oriented toward four goals: 1) economic integration into Western

Europe, 2) political commitment to the Western Alliance, 3) military membership in NATO and

4) unification of Germany.347

With regard to economic integration into Western Europe, the pursuit of such orientation of the national interest became one of the main objectives of Adenauer and successive German governments from 1947 and onward. The view of national interests strongly linked to the economic integration influenced the pursuit of a German foreign policy that strongly supported

European integration. Starting with the 1950s and onward Germany became one of the driving forces behind European integration.

345 Williams, Charles. Konrad Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany (2001), p. 375; Jarausch, Konrad H. After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 57. 346 Walter Russell Mead, in Special Providence: American foreign policy and how it changed the world, A Century Foundation Book, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 2001, pp. 34-37. 347 Williams, Charles. Konrad Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany (2001), p. 375; Jarausch, Konrad H. After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 57. 144

With regard to the political commitment to Western Alliance and military membership to

NATO, all German governments from 1949 and onward, regardless of the slight variations in their orientations, viewed national interests as closely linked to the US. This view of national interests influenced the orientation of postwar German foreign policy toward strengthening the alliance with the US and France and commitment to the West and membership in NATO.348 This was the drive behind the national interests under Adenauer and it remained the same during the

1960s under the leadership of Erhard, Keisinger and Schmidt.

With regard to unification of Germany, this dimension also became and remained an important part of definition of the national interests of postwar Germany throughout all successive German leadership and governments regardless of their ideological affiliation. During the 1950s and the 1960s, Adenauer, Erhard, Keisinger and Schmidt all were driven by this goal but they refused to achieve it under the terms imposed by the Soviet Union. In the 1970s, Brandt linked the realization of the unification to détente and East-West coexistence whereas in the

1980s Kohl linked Germany‘s reunification to the strengthening of the alliance with the US,

Britain, and France and the deepening of European integration. The goal of unification of

Germany was helpful to the democratization of postwar Germany because it oriented the foreign

348 Adenauer believed that by giving support to the Schuman Plan for the creation of a coal and steel community, the agreement would end the unilateral Allied control over the Ruhr valley and establish peaceful relations between France and Germany. In the debate between ―Atlanticists‖ and ―Gaullists‖ on whether Germany had to emulate the Anglo-American or the French ―West model,‖ Adenauer tended to side with Atlanticists. However, he was convinced and maintained that Germany should develop good relations with both the US and France, regardless of diverging views among the two. While the SDP criticized it (although later it embraced it as well), Adenauer viewed Germany‘s membership in NATO as a step toward the ―restoration of German sovereignty.‖ Adenauer rejected the Soviet‘s proposal in early 1952 for unifying East and West German territories and declaring the resulting entity ―neutral.‖ Adenauer viewed unification possible through the Western Allies, democracy and freedom and not through the Soviets and Communist dictatorship. See Willis, Frank Roy. France, Germany and the New Europe, 1945–1967, Second Edition, London, 1968. 145 policy of Federal Republic of Germany toward the pursuit and development of peaceful relations with East Germany and other states.

Thus, the re-conceptualization and definition of national interests was an important factor and helped the democratization of postwar Germany because it created the favorable conditions for focusing the attention on issues and policies linked to democratization.

3.3.2.2 The Character of Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is the second factor important to democratization of postwar Germany. It influences the character and stability of security environment and interstate relations. One cannot speak of the existence of a genuine German foreign policy from 1945 until 1949 because

Germany was run by the Allied Forces. Since 1949, however, the foreign policy of postwar

Germany re-defined itself and became orientated toward democratic realism, which combined security and power concerns with democratic ideals. This new orientation reflected the military defeat and occupation of Germany and the re-conceptualization of national interests. The new foreign policy reflected two features.

One feature was the similarity of the foreign policy between postwar Germany and the

US since 1949. Both German and US foreign policies were realist in character and democratic in their perspective. The foreign policy of postwar Germany was not in fundamental conflict with the US in terms of its orientation. The other feature is the positive influence it exerted in creating a stable and favorable environment to the democratization of postwar Germany.

The re-conceptualization of foreign policy on the new basis of democratic realism helped democratization in three major ways. First, Germany, like the US, managed its interests in

Western Europe through peaceful means. Second, the peaceful drive behind Germany‘s postwar

146 foreign policy and the peaceful management of interstate relations contributed to the creation in

Western Europe of an environment and security characterized mostly by stability. Third, the stability in Western Europe contributed to the creation of a favorable environment for the democratization of postwar Germany. Thus, the propensity for peaceful relations, the stability and the favorable environment allowed Germany, and especially the US, to pay full attention to issues related to democratization rather than split it between democratization and security concerns.

The positive influence of the re-conceptualized foreign policy was expressed in its orientation toward four main directions: 1) the provision of full support for European integration,

2) the strengthening of the alliance with the US and France, 3) the membership in international regional and global organizations and 4) the pursuit of peaceful relations with other states in

Europe and around the world.

Before 1945, historically, German foreign policy was guided by Realpolitik, pursued initially by Bismarck, and later by Hitler, and characterized by a zero-sum game mindset, expansionism, a predisposition to challenge the international status quo, military threats, aggressiveness and the use of force, annexations, conflict and war.349

349 ―Realpolitik‖ is the German term for politics and diplomacy based primarily on power and practical, material interests rather than ideological, ethical, moral, idealistic and principled considerations. In Europe, it is mostly identified with the Continental realism of the 19th century powers such as Austria, Prussia, and France. It shares elements with realism and pragmatism, it implies policies that are coercive and free of morals, it is associated with the Machiavellian view, and sees relations among states as driven by interests and the quest for power, not benevolence and ideals. See Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World, A Century Foundation Book, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2001, pp. 34-35; Dalton, Russell J. ―Politics in Germany,‖ pp. 239-296, in Almond, Gabriel A., Bingham, Powell G. Jr., (eds.) Comparative Politics Today, a Worldview, Harper Collins Publishers, 1992, p. 241; See also Holborn, Hajo. History of Modern Germany: 1840-1945. Princeton University Press, 1982; Francis Diehl, Paul. (eds.), Reconstructing Realpolitik. University of Michigan Press, 1994. 147

After 1945, starting in 1949, German foreign policy moved away from 19th century

Realpolitik toward democratic realism and orientation of Germany toward integration into

Western Europe, peaceful neighborly relations, and membership in international organizations.

The reorientation was accomplished through Adenauer‘s western orientation, Erhard‘s military restraint, Brandt‘s Ostpolitik, Schmidt‘s community of peace, and Kohl‘s advanced European integration.350 Each strategy differed in terms of its priorities and emphases, but all of them build upon the awareness of three important realities: the relationship with the US and France, threats coming from Soviet power and ideology and a Germany that is demilitarized and integrated into

Western Europe.

With regard to European integration, alliance with the US and France, membership in international organizations, and the pursuit of peaceful relations with other states represented the most important features of German foreign policy during 1949-1960 under Adenauer. The latter aimed at restoring the position of West Germany on the world stage by tying West Germany to the West. Adenauer believed that West Germany should 1) be a firm ally of the United States, 2) come to terms and reconcile with France, 3) become a promoter of Western European integration and 4) firmly integrate itself politically and militarily into the emerging Euro-Atlantic community, such as NATO and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation

(OEEC).351

These orientations became a characteristic of the German foreign policy from 1949-1955 and after the end of occupation. They affected not only relations of Germany with other states but also European politics and stability. The effects of such orientations were felt throughout the

1960s, 1970s and 1980s as well.

350 Dalton, Russell J. ―Politics in Germany,‖ pp. 239-296, in Almond, Gabriel A., Bingham, Powell G. Jr., (eds.) Comparative Politics Today, a Worldview, Harper Collins Publishers, 1992, pp. 244-245. 351 Williams, Charles. Konrad Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany, 2001, p. 403. 148

Erhard‘s 1963-1966 foreign policy of military restraint, and Keisinger‘s 1966-1969 foreign policy of a dual approach aimed at pursuing a pragmatic approach in its relations with its

Western allies and with the East. Both built upon the efforts to keep Germany‘s armament within acceptable levels, not to engage Germany militarily in world affairs and to soften West

Germany's approach to the German question.352 Both were driven by the beliefs that Germany should 1) collaborate more with the US than with France, 2) achieve a ―modus vivendi‖ with

East Germany and 3) ease tensions with the Soviet Union.353

Brandt‘s 1969-1974 foreign policy of new Ostpolitik (New Eastern Policy) was aimed at improving relations between West Germany and East Germany, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet

Union.354 It rejected the Hallstein doctrine that had been a part of German foreign policy for more than a decade and pursued the rapprochement.355 It believed that 1) non-recognition of East

352 Due to increased security tensions between the US and the Soviet Union, developments in the Korean peninsula and increasing awareness that Germans needed to develop some self-defense capacities against a potential Soviet attack. By the end of the 1950s, the US started rearming West Germany. Part of such rearmament was the question of tactical atomic weapons. While the Federal Republic had explicitly renounced atomic, biological, and chemical weapons in the Paris Treaties, both Adenauer and his energetic Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauß wanted to gain some influence over this issue. Erhard‘s sensitivity to any international military involvement of Germany reflected German opposition to a new militarization of Germany, which had increased among the population from sixty-two percent in 1948 to seventy-two percent in the 1950s. In December 1965, following Lyndon Johnson‘s request for a German assistance with equipment and troops in the Vietnam war, Chancellor Erhard sent the hospital ship Helgoland and extended the access of South Vietnam to easy credit but refused to send combat troops, on the ground of Germany‘s restriction for engagement on international military affairs by the Basic Law. 353 Schoenborn, Benedikt. ―Bargaining with the bear: Chancellor Erhard‘s bid to buy German reunification, 1963-1964,‖ Cold War History, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2008, pp. 23-53. 354 Time Magazine. Willy Brandt, January 4, 1971. 355 Following the US refusal to establish diplomatic relations with the new Communist regimes, except the Soviet Union, the Hallstein Doctrine, named after the 1955 German Secretary of State, used the instrument of non-recognition and did not establish or maintain diplomatic relations with any state recognizing the German Democratic Republic, on the ground that the Federal Republic of Germany was the only legitimate representative of the German people. See Wendt, Hans. Hallstein Doctrine, Interview of Wilhelm Grewe, Head of the Political Department of the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany. NordWestdeutscher Rundfunk, December 1955; Rapprochement, a French word, refers to a change in the relations between two parties becoming closer and friendlier. Prior to being embraced by Brandt, it was first offered by Egon Bahr in 1963 as an attempt to break with Adenauer‘s policy pursued during the 1949-1969 period, when maintaining that West Germany was the only legitimate German government, he ignored and isolated the Communist regime of the German Democratic Republic. 149

Germany as a political reality was a practice harming West Germany in developing its policies around the world and 2) West Germany had to pursue a reconciliatory approach and offer cooperation to East Germany.356

Schmidt‘s 1974-1982 foreign policy of the community of peace was aimed at continuing the improvement of relations between the two German states and making West Germany an important factor of peace in Europe.357 It built on the notion of developing an internal dialogue with East Germany and was driven by the beliefs that Germany should 1) reduce tensions between East and West Germany, 2) improve relations with France, and 3) push for and promote a European security based on collective and institutionalized efforts and commitment.

Kohl‘s 1982-1998 foreign policy of advanced European integration aimed at advancing

Germany‘s interests within European institutions. It built upon the efforts to deepen European integration and the continuation of Ostpolitik and détente and it was driven by the belief that

Germany 1) can secure and advance its interests further through deepened European integration,

2) should continue to strengthen relations with the US and France and 3) should take and keep a hard-line approach to the Soviet Union. By 1989, when the Berlin wall went down and the

Soviet Union no longer opposed a unified Germany, Kohl led and oversaw the unification of both German states under the framework of the 1949 Basic Law.

Thus, the German foreign policy during 1949-1955 helped the creation of favorable conditions to democratization of postwar Germany by affiliating itself with democratic realism and pursuing similar orientation with the US foreign policy, even though the US foreign policy

356 Fink, Carol., Schaefer, Bernd. Ostpolitik, 1969–1974, European and Global Responses, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009. 357 Jarausch, Konrad H. After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 67. 150 was characterized by a global dimension of security concerns whereas German foreign policy was driven by local security concerns.

3.3.2.3 The View of Sources of International Security and Stability

The view and analysis of international security and the sources of stability is the third factor important to the democratization of postwar Germany. It is the basis on which the states manage neighbor relations and regime differences. It reflected the defeat and occupation of

Germany and it was expressed in the new way that German policymakers viewed international security and sources of stability in postwar Europe.

The view of international security and sources of stability by German policymakers during 1949-1955 is characterized by two features. One feature is the similarity and realist perspective of the analysis of postwar European security, politics and stability among the

German and US policymakers. The second feature is the similarity of actions accompanying the view and analysis of European security, politics and stability among the German and US policymakers.

In the view of US policy-makers, the post-1945 security environment in the world represented more a zero-sum than a win-win game. They viewed international relations and politics as dominated by concerns about the balance of power, and divergent and clashing interests and the arms race. The conditions were not conducive to cooperation and the stability was fragile.358 From Truman to Nixon, power and power balance remained the central concerns of the US administrations. In the view of German policymakers the security and stability in postwar Europe depended on and reflected the influence and role of five major factors: 1) the

358 Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy, Oxford University Press, New York, 1982, pp. 109-111. 151 confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union, 2) the development of nuclear weapons and the arms race, 3) the balance of power between West and East, 4) the divergent and clashing character of the interests and 5) the perceptions and miscommunication or lack thereof.

The similarity in analysis and actions among the German and US policymakers helped democratization in three major ways. First, it contributed to the development of a peaceful approach of interstate and neighbor relations. Second, it contributed to management of the differences in political regime in a peaceful way. Third, it contributed to creation of an international environment in Europe stable and prone to the preservation of peace. All together these actions allowed Germany and the US to focus their attention on issues linked to democratization.

The positive influence of the way the German and US policymakers analyzed international security, politics and stability was expressed in five major emphases: 1) the attention to a possible attack from the Soviet Union, 2) the avoidance of the nuclear holocaust, 3) the strengthening of Western political and military alliance, 4) the management of diverging interests, and 5) the development of the channels of communication.

With regard to threats from the Soviet Union, German policymakers viewed it as the most important factor influencing the security of Germany. Reflecting such awareness the actions of German policy-makers, after 1949 and onward, especially under Adenauer, consisted of avoiding any confrontation with the Soviet Union as the only way to preserve the Federal

Republic. The actions of all successive German government and leaders during 1949-1955 and after the end of the occupation, during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, were conditioned and shaped, to a large extent, by the threat from the Soviet Union.359

359 Geyer, Michael. ―The place of the Second World War in German memory and history,‖ New German Critique, No. 71, 1997, pp. 5–40. 152

With regard to the nuclear weapons and arms race, German policy-makers were also aware that any day could have been the day of the nuclear holocaust. They were aware that the shorter the range of the missiles, the deader the Germans were!360 From Adenauer to Kohl, all

German policymakers were aware that the interests of West Germany were best served by keeping a low military profile and an anti-militarist mindset. While Germany did host nuclear medium range missiles as part of its responsibilities as a member of NATO, it did not take its rearmament beyond a sufficient level of self-defense, and it did not get involved in military conflicts outside of West German territory.361 The armament was conducted on the logic of the defensive rather than offensive realism.

With regard to Western Alliance and balance of power between West and East the

German policymakers were aware of the importance of such alliance to West Germany. They viewed the latter as unable to survive without tying itself to the West, in particular, the US and

France. Based on such awareness, from 1945 and onward, they oriented themselves toward the

West for contact, commerce and cooperation. They developed cultural and economic relations with France and England and began to think of themselves as an ―integral part of Western

Europe.‖ This resulted in a Federal Republic that was more western and civic in character and way of life compared to the German states of previous centuries.

With regard to management of diverging interests, perceptions and interstate communication, the German policymakers were aware of the importance of the management of the relations between East and West German states. During 1949-1955 they refused to recognize the existence of East Germany. In the 1960s they started to believe that the future of their

360 Ibid. 361 The Federal Diet approved introduction of nuclear delivery systems in Germany following the 1958 ultimatum that Khruschev issued to Berlin. However, their installation, and the control of the warheads, remained within the Allied decision. See Bark, Dennis L., Gress, David R. A History of West Germany, Oxford, 1989, Vol. 1, pp. 366, 386, 399. 153 unification was better served by recognizing each other and developing peaceful relations rather than by stopping to communicate or even looking at each other. While the East and West

German states were officially reunified on October 3, 1990, their unification had started earlier in the minds of Eastern Germans, through the economic superiority, higher living standards, and political stability that West Germany had proven to have vis-à-vis East Germany.

The analysis and actions of postwar Germany policymakers, during 1949-1955 and after the end of the occupation, consisted of accepting the status quo, avoiding provocations and the escalation of conflicts into war and use of force, practicing the mutual accommodation and pursuing cooperation with other states in Europe. The stable and peaceful character of the security environment in Europe generated favorable conditions to make Germany and the US focus their attention on issues related to democratization. This, in turn, helped democratize postwar Germany.

3.3.2.4 Management of Neighborly Relations and Differences in Regime Type

The management of neighbor relations and regime differences is the fourth important factor contributing to democratization of postwar Germany. It influences the stability and peaceful character of the international environment. The management of neighbor relations and regime differences is characterized by a change in the way Germany acted. The behavior of

Germany changed from an aggressive to a peaceful mode of behavior. This change reflects two features: 1) the similarity between Germany and the US in the management of neighbor relations and regime differences and 2) a positive influence on Western European security environment of the way that Germany managed relations between East and West German states.

154

Both the US and West Germany dealt in similar ways with East Germany and the Soviet

Union. The common characteristic of their approach is that while both viewed and treated the

Soviet Union as an adversary and stood up to Soviet challenges, they did not provoke a conflict with them, nor did they allow the escalation of tensions into an open military conflict or war.

West Germany managed the neighborly relations and differences in regime with East Germany not through force but through acceptance of the status quo and mutual accommodation.

The management of neighborly relations and regime differences in a peaceful way helped the democratization of postwar Germany in two ways. First, it contributed to the development of peaceful and stable relations between East and German states regardless of the differences in ideology and political regime. Second, it promoted the stability and peaceful character of neighbor relations in Western Europe and contributed to the creation of a peaceful and favorable environment for the democratization of postwar Germany. The environment that was created allowed Germany and the US pay attention to the issues linked to the democratization of postwar

Germany.

The positive influence of the management of neighborly relations and regime differences is expressed in four main aspects of neighbor relations: 1) the acceptance of status quo, 2) the avoidance of provocations and escalation of conflicts into war, 3) the mutual accommodation of interests and 4) the pursuit of cooperation.

With regard to acceptance of status quo, this reflected the balance of the military power between the US and the Soviet Union and the diversity in terms of the goals and intentions. With the creation in 1949 of the Federal Republic, the Allies and German leadership accepted the status quo of de facto division of Germany into East and West. During 1948-1955, Adenauer hoped and aspired for unification of East and West but he never trusted the Soviets and turned

155 down Stalin‘s 1952 proposal for unification of Germany as a neutral state with its own, non- aligned national army.362 Adenauer did not see German reunification in 1952 as having a realistic chance and called it an experiment.363

With regard to avoidance of provocations and escalations of conflicts into war the behavior of West and East German states on the one hand and the US and the Soviet Union on the other were driven by three beliefs: 1) both sided possessed comparable military power in terms of troops, weapons and technology, 2) neither could prevail over the other and 3) should a minor provocation or conflict escalate into a war the outcome of such would be the same for both sides. Thus both sides were very attentive to avoid the transformation of the provocations into a larger conflict or war. Adenauer, on the one side committed Germany to NATO and to the alliance with the US on the other side he tried to avoid any confrontation with East Germany and the Soviet Union. This approach continued in the 1960s by his successor, Erhard.

With regard to mutual accommodation of interests, during the 1949-1955, after the de facto division of Germany into West and East, both sides accepted one another as they were. The

West-East confrontation forced Germans choose between a West Germany oriented toward the free world and an East Germany oriented toward building socialist society. West Germany touted liberal democracy, Christian values and rule of law whereas East Germany claimed to represent the real democracy for people. West Germany proved to be more attractive. Between 1950 and

September 1954, 1,584,000 people moved from the East to the West, while only 164,000 went in the opposite direction.

With regard to pursuit of cooperation, from 1949 onward successive German leadership and government viewed the cooperation with the East Germany and Soviet Union as necessary

362 Williams, Charles. Konrad Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany, 2001, p. 376. 363 Frum, David. How We Got Here: The 1970s, New York, New York: Basic Books, 2000, p. 8. 156 and multidimensional. During the period 1949-1955 the focus of cooperation was the unification of Germany whereas after the 1960s it extended into the economic, social and other areas. From

Erhard, the successor of Adenauer, to Brandt, Schmitt and Kohl pursued cooperation with East as a complementary for to advancing German interests.

Erhard‘s approach to the Soviet Union was based on his desire for more political liberty in East Germany and for making the reunification happen. While continuing to be a strong ally of the US and relying on US power, at the same time Erhard offered the Soviet Union massive economic aid in exchange for achieving his goals.

Breaking with the previous tradition of 20 years, Brandt moved to accept the existence of the German Democratic Republic as a political reality and choose to engage it rather than isolate it diplomatically and commercially. The essence of Ostpolitik was the attempt to address regime differences between West and East German states through normalization of relationships and the belief that the strains of the Cold War might be overcome. Eastern treaties with the Soviet Union and East Germany aimed at the renunciation of violence, demonstration of West Germany peacefulness, viewing German division as an internal conflict and initiating change through cooperation.

The policies of Schmidt and Kohl were characterized by a hard-line stance toward the

Soviet Union and a soft one toward the East German regime. They did not hesitate to support the installation of Pershing and Cruise medium-range nuclear missiles in the territory of West

Germany and develop friendly relations with East German leadership. Kohl became the promoter and was the signer of the 1990 treaty of unification of Germany.

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Thus, the patience and firmness that characterized the approach of the US and West

Germany toward the Soviet Union and East Germany helped the creation of a security environment favorable to democratization of postwar Germany.

To conclude, the harmony in terms of national interests, foreign policy, analysis of international politics and security and management of neighborly relations, all helped the democratization by creating a security environment that was favorable to the democratization of postwar Germany. The favorable environment allowed the US and German policymakers to proceed and advance with the democratization agenda.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the action and combined interaction of the goals, policies and commitment of the intervening power, the security environment and the political culture all helped the democratization of postwar Germany.

Democratization of Germany was one important goal of the Allied Powers, the Allies‘ policies made the democratization of Germany their top priority, and that the time and resources that the Allied Powers committed to the democratization were sufficient. The postwar political culture changed from authoritarian to democratic. This change was result of both the efforts made by the Allied Powers and the efforts made by German elite and the people themselves. The security environment, in all its components, also exerted a positive influence on democratization of Germany by creating a favorable environment.

The analysis also shows that the Allies‘ policies, the political culture dynamics and the security environment also influenced the influencing power of each other. It would have been more difficult for the Allies to have the impact they did have, had it not been for the willingness

158 of Germans themselves to respond positively to the actions undertaken by the Allied Powers and for the conducive security environment. The change in German political culture, and thus its positive influence upon democratization, would not have taken place without the Allied actions of cleansing the German minds and public sphere from non-democratic ideas and values and the circumstances and incentives created by the security tensions between the East and West German states. The security environment would not have created an environment favorable to democratization had the East-West conflict escalated into a military confrontation.

This analysis thus shows that the democratization of a regime through an exogenously imposed force could require, or benefit from the combination of the above conditions or, if they are absent, acting to create them.

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Chapter 4

Japan

4.0 Introduction

Post-1945 Japan differs in a distinguished way from pre-1945 Japan. Before 1945, its regime was hybrid and anocratic that combined weak autocratic with weak democratic elements.364 From 1945-1952 Japan was occupied by the US and went through a process of democratization. From 1952 and onward Japan became a strong democracy. This change is reflected in its polity scores: from +1 during 1868-1944 to democratization during 1945-1952 to

+10 from 1952 and onward.365 Postwar Japan moved to a democratic constitution, model of government, approach to power, party system and electoral practices (see in Appendix 3, Tables

A3.1 on regime scores and differences, A3.2, A3.4 and A 4.5 on the character of government and approach to power and A3.3 on party system and electoral practices).366 This chapter examines the role of the US occupation, the political culture and security environment in democratization of post-1945 Japan.

The next section looks at the US occupation of postwar Japan. The goals, policies and commitment of the US occupation helped democratization in four ways: 1) politically, by establishing a democratic constitutional framework, political institutions and transforming Japan into a peaceful nation, 2) socially, by cleaning the Japanese society from the militarist spirit and mindset and protecting it from the influence of communist ideology, 3) economically, by

364 To describe the regimes that combine autocratic and democratic elements, the Freedom House uses the term ―hybrid‖, whereas the Polity Project uses the term ―anocratic.‖ 365 Polity IV: Regime authority Characteristics and Transitions Datasets. Polity IV annual time-series 1800-2010 and Polity IVd case format 1800-2010, www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm 366 See the Appendix 3 for the democratic features of postwar Japan in terms of the constitutional framework, state and government, the institutional functioning, approach to power, political rights and participation, the election system and party politics, media and civil society, governance and policy- making and economic system and development. 160 creating the conditions for the revival of the economy and 4) militarily, by transforming Japan into a demilitarized and peaceful state.

The following section analyzes the role of political culture in the democratization of postwar Japan. It argues that it exerted a positive influence on democratization for two reasons:

1) the population showed the willingness to embrace the democratic political culture and 2) the occupation authorities invested themselves in democratizing the political culture of the elite when the later showed reluctance to do so. Political culture helped democratization of postwar

Japan in two ways: 1) by changing values and beliefs, behavior and attitudes, institutional functioning and development, political participation, civil society and attitudes toward change from non-democratic to a democratic and 2) by involving the population and the elite in democratization, even though initially, the elite was reluctant.

The final section explores the influence of the security environment. It argues that the security environment was favorable to democratization for two reasons: 1) the change in perspective, drive and behavior that occurred among the Japanese government and leaders and 2) the role of the US in helping Japan deal with its postwar security and re-engagement in Asia. It helped democratization through four elements: 1) the re-conceptualization of national interests from a basis of nationalism, power and imperialist ambitions to a basis of strong antimilitarism and peaceful orientation, 2) the change of foreign policy character from aggressive and driven by militarist and imperialist ambitions to peaceful and driven by democratic realism, 3) the analysis of Asian peace and stability from a perspective of pacifism and 4) the change of the way Japan managed relations with its neighbors from aggressiveness and force to pacifism and peaceful accommodation.

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As mentioned in Chapter 2, democratization is the process of moving from a non- democratic or weak democratic regime to a full and strong democratic regime, getting democratic under the military occupation and staying democratic for at least the first few years after the end of the military occupation. Thus, this discussion also covers the country staying democratic for at least the first few years after the end of the military occupation. Based on this definition, in Japan, democratization is analyzed principally in the years 1945-1952 when the polity score changed to +10 points and then for about a decade thereafter to the late 1950s when the polity score remained at this level and did not backslide. I, therefore, analyze all the independent variables of military occupation, political culture and security environment during these years. Democratization of Japan started in 1945 and was completed by 1952. Occupation is characterized by the preservation of the Emperor and bureaucracy and indirect governance by the military government.

4.1 The Allied Occupation of Post-1945 Japan.

The occupation of Japan officially started on September 2, 1945, when Japan signed the

Japanese Instrument of Surrender, and ended on April 28, 1952, when the San Francisco Treaty, signed on September 8, 1951 came into force.367

Officially, Japan was set under the control and directives of the Four-Nation Allied

Council, consisting of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China. In 1946 the

Allies created the Far Eastern Commission to act on their behalf. It consisted of eleven members, whose task was to formulate occupation policies, advise the Supreme Commander for the Allied

Powers (SCAP) and review SCAP actions. In practice, however, the occupation and management

367 On August 14, 1945 the Japanese government notified the Allies that it was about to surrender. On August 15, 1945 Emperor Hirohito announced it on radio. MacArthur and the US troops arrived in Tokyo on August 30, 1945 whereas the ceremony of the official surrender took place on September 2, 1945. 162 of postwar Japan was identified mostly with the US military government headed by General

Douglass MacArthur. He took orders from the US government and paid scant attention to the

Four-Nation Allied Council and the Far Eastern Commission. The US military government had different acronyms: sometimes GHQ (General Headquarters), other times SCAP, SCAP-GHQ, or simply GHQ. It ran Japan for eight years until 1952 when Japan regained its sovereignty.368

The occupation goals of changing political regime, demilitarizing Japan, transforming

Japanese society, economy and governance, the occupation policies of establishing a democratic constitutional framework, government model and political institutions, as well as policies of demobilization, disarmament, economic reconstruction and decentralization of governance; and the strong commitment by the US in terms of troops, duration of occupation and economic assistance, all helped democratization of Japan during 1945-1952.

The goals and commitment of the US shaped the scope and depth of policies pursed in

Japan in the same way they did in Germany. As Figure A4.1 in Appendix 4 shows, the goal of changing the political regime opened the way to policies that established a new democratic constitutional framework, government, political institutions and political culture. The goals of demilitarization and transformation of Japanese society, economy and governance opened the way to policies of demobilization, disarmament, economic restructuring and decentralization of governance. In addition, the implementation of policies was facilitated by a strong commitment by the US in terms of troops, duration and economic resources.

Democratization of Japan was also helped by pre-1945 democratic tradition of Japan and the embrace of the Allied policies by the population and the elites.

368 On August 8, 1951 Japan and the US signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The treaty came into force on April 28, 1952, marking the return of sovereignty to Japan. 163

4.1.1 Occupation Goals.

An analysis of the most important documents issued by the US government from 1945-

1948 about the occupation of Japan reveals five major goals: demilitarization, changing the political regime, transformation of Japanese society, transformation of Japanese economy and transformation of the Japanese model of governance.369 As Table 4.1 shows, demilitarization and the change of political regime were the two most important goals, but other goals closely linked to the first two appeared as well.370 They were enriched in their scope and content in a way that reflected domestic and international developments within and outside of Japan.

The goal of changing the political regime appeared in all main documents issued between

June and August 1945. The documents asked for the unconditional surrender of Japan and made it explicitly clear that the Allies intended to create a new democratic Japanese government, political institutions and political culture. The Allies viewed the elimination of restrictions to freedom of expression, speech, religion and assembly, reinstatement of the respect for political and civil rights, the release of political prisoners, the trial of all war criminals, the abrogation of all non-democratic laws and the establishment of a democratic government as important steps to move Japan away from the militarism and create a democratic Japan.371

The goal of demilitarization articulated in all documents reflected the concerns of the

Allies, especially the US, about the militarist behavior that had characterized the Japanese state and leadership, especially during the period from 1925-1944. Demilitarization intended to limit

369 These documents are: 1) The Initial US post-defeat policy relating Japan (June 11, 1945), 2) the Potsdam Declaration (July 26, 1945), 3) James F. Byrnes notes to the conditions of Japan surrender (August, 11, 1945), 4) the JCS 1380/15 (November 3, 1945) and 5) the SCAP Directives (January-April 1947, January-December 1948). 370 Gordon, Andrew. A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 229. 371 Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 658-670. 164

Japan‘s military to the home islands to make sure Japan was not to become again a menace to the

US. It also intended to create a Japanese state that was peaceful, responsible, respectful of other states rights and permanently demilitarized.372 The US Initial Post-Surrender Policy Relating

Japan and the JCS 1380/15 detailed the steps toward achieving this goal.

The transformation of Japanese society and model of governance were two other goals articulated in the documents that were closely linked with the change of political regime and demilitarization. They reflected the Allies preoccupation to remove all obstacles to revival of

Japanese democratic tradition and make possible the combination of democratic self-government with the free will of the people. Racism, extremist ideologies, militarist mindset, military based bureaucracy and governance and social inequalities were viewed to be not only the main obstacles to a democratic Japan but also the main sources of militarist Japan.373 The US Initial

Post-Surrender Policy Relating Japan, the JCS 1380/15 and SCAP Directives during 1947-1948 contained explicit guidelines what was needed to do to achieve the transformation of Japanese society and model of governance.

Transformation of the Japanese economy was the last goal articulated. It reflected the link between the militarist orientation of the Japanese economy and the Japanese militarism and the

Allied commitment to transform the Japanese economy from a mercantilist one to an economy that combined capitalist markets and democracy, sustained the population but was not militarist in orientation, was stable and not dominated by zaibatsu but open to world markets.374

372 Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, pp. 75-76, 229-230. 373 Ward, Robert E. ―Japan: The continuity of modernization,‖ in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 52. 374 Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 658-670. 165

Table 4.1 List of the Allied Goals toward Japan during 1941-1949.

Goals Listed Number of Documents The Year as Emphasized Expressing Allied Powers Goals the Document was Issued Expressed in 5 documents 1. The US Initial Post-Surrender Policy Relating to Japan 1. Jun 11, 1945 (SWNCC150) = Annex B, Items II, III Change = Annex C, Item IV. of 2. Potsdam Declaration 2. Jul 26, 1945 Political = Item 10, 12 Regime 3. James F. Byrnes Notes to the Conditions of Japan Surrender 3. Aug, 11, 1945 in = paragraph 6 Japan 4. Basic Initial Post Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for 4. Nov 3, 1945 the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan (JCS 1380/15) 5. Mar-Jul, 1946 = Part I, Item 4, 7, 9, 10, Aug-Dec 1946 5. SCAP Directives = Reel Nr. 2, 3; Expressed in 3 documents 1. The US Initial Post-Surrender Policy Relating to Japan 11. Jun 11, 1945 (SWNCC150) = Annex B, Items II, III, Demilitarization = Annex C, Item I of 2. Potsdam Declaration 12. Jul 26, 1945 Japan = Item 6, 9 3. Basic Initial Post Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for 13. Nov 3, 1945 the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan (JCS 1380/15) = Part I, Item 6, = Part II, Item 14 Expressed in 3 documents 1. Jun 11, 1945 1. The US Initial Post-Surrender Policy Relating to Japan (SWNCC150) Transformation = Annex B, Items II, III Of = Annex C, Item IV. Japanese 2. Basic Initial Post Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for 2. Nov 3, 1945 Society the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan (JCS 1380/15) = Part I, Item 4, 7, 9, 10, 3. SCAP Directives 3. Mar-Jul, 1946 = Reel Nr. 2, 3; Aug-Dec 1946 Expressed in 4 documents Transformation 1. The US Initial Post-Surrender Policy Relating to Japan 1. Jun 11, 1945 of (SWNCC150) Japanese = Annex C, Item I, Item II. Economic 2. Potsdam Declaration 2. Jul 26, 1945 System = Item 11, and 3. Basic Initial Post Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for 3. Nov 3, 1945 Model the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan (JCS of 1380/15) Development = Part II, Annex A 4. SCAP Directives 4. May-Aug, 1946 = Reel Nr. 8, 9; Expressed in 4 Documents 1. The US Initial Post-Surrender Policy Relating to Japan 1. Jun 11, 1945 (SWNCC150) = Annex B, Items II, III Transformation = Annex C, Item V. Of 2. Potsdam Declaration 2. Jul 26, 1945 Japanese = Item 7 Model 3. Basic Initial Post Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for 3. Nov 3, 1945 of the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan (JCS Governance 1380/15) = Part II, Annex A 4. SCAP Directives 4. Jan-Apr 1947, 1948; = Reel Nr. 4, 6, 7; Sep-Dec 1947

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4.1.2 Occupation Policies

The policies of US occupation from 1945-1952 all helped the democratization of postwar

Japan. Their implementation reflected not only goals and commitment but also the specific character of the Japanese context.

In terms of this context, the unconditional surrender of Japan gave the occupation authorities the freedom to reconstruct the postwar political system. It allowed the US to act freely and regardless of what Japanese leadership would have wanted, but the cultural and language barriers that existed between the US troops and the Japanese constrained the freedom of the US to govern directly.375

Given this specific context, the formulation of policies had to deal with two issues. One was about whether the US was to pursue a radical or moderate change, whether the US was to destroy the entire institutional superstructure or retain some of the prewar institutions. The positions among the policymaking circles in Washington varied, but in the end the US opted for retaining the Emperor, viewing him as crucial to the democratization of Japan. The other issue was about the administration of policies. Due to cultural and language barriers, the occupation authorities had to govern indirectly. The US did not abolish the Japanese government but put it under the guidance of the CSAP‘s directives and reforms.376

Though indirectly implemented, however, the main feature of the occupation policies was their broad scope.377 Reflecting the Allies‘ goals, they covered political, social, economic, governance and security areas and one can distinguish fourteen major policies.

375 Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 658-670. 376 Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, p. 27, 212. 377 Gordon, Andrew. A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 226-234. 167

First, reflecting the goal of changing the political regime, occupation policies focused on four major areas: 1) the constitutional framework, 2) the model of government, 3) the political institutions and 4) the political culture.378 The implementation of these policies took place in the context of the military, economic and psychological defeat. The Japanese viewed themselves as having no other choice but to accept what the occupation offered to them. Policies also reflected the clash between two perspectives, both driven by the desire to dismantle the militarist Japan but divergent in terms of their paths.379 One argued for pursuing radical policies and denouncing the Emperor. The other perspective argued for pursuing moderate policies and viewing the

Emperor as an important force for change.380

With regard to constitutional framework, occupation authorities became directly involved and played an important role in drafting a democratic constitution.381 SCAP relied on the Charter

Oath and Japanese traditional values but wrote the new constitution with two guiding principles:

1) create a basis for a democratic Japan and 2) produce a pacifist Japan.382 Its framework

378 Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 658-670. 379 Reischauer, Edwin O. The United States and Japan, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950, p. 224. 380 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, pp. 27, 212, 278-308. 381 In February 1946, the Matsumoto Commission, appointed by the Prime Minister Shidehara Kijuro, submitted to MacArthur their version of a new constitution. MacArthur rejected it as too conservative and appointed two senior army officers with law degrees, Milo Rowell and Courtney Whitney to complete a draft. The SCAP submitted its version to Shidehara Kijuro and Yoshida Shigeru on February 13, 1946. The Japanese government disclosed the draft publicly on March 6, 1946. From March to October, the Diet made some amendments. The Emperor gave his assent on November 3, 1946 and the new Constitution came into effect six months later on May 3, 1947. 382 The ―Constitutional Convention‖ consisted of 16 officers and 8 civilians, none with a background in constitutional law, some with a conservative, other with a New Deal perspective. It wrote constitution in secret week-long session and presented it to public as the government‘s own handiwork. The main principles consisted of 1) the Emperor is the symbol of the nation, rules by consent of the people, exercises powers in accordance with Constitution, and is responsible to people; 2) the feudal system ceases; 3) war is no longer a sovereign right; 4) the new Japan associates itself with higher ideals; and 5) budgetary affairs are arranged after the British system; See Ward, Robert E. ―The origins of the present Japanese Constitution,‖ American Political Science Review, Vol. 50, Issue 4, December 1956, pp. 980- 168 reflected the Anglo-American democratic ideals and popular sovereignty, combined monarchism with democratic idealism and placed pacifism and antimilitarism at the center of the national character.383 The constitution that came into effect on May 3, 1947 produced three effects. First, it created the basis of new democratic postwar Japan; since 1952 Japan has been a stable and strong democracy. Second, it eliminated the basis of power and influence that the military had enjoyed in prewar Japan and that had allowed it to hijack the government. Third, the Article 9 created the basis for an antimilitarist and pacifist postwar Japanese state and society.

With regard to the model of government, the occupation policy focused on making two significant changes: 1) restructure distribution, balance and exercise of power and 2) give a representative character to new democratic government. The occupation contributed in three ways in democratizing the model of government. One is by restructuring the distribution of power between the emperor, the Diet and the Prime Minister. The Diet continued to be directly elected, but it was empowered to select the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister was officially appointed by the Emperor, but he/she was directly accountable to the Diet. The other is by making the government more representative. The occupation authorities opted for changing the

Diet from a unicameral to a bicameral house. The Lower House, consisting of representatives directly elected, represented the Japanese. The Upper House, consisting of appointed officials, represented the interests of regional and other local government bodies. The third is by sanctioning the civilian character and composition of the executive. Occupation authorities established clear rules determining the ascendance to power and the modalities of transfer of

1010; McNelly, Theodore. The Origins of Japan’s Democratic Constitution, Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2000, pp. 55-76. 383 Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, pp. 244-251, 348-350, 361-362, 364-367; Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 666-675. 169 power. The resulting model of government proved to be not only democratic and stable but also able to deal with the pressures and demands coming from various social groups and crisis that

Japanese government had to deal with during 1945-1952 and later in the 1960s and the 1970s.

With regard to political institutions, the US occupation policy was driven by two principles: 1) retain but democratize some of the previous institutions and 2) create and support the rise of new democratic leaders and parties. The occupation contributed to democratization of political institutions in three ways. First, they retained the institution of Emperor as they viewed him as an essential factor in the process of redesigning the political institutions and an important force for change and democracy.384 He was viewed to represent the hope to the shattered psychologically Japanese people, and a positive factor for completing the surrender and getting cooperation from the Japanese people and military.385 To make the Emperor serve as a factor of positive influence, the occupation authorities cleared the Emperor from war crimes, gave him back to the people transforming the institution from one based on divine sovereignty to one based on popular sovereignty, and restated the status of Emperor as a symbol of national unity and a magnanimous peacemaker.386 Second, the occupation authorities established a democratic electoral and party system. They cleansed the old political leadership and elites and encouraged the new democratic parties. Third, the occupation policies focused on guaranteeing freedom of speech and expression, implementing universal suffrage and conducting the first free and

384 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, pp. 278-308. 385 Those who advocated for abolishing the imperial institution and trying the Emperor argued that the Emperor had been the epicenter of the Meiji state and knew of the Pearl Harbor attack. Abdication was a way of absolving him of war responsibility. MacArthur viewed the Emperor as essential to the success of the occupation because punishing him would strengthen militarists, prolong the war and doom the goals. 386 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, pp. 281-285, 278-285, 292, 308, 319-325; Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 666-675. 170 democratic post-war elections in 1946. The voting right was extended to women as well. The latter participated and voted for the first time in the elections held on April 1946.387 The effects of such policies were expressed in the re-dimensioning of the figure of Emperor, the emergence of new political parties and the increase of political participation among the Japanese.

With regard to political culture, the occupation policy was driven by three principles: 1) root out authoritarian values, 2) revive the best democratic values and tradition and 2) create a set of new democratic values.388 To achieve this change, the occupation policy focused on rooting out the racism inherited from prewar militarist regime, cleansing the society from the extreme ideologies of the right and reeducating Japanese with democratic values and behavior.

SCAP tried to reinforce American ideals of freedom and democracy, keep Japanese society out of the influence of communist ideas and support anticommunist forces.389 The effects of this policy were expressed in the abandonment of the authoritarian mindset, the embrace of democratic values and behavior and the increase of political consciousness and participation. The

Japanese government outlawed censorship, guaranteed freedoms of speech, press, assembly and religion and respected labor and farmer‘s right to organize into unions.390

Second, reflecting the goal of demilitarization, occupation policies focused on three specific areas: 1) disarmament, 2) demobilization and 3) maintenance of the public order. These three other policies also helped the democratization of postwar Japan.

387 Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, pp. 65-69, 244-251. 388 Ward, Robert E. ―Japan: The continuity of modernization,‖ in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, NJ:. Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 52. 389 Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, p. 210; Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, p. 699. 390 Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Political Reorientation of Japan, Government Section, Vol. 2, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949, p. 467. 171

To a large extent, the Allied Forces, especially the US, attributed the aggressiveness of pre-1945 Japan to the influence exerted by the military circles and the militarist mindset and agenda pursued by the Japanese government. The implementation of policies started immediately after the official surrender of Japan.

With regard to disarmament, the policy consisted of the management of defeated

Japanese army. The actions included complete disarming the imperial army and navy and destroying their equipment. With regard to demobilization, the policy consisted of demobilizing and dissolving the Japanese military, army and navy, repatriating Japanese soldiers and dissolving the Special Higher Police.391 With regard to public order, the policy consisted of guaranteeing a normal working environment for the new democratic government and military administration, restructuring the police force and integrating former military forces into new structures and services.392

Disarmament and demobilization had a significant effect on the democratization of Japan.

The effect was reflected in two ways. First, Japanese quickly abandoned militarism as a way of thinking and acting. Postwar Japan did not develop military capabilities and troops. The military lost and did not exert the influence it did in prewar Japan. Second, postwar Japan embraced pacifism. The later became the foundation of relations between Japan and other states. The

391 McWilliams, Wayne C., Piotrowski, Harry. The World since 1945: A History of International Relations. Lynne Rienner Publisher, Boulder, Colorado, 1990, pp. 50; Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, pp. 212, 200; Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 666-675. 392 SCAP decentralized the police and organized it so as cities, towns, and villages were to fund and control their own police departments even though politicians and local taxpayers in small communities feared that the police force would be ineffective at monitoring left-wing challenges and were not enthusiastic about paying for their police forces. In 1948, George F. Kennan questioned the wisdom of programs implemented by SCAP. He noted that policies would render Japan vulnerable to Communist political pressure and takeover; See Kennan, George F. Memoirs, 1925–1950, New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1967, p. 376. 172 effects of policies pursued in terms of demilitarization were expressed not only during 1945-

1952 but also in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s when Japan had to deal with various domestic and international issues.

Third, reflecting the goal of transformation of the Japanese society, occupation policies focused on three areas: 1) de-indoctrinating the Japanese and eradicating the militarism as mindset and practice, 2) supporting the rise and development of new democratic values, practices and forces and 3) instilling pacifism among the Japanese.

With regard to de-indoctrination and eradication of the military influence, SCAP prosecuted, tried, convicted and purged military leaders and war criminals.393 It also released political prisoners and injected an array of fundamental rights and expanded the concept of rights into the social realm.394 In addition, SCAP kept under the surveillance and control the forces inimical to new democratic government and domestic demonstrations and protests. As communist influence and agitation rose, MacArthur and SCAP pronounced demonstrations as harmful to public order and economy and intervened directly whenever the objectives of occupation were threatened.395

393 The new legal system was inaugurated with the creation of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East on January 19, 1946. The arrests took place from September to December 1945 whereas the trials began on May 1946. There were three classes of crimes: A (against peace), B (against humanity), and C (planning, ordering, authorization, or failure to prevent war crimes); Leaders were held responsible for acts of State; Prosecution charged that ―conspiracy‖ to commit aggression dated back to 1928 and that carrying out a single, consistent plan of aggression began in 1931. The persons charged were allowed to defend themselves; See Minear, Richard H. Victors’ Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. 394 Writers relied on Gettysburg Address, Declaration of Independence, US Constitution, Atlantic Charter, and Teheran Conference Declaration. The rights recognized included in political realm, the universal suffrage, speech, religion, assembly; in social realm, rights for education, physical abilities, living standards, work, organization, collective bargaining; discrimination based on sex, race, creed, social status, or family origin was outlawed and women were given explicit guarantees of equality in marriage, divorce, property, inheritance, and other family matters. 395 Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, pp. 265-268. 173

With regard to the rise and development of new democratic values, practices and forces,

SCAP purged the old elites, assisted the rise of new leadership and encouraged and supported new liberal forces. While showing sensitivity to the Japanese tradition, SCAP strengthened the equality of women, pushed for social reforms and infused Western democratic standards.396 In addition, SCAP kept under the control labor unions with a Communist affiliation, purged communists and rehabilitated the right-wing, conservative elements by either dropping charges against or releasing them from the prison.397 It changed its approach from ―no fraternization‖ with Japanese, pursued in the immediate postwar months, toward developing tolerance and friendship.398

396 SCAP created a Women Division headed by a woman, which granted women the right to vote, have equal position in divorce and inheritance, and put an end to the samurai-style pattern of family or house control of the Meiji‘s Civil Code; Social reforms consisted of promoting social equality, enfranchisement, land redistribution, living standard and safe working conditions. 397 In 1947, when Communist influenced labor union called a nationwide general strike aiming at overthrowing the Yoshida cabinet General MacArthur ruled it out as a threat to economy. In 1950, SCAP started the ―red purge‖ of thirteen thousand Communists from the public or private sectors in government, education, politics, and law, forcing the Communist Party leaders go underground The US brought back to the public and political activity war time militarist leaders, ultra-nationalists and established the hegemony of conservative politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen; Tsuji Masanobu went from being a war criminal to politician in House of Representatives; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, pp. 238-240; Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, pp. 272-273, 285, 511-515, 525. 398 Initially, in the context of the ―no fraternization‖ policy, the Americans called all Japanese staff ―indigenous personnel,‖ and viewed them as inferior beings. MacArthur himself never made the slightest attempt to ingratiate himself with the Japanese public but maintained a daily official routine. Americans had upper-class homes and frequented theaters, stores, hotels, trains, and recreation centers designated for occupation personnel only; See Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, p. 210; Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, p. 681. 174

With regard to pacifism, SCAP pursued reforming the Japanese education system. The efforts focused on eliminating the racist, nationalistic, militarist ideas from the textbooks and teaching at all levels of education.399

Fourth, reflecting the goal of transformation of the Japanese economy, occupation policies reflected two different approaches: 1) from 1945 to mid 1948 it pursued deindustrialization and 2) from mid-1948 and beyond it pursued restructuring.400 These approaches differ in terms of the treatment of the defeated Japan, economic institutions, legal framework and economic actors, as reflected in the actions undertaken.

The initial approach, maintained until 1948, reflected the belief that Japan had to pay reparations, demilitarize its economy and be no longer a competitor to the US.401 SCAP actions consisted of 1) breaking up and dismantling the pre-war zaibatsu and financial cartels,402 2)

399 Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, pp. 265-268, 400, 409-418, 490-491; Dower, John W. Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Empire, 1878–1954, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979; Shigeru, Yoshida. The Yoshida Memoir: The Story of Japan in Crisis, Boston: Houghton Mifﬂin, 1962; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, pp. 232, 220-224, 244-251. 400 MacArthur and the Pauley Commission advocated reducing Japan economy to the level of 1920s- 1930s, an agricultural economy based on cheap exports, oriental specialties, and textiles with primary markets in Asia, not in the US and Europe. Kenneth Royall, the US Secretary of the Army and Joseph Dodge, an economist and banker, argued that policies of Pauley Commission were inadequate and Japan would not be able to support itself but would become a burden to the US. 401 About 1100 large enterprises were dismantled and given to the Asian countries aggressed by Japan. Demilitarization transformed war industries into civilian ones. Komatsu tank maker became a bulldozer manufacturer, Canon and Nikon moved in optics, Honda in motorized bikes, Sony in communications industry. To avoid competition from Japan, the US forced the Japanese Government to recognize labor rights. See Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, pp. 532-535, 537; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, pp. 75-80. 402 Zaibatsu controlled 49% of investments in mining, machinery, shipbuilding, and chemicals, 50% in the banking sector, 60% in insurance industry, and 61% of shipping. The US decision to break them up caught them by surprise because the zaibatsu cheered the occupation troops as friends. During the war they experienced the state control and lost overseas investments; SCAP asked zaibatsu owners to sell off their assets; It targeted 325 large firms for breakup, dismantled 1,200 firms through Holding Company Liquidation Commission, charged with the custody and public resale of their stock shares; it passed 175 reducing the production capacity,403 3) stabilizing but not rehabilitating and developing the economy,404 4) purging the old economic elite, 5) replacing the old economic institutions and legislation with new ones,405 and 6) reforming land and labor markets.406 It raised a lot of criticism and was changed because of its negative effects.407

The other approach pursued after 1948 reflected the intensification of the Cold War, the concerns for the stability and self-sufficiency of Japan, and the new quality of cooperation between SCAP and Japanese government.408 The changes, following the recommendations of

Joseph Dodge, known as the ―Dodge Line,‖ included 1) making Japan self-sufficient by stopping the de-concentration and deindustrialization, moving its economy toward the rehabilitation,

antimonopoly laws to prevent commercial empires. See Schonberger, Howard B. Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945–1952, Kent: Kent State University Press, 1989. 403 The US drastically reduced capacity in steel and strategic materials, completely eliminated aircraft capacity, and delayed plans for resumption of production. See MacArthur, Douglas. ―Reply to Criticism of Economic Policy,‖ in SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, February 1948, Vol. 2, p. 762. 404 The US policy was not interested in rehabilitation but in stability because the latter sufficed to avert the chaos. See Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 658-670, 666-675. 405 The US purged 1500 wartime executives, dissolved the old Home Ministry, and created the Labor Ministry and Economic Stabilization Board to oversee reforms and cooperation between management and unions. The Board consisted of 500 economists, engineers and former businessmen who supervised the Ministry of Finance, Labor, Commerce, Industry, and Bank of Japan. It retained many of wartime controls, in even more strict manner. In 1947, the Allies forced the Diet to pass legislation on antimonopoly and de-concentration. 406 SCAP recognized the rights of organizing, collective bargaining and striking, passed the Trade Union Law, ―The Labor Relations Adjustment‖ and ―Labor Standards,‖ expropriated landlords and created small family farms. See Cohen, Theodore. ―Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal,‖ in Herbert Passin (eds.), New York: Free Press, 1987, pp. 229-231; Garon, Sheldon. The State and Labor in Modern Japan Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987, pp. 230-245. 407 The Japanese bureaucrats criticized the dissolution of the zaibatsu as utterly naïve, decentralization as inefficient and counterproductive and collaboration with big business as the best strategy for economic recovery. The US critics expressed concerns about Japan‘s self-sufficiency and the cost of occupation. 408 Self-sufficiency was linked to two other issues: the resources that the US had to make available for Japan and the ability of Japan to be a regional partner for the US in the war against Communist influence and containment. Some differences between US Administration and Japanese bureaucrats remained. The Japanese leaders favored expansionist policies whereas US authorities viewed them as reckless. However, from 1948 and onward the American policy and the Japanese hopes coincided more and more; both accepted the view that Japan economy needed to revive and relations changed from dictates to joint consultation and cooperation; See Schaller, Michael. The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985, pp. 5-17. 176 reconstruction, greater production and recovery,409 2) re-conceptualizing the role of the state by diminishing its pressures on the zaibatsu, accepting the bank-centered capitalism and allowing the bureaucratic guidance of the economy,410 3) closing down some institutions and legislation and creating some other new ones and 4) changing the approach toward labor.411

Overall, the influence of economic policies was positive despite the fact that the amount of aid was small compared to the size of the Japanese population and smaller than the amount accorded to Germany.412 The initial policies did have some negative effects but after their modification, they paved the way for the success of postwar Japan.413 The positive trends such as the postwar industrial policy making, the state-driven capitalism, the emergence of new enterprises, and the orientation of the economy toward the exports to a large extent are all a result of the US occupation policy.414 They helped democratization in two major ways. One is

409 Initially, SCAP had no plans for economic revival for it was instructed to not rehabilitate the Japanese economy. SCAP moved toward the economic recovery and self-sufficiency upon Kennan‘s insistence and concerns about the occupation costs. Dodge recommendations included balanced budget, favorable exchange rate, increased foreign trade, increased competitiveness, and export-oriented production. Following the recommendations, of the 1,200 firms and large enterprises selected for de-concentration only 39 were broken up. SCAP increased production in heavy and chemical industry and the Korean War helped double it. From 1949 to 1951 the US orders represented 70% of all Japan‘s exports. Corporations began to make profits for the first time since the surrender, the investments surged, and GNP increased at double-digit rates. 410 Dodge detested the government support or regulation of the economy. Following his recommendations SCAP reduced government intervention in price control, suspended all state loans to industry, abolished all state subsidies and allowed the cooperation between zaibatsu, banks and government bureaucracy known as the bank-centered capitalism and bureaucratic guidance of the economy. 411 In 1949 SCAP closed down Reconstruction Finance Bank and established the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and watered down labor laws approved by Diet after 1945. 412 Dobbins, James. et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2003, pp. 150-158. 413 By 1950, a year after the implementation of the Dodge recommendations, inflation halted but the industry starved for capital and unemployment increased. The budget cuts led to the decline in production, economic slowdown, and Japan was not on the brink of recovery but a deepening depression. The Korean War and the enormous infusion of foreign exchange helped Japan fund and complete the Dodge reforms. 414 The post-war industrial policy-making reflected the close cooperation between government and big business. The state intervention in the economy was in the form of guidance rather than control. The antimonopoly measures, forced retirement of wartime economic leaders, and reconstitution of old 177 by contributing to the stability of government. The other is by helping the Japanese government establish better relations with its citizens and respond to their needs.

Fifth, reflecting the goal of transformation of the governance model, occupation policies focused on two areas: 1) state bureaucracy and institutions and 2) policy-making and reforms. It was driven by two principles: 1) restructure the model of governance along democratic standards and 2) keep under close control the functioning and actions of the Japanese government and bureaucracy. Because the occupation authorities enjoyed the freedom in formulation and implementation of policies, GHQ ran Japan with the attributes of a super-government.415 It retained the Emperor and the Japanese government, and encouraged the Emperor to bolster his aura; however, in reality, SCAP controlled the policy-making and decision-making. It avoided or bypassed Japanese experts as much as it could and whenever it could.416

With regard to state bureaucracy and institutions, the occupation policy consisted of dismantling the military leadership from the government and their influence in the formulation of policies and governance, disbanding all the oppressive institutions, and purging from the state bureaucracy and government all individuals associated with militarist mindset. In achieving this,

SCAP cooperated closely with the Japanese government and bureaucracy. Home Ministry and the Military experienced massive purges whereas the civilian bureaucracy was left relatively

enterprises, created opportunities for the emergence of new groupings known as keiretsu, a form of firms centering around one great bank. The Japanese economy, with the US support and help, returned to the world trade. 415 Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, p. 200. 416 SCAP issued directives, the Japanese responded to them. Directives were issued and taken as orders. An office staffed by bilingual Japanese officials maintained the links between the SCAP and the Japanese. SCAP conceived all the reforms implemented by the existing Japanese bureaucracy. It associated the Japanese experts with the conservative elite. Initially, they were not enthusiastic about Yoshida. SCAP tolerated him, but also tried to outmaneuver him. See Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, pp. 224, 285; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 234. 178 untouched.417 SCAP was forced to govern indirectly because the US troops lacked the linguistic and technocratic capacities to govern Japan. On the other hand, SCAP kept close relations with the Japanese government and did not delegitimize it, but addressed it as the Imperial Japanese

Government, because the Japanese leaders did not commit suicide, or escape, but waited for the

Allied Forces to arrive in Tokyo.418

With regard to policy-making and reforms, the occupation policy consisted of developing new democratic practices of policy-making and undertaking a broad specter of reforms. In spite of the existence of two contradicting views, SCAP promoted and guided undertaking reforms in the areas of education, labor, and agriculture.419 The most important reforms included demilitarization, the decentralization of state police, the purge of bureaucracy and labor unions from war criminals and Communists, the democratization of the education system, the establish of the local government and autonomy and the land reform.420

417 Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 666-675; Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, pp. p. 213-218. 418 Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 666-675; Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, pp. 213-218. 419 Joseph Grew, the former ambassador to Japan and the key aides to MacArthur argued against deep reforms. They viewed the war as a misstep and a result of few militarist leaders hijacking the state. They called for modest reforms consisting of dismantling the military, returning political democracy, turning the power back to few ―responsible elements‖ such as Shidehara Kijuro and Yoshida Shigeru. They thought that deep reforms and a mass democracy would be dangerous. 420 Besides disbanding the military, demilitarization included the prohibition of nationalist rhetoric, symbols and the display of the Japanese flag for some time. From 1946-1948 occupation authorities purged 200,000 individuals from bureaucracy and public office; by 1949 the ―red purge‖ started among radical unions. SCAP also pushed for the land reform as it viewed it essential to the suppression of militaristic agrarianism. See Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 230; Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 666- 675; Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, pp. 272-273, 285; Dore, Ronald P. Land Reform in Japan, New York: Oxford University Press, 1959, pp. x-xxiv, 107-113. 179

To summarize, US policies linked to the goals of changing the political regime, demilitarizing Japan, transforming Japanese society, economy and governance, all contributed to the democratization of Japan. The did so by establishing the basis for a democratic and pacifist government, democratic political institutions, values, practices and political culture and by modifying the policies in the areas of economic and social transformation of Japan when they did not work.

4.1.3 Occupation Commitment

The positive influence of policies was also reinforced by US commitment to the implementation of policies. The US committed a sufficient number of troops over a long period of time and sufficient resources. All these commitments helped implement policies which, in turn, helped the democratization of Japan.

With regard to number of occupation troops, as Table 4.2 shows, the number of the military troops was slightly smaller than in Europe, but it was sufficiently high.421 Upon the surrender of Japan on August 1945, the US troops that occupied Japan numbered around 450,000 soldiers from the US Eighth and Sixth Armies or one soldier for every 177 people in the population.422 After the surrender, the number of troops dropped significantly as it became apparent that the Japanese were completely faithful in their surrender and the occupation was

421 Dobbins, James. et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2003, pp. 150-158. 422 The US numbered around one million American GIs in the Asian theater. After the surrender, the US troops in Japan numbered around 450,000 soldiers. See Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, pp. 220-224; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 274. Finn, Richard B. Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida and Postwar Japan, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, Ltd., 1992, p. 35. 180 progressing peacefully.423 By the end of 1946, the Sixth Army was disbanded and the number of troops was reduced to approximately 200,000 soldiers, all of the Eighth Army. By 1947 the number went down to 120,000 soldiers and by 1948 it was reduced further to 102,000 soldiers.424 During 1946-1949 the average number of US troops was 135,000 soldiers, or one soldier for every 615 people in the population.425 This number was viewed by MacArthur to be sufficient to maintain stability. After 1950, as Table 4.7 shows, the number of occupation troops continued to be reduced even further and after 1960, the year when the US and Japan renewed the Security Treaty, the number went down to one soldier for 1,164 people in the population.

Table 4.2 Number of Troops in Japan

Period Number of Troops JAPAN’s Population Population/Troops Ratio 1945 450,000 80,000,000 1 soldier / 177 people 1946-1949 135,000 83,000,000 1 soldier / 615 people 1950-1955 181,926 86,942,000 1 soldier / 478 people 1956-1960 119,190 92,421,400 1 soldier / 775 people 1961-1965 83,189 96,859,200 1 soldier / 1,164 people 1966-1970 81,875 102,018,600 1 soldier / 1,246 people 1971-1975 57,883 108,665,400 1 soldier / 1,877 people 1976-1980 46,236 114,851,400 1 soldier / 2,484 people 1981-1985 47,721 119,232,400 1 soldier / 2,498 people 1986-1990 48,804 122,568,200 1 soldier / 2,511 people 1991-1995 44,355 124,690,800 1 soldier / 2,811 people 1996-2000 41,016 126,213,600 1 soldier / 3,077 people

Note: The figures represent the average values for both, occupation troops and German population. Calculations are made using two sets of data. Sources: For the size of military troops, data are obtained from the U,S, Department of Defense, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, Statistical Information Analysis Division, (SIAD) ―Military personnel historical Reports: Active duty military personnel by regional area and by country,‖ at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/05/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2005 For the population size, data are obtained from the US Census Bureau, International Programs, at http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/country.php

The Allies also made available sufficient troops for postwar management. The US troops constituted the hardcore of the Allied Forces. They dealt with demobilization, security and order,

423 The Eighth US Army, Manual of Military Government in Japan (Provisional), Tokyo, Japan, 1948, pp. 4-6. 424 Weintraub, Stanley, ―American proconsul: How Douglas MacArthur shaped postwar Japan,‖ Military History, Vol. 28, Issue 5, January 2012, pp. 44-51. 425 Finn, Richard B. Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida and Postwar Japan, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, Ltd., 1992, p. 35. 181 governance and civilian affairs and social issues. The occupation military government combined the military with the civilian experts. It comprised thousands of military and civilian administrators divided into sections which included Government, Civil Information and

Education, and Economic and Scientific. It also recruited and searched for talented and experienced specialists.426

To deal with demobilization and disarmament, the Allied Forces assigned a force of

40,000 soldiers, with headquarters at Kure and known as the British Commonwealth Occupation

Force (BCOF) since it was composed of Australian, British, Indian and New Zealand military troops and personnel. By 1947, as the process of demobilization and disarmament progressed at a good pace, the activity of BCOF began to decrease and officially wound up in 1951.427

To deal with security and order the Allied Forces assigned this task to a force that numbered approximately 100,000 soldiers and was commanded by Lieutenant General Robert

Eichelberger. In addition, the Allies created a decentralized police force fore every town of 5,000 inhabitants or more.428

To deal with the supervision of the Japanese government and civilian affairs the US assigned this task to the Eighth Army. The mission of the Eighth Army was to survey and supervise the Japanese in executing directives issued to their government by the Supreme

Commander, MacArthur.429 The Eighth Army assumed the role of military government under

MacArthur‘s SCAP headquarters. SCAP numbered about 5,000 military and civilian officers and

426 Cohen, Theodore E. Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal, New York: Free Press, 1987, pp. 8-15. 427 Wood, James. The Forgotten Force: the Australian Military Contribution to the Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952, Allen and Unwin, 1998, pp. 1-68. 428 Finn, Richard B. Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida and Postwar Japan, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, Ltd., 1992, p. 35; Perry, John Curtis. Beneath the Eagles Wings: Americans in Occupied Japan, New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1980, p. 148. 429 Eighth US Army, Manual of Military Government in Japan (Provisional), Tokyo, Japan, 1948, p. 4; 182 its task was to develop local occupation plans in the areas of economy, legal and government, civil education, civil information, public health, public welfare, finance and civil property, customs and immigration and civil employment. The Eighth Army had embedded a force of

2,500 soldiers who were trained and specialized in dealing with issues pertaining to civilian affairs and governance.430 This force was organized into fifty-three teams, one team for each of the forty-six Japanese prefectures and one team for each of the seven administrative regions in

Japan.431

To deal with de-indoctrination of the Japanese society, within the first six months of the occupation the US brought in Japan the American Educational Mission, chaired by Dr. A. J.

Stoddard, the President of the University of Illinois. Their role was to reform the Japanese education system. Commission consisted approximately of two dozen prominent American

430 As early as 1941, the War Department had established facilities and curriculum to train officers in civil affairs and military government. The training had been extensive. In May 1942, it opened the School of Military Government (SMG) in Charlottesville, Virginia, providing the attending officers with technical or professional skills relevant to military government. The curriculum covered subjects in public health and safety, civilian supply, international law, public administration and public finance. It was designed to equip its graduates with the skills necessary to administer the military government at the general staff level, familiarize them with the staff organization of the Army and arm the students with foreign area knowledge. In addition to SMG, in March 1943 the War Department established CATS (Civil Affairs Training Schools) in six universities, University of Chicago, Harvard, University of Michigan, North Western University, Stanford and Yale. CATS trained civilian affairs officers for use in the Far Eastern Theater. By August 1945, more than 2,000 Army and Navy officers had been trained for duty in Japan. See Trask, David F. Army Historical Series: Military government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1950, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987, pp. 10-11; Friedrich, Carl J. American Experiences in Military Government in World War II, New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., p. 321; Holborn, Hajo. American Military Government: Its Organization and Policies, Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1947, pp. 3-4, 39, 46. 431 The civilian affairs teams were tasked with investigating, inspecting and reporting up through the Eighth Army to SCAP. The prefecture teams numbered about 2,500 officers, enlisted men and civilians. The regional teams numbered approximately 25 personnel who represented the first-hand observers of how well the policies were implemented by the Japanese government and populace. They inspected the former war plants and possible black market locations, monitored the newspapers, visited schools to ensure compliance with occupational directives and were present together with military and local police at any riots, public disorder and demonstration. See The Eighth US Army, Manual of Military Government in Japan (Provisional), Tokyo, Japan, 1948, pp. 4-6, 8; Gayn, Mark, Japan Diary, New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1948, pp. 332-336. 183

educators. They looked at the areas of teachers, content, methods, administrative ways and scope

and submitted their recommendations for change.432

As important to the democratization of postwar Japan was the length of the occupation.

The occupation was long and lasted for eight years, from 1945 to 1952.433 The length of

occupation was shorter than the two decades that some US officials had anticipated; however,

US troops continued to maintain their presence afterwards as well through military bases for

their air, navy, and land forces.

The US also committed sufficient resources to postwar Japan. As Table 4.3 shows, the

resources that the US committed to postwar Japan covered the political, economic, social,

security and military areas.434

Table 4.3 US Assistance to Japan for the Period 1946-1965

Under Under Under Under Postwar Marshall US-Japan Foreign JAPAN Relief Period Plan Security Pact Assistance Act (1946-1948) (1949-1952) (1953-1961) (1962-1965) Total Economic Assistance 8,042.2 9,072.2 1,225.2 1,359.6  USAID - - 146.1 3.4  Department of Agriculture - 10.4 1,079.1 13.2  Other Assistance 8,042.2 9,061.8 - 1,342,9 Total Military Assistance - - 6,361.7 1,384.4 Total Economic & Military 8,042.2 9,072.2 7,586.9 2,744.0

Note: Figures are in Millions of Current Year Dollars. Totals may not add due to rounding Source: U.S. Agency for International Development. US Overseas Loans and Grants Database. http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/detailed.html

432 Perry, John Curtis, Beneath the Eagles Wings: Americans in Occupied Japan, New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1980, p. 133. 433 Finn, Richard B. Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida and Postwar Japan, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, Ltd., 1992, p. 28. 434 In the political area, resources were made available for designing democratic constitution, government, institutions and party system. In the economic area, they spent for rehabilitating the physical infrastructure, reforming economic institutions, and overcoming the poverty. In the social area, funds were made available for developing civil society and media, undertaking social reforms, reshaping social institutions, encouraging the emergence of new elite, instilling democratic values, reforming education system, promoting new standards in science, philosophy and religion and a new peaceful nation. In security, money was spent for restoring order and controlling the breakdown of law and order, carrying purges and managing social conflicts. 184

4.1.4 Attitudes of Japanese toward the Occupation

Democratization of postwar Japan was also helped by the attitudes of the Japanese population toward the occupation forces and its policies and actions. Two features characterize the attitude of the Japanese. One is the difference between the Emperor and the Japanese population and the Japanese elite toward the defeat. The Emperor Hirohito and the population masses accepted the defeat but most of the elite did not.435 Some elite circles viewed the US troops as liberators, but the old elite viewed the occupation and changes as a modern neocolonialism and resisted the US‘s ideas and actions. The other is the different attitude among the population and the elites toward actions taken by the US occupation in political, economic, and social areas.436

Politically, Emperor Hirohito and the masses willingly embraced the democratic changes.

Hirohito supported the new constitution and pressed the government to accept it.437 The Japanese people embraced and willingly participated in the abolishment of the patriarchal family system, the labor reforms, and the abandonment of the militarist practices and mindset.438 Among the old

435 Hirohito accepted the defeat and urged Japanese to endure the consequences, look forward to peace and pace with the progress of the world. The Japanese population viewed US occupation as a positive reality until 1948. By 1949, they started to express fears of getting involved in war again. During the Korean War they become more supportive of peace and critic of the US military bases. See Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 274; Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, p. 687; Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, pp. 525, 34–39; Butow, Robert J. C. Japan’s Decision to Surrender, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967, pp. 1–4; Cohen, Theodore. Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal, New York: The Free Press, 1987, p. 262. 436 Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 234; Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, p. 236, 245. 437 In his New Year‘s message, Hirohito made two points: his ties with Japanese people should not be defined on legends and false conception of divinity, and Japanese people were not superior to other races and fated to rule the world. 438 Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, pp. 227-229, 245. 185 elites, only a few individuals and groups embraced the democratic changes. Most of the old establishment doubted in the combination of the imperial institution with the democratic government. 439

Socially, the population embraced the new democratic habits and institutions. Among the elites, some intellectuals joined the population in denouncing war criminals and expressing remorse for the war, but a considerable portion of the old elite showed reluctance in accepting changes in values, education system, and social structure and hierarchy.

Economically, both the elites and the population followed the US policies. The elites, however, did also develop a sense of constructive criticism toward occupation economic policies.

Concerned with the place of Japan in the future economic world, the Japanese economic elite resisted the idea of a permanent state-planned economy.440 Pursuing the state-guided capitalism,

439 Until 1947, leftists, liberals, and Communists alike viewed Americans as liberators and Yoshida praised MacArthur as ―great benefactor,‖ for preserving imperial institution. Liberals, Communists, disagreed over the Emperor system but praised democratic reforms, human rights and renounce of war. Yoshida Shigeru, leader and prime minister of Liberal Party during 1946-1953, supported the Allied and worked with MacArthur to get rid of the militarist past and vestiges of feudalism. He believed that occupation could be well-meaning, managed and worked at Japan‘s advantage, that one could lose a war but win peace. After his death he was hailed as the grand man of post-surrender Japan. Nevertheless, some elites showed reluctance toward the US actions. The old elites of bureaucrats, ex-military, and zaibatsu leaders defended the old Emperor system and resisted political changes. They accepted changed not because they wanted them, but because they were imposed upon them and because they believed they could undo many articles after Occupation. See Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 675- 677; Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, pp. 69, 285. 440 Yoshida and Hiromi did not believe in state planned economy and viewed it as inappropriate for a capitalist society. But both viewed the role of government to be an important factor given that zaibatsu conglomerates broken up as they were could not take a leading role and reforming of the old order would not have been possible without the bureaucracy; See Okita, Saburo. Japan’s Challenging Years: Reﬂections on My Lifetime, Canberra: Australian National University, 1983, pp. 32–33; Gao, Bai. ―Arisawa Hiromi and his theory for a managed economy,‖ Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 1994, pp. 115-140. 186 they oriented the economy toward exports, high-value-added manufacturing, scientific management, foreign trade, and foreign direct investments abroad.441

4.2 Political Culture Dynamics in Post-1945 Japan

Three observations can be made about the dynamics in political culture in postwar Japan from 1945-1952. First, the political culture changed from authoritarian to democratic. This change included six aspects of political culture: values and beliefs, behavior and attitudes, institutional functioning and development, political participation, civil society and attitudes toward change. As Figure A4.2 in Appendix 4 shows, all were important to and helped democratize postwar Japan. Second, there was a difference between the Emperor, the population and the elites. The first two embraced the change toward democratic political culture from the very beginning. The elites initially resisted the change but later embraced democratic standards under the pressure of US occupation authorities. Third, democratization of the political culture and society was a result of the efforts made by the US occupation authorities and the willingness of the Japanese people to embrace the democratic values and behavior.

4.2.1 Values and Beliefs

The change of values and beliefs was a factor that helped the democratization of postwar

Japan during 1945-1952. This change started in 1945, initially among the Emperor and the

441 MITI assumed the task of guiding economic policies and development. It served as a bridge between big business, bureaucracy, and politicians and as the main supporter of the keiretsu which were less pyramidal (hereditary), more horizontal, internally competitive, and more flexible. By the early 1950s, 6 keiretsu had emerged, all centering on city banks: Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuji, Daiichi, and Sanwa. Investments followed the trade routes and were made in American treasury bills, manufacturing plants in the United States, Europe, and Asia. In the mid-1960s, Japan‘s FDI were barely one billion U.S. dollars. By 1975 they reached to 15 billion, and by the 1980s into 50 billion. 40% of investments were in North America; Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, pp. 537, 544. 187

Japanese population and after 1947 encompassed the Japanese elites as well.442 As shown in

Figure 4.2 it influenced democratization in two ways: 1) directly, by influencing behavior and attitudes and 2) indirectly, by influencing institutional functioning and development.

What is important about this change is the difference in the willingness between the

Emperor, the population, and the Japanese elites. After the 1945 US occupation, the Emperor, citizens, intelligentsia, young people, women, and labor unions embraced and internalized the new democratic values and beliefs regardless of whether the change came from the occupation or the Emperor.443 The Emperor‘s willingness is expressed in his speech addressing the surrender of Japan, where he urged the Japanese to look forward to a new era. The Japanese, shattered both psychologically and physically by the defeat, submitted themselves unconditionally to the new democratic orientation the Allies forced upon them. The old elites and establishment, however, viewed the defeat as an accident. Given that the Allies allowed the Japanese government to remain and continue to work they did not show the willingness to become part of this change but resisted it. This reluctance was expressed in the draft of the new constitution they proposed to

MacArthur. The draft reflected the prewar conservative spirit and mindset. It did not include rights, liberties and freedom for children, young people and women or the values of free speech and religion. The elites were shocked with the radicalism of the US policies and refused to accept the inclusion of US suggestions in the new constitution. The resistance of the Japanese

442 Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 183; Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, pp. 226, 245; Tsunoda, Ryusaku., de Bary, Theodore., Keene, Donald., Sources of Japanese Tradition, Columbia University Press, 1964, Vol. 2, pp. 705–707. 443 Koikari, Mire. ―Exporting Democracy? American women, ‗feminist reforms‘, and politics of imperialism in the U.S. Occupation of Japan 1945-1952,‖ in Frontiers, 2002, Vol. 23, No 1; She attributes the recognition of rights to women to the struggle of Japanese women and to a lesser degree to MacArthur; Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, New Press, 2000, pp. 23-24, 73-79, 83-84, 228, 234-235, 355, 375-377; Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, p. 712. 188 elites continued until 1947, when the new constitution written by the US occupation authorities, after few amendments by the Diet, was promulgated by the Emperor as the new basic law of postwar Japan. The elites accepted the changes only out of fear of being excluded from power- sharing and left unseated by popular pro-democratic forces. From 1947 onward, the change in values and beliefs included both the population and the elites and was reflected in four main elements: 1) on the view about authority and government, 2) on individual rights and liberties, 3) on individual responsibility and participation in public affairs and 4) on state and ideology.

With regard to the way the Japanese viewed the authority and government, before 1945, the Japanese were characterized by loyalty, obedience and blind and unconditional respect to the

Emperor, the acceptance of authoritarian, elitist and centralized character of government and the acceptance of control, indoctrination and manipulation exercised by the government and authorities.444 After 1945, during the period 1945-1952, the Japanese developed a sense of constructive criticism to government, evaluated authority on a democratic basis and framework of parliamentary democracy and linked the legitimacy and performance of government to its contribution to the people‘s well-being.445

With regard to individual political rights and civil liberties, before 1945 the Japanese reflected a strong dimension of collective rather than individual character. They cherished collective devotion and obligation to the Emperor and national service, good morals and manners based on the respect for the social hierarchy and harmony, duties and obligations. The notions of

444 Ward, Robert E. ―Japan: The continuity of modernization,‖ in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 57-73; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 199; Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, p. 364; Passin, Herbert. Society and Education in Japan, New York: Columbia Teachers College, 1965, pp. 210–211. 445 Ward, Robert E. ―Japan: The continuity of modernization,‖ in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 52, 57-73. 189 political rights and civil liberties were shadowed by notions of piety, diligence, industriousness, respect for elders and the harmony between duty and emotion.446 After 1945, especially during

1945-1952, the Japanese developed an individual notion of liberty and equality. This was reflected in the increase of political and social conscience among the Japanese. The treatment of individual political rights and liberties became the basis of the relationship between the Japanese individuals and groups and the state, government and authorities.447

With regard to individual responsibility and participation in public affairs, before 1945 the notion of civic duty did not exist as such. Politics and society were identified with the hierarchical loyalty to the family and community, local or upper elites, or Japan as a nation.448

Loyalty to the Emperor was more important than democracy, parliamentary rule, reforms and peace.449 Participation was either absent or when it occurred, it was characterized by the localism, the conformist and herd-like mentality, or indoctrination, rebellion and anarchy.450

After 1945, the Japanese developed an individual and democratic sense of civic duty and

446 Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, p. 226; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, pp. 181-198. 447 Gordon, Andrew. A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 231; Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, pp. 23-24, 73-79, 83-84, 228, 234-235, 355, 375-377. 448 Dore, Ronald P. Land Reform in Japan, New York: Oxford University Press, 1959 pp. 33-38; Ronald P. ―The Legacy of Tokugawa Education,‖ Conference Paper submitted to Conference on Modern Japan, January 1962, pp. 33-38; Ward, Robert E. ―Japan: The continuity of modernization,‖ in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 33. 449 Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, pp. 181-198. 450 Ward, Robert E. ―Japan: The continuity of modernization,‖ in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 33, 57-73; Dore, Ronald P. ―The legacy of Tokugawa education,‖ Conference Paper submitted to Conference on Modern Japan, January 1962, pp. 33-38; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 136. 190 participation.451 They became active citizens and participants, with interests that included both individual and national issues; they also rejected indoctrination and manipulation and developed a constructive criticism toward the government.452

With regard to the way that Japanese viewed the state and its ideology, before 1945, the

Japanese understanding reflected the identification of the state with empire, divine sovereignty, nationalism, militarist spirit and mindset, and imperialism.453 After 1945, the re- conceptualization of the understanding of the state was among the first changes that occurred during 1945-1952. In postwar Japan, the Japanese people linked the state to the notions of popular sovereignty, democratic state and pacifist orientation.

The change in values and beliefs influenced democratization of behavior and attitudes in two ways: 1) it helped them develop a democratic content and orientation and 2) it gave them a strong pacifist orientation. The democratic content and pacifist orientation of behavior and attitudes were reflected in turn in the way that postwar Japanese institutions functioned and developed.

4.2.2 Behaviors and Attitudes

451 Public opinion polls in 1945 Japan showed a decline in support for imperial order. The Emperor worship became a façade and the sentiments moved toward resignation or indifference about matters and fate of imperial order and house. As a result of the tarnished image of imperial house from the surrender, only 4% of Japanese expressed worry, shame, or sorrow for Emperor; 25% favored Emperor abdicating at the right time; See The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The effects of strategic bombing on Japanese morale, Washington D.C. Morale Division, 1947, Chapter 12, ―Aftermath of the War,‖ p. 148; The survey is available at http://www.archive.org/stream/effectsofstrateg00unit#page/n5/mode/2up. 452 Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, p. 84, 206; Ward, Robert E. ―Japan: The continuity of modernization,‖ in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 52, pp. 57-73. 453 The Ministry of Education, especially during the 1930s and the 1940s, identified the new Japan with the loyalty to the Emperor, Imperial House, nationalism and militarist spirit and promoted it among the population and the young people. See Shively, Donald H. Motoda Eifu: Confucian Lecturer to the Meiji Emperor, Institute for International Studies, University of California, 1959, p. 330. 191

The change in behaviors and attitudes is another factor that helped the democratization of postwar Japan during 1945-1952. As shown in Figure A4.2, it did so in two ways: 1) it helped the democratization of institutional functioning and development and 2) it helped democratization of political culture through practices it injected in institutions. The democratization of institutional functioning and political culture made it easier for the US occupation to advance its agenda of democratization and, in turn, help the democratization of postwar Japan.

What was important about this change was that both the population and the elites, willingly or not, changed their behavior. The change started in 1945 first among the population and after 1947 it encompassed the Japanese elites as well. It is characterized by two features.

One feature was the radical change in the drive guiding the behaviors and attitudes of the

Japanese. The drive changed from aggressiveness to pacifism. This change occurred not only among the Japanese individuals and groups, but was also reflected in the way the new postwar elite, especially the political leadership at the government and state level behaved. The second feature was the orientation of behavior and attitudes toward democratic content and standards.

This was reflected in four main elements: 1) attitudes toward others, 2) the predisposition preceding the actions, 3) attitudes toward the rules and institutions and 4) participation in public sphere.

With regard to attitudes toward others, before 1945, it reflected two patterns, one among the population and the other among the elites. The population showed willingness for individual sacrifice, the herd-mentality, the loyalty, obedience and unconditional support of the Emperor and elites regardless of their democratic or fascist character, and tolerance, affection, harmony, charity and diligence among themselves. The elite showed loyalty to the Emperor and

192 willingness to compromise among themselves but intolerance, racism, aggressiveness toward the population.454 The elites set the pattern of thoughts whereas the masses imitated and submitted to them.455 After 1945, both the elites and the population changed their attitudes not only toward the authority, but also toward each other. The postwar attitudes are characterized by tolerance, mutual respect and accommodation.456

With regard to predisposition preceding the actions, before 1945, the Japanese society was characterized by two patterns. One pattern reflected the attitude toward the Emperor. Both the elite and the population showed trust and loyalty to the emperor. The other pattern reflected the relations between the elites and the population. These relations were characterized by factionalism, distrust, local and personal loyalty and patterns mixing the conflict with cooperation.457 After 1945, among the population the predisposition started to change from being characterized by inferiority, credulousness, and superstition toward social events to viewing themselves as linked to and part of social changes; from being characterized by misrepresentation and regimented thought, intense emotionality, self-dramatization and self-

454 Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, pp. 165, 170-171; Ward, Robert E. ―Japan: The Continuity of Modernization,‖ in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 52, 57-73. 455 Ward, Robert E. ―Japan: The continuity of modernization,‖ in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 33-52; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, pp. 219-220. 456 The factors contributing to this change include the pursuit of the developmental state model, economic growth, full employment, improved general welfare, higher living standards, doubled gross national product and the avoidance of confrontation between the government, business and unions; see Economic Planning Agency, New Long-Range Economic Plan of Japan 1961–1970: Doubling National Income Plan, Tokyo, 1961; Johnson, Chalmers. MITI and the Japanese Miracle, Stanford, Calif. Stanford University Press, 1981; Garon, Sheldon., Mochizuki, Mike. ―Negotiating social contracts,‖ in Andrew Gordon (eds.) Postwar Japan as History, University of California Press, 1993, pp. 148–155. 457 Ward, Robert E. ―Japan: The continuity of modernization,‖ in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 33; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, pp. 128, 181-198. 193 destruction toward elites to viewing the relations with them on the grounds of common interests; from being characterized by attachment to home, family and the emperor to the one regulated by democratic norms.458 Among the elites, the predisposition changed from being characterized by inflexibility, factionalism and personal loyalty to developing the spirit of cooperation and association outside and across the parties where factionalism and personal loyalty continued to be an important habit but did no longer preclude the cooperation.459

With regard to attitudes toward rules and institutions, before 1945 the Japanese were characterized by acceptance of the government as legitimate. They did not draw a clear distinction between the Meiji, Taisho and Showa regimes because their emergence was natural and the pass from one power structure and constitutional regime to the other was gradual. The distinction between democratic and fascist phases was difficult because rather than going outright in fascism, Japan went through a semi-military regime.460 After 1945 the Japanese did preserve the respect for the institution of Emperor and the rules and the legitimacy of institutions, but their acceptance and respect for them was defined by democratic standards.461

With regard to participation in public sphere, before 1945 the Japanese reflected a mixed pattern. Among the elites, it was active since they viewed the governance and public sphere as a domain of their own. Among the population, it was passive because they viewed the government

458 Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, p. 284. 459 Ward, Robert E. ―Japan: The continuity of modernization,‖ in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 57-73. 460 Moore, Barrington Jr. Social Origin of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Beacon Press, Boston, 1966, p. 304; Robert E. Ward, ―Japan: The continuity of modernization,‖ in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 52. 461 Field, Norma. In the Realm of a Dying Emperor: Japan at Century’s End, New York: Vintage Books, 1991, pp. 19–25. 194 and public sphere as an elite way to exploit the masses.462 After 1945, especially during 1945-

1952, the participation was marked by a revival of the interest and activity in the public sphere and social matters, a stronger social and political conscience and new forms of citizen activism.

Participation was no longer viewed as the domain of elites but involves students, women, labor unions and other social groups.463

The US occupation authorities played an important role and contributed in the change of behaviors and attitudes among the Japanese leadership and society. MacArthur and SCAP kept under close surveillance the Japanese individuals, groups, elites and political leadership in the government, bureaucracy, public sphere and social relations. They did so to prevent the influence and continuation of prewar patterns of authoritarian and militarist attitudes.

4.2.3 Institutional Culture and Patterns

The change of institutional culture and patterns is the third factor that helped the democratization of postwar Japan. It did so in two ways: 1) by democratizing relations between the Japanese citizens, government and ruling leadership and 2) by making it easier for the US occupation to advance and complete the agenda of democratization.

This change was important for three reasons. First, it had to overcome the heritage of the prewar tradition where the government represented and served the interests of the narrow elite circles and the military rather than the population. Second, it had to overcome the reluctance of

462 Yoshikawa, Eiji. Fragments of a Past: A Memoir, trans. Edwin McClellan Tokyo: Kodansha, 1992, pp. 112, 186; Notehelfer, F. G. Kotoku Shusui: Portrait of a Japanese Radical, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971, p. 203. 463 Havens, Thomas R. H. Fire across the Sea: The Vietnam War and Japan, 1965–1975, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987, pp. 133, 207; Apter, David., Nagayo, Sawa. Against the State, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, pp. 281-283. 195 the Japanese elites to democratize their concept of government and governance. Third, it was important in determining the duration of occupation.

This change is characterized by two features. One reflects the change in the driving force behind the functioning of institutions. The drive changed from nation-building, nationalism and militarism to democratic and pacifist orientation. The other feature reflects the change in the institutional practices and behaviors in four main aspects: 1) the representative character of institutions, 2) the approach of power and authority, 3) the style of governance and 4) the decision and policy-making.

With regard to the character of institutions, before 1945 they reflected a strong democratic deficit and lacked broad popular representation. During Tokugawa Japan the institutions represented the interests of daimyo, shogun and samurai.464 During Meiji Japan, though the representation expanded, they continued the tradition of limited representation and did not move toward becoming fully representative.465 After 1945, the creation of a new constitutional framework created the conditions for opening up of institutions to unlimited competition. The government, especially after the first elections in 1946, became representative of all social groups and populations.

With regard to approach of power and authority, before 1945 the structure and distribution of power was hierarchical and concentrated at the hands of the Emperor, the military

464 Dore, Ronald P. ―The Legacy of Tokugawa Education,‖ Conference Paper submitted to Conference on Modern Japan, January 1962, pp. 40-54. 465 Meiji institutions expanded voting rights to a larger segment of population, opened up a greater degree of competition, acknowledged the role of the Diet and parties, nevertheless, the government and its changes did not reflect the choice of the voter but the political machinations between the outgoing prime minister and the Home Ministry who run the police and supervised the elections. Dore, Ronald P. ―The legacy of Tokugawa education,‖ Conference Paper submitted to Conference on Modern Japan, January 1962, pp. 40-54; Byas, Hugh. Government by Assassination, New York: A.A. Knopf, 1942. 196 and the civilian elites.466 The Emperor was at the center of the political order. Other formal institutions such as the Privy Council, the House of Peers, and the Oligarchic Elite of elder statesmen, called Genro, either had much less power or bolstered the culture of centralized power within the imperial state.467 After 1945, among the first things that the US occupation did was restructure power relations. The new structure and distribution of power changed along democratic standards by dividing it between the Diet and the Executive.468 After the new constitution came to force in 1947, the new political Japanese leadership adjusted to the new power structure and distribution and played the political game by conforming to the new rules.

With regard to style of governance, before 1945 it was characterized by an authoritarian and centralized character and top-down flow of authority and actions in management of the imperial institutions. There were some formal and informal constraints, yet it was limited to narrow circles, was detached of people, served the elite circles, and was driven by rational calculations.469 After 1945, the style of governance reflected the new structure of power and authority and re-dimensioning of relations between the Japanese citizen and government. It became democratic in conceptualization and character and it became sensitive to the demands

466 Neither the military nor the civilian elites were accountable to the parliament or each other. Military elites were accountable to the Emperor only, as Constitution gave to the Emperor the direct and supreme command of the military. Military leaders acted independently of the Prime Minister. Civilian elites were and served as appointees of the Emperor. They acted independently from the parliament because they did not owe their job to the Diet. 467 The Privy Council, a body fourteen members established in 1889 and appointed for life by the Emperor, advised the Emperor on constitutional matters, laws, budget, or international treaties and served as counterweight to party cabinets. The House of Peers, a bastion of Emperor-centered authoritarian politics. The oligarchs, or the Genro, advised the Emperor on the choice and appointment of the prime minister and ensured that party rulers did not contradict the wishes of nonparty elites. 468 Under new postwar Constitution, the Emperor retains a symbolic power, as representative of Japanese nation whereas power is divided between the executive and legislative branches. 469 Ward, Robert E. ―Japan: The continuity of modernization,‖ in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 57-73; Dore, Ronald P. ―The legacy of Tokugawa education,‖ Conference Paper submitted to Conference on Modern Japan, January 1962, pp. 40-54. 197 and pressures coming from various social groups. During 1945-1952 it tended, in general, to respond to the most immediate needs reflecting the postwar situation.470

With regard to policy and decision-making, before 1945 they reflected a strong authoritarian, militarist, warlike orientation. To a certain level, they reflected a degree of competition, bargaining and compromise among Japanese elite and leadership. They also reflected the radical attacks from the right and the left, nationalist rhetoric, anti-democratic hierarchic politics, and aspirations for military hegemony.471 The policies advocated and advanced by the military elites and leadership put Japan in the path of military strength and discipline.472 After 1945, the decision-making style changed toward opened up to include and reflect the wishes and interests of the people.473 The most important change was their drive and orientation toward peaceful and pacifist causes.474

The change in institutional culture and patterns was helped by what the US occupation authorities and the Japanese did. The US helped this change by creating the new democratic institutional framework, providing security, maintaining stability and supervising the behavior of

470 Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 112. 471 Ward, Robert E. ―Japan: The continuity of modernization,‖ in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 52; 57-73. 472 Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 67. 473 Ward, Robert E. ―Japan: The continuity of modernization,‖ in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 57-73. 474 Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, pp. 165, 272-273; Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, New York: W.W. Norton, 1999, pp. 314–315; Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 456- 457; Ward, Robert E. ―Japan: The continuity of modernization,‖ in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 52. 198 the Japanese elites. On the other hand, the Japanese helped this change by embracing it and sticking with the new democratic standards set by the occupation forces.

4.2.4 Political Participation

The change in political participation is the fourth factor helping the democratization of postwar Japan. During 1945-1952 it helped democratization in two major ways: 1) it democratized participation in politics since it opened up the political arena to all individuals, giving an end to the discrimination and exclusion of women practiced before 1945, and 2) it helped the democratization of relations between the citizens and government and the governance itself.

The role and importance of this change to democratization is attributed to two elements.

One is the intensity and extent of participation. Following the military defeat and the end of the suppressive practices pursued by the prewar regime, the revival of interests and direct participation of various groups was characterized by an increase. The second is the diversity of participation. The occupation authorities were faced with the revival of the activities and ideas from groups associated with extreme left-wing and right-wing ideologies.

Two features characterize the dynamics in political participation of postwar Japan. First, its patterns changed from a mix of democratic, authoritarian and fascist elements to a democratic character. Second, democratization was reflected in three main elements: 1) the channels of participation, 2) the forms of participation and 3) the electoral alignment.

With regard to the channels of participation, before 1945 political parties, groups and organizations, elections and electoral processes did exist but their relationship with the population was asymmetric. They did not recognize people as political actors in their own right,

199 but treated them as objects of the political action.475 The channels were limited to elites and a few segments of society. During the period from the 1920s-1940s, the arrest of the radical voices, the dissolution of political parties and trade unions, the fake character of electoral processes and the national mobilization and militarization turned the channels into a façade for the regime.476 After 1945, there is a revival and proliferation in the number of participation channels and in the democratic relationship between them and the population. In the first postwar election, there were 2,770 candidates and 363 political parties. Media outlets, labor, women and student groups grew and diversified in number, ideological perspectives and foci.

With regard to forms of participation, before 1945 it was realized through both peaceful and violent manners, was driven by social, economic and political demands and faced suppressive and punitive actions by the government.477 After 1945, especially during 1945-

1948, participation continued to be realized through radical, ideological and peaceful forms, reflecting the social and economic condition that characterized late 1940s and early 1950s.

475 Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 77; Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 383-387; Beckmann, George M. The Making of the Meiji Constitution: The Oligarchs and the Constitutional Development of Japan, 1868–1891, Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1957, p. 149; Ronald P. Dore, ―The legacy of Tokugawa education,‖ Conference Paper submitted to Conference on Modern Japan, January 1962, pp. 40-54. 476 Dore, Ronald P. ―The legacy of Tokugawa education,‖ Paper submitted to Conference on Modern Japan, January 1962, pp. 40-54; Moore, Barrington Jr. Social Origin of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Beacon Press, Boston, 1966, pp. 300-301; Gordon, Andrew. A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 203. 477 McLaren, W. W. Japanese Government Documents, Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. 42, May 1914, pp. 426–433; Ike, Nobutaka. The Beginnings of Political Democracy in Japan, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1950; Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 377-384, 387; Gordon, Andrew. A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 40, 86, 203; Gordon, Andrew. Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan, Berkeley: University of California, 1991, pp. 26, 85, 134-136. 200

Following the start of the Korean War and improvements in the economic conditions in the early

1950s, the participation took milder nonviolent and peaceful forms.478

With regard to electoral alignment, before 1945 there were no alignment dynamics.

During the 1920s-1940s the electorate support was fixed, frozen and linked to pro-government, pro-nationalist and militarist parties.479 After 1945 the alignment is characterized by a decline of class antagonism and ideological divisions and realignment. It is influenced by parties, factions, bureaucratic circles and the one-and-a-half rather than a two-party system. During the early postwar years the electorate tended to align with the left-wing forces. In the early 1950s the electorate alignment shifted toward the conservative forces helping the conservative LDP stay in power for more than forty years.

The democratic orientation of political participation was a product of the role of the US occupation troops and the Japanese themselves. The occupation authorities faced two challenges:

1) the rising influence of left-wing forces and 2) limiting the influence of the left forces among the Japanese society without compromising the notion of political freedom and liberties. The US occupation forces contributed to the democratization of political participation by limiting the influence of radical left ideas and groupings, and by allowing free participation in politics but intervening and outlawing the radical left forces when they embarked on violent acts and put the system under serious economic strains. The Japanese contributed to the democratization of political culture by participating in a massive way and shifting their support toward democratic parties and forces.

478 Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, pp. 260-262, 265-268. 479 Moore, Barrington Jr. Social Origin of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, Beacon Press, Boston, 1966, pp. 300-301. 201

4.2.5 Civil Society

Civil society is the fifth factor that helped the democratization of postwar Japan. Like in

Germany, democratization and development of civil society reflected the willingness of the

Japanese to reconstruct the relationship between the individual and the state. It helped democratize postwar Japan in two ways: 1) by providing a medium of expression for various social groups, interests, intellectuals and public figures and 2) by serving to develop a constructive criticism and approach to government.

Two elements make the change and revival of civil society important to democratization.

One is the transformation of its relationship with the state. The relationship changed from one in which the civil society was either identified with or dependent on the state to one in which the civil society became not only independent from the state but also a voice of criticism toward the government. The second element is the rise and revival of civil society in two important elements: 1) the number of civic organizations and 2) the development of an active public sphere.

With regard to the number of civic organizations, before 1945 they were either underdeveloped or few in number and factionalized. Even the organizations that existed either served the interests of the elite, or willingly or unwillingly, became identical with the state, especially during the period 1930-1945. They echoed the wishes of the Emperor and ruling elite.480 After 1945, along with the embrace of a new democratic orientation, there was a revival of civic organizations and groups that embraced the best elements from the previous tradition and embarked in defending and advancing the interests of various social groups, public interest and society. The most active organizations during 1945-1952 included those with links to labor

480 Dore, Ronald P. ―The legacy of Tokugawa education,‖ Paper submitted to Conference on Modern Japan, January 1962, pp. 40-54. 202 unions, women and students. Their activity was supplemented by the active role of intellectuals, peace movements, powerful publishing companies and media.481 The civic organizations diversified the areas of their interest and activity, grew and became vibrant, developed their independence from the state, intensified their activity and influence and became an important safeguard of the new democracy.482

With regard to the public sphere, before 1945 especially during the militarist period, the public sphere became either non-existent or silent or echoed the goals of the militarist elite and state.483 After 1945 the revival of the public sphere was among the first things that occurred. It was populated by intellectuals and public figures, who voiced their own issues, took positions independently of the state and political elites on various issues, shaped the public debate and had their own impact on politics and society. During 1947-1952 their activism and involvement in public affairs became the dominant pattern.484 In the early 1950s, they debated about their silence during the militarist period and co-optation by the state. They also contributed to the banishment of conservative heroes of the past and vehemently supported new democracy and peace. Their influence was felt even during the late 1950s and early 1960s when they addressed the issues of

481 Civic organizations and groups included young people, students, women, labor and religion followers, university professors and intellectuals. By the end of 1946, the labor movement had nearly five million members; in 1949, it had 6.7 million or 56% of the workers; Women‘s organizations emerged with the Christian Women‘s Reform Society, Housewives Association and Mothers Conference. In 1948, students founded All-Japan Federation of Student Self-Governing Associations. 482 The Nagasaki Citizens Committee was one of civic organizations defending freedom of speech. It demanded an end to taboos in political discussion and defended the mayor of Nagasaki who had called the Emperor as the person responsible for war. The petition they prepared in defense of the mayor was signed by four hundred thousand people; See Field, Norma. In the Realm of a Dying Emperor: Japan at Century’s End, Vintage, 1993, pp. 233–234. 483 Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 705-707. 484 The Nagasaki Citizens Committee was one of the civic organizations defending freedom of speech. It demanded an end to taboos in political discussion and defended the mayor of Nagasaki who had called the Emperor as the person responsible for war. The petition they prepared in defense of the mayor was signed by four hundred thousand people. In 1949, Sekai emerged as the most influential voice among progressive intellectuals and inspired the formation of a Peace Problems Discussion Group. See Field, Norma. In the Realm of a Dying Emperor: Japan at Century’s End, Vintage, 1993, pp. 233–234. 203 nuclear disarmament, the US–Japan Security Treaty, democratization of academia and the quality of social reforms undertaken by government. They did set the terms of debate, shaped public opinion, and served as a source of criticism for the conservative government.485

While the rise and development of civil society was mostly a product of endogenous

Japanese forces and society, orientation toward democratic standard was a product of both the

US occupation authorities and the Japanese society. The US contributed by keeping under the control the influence of radical ideas and ideologies from the left and the right. The Japanese contributed to the development of civil society along democratic standards by keeping away the influence of radical groups and ideas and embracing democratic standards and the guiding principle of their activity and reconstruction of relations between the individual and the state.

4.2.6 Attitude toward Change

The attitude toward change is the sixth factor helping democratization of postwar Japan.

Like in Germany, it reflected the military defeat and occupation. It was important to democratization for three reasons: 1) the Japanese had shown a propensity to embrace the change regardless of its positive or negative effects, 2) the different attitudes shown by the elites and the population and 3) its influence on the democratization and duration of occupation.

The main feature of the attitude shown by the Japanese toward social and political change was the different approach shown by the Emperor, the population and the elites. The first two embraced it from the very beginning whereas the elites initially resisted it. The dynamics in

485 Tamamoto, Masaru. Unwanted Peace: Japanese Intellectuals in American Occupied Japan, 1948– 1952, Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1988; Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 705-707; Uno, Kathleen S. ―The death of ‗Good Wfe, Wise Mother‘?‖ in Andrew Gordon (eds.), Postwar Japan as History, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 308–312; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, pp. 236, 242-244, 273-275. 204 terms of the attitudes toward change were reflected in two elements: 1) acceptance or resistance of the change, and 2) the direction of change in attitudes among the Japanese.

With regard to acceptance or resistance to social and political change, before 1945 the

Japanese, the population and the elites, had shown patterns of both embrace and resistance to it.486 The elite resisted or embraced the change depending on the purposes and the initiator.

They accepted the change coming from the above but resisted the change coming from below.487

After 1945, the population embraced the change coming from the US occupation; the elites did not. They resisted and eventually embraced it after 1947, only because they faced a strong pressure by the occupation administration and out of the fear they would be politically relegated and left aside.488

With regard to direction of the change in attitudes, before 1945 the Japanese had shown they had accepted social and political changes regardless of their positive or negative directions

486 Meiji elite, on the one hand, was open to Western ideas and practices and took the West as modernization model, on the other hand preserved Japan‘s oldest myths to bolster the authority of the Emperor. It was inspired by Euro-American technology and ideas but saw them as both opportunity and danger militarily and politically. Meiji elites sent people to the West to learn and shaped domestic reforms along Western experience. But the borrowed from Europe selectively, viewed democratic ideas with great concern, viewed parliament as a divisive institution rather than a source of unity and strength, and feared the popular support turning into mass rebellion or social anarchy. When modernization and myths conflicted, Emperor authority and legitimacy took precedence. See Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, p. 493-494; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 74. 487 Domestically, institutions and rites were changed and re-created to serve creation of new culture and tradition, define what Japan had been, reject warrior rule and create a new Japan. Internationally, the change was viewed a function of Japan catch up and escape semi-colonial dependence. Viewing the world as divided into competing national economic units and Japan as a latecomer; See Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 493-494; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, pp. 71-73. 488 The old elites believed that blaming a few military conspirers, calling war an aberration, taking reforms limited to simply to thwart social upheaval, and keeping the Emperor as their shield sufficed. John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, p. 84; Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 743-753. 205 and effects. They embraced the change in a positive direction for the Early Meiji and Taisho periods but they also embraced the change toward a negative direction during the militarist period. They had also embraced changes whose effects were greater among upper classes and minimal or absent toward lower classes.489 After 1945, and especially after 1948, when the elites willingly or not joined the population, the Japanese embraced the political and social change orienting them toward a democratic society and they also accepted all political, social and economic changes that affected all social groups and the populace.490

To summarize, political culture helped the democratization of postwar Japan through changes that occurred in values and beliefs, behaviors and attitudes, institutional functioning and development, political participation and civil society. The changes in political culture reflected not only the willingness for change among the Japanese population but also the role that the US occupation authority played in forcing the postwar Japanese elites to embrace the new democratic political culture.

4.3 Security Environment and Post-1945 Japan

The post-1945 security environment that accompanied the occupation of Japan during

1945-1952 was both internally and externally stable and favorable to democratization of postwar

Japan. The stability helped the US occupation government successfully advance the agenda of democratization. It also created conditions for the democratization to proceed at a fast pace. By

1952 Japan was a fully democratic state and society.

489 Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, pp. 63-64, 75-76, 202-203. 490 Field, Norma. In the Realm of a Dying Emperor: Japan at Century’s End, Vintage, 1993, pp. 233– 234; Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, pp. 150-160. 206

4.3.1 Internal Security Environment

The internal security of Japan during the occupation years was characterized by stability and absence of conflicts or threats. The stability reflected the role of three factors: 1) the willingness of Japanese to embrace the defeat and obey and cooperate with the US occupation government, 2) the homogeneity of the Japanese population and 3) the role played by the US occupation forces in maintaining internal order and security. The level of internal conflict and instability in Japan during the occupation years was 0, that is, there were no security threats.491

4.3.2 External Security Environment.

The external security environment for post-war Japan was conducive to democracy for a few reasons. One was that there was no war or major military confrontation on Japanese territory. Also, the possibility of military conflict with the Soviet Union and China was much less than in the case of Germany. While the Korean war demonstrated that conflict in East Asia could occur, this was not a major threat to the Japanese homeland. Moreover, any military threat arising out of conflict in East Asia was adequately addressed by the US military presence in and alliance with Japan. Such a security environment could be considered as conducive to – or at least not hurting – democratization.

Japan‘s external security environment also reflected the positive influence of four security-related elements: 1) the new conceptualization of national interests on the part of Japan.

This re-conceptualization reflected the congruence between the Japanese and US postwar national interests, 2) the new character and drive behind the postwar Japanese foreign policy.

491 The Center for Systemic Peace, in ―Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946-2008,‖ measures the activity of both external and internal factors related to security measuring them from 1 (loWest) to 10 (highest). 0 denotes no evidence of threat to security. See www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm.

207

The latter was characterized by harmony with the US postwar foreign policy, 3) the new perspective based on which the Japanese leaders viewed and analyzed postwar intestate relations and politics in Asia. The Japanese policymakers viewed the sources of peace, security and stability in a similar ways as the US policy-makers did, and 4) the way that the postwar Japan managed neighborly relations regardless of the regime character. Japan and the US shared the same approach about the way Japan had to manage the relations with its neighbors.

As shown in Figure A4.3 in Appendix 4, these security elements helped the creation of an environment favorable to the democratization of postwar Japan in two ways. First, the re- conceptualization of national interests and the compatibility of their construction that characterized national interests of Japan and the US helped the pursuit of similar foreign policies by Japan and the US in Asia. This was one factor that helped create a favorable environment to democratization. Second, the new perspective on which Japan viewed and analyzed sources of peace, security and stability in postwar Asia and similarity between the Japanese and US on the position of Japan in postwar Asia, helped to the construction of neighborly relations and management of regime differences by Japan and the US in postwar Asia that was not only similar but also favorable to democratization of postwar Japan. Viewed in whole, all these security elements helped the creation of a favorable security environment to the democratizing postwar Japan.

4.3.2.1 National Interests

The re-conceptualization of national interests was one of the factors that indirectly helped the democratization of postwar Japan. It was reflected in two elements. One was the basis of definition. This basis changed from a realist, power-driven, imperialist view to a peaceful, anti-

208 militarist and democratic one. The second was the compatibility of the post-1945 definition of

Japanese national interests with those of the United States. The re-conceptualization helped democratization in two major ways: 1) directly, it helped the construction of a foreign policy driven by pacifism and democratic drive and 2) indirectly, it helped the creation of a favorable security environment. The positive effects of the re-conceptualization of national interests were expressed in three elements: 1) the pacifist orientation of Japan, 2) the improvement of relations with neighboring countries and 3) the democratic character of political, economic and military alliance with the US.

Before 1945, Japan defined its national interests on the basis of nationalism and militaristic expansion. The definition reflected three concerns: nation-building, consolidation of the state and political regime and militarization of Japan. Following its defeat in 1945, Japan changed the basis of definition of national interests from nationalism and militarism to pacifism, antimilitarism and democratic orientation.492 The redefinition of postwar Japanese national interests was expressed in three dimensions: 1) their content, 2) their emphasis and 3) their orientation.

With regard to content of the national interests, before 1945 they contained a strong militarist spirit and reflected imperialist aspirations, especially during 1925-1944. The militarism and imperialism reflected the rise in power and the influence of the military elite.493 Japan pursued the military buildup, realignment, expansionism, and ideologically inspired wars.494 To

492 Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. xiii. 493 Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 628-635. 494 Pelz, Stephen. Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, pp. x-xiii, 175; 209 sustain its domestic economic growth, Japan embarked in the acquisition and control of new resources beyond Japan. To become a great power and turn Japan into the epicenter of the Asian world, Japan started to push for developing and reforming Asia along the Meiji vision.495 After

1945, the national interests of Japan reflected the effects of the defeat in World War II. Their content changed and took a strong peaceful and anti-militarist orientation.

With regard to an emphasis that characterized the national interests, before 1945 the national interests echoed and gave priority to economic, security and ideological concerns. The leaders of the late Meiji (1890-1910) and Taisho Japan (1910-mid 1920s) grew concerned about the access of Japan to economic resources that would allow Japan to sustain its economic growth domestically. In addition to economic concerns, the militarist Japan (1925-1940) emphasized concerns related to the security of Japan and ideological differences between Japan and Russia.

During 1907-1910 Japan participated in ideologically inspired wars.496

After 1945, the national interests changed their emphases from economic, security and ideological concerns toward economic and political concerns. Politically, regaining sovereignty and re-entering the international society of states became the priority defining the national interests of postwar Japan. Japan accepted the renunciation of war as a sovereign right to resolve disputes with other nations, turned itself into a pacifist state and a passive nation in global politics, pursued disarmament and demilitarization, did not engage militarily at the international

Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, p. 617. 495 Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 429-432. 496 Pelz, Stephen. Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, pp. x-xiii, 175; Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, p. 617. 210 stage and refused the demands for rearmament.497 The most important emphasis became the economy. Japan made economic recovery and growth its first priority, paid reparations to countries it had occupied during the World War II, opened Japan to foreign trade but on its own terms, established strong economic and trade relations with the United States and oriented its economy toward exports.498

With regard to orientation of national interests, before 1945 Japan viewed its national interests as fitting better with the revisionist powers such as Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. It turned against agreements and relations it had developed with the United States and Great Britain and became one of the three members of the Axis Rome-Tokyo-Berlin. After 1945 the national interests were re-oriented toward establishing a strong alliance with the US within a framework of democratic realism and pacifism.499 It also oriented itself to self-defense based on collective security.500 Responding to the US interest to have a strong political ally in Asia, in 1951 Japan signed with the US the Peace Treaty and the US-Japan Security Treaty.501

497 Japan‘s Constitution, Article 9; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. xiii; Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 702-703. 498 Japan‘s efforts were favored by strong ties with the US, the US trade policies toward Japan, and the exchange rate. Strong ties with the US helped Japan access the world‘s largest market. American manufacturers were generous and even careless in providing technology for Japan‘s new industries. The exchange rate helped Japanese manufactures be competitive. Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 702-703. 499 Mead, Walter Russell. Special providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World, A Century Foundation Book, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 2001, pp. 162-165, 192-194; Gaddis, John Lewis. We now know: Rethinking Cold War History, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1997, pp. 33-38; Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: A critical appraisal of postwar American national security policy, Oxford University Press, new York, 1982, pp. 27-32, 130-132, 201-202, 279-282. 500 Renunciation of the war did not allow for the development of self-defense capabilities. To make up for this, Japanese oriented themselves toward a self-defense managed internationally relying on the assistance of the US and international peace organizations; Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, p. 397. 501 US-Japan Security Treaty specified that the United States of America should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attacks, and maintain peace and security in the Far East. 211

The re-conceptualization of national interests of postwar Japan reflected not only the effects of the wartime defeat of Japan and the embrace of change by the Japanese leadership and government but also the role of the US in postwar Japan. The combination is expressed in the harmony of the national interests between the US and Japan.

Politically, the US needed an ally in the region and Japan took this role willingly.

Economically, the US needed to lessen the economic burden of Japan‘s reconstruction. To this end, the US provided assistance to Japan to enable its economic recovery, opened its markets to

Japan exports, and helped Japan become member of international economic, trade, financial organizations and institutions.502 Militarily, the US was interested in creating bilateral and multilateral alliances against the communist threat. The US expected that while it would provide the defense for it, Japan would increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense, avoiding any offensive armament.

Thus the re-conceptualization of national interests was a factor that helped democratization and its direct expression was the changes that occurred in the foreign policy of postwar Japan.

4.3.2.2 The Character of Foreign Policy

Re-orientation of postwar Japanese foreign policy is the second factor that directly helped democratization. It influenced democratization through creating an environment favorable in interstate relations between Japan and other countries in the Asian region. As in the case of

502 The US helped the revival of the Japanese economy by making large sum orders and payments to Japan during the Korean War. In addition, the US allowed Japanese exports to the US and protectionism to the US goods. The policy caused complaints of companies in the US but the latter, due to the vital importance of the security ties with Japan, headed off the demands for protectionist policies against Japan. See Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 703, 733. 212

Germany, one cannot speak of a genuine Japanese foreign policy; however, unlike Germany, which was governed directly by the Allied military government, Japan was run by its own government under the close supervision of the MacArthur and US military government. Thus, in the case of Japan, while postwar foreign policy was clearly under the influence of US occupation authorities, to some extent it reflected the orientation of the Japanese policymakers as well.

Two dynamics characterize the post-1945 Japanese foreign policy. One is the radical change of its drive and orientation. It changed from an aggressive, militarist, expansive and imperialist character toward a pacifist and democratic foreign policy. The other dynamic is its congruity with the US foreign policy. The change of character of postwar Japanese foreign policy and its congruity with the US foreign policy helped democratization in two ways. First, it oriented Japan toward a developing a peaceful and antimilitarist profile.503 Japan embarked on pursuing a foreign policy away from continental realism that had characterized it before 1945 toward a peace-driven, antimilitarist and democratic foreign policy. This change was to help

Japan repair its image and restore its relations with other states in the region. Second, the new character of postwar foreign policy helped Japan restore and develop peaceful relations with the other states in the Asian region. The positive influence of the new foreign policy pursued by postwar Japan was expressed in two elements: 1) the content of relations between Japan and other states in Asia and 2) the orientation of postwar Japanese foreign policy.

With regard to content of relations between Japan and other Asian states, before 1945, from the late 1880s to the early 1940s, they reflected the evolutionary development of the

Japanese state and the reflection and projection of such development upon other states in the region.

503 Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. xiii; Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 527-529. 213

During the Early Meiji Japan 1860-1880, the relations between Japan and other Asian states were influenced by the domestic agenda of national unification, nation-building, and international recognition. Japan aimed at building a strong military, normalizing the relations with great powers and advancing its own colonial aspirations in Asia.504 Japan saw the local wars as an extension of nationalist foreign policy. It fought back the Chinese, Russian, Korean, and British influence.505

During the Late Meiji Japan, from the 1880s to the 1910s, the relations between Japan and other states in Asia reflected the replacement of the peace-oriented Japanese leaders by a war-oriented generation of politicians and the increasing dominance of imperialist aspirations.506

During the Taisho reign, until the mid-1920s, Japan‘s foreign policy was influenced by domestic debate over its direction and participation in international affairs.507 Japan took a

504 During 1880s-1890s, following Germany as a model, Japan took a substantial military buildup of the navy and the army to keep order at home defend itself and expand abroad. Japan tried to negotiate and change treaties with the US, Britain, Prussia, France, and Russia. Japan also sought to establish its own colonies by emulating the West. It invaded Korea in 1873, secured possession of the Kurils in 1875, asserted full control over Ryukyu in 1879; in 1876 pursued gun-boat diplomacy against Korea, forcing it to accept the Treaty of Kanghwa based on which Korea opened three ports to Japan, gave the Japanese extraterritoriality, and expanded economic trade with Japan. During 1881-1885, it embarked in a powerful rhetoric of pan-Asian solidarity with Japan as tutor and military hegemon, extending beyond Korea; Hiroaki, Osawa. ―Emperor versus army leaders: The ‗Complications‘ incident of 1886,‖ Acta Asiatica, Vol. 59, Tokyo, 1990, p. 10; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 117; Eskildsen, Robert. ―Of Civilization and Savages: The Mimetic Imperialism of Japan‘s 1874 Expedition to Taiwan,‖ American Historical Review, Vol. 107, No. 2, April 2002, pp. 388–418. 505 Meiji leaders, on the one hand, fought Russian ambitions to the north and faced Korea‘s rejection to establish diplomatic relations, on the other, they struggled to achieve unity since the government did not control all Tokugawa domains. Leaders believed retorting to war would bring unity, promote modernization, and make Japan respectable. Takayoshi, Kido. The Diary of Kido Takayoshi, Vol. 1, Entry for March 12, 1869, pp. 167–168, 191; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 177. 506 From 1900-1907, the war and Navy ministers were cabinet members and worked independently of civilian politicians. Foreign policy was determined by a military troika: the army minister, chief of General Staff, and the inspector general of military education. War plans targeted Russia, the US, and France as putative enemies; Genro Katsura Taro, especially Tanaka Giichi, advocated vigorously larger armies and national expansion; See Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 448-452. 214 cooperative and accommodating approach. It streamlined military forces, reduced the military buildup and expenditures, and tried to redefine its course.508

During the Showa militarist reign, from the mid-1920s to the early 1940s, the relations between Japan and other states were influenced by the notion of Japanese supremacy and the imperialist logic of military power and territorial expansion.509 It reflected the internal conflict between civilian and military establishments, the unwillingness of pro-war militarist circles to retreat from the imperialist orientation of Japan and the control of policy-making by the military elite.510 The foreign policy pursued the doctrine of ―zones of sovereignty and zones of advantage,‖ the military buildup, expansion in Asia and use of force and aggression.511 It challenged the status-quo, the international initiatives and the League of Nations.

507 The debate reflected divisions among parties, elites, military leaders, and media. Some argued for a larger army and navy, others favored economic expansion. Japan joined the international peace conference in Washington that aimed at ending the emerging naval arms race between Japan, Britain, and the US that set then against each other and ensuring the security of each nation. 508 In the early 1920s on the advice of the European Powers, Japan returned to China the former German holdings in Shantung, became a full participant in cooperative efforts to work out new tariff and customs arrangements for China, and in the Nine Power Treaty, designed to protect Chinese sovereignty, pledged to respect China‘s territorial sovereignty, maintain the ―Open Door‖ in trade, and cooperate in helping China achieve unity and stability. In 1920, at the International Peace Conference in Washington Japan agreed to accommodate the US and British concerns about naval power and keep warship capacities to a tonnage ratio of 5:5:3. Japan cut manpower and weapons, diminished military costs from 55% of the budget in 1918 to just 29% in 1924, reduced troops, and bought new modern weapons; See Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 175; Bix, Herbert P. Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, Perennial, 2001. 509 Bix, Herbert P. Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, Perennial, 2001; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, pp. 5, 183. 510 Gordon, Andrew. Labor and Imperial Democracy, Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1991, pp. 266–267; Akira Iriye, ―Japan‘s drive to Great-Power status,‖ in Cambridge History of Japan, The Nineteenth Century, 1989, Vol. 5, p. 747; Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, p. 430;Young, Louise. Japan’s Total Empire, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, pp. 55–114; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 191. 511 Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, pp. 122-123, 191; Wakabayashi, Bob Tadashi. Anti-Foreignism and Western Learning in Early-Modern Japan: The New Theses of 1825, Cambridge: Harvard Council on East Asian Studies, 1986, p. 149. 215

After 1945, Japan re-conceptualized and constructed its relations with other states in both the Asian region and the world on the bases of pacifism and antimilitarism. This reconstruction was evident during 1945-1952. As Japan developed economically, it started to factor in relations with other states the economic assistance. The double-digit growth that characterized Japan during the 1960s and the 1970s allowed Japan to serve as a source of economic assistance to other countries in the Asian region.

With regard to the orientation of Japanese policy, before 1945 Japan‘s foreign policy was oriented toward the development of relations with the Great Britain, the US and France. Later it joined Italy and Germany, which were both weak democracies that headed toward Nazism and

Fascism.

Japan‘s foreign policy toward Great Britain shifted from one of mutual benefits and cooperation to a policy of doubts and animosity.512 Toward the United States, it changed from one of relatively friendly relations toward suspicions and animosity. Relations went on to develop even more animosity and mutual distrust.513 The growing animosity in US-Japan relations reflected the abandonment of the League of Nation by Japan, alignment with Germany and Italy in the anti-Comintern Pact and the invasion of Manchuria. It turned its eyes toward these powers and pursued a collision course with the foreign policy of the United States and

Great Britain.514 The turn culminated with the attack against the US in Pearl Harbor.515

512 By the late 1920s, the Japanese militarist circles started to doubt the benefits of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance because of the close cooperation between the US and Britain. They feared that Britain would not support Japan in a possible struggle with the US. They were also aware of Japan‘s lacking the strength to challenge both powers. 513 In 1907, Roosevelt requested preparation of an ―Orange‖ war plan was for Japan and ordered the move of the entire battleship fleet to the Pacific Coast from its Atlantic bases, hailed as the ―White Fleet‖ on its visit to Japan in 1908. On the other hand, following the increase of its own anti-American feeling, the Japanese Imperial Navy considered the United States as its possible future enemy. 514 Japan provoked the Western powers by occupying the Manchukuo, putting the Great Wall under Japanese rule, extending its protectorate to central China, and continuing army expansionism. In 1933, 216

After 1945, Japan‘s foreign policy changed and was characterized by congruity with the

US foreign policy and actions in Asia and the world. The congruity reflected the defeat and occupation of Japan. It followed the spirit underlying Treaty of Peace and Security Treaty that

Japan signed with the United States and was expressed in political, economic, military and security areas.

The orientation of Japan‘s postwar foreign policy toward congruity with the US foreign policy reflected not only the effects of the defeat of Japan but also the influence and role of the

US in postwar Japan. The US foreign policy toward Japan in particular and Asia in general stood upon two orientations: 1) making and relying on Japan as the first and closest ally in the region and 2) containing the Communist influence.

Politically, US foreign policy aimed at the democratization and rehabilitation of Japan in the region.516 Japan‘s foreign policy followed the US on issues over China, Taiwan, North-

South conflict in Korean peninsula, and communist containment, despite the powerful domestic

Japan defied the condemnation of the Manchukuo regime by League of Nations; Japan withdrew from the Kellogg-Briand Pact that outlawed and renounced war as an instrument of national policy, on the ground that the phrase ―respective peoples‖ was unconstitutional and infringed Emperor‘s prerogative to make war and declare peace. In the 1940s, Japan allied with Germany and Italy to checkmate the United States and Great Britain; See Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 191; Akita, George. ―The Other Ito: A Political Failure,‖ in Albert M. Craig and Donald H. Shively (eds.), Personality in Japanese History, University of California Press, 1970, pp. 335–372; Takeuchi, Sterling Tatsuji. War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire, New York: Doubleday, 1935, pp. 262–274; Toshihiko, Shimada. ―Designs on North China, 1933–1937‖ a James B. Crowley translation in James William Morley, (eds.), The China Quagmire: Japanese Expansion on the Asian Continent, 1933–1941, New York: Columbia University Press, 1983. 515 Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 205; Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, p. 617. 516 The US negotiated with many Asian countries to reach a settlement with Japan. The result was a number of defense agreements with the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. Asian nations were also given the right to negotiate bilateral reparation agreements with Japan. In September 1951 representatives of forty-eight nations met in San Francisco and signed a treaty ending the state of war that still formally existed with Japan; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 242. 217 debate between the left and right camps.517 It tried to erase the distrust of many Asian countries, regain the trust among neighbors and other states and normalize relations with the Soviet Union and China. Economically, the US foreign policy aimed at the revival and integration of the

Japanese economy in the region, international organizations and institutions. Japan also tried to rehabilitate itself among Asian countries and other countries in the world. In security and military affairs, the Security Treaty that the US signed in 1951 with Japan allowed and enabled

Japan to take the responsibility for its own security and rearm.518 Japan pursued disarmament, pacifism, and reliance on the US for its security. It renewed the Security Treaty in 1960, refused pressures for its rearming, and stayed under the US atomic umbrella.519

4.3.2.3 The View of Sources of Security and Stability

517 During the 1950s, the left and right clashed over re-armament, US military presence, and Security Treaty. The conservatives were supportive of US policies and proposals for rearmament, ready to even revise constitution, redefine position of the Emperor, and permit the recreation of some kind of military structure. The left was highly critical of US policy, championed the Peace Constitution as its own, and was against Japan‘s rearmament. It called the Security Treaty a violation of Japanese neutrality and disarmament. They feared the U.S. troops would make Japan a lightning rod for an attack by America‘s enemies. See Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, pp. 242, 272; Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, p. 701. 518 In 1948, when it became clear in Washington that Communist would prevail in China, Keenan urged to stop disarming and de-industrializing Japan and starting reviving its economy, industry and army. The treaty was signed two hours after the Peace Treaty was signed. It recognized the US’s right to retain troops and bases in Japan, control Okinawa and it obliged the US to protect Japan from attacks, and guarantee international peace and security. The US was to remain in Japan until Japan could assume responsibility for its own defense. It was to assist Japan in defensive armament, technology, and training, to enable Japan to defend itself. Japan was obliged not to grant similar rights to any third power without US approval, follow the US on foreign policy issues, and recognize Taiwan, not the Beijing government, as the legitimate government of China; See The US-Japan Security Treaty, 1951; Gordon, Andrew (eds.), Postwar Japan as History, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. 519 During the 1950s the US asked Japan to take responsibility for its own security. The Prime Minister Yoshida did not want to bypass Article 9 of the Constitution and reached a compromise to establish a Police Reserve taking some security responsibilities with the perspective of becoming the Self-Defense Forces. See Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 242. 218

The way that the Japanese and US policy-makers analyzed and viewed the sources of security and stability is another factor that indirectly helped democratization of postwar Japan as shown in Figure A4.3. It was based on the construction of neighborly relations and helped the creation of a favorable security environment, which in turn helped the democratization.

Two features characterize the way that policymakers viewed sources of security and stability. First, in terms of perspectives both viewed the sources of security and peace in the context of a bipolar postwar order and rise of the communist threat. Second, in terms of actions, the actions of Japan and US in postwar Asia were both driven by desires to preserve the status quo and peace. Japan embraced pacifism and the US pursued the policy of containment of

Communism but avoided confrontation. The similarity in view and actions between the Japanese and US policymakers helped Japan develop relations with its neighbors and accommodate regime differences in a peaceful way. The change in the way that policymakers viewed sources of security and stability was reflected in two elements: 1) the interpretation of interstate relations and 2) the actions deriving from the view.

With regard to interstate relations, after 1945 the interpretation of interstate relations and politics by Japanese policymakers reflected its defeat in the World War II, the nuclear experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, US occupation, rise of bipolar system, the military, political, economic, ideological competition between the US and Soviet Union and the alliance with the

United States.520 Its core reflected the democratic realism. It continued to account for the concerns about balance of power, competition, threats, and expansion, it was aware of the rise of communist forces in China and North Korea and the ideological, political, economic, and military clash between democratic and Communist forces. Yet, the interpretation of postwar

520 New worldview is expressed in Japanese orientation toward regaining its place in Asian region and international community through negotiations, treaties, antimilitarist, peaceful approach, economic cooperation, and participation in international institutions and organizations. 219 interstate politics, security and stability in relations between Japan and other states was given a strong pacifist orientation that was expressed in the cooperation with and accommodation of the interests of other states in the Asian region and the world.521

With regard to actions deriving from the view on interstate relations and politics, after

1945, the behavior and actions of Japan reflected the influence of is defeat and occupation by the

US, rise of communist threats, and alliance with the US. Japan focused on rebuilding relations with its neighbors, keeping and developing them within a framework of peaceful predisposition, accommodation of interests, and bilateral or multilateral cooperation. Japan changed its behavior in political, economic, security and military areas. Politically, Japan paid attention to its image and its rehabilitation. It embraced pacifism, participated in international institutions and organizations, stood by the US, and worked for the stability of the system. Economically, Japan focused on regaining its place in world economy. It moved to rehabilitate regional and global economic ties and place, gain access in markets, engaged in bilateral and multilateral cooperation agreements, and assisted financially various countries in need, and grew to become a great economic power. Militarily, Japan pursued demilitarization and disarmament. It displayed no aspiration for military capabilities and power, kept strong ties with the US, and served as the

Asia‘s bulwark against communism.522

4.3.2.4 The Management of Neighborly Relations and Differences in Regime Type

The management of relations with its neighbors is the last security-related factor that helped directly the democratization of postwar Japan. It influenced the creation of security

521 Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 238; Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, p. 526. 522 Cumings, Bruce. ―Japan in the world system,‖ in Postwar Japan as History, Andrew Gordon (eds.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 40. 220 environment favorable to democratization. It reflects two features: 1) similarity with the US in its approach of dealing with its neighbors and 2) radical change in conceptualization of relations with its neighbors from the basis of force and aggressiveness toward peaceful coexistence and pacifism.

Japan framed the relations with its neighbors in a radically new different way based on pacifism. The US was for the management of relations between neighboring states in the Asian region through avoidance of provocations or conflicts that could have escalated into a war. The change and similarity in treatment of neighborly relations helped democratization in two ways.

One was through development of peaceful and stable relations with neighboring countries regardless of their political regime. The other way was through creation of a security environment favorable to democratization. The change in the way of management of neighborly relations was expressed in two main elements: 1) the premises shaping the relations and 2) the management of conflicts and accommodation of mutual interests.

With regard to premises, before 1945 the premises on which Japan constructed relations with its neighbors consisted of dislike, distrust, competition and tensions. Japan did borrow institutions and practices from China, and its stability was linked to China‘s, but Sino-Japanese relations were characterized by mutual dislike, distrust, and competition.523 The Japanese-

523 Meiji Japan borrowed from China identification with monarchy, civil service examinations, and imperial pronouncements. Meiji Restoration was brought forth from China‘s crisis and opium war. The dislike derived from the abnormal conditions of first Sino-Japanese contacts, Japanese violence toward Chinese ex-soldiers and civilians following the fall of Port Arthur, and demonization and denigration of China by Japanese press; Shillony, Ben-Ami. ―The Meiji Restoration: Japan‘s attempt to inherit China,‖ in Ian Neary (eds.) War, Revolution, and Japan Kent: Sandgate, Folkestone, 1993, pp. 20–32; Jansen, Marius B. The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, Harvard University Press, 1954; Donald, Keene. ―The Sino- Japanese War of 1894–95 and its cultural effect on Japan,‖ in Donald H. Shively (eds.) Tradition and Modernization in Japanese Culture, Princeton NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1971. 221

Korean relations did also suffer from mutual distrust.524 These elements characterized relations between Japan and its neighbors until 1945.

After 1945, Japan changed the premises on which it constructed relations with its neighbors. The premises changed to showing sympathy, trust, cooperation and accommodation.

Postwar Japan needed to heal war wounds, regain trust, and rebuild relations. To achieve this,

Japan had to prove to its neighbors that the postwar Japan was a benevolent economic power and a neutral and peaceful nation.

With regard to the management of conflicts and accommodation of mutual interests, before 1945 Japan pursued the doctrines of power politics and imperialism. Japan routinely intervened politically, economically and militarily in Korea under the justification of helping

Korea to modernize. After imposing a colonial regime on Korea, Japan moved to do the same with China by submitting ―Twenty-one Demands‖ in 1915, which was justified by the unstable and revolutionary situation in China.525

During the Showa militarist Japan (late 1920s until 1945), Japan pursued the Asian version of the Monroe Doctrine that viewed Asia and China as the sole responsibility of Japan and any interference by other foreign powers as undesirable and harmful.526 In China, Japan occupied Manchuria, created Manchukuo, pursued colonialist policies, suppressed nationalist

524 In 1880, Japan sought to forge a close political relationship with Korea aiming at promoting a pro- Japan regime independent of influences from China and Russia. In 1875, Japan forced Korea to accept a treaty quite as unequal as those which Western powers forced Japan to accept: three Korean ports were opened for trade, consular jurisdiction brought extraterritoriality, and Korea was declared fully independent from Chinese hegemony. In 1881 Japan sent military advisors to modernize the Korean army. Japan viewed Korea as a ―zone of advantage‖ protecting Japan‘s home-island ―zone of sovereignty.‖ 525 Japan demanded the Chinese government to accept Japan‘s control of railways, coasts, and major cities of Shandong Province, Japan‘s extraterritoriality in Manchuria, Japan‘s control of iron and steel raw material Chinese resources, to accept appointment of Japanese advisors in political and economic as well as military affairs and to no longer give concessions to other foreign powers except Japan. 526 Crowley, James B. Japan’s Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930–1938, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, p. 195. 222 demonstrations and communist activities, engaged in war against both nationalist and

Communist forces, occupied China, and committed war crimes.527 In Korea, Japan pursued the colonial exploitation whereas in Taiwan it cracked down on the political movement for self- rule.528

After 1945, Japan changed the way it managed the disputes and interests with its neighbors. The re-conceptualization of relations with its neighbors changed from a basis of force, intervention, aggressions, occupation and annexation toward a basis of pacifist orientation, accommodation and economic assistance. It did not engage in military confrontation with China and the Soviet Union and its ties with South Korea, though charged by historical emotions, marred by frictions, and characterized by a reluctant cooperation, developed within the framework of the security triangle between the US, Japan and South Korea.529 All these helped democratization because they helped the creation of an external security environment favorable to democratization. Japan did not face any external threat. These made it easier for both the US military government and the Japanese government focus on dealing with the issues linked to democratization.

To conclude, the change and re-conceptualization of national interests, foreign policy, analysis of sources of security and stability and management of neighborly relations all helped democratization by contributing to the creation of a favorable security environment to

527 In 1919, Japan suppressed the May 4th demonstrations in China. During 1932-1936 in the occupied Manchuria, advanced strategic projects, combined state and private investments in twenty-six key industries from mining and shipping to aircraft production and treated Manchukuo as a laboratory of state-led economic development. During the 1930-1940 war against the Chinese it committed acts of atrocity, murder, rape, roundups, killings, (Nanjing Massacre), with the Japanese high command in Nanjing allowing or not taking decisive steps to rein in the troops. 528 Coox, Alvin. Nomonhan: Japan against Russia in 1939, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1985, pp. 914–915. 529 Cha, Victor D. Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Japan-South Korea Security Triangle. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999, pp. 9-10. 223 democratization of postwar Japan. This made it easier for the US occupation authorities to advance with democratization of Japan.

4.4 Conclusion.

Democratization of postwar Japan in the years 1945-1952 and the continuation of Japan as a democratic regime by not backsliding after the late 1950s and beyond was a result of the occupation efforts, positive dynamics in political culture and the favorable security environment.

First, the occupation power did engage in democratizing Japan and its task was greatly facilitated by the previous democratic tradition of pre-militarist Meiji Japan which reflected a heritage endogenously developed. Second, the political culture in Japan, while characterized by a different pattern among elites and population, did shift toward the embrace of democratic values.

This change, while important to democratization reflected, however, the combined efforts of the occupation authorities and Japanese society. Third, the security environment influenced democratization in Japan in a positive way. An important factor in its positive influence was the radical change in the way Japan shaped its foreign policy and relations with its neighbors after

1945.

The case of post-1945 Japan shows that democratization is more likely to occur when the conditions involving goals, policies and commitment on the part of the occupying power, changes in political culture, and security environment are present than when one or more of them are absent.

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Chapter 5

A Comparative Assessment and Conclusions

5.0 Introduction

The previous chapters examined how three main variables, namely foreign military occupation, the political culture and the security environment, influenced the democratization of post-1945 Germany and Japan.530 This chapter undertakes a first cut at generalizing the findings beyond Germany and Japan. Table 5.1 looks at these variables in a comparative perspective by analyzing whether the same variables apply in Italy and South Korea. A detailed study of these and other cases is the topic for future research. .

Table 5.1 Independent Variables and Outcome during the Period from 1945 to Early 1950s Military Political Security Occupation Culture Environment Outcome  period: 1945-1955  values, beliefs, attitudes,  national interests, foreign  democratized  goal: democratization behavior, institution policy, view of sources of  reached polity score Germany  policies: functioning, participation, security and stability and +10 by 1948 democratization civil society shifted management of neighborly  commitment: long. toward displaying a relations were favorable to democratic character. democratization  period: 1945-1955  values, beliefs, attitudes,  national interests, foreign  democratized  goal: democratization behavior, institution policy, view of sources of  reached polity score  policies: functioning, participation, security and stability and +10 by 1952 Japan democratization civil society shifted management of neighborly  commitment: long toward displaying a relations were favorable to democratic character. democratization  period: 1943-1947  values, beliefs, attitudes,  national interests, foreign  democratized  goal: democratization behavior, institution policy, view of sources of  reached polity score Italy  policies: functioning, participation, security and stability and +10 by 1948 democratization civil society shift toward management of neighborly  commitment: long displaying a democratic relations were favorable to character. democratization  period: 1945-1948  no shift or change of  the view of sources of  did not democratize  goal: containment of values, beliefs, attitudes, security and the  polity score was +1 South communist expansion behavior, institution management of neighborly during 1945-1948, - Korea  policies: shaped by functioning, participation, relations created an 3 during 1949-1951, containment civil society toward a environment not favorable and -4 during 1952-  commitment: short democratic character. to democratization 1958

530 While these study limits its focus on three main variables, it acknowledges that their positive influence on democratization was also helped by the role of other factors such as the pre-existing tradition of semi- democratic institutions of Germany and Meiji Japan, the defeat or surrender prior to occupation, the predisposition among the defeated elites and population for demilitarization and pacification both, psychologically and institutionally, non-military personnel and civilian experts among the occupation troops, the role of dynamics in relations between West Germany and East Germany and North Korea and South Korea, and the direct or indirect forms of the military government in Germany and Japan. 225

5.1 Democratization: Similarities and Variations across the Cases.

Germany, Japan, Italy and South Korea are all cases that were non-democratic regimes before 1945, and were then occupied by the Allied Forces. A comparative analysis of all our cases shows, however, the existence of similarities and differences in terms of their democratization.

In Appendix 5, Tables A5.1 to A5.4 show that democratization showed similar patterns in the cases of Germany, Japan and Italy. Democratization occurred during the military occupation and the countries stayed democratic even in the years after the end of the occupation. Table A5.5 shows that in South Korea, democratization showed a different pattern: it did not occur during the US occupation, nor did it occur in the immediate years after the end of the occupation.

5.1.1 Germany and Japan

In Appendix 5, Tables A5.1, A5.2 and A5.3 give, in both summarized and detailed form, the similarities and differences for Germany and Japan. Their democratization is similar in the outcome, length, direction and trend but it differs in the starting point, with a polity score of -9 for Germany vs. +1 for Japan, the character of change (radical vs. major) and the pace of change

(quick vs. moderate) as summarized below in Table 5.2 .

Table 5.2 The Character of Pace of Change in Germany and Japan GERMANY JAPAN Quick Pace: Moderate Pace.  Polity Score improves by + 6 points in 3 years;  Polity score improves by + 3 points in 3 years; The Polity Score: The Polity Score:

 increases on average by 3.80 points per year;  increases on average by 1.125 points per year; Pace Polity Score Polity Score 1944 -9.00 1944 +1.000 of 1945 -5.20 1945 +2.125 1946 -1.40 1946 +3.250 Change 1947 +2.40 1947 +4.375 1948 +6.20 1948 +5.500 1949 +10.00 1949 +6.625 1950 +7.750 1951 +8.875 1952 +10.00

226

The difference in the initial polity score of Germany and Japan reflects to a large extent their differences in democratic tradition in the pre-1945 period. Germany lacked such a tradition because the Weimar Republic was exogenously imposed and never fully embraced by the

Germans. Japan did have a democratic tradition of its own, because it was produced and developed endogenously.

The variation in the pace of change of Germany and Japan reflects to a large extent the different political attitudes of the elites and the population toward changes imposed by the occupation. The faster pace in Germany could be explained by the willingness of the elites and the masses to embrace democratic values from the beginning. The slower pace in Japan could be explained by the resistance initially showed by the Japanese elite toward changes imposed by

SCAP. Since the democratic tradition and the political culture are shown to have an important relation to democratization, one may draw three conclusions.

First, the democratic tradition prior to the foreign occupation can be an important condition but not a determinative one for democratization. It does influence the starting point of democratization and the change, it makes the occupation task easier, but it does not determine the pace of change and the final outcome. Germany lacked a democratic tradition, yet as Table

5.2 shows the democratization pace was fast and Germany did democratize. Second, the political culture of the elites and the population is a necessary condition for democratization. It influences, positively or negatively, the pace of change, the length of time that democratization takes and the influencing power of the occupation. As Table 5.2 shows, in Japan, the occupation‘s task was to move Japan from a Polity of a score +1 to a Polity of a score +10. The distance Japan had to go toward was much shorter compared to that of Germany. Yet, rather than taking less time, democratization in Japan took a little bit longer (three more years) than in Germany because of

227 the resistance coming from the endogenous elite. Third, the foreign imposed democracy has a better chance to succeed when the occupying force puts more efforts toward orienting the elites and the population to cultivate and internalize a democratic political culture than when it does not.

5.1.2 Italy and South Korea

In Appendix 5, Tables A5.4 and A5.5 summarize the dynamics of democratization of

Italy and South Korea. Tables show a different pattern of democratization in these cases.

In Italy the change of the regime and democratization showed a pattern closer to that of

Germany and Japan. As Table A5.4 shows, the change was radical, the pace was fast, the direction was positive, and the trend of change was linear. Democratization of postwar Italy occurred in six years, from a polity score of -9 in 1942 to a polity score of +10 in 1948. Italy remained strongly democratic even after the end of the occupation in 1948.

In South Korea, the change of the regime and democratization, as Table A5.5 shows, was characterized by many setbacks, and democratization took more than forty years to occur.531

During 1945-1948 South Korea was occupied and governed by US troops but unlike Germany,

Japan and Italy when the US troops left in 1948, South Korea reflected the features of a hybrid, anocratic regime combining weak democratic with weak authoritarian features. Democratization, the change from a weak democratic regime to a strong democratic regime, did not occur either during the occupation period 1945-1948 or in the immediate years after the end of the occupation. The polity score of South Korea remained at +1. In the immediate years after the leave of the US troops, during 1949-1951 and 1951-1952, South Korean regimes moved away

531 During 1945-2010, South Korea experienced three strong autocratic regimes, three weak autocratic regimes, three weak democratic regimes, three strong democratic regimes, and one consolidated democracy. 228 from democracy and toward an authoritarian regime. By 1949 its polity score changed and worsened initially by -4 points and in 1952 by another -1 point. Throughout the Korean War, the regime in South Korea was characterized by authoritarianism. South Korea became finally a democratic regime by 1988. Until then, however, it experienced seven regime changes between regimes with either democratic or authoritarian orientations.

This study shows that the features of foreign occupation, political culture and security environment in South Korea were different from those in Germany, Japan and Italy and the differences in these features as well as in other ones such as the level of economic development correlate with the absence of democratization in South Korea.

5.2 Foreign Occupation: Similarities and Variations across the Cases.

Military occupation is the first independent variable that this work focused on in analyzing democratization brought about by military occupation. A comparative analysis of the role of the occupation goals, policies and commitment in all four cases shows the existence of similarities and differences in terms of the goals, policies and commitment. As Tables A5.6,

A5.7, A5.8 and A5.9 show in Appendix 5, the military occupation showed similar patterns in the cases of Germany and Japan. Occupation patterns are similar in Italy, but differ in the case of

South Korea.

In the cases of Germany, Japan and Italy the goals, policies and commitment of the military occupation were directly concerned with the democratization of those countries and their political regimes. In the case of South Korea, the goals, policies and commitment were not directly focused on a democratization agenda. They were concerned with the security threats and competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

229

5.2.1 Germany and Japan

In Appendix 5, Tables A5.6, A5.7, A5.8 and to A5.9 give, in both summarized and detailed form, the role of foreign occupation in democratization of Germany and Japan. The occupation helped democratization in three major ways: 1) by the goals it set forth, 2) by the policies it pursued and implemented and 3) by its commitment.

Table A5.6 shows that the role of the occupation differed in five respects when comparing Germany and Japan: 1) the task (engineer a radical change in Germany versus a major change in Japan), 2) the administration of policies (direct in Germany versus indirect in

Japan), 3) the attitude faced from the elites (embracing in Germany versus resisting in Japan), 4) the duration (11 years in Germany versus 8 years in Japan) and 5) the composition of the administration (military and civilian in Germany versus mostly military plus interpreters in

Japan).

Even so, the occupation in Germany and Japan showed similarities in nine respects: 1) the goals, 2) the policy areas, 3) the policy modification, 4) the actions undertaken, 5) the attitude faced from the population, 6) the level of troops, 7) the military presence, 8) the resources made available, and 9) the effects of the military presence.

In Germany and Japan, the military occupation reflected some slight differences but the outcome was that both countries democratized. The outcome allows one to draw two conclusions: 1) that the differences in terms of direct or indirect forms of governance, composition of the military government and approach to the pre-occupation institutions were less important to democratization that the clarity of goals, pursuit of policies linked to democratization and commitment reflected by the occupation force or 2) the differences observed in the occupation of Germany and Japan were either not detrimental to democratization

230 or played a positive role in the given context. Unlike Germany, in Japan the US military government, after cleansing the prewar militarist elites and policy-makers, retained the institutions of the Emperor and the government bureaucracy and governed indirectly, yet Japan democratized. The preservation of the Emperor helped the occupation authorities establish and develop sympathetic relations between the occupation troops and occupied population, win the support of the Japanese people and advance the agenda of democratization.

5.2.2 Italy

Italy is a case that before 1945 was a non-democratic regime, was occupied and administered by the Allied Forces, democratized following the Allied occupation and remained democratic even in the years after the end of the military occupation. When looking at the goals, policies and commitment of the Allies in postwar Italy, one may observe a similarity with the goals, policies and commitment observed in the occupation of Germany and Japan.

5.2.2.1 Occupation Goals

In terms of goals, the Allied occupation was characterized by two features: 1) a clear set of goals,532 2) the harmony between the stated and pursued goals533 and 3) their orientation toward making Italy a democratic regime.534

532 The Allied goals toward Italy are expressed in a number of documents such as The Casablanca Conference (January 1943), Third Washington Conference (May 1943), Italian Armistice, Short and Long versions (3-29 September 1943), Protocol of Rome (December 1944) and The Statement by the Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew (1945). 533 The Allied goals toward Italy included: 1) militarily, unconditional surrender, supervision of the execution of the terms of the Italian Armistice, 2) politically, the destruction of the Fascist philosophy, the abolition of Fascist institutions, surrender of Mussolini; democratization of Italy so it would be able to withstand Communist threat and totalitarianism, 3) in governance, establishment of the military government, purging of Fascists from government bureaucracy and institutions, and 4) economically, aid the civilian population, assist economic recovery and strengthen Italy financially and economically. The 231

5.2.2.2 Occupation Policies

In terms of policies, the Allied occupation reflected three features similar with Germany and Japan. First, policies and actions reflected the goal of democratization and covered five important areas to democratization: 1) political,535 2) economic,536 3) social,537 4)

Allies pursued in reality the same goals they had articulated. See the Casablanca Conference, Third Washington Conference, Italian Armistice and the Statement by the Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew. 534 Harris, C.R.S. The Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943-1945, London, 1957, pp. 105-107; Allied Command, A Review of Allied Military Government and of the Allied Commission in Italy: July 10, 1943, D-Day Sicily, to May 2, 1945, Germany Surrender in Italy, 1945, Vol. 12, pp. 3, 60; Stein, Eric. ―War, politics, law, and love: Italy 1943-1946,‖ Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, Spring 2011, p. 559; Aga-Rossi, Elena. A Nation Collapses: The Italian Surrender of 1943, Translated by Harvey Ferguson II, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 13; Ginsborg, Paul. A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943-1988, Penguin Books, 1990, p. 79. 535 In the political area, the Allies prepared the condition for a democratic government, pushed for freedom and liberties, undertook de-Fascistization, reestablished the court System, oversaw the compliance of the Italian government with the Armistice obligations, supported democratic parties and sought minimization of the influence of Communist ideology and the takeover of Italy by the Communists. See Harris, C.R.S. The Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943-1945, London, 1957, pp. 135-137; Ginsborg, Paul. A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943-1988, Penguin Books, 1990, pp. 35-37, 68-70; Kritz, Neil J. ―Italy,‖ in Neil J. Kritz (eds.) Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes: Volume II, Country Studies, United States Institute of Peace, 1995, p. 154, 160; Stein, Eric. ―War, politics, law, and love: Italy 1943-1946,‖ Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, Spring 2011, p. 559, 561; Blum, William. Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II, 1995, pp. 27-33; Daugherty, William E. and Morris Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1958, pp. 319-26; Copeland, Miles. Without Cloak and Dagger, New York, 1974, pp. 235-236; Martinez, Edda E. and Edward A. Suchman, "Letters from America and the 1948 elections in Italy," The Public Opinion Quarterly, Princeton University, Spring 1950, pp. 111-125. 536 In the economic area, the Allies established a number of economic and financial bodies to deal with agricultural production and prices, included Italy in UNRRA and the European Recovery Plan (ERP), also known as the Marshall Plan, and provided strong economic and financial assistance. On April 2, 1948, the US House Appropriations Committee, approved $18.7 million dollars; on April 12, 1948 the State Department approved the return of $31 million in gold of the gold looted by the Nazis; on April 14, 1948 the US government authorized shipments of food and grains worth $8 million; on April 14, 1948 the American Commission for the Restoration of Italian Monuments announced a series of grants to the Italian Ministry of Fine Arts; on May 1, 1948, the US government announced a $4.3 million payment of wages to 60,000 former Italian prisoners of war in the US who had worked "voluntarily" for the Allies. See Stein, Eric. ―War, politics, law, and love: Italy 1943-1946,‖ Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, Spring 2011, pp. 558-559; Ginsborg, Paul. A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943-1988, Penguin Books, 1990, pp. 78-79); Blum, William. Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II, 1995, pp. 27-33. 537 In the social area, the Allies pushed for de-Fascistization, the spread of the American lifestyle and thinking as opposed to a Communist one, dissociation of the educational system from nationalist-Fascism and its orientation toward democratic values and practices. See Kritz, Neil J. ―Italy,‖ in Neil J. Kritz (eds.) 232 governance538 and 5) security and military areas.539 Second, the Allied occupation modified policies over time.540 Third, the Allied occupation was also similar in terms of the anticommunist orientation of its policies.541

5.2.2.3 Occupation Commitment

In terms of commitment, the Allied occupation in Italy showed similarity with Germany and Japan in four elements. The first was a strong commitment in terms of military troops. There

Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes: Volume II, Country Studies, United States Institute of Peace, 1995, p. 154; Blum, William. Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions since World War II, 1995, pp. 27-33; Holt Robert T. and Robert W. van de Velde, Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy, University of Chicago Press, 1960, p. 169; Allemann-Ghionda, Cristine. ―Dewey in post-war Italy: The case of re-education,‖ Studies in Philosophy and Education, 2000, Vol. 19, pp. 53-67. 538 In the area of governance, the Allies policies focused on purging Fascists from the government bureaucracy and institutions and strengthening the government and bureaucracy to enable Italians assume self-governance. See Harris, C.R.S. The Allied Military Administration of Italy 1943-1945, London, 1957, pp. 173, 224, 284; Ginsborg, Paul. A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943-1988, Penguin Books, 1990, pp. 68, 91; Domenico, Roy Palmer. Italian Fascists on Trial 1943-1948, Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1991, pp. 15, 19-21, 32-34, 41-44, 55-64, 73-79, 80-89, 90- 97, 105-107; Kritz, Neil J. ―Italy,‖ in Neil J. Kritz (eds.) Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes: Volume II, Country Studies, United States Institute of Peace, 1995, p. 161. 539 In the area of military and security affairs the Allied policies focused on disarming the Nazis and partisans, dealing with refugees and military training. See Harris, C.R.S. The Allied Military Administration of Italy 1943-1945, London, 1957, pp. 41, 94; Stein, Eric. ―War, politics, law, and love: Italy 1943-1946,‖ Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, Spring 2011, p. 564-565. 540 The modified policies included purges, economic assistance, and governance style. See Harris, C.R.S. The Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943-1945, London, 1957, p. 359; Flores, Marcello. ―L‘Epurazione in Italia‖ in AA. VV., L’Italia Della Liberazione, 1967, p. 442; Kritz, Neil J. ―Italy,‖ in Neil J. Kritz (eds.) Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes: Volume II, Country Studies, United States Institute of Peace, 1995, p. 154; Di Palma, Giuseppe. ―Italy: is there a legacy and is it Fascist?‖ in John J. Herz (eds.) From Dictatorship To Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982, pp. 107-108. 541 In the context of an antiCommunist orientation, the Allies signed a ten-year Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Italy, signed the Peace Treaty in 1947, helped Italy resolve the issue of Trieste, warned the Soviet Union to not extend its influence in Italy and made it clear that it would use force if necessary to prevent Italy from going Communist (see Aga-Rossi, Elena. A Nation Collapses: The Italian Surrender of 1943, Translated by Harvey Ferguson II, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 125; William Blum, Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II, 1995, pp. 27- 33; Smith, Howard K. The State of Europe, London, 1950, p. 202; Stein, Eric. War, ―Politics, law, and love: Italy 1943-1946,‖ Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, Spring 2011, pp. 558-559. 233 were around 660,000 troops in the 1943-1945 period, and around 100,000 troops during 1945-

1949, declining to less than 5,000 troops in 1950.542

The second element was the enormous resources committed. The Allies established a number of economic and financial bodies to deal with agricultural production and prices, included Italy in UNRRA and the European Recovery Plan (ERP), also known as the Marshall

Plan, and provided strong economic and financial assistance. On April 2, 1948, the US House

Appropriations Committee, approved $18.7 million dollars; on April 12, 1948, the State

Department approved the return of $31 million in gold of the gold looted by the Nazis; on April

14, 1948, the US government authorized shipments of food and grains worth $8 million; on April

14, 1948, the American Commission for the Restoration of Italian Monuments announced a series of grants to the Italian Ministry of Fine Arts; on May 1, 1948, the US government announced a $4.3 million payment of wages to 60,000 former Italian prisoners of war in the US who had worked "voluntarily" for the Allies.543

542 These troops included 165,000 troops of the Fifth US Army under the command of Mark Wayne Clark, 270,000 troops of the Seventh US Army under the command of George Smith Patton and around 220,000 troops of the Eight British Army under the command of British General Bernard Montgomery. During 1943-1945, the ratio soldier/population went up to 1 soldier for every 70 people. After 1945 the ratio reflected the decrease of the number of the occupation troops given the return of US troops to the US. By the end of March 1946, the Seventh US Army was sent back to the US. The Eighth British Army also was deployed back in the UK. So during 1945-1947, as the number of the occupation troops went down to around 100,000 troops, the ratio was 1 soldier for every 460 people. The number of troops was reduced even further after 1947 and in 1950 the US occupation troops numbered around 4800 soldiers and the ratio was 1 soldier for every 9820 people. During the 1951-1955 period the ratio went down to 1 soldier for every 6420 people. For the number of troops in Italy see Taylor, A. J. P. The Second World War: An Illustrated History, Penguin Books Ltd., 1976, p. 173. For the number of troops from 1950 and onward and calculation of the ratios, see data from the US Census Bureau, International Programs, at http://www.census.gov.population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php and from the US Department of Defense, Directorate for Information Operation and Reports, Statistical Analysis Division (SIAD) ―Military personnel historical reports: Active duty military personnel by regional area and by country,‖ at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/05/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2005. 543 The Allies, led by the US, invested enormous human, material, and know-how resources in Italy, reflecting the goal of enabling the Italian government to resume its functions and work in a stable environment. 234

The third element was the long duration of military occupation and military presence.544

The Allied occupation officially lasted around four years. It began on July 10, 1943, with the capture of Sicily and ended on January 31, 1947, with the signing of the Treaty of Peace. The

Allied military governance lasted officially three years. It began in 1943 and ended on December

31, 1945.

The fourth element was the character of the military government. It was characterized by two elements: 1) similarly with Germany, the Allied military government was composed by military and civilian experts545 and 2) similarly with Japan, the governing style of the Allied military government was indirect.546 The Allies governed along with the Italian government both at central and local levels.

So post-1945 Italy reflects similarity with Germany and Japan in terms of the occupation goals, policies and commitment, and the outcome of occupation. This allows one to conclude that the goals that occupation sets forth, policies that it pursues and the commitment it shows are important to democratization by foreign occupation.

544 In Italy, the US continued its military presence in the form of seven military bases, one for Air forces, two for Army forces and four for Navy forces. 545 Both the US and British military troops had embedded military specialists , trained civil affairs officers and civilian specialists who dealt with civilian governance and affairs (see Harris, C.R.S. The Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943-1945, London, 1957, pp. 94-95; Allied Command, A Review of Allied Military Government and of the Allied Commission in Italy: July 10, 1943, D-Day Sicily, to May 2, 1945, Germany Surrender in Italy, 1945, Vol. 12, p. 10. 546 The Allies governed directly during 1943-1945 and jointly with local officials during 1945-1947. See Kritz, Neil J. ―Italy,‖ in Neil J. Kritz (eds.) Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes: Volume II, Country Studies, United States Institute of Peace, 1995, p. 160; Di Palma, Giuseppe. ―Italy: is there a legacy and is it Fascist?‖ in John J. Herz (eds.) From Dictatorship To Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982, pp. 116-119, 121-122; Harris, C.R.S. The Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943-1945, London, 1957, pp. 173, 224, 284; Allied Command, A Review of Allied Military Government and of the Allied Commission in Italy: July 10, 1943, D-Day Sicily, to May 2, 1945, Germany Surrender in Italy, 1945, Vol. 12, pp. 5-6; Stein, Eric. ―War, politics, law, and love: Italy 1943-1946,‖ Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, Spring 2011, p. 559. 235

5.2.3 South Korea

South Korea is the case that before 1945 was a non-democratic regime under the

Japanese occupation, was occupied by the US during 1945-1948 following the defeat of Japan, but did not democratize either during the US occupation or in the following years after the end of the US occupation. An observation of the US military occupation in South Korea reveals a difference with the pattern observed in Germany, Japan or Italy in goals, occupation and policies.

5.2.3.1 Occupation Goals

The difference in the occupation goals is the first major difference that can be observed.547 The goals of US occupation in Korea were not primarily shaped by democratization agenda, as they were in cases of Germany, Japan and Italy, but by the security concerns deriving from the rise of the communist threat and the competition between the United States and the

Soviet Union. They showed three features: 1) they focused mostly on Korea‘s statehood,548 2) they reflected disagreement with the Soviet Union549 and 3) they reflected the US security

547 The main documents expressing a general view of the goals for Korea include the Cairo Declaration (December 1943) and the Potsdam Declaration (July 1945). A more specific view of the goals for Korea can be found in the Moscow Meeting of Foreign Ministers (December 1945) and the State Department Plan for post-war occupation of Korea (10 September 1945. 548 The goals for Korea consist of preparing Korea for independence and self-government through a trusteeship, of unifying the country and of helping Koreans create an effective government politically and economically. See Oh, Bonnnie B.C. ―Introduction: The setting,‖ in Bonnnie B.C. Oh (eds.) Korea under American Military Government 1945-1948, Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002, pp. 2-3; Matray, James I. ―Hodge Podge: American occupation policy in Korea, 1945-1948,‖ Korean Studies, Vol. 19, 1995, p. 23; Matray, James I. The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea 1941-1950, University of Hawaii Press, 1985, pp. 7-27; Meade, Grant E. American Military Government in Korea, New York, King‘s Crown Press, Columbia University, 1951, pp. 43-44; Angus, William N. "American policy in Korea: Aim of military government," Far Eastern Survey, July 31, 1946, p. 230; Borton, Hugh. "Occupation politics in Japan and Korea," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 25 January 1948, p. 152. 549 The meeting of the US-Soviet Union Joint Commission on March 1946 failed. The parties disagreed about which Korean political forces had to be invited for consultation and the new government. See Borton, Hugh. "Occupation politics in Japan and Korea," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 25 January 1948, pp. 152-153. 236 concerns about communist expansion.550 They either lacked a direct link to democratization or remained at the rhetorical level.551 Thus, the US viewed Korea much more in terms of containment than democratization.552

5.2.3.2 Occupation Policies

The difference in terms of the occupation policies is the second major difference that can be observed. The US occupation policies in South Korea reflected five different features from those observed in Germany, Japan and Italy. One feature was that they were not defined by a democratization agenda but by six factors: 1) the rise of the Soviet threat and anti-Communist imperatives,553 2) Washington policies that have been faulted,554 3) the lack of clear and

550 Such concerns were expressed by President Truman in a Statement on September 18, 1947; the State of the Union Address on January 21, 1948; the Speech of the Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson in January 1950; and the Declaration of Chief US delegate to the UN, Warren Austin in October 1950. See Oh, Bonnnie B.C. ―Introduction: The setting,‖ in Bonnnie B.C. Oh (eds.) Korea under American Military Government 1945-1948, Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002, pp. 2-3, 5; New York Times, 1 October 1950, p. 3. 551 Until 1945, the Allies had no plans for establishing a democratic regime and government in Korea. The issue of the postwar Korean regime became evident only after the surrender of Japan, and it was first discussed in the 1945 Moscow Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. The absence of democratization goals and plans made the US troops under Hodgson unprepared to deal with the struggle between the Interim Administration they found in Korea and the claims of the Provisional Korean Government waiting in China. The only mention of democratic standards is found in Mac Arthur‘s proclamation on September 7, 1945 when he spoke of guaranteeing personal and religious rights along the creation of a free and independent Korea. See Meade, Grant E. in American Military Government in Korea, New York, King‘s Crown Press, Columbia University, 1951, pp. 16-17; Matray, James I. ―Hodge Podge: American occupation policy in Korea, 1945-1948,‖ Korean Studies, Vol. 19, 1995, p. 17. 552 Helgesen, Geir. Democracy and Authority in Korea: the Cultural Dimension in Korean Politics, Surrey, United Kingdom: Curzon Press, 1998, pp. 95-99. 553 George Elsey authored the White House Policy Paper, known as the Clifford Paper, arguing that the US must assume that the Soviet Union could start a war at any time; Matray, James I. ―Hodge Podge: American occupation policy in Korea, 1945-1948,‖ Korean Studies, Vol. 19, 1995, p. 17; Oh, Bonnnie B.C. ―Introduction: The setting,‖ in Bonnnie B.C. Oh (eds.) Korea Under the American Military Government, 1945–1948, Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002, p. 5. 554 Oh, Bonnnie B.C. ―Introduction: The setting,‖ in Bonnnie B.C. Oh (eds.) Korea under the American Military Government, 1945–1948, Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002, p. 4; Matray, James I. ―Hodge Podge: American occupation policy in Korea, 1945-1948,‖ Korean Studies, Vol. 19, 1995, p. 18; Matray, James I. The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1985, p. 53. 237 detailed guidance from Washington,555 4) the authoritarian character of the military government,556 5) sluggishness in the modification of faulty policies557 and 6) the negligence to create a real democratic environment.558

The second feature was the orientation of policies and actions toward the creation of a security and economic environment favorable to the new regime rather than its democratization.

The US occupation policies covered five major areas: 1) political,559 2) economic,560 3)

555 Oh, Bonnnie B.C. ―Introduction: The Setting,‖ in Bonnnie B.C. Oh (eds.) Korea under the American Military Government, 1945–1948, Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002, pp. 2-3; Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS] 5, Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1944, pp. 1239- 1242; Meade, Edward Grant. American Military Government in Korea, New York, King‘s Crown Press, 1951 p. 14; MacArthur to Hodge, 29 Aug. 1945, History of Occupation of Korea, Vol. I, pp. 60-61, 63. 556 Oh, Bonnnie B.C. ―Introduction: The setting,‖ in Bonnnie B.C. Oh (eds.) Korea under American Military Government 1945-1948, Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002, pp. 2-5. 557 Truman, Harry S. "News Conference,‖ September 12, 1945," Public Papers of the Presidents Harry S. Truman, Vol. 1, 1945, Washington, D.C., 1961, p. 318. 558 Meade, Edward Grant. American Military Government in Korea, New York, King‘s Crown Press, 1951, pp. 186-189; Mitchell, Clyde C. Korea: Second Failure in Asia, Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Institute, 1951, p. 18; Henderson, Gregory. Korea: The Politics of the Vortex, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, pp. 153-154. 559 In the political area, the US did strive for achieving the independence and self-governance of Korea, but did not make efforts to write a democratic constitution, or enforce rights and liberties; however, it did establish governing bodies, but did not undertake a democratic reconstructing of institutions. It hailed democracy but did not insist on it; it suppressed the Provisional Korean Government and supported the rise of an authoritarian regime; it prepared elections, but aligned with the extreme right, undermined the activity of moderate political forces, did not allow honest elections and created a non-democratic environment that harmed representation, polarized Koreans politically and opened the way to authoritarianism. See Meade, Edward Grant. American Military Government in Korea, New York: King‘s Crown Press, 1951, pp. 15-17, 24-27; Matray, James I. ―Hodge Podge: American occupation policy in Korea, 1945-1948,‖ Korean Studies, Vol. 19, 1995, p. 22-23, 25-28; McCune, George M., Grey, Arthur L. Korea today. Harvard University Press, 1950, pp. 46-50, 83-84, 129-139, 201 -209; Oh, Bonnnie B.C. ―Introduction: The setting,‖ in Bonnnie B.C. Oh (eds.) Korea under American Military Government 1945-1948, Westport, Conn. Praeger, 2002, pp. 2-3, pp. 2-9; Henderson, Gregory. Korea: The Politics of the Vortex, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, pp. 143-144, 151-153; Weems, Benjamin. "Behind the Korean Elections," Far Eastern Survey, 17 and 23 June 1948, p. 143; Blum, William. Killing hope: US military intervention since 1945, Common Courage Press, 1995, pp. 44-53; Borton, Hugh. "Occupation Politics in Japan and Korea," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 25 January 1948, pp. 154-155; Schnabel, James F. Policy and Direction: The First Year, Washington, D.C: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972, p. 12; Helgesen Geir. Democracy and Authority in Korea: the Cultural Dimension in Korean Politics, Surrey, United Kingdom: Curzon Press, 1998, pp. 95-99. 560 In the economic area, the US heavily assisted South Korea economically and financially; its aid and loans funded 70% of imports and 80% of domestic capital, and, until the late 1950s, US assistance totaled 238 social,561 4) security and military affairs562 and 5) governance.563 Yet, primacy was given to security and economic areas rather than the change of the political regime, the establishment of a

up to $1 billion annually; it also pushed South Korea toward a liberal, capitalist economy, increased imports of foods, fertilizers, transportation and equipment and facilitated the resumption trade relations between South Korea and the world; but the provision of economic and financial assistance reflected disagreements and differences in Washington and had to overcome the struggle between President Truman and the Congress. In June 1949, the Truman Administration asked for $150 million for economic and military assistance to South Korea. On January 19, 1950, the House of Representatives rejected the Korean aid bill. Truman and his Secretary of State Dean Acheson went back to Congress and argued that the failure to provide this economic help portended the loss of all Korea to the Communists within two or three months. The assistance was important to keep South Korea holding firm against the North and staying on the side of the US. Congress approved the bill on 14 February 1950. See Ekbladh, David. ―How to build a nation,‖ The Wilson Quarterly, Winter 2004, p. 63; Cotton, James. ―From authoritarianism to democracy in South Korea,‖ Political Studies, 1989, Vol. 38, p. 247; Kim, Dong- Choon. ―The great upsurge of South Korea‘s social movements in the 1960s,‖ Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, Volume 7, Number 4, 2006, p. 620; Borton, Hugh. "Occupation politics in Japan and Korea," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 25 January 1948, p. 154; Meade, Edward Grant. American Military Government in Korea, New York, King‘s Crown Press, 1951, p. 30; Testimony, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Korean Aid, H.R. 5330, 23 June 1949; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1969, p. 358. 561 In the social area, the US did make some efforts, such as reforming the education system. However, the efforts were minimal and did not lead to development of friendly relations with Koreans; they were not geared to and the US did not insist, on changing of the education system to cleanse it of nationalist and authoritarian values and practices. In essence, they left the education system unchanged and allowed it to orient itself toward a strong anti-Communist, anti-Japanese ideology and values rather than individualism, equality and participation that are conducive to democracy. See Lee, Jeong-Kyu. ―Korean higher education under the United States military government: 1945-1948,‖ Radical Pedagogy, 2006, pp. 1-3; Seth, M. J. ―Democratizing education in South Korea: The U.S. military and its educational reforms,‖ in Xio-bing Li and Walter Jung (eds.) Korea and Regional Geopolitics, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989; Borton, Hugh. "Occupation politics in Japan and Korea," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 25 January 1948, p. 154; Helgesen, Geir. Democracy and Authority in Korea: the Cultural Dimension in Korean Politics, Surrey, United Kingdom: Curzon Press, 1998, pp. 95, 99, 151-160, 179-185; Yi, Boram. GIs and Koreans: The First Impression, 1945-1948, University of Baltimore, 2009, pp. 3-14. 562 In the area of military and security affairs the US did keep order, created, trained and advised the police and national defense forces which each numbered 25,000 men by January 1946, and 20,000 men during 1947, but it also generated a series of popular uprisings, did not dissociate itself from the practices of suppression and persecution of the people, allowed security forces to suppress rebellions against the interim government, to slaughter civilians, to target civilian villages and population and to conduct anti- guerilla warfare, and miscalculated the level and quality of the military preparation of Korean military forces. See Meade, Edward Grant. American Military Government in Korea, New York, King‘s Crown Press, 1951, pp. 15-17, 25, 31, 34-37; Matray, James I. ―Hodge Podge: American occupation policy in Korea, 1945-1948,‖ Korean Studies, Vol. 19, 1995, p. 20, 23, 26; Sawyer, Robert K., Hermes, Walter G. Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1962, pp. 12-13, 17, 23n, 29n; Kim, Joungwon A. Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945-1972, Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1975, p. 67; Oh, John Kie- Chiang. Korea: Democracy on Trial, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1968, p. 35; Henderson, 239 democratic constitutional framework and democratization of governance, political institutions and political culture among the elite and the population.

The third feature of the US occupation policies in Korea was the attitude of the US policymakers toward changing their own policies. Unlike Germany, Japan and Italy where the

US policymakers did not hesitate to change the occupation policies when they did not work and brought negative effects, in South Korea the modification of policies either did not occur or was done too late.564

The fourth feature of the US occupation policies in South Korea was the composition of the military government, the style of governance and the management of policies. The military government was composed only of military officers. The military government either lacked or

Gregory Korea: The Politics of the Vortex, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1968, p. 167. Blum, William. Killing hope: US Military Intervention since 1945, Common Courage Press, 1995, pp. 27-33. 563 In the area of governance, the US did restore local administration, transportation and communication, trained and prepared Koreans for assuming administrative responsibilities, prevented starvation, reestablished educational facilities, improved sanitation and flood control, initiated a re-forestation program and rehabilitated the fishing industry, but it also created a government even more centralized and authoritarian than the one under the Japanese occupation, relied on Japanese administrators and Koreans from the extreme right, did not hesitate to suppress anti-government elements and popular movements, making Koreans feel economically exploited, politically repressed and psychologically intimidated. Further, it undermined Korean unity, brought extreme confusion, and made Koreans view the US to be as bad as Japan (Meade, Edward Grant. American Military Government in Korea, New York: King‘s Crown Press, 1951, pp. 61, 159, 233; Borton, Hugh. "Occupation politics in Japan and Korea," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 25 January 1948, p. 155; Oh, Bonnnie B.C. ―Introduction: The setting,‖ in Bonnnie B.C. Oh (eds.) Korea under American Military Government 1945-1948, Westport, Conn. Praeger, 2002, pp. 2-9; Matray, James I. ―Hodge Podge: American occupation policy in Korea, 1945-1948,‖ Korean Studies, Vol. 19, 1995, p. 22-23. 564 In Korea the US did modify some policies in the areas of political and governance affairs, such as moving from cooperation with the Soviets to creating South Korea without Soviet cooperation, from relying only on the extreme right to broadening their support to moderate and liberal forces, and from relying on former Japanese administrators to relying on Koreans; but such modifications were either sluggish or done late, after the damage had been done. They fell victim to the Cold War. See Matray, James I. ―Hodge Podge: American occupation policy in Korea, 1945-1948,‖ Korean Studies, Vol. 19, 1995, p. 22, 26; Meade, Edward Grant. American Military Government in Korea, New York, King‘s Crown Press, 1951, p. 18; Oh, Bonnnie B.C. ―Introduction: The setting,‖ in Bonnnie B.C. Oh (eds.) Korea under American Military Government 1945-1948, Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002, p. 10; Truman, Harry S. "News Conference, 12 September 1945," Public Papers of the Presidents Harry S. Truman, Vol. 1, 1945, Washington, D.C., 1961, p. 318. 240 enlisted few experts of Korea.565 It also administered and managed policies through a direct style of governing.566

The fifth feature characterizing the US occupation policies in South Korea was the problematic relations with the Korean population. They faced either resistance or opposition from both the Korean elites and the population.567

5.2.3.3 Occupation Commitment

The commitment shown by the occupying power is the third major difference that can be observed in the case of South Korea. The US occupation was similar with Germany, Japan and

Italy in terms of the number of troops,568 resources,569 duration and forms,570 but it differed in

565 In Korea, the military government was characterized by two problems: 1) the impossibility of retaining experienced men and officers, and 2) the lack of Americans who could speak or understand Korean. After the initial reliance on Japanese administrators and the criticism faced for doing so, the US was forced by the situation to bring unqualified Koreans into positions at all levels of responsibility. See Meade, Edward Grant. American Military Government in Korea, New York, King‘s Crown Press, 1951, p. 48. 566 The governing style applied by the US in South Korea combined trusteeship, direct military governance, and reliance on Japanese administrators and extreme right-wing Koreans. It was characterized by a centralized and autocratic administrative structure, racism toward Koreans, fears about the potential for political instability and concern that the Soviet Union could take over Korea. See Oh, Bonnnie B.C. ―Introduction: The setting,‖ in Bonnnie B.C. Oh (eds.) Korea under American Military Government 1945-1948, Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002, p. 2; Meade, Edward Grant. American Military Government in Korea, New York, King‘s Crown Press, 1951, p. 48; Matray, James I. ―Hodge Podge: American Occupation Policy in Korea, 1945-1948,‖ Korean Studies, Vol. 19, 1995, pp. 20-22; Dobbs, Charles M. The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea, 1945-1950, Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1981, p. 34; Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 1: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981, pp. 127-128. 567 Both the Korean elites and the population showed a mixed attitude. Initially they welcomed the US as a liberator. Later, conservative circles developed resentment over the social implications of the American presence, whereas the population turned against occupation policies and the government because they disliked the trusteeship and wanted the freedom about which their liberators kept talking at once. They called it as "government by interpreters." See Hodge to Mac Arthur. ‖Memorandum, 24 September 1945,‖ Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1945, Vol. VI, pp. 1054, 1055; Meade, Edward Grant. American Military Government in Korea, New York, King‘s Crown Press, 1951, pp. 19, 21-22. 568 Meade 1951, p. 25, 30 and Oh 2002, p. 2 note that when the US army occupied Korea in 1945 it numbered 75,000 men. This number went down to 43,500 in 1946, 16,000 in 1947, 7500 in 1948, and 3000 in 1949. According to the US Department of Defense, Directorate for Information Operation and Reports, Statistical Analysis Division (SIAD) in ―Military personnel historical reports: Active duty 241 that it was defined by the military conflict with Communist North Korea rather than simply threats.571

Discussion of the case of South Korea shows that the goals, policies and commitment of the US occupation troops differed from those observed in the cases of Germany, Japan and Italy.

In South Korea, the US occupation was, to a large extent, shaped by security concerns. Given that democratization of South Korea was not the outcome of the US occupation, one may conclude that the lack of goals, policies and commitment clearly and directly linked to democratization, contributed to the sliding of post-1945 South Korea into an authoritarian regime.

military personnel by regional area and by country,‖ at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/05/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2005 there were 510 American troops in 1950. Given the size of the Korean population (some 20 million people, the ratio soldier/people in Korea was 1 soldier per 277 people, a ratio smaller than the ratio in Germany, Japan, and Italy but well below the level 1 soldier for 450 people. 569 The US engaged significant human, material, economic, financial resources in Korea, but most of them were military in character, reflecting the US security concerns. See Wards, Robert E. in Lucian W. Pye, Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965, pp 52-53. 570 The official occupation of Korea lasted four years (1945-1948). The US withdrew its troops by the end of 1948 amid disagreements between the US Defense and State Departments, with Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer reporting about the intensification of the threats and pressures from Soviet-backed North Korea and suggesting that US troops should continue to stay in Korea. See Ekbladh, David. ―How to build a nation,‖ The Wilson Quarterly, Winter 2004, p. 63; Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, Report to the President, Korea, Sep. 47, pp. 13, 25; Defense-State disagreement may be traced in DA file P and O X091 Korea, sec. V; Sawyer, Robert K. Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War, Army Historical Series, Washington, 1962, pp. 35-37; Department of State, Korea, 1945 to 1948, pp. 6-7, 114-115. 571 In 1950, US troops came back to South Korea to assist it in the war against Soviet-backed North Korea. During 1950-1955, the US committed a significant number of troops, 1 soldier per 100 people. Afterward the number of US troops stationed in South Korea ranged between 1 soldier for 400 people and 1 soldier for 1271 people, and the US kept its military presence through fifteen military bases, two bases for Air Forces, 12 bases for Army forces, and one Base for the Navy. The ratios are calculated using data from the US Census Bureau, International Programs, at http://www.census.gov.population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php and from the US Department of Defense, Directorate for Information Operation and Reports, Statistical Analysis Division (SIAD) ―Military personnel historical reports: Active duty military personnel by regional area and by country,‖ at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/05/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2005. 242

5.3 Political Culture: Similarities and Variations across the Cases.

Political culture is the second variable this work focused on in analyzing democratization by military occupation. A comparative analysis of the role of political culture in all four cases shows the existence of similarities and differences in the dynamics accompanying values and beliefs, behavior and attitudes, institutional functioning and development, political participation, the character of civil society and the attitude toward change. In Appendix 5, Tables A5.10 to

A5.14 show that the dynamics in political culture showed similar patterns in cases of Germany,

Japan and Italy but different pattern in the case of South Korea. In the cases of Germany, Japan and Italy the change of political culture toward features conducive to democracy began and occurred during the military occupation and it continued even in the years after the end of the occupation. In the case of South Korea, the change of political culture toward features conducive to democracy did not occur during the US occupation, nor did it occur in the years after the end of the US occupation.

5.3.1 Germany and Japan

In Appendix 5, Tables A5.10, A5.11 and A5.12 show both, in a summarized and in a detailed way, how these elements influenced the character of the political culture in Germany and Japan and the shift from a non-democratic to a democratic political culture.

As Table A5.11 shows, pre-1945 Germany and Japan were similar in all of political culture components except political participation. They show a non-democratic character in terms of values and beliefs, attitudes and behavior, civil society, institutional culture and attitude toward change. Political participation in Japan differs from Germany‘s in that in Germany all parties were prohibited from conducting political activity and elections were a farce, whereas in

243

Japan, even though the system went increasingly under the control of military elites, parties that did not go against the nationalist and militarist agenda were allowed to run and the elections did reflect a certain degree of competitiveness.

As Table A5.12 shows, the changes in the post-1945 political culture of Germany and

Japan are characterized by three similarities and one difference. Change occurred in all the components, was initiated by the Allied, was embraced by and advanced further by the population but while German elites embraced change from the very beginning, the Japanese elites initially resisted it. In Japan, the elites changed their political behavior toward features conducive to democracy only later out of the fear of being left out of power and authority structures and because of the pressures exercised by the US occupation administration.

In Germany, the changes in political culture helped democratization in two major ways.

First, it made it easier for the occupation to advance the democratization agenda, thus increasing the power of the occupation to influence the process of democratization. Second, it empowered endogenous forces that supported and furthered rather than opposed and undermined democratization. In Japan, in addition to increasing the influencing power of the occupation and giving the democratization process a strong endogenous dimension, the changes in political culture helped democratization in two other ways: First, it made it easier to overcome cultural and communication barriers between the occupation and the Japanese authorities. Second, it mounted significant pressure and forced the new Japanese elite definitively to embrace democratic values and behavior, which in turn influenced the overall positive functioning and stability of the political system and government.

Given that democratization of Germany and Japan was also characterized by the change of political culture among the elites and the population toward features conducive to democracy,

244 one may conclude that the dynamics and the features that characterize political culture are an important factor contributing to democratization by military occupation.

5.3.2 Italy

In Italy the change of political culture shows a positive trend and influence. As Table

A5.13 shows, despite the negative influence that the heritage of the pre-Fascist and Fascist regimes exerted in the initial years during and after the occupation, in general, there is a move toward democratic values and beliefs,572 democratic attitudes and behaviors,573 participation in

572 Values and beliefs changed from those of obedience toward government, political clientelism and localism, apathy, parochialism, isolation and ideological brainwash toward believing in the republic, liberty and equality, and active participation. This change occurred despite the influence of nationalism, Marxism, the Catholic Church, North-South differences and, antagonism toward government, the regime and the political system. Concerning the 1947 referendum on the monarchy, 68% of the voters had not read the documents and 38% had no intention to read it. See LaPalombara, Joseph. ―Italy: Fragmentation, isolation, alienation,‖ in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 291, 297-322; Tarchi, Marco. ―Italy: Early crisis and Fascist takeover,‖ in Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Jeremy Mitchell (eds) Conditions of Democracy in Europe, 1919-1939: Systematic Case Studies, Macmillan Press LTD, London, 2000, pp. 296-302, 319-320; Ginsborg, Paul. A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943-1988, Penguin Books, 1990, pp. 2-3, 33-34, 91; Spreafico, Alberto., LaPalombara, Joseph. (eds). Elezioni e Comportamento Politico in Italia, Milan 1963; Luzzato-Fegiz, Pierpaolo. Il Volto Sconosciuto dell’Italia: Dieci Anni di Sondaggi, DOXA, Milan, 1956, p. 419. 573 Behaviors and attitudes changed from those of fear, insecurity, authoritarianism, suppression, violence, radicalism, sectarianism, individualism, inability to compromise, distrust, discontent and the lack of confidence with institutions government, the ruling elite, the political system toward trust, accommodation, institutional cooperation, respect for rules, institutions, process, and government. The change occurred despite the continuation of the influence of some habits of the past such as criticism, fragmentation, polarization and suspiciousness. See Tarchi, Marco. ―Italy: Early crisis and Fascist takeover,‖ in Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Jeremy Mitchell (eds) Conditions of Democracy in Europe, 1919- 1939: Systematic Case Studies, Macmillan Press LTD, London, 2000, pp. 300-301; 319-320; Ginsborg, Paul. A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943-1988, Penguin Books, 1990, pp. 2-3, 33-34, 83, 86-88; Morlino, L. Come Cambiano i Regimi Politici, Milan: Angeli, 1980 pp. 302-311; Gentile, E. Storia del Partito Fascista 1919-1922: Movimento e Milizia. Bari, Laterza, 1989; Jacini, S. Storia Del Partito Popolare Italiano. Milan: Grazanti, 1951; Lapalombara, Joseph. ―Italy: Fragmentation, isolation, alienation,‖ in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 296; Spreafico, Alberto., LaPalombara, Joseph. (eds). Elezioni e Comportamento Politico in Italia, Milan 1963. 245 political and social life,574 development of civil society,575 a new democratic institutional culture576 and a positive attitude toward change.577 In addition to internal dynamics, the changes in political culture were also influenced to a large extent by the actions and pressures exerted by

574 Participation changed from being influenced by instability, conflicts, frustration, aversion, social division and support of the Fascist party toward participation focused on the republic, the future of the country and society and the evaluation of alternatives offered by parties of the left and the right. See Morlino, L. Come cambiano i regimi politici, Milan: Angeli, 1980 pp. 302-311; Tarchi, Marco. ―Italy: Early crisis and Fascist takeover,‖ in Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Jeremy Mitchell (eds) Conditions of Democracy in Europe, 1919-1939: Systematic Case Studies, Macmillan Press LTD, London, 2000, pp. 319-320; Lapalombara, Joseph. ―Italy: Fragmentation, isolation, alienation,‖ in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 296; Ginsborg, Paul. A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943-1988, Penguin Books, 1990, pp. 9-16, 72-75, 80-85; Luzzato-Fegiz, Pierpaolo. Il Volto Sconosciuto dell’Italia: Dieci Anni di Sondaggi, DOXA, Milan, 1956, p. 419. 575 Civil society changed from being underdeveloped, with few organizations linked to and dependent on state and identical with the Fascist ideology toward becoming numerous in organizations and associations and active participant in public affairs, social movements and political issues. See LaPalombara, Joseph. ―Italy: Fragmentation, isolation, alienation,‖ in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 296; Tarchi, Marco. ―Italy: Early crisis and Fascist takeover,‖ in Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Jeremy Mitchell (eds) Conditions of Democracy in Europe, 1919-1939: Systematic Case Studies, Macmillan Press LTD, London, 2000, p. 294-299. 576 Institutional culture changed from one characterized by institutional weakness, inefficiency, inability to take political actions, concentration of power, skewed representativeness, Fascist-driven governance and policy-making toward institutional democratization and efficiency, power balance, representativeness, and governance driven by public interest even though the legislative and executive reflected the influence of party leaders and bureaucrats in their work. See Schneider, Herbert W. The Fascist Government of Italy, D. van Nostrand Inc, the Michigan University, 1936, pp. 13-25, 30-62; Spenser, Henry Russell. Government and Politics of Italy, World Book Company, the Michigan University, 1932, pp. 64-75, 85-100; Farneti, P. Sistema Politico e Societa Civile, Turin: Giappichelli, 1971; Tarchi, Marco. ―Italy: Early crisis and Fascist takeover,‖ in Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Jeremy Mitchell (eds) Conditions of Democracy in Europe, 1919-1939: Systematic Case Studies, Macmillan Press LTD, London, 2000, p. 314; Ginsborg, Paul. A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943-1988, Penguin Books, 1990, pp. 2-3, 90-91; Morlino, L. Come Cambiano i Regimi Politici, Milan: Angeli, 1980; Almond Gabriel A., Verba, Sidney. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Countries. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1963, Chapter 4. 577 Both the new elites and the population embraced the change toward democracy and Christian values of family morality, representative democracy, anti-communism, commitment to the capitalist system, and attention to the middle class. See Ginsborg, Paul. A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943-1988, Penguin Books, 1990, pp. 2-3, 33-34, 77. 246 the Allied forces during the occupation and by the US during the first years following the transition of power from the occupation authorities to the new Italian government.578

Given the fact that Italy democratized, and that the political culture of the elite and the population changed toward embracing features conducive to democracy, Italy is another case that confirms the importance of political culture to democratization by military occupation.

5.3.3 South Korea

In South Korea, the political culture shows a different picture from that of Germany,

Japan, and Italy. As Table A5.14 shows, it changed from displaying non-democratic features to democratic features during the 1980s, but the dynamics of change differed in three important ways.

First, the change was not a result of attention paid by the US occupation to political culture but a byproduct of the internal dynamics and struggle between the elites and the population. The US was more concerned with the threat coming from the Soviet Union than with

578 The US engaged in overt and covert efforts to thwart the rise and democratization of the Communist influence and forces in postwar Italy. To avoid Italy turning Communist, the Italo-American community engaged in a campaign of letters sent to their relatives in Italy warning of the danger of a victory of the Communists in Italy; American labor leaders urged Italian unions to reject the Communists, whereas the Italo-American Labor Council contributed $50,000 to anti-Communist labor organizations in Italy. The State Department through George Marshall, the Department of Justice through the Attorney General, Voice of America, prominent Americans such as Frank Sinatra and Gary Cooper, the American Catholic Churches, and US officials in Italy, called the 1948 elections a moment of choice between Communism and democracy in which a vote for the Communists would harm American-Italian relations; The CIA and its Office of Policy Coordination engaged in actions supporting and financing Christian Democrats and undermining the influence and electoral basis of the Communist party, discrediting Communist leaders and subsidizing anti-leftist trade unions. The US pressed De Gaspari to throw Communists out of his government. See Martinez, Edda E., Suchman, Edward A. "Letters from America and the 1948 Elections in Italy," The Public Opinion Quarterly, Princeton University, Spring 1950, pp. 111-125; William Blum, ―Italy 1947-1948: Free elections, Hollywood style,‖ Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II, Common Courage Press, 1995, pp. 27-33; Holt, Robert T., van de Velde, Robert W. Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy, University of Chicago Press, 1960, p. 169; Copeland, Miles. Without Cloak and Dagger, New York, 1974, pp. 235-236; Goode, Stephen. The CIA, Franklin Watts, Inc., New York, 1982, p. 45. 247 the creation of a democratic political culture.579 The US aligned with and supported the South

Korean elite regardless of the character of its political culture.

Second, the political culture of the elites differed from that of the population in terms of values and beliefs,580 attitudes and behavior,581 participation in politics,582 relations with civil

579 Matray, James I. ―Hodge Podge: American occupation policy in Korea, 1945-1948,‖ Korean Studies, Vol. 19, 1995, pp. 26-28; Oh, Bonnnie B.C. ―Introduction: The setting,‖ in Bonnnie B.C. Oh (eds.) Korea under American Military Government 1945-1948, Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002, pp. 1-12; Hua, Qingzhao. From Yalta to Punmunjom: Truman’s Diplomacy and the Four Powers, 1945-1953, Ithaca, NY: East Asia program, Cornell University, 1993, p. 69. 580 From 1945 until the 1980s, the South Korean elites viewed authority, the government, rights and liberties, civic duty and participation from an authoritarian perspective and as a domain of the elites only. Unlike the elites, the population combined Confucian values with Western notions of democratic government, individual freedom, social justice, and active citizenship and during 1950s-1980s developed them further. See Helgesen, Geir. Democracy and Authority in Korea: the Cultural Dimension in Korean Politics, Surrey, United Kingdom: Curzon Press, 1998, pp. 5-7, 107, 136, 151-160, 179-185; Kritz, Neil J. ―Korea,‖ in Neil J. Kritz (eds.) Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon With Former Regimes: Volume II, Country Studies, United States Institute of Peace, 1995, pp. 205-207; Ekbladh, David. ―How to build a nation,‖ The Wilson Quarterly, Winter 2004, p. 63; Han, Sung-Joo. The failure of democracy in South Korea, University of California Press, 1974, pp. 139-142; Kim, Kwang-ok. ―A study on the political manipulation of elite culture: Confucian culture in local level politics,‖ Korean Journal, Vol. 28, No 11, Seoul, 1988, p. 10; Kim, Dong-Choon. ―The great upsurge of South Korea‘s social movements in the 1960s‖ Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, Volume 7, Number 4, 2006, pp. 621-625; Kihl, Young Whan. Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform and Culture, Armonk, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 2005; Kim, Bun-woong. ―Korean political tradition and democratic elitism,‖ Korea Journal, Vol. 17, No. 10; Park, Sangsop. ―Obstacles to democracy. Some peculiar features of Korean political society,‖ Conference paper, Stockholm: Center for Pacific Asia Studies, Stockholm University. 581 The attitudes and behaviors of the elites toward others, predisposition, rules, processes, and institutions were driven by authoritarianism and exclusion whereas the population‘s behavior was driven by a democratic mindset of constructive criticism, inclusiveness, harmony and fairness. The elites did not change their attitudes and behaviors until the 1980s, whereas the population strengthened its democratic solidarity, criticism, cooperation among various social groups and pressures and demands toward the government for respecting the rules and institutions. See Kritz, Neil J. ―Korea,‖ in Neil J. Kritz (eds.) Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes: Volume II, Country Studies, United States Institute of Peace, 1995, pp. 205-207; Min, Kwan-shik. ―Personal reflections on democracy in Korea,‖ Center for Korean Studies, Colloquium Paper No. 3, Honolulu, 1975, p. 2; Cotton, James. ―From authoritarianism to democracy in South Korea,‖ Political Studies, 1989, Vol. 38, pp. 249- 255; Shin, Doh Chull., Park, Chong-Min., Jang, Jiho. ―Assessing the shifting qualities of democratic citizenship: The case of South Korea,‖ Democratization, Vol. 12, April 2005, p. 211, 213. 582 In the early years, the elites and the population channeled their participation through the political parties created. The elites, however, viewed political participation as a means toward establishing their control over the country whereas most of the population viewed it as a way toward establishing self- governance and a new political system. With the rise in power of Rhee, political participation became dominated by the extreme right and its anti-Communist agenda. Until the 1980s political participation was controlled through corruptive and repressive methods. On the other hand, the population, while combining peaceful and violent forms of participation, grew in its support for parties of the center and 248 society,583 institutional culture584 and the attitude toward change.585 The political culture among the population reflected, in general, a democratic character and during more than four decades went toward democratization of its democratic character. The political culture of the elites reflected a strong authoritarian character and remained non-democratic until pressures from the mass of the population forced them to democratize.

moderate right, increased its criticism toward the successive governments of Rhee, Park and Chun, and demanded democratization of the political system and governance. See Helgesen, Geir. Democracy and Authority in Korea: the Cultural Dimension in Korean Politics, Surrey, United Kingdom: Curzon Press, 1998, pp. 151-160, 179-185; Han, Sung-Joo. The failure of democracy in South Korea, University of California Press, 1974, p. 138; Cotton, James. ―From authoritarianism to democracy in South Korea,‖ Political Studies, 1989, Vol. 38, pp. 249-255. 583 The initial relations between the elites and the emerging civil society were characterized by mutual cooperation for constructing the political system, later they diverged and took opposite positions. Starting with an increase of the authoritarian practices of the Rhee government, relations between civil society and the population grew stronger as they tried to stop the authoritarianism pursued by the successive governments. See Kim, Dong-Choon. ―The great upsurge of South Korea‘s social movements in the 1960s‖ Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, Volume 7, Number 4, 2006, pp. 621-625; Helgesen, Geir. Democracy and Authority in Korea: The Cultural Dimension in Korean Politics, Surrey, United Kingdom: Curzon Press, 1998, pp. 191-199; Jee, Joohee. ―Class structure and class consciousness in South Korea,‖ Journal of Contemporary Asia, 1997, Vol. 27, No. 2, p. 138; Kim, Sungmoon. ―Civil society and political action in democratized Korea: Revamping democratization form a participatory perspective,‖ New Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 4, December 2006, p. 529; Borton, Hugh. "Occupation politics in Japan and Korea," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 25 January 1948, p. 153. 584 The elites preferred a model of concentrated power and authority, did not have any concern about the representative character of the government and institutions, and defined their governance and policies by an anti-Communist orientation. Until the 1980s, the elites continued to pursue practices conforming to this model. They were forced to relinquish the authoritarian model with increasing pressure from Korean social and political forces. Unlike the elites, the population viewed authority and power as a function of the creation of the national state and government, and associated them with and expected to see them characterized by a strong democratic dimension. Increasingly, and for more than thirty years, the population opposed the authoritarian model of governance, concentration of power and skewed representativeness and demanded the democratization of government, the institutions, the political system and governance. See Kritz, Neil J. ―Korea,‖ in Neil J. Kritz (eds.) Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes: Volume II, Country Studies, United States Institute of Peace, 1995, pp. 205-207; Ekbladh, David. ―How to build a nation,‖ The Wilson Quarterly, Winter 2004, p. 621; Ahn, Chung-si. ―Political culture and political socialization of the post-war generation in South Korea‖, Korea Journal, Vol. 28, No 5, Seoul, 1988, p. 9. 585 The elites resisted embracing democratic change during the 1950s and continued to resist such a change until the 1980s. They became part of the democratic change only after 1985, after facing growing pressure from the population. The later embraced the change for democracy from the early 1950s and throughout more than forty years persisted in trying to force the elites to accept and become part of the change toward a democratic Korean society and politics. 249

Third, the change of the political culture during the 1980s from one characterized by non- democratic features to one characterized by democratic ones marks at the same time democratization of South Korea.586

The main feature of post-1945 South Korea is the lack of change of political culture toward features conducive to democracy, especially among the South Korean elites. The latter resisted the change and their political behavior reflected strong authoritarian elements. The fact that South Korea did not democratize either during the US occupation or in the years after the end of the occupation and that the absence of change in political culture highlight the importance of the change of political culture toward features conducive to democracy to democratization.

5.4 Security Environment: Similarities and Variations across the Cases.

A comparative analysis of the role of security environment in all four cases shows the existence of similarities and differences in the dynamics accompanying the security, internally in terms of the stability, and externally, in terms of the conceptualization of national interests, the foreign policy pursued, the analysis of international politics, security and stability and the management of relations with neighbor states and differences in regime type.

5.4.1 Internal Security Environment

As Table 5.3 shows, internal security environment is similar in cases of Germany, Japan and Italy but is different in the case of South Korea. In the first three cases, the internal security is characterized by lack of conflict among societal groups and political stability. In South Korea internal security is characterized by high level of social conflict and political instability.

586 Kritz, Neil J. ―Korea,‖ in Neil J. Kritz (eds.) Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes: Volume II, Country Studies, United States Institute of Peace, 1995, pp. 205-207. 250

Table 5.3 The Level of Internal Political Stability and Security for the Period 1945-1955

1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 South Korea 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 6 6 0 0

Note: The level of threat to security ranges from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). 0 denotes no evidence of threat. Source: ―Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946-2008,‖ The Center for Systemic Peace, in www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm

5.4.2 External Security Environment

External security shows similarities in the cases of Germany, Japan and Italy but it differs in the case of South Korea. In Appendix 5, Tables A5.15 to A5.20 show that in Germany, Japan and Italy from the late 1940s to the early 1950s the security environment, in all its components, was favorable to democratization. In South Korea, the security environment in the late 1940s was characterized by competition and tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union and in the early 1950s by war between North Korea backed by the Soviet Union and South Korea backed by the United States.

5.4.2.1 Germany and Japan

In Appendix 5, Tables A5.15 to A5.19 show, in a summarized and detailed way, the similarities and differences between the occupied country and the occupying country, in the cases of Germany and Japan. Three conclusions come out of the tables. First, before 1945, both

Germany and Japan pursued more or less the same set of national interests and the same kind of foreign policy; both came into conflict with US national interests and foreign policy. Second, after 1945, both Germany and Japan adjusted their national goals and foreign policies to those associated with democratic realism that characterized the US after 1945 as well. Third, Germany

251 and Japan analyze international politics and security and manage neighborly relations and regime differences in similar ways with the US.

Germany and Japan show four important similarities in the relationship between the security environment and their democratization. One way Germany and Japan are similar is in terms of conceptualization, orientation and the content of their national interests. They changed the conceptualization from a realist to a democratic basis, oriented themselves toward allying with the democratic camp led by the US, and viewed their fate and future as closely linked with the United States.

Another way they are similar is in terms of the character, orientation and strategies of their foreign policies. These policies changed from being driven by a realist and imperialist perspective to a perspective of democratic realism and democratic pacifism. Both reoriented their foreign policies toward the preservation of peace and stability and both pursued strategies complementary and similar to US foreign policy and strategies.

The third way Germany and Japan are similar is in the view, observations and principles guiding their behavior in the context of post-1945 international politics and security. Both of them, in synchrony with the US, viewed the world from the perspective of bipolar order, with post-1945 stability seen as fragile, and were guided in their behavior by the interest to preserve the status quo and peace.

The last way Germany and Japan are similar is in the strategies they pursued in the context of the management of neighborly relations and regime differences. Both of them viewed the Soviet Union, East Germany, China and North Korea as adversaries and their strategies were characterized by caution not to escalate any potential conflict into a war but to resolve the problems through negotiations, accommodation and economic and financial channels.

252

There are also some differences between Germany and Japan but they are not significant in terms of affecting democratization. One difference is in terms of national interests. Germany strove for unification with East Germany, whereas Japan strove for rehabilitation of its image from that of an aggressive country in the region. A second difference is in foreign policy.

Germany‘s foreign policy was engaged toward the integration of Germany into Europe and

NATO, whereas Japan‘s was toward assuring the world of its pacifism.

In Germany, the security environment helped democratization in four important ways.

First, the re-conceptualization of national interests in a democratic framework, and linking them to European integration, NATO and strong relations between France and Germany, helped

Germany feel secure in its territorial integrity against a possible attack by the Soviet Union.

Second, the re-conceptualization of foreign policy within a democratic realist framework and its strong dimension of peaceful relations and coexistence allowed West Germany to lessen tensions in its relations with East Germany and thus reduce the likelihood of an open conflict or even war with East Germany, and as a consequence, with the Soviet troops installed in East Germany.

Third, the viewing of post-1945 stability as very fragile, the rising anti-militaristic spirit among

Germans and predisposition of successive West German leaders and governments to preserve the peace and status quo also helped diminish the tensions between the two German states, easing inter-German relations and thus allowing West Germany progress with democratization. Fourth, the flexibility and variation in strategies between the stick and carrot that West Germany pursued in dealing with East Germany and the Soviet Union allowed West Germany to keep the threat from East Germany and the Soviet Union at bay and to advance successfully in the process of democratization.

253

In Japan, in addition to the direct reliance of Japan on the US militarily, politically, and economically, the security environment helped democratization through the reorientation of national interests and foreign policy, as well as Japan‘s behavior toward pacifism and readiness to assist other countries financially and economically. This reorientation helped Japan, gradually but steadily, to rehabilitate its tarnished image among Asian neighbors, focus on its internal development, deal with and resolve various political and social issues that emerged along the way and successfully complete the process of democratization.

Given that democratization of Germany and Japan was accompanied by the reorientation of national interests and foreign policy, the change of the view of sources of security and stability and the change of the way both Germany and Japan managed their relations with neighboring countries and countries with political regimes different from theirs, one may conclude that the way that national interests are conceptualized, the foreign policy that is pursued, the way a country views the sources of its security and stability and the way a country manages relations with its neighbors and other countries with a different political regime are factors that contribute to creation of a security environment conducive to democratization.

5.4.2.2 Italy

The security environment in Italy, as Table A5.20 in Appendix 5 shows, is characterized by more or less the same patterns observed in Germany and Japan. Changes can be noticed in terms of national interest, foreign policy, analysis of international security and stability, and management of neighborly relations. In the context of national interests, two observations can be made. First, there is a change of basis from an imperialist to a democratic conceptualization.587

587 Before 1945, Italian national interests were constructed on a colonial basis, in the function of making Italy a Great Power, aiming at territorial expansion and control in Northern Africa and the Balkans, and 254

Second, post-1945 Italian national interests run, in general, in harmony with US national interests in Europe in general and in Italy in particular.588

Post-1945 Italian foreign policy is characterized by three important dynamics and changes. First, its character changed from an aggressive and imperialist one to a democratic orientation and it developed within West European geopolitics.589 Second, its foreign policy

expressed through the buildup of military capabilities, conflicts and the acquisition of colonies. After 1945, Italian national interests were re-conceptualized on a democratic realist basis. The re- conceptualization reflects two major influences: 1) externally, the European initiatives and Italian-US relations, 2) internally, the conflict between the national, international and supranational dimensions of national interests. Post-1945 Italian national interests revolved around such dichotomies as sovereignty vs. independency, national vs. supranational orientation, European vs. Atlantic primacy. They show three priorities: 1) integration into Western Europe, 2) strengthening the alliance with the US, and 3) membership in NATO. They also reflected the concerns for reacceptance of Italy in the international community and regaining full sovereignty, increasing economic well-being, and protecting citizens from a potential attack. See Spenser, Henry R. Government and Politics of Italy, New York, World Book Company, 1932, pp. 263-280; Schneider, Herbert W. The Fascist Government of Italy, D. van Nostrand Company, 1936, Chap. 6; Mondello, Mario. ―L‘interesse nazionale,‖ in Enrico Sera (eds.) Gli Ambasciatori Italiana e la Diplomazia Oggi, Milan: Angeli, 1986, pp. 150-151; Prati, Giulia. Italian Foreign Policy 1947-1951: Alcide De Gaspari and Carlo Sforza, Bonn University Press, 2006 pp. 15, 51, 54-72; Edelstein, David M. ―Occupational hazards: Why military occupations succeed or fail,‖ International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1, Summer 2004, p. 91. 588 Some scholars note a number of problems with the priorities between Italy and the US and speak of asymmetrical priorities. Italy prioritized economic needs over domestic needs over international needs, whereas the US prioritized international needs over domestic needs over economic ones. The European integration pursued by Alcide De Gaspari, the Italian Prime Minister of eight Christian Democrats governments during the 1945-1953 period and the strengthening of the US-Italian alliance pursued by Carlo Sforza, the Italian Foreign Minister during 1947-1951 were in harmony with the US interest in making and keeping Italy a part of the Western European democratic community and alliance and out of the Soviet sphere of influence. See Romano, Sergio. ―Contribution,‖ in D. W. Ellwood (eds.) The Marshall Plan Forty Years After: Lessons for the International System Today, Bologna, The Bologna Center of the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, 1988, pp. 104-105; Miller, James E. The United States and Italy 1940-1950: The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization, Chapel Hill, N.C., The University of North Carolina Press, 1986, p. ix; Kolko, Gabriel. The Politics of War: The World and the Unites States Foreign Policy 1943-1945, New York, N.Y. Random House, 1968, p. 46; C.R.S. Harris, Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943–1945, London: Her Majesty‘s Stationery Office, 1957, pp. 59–73; Mignone, Mario B. Italy Today: Facing the Challenges of the New Millennium, Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., New York, 2008, pp. 110-115. 589 Before 1945, Italian foreign policy was characterized by a colonial and imperialist character. It reflected the rise of nationalism and the efforts of the revisionist states to change the balance of power in Europe and the world, and it was driven by colonialist territorial expansion, aspirations for greater power, and an anti-democratic alliance with Nazi Germany. After 1945, Italian foreign policy moved toward democratic realism. It reflected the influence of the US occupation, the rise of the Communist threat, and the bipolar structure of the post-1945 power balance and international politics. It changed its orientation from neutralism to Atlanticism, from the Mediterranean to Western Europe, and was guided by two 255 changed from one against the US, before 1943, to one in harmony with US Foreign Policy after

1945.590 Third, the strategies pursued by the Italian leadership and government in the context of post-1945 foreign policy were similar and complementary to the US strategies and foreign policy.591

The viewing and analysis of international politics and security was also characterized by changes in terms of the perspective from which the Italian leadership and government analyzed international politics and security, sources of stability and the principles guiding the state behavior.592

pillars: the Atlantic alliance and European integration. See Spenser, Henry R. Government and Politics of Italy, New York, World Book Company, 1932, pp. 263-280; Prati, Giulia. Italian Foreign Policy 1947- 1951: Alcide De Gaspari and Carlo Sforza, Bonn University Press, 2006, p. 15, 73; Ranieri, Ruggero. ―Europeismo e politica europea: Osservazioni sulla presenza in Europa occidentale dal 1947 al 1951,― in Storia Delle Relazioni Internazionali, Vol 1, 1985, pp. 161-181; Reitzel, William. The Mediterranean: Its Role in America’s Foreign Policy, 2nd edition Washington, N.Y. Kennikat, Pr. 1969. 590 Both foreign policies viewed keeping Italy within the democratic camp as important to peace and stability in Europe as the democratization of Germany and made every effort to succeed in four objectives: 1) strengthening the alliance with the US, 2) enmeshing Italy within the process of European integration, 3) making Italy a member of NATO and other international organizations and 4) keeping Italy out of the influence of the Communists internally and of the Soviet Union‘s sphere of influence externally. See C.R.S. Harris, Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943–1945, London: Her Majesty‘s Stationery Office, 1957, pp. 59–73; Edelstein, David M. ―Occupational hazards: Why military occupations succeed or fail,‖ International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1, Summer 2004, p. 91; Mignone, Mario B. Italy Today: Facing the Challenges of the New Millennium, Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., New York, 2008, p. 110-115; Romano, Sergio. ―Contribution,‖ in D. W. Ellwood (eds.) The Marshall Plan Forty Years After: Lessons for the International System Today, Bologna, The Bologna Center of the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, 1988, pp. 104-105. 591 De Gaspari worked hard toward the strategy of the European integration of Italy whereas Sforza‘s strategy was focused on strengthening relations between Italy and the US, known otherwise as ―Atlanticism.‖ The US, in its part, pursued the strategy of containment and undermining of Communist influence in Italy. See Miller, James E. The United States and Italy 1940-1950: The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization, Chapel Hill, N.C., The University of North Carolina Press, 1986, p. ix; Kolko, Gabriel. The Politics of War: The World and the Unites States Foreign Policy 1943-1945, New York, N.Y. random House, 1968, p. 46; Hughes, Stuart H. The United States and Italy, 3rd enlarged ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979; Quartaro, Rosaria. Italia e Stati Uniti: Gli Anni Difficili, 1945-1952, Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1986; Agarossi, Elena. Italia e Stati Uniti Durante l’Amministrazione Truman, Milan, Angeli, 1976. 592 The analysis is marked by a change from a perspective of Realpolitik and Machiavellianism that had characterized Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and militarist Japan to a perspective based on democratic realism and along the lines of the US view and analysis. Before 1943, the view of the Italian leadership and government on international stability reflected the conflict between the revisionist and the status quo 256

Italy also shows changes in terms of perspective and the practical approach it pursued toward the management of neighborly relations regardless of the regime.593 Italy thus shows a security environment favorable to democratization because national interests, foreign policy, the analysis of security and stability and the management of neighborly relations were based on the maintenance of the status quo, normal relations, patience and firmness.

Democratization of Italy is the third case that shows that reorientation of the national interests and foreign policy, the view of sources of security and stability and the management of relations with other countries, all contribute to creation of a security environment conducive to democratization.

powers and stability was closely linked to re-division of spheres of influence and control and redistribution of power. After 1945, the view of the Italian leadership and government for international and regional stability reflected the bipolar character of the post-WWII world and was closely linked to the Communist threat, the rising influence of the Soviet Union and the ideological, military, economic, political and cultural competition between the US and the Soviet Union. Before the fall of Fascist Italy, the behavior of the Italian leadership and government was guided by demands made and imposed upon others and showing a willingness to act militarily in support of the imposed demands. After 1945, the behavior of the Italian leadership and government is driven by the desire to maintain peaceful relations with neighbors, keep the status quo, and fend off attempts for a greater influence by the Communists and the Soviet Union. Italy signed a peace treaty not only with the US but also with other countries it had attacked and occupied during WWII. See Prati, Giulia. Italian Foreign Policy 1947-1951: Alcide De Gaspari and Carlo Sforza, Bonnn University Press, 2006, p. 73; Mignone, Mario. B. ―The US-Italian relations and the American Presence,‖ Italian Journal, Vol. 9, Issue 2, 1995, pp. 26-35; Kogan, Norman. The Politics of Italian Foreign Policy, London: Pall Mall Press, 1963, p. 135; Edelstein, David M. ―Occupational hazards: Why military occupations succeed or fail,‖ International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1, Summer 2004, pp. 61-62; Varsori, Antonio. ―Il trattato di pace italiano: Le iniziative politiche e diplomatiche dell Italia,‖ in Italia Contemporanea, 1991, pp. 27-50. 593 Before 1943, Italy viewed relations with its neighbors from a perspective of animosity, escalation of conflict, and unilateral accommodation of Italian interests. After 1945, the perspective changed toward viewing neighboring countries with political regimes different from Italy, such as Yugoslavia, Albania and some other countries in North Africa, as adversaries but with a predisposition to develop peaceful relations, respect the status quo and pursue mutually accommodating practices. The Italian leadership and government handled relations and disputes with neighbors through demands and threats, showing a readiness for conflict and war, and reliance on military support from Nazi Germany. After 1945, Italy sought to solve territorial and border disputes peacefully, offered its neighbors normal relations and maintained them, showed patience and firmness in the management of differences in regime type and relied on US assistance and mediation for resolving disputes and conflicts. See Paris Peace Treaties 1947, and Treaty of Peace with Italy. 257

5.4.2.3 South Korea

South Korea differs from Germany, Japan and Italy in all of the security environment components. While South Korea represents an interesting case and remains open to future research, this work makes three observations about the security environment in South Korea.

First, it was characterized by two levels of conflict, one between the US and South Korea on the one hand and the Soviet Union and North Korea on the other, and the other level of conflict between US policy and the Korean elites and population. Second, the US perspective, analysis, and actions in Korea come closer to a realist perspective, driven by power and ideological concerns, rather than the democratic realism it pursued in Europe and Japan. Third, unlike in

Western Europe, in Korea security and stability suffered from everyday conflicts and threats that escalated into the Korean War.

The case of South Korea shows three important differences compared to Germany, Japan and Italy. The first is in the context of national interests. Unlike Germany, Japan and Italy, whose national interests showed a considerable compatibility with the US national interests, there was a lack of compatibility between the South Korean and US national interests.594

The second difference is reflected in foreign policy. Both the US and South Korea pursued a foreign policy characterized by a strong ideological dimension of anticommunism and

594 Before the US occupation, both the Korean elites and the population defined the national interests in terms of gaining full independence, creating a functional national government, and undertaking reforms. After the creation of South Korean republic and the withdrawal of the US troops, the Korean leadership and government framed the national interests in terms of defending South Korea from a Communist takeover from North Korea. Upon the occupation of South Korea, US national interests vis-a-vis Korea consisted of eliminating Japanese vestiges, preparing Koreans for self-governance, and establishing an independent Korea. See Meade, Grant E. American Military Government in Korea, New York: King's Crown Press, Columbia University 1951, pp. 20-28, 228; Oh, Bonnnie B.C. ―Introduction: The setting,‖ in Bonnnie B.C. Oh (eds.) Korea under American Military Government 1945-1948, Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002, p. 2; Chay, Jongsuk. Unequal partner in peace and war: The Republic of Korea and the United States 1948-1953, Praeger, 2002, p. 44, 48-49; The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea, August 30, 1946, FRUS 1946, Vol. 8, p. 734; Annex in a memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman, September 14, 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. 6, p. 1048. 258 an orientation toward containment and balance of power with the Soviet Union.595 The strategies pursued by both did have the anticommunist dimension in common, but US strategies in South

Korea were not characterized by consistency and continuity but were reactive to the situations created with the Soviets.596

The last difference is in the view of international politics and security and the management of neighborly relations and regime differences. Both the US and South Korean leadership viewed security and stability in realist terms and as linked to the efforts by the Soviet

Union and North Korea to extend their influence and presence in South Korea.597 However, they

595 US foreign policy was driven by the viewing of Korea as a bulwark for American security against Soviet expansion. Fear of Communist expansion influenced and compromised the democratic principles and dimensions of US foreign policy. The primary goal was balancing the Soviet power and keeping South Korea out of the Soviet influence, not democratizing it. Containing Soviet expansion was more important to the US than allowing Koreans to choose their own government. This drive behind the US foreign policy made Koreans view the US military presence as an occupation rather than as liberation from the Japanese. See Meade, Grant E. American Military Government in Korea, New York: King's Crown Press, Columbia University 1951, p. 82; Kolko, Joyce, Kolko Gabriel. The Limits of Power: The World and the United States Foreign Policy 1945-1954, New York, Harper and Row, 1972, p. 283; Nye, Joseph S. ―Redefining national interests,‖ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 4, July-August 1999, p. 34; Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 1: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1981, pp. 136, 267–381, 431; Matray, James I. ―Hodge Podge: American occupation policy in Korea, 1945–1948,‖ Korean Studies, Vol. 19, 1995, pp. 23-25; Oh, Bonnnie B.C. ―Introduction: the setting‖ in Oh (eds.), Korea Under the American Military Government 1945–1948, Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002, p. 9; Edelstein, David M. ―Occupational hazards: Why military occupations succeed or fail,‖ International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1, Summer 2004, p. 81; Chay, Jongsuk. Unequal Partner in Peace and War: The Republic of Korea and the United States 1948-1953, Praeger, 2002, pp. 43, 49. 596 The strategies pursued initially by the US during the 1946-1947 period and by South Korean President Syngman Rhee after 1948, built upon fighting back any pro-Communist effort or dynamics. Initially, the US followed the strategy of trusteeship. Later it followed the strategy of taking the Korean issue to the UN. By 1947, President Truman added Korea to Kennan‘s strategy of containment. See Stueck, William. The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1981, p. 6; Dobbs, Charles M. The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War and Korea, 1945-1950, Kent, Ohio, Kent State University Press, 1981, p. 103; Matray, James I. The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1985, pp. 64-66, 80; Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 1: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1981, pp. 215-217; Chay, Jongsuk. Unequal Partner in Peace and War: The Republic of Korea and the United States 1948-1953, Praeger, 2002, pp. 43, 47, 53; 597 The US was aware of and viewed Korea as an ideological battleground between democratic and Communist visions. See Chay, Jongsuk. Unequal Partner in Peace and War: The Republic of Korea and 259 differed in the principles guiding their behavior. In resolving the Korean issue, the US, while aware of Soviet intentions, showed a preference for a peaceful approach and cooperation with the Soviets rather than being predisposed to stir tensions or escalate conflicts into war.598 On the other hand, the Korean right wing elite and the leaders Syngman Rhee, especially after the withdrawal of US troops, showed a preference for provoking the North through paramilitary actions and military operations at the borders with North Korea.599

South Korea shows that the conceptualization of national interests, the foreign policy that is pursued, the view a country has for the sources of its security and stability and the way it manages relations with its neighbors and countries with a different political regime affect, in a significant way, the security environment and indirectly the democratization itself. In the case of

South Korea, all these elements displayed features different from those observed in other cases.

5.5 Conclusions.

A comparative assessment shows that in the post-World War II cases, each of the three main variables was similar in its influence on democratization but each also differed in terms of the United States 1948-1953, Praeger, 2002, p. 44; Edwin W. Pauley to Truman, June 22, 1946, FRUS 1946, Vol. 8, pp. 706-709; Truman to Edwin W. Pauley, July 16, 1946, FRUS 1946, Vol. 8, pp. 713-714; Truman to the Secretary of War Patterson, July 3, 1946, FRUS 1946, Vol. 8, p. 721. 598 During the occupation period 1945-1948, the US tried to work out a peaceful solution with the Soviets. It created the Republic of South Korea only after the Soviet refusal to accept the plan proposed by the US and pursued by the UN of holding general elections for a Korean Government. See Matray, James I. The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1985, pp. 123-125; Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1981, p. 67; Chay, Jongsuk. Unequal Partner in Peace and War: The Republic of Korea and the United States 1948-1953, Praeger, 2002, pp. 52, 56-57. 599 Some scholars find the responsibility for the initiation of the Korean War in the regular provocations in the form of guerrilla war, territory incursions and invasions and full-scale battles by the South Korean troops during 1949-1950, rather than the initiation of a direct and organized attack by North Korean troops on South Korea. See Blum, William. Killing Hope: US Military Intervention since 1945, Common Courage Press, 1995, pp. 44-53; Meade, Grant E. American Military Government in Korea, New York: King's Crown Press, Columbia University 1951, pp. 37-40; McCune, George C. "The Korean situation," Far Eastern Survey XVII, 8 September 1948, 197-202; KMAG, Semi-Annual Report, 31 December 49, Sec. IV, p. 22. 260 the character of its influence. The latter reflected the influence of other factors as well. In the cases of Germany, Japan and Italy, all independent variables exerted a positive influence on democratization. The positive character of their influence was also influenced by other interactions. In the case of South Korea, when variables were either absent or negatively influenced by other interaction, the character of their influence on democratization was negative.

5.5.1 Military Occupation

Foreign intervention was similar and positive in its influence on democratization in the cases of Germany, Japan and Italy but it was different and negative in its influence on democratization in the case of South Korea. Foreign occupation positively influenced democratization through its goals, policies and commitment in thirteen major ways, divided below into three groups and with differences notices in the four countries studied.

First, foreign occupation displayed four major similarities in all four occupied countries:

1) the areas covered by occupation policies, 2) the number of troops, 3) the resources committed and 4) the forms of the military presence. Germany, Japan, Italy and South Korea show that the occupation policies covered the political economic, social, military and security, and governance areas; sufficient troops and resources were committed, with the military occupation combining

Air Force, Army and Navy bases.

Second, foreign occupation displayed six other similarities, but only in three of the countries: 5) consistency between the articulated and pursued goals, 6) policies driven by democratization, 7) modification of faulty policies, 8) the generation of a positive attitude among the population, 9) a military government that combined both military and civilian experts and 10)

261 a duration of the occupation for at least five years. These conditions are found in Germany, Japan and Italy but not in South Korea.

The first three countries democratized within a decade. South Korea did not. These differences in outcome correlate with the fact that the occupation goals were not linked to democratization, there was no harmony between the articulated and pursued goals, the policies were not geared toward democratization, the policies were not modified in a timely way, the military government generated a shift in the attitude of both elites and people from a positive to a negative stance toward its policies, the military government was composed of military experts only and the military occupation lasted less than four years.

Third, the foreign occupation reflected its positive influence in three other ways, but only in two of the countries: 11) the direct and democratic style of policy implementation and governance (Germany, Italy), 12) the indirect and democratic style of policy implementation and governance (Japan, Italy), and 13) the positive attitude created by the occupation among the elites (Germany, Italy). These conditions are found in one or more of the cases of Germany,

Japan and Italy, but not in South Korea. In the latter, the governing style was direct but authoritarian, and the occupation policies led to a change in attitude among both the elites and the population from a sympathetic to an opposing one. These features may well have helped democratization in the three countries, but they are not present in South Korea, correlating with the absence of democratization in this case.

5.5.2 Political Culture

The political culture was similar and positive in its influence on democratization in the cases of Germany, Japan and Italy but was different and negative in its influence on

262 democratization in South Korea. Political culture can influence democratization, positively or negatively, depending on 1) what the endogenous elite and population do or do not do with respect to changing their political culture toward one characterized by democratic features and 2) what the occupying power does or does not do with respect to changing the political culture of the occupied elites and population toward one that reflects democratic features.

There are eight possible scenarios, four of them in the context of the occupied elites and population: 1) both the elites and the population embrace the shift toward a democratic political culture; 2) the elites embraces the shift toward a democratic political culture but the population does not; 3) the population embraces the shift toward a democratic political culture but the elites do not and 4) both the elites and the population resist the shift toward a democratic political culture.

Of the four, the first combination represents the best whereas the fourth combination is the worst environment for democratization. In the other two combinations, democratization is more likely if the occupying power engages in changing the political culture of the elites or population toward one characterized by democratic features and it is less likely if the occupying power does not engage in changing the political culture of either one.

In the context of what the occupying power does or does not do, there are four other scenarios as well: 1) the occupying power tries to change the political culture of both the elites and the population, 2) the occupying power tries to change the political culture of the occupied elites, but not of the occupied population, 3) the occupying power tries to change the political culture of the occupied population but not of the occupied elites and 4) the occupying power does not try to change the political culture of either one.

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Of the four, the first combination represents the most difficult enterprise.

Democratization becomes easier when both the elites and the population change their political culture toward one characterized by democratic features and it becomes less likely to succeed when the two resist changing their political culture. The last combination may represent the easiest way for the occupying power to act, but negligence toward changing the political culture of the occupied elites and population is more likely to harm and undermine democratization. The two other combinations represent an easier enterprise than both of the others because the occupying force has at least an endogenous ally in its efforts to democratize the occupying country.

Given these scenarios, the combining of the political culture with the foreign occupation in the cases of Germany, Japan, Italy and South Korea shows that the democratization by military occupation is more likely to succeed under three conditions.

One condition is when both the occupied elites and population embrace the shift of their political culture toward one characterized by democratic features, regardless of whether the occupying force engages in changing their political culture. This condition applies in the case of

Germany, post-1947 Japan, post-1948 Italy, and did not happen in South Korea in the post-1945 period, it only occurred in post-1985 South Korea.

Another situation is when the occupied population changes its political culture and the occupied elites resist changing its own political culture but the occupier forces the elites to change their political culture toward one reflecting democratic features. This condition applies in the case of Japan during 1945-1947.

The third situation is when the occupied elites embrace the change of its political culture and the occupied population shows hesitation but the occupier convinces the population to

264 embrace the political culture reflecting democratic features. This condition applies in the case of

Italy during 1945-1948. The case of South Korea also shows that the democratization is more likely to fail or be delayed when the occupied population embarks in changing its political culture, the occupied elites resist the shift toward a political culture characterized by democratic features and the occupying power fails to engage in forcing those elites to change their political culture. This condition applies in the case of South Korea during 1945-1948.

5.5.3 Security Environment

The security environment was similar and positive in its influence and effects in the cases of Germany, Japan and Italy, but it was different and negative in its influence and effects in the case of South Korea. It influenced democratization in four major ways: through the character of the national interests, through the orientation and thrust of the foreign policies, through the view held about international security, peace and stability, and through the management of neighborly relations and regime differences.

The security environment was positive in its influence and helped the democratization of the exogenously imposed democracy through a conceptualization of the national interests on a democratic basis by the occupying forces and the occupied country and through the compatibility of their national interests. This was the case of Germany, Japan and Italy. In South Korea, neither element was present.

Second, the security environment helped democratization when the foreign policies of both, the occupying forces and the occupied country, were formed upon and driven by a democratic realist basis, were complementary and in harmony with one another, and were pursued and implemented through strategies sharing common goals, means, approaches and

265 implementation. This is the case of Germany, Japan and Italy. In South Korea, foreign policies lacked both the democratic realist basis and the complementary and harmonious character.

Third, the security environment helped democratization when both the occupying power and the occupied country shared the same view and analysis of international politics and security, agreed on the sources contributing to stability or instability, and were driven by a similar rationale and set of principles. This was the case in Germany, Japan and Italy. In South

Korea, while the US and South Korea shared the same predominantly realist view and analysis of international and Asian politics and security and the sources of stability, they differed in their patterns of behavior and the principles driving the behavior. While US behavior tended to be driven by a mature view of the Korean issue, in favor of a peaceful solution, the South Korean leadership embarked on a behavior characterized by conflict-prone attitudes.

Fourth, the security environment helped democratization when both the occupying power and the occupied country shared the same perspective and approach in the management of neighborly relations and regime differences, pursued similar strategies driven by the love of peace, avoidance of the escalation of conflicts into war, mutual accommodation, and a combination of cooperation with the adversary accompanied by firmness not to allow the adversary to dictate its will. This was the case of Germany, Japan and Italy. In South Korea, the crucial element that made the case differ from the other three is the way the South Korean elites and government managed relations with the Communist North.

5.5.4 Interacting Factors

This work also sees and emphasizes the importance of three interactions. The first is between the foreign intervention and the endogenous political culture. This interaction or lack

266 thereof is observed in Germany, Japan, Italy and South Korea. An important element of this interaction is the civilian experts. The prevalence of civilian experts in Germany and Japan facilitated a number of processes ranging from writing new democratic constitutions to transforming the curriculum taught in educational institutions. The presence of civilian experts is relatively high in cases of Germany, Japan and Italy but it is low in the case of South Korea.

In Germany the interaction was expressed in the joint efforts of the Allied Occupation and the German elites and population to change the political culture. This interaction had a positive influence on democratization.

In Japan, the interaction took two forms: 1) between the US Occupation Administration, the Emperor and population and 2) between the US Occupation Administration and the old

Japanese elites. While the first interaction exerted a positive influence upon democratization, the second interaction exerted a positive effect only through the pressures that the US Occupation

Authorities exerted on the old Japanese elites to force them to democratize.

In Italy, the US had to press both the Italian elites and the population showing affiliation with the Communist forces to make them abandon such affiliation. It was US pressures that made possible changes in the political culture of Italian elites and the population toward embracing democratic values as opposed to Communist ones, enabling Italy to stay in the democratic camp and democratize.

In South Korea, on the other hand, this interaction is either absent, or negative in its influence. It is so because the US did not engage in democratizing the political culture of the

Korean elites, did not support the democratic elements in the political culture among the Korean population, and did not oppose the authoritarian tendencies in the political culture of the Korean elites.

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The second interaction is between the foreign intervention and security environment. This interaction shows a positive influence and effect in the case of Germany, Japan and Italy. The security environment was conducive to and helped the democratization by increasing the influencing power and effects of the occupation authorities on the democratization process in these countries. In South Korea, the security environment had a negative influence on democratization. Security concerns absorbed all the energy and attention of the occupying force, thus distracting them from paying attention to other aspects linked to the democratization process.

The third interaction is between the political culture and the security environment. This interaction had a positive influence and effects in Germany, Japan and Italy. The conducive aspects of the security environment allowed and made it easier for both the occupation authorities and domestic elites to deal with the echoes of non-democratic political culture, to tackle them and to produce change toward a democratic political culture, which in turn, made it easier for the democratization process to succeed. In South Korea, the adverse influence of the security environment served as a justification for both the Korean elites and the US Occupation

Authority to accept non-democratic behavior and a non-democratic political culture, which in turn made it harder for Korea to enter the path of democratization.

5.5.5 Contribution of this Study

These findings contribute to the literature on democratic democratization and military occupation in three ways.

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First, the findings confirm the argument made by the conditional scholars that the imposition of democracy by foreign military intervention is possible when the specific conditions discussed in this work are fulfilled.

Second, the findings show that the process and the success of democratization depend not only on what the occupying force does in terms of goals, policies, and commitment, but also on dynamics of political culture accompanying the occupation. As this work has demonstrated, the democracy-inducing power of the occupying force does not depend solely on the economic, financial, military, political, and human resources it invests. It also depends on the way the occupying force seeks to shape the political culture in the occupied country. Most scholars downplay the importance of political culture, arguing that it would eventually change on its own, after the occupying force has imposed democratic institutions, rules and processes. In contrast, this work maintains that when occupying power seeks to change the political culture in the occupied country towards a democratic character, the chances that the occupation will succeed in making the occupied country democratic are increased.

Third, this work confirms the importance of the security environment. It shows that both the influencing power of the occupying forces and the outcome of the democratization process are directly affected by the security environment.

While this work has focused only on the post-World War II cases of Germany Japan,

Italy and South Korea, its findings can be tested in other cases. These include cases other than those after the end of World War II. They involve the colonial powers such as France and Britain or other states in various historical periods. Expanding the sample of cases in terms of historical period, intervening power, geographical location and cultural background, will help refine the accuracy, validity and applicability of the findings of this study.

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Appendix 1 A Comparison of Pre-1945 and Post-1945 regimes in Germany

1.0 Post-1945 Germany: Change and Democratization.

Post-1945 Germany differed from pre-1945 Nazi Germany in many ways, as shown in Tables

A1.1 on regime score, A1.2 and A1.3 on party system, and A1.4 on the character of media. Thus, its polity score moved upward by 19 points: it was -9 in the Nazi era from 1933 to 1944; 0 in the occupation period 1945-1949 and +10 from 1949 onward. Also, the party system changed from a single to a multiparty system and the media changed toward multiple channels of information.

Using parameters from Polity IV and Freedom House, Table A1.1 summarizes regime dynamics for the period 1933-2011 and shows the extent of regime change in Germany.600

Table A1.1 Regime Score and Change in Germany for the Period 1933-2011

1933-1944 1945-1949 1950-2011 Nazi Regime Regime Change by Occupation Democratic Regime Regime  -9 (Polity IV)  0 (Polity IV)  +10 (Polity IV) Score  +7 (Freedom House)  n.a.  +1 (Freedom House) Autocracy Transition by Occupation Democracy Regime  strong  military administration  strong Type  full  exogenously imposed  full institutionalized  consolidated  democratic  consolidated

Regime Nazi Regime Democratization by Occupation Democratic Regime Duration  11 years (1933-1944)  5 years (1945-1949)  60 years + (1950-2010) Scale of Change From Weimar to Nazi Regime From Nazi to Democratic Regime Since 1950 from  -15 pts (Polity IV)  +19 pts (Polity IV)  0 pts (Polity IV) previous  +5 pts (Freedom House)  - 6 pts (Freedom House)  0 pts (Freedom House) regime Pace Toward Nazi Regime Toward Democratic Regime Since 1950 and  Radical in character  Radical in character,  no change Character  Quick in pace  Quick in pace of Change From Weimar to Nazi From Nazi to Postwar Germany Since 1950 Direction Germany  Positive  no change of  Negative  Toward Democracy  democracy consolidated Change  Toward Autocracy

Note: Freedom House scale ranges from +7 (lowest, autocratic) to +1 (highest, democratic). Polity IV scale ranges from -10 (lowest, autocratic) to +10 (highest, democratic)

600 Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions Datasets. Polity IV annual time-series 1800-2010 and Polity IVd case format 1800-2010, www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm 270

Three observations can be made. One is about the differences between the regime and the change from one regime to the other. Table A1.1 shows that the contrast between the Nazi regime and post-1945

Germany is stark in terms of the constitutional framework and government, institutional culture and distribution of power, the rights and liberties, the elections and party system, the media and civil society, governance and policy-making and economic system and development.

The second observation is about the change. As Table A1.1 shows, the change from autocracy to democracy was quick, radical, positive, and linear. Regime change and transition to democracy in

Germany took place in only four years, it moved only in a positive direction, and it had no bumps or advances followed by setbacks. Occupation seems to have produced a radical change:601 from an institutionalized, strong autocratic regime to a full, strong, and consolidated democracy.

The third observation is about the strength of democracy. The Polity Score in Table A1.1 shows that the German democracy consolidated by 1950, and since then it has not known setbacks.

1.1 Post-1945 Germany: From a Nazi to a Democratic Regime

Pre-1945 Nazi Germany is an autocratic regime characterized by lack of freedom, dictatorial rule and policies, and practices with no respect for basic human rights standards, democratic norms, or the rule of law. Some scholars have debated whether it represents a new start or a restoration of some previous democratic traditions.602 However, post-1945 Germany appears as a strong, quickly consolidated democracy that has broken with its undemocratic past.603 It is different from Nazi Germany in its constitutional framework, state and government, institutional culture and practices of power, political rights and participation, electoral system and party politics, media and civil society, governance and policy-making and economic system and development.

601 According to Polity IV, when regime score changes by nineteen points the change is considered as ―radical.‖ 602 Jarausch, Konrad H. After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 138. 603 Conant, James B. ―The Foundations of a Democratic Future for Germany,‖ Department of State Bulletin, May 17, 1954. 271

1.1.1 Constitutional Framework

Pre-1945 Germany built on the constitutional framework of the Weimar Republic. Until 1933, it reflected, in general, a democratic character. It stated that the power was derived from people through elections, the individuals enjoyed political rights and freedoms and the government model was the parliamentary democracy. However, its democratic character changed to authoritarian after the ascent in power of Hitler and the acts and decrees declared during 1933-1934. The Acts eliminated the rights and liberties, changed the relations of power, authority, policy-making and decision-making between the national and local levels of government and centralized the power at the hands of Hitler.604

Post-1945 Germany builds on the constitutional framework of the Basic Law that builds on three elements: 1) the recognition of political, civil, social and economic rights and individual freedoms and liberties, 2) the redefinition of power relations among the branches of the government and 3) the creation of the Federal Republic based on redefined relations between the Federal, Lander, and local levels of governance.605

1.1.2 State and Government

The pre-1945 German state and government reflected the democratic principles of the Weimar

Republic. Yet, from 1925 to 1930, their character and functioning evolved from a democratic to authoritarian, from the parliamentary republicanism to one-party rule.606 The German state grew

604 The ―Reichstag Fire Decree‖ (February 1933), the ―Enabling Act‖(March 1933) and the ―Act to rebuild the Reich‖(January 1934) changed the character of Weimar Constitution from a democratic to an authoritarian one. See Tipton, Frank. A History of Modern Germany since 1815, Continuum Press, New York, 2003; Read Anthony. The Devils Disciples, W.W. Norton, 2003; Fulbrook, Mary. The Divided Nation: A History of Germany 1918-1990, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 45. 605 The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, 23 May 1949. Published by the German Bundestag, Public Relations Division, Parliamentary Public Relations Work. Translation in English by Tomuschat, Christian., Currie, David P., and Kommers, Donald P. 606 Fulbrook, Mary. The Divided Nation: A History of Germany, 1918-1990, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 45; Hitler declared himself Fuhrer (the ―leader‖), concentrated all the power in his hands, exercised it without any institutional constraint, and embarked in intimidation and elimination of his political enemies both in and outside the Nazi party. From 30 June to 2 July 1934, Hitler purged Ernst Röhm, his SA cohort, and the Strasserist, the left-wing Nazis. He ordered the Schutzstaffel (SS) and the 272 centralized, authoritarian, and oriented toward nationalist policies. The Third Reich judiciary preserved most of the judicial structures and legal codes of the Weimar Republic, but with significant changes. It declared the Nazi Party as the only political party legally allowed, disabled most of Weimar‘s human rights through ―Reich‘s Laws,‖ and in 1934 created ―people‘s courts‖ to deal with political cases.607

The post-1945 German state and government is organized on the principles of federal, parliamentary, and representative democracy.608 It combined the historical predecessors with new creations.609 The federalism regulates, respects, and guarantees the rights of the Lander.610

1.1.3 Institutional Culture and Approach to Power

Pre-1945 Germany is characterized by three elements: 1) the weak tradition of democratic institutions and authority, 2) the weak and inefficient mechanism of distribution and control of power and

3) a tendency to concentrate the power on the hands of a few individuals or elite circles. From 1933 until

1944, the power was concentrated on Hitler.

Gestapo to assassinate his political enemies both in and outside the Nazi Party in what is now known as the ―Night of the Long Knives.‖ The loyalty of German soldiers and people shifted from the Constitution and Germany to Hitler as persona. See Kershaw, Ian. The "Hitler Myth": Image and Reality in the Third Reich, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 253; Kershaw, Ian. Hitler: A biography, W.W. Norton & Co, 2008, p. 315; Read, Anthony. The Devils Disciples, W. W. Norton & Co, 2003. 607 The Third Reich judiciary deprived Jews, opposition politicians, and prisoners of war of most of their rights and responsibilities. German courts from 1934-1944 gave a total of 5375 death sentences whereas from July 1944 to April 1945 death sentences are estimated at around 2000 cases. See Evans, Richard J. The Third Reich in Power: 1933-1939, Penguin Press, 2005, pp. 20-81. 608 Article 20, The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, 23 May 1949. Published by the German Bundestag, Public Relations Division, Parliamentary Public Relations Work. Translation in English by Tomuschat, Christian., Currie, David P., Kommers, Donald P. 609 Some Landers (Bavaria, Saxony) were reconstituted as administrative units based on their historical predecessors, while others (North-Rhine Westphalia, Thuringia) were largely new, created to offer German officials a chance to gain experience in self-government since they assumed responsibility for food, supplying heating fuel, and all of the other necessities of life; 610 Three articles, Article 28 (Land constitutions, Autonomy of municipalities), Article 30 (Sovereign powers of the Länder), and Article 31 (Supremacy of federal law), Chapter ―Federation and the Länder,‖ pp. 26-37, clarify that Territory is divided into Länder, Federation guarantees the constitutional order, Federal law takes primacy over the Land law and Länder have a size and capacity to perform their functions effectively, exercising state powers and functions upon the principles democracy, the social state and the rule of law; and any revision of territorial division is effected by a federal law confirmed by referendum. 273

In post-1945 Germany, the authority derives from the expression of the free will of people through elections or from elections by other specific institutional bodies at all Federal, Lander, and local levels of government.611 The power is distributed both horizontally between branches of government and vertically among different levels of governing bodies, and it is exercised democratically through constraints and check-balance powers.612 The law-making process reflects the sharing of power, authority and expertise of all institutional actors both horizontally and vertically.613 The judiciary functions on the

611 Article 20, Constitutional principles of FRG, The Basic Law 1949, Section Federation and the Lander, p. 26. Elected in general, direct, free, equal and secret elections are the Bundestag (Article 38, Election of Bundestag), County and Municipal representatives (Article 28, Land constitutions – Autonomy of municipalities). Elected through other institutional bodies are the Bundesrat members (appointed by Land governments, based on Article 51, Composition of Bundesrat), the Federal President (elected by a Federal Convention consisting of members from the Bundestag and Lander parliaments based on Article 54, Election of the Federal President), the Federal Chancellor (elected by the Bundestag based on Article 63, Election of the Federal Chancellor), and Federal Ministers (appointed and dismissed by the Federal President upon the proposal of the Federal Chancellor based on Article 64, Appointment and dismissal of Federal Ministers). 612 Articles 37-65 specify the division of power between the Bundestag, Bundesrat, Federal President, Federal Chancellor, and Federal Government, The Basic Law, pp. 37-55; Article 70 specifies the division of powers between the Federation and the Länder. The Basic Law, Section ―Federal legislation and legislative procedures‖ pp. 56-82; The power assigned and the ability to check the power of other institutions is defined by the Basic Law in the Articles 40-68. The Bundestag, based on Articles 40 (Rules of procedure), 61 (Impeachment), 67 (Vote of no confidence), has the right to elect and impeach the Federal President, hold a vote of confidence on the Chancellor and dismiss him if the majority so votes; The Federal President, based on Articles 58 (Counter-Signature), 60 (Appointment of civil servants, Pardon, Immunity), Article 68 (Vote of confidence), 67 (Vote of no confidence), 65 (Power to determine policy guidelines) dissolves the Bundestag upon the proposal of the Federal Chancellor, appoints the Chancellor, approves rules and procedures resolving differences between the Chancellor and Ministers, appoints, dismisses federal judges, civil servants and army officers, pardons individual offenders, represents the Federation internationally, concludes treaties, accredits and receives envoys. The Federal Chancellor, based on Articles 65 (Power to determine policy guidelines), 68 (Vote of confidence), 58 (Counter-Signature) is responsible for policies, may request a vote of confidence to the Bundestag and its dissolution to the President, call new elections and countersign Federal President orders. The Bundesrat, based on Article 61 (Impeachment), may impeach the Federal President; The Federal Ministers, based on Articles 65 (Power to determine policy guidelines), 58 (Counter-Signature) are responsible for conducting the affairs of the department independently and countersign orders of the Federal President. The Federal Government representatives, based on Articles 43 (Right of presence, of access, to be heard), 53 (Attendance) may attend all Bundestag and Bundesrat sittings, their committees meetings, and has the right to be heard at any time. 613 A bill passed by Bundestag becomes law if the Bundesrat consents to it (Article 78, Passage of federal laws) and Amendments generally require a two-thirds majority of both chambers of parliament (Article 79, Amendment of the Basic Law); Five articles regulate the role of federal, Lander, and local governing bodies within the law-making context. Based on Articles 70 (Division of powers between the Federation and the Länder), 71 (Exclusive legislative power of the Federation) legislation power resides primarily 274 principles of respect and fair and equal treatment of all citizens, diversified structure, independence and democratic accountability.614

1.1.4 Political Rights and Political Participation.

Pre-1945 Germany systematically violated political rights and civil liberties.615 The violation became a state practice and norm with the ―Reichstag Fire Decree,‖ issued on February 27, 1933. Political

with the Federation. Länder legislate only when authorized by a federal law, or insofar Basic Law does not confer legislative power on the Federation. Based on Articles 72 (Concurrent Legislative Powers) and 74 (Matters under concurrent legislative powers) there are 33 areas where Federal and Lander institutions share concurrent law-making power. Federal institutions hold the last say in the areas of foreign policy, defense, nuclear energy, citizenship, currency (Article 73, Matters under exclusive legislative power of the Federation) whereas local government, within the limits of its functions designated by law, has the right of self-government and is responsible for regulating all local affairs with regard to financial autonomy, tax revenues and subjects taxed (Article 28, Land constitutions – Autonomy of municipalities); 614 Articles 102 (Abolition of capital punishment), 103 (Fair trial), 104 (Deprivation of liberty) 137 (Religion) serve as basis by guaranteeing the abolish of capital punishment, non discrimination on religious ground, clarification that a person‘s liberty can be restricted only pursuant to a formal law, procedures and a judge‘s ruling, and that the person cannot be held in custody more than 24 hours without a judge‘s order; The structure of the Judiciary is defined by Articles 94 (Federal Constitutional Court), 95 (Supreme Federal Court) and 96 (Other Federal Courts). The system is regulated by federal law and consists of the Constitutional Court, Court of Justice, Administrative Court, Finance Court, Labor Court, Social Court and Courts dealing with industrial property rights and military criminals. Article 92 (Court organization) vests judges with power at the level of Constitutional, Federal and Lander Courts; Article 97 (Judicial independence) declares judges independent and subject only to the law; Article 93 (Jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional Court) assigns interpretation of the Basic Law, disagreements and applications concerning Federal, Land, of Government Law, and review of complaints by any person or municipality to the Federal Constitutional Court; Article 97 (Judge Appointment) holds that judges are appointed permanently, full-time; A number of articles define the mechanisms for checking and balancing the power of judges. Articles 94 (Composition of the Federal Constitutional Court), 95 (Supreme federal courts) Article 97 (Judge Appointment) 98 (Legal status of judges, Impeachment) specify that judges are elected by the Bundestag, the Bundesrat, Federal Minister, and a committee of Land ministers; that the Bundestag sets age limits for the retirement of judges appointed for life, that the Bundestag and the Federal Constitutional Court regulate the legal status of judges, transfer, retire or impeach them when they infringe the principles of the Basic Law or the constitutional order. 615 Nazi Germany became notorious for the expropriation and extermination of Jews, political suppression and persecution of Communists, Socialists, liberals, forced retirement of individual politicians, all done in the name of national unity, solidarity, racial cleansing and cultural revolution. The Nazi regime was responsible for many other violent practices. Between 1933 and 1945 more than 3 million Germans were sent to concentration camps or prison for political reasons. Between 1933 and 1945 tens of thousands of Germans were killed for one or another form of resistance. Nazi ―special courts‖ killed 12,000 Germans, martial courts punished by death 25,000 German soldiers, civil courts sent 40,000 Germans to death. See Evans, Richard J. The Third Reich in Power: 1933-1939, Penguin Press, 2005, pp. 20-81; Evans, Richard J. The Coming of the Third Reich: The Penguin Press, 2003, p. 441; Goldhagen, David. Hitlers willing executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, Vintage, 1997; Almond, 275 participation was characterized by an alignment of the majority of the population with the Nazi Party, its agenda and orientation.

In post-1945 Germany, political rights and civil liberties are guaranteed by the Basic Law and practiced in everyday life.616 Political participation diversifies and reflects the return of multiparty politics and pluralism.617

1.1.5 Electoral System and Party Politics

During pre-1945 Germany, the electoral process and party system were reduced to and identified with the National-Socialist (Nazi) Party. As Table A1.2 shows, between the 1919-1932 period Nazi

Germany moved from a multiparty, democratic state to a one-party, totalitarian system.618

Gabriel. ―The German resistance movement,‖ Current History, Vol. 10, 1946, pp. 409–527; Clay, David. Contending with Hitler: Varieties of German Resistance in the Third Reich, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 122; Mitchell, Otis C. Hitler's Nazi State: The Years of Dictatorial Rule, 1934-1945, New York 1988, p. 217. 616 The Basic Law was written with the idea that it represents the ethical foundation for the Federal Republic. It is a crucial instrument protecting nonconformist individuals and critical groups from the repressive urges of state power. Based on this conceptualization, the Basic Law declares political rights and civil liberties inviolable (Article 1); Seven articles protect political rights: Article 2, Protection of personal freedoms, life, physical integrity; Article 5, Freedom of expression, arts and sciences; Article 13, Inviolability of the home; Article 16, right to Citizenship, Extradition, asylum; Article 8, Freedom of assembly; Article 17, Right of petition; Article 33, the Right to enjoy equal political rights, and be equally eligible for any public office regardless of affiliation or creed); Ten articles protect civil liberties: Article 3, Equality and no discrimination before the law; Article 4, Freedom of Faith and Conscience; Article 6, Freedom of Marriage, Family, Children; Article 7, Right of Education; Article 9, Freedom of association; Article 10, Privacy of correspondence, post and telecommunications; Article 11, Freedom of movement; Article 12, Occupational freedom; Article 14, Right to Property, Inheritance, Expropriation, and Article 15, Socialization; Two articles define the conditions of the restriction of rights and remedies: Articles 17a, Article 18, instances of restriction or forfeit of rights; Article 19, legal remedies for restriction of basic rights through recourse to the courts. See Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945- 1995, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 66; 617 Surveys from the late 1940s show Germans increasingly appreciating the importance of political rights and civil liberties in their everyday life. See Merritt Anna J., Merritt, Richard L. Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The OMGUS Surveys, 1945–1949, Urbana, 1970, p. 39, 178-179; Merritt Anna J., Merritt, Richard L. Public Opinion in Semi-sovereign Germany: The HICOG Surveys, 1949–1955, Urbana, 1980, p. 43, 61. 618 Elimination of other political parties took place in the period 1933-1934 following the ascent to power of the Nazi Party in 1933 through a coalition with the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) and the appointment of Hitler by President Hindenburg as chancellor. It started with the Enabling Act voted in March 1933 and allowing changing the Weimar Constitution. The Act, renewed in 1937 and 276

Table A1.2 Germany’s Party System during the Period 1919-1944

Period Political Party System Electoral Support Year of Ban

Multiparty Political System 1. NSDAP - National Socialist German Workers Party 2.6% - 43.9% 2. SPD - Social Democratic Party of Germany 18.3% - 37.9% June 1934 3. DNVP - German National People's Party 6.1% - 20.5% June 1934 4. Z - Centre Party 11.2% - 19.7% July 1934 5. DDP - German Democratic Party 0.7% - 18.6% 6. USPD - Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany 7.6% - 17.9% 7. KPD - Communist Party of Germany 2.1% - 16.9% March 1933 8. DVP - German People's Party 1.1% - 13.9% July 1934 1919 9. NSFP - National Socialist freedom Movement 3.0% - 6.5% - 10. WP - Reich Party of the German Middle Class 0.3% - 4.5% 1932 11. BVP - Bavarian People's Party 2.7% - 4.4% 12. NBL - Christian National Peasants and Farmers Party 1.9% - 3.1% 13. CSVD - Christian Social People‘s Service 0.5% - 2.5% 14. BB - Bavarian Peasants League 0.8% - 2.4% 15. Agricultural League 0.2% - 2.0% 16. DBP - German Farmers‘ Party 0.3% - 1.6% 17. Right Wing People‘s Party 0.2% - 1.6% 18. DHP - German-Hanoverian Party 0.2% - 1.1%

1933 Single Party System - 1. NSDAP - National Socialist German Workers Party 92.2% - 99.1% July 1934 1944

Note: Data for federal elections, political parties, and their electoral support since 1919, the year of creation of the Weimar Republic, are available in the section for Germany, Wikipedia.

In post-1945 Germany, party politics and electoral systems are important instruments for channeling middle class interests, representation and participation.619 Declared as a crucial element of the political system, parties did not just reintroduce the failed Weimar electoral and party practices, they transformed German politics.620 As Table A1.3 shows, the party system started to function with recreation of a number of parties in 1945, and while the number of parties has varied, the system remains multiparty in character with five or six parties representing major political forces.

1941, allowed Hitler to pas his laws, ruthlessly eliminate all political opposition starting initially in 1933 with the ban of the Communist party and moving throughout 1934 to other parties as well, and finally, imposing a single-party system. Elections in 1933, 1936, and 1938 were entirely Nazi-controlled and the Nazi Party won up to ninety-nine percent of the vote, thus creating a legislative rubber-stamp of Nazi policies. 619 Rogers, Daniel E. Politics after Hitler: The Western Allies and the German Party System, Houndmills, 1995. 620 The Basic Law (Article 21, Political Parties) declares parties as central elements in the formation of the political will of the people, and thus the state guarantees their existence, functioning and financing. 277

Table A1.3 Germany’s Party System during the Period 1945-2011

Year Number of Political Parties Year of Electoral Period Within the German Multiparty System Re-creation Support

5-10 Political Parties 1. CDU - Christian Democratic Union 1945 25.2% - 36.4% 2. SPD - Social Democratic Party of Germany 1945 28.8% - 29.2% 1945 3. FDP - Free Democratic Party 1948 9.5% - 11.9% - 4. CSU - Christian Social Union 1946 5.8% - 8.8% 1956 5. KPD - Communist Party of Germany 1945 2.2% - 5.7% 6. GB-BHE - All-German Bloc of Expellees and Deprived of 1950 0.0% - 5.5% Rights 1946 0.0% - 4.2% 7. BP - Bavarian Party 1949 3.3% - 4.0% 8. DP - German Party 1945 0.8% - 3.1% 9. DZP - German Center Party

4-5 Political Parties 1957 1. SPD - Social Democratic Party of Germany 31.7% - 45.8% - 2. CDU - Christian Democratic Union 34.2% - 39.7% 1989 3. FDP - Free Democratic Party 5.8% - 12.8% 4. CSU - Christian Social Union 7.1% - 10.6% 5. DP - German Party 0.0% - 3.4%

6-7 Political Parties 1990 1. SPD - Social Democratic Party of Germany 33.5% - 40.9% - 2. CDU - Christian Democratic Union 28.4% - 36.7% 2010 3. FDP - Free Democratic Party 4.7% - 11.0% 4. PDS - Party of Democratic Socialism 2.4% - 11.0% 5. The Greens & Alliance 90s 1979 5.0% - 9.2% 6. CSU - Christian Social Union 6.8% - 9.0%

1.1.6 Media and Civil Society

Before 1945, under the Nazi regime, civil society was nonexistent, and except for the Protestant and Catholic churches, everything was put under Nazi Party control.621 The media was controlled by

Goebbels, the Propaganda Minister, using it to instill full support of the Nazi regime, Hitler and his policies and Nazi ideology among the Germans.622 After 1945, the media and civil society also represent significant influences within the new political system. As Table A1.4 shows, the first postwar democratic regime newspapers and magazines were founded in 1945.623

621 Evans, Richard J. The Third Reich in Power: 1933-1939, Penguin Press, 2005, pp. 20-81. 622 Speer, Albert. Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs, Simon and Schuster, 1970, p. 19; Shirer, William L. The rise and fall of the Third Reich: A history of Nazi Germany, Simon and Schuster, 1960, pp. 109, 371, 840, 1039; Barnett, Correlli. Hitler’s generals, New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989, p. 2. 623 To start publishing a newspaper required permission from the Allied occupation authorities. The permit was granted only if the requester proved he had no previous connections with the Nazi regime. 278

Table A1.4 Daily Newspapers Founded in Post-1945 Germany

Title of the Short Starting Circulation Founding Ideological Newspaper Day Publisher Orientation Emil Carlebach, Hans Etzkorn, Frankfurter FR Aug 1, 1945 Daily Wilhelm Karl Gerst, Liberal Rundschau National Otto Grossmann, Wilhelm Knothe, Paul Rodemann Arno Rudert Der DT Sep 27, 1945 Daily Eric Reger Classical Liberal Tagesspiegel Local Edwin Redslob Suddeutsche SZ Oct 6, 1945 Daily Eberhard Ebner Centrist to Liberal Zeitung National Dieter Schaub Gerd Bucerius Die Weekly Lovis H. Lorenz Centrist Zeit DZ Feb 21, 1946 National Richard Tungel to Ewald Schmidt di Simoni Social-Democratic Marion Grafin Donhoff Die DW Apr 2, 1946 Daily Rudolf Kustermeier Conservative Welt National Hans Zehrer Der Weekly British Administration Fact-Checking Spiegel DS Jan 4, 1947 National Rudolf Augstein Investigative Frankfurter Daily Center-right Allgemeine FAZ Nov 1, 1949 National Erich Welter to Zeitung Conservative

Initially closely supervised by occupation authorities for their ideological orientation and the ideas expressed, by the early 1950s, the newspapers and magazines not only had grown to become liberal but also developed a new professional ethos and became a counterweight to the government by exposing scandals and leveling criticism against it rather than approving all policies and actions.624 The orientation of the emerging ne civil society toward defending the constitutional state, freedom, rule of law and human rights started in 1945 through some efforts to re-create of a number of organizations previously existing but disbanded by the Nazi regime, and also with the creation of new organizations.625 The West German

624 Frankfurter Rundschau was established with the permission of US authorities, and the first group of the publishers included people of liberal, Jewish and Communist background. Eighteen months after the establishment of the newspaper, the authorities forced those editors with Communist affiliations to leave the newspaper. See Jarausch, Konrad H. After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 143. 625 ―Gruppe 47‖ was a literary association established by Alfred Andersch and Walter Kolbenhoff in September 1947 to inform and teach the German public about democracy. See Jarausch, Konrad H. After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 43; Lora 279 public sphere became vibrant through the public activity of various individual intellectuals and social critics, who strove to give an accurate portrayal of the shortcomings of postwar German society. The democratic character and role of media and civil society is reflected in the public debate in the 1960s over democracy and democratization between conservative and liberal voices, and the rise and influence of social movements of young, urban professionals, unions, the Protestant Church, intellectual circles, and peace advocates demanding democratic reforms, respect of rights and the preservation of peace.

1.1.7 Governance and Policy-Making

In pre-1945 Germany, governance and policy-making were characterized by two elements: 1) their centralized and authoritarian character and 2) their nationalist orientation and agenda. The local government ceased existing with the Act to Rebuild the Reich issued by Hitler on January 30, 1934.626

In post-1945 Germany, governance and policy-making reflect three elements: 1) democratic character, 2) openness of policy-making to various groups and 3) stability and efficiency. The successive governments of the Federal Republic of Germany have been characterized by stability and effectiveness in policy-making and implementation.627

Surveys conducted for the twenty-fifth and fiftieth anniversaries of the Federal Republic showed a growing sense of satisfaction among Germans with their government.628

Wildenthal in "The Origins of the West German human rights movement, 1945-1961," Research Papers Human Rights Institute, April 2004, Paper 4. p. 1, holds that the efforts made since 1945 led to the creation in 1961 of the Humanist Union (Humanistische Union) focused on civil liberties and human rights, and in 1968 the creation of the Society for Threatened Peoples, both with a considerable large membership. 626 The act disbanded Lander (federal state) parliaments, and transferred state rights and administration to the central government. Reich governors replaced state governments and the mayors of cities and towns were appointed by the Interior Minister. Mayors of Berlin, Hamburg, and Vienna were appointed by Hitler himself. See Evans, Richard J. The Third Reich in Power: 1933-1939, Penguin Press, 2005, pp. 20- 81. 627 Some attribute the stability of government to three changes in the Basic Law: the power of the Federal President (it is weaker), the vulnerability of the Chancellor to a vote of no confidence, and the small number of parties sitting in the Bundestag due to the entry threshold of five percent; 628 Merkl, Peter H. (eds.), The Federal Republic of Germany at Fifty: The End of a Century of Turmoil, Houndmills, 1999; 280

1.1.8 Economic System and Development.

The pre-1945 German economic system and development reflects the influence of international politics and events on Germany and is characterized by three features: 1) national unification, 2) making

Germany and economic and military power and 3) state-driven industrialization. During the period of the

Weimar Republic, the economic system and development built upon three principles: 1) justice, 2) dignified life for all and 3) economic freedom. The failure of the Weimar Republic to deliver on its promises, given the economic crisis of the 1930s, and the inability of German governments to respond effectively to the problems characterizing the German economy during 1925-1930, and the rise of Hitler in power paved the way for orientation of economic system and development toward state-controlled economy, nationalist orientation and militarization.

The post-1945 German economic system and development reflects the influence of five factors:

1) the World War II defeat, 2) the US occupation policies and the Marshall Plan, 3) the rise of the Soviet

Union and the start of the Cold War, 4) the orientation of West Germany toward European integration and

5) the pacifist character of the successive German governments. The post-1945 economic system and development, dubbed as the ―German miracle,‖ builds on an active role of the state, close cooperation between the state, business and labor unions, the combination of free market capitalism with the social and welfare state, and orientation of German economy toward the exports.

1.2 Post-1945 Germany: A Consolidated Democracy

The Polity Scores show that the German democracy consolidated by 1950, and since then it has not known setbacks. Ten years after the defeat of the Nazi regime and the imposition of democracy, some doubted whether democracy in Germany had taken root. The consolidation of democracy, however, was proven by four major tests.

The first was about the transition of power within the leadership of the governing party and from the governing to the opposition party, viewed as the strongest proof of the stability of German

281 parliamentary democracy.629 A second test was about the functioning of the state administration and parliamentary democracy. Both showed efficiency and stability regardless of facing crises such as leadership resignation, oil shocks, reforms and political relations with East Germany.630 A third test was about coping with extremist political movements and terrorism.631 The fourth test was about dealing with citizen movements raising their voice for reforms, the environment, nuclear energy and peace. While dealing with these movements turned out to be very problematic, sometimes resulting in the use of massive police power, water cannons or heavy fines, the Federal Republic did not relapse into fascist methods but relied on and used all institutional means, debated democratic values and practices openly in public, set the boundaries of the use of political power and worked out nonviolent ways and solutions.632

The consolidation of democracy in Germany is confirmed by the relationship it created with the

Germans. By the end of the 1980s, nearly eighty percent of all West German citizens were either ―very satisfied or fairly satisfied‖ with the democratic system.

629 The year 1963 marks the first transition of power within the CDU, from Adenauer to Erhard; in 1966, Erhard transferred the power to Keisinger; 1969 marks the transition of power from Keisinger and the governing party CDU to Brandt and the opposition party SPD; in 1974 Brandt transferred the power to Schmidt. Since then, following the election outcome, power has been regularly transferred between coalition governments of the center-left and center-right. 630 Konrad Adenauer resigned in 1963 following his entanglement with a scandal involving defense minister Franz Joseph Strauss; Willy Brandt resigned in 1974 following the revelation that his aide Günter Guillaume was an East German spy. 631 In 1967, the extreme right National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) passed the threshold of five percent of the votes and entered several state assemblies. In 1972, the extremist left and Red Army Faction demanded for a radical change of power relations. In 1972 the Federal Prosecutor Siegfried Buback and the head of the employers‘ association Hanns-Martin Schleyer were murdered. 632 Jarausch, Konrad H. After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 151-152; 282

Appendix 2 Democratization, Military Occupation, Political Culture and Security in Germany

Figure A2.1 Democratization and Military Occupation in Postwar Germany: Goals, Policies and Commitment.

DEMOCRATIZATION

GOALS POLICIES COMMITMENT

Democratic Number Constitution of Troops

Democratic Government Model Change of the Political Regime Democratic Political Institutions

Duration Democratic of Political Occupation Culture

Demobilization Demilitarization of Germany Disarmament

Transformation of German De-Nazification Economic Society & Financial Deindustrialization Resources Economic Transformation Reconstructing

Transformation of Decentralization Governance

283

Figure A2.2 Democratization and Political Culture in Postwar Germany: Values and Beliefs, Behavior and Attitudes, Institutional Culture and Patterns, Civil Society, and Attitudes toward Change.

DEMOCRATIZATION

VALUES BEHAVIOR INSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL CIVIL ATTITUDE and and CULTURE PARTICIPATION SOCIETY TOWARD BELIEFS ATTITUDES and CHANGE PATTERNS

Toward the on Others Character Channels Number Among Viewing the of of of Civic the Others Institutions Participation Organizations Elites Predisposition to Trust or Distrust

on Distribution Interest Development Among Rights and Exercise of for of the and Rules Power Participation Media Population Liberties Processes Outcomes Institutions on Style Electorate Public Sphere Government of Alignment and and Evaluation of Governing and Public Debate Authority Government Realignment and Leaders on Social Adaptability Political to Various Institutions Situations

on Policy and Individual Decision-making Responsibility Practices

on Social Change

284

Figure A2.3 Democratization and External Security Environment in Postwar Germany: National Interests, Foreign Policy, the Viewing of Sources of Security and Stability, and the Management of Neighborly Relations and Differences in Regime Type

DEMOCRATIZATION

FAVORABLE ENVIRONMENT

NATIONAL FOREIGN MANAGEMENT VIEW ABOUT THE OURCES INTERESTS POLICY OF NEIGHBOR RELATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL AND REGIME DIFFERENCES SECURITY AND STABILITY

Economic Support Acceptance Military confrontation Integration European of with into Integration Status quo the Soviet Union Western Europe

Political Strengthen Avoidance of Nuclear Weapons Commitment the Alliance Provocations and Arm Race to with the US Conflict escalation Western and France and Use of force Alliance

Balance of Power Membership Pursuit of Military in Mutual Membership International Accommodation in NATO Organizations Divergent and Clashing Pursuit Interests Unification of Pursuit of Peaceful of Germany Relations Cooperation Perceptions and Communication

285

Appendix 3 A Comparison of Pre-1945 and Post-1945 Regimes in Japan

3.0 Post-1945 Japan: Change and Democratization.

Post-1945 Japan differs in a distinguished way from pre-1945 Japan. Before 1945 it was a hybrid and anocratic regime combining weak autocratic with weak democratic elements with a polity score +1.

From 1952 and onward it became a democracy with a polity score +10. Postwar Japan had a democratic constitution, government, party system and electoral practices. As Tables A3.1-A3.5 in Appendix 3 show, there are differences between regimes in terms of the character of government, approach to power, party system and electoral practices.

Table A3.1 allows for two observations: 1) the pace of change was moderate, the direction was positive and the trend was linear because the change occurred within eight years and since 1952 Japan has been a stable democracy and 2) the democratization of Japan started inheriting a prewar democratic tradition better than Germany‘s. Japan was a non-democratic regime but it differed slightly from

Germany in terms of its polity score and the experience with democracy.633 Given these two differences, the task of occupation consisted of two things: 1) to engineer a major rather than a radical change and 2) to demilitarize the Japanese mindset and revive previous, truly democratic tradition.

3.1 Post-1945 Japan: From a Militarist to a Democratic Regime

The analysis of differences between pre-1945 and post-1945 regimes rests on three observations.

First, pre-1945 Japan oscillated between a weak democratic regime during the Meiji period (1868-1910)

633 The pre-1944 Germany was an authoritarianism state and society that did not allow room for even a single weak democratic element. It did have a democratic experience with the Weimar Republic (1919- 1933) but it was imposed exogenously by Great Powers, following the defeat of Germany in World War I. It was short in duration, never embraced willingly by Germans, and it was also resisted and rejected. Japan, while a militarist regime, did contain some very weak democratic elements. Its experience with democracy included the Meiji Restoration (1868-1912) and Taisho (1912-1929) periods, was a product of endogenous dynamics and political struggle between the social, political and economic forces, was gradual, and its duration extended along more than sixty years. 286

Table A3.1 Regime Score and Change in Japan for the Period 1868-2010.

1868-1944 1945-1952 1952-2010 Regime Meiji, Taisho, Showa Regimes Regime Change by Occupation Democratic Regime Score  +1 (Polity IV)  0 (Polity IV)  +10 (Polity IV)  +4 (Freedom House)  n.a.  +1 (Freedom House) Autocratic, Militarist Transition by Occupation Democracy Regime  anocratic, hybrid regime  military administration  strong Type  combines weak autocratic  exogenously imposed regime  full and weak democratic features  institutionalized

Meiji Weak Democratic Regime Democratization by Occupation Democratic Regime  44 years (1868-1911)  8 years (1945-1952)  58 years + (since 1952) Regime Taisho Weak Liberal Regime, Duration  15 years (1912-1926) Showa Militarist Regime  19 years (1926-1944) From Meiji to Showa  77 years (1868-1944) Scale of Change From Tokugawa to Meiji: From Meiji to Democratic Regime Since 1952 from  +11 pts (Polity IV)  +9 pts (Polity IV)  0 pts (Polity IV) previous  -3 pts (Freedom House)  -3 pts (Freedom House)  0 pts (Freedom House) regime Pace and Toward a Hybrid Regime Toward a Democratic Regime Since 1952 Character  Major in character  Major in character,  no change of Change  Slow in pace  Moderate in pace From Tokugawa to Meiji Japan From Meiji to Postwar Japan Since 1952 Direction  in general, positive  positive  no change of  change toward less  toward democracy  democracy consolidated Change autocratic, more democratic, but not fully democratic state, government, and society

Note: Freedom House scale ranges from +7 (lowest, autocratic) to +1 (highest, democratic) Polity IV scale ranges from -10 (lowest, autocratic) to +10 (highest, democratic)

and Taisho period (1910-1926) and a weak authoritarian and militarist regime during Showa (1926-1944) period. Second, the oscillation, the inability of Japan to move from a weak democracy to a strong democracy and the shift from a weak democracy to a militarist regime all reflect the way the constitutional framework and government model were created and developed as well as the path of institutional and political development. Third, post-1945 Japan differed significantly from pre-1945 Japan in terms of the constitutional framework, state and government, the institutional functioning, approach to power, the political rights and participation, the election system and party politics, media and civil society, governance and policy-making, and the economic system and development.

287

3.1.1 Constitutional Framework

Three elements characterized the pre-1945 constitutional framework: 1) the flaws that reflected the choices made by its writers, its underlying principles and the accompanying political context, 2) the oligarchic rather than representative form of government and 3) the special place given to the military.

The writers opted for 1) the authoritarian model of the 1850 Prussian constitution, 2) the imperial sovereignty, 3) a non-representative government, 5) unclear procedures about the selection the executive authority and 6) the rights established by law.634 The principles consisted of 1) imperial sovereignty as the foundation of government, 2) maximization of the power of the state, 3) creation of a government powerful and off the hands of the uncontrollable masses, 4) putting the Meiji leaders in charge of the political system, and 5) a minimal role and influence for the people.635 The political context reflected the motives among the elite and the populace and the rationale behind their choice for the constitutional model. The populace desired a representative government whereas the elite aimed at changing Japan‘s position internationally.636 The elites were aware of the competitive and western character of international politics and the need for the modernization of Japan to get rid of its inferior position. To achieve this, they opted for an oligarchic rather than representative government.637

634 Sovereign power was vested in the Emperor but the political power was divided among a small set of competing elites. The majority party in the Diet did not automatically have the right to form a government; instead, it is the Emperor who appoints the Prime Minister. The political parties vied for power with the military, the bureaucracy, the leading industrialists (zaibatsu), and groups close to the Emperor. The military was not legally subordinate to civilian control, a structural flaw that the military exploited to the fullest. 635 Pittau, Joseph. Political thought in early Meiji Japan, 1868–1889. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967, Vol. 24, pp. 177-178; Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 390- 395. 636 Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, pp. 80, 85; Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 345-346, 384-392. 637 From 1871 to 1873 the Japanese government sent hundreds high officials to study the government models of Great Britain, France, US, Spain, Germany and other countries. They rejected the US model as too liberal, the British model as too unwieldy, and the French and Spanish models as open to despotism. The German model was the best because it accommodated the desire to keep power concentrated on the Emperor, insulated the state from popular control, and allowed a minimal space for the rights and role of the parliament. Conte, James F. Overseas Study in the Meiji Period: Japanese Students in America, 1867– 288

The 1890 Meiji constitutional framework was democratic but oligarchic because it granted rights, but on a selective basis; allowed elections, but excluded various social groups from the participation; recognized political parties, but did not allow them to have a real influence on the matters of government and it opened up the governance to democratic practices yet it allowed elites to mask their oligarchic and authoritarian tendencies. It generated four dynamics: 1) an oscillations between imperial, liberal and militarist tendencies, 2) a centralized and hierarchical state, 3) an oligarchic and authoritarian government and 4) a militarist state, government and society.

The post-1945 constitutional framework of Japan differed in three elements: 1) its exogenous origin, 2) the democratic character of its basic principles and 3) its pacifist character. The new

Constitution reflected the defeat of Japan and the role of the US occupation; it was written by the US occupation troops and approved by Diet. The old elite, despite its objections, accepted the Constitution as it was proposed.638 The new Constitution reiterated the values of the Charter Oath but renounced the divine character of the Emperor and Japan‘s superiority to other races.639 It also made sure no one could take over the system, as the military did in the 1930s and renounced war as a national policy or a sovereign right through the Article 9 of the Constitution.

3.1.2 State and Government

Two elements characterized the pre-1945 state and government: 1) the militarist orientation and

2) the struggle for power between the military and civilian elites. The militarist character became more pronounced during the 1930s, but its origin echoed back to the early Meiji period. It reflects the special

1902, Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1977; Beasley, W. G. Meiji Political Institutions, The Cambridge History of Japan, 1989, Vol. 5, The Nineteenth Century, pp. 651-665; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 85; Siemes, Johannes. Hermann Roesler and the Making of the Meiji State, Tokyo: Sophia University Press, 1966. 638 Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. Norton & Company, The New Press, 2000, p. 160, 355. 639 Jansen, Marius B. Japan and its world: Two centuries of change, Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 63; Government Section, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Political Reorientation of Japan, Vol. II, appendices Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949, p. 470. 289 place that the military circles had in the power structure.640 As Tables A3.2, A3.3, A3.4 show the office of Prime Minister and cabinet ministers rotated among the civilian elite or Genro, but the military circles always attempted to gain more influence and power. In the 1930s the military used ruthless tactics and coup d‘états to force civilian leadership to yield gradually to and accept the military takeover of the government.641

Table A3.2 Prime Ministers for the Late Meiji Period 1885-1912

PRIME MINISTER RANK TIMES/PERIODS SERVING AS TIME SERVING NAME TITLE PRIME MINISTER AS MINISTER Ito Hirobumi Prince Duke 4 Times (~ 8 years) 4 Times Genro  Dec 1885– Apr 1888  Aug 1892– Sep 1896  Jan 1898 – Jun 1898  Oct 1900 – Jun 1901 Matsukata Masayoshi Prince Duke 2 Times (~ 3 years) 7 Times Genro  May 1891 – Aug 1892  Sep 1896 – Jan 1898 Yamagata Aritomo Prince Duke 2 Times (3,5 years) 5 Times Genro  Dec 1889 – May 1891  Nov 1898 – Oct 1900 Katsura Taro Prince Duke 2 Times (~ 8 years) 6 Times Genro  Jun 1901 – Jan 1906  Jul 1908 – Aug 1911 Saionji Kinmochi Prince Duke 2 Times (3 years) 6 Times Genro  Jan 1906 – Jul 1908  Aug 1911 – Dec 1912 Kuroda Kiyotaka Count 1 Time (~ 2 years) 3 Times Genro  Apr 1888 – Dec 1889 Okuma Shigenobu Marquis 1 Time (6 months) 5 Times Genro  Jun 1898 – Nov 1898

Sources: Jansen, Marius B. Prime Ministers, 1885-1912 in The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, p. 420; Gordon, Andrew. Appendix A, Prime Ministers of Japan, 1885-2001, in Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 333.

The post-1945 state and government are characterized by 1) democratic and representative character and 2) pacifism. The state built upon the popular sovereignty. The Emperor no longer

640 Gluck, Carol. Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the late Meiji Period, Princeton University Press, 1985, pp. 17-35; Pyle, Kenneth B. ―Meiji Conservatism,‖ in The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 5, The Nineteenth Century, 1989, pp. 674–720. 641 Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 592-595, 645-646; Connors, Lesley. The Emperor’s Adviser: Saionji Kinmochi and Prewar Japanese Politics, London: Wolfeboro, N. H.: Croom Helm, 1987, p. 126; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 189; Shillony, Ben-Ami. Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981. 290 represented a divine authority that ruled independently from the people but the symbol of nation‘s unity whose power was derived from the people. The government, also derived from the people, was accountable to them and pursued peaceful policies.642

3.1.3 Institutional Culture and Approach to Power

The main feature of pre-1945 Japan was its centralized character. The emperor was the epicenter of the power structure, but he did not govern directly. The real power rested with the military leaders that

1) received the power and legitimacy directly from the emperor, 2) acted independently from civilian authorities because Article 11 of the Constitution guaranteed it and 3) served as the guarantor of the strength of state, defender of the country, and preserver of the social order.643 The other institutions either enjoyed a minimal level of power, insufficient to serve as a check to the military power, or did not have power at all. The Prime Minister did have some power over the Diet but not over the military. He could suspend the Diet and dissolve the House of Representatives, but did not have any control over the military.644 The role of the Privy Council, the Upper House of Peers, and the Lower House of Diet was to protect the Emperor from the popular radicalism and republicanism rather than control the military.645

Three features mark the post-1945 Japan: 1) the new role for the Emperor, 2) the empowerment of the Diet and 3) a clear definition of the Executive powers. The role of emperor became symbolic. Diet

642 Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 684-686. 643 Smethurst, Richard. A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism: The Army and the Rural Community, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974, p. vii; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 77; Daikichi, Irokawa. The Culture of the Meiji Period, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 101. 644 Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 345-346, 393-394, 414; Pittau, Joseph. Political thought in early Meiji Japan, 1868–1889. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967, Vol. 24, pp. 177-178; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, pp. 90-93. 645 Fraser, Andrew. ―The House of Peers 1890–1905: Structure, Groups, and Role,‖ in Andrew Fraser, R. H. P. Mason, and Philip Mitchell (eds.), Japan’s Early Parliaments, 1890–1905, London: Routledge, 1995; Akita, George. Foundations of Constitutional Government in Japan, 1868–1900, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967. 291 changed from a unicameral to a bicameral house, both directly elected. The Prime Minister was chosen by

Lower House.

3.1.4 Political Rights and Participation

Before 1945 they are characterized by 1) a limited character and 2) a declining trend. The constitution subjected the rights to law, granted them upon qualification, and discriminated in gender and religious terms.646 In the 1930s there was a significant drop in participation among women, labor, urban, rural, and political organizations and a wane of support for civil and political rights.647 The decline reflected the shift of the emphasis from the political rights to national unity and nationalist spirit, the indoctrination by the ruling elite, the government intrusion and the control of political activities.648 After

1945 they are characterized by three changes: 1) the rights no longer are subject to law, 2) the respect and guarantees of the rights and beliefs are affirmed and 3) the popular character of participation.649

3.1.5 Electoral System and Party Politics

Before 1945, they are characterized by 1) the limitation to a few elite circles and segments among the population, 2) exposure to government intrusion, control and surveillance and 3) the lack of influence on the government.650 After 1945 they are characterized by 1) the disappearance of old Meiji parties and

646 Seivers, Sharon. Flowers in Salt, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1983, p. 36; Grifﬁs, William Elliot. The Mikado’s Empire: A History of Japan from the Age of Gods to the Meiji Era (660 BC - AD 1872), Harper and Brothers, 1913, pp. 336–337. 647 Tsurumi, Patricia E. ―Visions of Women and the New Society in Conﬂict: Yamakawa Kikue versus Takamure Itsue,‖ in Sharon Minichiello (eds.), Japan’s Competing Modernities: Issues in Culture and Democracy, 1900–1930, University of Hawaii Press, 1998, pp. 335–357; Large, Stephen. The Rise of Labor in Japan: The Yuaikai, Tokyo: Sophia University Press, 1972, p. 142; Beckmann, George M. The Making of the Meiji Constitution: The Oligarchs and the Constitutional Development of Japan, 1868– 1891, Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1957, p. 149. 648 Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, p. 509; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, pp. 105, 196. 649 The new constitution recognized thirty-eight political, civil, economic and social rights. 650 The franchise was limited, the number of candidates was small, the elections suffered from patronage, ballot stealing, bribery, intimidation and assassination of candidates. Parties developed along the 292 leadership, 2) the division on ideological basis rather than elite status, 3) the use of British model of the single district, 4) the shift of the electoral support from the left to the right and 5) one-party rule during

1955-1988. The purges touched both the right and left parties and the new parties were either new, or reestablished on a transformed political profile. As Table A3.3 shows there were two political groupings, the conservative right parties (Democratic, Liberals) and the left parties (Socialists, Communists) that were divided on the issues such as demilitarization, disarmament, US presence in Japan, and US Cold

War policy toward the Soviet Union. Party splits are also common because of internal factionalism, inter- parties coalitions and creation of new parties. The Liberal Democratic Party was a merger of the Liberal

Party and the Democratic Party.651 The competition opened to parties and individuals alike. Socialists and Communists enjoyed considerable support because of their criticism to imperialist policies of the wartime regime, but they lost the support because of their agenda of nationalization, the pursuit of a violent path by the left-wing forces in the 1950s, SCAP purges, the Korean War, and the unification of the right forces into the Liberal Democratic Party.652 The LDP stayed in power for thirty-eight years due to successful cooperation between politicians, bureaucrats and business, known as the ―iron triangle,‖ the economic growth, the role of state in development, the ability of LDP to modify its course and the bureaucratic background of its leadership.653

European models, frequently changed their leadership and became ideologically diversified, but had no influence upon the government and often dissolved. The 1925 Peace Preservation Law and the activity of police forces led to the ban of the left-wing parties and the arrests and the censure of labor movement. In the 1930s, the military controlled the electoral meetings and parties either merged into pro-military political organizations or lost their influence. See Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 388, 505-508. 651 Some parties revived old parties of the 1930s. The Progressive Party, later called Democratic, followed the state-centered conservative tradition of prewar Minseito; Socialists and Communists followed their prewar traditions. The purges touched conservative and non-Communist parties that had supported the war. In the right camp 90% of the leaders of Progressive Party, and 45% of the Liberal Party were purged. In the left camp, purges touched the Labor and Farmers parties but not Socialists and Communists. 652 Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, pp. 238-239. 653 Laura Hein, ―Growth versus success,‖ in Andrew Gordon (eds.), Postwar Japan as History, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 111–112; Calder, Kent. Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan, 1949–1980, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988, pp. 5-20. 293

Table A3.3 Party System and Electoral Support in Japan during the Period 1946-2000

Year Parties Electoral Parties Electoral Government Period in the Right Spectrum Support in the Left Spectrum Support 3 Political Parties 4 Political Parties  DemocraticLiberal Party 55.0% - 56.0%  Socialist Party 10.0% - 31.0% (Minshujiyuto) (Shakaito) 1946  Liberal Party 28.0% - 30.0%  Co-operative Party 3.0% - 6.0% Right - (Jiyuto) (Kyodoto) Coalition 1949  Progressive Party 20.0% - 21.0%  Communist Party 1.0% - 8.0% (Shinpoto) (Kyosanto)  Democratic Party 14.0% - 26.0%  Labor Farmer Party 1.0% - 2.0% (Minshuto) (Rodosha nominto) 6 Political Parties 5 Political Parties  Liberal Democratic Party 61.0% - 62.0%  Socialist Party 35.0% - 36.0% Left (Jiyuto Minshuto) (Shakaito) Coalition  Liberal Party 51.0% - 52.0%  Left Socialist Party 11.0% - 19.0% (until 1955) (Jiyuto) (Shakaito Saha) 1950  Yoshida Liberal Party 42.0% - 43.0%  Right Socialist Party 12.0% - 14.0% - (Yoshida Jiyuto) (Shakaito Uha) Right 1959  DemocraticLiberal Party 39.0% - 40.0%  Labor Farmer Party 0.9% - 1,1% Coalition (Minshujiyuto) (Rodosha nominto) (from 1955)  Reformist Party 16.0% - 24.0%  Communist Party 0.0% - 0.4%  Hatoyama Liberal Party 7.0% - 8.0% (Kyosanto) 2 Political Party 3 Political Parties  Liberal Democratic Party 57.0% - 63.0%  Socialist Party 18.0% - 31.0% 1960 (JiyutoMinshuto) (Shakaito) Right -  Komei Party 5.0% - 10.0%  Democratic Socialist 3.5% - 6.5% Coalition 1969 (Komeito) (Minsuto Shakaito)  Communist Party 0.5% - 3.0% 2 Political Party 4 Political Parties  Liberal Democratic Party 48.0% - 55.0%  Socialist Party 21.0% - 24.0% 1970 (JiyutoMinshuto) (Shakaito) -  Komei Party 6.0% - 11.0%  Democratic Socialist 4.0% – 6.5% Right 1979 (Komeito) (Minsuto Shakaito) Coalition  Communist Party 3.5% - 7.5% (Kyosanto)  Social Democrat Lg. 0.0% - 0.4% (Shakaiminshurengo) 3 Political Party 4 Political Parties  Liberal Democratic Party 49.0% - 59.0%  Socialist Party 16.5% - 22.0% (JiyutoMinshuto) (Shakaito) 1980  New Liberal Club 1.0% - 3.0%  Democratic Socialist 6.5% - 7.5% Right - (Shin Jiyu Club) (Minsuto Shakaito) Coalition 1989  Komei Party 7.0% - 11.0%  Communist Party 5.0% - 6.0% (Komeito) (Kyosanto)  Social Democrat Lg. 0.5% - 0.8% (Shakaiminshurengo) 7 Political Party 4 Political Parties  Liberal Democratic Party 43.0% - 54.0%  Socialist Party 14.0% - 27.0%  New Frontier Party 30.0% - 31.0%  Democratic Socialist 2.5% - 3.0% 1990  Renewal Party 10.0% - 11.0%  Communist Party 2.9% - 3.1% Right -  Komei Party 9.0% - 10.0%  Social Democrat Lg 0.2% - 0.8% Coalition 2000  New Komeito Party 6.0% - 7.0%  New Harbinger Party 0.4% - 2.5%

Sources: Gordon, Andrew. Appendix A, Prime Ministers of Japan, 1885-2001, in Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, pp. 333-344;

294

3.1.6 Media and Civil Society.

Before 1945, two features characterized them: 1) a contradictory set of values and 2) the identification with the state ideology. There were times when they criticized the government, conveyed progressive ideas and a liberal spirit, advocated individual responsibility and fought for social equality and political rights.654 Nevertheless, they also embraced martial valor, Japanese nationalism and superiority, conservatism and radicalism. In addition, they warned against the excessive influence of the

West, advocated ideas close to the political elite and accommodated the government interests and actions.

In the 1930s, they embraced the ultra-nationalist agenda, became identical with the state and its militarist policies and contributed in the militarization of the society as a whole. Many intellectuals were co-opted into government structures and organizations, embraced nationalism, supported war against China and condemned the voices opposing nationalism and war.655

After 1945, three features marked the change: 1) the new role, importance and content of media,

2) its diverse and antimilitarist character and 3) the constructive criticism of the government. Media regained its importance, developed numerically, diversified ideologically and played a key role in reconstructing a new national identity.656 Civil society was revamped by a new generation of intellectuals, public voices, civic movement and organizations; both embraced the democratic mindset, debated issues and became strong defenders of peace.657

654 Sukehiro, Hirakawa. ―Japan‘s Turn to the West,‖ in Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 5, The Nineteenth Century, 1989, p. 477; Sansom, G. B. The Western World and Japan: A study in the interaction of European and Asiatic cultures, Knopf, 1949, p. 414. 655 Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 377-384, 461-467, 560, 570-571, 604-605, 643- 645; Mitchell, Richard H. Censorship in Imperial Japan, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983, p. 132; Rubin, Jay. Injurious to public morals: Writers and the Meiji state, University of Washington Press, 1984, pp. 196–197; Keene, Donald. ―Japanese writers and the Greater East Asian War,‖ in Donald Keene (eds.), Landcapes and Portraits: Appreciations of Japanese Culture, Tokyo and Palo Alto: Kodansha International, 1971, pp. 300-321. 656 The number of publishers increased six fold in six years; in 1949, 45,000 books were submitted to SCAP for censoring; See Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 265. 657 Japanese groups and organizations did actively participate in demilitarization of the society. Peace movements addressed the nuclear disarmament, intellectuals banished the conservative heroes of the past, 295

3.1.7 Governance and Policy-Making

Table A3.4 and A3.4 show three features of the pre-1945 period: 1) the clash between the military and the civilian elite, 2) nationalist policies and 3) militarization of the governance. Politically, Japan was characterized by fascist practices and purges among the military leadership and assassinations of a number of prime ministers and capitalists.658 Ideologically, policy-making was oriented toward militarism and imperialism.659 The governance reflected the decline of power among the civilian leadership and the rise of influence among the military circles. Given the latitude the military had within the decision-making process and the fragmentation of authority and responsibility, by the 1930s, the military became a key player in making and breaking the governments.660

After 1945, three features characterized them: 1) a democratic character, 2) political stability and

3) efficiency. The change was expressed in the practice of the ―iron triangle‖ that fostered the cooperation between the ruling political leadership, bureaucracy, corporate executives, the business community and labor sector, the ability of the government to manage the economic recovery in the early years and

and those co-opted by the military were relegated. Postwar media atoned for the silence during the militarist period and took a critical position of the conservative government. Major newspapers were reorganized and shaken up and public radio became a forum of political discussion. 658 The military purged all those who helped them come into power. They interrogated, prosecuted, tried, court-martialed, sentenced to death and purged army officers, officers in reserve, soldiers, and civilians; See Shillony, Ben-Ami. Revolt in Japan: The Young Ofﬁcers and the February 26, 1936 Incident, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, pp. 188-198; Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 361-362. 659 Ikei, Masaru. ―Ugaki Kazushige‘s View of China and His China Policy, 1915–1930,‖ in Iriye, The Chinese and the Japanese, pp. 199–219; Shinichi, Kitaoka. ―China Experts in the Army,‖ in Duus, Myers, and Peattie, The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989, pp. 330–368; Shinichi, Kitaoka. ―The Army as a Bureaucracy: Japanese Militarism Revisited,‖ Journal of Military History, Vol. 57, October 1993, pp. 67–86. 660 Between 1885 and 1945 there were 43 cabinets headed by 30 prime ministers, of whom half were military ﬁgures, 9 generals and 6 admirals. Of 494 civilian posts in those cabinets, 115 were occupied by generals and admirals. The military proportion was high in Meiji, lower in Taisho, and up again in presurrender Showa, with 62 of 165 posts. See Hackett, Roger F. ―The Military,‖ in Ward, Robert E., Rustow, Dankwart A. (eds.), Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, Princeton University Press, 1964, p. 346. 296 achieve a double digit-annual growth for more than twenty years and government openness to initiatives and reforms.661

Table A3.4 The Japanese Governments during the Taisho Era 1912-1932

GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT PRIME MINISTER RANK REASON PERIOD HEAD NAME TITLE OF THE FALL Jan 1906 – Jul 1908 Civilian Saionji Kinmochi Genro Army Demand Jul 1908 – Aug 1911 Civilian Katsura Taro Genro Army Demand Aug 1911 – Dec 1912 Civilian Saionji Kinmochi Genro Army Demand Dec 1912 – Feb 1913 Civilian Katsura Taro Genro Political Crisis Feb 1913 – Apr 1914 Military Yamamoto Gonnohyo Navy Admiral Corruption Apr 1914 – Oct 1916 Civilian Okuma Shigenobu Genro Genro Decision Oct 1916 – Sep 1918 Military Terauchi Masatake Army General Economic Crisis Sep 1918 – Nov 1921 Civilian Hara Takashi - Assassinated Nov 1921 – Jun 1922 Civilian Takahashi Korekiyo - Stand-in Jun 1922 – Sep 1923 Military Kato Tomosaburo Admiral Died in Office Sep 1923 – Jan 1924 Military Yamamoto Gonnohyoe Admiral Military Attack Jan 1924 – Jun 1924 Civilian Kiyoura Keigo - Political Crisis Jun 1924 – Jan 1926 Civilian Kato Takaaki - Died in office Jan 1926 – Apr 1927 Civilian Wakatsuki Reijiro - Financial Crisis Apr 1927 – Jul 1929 Military Tanaka Giichi General Emperor displeasure Jul 1929 – Apr 1931 Civilian Hamaguchi Osachi - Assassinated Apr 1931 – Dec 1931 Civilian Wakatsuki Reijiro - Manchurian Incident Dec 1931 – May 1932 Civilian Inukai Tsuyoshi - Assassinated

Sources: Jansen, Marius B. Prime Ministers, 1885-1912 in The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, p. 503; Gordon, Andrew. Appendix A, Prime Ministers of Japan, 1885-2001, in Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 333.

Table A3.5 The Japanese Governments during the Showa Era 1932-1945

GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT PRIME MINISTER RANK REASON PERIOD HEAD NAME TITLE OF THE FALL May 1932 – Jul 1934 Military Saito Makoto Admiral Corruption Jul 1934 – Mar 1935 Military Okada Keisuke Admiral Army Revolt Mar 1935 – Feb 1937 Civilian Hirota Koki - Army Demand Feb 1937 – Jun 1937 Military Hayashi Senjuro Army General Election Defeat Jun 1937 – Jan 1939 Civilian Konoe Fumimaro - China Issue Jan 1939 – Aug 1939 Civilian Hiranuma Kiichiro - Nazi-Soviet Pact Aug 1939 – Jan 1940 Military Abe Nobuyuki Army General Political Crisis Jan 1940 – Jul 1940 Military Yonai Mitsumasa Admiral Army Demand Jul 1940 – Oct 1941 Civilian Konoe Fumimaro - Foreign Policy Failure Oct 1941 – Jul 1944 Military Tojo Hideki Army General Fall of Saipan Jul 1944 - Apr 1945 Military Koiso Kuniaki Army General Okinawa Invaded Apr 1945 – Aug 1945 Military Suzuki Kantaro Admiral Surrender

Sources: Jansen, Marius B. Prime Ministers, 1885-1912 in The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, p. 591; Gordon, Andrew. Appendix A, Prime Ministers of Japan, 1885-2001, in Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 333.

661 Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, p. 245. 297

3.1.8 Economic System and Development

Before 1945, two main features characterized them: 1) the imitation of the German state-guided industrialization and 2) the militarist orientation.662 The development was based on the guiding role of the state, incorporation of Western knowledge and technology, and mercantilist policies.663 The economy aimed at establishing Japan as a strong, new rising power and hovered between the rigidly planned, state- run socialism and the laissez-faire economic liberalism.664 After 1945, three features mark the change: 1) the successful dealing with the WWII destruction, and famine and poverty of the 1950s, 2) the pursuit of the developmental state model and 3) the competitive character of the economy.665

3.2 Post-1945 Japan: A Consolidated Democracy

In 1952 Japan became a democracy and since then it has remained a strong democracy. During the 1960s and the 1970s it successfully passed a number of tests. Among the most important issues tested were the debates over the renewal of Security Treaty with the US, the revival of right wing terrorist acts and militarist tendencies, the suppression of dissent and the 1973 oil crisis.666 These issues tested Japan‘s democracy in its political, economic and social dimensions. Politically, it was challenged by the division between the left opposition and the right conservatives and the physical attacks by the right wing fanatics and the assassinations of left and right politicians. Socially, it was challenged by the demonstrations from

662 Gao, Bai. ―Arisawa Hiromichi and His Theory for a Managed Economy,‖ Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 20, Issue 1, Winter 1994, pp. 115–153. 663 Patrick, Hugh T. ―The Economic Muddle of the 1920s,‖ in James Morley (eds.), Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. 252–55. 664 Lockwood, William. The Economic Development of Japan, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968, pp. 64–77; Johnson, Chalmers. MITI and the Economic Miracle, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982, pp. 3-18. 665 Johnson, Chalmers. MITI and the Japanese Miracle, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982, pp. 3- 16, 245-246; Yuji Horioka, Charles. ―Consuming and Saving,‖ in Andrew Gordon (eds.), Postwar Japan as History, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993; Gordon, Andrew. Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2003, pp. 246-248, 315. 666 Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, pp. 718-719. 298 labor unions, students and university professors, peace and urban groups and the use of force by the state police.667 Economically, it was challenged by the 1973 oil crisis.

The tests reflected the rise of political consciousness among Japanese who were initiating rather than accepting the change. The success is attributed to five reasons. First, the political behavior of the elite changed from confrontation to accommodation. This was helped by the US encouragement of the ruling LDP to listen to non-communist political forces and establish of a dialogue with them. Second, the labor unions changed their stance toward the government from opposing it to bargaining with it. Labor unions retreated from aggressive demands and moderated the protests. This change was helped by the extension of social benefits to the middle class and stability. Third, the attention changed from politics to economics. The social forces focused on well-being, distribution and national income. Fourth, the attitudes changed from a tense to a relaxed one. This happened because the intellectuals, students and people read and traveled more. Fifth, government policies moved Japan from poverty to prosperity.668 It doubled the GNP in ten years, kept inflation and unemployment low, increased productivity and recovered fast after the 1973 oil crisis. This was helped by the new role of government, the Japanese management system, the corporate-centered character of Japanese society and the belief among the people that what was good for the company was good for the society.669 Sixth, Japan returned in the world politics as a peaceful state. This was helped by the treaties that Japan signed with Southeast Asian nations and the ability of Japan to contain during the 1970s-1980s the chronic tensions with Asia and West.670

667 Packard, George R. Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, pp. 5-35. 668 Dore, Ronald. Stock Market Capitalism, Welfare Capitalism: Japan and Germany versus the Anglo Saxons, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 225. 669 Lillrank, Paul., Kano, Noriaki. Continuous Improvement, Ann Arbor: Center for Japanese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1989, p. 1; Dale, Peter N. The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness, London, University of Oxford, 1986, pp. 16, 23, 65–67, 72–73, 189–90. 670 Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 2000, p. 709. 299

Appendix 4 Democratization, Military Occupation, Political Culture and Security in Japan

Figure A4.1 Democratization and Military Occupation: Goals, Policies and Commitment

DEMOCRATIZATION

GOALS POLICIES COMMITMENT

Democratic Number Constitution of Troops

Democratic Government Model Change of the Political Democratic Regime Political Institutions Duration of Democratic Occupation Political Culture

Demobilization

Demilitarization of Disarmament Germany

Security & Order Economic & Financial De-Indoctrination Resources

Transformation of Development of German Democratic Society Habits

Instillation of Pacifism

Deindustrialization Economic Transformation Reconstructing

State Bureaucracy and institutions Transformation of Governance Policy-Making Practices and Reforms

300

Figure A4.2 Democratization and Political Culture: Values and Beliefs, Behavior and Attitudes, Institutional Culture and Patterns, Civil Society, and Attitudes toward Change.

DEMOCRATIZATION

VALUES BEHAVIOR INSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL CIVIL ATTITUDE and and CULTURE PARTICIPATION SOCIETY TOWARD BELIEFS ATTITUDES and CHANGE PATERNS

Toward the on Others Character Channels Number Acceptance or Government of of of Civic Resistance by and Institutions Participation Organizations the Elites and Authority Predisposition the Population to Trust or Distrust

on Distribution Forms Public Sphere Orientation Rights and Exercise of of and toward and Rules Power and Authority Participation Public Debate Positive Change Liberties Processes Outcomes Institutions on Style Electorate Individual of Alignment Participation Participation Governing and in in Realignment Public Affairs Public Affairs

on Policy and Decision State Making and Practices Ideology

301

Figure A4.3 Democratization and Security Environment: National Interests, Foreign Policy, View of Sources of Security and Stability, and the Management of Neighborly Relations and Differences in Regime Type.

DEMOCRATIZATION

FAVORABLE ENVIRONMENT

NATIONAL FOREIGN MANAGEMENT VIEW OF SOURCES INTERESTS POLICY OF NEIGHBOR RELATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL AND REGIME DIFFERENCES SECURITY AND STABILITY

Pacifist Content Premises Pacifist Orientation and Shaping Relations and Orientation Pacifist with Neighbors Democratic Realism Drive and Basis of Analysis Character of Relations with with other Emphasis Asian states Peaceful Accommodation on Accommodation of interests Political and and and Economic Assistance Cooperation with Economic to Neighbors other states Issues

Orientation Reliance toward on Alliance Alliance with with the US the US

302

Appendix 5 A Comparative Assessment of Germany, Japan, Italy and South Korea

Table A5.1 A Summary of Similarities and Differences of Democratization in Germany and Japan

SIMILARITIES DIFFERENCES In terms of: between Germany and Japan between Germany and Japan

Similarities in 10 indicators: Differences in 8 indicators: 1. culture of power and authority 1. regime score and features Pre-1945 2. government at national and local levels 2. experience with democracy Regimes 3. political stability 3. constitution‘s origin and framework Features 4. political participation 4. state of rights and liberties 5. electoral system and politics 5. political participation 6. party system and politics 6. electoral system and politics 7. civil society 7. party system and politics 8. media 8. media 9. judiciary 10. economic system and development

Regime Similarities in 4 elements: Differences in 4 elements: Change 1. the polity score and the outcome of regime 1. the polity score and starting point of democratization change at the end of the occupation; at the beginning of the occupation; and 2. the length of transition under the occupation 2. the pace of change 3. the direction of change 3. the character of change Transition 4. the trend of change 4. the year of regaining sovereignty under Occupation

Similarities in 11 indicators: Differences in 3 indicators: 1. regime score and features 1. origin of constitution Post-1945 2. constitutional framework 2. type of state Regime 3. state of rights and liberties 3. model of economic development Features 4. culture of power and authority 5. government at national and local levels 6. political stability 7. electoral system and politics 8. party system and politics 9. civil society 10. media 11. judiciary

Similarities in 4 indicators: No Differences. Character 1. consolidated democratic regime of 2. time of testing democratization (1960s-1970s) Regime 3. areas of tests after 4. patterns of power and authority displayed the 5. political approach and attitude displayed Occupation 6. quality and effectiveness of the state, government, and governance;

303

Table A5.2 Detailed Similarities and Differences of Regimes Before and After 1945 in Germany and Japan

Indicators Pre-1945 Germany Pre-1945 Japan Similarities Power  centralized, acquired by struggle:  centralized, acquired by struggle: and  legitimated through Fuhrer  legitimated through Emperor: Authority  exercised without constraints  exercised without clearly defined rules  one-party government:  oligarchic and militarist government: Government  elitist governance and policy-making:  military controlled policy-making:  local government dysfunctional:  local government is absent. Stability  based on terror  fragile: Participation  massive, driven by Indoctrination  massive, driven by Nationalism: Elections and  elections controlled by the Nazi Party  elections controlled by the military elites: Party System  single-party system  party system centered around the military elite:  controlled by the Nazis  controlled by the military Civil Society  reflected Nazi ideology  reflected state needs  dependent financially  suppressed and co-opted by the government Media  not free, faced suppressive law  diverse but not totally free; faced suppressive law Judiciary  differs from the Weimar‘s judiciary  discriminatory Economy  state-driven, capitalist, militarist orientation  state-driven, capitalist, militarist Differences  in 1944, polity score -9:  in 1944, polity score +1: Regime Score  strong autocratic regime;  hybrid, anocratic, militarized regime;  imposed by the Great Powers after WWI  developed internally from Meiji to Taisho Democratic  experienced in Weimar Republic (1919-1933);  reflected the will resulting from the struggle between social, Experience  was never willingly embraced by Germans political, and economic forces; Constitutional  exogenous origin:  endogenous origin: Origin and  framework based on popular sovereignty:  framework based on imperial sovereignty Framework Rights and  violated systematically by the state  rights from Meiji and Taisho eras are not completely Liberties eradicated but some are limited or set under control.  parochial in character  a rich tradition: Participation  ideological-driven in behavior;  channeled through organizations; Election and  dysfunctional electoral system:  problematic but functioning electoral system: Party System  weak party system;  multiparty system Media  weak, underdeveloped, elitist  diverse and massive Indicators Post-1945 Germany Post-1945 Japan Similarities Regime Score  polity score of +10 points  polity score of +10 points  fully consolidated democratic regime;  fully consolidated democratic regime Constitution  democratic, based on popular sovereignty  democratic, based on popular sovereignty Rights and  guaranteed by Basic Law  Guaranteed by the new Constitution: Liberties  practiced in everyday life.  practiced in everyday life. Power and  acquired through competition and elections  acquired through elections and competition Authority  power is exercised by constraints  power is exercised by constraints  parliamentary, representative, federal;  parliamentary, representative government; Government  governance based on power sharing, broad  governance based on cooperation bureaucracy, ruling party, Model participation, effective policy-making and corporate executives,  functioning local government  functioning local government: Stability  reflects the legitimacy of the government  reflects the legitimacy of the government  helped by the US presence  helped by the US presence Participation  broad, massive, increased, intensified  massive, combines increase with decline; Election and  open, competitive election system  open, competitive election system: Party System  multiparty  multiparty Civil Society  large, diverse, active, democratic  large, diverse, active, democratic Media  democratic, diverse, plural  diverse, plural, democratic  no libel or harassment laws  no libel and harassment laws Judiciary  democratic, fair, accountable  democratic, fair  diversified, independent structure  independence Differences Constitution  a US-German product  written by US occupation authorities State Power  Federal, decentralized  unitary, centralized Economy  based on social market capitalism  based on developmental state

304

Table A5.3 Detailed Similarities and Differences in Change and Democratization of the Regime and Regime Character after the end of the occupation in Germany and Japan.

Element Germany Japan Displaying Differences Starting Point  starts from a polity score -9  starts from a polity score is +1 of  strong, authoritarian regime  anocratic, hybrid, militarist regime Democratization  destroys all Nazi institutions  retains previous democratic institutions Emperor and government bureaucracy; Character  radical character  major character of  polity score moved upward by +19 points, from -9  polity score moved upward by +9 points, from +1 Change (1944) to +10 (1949) (1944) to +10 (1952) Regained Sovereignty  1955  1952 Displaying Similarities Outcome of  Germany changed from a strong autocratic to a  Japan changed from a militarist to a full Regime Change democratic regime democratic regime Length of Official  long, 10 years  long, 8 years Occupation  started in 1945, ended in 1955;  started in 1945, ended in 1952 Direction  positive:  positive: of Change  polity score only improved and went upward;  polity score only improved and went upward;  linear:  linear Trend of Change  democratization occurs without bumps, or advances  democratization occurred without bumps, or and setbacks; advances and setbacks;

Transfer of power: Security:  tested in 1963, 1966, 1969, 1974:  renewal of US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960;  took place within the governing party leadership;  faced left-right division, demonstrations by labor  took place between the governing and opposition unions, students, university professors, peace and Tests parties; urban groups; of the Functioning of state and government:  accompanied by the use of force by police; Democratic  tested in the 1970s; Functioning of state and government: Character  leadership resignation (Adenauer 1963, Brandt  in the 1970s; of the 1974);  faced the economic crisis; Post-occupation  oil shock in 1972;  questioned government economic policies; Regime  economic reforms;  economic development threatened;

 political relations with East Germany Dealing with extremist groups: Dealing with extremist groups:  tested in the 1960s:  tested in the 1970s;  faced right wing terrorism;  faced the left and right terrorism, extremism;  faced the risk of the revival of pro war and militarist  faced the rise of neo-Nazi groups groups; Dealing with citizen movements: Dealing with civic dissent:  in the 1970s;  took place in the 1960s;  faced the rise of voices in favor of reforms, clean  faced social groups that sought the political change environment, nuclear energy, and peace; to come from below, not from above;

Power and authority: Power and authority:  institutional boundaries are set in the use of  reflects concerns about the quality and stability of political power; political system and relations;  state and police force are used without relapsing  keeps the conflict within democratic confines; Indicators into fascist methods; Political approach and attitude: of Political approach and attitude:  moves from confrontation to accommodation; Democratic  nonviolent ways and solutions are worked out;  relations among individuals and groups change from Character  decisions are made and implemented through tense to relaxed; of the institutional means;  relations between unions and government change Post-occupation  open public debate about democratic values and from opposing to bargaining; Regime practices State, government and governance: State, government, governance:  change from service of elites to people  all produce economic stability, growth, and  change focus from dealing with poverty to providing development; economic wellbeing and prosperity;  change from an aggressive to a peaceful state.

305

Table A5.4 Dynamics in Types, Change, Democratization and Post-occupation Character of Regimes in Italy

ELEMENTS ITALY

PERIOD Polity Score Regime Type

Dynamics 1928–1942  -9 points Fascist Regime  strong, consolidated autocracy; in

Polity Score  -77 Occupied country 1943–1945  collapse of central authority and  in North by Nazi Germany and internal war  in South by Allied Forces

Regime Type

1945–1947  -88 Occupied country  regime transition by occupation  governed by the Allied Forces

1948–2010  +10 points Democratic Regime  strong, consolidated democracy

Year Polity Score of the Regime Character of Pace

Pace 1942  - 9.00 points  starting polity score 1943  - 5.83 points  fast, moved upward by +3.17 points of 1944  - 2.65 points  fast, moved upward by +3.17 points

1945  + 0.50 points  fast, moved upward by +3.17 points Change 1946  + 3.70 points  fast, moved upward by +3.17 points 1947  + 6.85 points  fast, moved upward by +3.17 points 1948  +10.00 points  fast, moved upward by +3.17 points

Character Period / Year Polity Score of the Regime Character of Change of Change 1942  -9 points  from a Fascist regime 1948  +10 points  to a democratic regime 1942-1948  moved upward by +19 points  radical change

Change in Polity Score Change in Regime Type Character of Direction Direction of  moved from a negative toward  moved from non-democratic  positive Change a positive polity score toward democratic regime

Dynamics of Change Character of Trend Trend Character of Regime from a Non-democratic of to a Democratic regime Change  changed from a Fascist to a  no setbacks  linear democratic  no ups and downs

306

Table A5.5 Dynamics of Types, Change, Democratization and Post-Occupation Regimes in South Korea

ELEMENTS SOUTH KOREA

Period Polity Score Regime Type

Dynamics 1945 - 1948 +1 point anocratic, weak democracy, occupied by the US troops; 1949 - 1951 –3 points anocratic, weak autocracy in 1952 - 1958 -4 points anocratic, weak autocracy 1959 - 1960 +8 points democratic, strong democracy Polity 1961 - 1962 -7 points autocratic, strong autocracy Score 1963 - 1971 +3 points anocratic, weak democracy 1972 - 1972 -9 points autocratic, strong autocracy and 1973 - 1980 -8 points autocratic, strong autocracy

1981 - 1986 -5 points anocratic, weak autocracy Regime Type 1987 - 1987 +1 point -88, internal transition, new constitution, anocratic, weak democracy 1988 - 1997 +6 points democratic, strong democracy 1998 - 2008 +8 points democratic, strong democracy 2009 - 2011 +10 points democratic, consolidated democracy

Year Change of in From To The Change Polity Score Number 1948 - 1949 -4 points a weak democracy a weak autocracy of 1958 - 1959 +12 points a weak autocracy a strong democracy 1960 - 1961 -15 points a strong democracy a strong autocracy Regime 1962 - 1963 +10 points a strong autocracy a weak democracy Changes 1971 - 1972 –12 points a weak democracy a strong democracy 1980 - 1981 +3 points a strong autocracy a weak autocracy

1986 - 1987 +6 points a weak autocracy a weak democracy

1987 - 1988 +5 points a weak democracy a strong democracy

2000 - 2009 +4 points a strong democracy a consolidated democracy

Pace Fast Pace Slow Pace Stagnant Periods 1958 – 1959 1948 – 1949 1951 – 1952 of Corresponding 1960 – 1961 1971 – 1972 1972 – 1973 Periods 1962 – 1963 1986 – 1987 Changes 1987 – 1988 1997 – 1998 2008 – 2009

Character Major Changes Minor Changes Stagnant Periods 1958 – 1959 1948 – 1949 1951 – 1952 of Corresponding 1960 – 1961 1980 – 1981 1972 – 1973 Periods 1962 – 1963 1986 – 1987 Changes 1917 – 1972 1997 – 1998 1987 – 1988 2008 – 2009

Changes with a Positive Direction Changes with a Negative Direction 1958 – 1959 1948 – 1949 Direction 1962 – 1963 1951 – 1952 of 1972 – 1973 1960 – 1961 Changes Corresponding 1980 – 1981 1971 – 1972 Periods 1986 – 1987 1987 – 1988 1997 – 1998 2008 – 2009

Overall Trend Democratization through A Path of Zig-Zags, Ups and Downs of Change  9 regime changes preceded the democratization of democracy.

307

Table A5.6 A Summary of Similarities and Differences of the Occupation in Germany and Japan.

SIMILARITIES DIFFERENCES Elements between Germany and Japan between Germany and Japan Engineer: Engineer: Occupation  regime democratization  a radical change in Germany, Task  a major change in Japan; Goals: Documents stating goals:  articulated goals  only 1 document states goals on both countries; Goals  pursued goals  goals for each country individually are stated in 13  content of goals documents; Areas covered by policies: Governance and administration of policies:  political  direct in Germany,  social  indirect in Japan;  economic  security The attitudes shown by the elites:  governance  In Germany, positive, embracing the changes Continuity in some policies: undertaken by occupation authorities in political,  in political area economic, social, security, and governance areas;  in governance area  In Japan, negative, resistant to the changes

Modification in 1947 of some policies pursued undertaken by the occupation in political,

during 1945-1947: economic, and social areas;

 in Social area

 in Economic area

 in Security area Policies Policy Actions:  in political area  in social area  in economic area  in security area Policies that had a Negative influence:  deindustrialization,  non-fraternization Policies that had a Positively influence:  demobilization  disarmament  democratic change of constitution, government, political institutions, political culture  decentralization  control of communist influence  economic restructuring Attitude of the occupied population toward the occupation actions:  politically, economically; socially Sufficient number of troops: Official duration of occupation:  in the beginning of the occupation 1  in Germany, 11 years soldier for 40-177 people;  in Japan, 8 years  in the end of the occupation 1 soldier for Composition of the military administration: 406-478 people;  In Germany, consisted of military and civilian Forms of military commitment: experts;  military occupation  In Japan, consisted mostly of military and Commitment  military presence language experts Level of committed resources in:  political area;  social area  economic area  security domestic and external;  military development; Positive effects of:  number of troops,  military presence  resources engaged (human, material, and economic) Negative effects of:  none

308

Table A5.7 Detailed Similarities and Differences of the Occupation Goals in Germany and Japan.

Elements Germany Japan Displaying Similarities

Five General Goals Five General Goals Goals 1. Change of the Political Regime in Germany 1. Change of the Political Regime in Japan Articulated 2. Demilitarization of Germany, 2. Demilitarization of Germany 3. Transformation of the German Society 3. Transformation of the Japanese society 4. Transformation of the German Economy 4. Transformation of the German Economy 5. Transformation of the German Governance 5. Transformation of the Japanese governance

Until 1947 Until 1947 1. Demilitarization 1. Demilitarization Goals 2. Transformation of the German Society 2. Transformation of the Japanese society Pursued 3. Change of the Political Regime 3. Transformation of the Japanese economy 4. Transformation of the German economy 4. Transformation of the Japanese Governance

After 1947 After 1947 1. Change of the Political Regime 1. Change of the Political Regime 2. Transformation of the German Economy 2. Transformation of the Japanese Economy

Aiming to: Aiming to:  disarm and demobilize German military  disarm, dissolve imperial Japanese army and navy, The forces,  demobilize Japanese military, Content  confiscate military equipment,  root out the influence of the military, of  demolish fortifications,  make sure that Japan will not become again a the Goal  establish control over military installations, menace to the US, of  stop arms production.  create a Japanese state that is peaceful, Demilitarization  capture war criminals, detain generals, responsible, respectful of the rights of other states officers, SS members, screen all prisoners and permanently demilitarized. before their release;  secure military records,  destroy Nazi military organizations of SA, Nazi Motor Corps, National Labor Service;

Aiming to: Aiming to:  ban uniforms, emblems, medals, decorations,  hold accountable and put in trial all war criminals, weapons, ammunition, explosives, maintain of  rewrite or abrogate non-democratic laws, The military sites and traditions, glorification of  disband all oppressive institutions, Content war, military schools, clubs, associations,  purge all individuals associated with militarist of memorials, monuments, posters, placards, mindset. the Goal statutes, schools and libraries,  root out racism, of the  cleanse publishing houses, research Transformation institutions, libraries of books advocating of violence, military training, and war ideas. Society  repudiate nationalism, develop the notion of a ―post-national‖ nation,  ban and dissolve Nazi party organizations, purge, remove Nazis from public posts, punish Nazi high-level functionaries and war criminals.

In terms of new constitutional framework: In terms of new constitutional framework:  create the Federal Republic combining  revive democratic tradition and practices, German constitutional traditions with Western  guarantee rights, liberties, freedoms of expression, models; assembly, speech, gender equality  revive positive elements of Weimar; The  guarantee rights and liberties, stable In terms of new model of government: Content government  transform imperial institution from a divine to a of popular sovereign, the Goal In terms of new model of government:  redefine power relations between the emperor, the of  representative institutions, Diet, and the Prime Minister Transformation  redefine, divide, balance, democratize power  restructure the Diet from unicameral to bicameral of relations horizontally and vertically between  create democratic political institutions, system and Political Regime the legislative, executive, judiciary, president; parties; 309

 support to all democratic parties, groups, individuals In terms of new political culture:  policy-making efficiency, ability to stand and  root out racism, function even in time of crisis, and self-  instill democratic values and behavior governing

In terms of new political culture  root out authoritarian values,  instill democratic values and behavior;  develop democratic media and society

Until 1947, aiming to: Until 1947, aiming to:  dismantle, decartelize, break up and prohibit  de-concentrate, breakup zaibatsu; trusts, cartels, syndicates and large companies;  purge pre-war economic policy-makers;  prosecute economic policy makers and  dissolve old economic institutions; The prominent industrialists,  pass new legislation; Content  place limits and restrictions on industrial  turn Japan into an agricultural country; of production  make land reform; the Goal  make pay reparations,  stabilize but not rehabilitate economy; of  reduce Germany to an agriculture state  compel payment of reparations; Transformation  reduce production; of After 1947, aiming to: the Economy  stop extensive deindustrialization After 1947, aiming to:  stop reduction of living standards,  stop de-concentration and deindustrialization;  push for economic recovery  start recovery, rehabilitation, reconstruction  start structural transformation,  give priority to production  restore free market economy,  make the economy self-sufficient but not  resume exports; amenable to military orientation,  expand production,  diminish pressures on zaibatsu,  reintroduce new currency  allow bank-centered capitalism bureaucratic  set new price mechanism guidance of the economy  effected improvement of living standards;  open Japan to world trade, markets and financial institutions;

The Aiming to Aiming to: Content  democratic, federal, decentralized governance  democratization of self-government of the  making it reflective of people‘s will Goal of  freeing it from military state bureaucracy, Transformation  making it undertake reforms in education, labor, of and agriculture. Governance Displaying Differences

Expressed in 10 Main Documents Expressed in 5 Main Documents 1. 1941 Atlantic Charter 1. 1945 The US Initial Post-surrender Policy 2. 1943 Teheran Conference Relating to Japan Defining 3. 1944 Morgenthau Memorandum 2. 1945 Potsdam Declaration Documents 4. 1945 Yalta Conference 3. 1945 James F. Byrnes Notes to the Conditions of 5. 1945 Directive JCS 1067 Japan surrender 6. 1945 Potsdam Declaration 4. 1945 Directive JCS 1380/15 7. 1946 James F. Byrnes speech 5. 1946 SCAP Directives 8. 1947 Directive JCS 1779 9. 1949 Occupation Statute of Germany 10. 1949 Petersberg Agreement

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Table A5.8 Detailed Similarities and Differences of Occupation Policies in Germany and Japan

Elements Germany Japan Similarities In political area, policies oriented to: In political area, policies oriented to:  eliminate Nazi order and shape the new German  put together a new, democratic constitution; constitutional order along the Western models;  dismantle authoritarian institutions;  create the Federal Republic;  create new democratic government, institutions,  guarantee rights and liberties; and political system;  create democratic government and political  revive democratic tradition and practices; institutions;  guarantee rights, liberties, and freedoms;  guarantee the stability of government;  reinforce American ideals of freedom, In social area, policies oriented to: In social area, policies oriented to:  root out authoritarian values;  root out Japanese racism and feelings of  reconstruct social and cultural fabric of Germany; superiority;

 instill democratic values, behavior, attitude,  cleanse society from ideologies of extreme right Areas political culture; and left; Covered  develop democratic media and civil society;  educate people with new democratic political

In economic area, policies oriented to: culture, values and behavior;  demilitarize the economy;  support anticommunist forces and keep Japanese  dismantle monopolies; society out of Communist influence;  encourage free competition; In economic area, policies oriented to:  create a free-market capitalist economy;  divest the economy of militarist orientation; In security area, policies oriented to:  dismantle cartels and zaibatsu;  cleanse Germany from Nazi elements;  create a capitalist, self-sufficient economy;  protect new Germany from communist threat;  integrate economy to the world economy;  keep domestic order; In security area, policies oriented to:  create favorable condition for functioning of  guarantee a normal working environment for the government; government and the occupation administration; In governance area, policies oriented to:  control the protests and keep stability;  eliminate Nazi practices, influence, and officials  intervene if security objectives are threatened; from all levels of governance; In governance area, policies oriented to:  establish a democratic government and practices;  free government from militarist bureaucracy;  decentralize governance;  make governance reflect people‘s will; Stage 1, 1945-1947, policies are oriented toward: Stage 1, 1945-1947, policies are oriented toward:  demilitarization of Germany;  demilitarization of Japan; Modification  transformation of the German economy;  transformation of the Japanese economy; of  change of the political regime  change of the political regime Policy Stage 2, 1947-1955, policies are oriented toward: Stage 2, after 1947-1952, policies are oriented Drive  Transformation of the German Economy toward:  Completion of the change of Political Regime;  Transformation of the Japanese economy;  Completion of the Change of the Political Regime; Policies pursued in political area: Policies pursued in political area:  rooting out the vestiges of the Nazi regime;  dismantling the old Meiji state through moderate  creating new democratic institutions and political transformation from above and undertaking a Policies system, radical revolution from below; that were  democratizing the society and the political culture;  demilitarizing state and society characterized Policies pursued in governance area:  democratizing institutions and governance by Continuity  undertaking of reforms and reform policies; Policies pursued in governance area:  direct administration and implementation of  undertaking reforms and reform policies; policies and reforms by the occupation forces and  indirect administration and implementation of authorities; policies through close cooperation between the CSAP and Japanese government; Modification in Economic Area. The policy: Modification in Economic Area. The policy:  changed from pursuing deindustrialization to  changed from pursuing de-concentration, breaking encouraging reconstruction, growth, stability; up of zaibatsu, non-rehabilitation toward Policies  faced criticism and concerns from the Germans rehabilitation, reconstruction, transformation of that were and from US policy-makers as well about the zaibatsu; characterized by occupation costs;  faced worries by US policy-makers about the Modifications Modification in Social Area. The policy: occupation costs;  changed from non-fraternization to fraternization, Modification in Social Area. The policy:  changed from non-socialization to curiosity,  changed from non-fraternization to friendship; tolerance, friendship ,and mutual activities;  changed from encouraging unions to keeping Modification in Security Area. The policy: Communist-influenced unions under control;  changed in its demilitarization orientation from Modification in Security Area. The policy: complete demilitarization to stopping  changed from purges and punishment of war demilitarization, rearmament and integration of criminals and the prosecution, arrest, trial, and

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Germany into NATO, punishment of all war criminals, right-wing,  changed the denazification process from a total conservative elements to dropping charges against purge and punishment of Nazi and war criminals right wing elements, releasing them from prison, by occupation authorities to transferring the relying upon them and using them on the battle process into the hands of German review boards, against Communism; making a general amnesty for young people born  faced the rise of Communist threat; after 1919 and rehiring Nazi followers; Toward creation of new constitutional order: Toward creating new constitutional order:  worked with new postwar German leaders to write  relying on the Charter Oath, SCAP wrote the new the Basic Law, the new democratic constitution; Constitution; Toward building democratic institutions: Toward building democratic institutions:  created a democratic structure of power and  retained the Emperor as symbol of Japanese state authority by redefining power relations and people, but moved beyond imperial divinity horizontally and vertically by dividing and and sovereignty toward the popular sovereignty; balancing power between the legislative,  redefined power relations between the emperor, executive, judiciary, president, Federal and Lander the Diet, and the Prime Minister; Policy Actions governments;  empowered the Diet by making it bicameral, that Reflected Toward political rights and civil liberties: directly elected, with the Lower House selecting the Goal of  re-established them the prime minister. the Change of  helped recognition of new rights and liberties  eliminated the ultraconservatives influence, Political Regime Toward creating a democratic electoral and party  Prime Minister and cabinet members were to be system: civilians only  encouraged creation of both of them Toward rights and liberties:  gave full support to all democratic parties, groups,  released political prisoners and guaranteed free individuals; speech, press, assembly, religion, and unionization;  extended rights into the social realm;  outlawed censorship, prostitution Toward creating a democratic electoral and party system:  established universal suffrage,  stopped the emergence and candidacy of prewar politicians.  supported free and democratic parties and elections Toward denazification of German society: Toward deindoctrination of Japanese society:  banned uniforms, emblems, medals, decorations,  rooted out social and political racism; weapons, ammunition, explosives, maintain of  purged old elites and supported the rise of new military sites and traditions, glorification of war, leadership and liberal forces; military schools, clubs, associations, memorials,  eradicated militarist ideas, censured any militarist Policy Actions monuments, posters, placards, statutes; idea or symbol and instilled antiwar conscience; that Reflected  cleansed schools, libraries, publishing houses,  worked to create social stability; the Goals of research institutions, books from ideas advocating  strengthened gender equality; Transformation violence, military training, war;  worked to democratize and reform the education of Society  repudiated nationalism, developed a sense of system; and ―post-national‖ nation;  undertook social reforms; Governance  banned and dissolved Nazi party organizations,  infused western social standards along keeping the purged Nazis from public posts, punished high- best Japanese tradition; level Nazi functionaries and war criminals and reformed education system; Initially, until 1948, deindustrialization: Initially, until 1948, deindustrialization  dismantled, decartelized, broke up trusts, large  de-concentrated, broke-up zaibatsu; companies, cartels and syndicates;  reduced production;  reduced and placed limits on production;  stabilized but not rehabilitated the economy;  prohibited monopolies;  passed new legislation; Policy Actions  demanded payment of reparations;  dissolved old economic agencies; that Reflected Later, after 1948, reconstruction and revival  purged prewar economic policy-makers; the Goal of  stopped extensive deindustrialization and reduction Later, after 1948, reconstruction and revival Transformation of living standards,  stopped de-concentration, deindustrialization, of Economy  initiated structural transformation;  gave priority to recovery, rehabilitation,  pushed for economic recovery; reconstruction, production, stabilization and self-  expanded production, allowed exports; sufficiency;  reintroduced new currency  diminished pressures on zaibatsu,  established new price mechanism;  allowed bank-centered capitalism and bureaucratic guidance of the economy; Toward disarmament and demilitarization: Toward disarmament and demilitarization:  disarmed, demobilized military forces;  repatriated Japanese soldiers;  confiscated and demolished military equipment  disarmed, demobilized Japanese military;

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Policy Actions and fortifications;  dissolved Army, Navy, Special Higher Police; that Reflected  established control over military installations;  destroyed military equipments; the Goal of  stopped production of arms;  worked to create a peaceful, responsible, Demilitarization Toward preservation of the public order: respectful, permanently demilitarized state; and  captured, detained, punished war criminals, Toward the preservation of the public order: Security generals, officers, SS members;  purged, tried, convicted the military and war  screened all prisoners before their release; criminals;  destroyed Nazi military organizations of SA, Nazi  restructured the police force; Motor Corps, National Labor Service, Todt  integrated former military forces into new Organization; structures, services, institutional structures; Deindustrialization (Economic Area) Deindustrialization (Economic Area) Policies  blocked production,  caused poverty that had a  stimulated unemployment  impeded economic recovery Negative  undermined rehabilitation, growth; Influence Non-fraternization (Social Area)  undermined socialization and spread of democratic habits and values; Democratizing institutions (Political Area) Retantion of Emperor (Political Area)  created democratic practices  led to faster embrace of democratic values and  consolidated democratic character of the practices Policies government, institutions;  helped consolidate democracy; that had a Democratizing culture (Social Area), Control of Communist influence (Social Area) positive  led to the embrace of democratic habits and  contained the spread of support for communist Influence practices; party and forces; Restructuring (Economic Area) Restructuring (Economic Area)  led to economic recovery and growth  improved living standards,  improved living standards.  helped social and political stability; Demilitarization, disarmament (Security)  led to top-level industrial policy making;  from physical become mentally absorbed;  oriented economy to exports  created anti-militarist, anti-armament culture; Demilitarization, disarmament (Security)  led to renunciation of radical nationalism and non-  created a pacifist, anti-militarist culture; toleration of Nazi ideology; The Germans cooperated with occupation: Emperor Hirohito and masses cooperated with  Politically, in building democratic political occupation: institutions;  Politically, in having new constitution, embracing Attitude  Economically, in restructuring the economy, and willingly participated in implementing changes Expressed embracing and practicing economic freedom and and reforms, abandoning militarist mindset, by competition, creating a social market, capitalist, reforms. Population economy, combining the economic benefits with  Socially, in embracing new modern social and social justice, and restoring economic relations political habits and institutions, denouncing the with foreign partners, past;  Socially, in moving toward embracing and practicing the new democratic values; Differences OMGUS enjoyed freedom in policy-making and SCAP served as a super-government but governed directly: governed indirectly: Governance  destroyed all Nazi institutional structure  did not abolish government of Japan but left and  created new structures of governance and military civilian bureaucracy, except for the Home Ministry Administration administration; and the Military, relatively untouched; of  designed, advanced, implemented, determined the  implemented directives and reforms in close Policies efficiency of all policies; cooperation with Japanese government;  designed policies, made decisions, instructed changes, avoided the Japanese as much as it could, guided the reforms; New German elite embraced the change: The Japanese elites resisted the change:  German elites, like the German people embraced  Politically, did not accept the defeat, resisted the and furthered the democratic change imposed by changes initiated by occupation forces, doubted the The Allied Forces; combination of imperial tradition with democratic Attitude government; Expressed  Economically, followed Allied policies but also by criticized them, resisted planned economy, looked the Elites to place Japan in the world economy, and oriented economy toward export manufacturing, scientific management, and foreign investments;  Socially, were reluctant to move away from conformism, old values, nationalism to new culture of debate, western values, and peaceful attitude;

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Table A5.9 Detailed Similarities and Differences of the Occupation Commitment in Germany and Japan

Elements Germany Japan Displaying Similarities Number Sufficient during 1945-1949: Sufficient during 1945-1952, though smaller: of  1 soldier for every 40 to 406 people,  1 soldier for every 177 to 478 people Troops  below the threshold 1 soldier to 500 people;  below the threshold 1 soldier to 500 people; Military Occupation: Military Occupation:  started on May 1945;  started on August 1945, Forms  ended on May 1955, when West Germany was  ended in 1952, when Japan was newly recognized as of newly recognized as sovereign country; sovereign country; Military Military Presence: Military Presence: Stay  continued after 1955 through more than fifty  continued after 1952 through military bases in military bases spread across Germany, and it lasted Okinawa, Yokohama and lasted more than a decade; more than a decade; Covered main areas of activity for: Covered main areas of activity for:  political changes  political changes  economic policies  economic policies  social issues  social issues  security issues  security issues Level Until 1947 reflected commitment mostly to: Until 1947 reflected commitment to: of  security (domestic security and order);  democratization (develop institutions, enable people to Resources  democratization (set democratic institution); enjoy rights, freedoms, participate, break and alter Committed  economy (guarantee physical survival, food aid) authoritarian, elite structure);

After 1947 expanded commitment to:  de-indoctrination (keep public sphere clear of left or  economic area (recovery, reconstruction; right extremist ideas, militarism, ultra-nationalism;  area of external security (contain Soviet threat); After 1947 expanded commitment in:  economic area (overcome poverty, rebuild infrastructure, promote markets);  security area (keep order);

Positive Effects: Positive Effects: Number of troops and military occupation: Number of troops and military occupation:  kept internal stability;  helped new government keep internal stability; Effects  helped population psychologically deal with the of fear generated by the communist threat; Human, material, and financial resources: Commitment Human, material, and financial resources:  paved the way for economic growth and prosperity;  helped Germany recover, grow and prosper; Negative Effects Negative Effects Duration of military presence Duration of military presence  raised fears for another military confrontation or war;  raised fears for another military confrontation or  was opposed by various pacifist groups; war;  was opposed by various pacifist groups; Displaying Differences

Official 11 years (1945-1955) 8 years (1945-1952) Duration of  lasted until May 5, 1955, when the General Treaty  lasted until April 8, 1952, when the San Francisco Occupation entered in force; Peace Treaty entered in force;

Composition Military and civilian administrators: Mostly military administrators: of  were experienced specialists in security and  security specialists; the Military civilian affairs;  interpreters that connected SCAP with Japanese Administration  engaged in administration of policies; government bureaucrats and officials;

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Table A5.10 A Summary of Similarities and Differences in Political Culture, Germany and Japan

SIMILARITIES DIFFERENCES Elements between Germany and Japan between Germany and Japan Values and beliefs on: Political participation in terms of:  government and authority  party and election systems  liberty, equality, civic duty, responsibility,  political activity

 electoral support and alignment  participation in politics and social life Behavior and attitudes in terms of:

 approach toward individual, groups, government  predisposition, trust/distrust, conflict/ccoperate  rules, processes, outcomes, institution Pre-1945 Civil society in terms of: Political  relations with the state Culture  diversity, independence, development  driving mindset Institutional culture in terms of:  authority and decision-making  distribution of power  representativeness  governance and policy-making Attitude toward change:  among elites and population Values and beliefs on: Attitude toward change  government and authority  among elites  liberty, equality, civic duty, responsibility,

 participation in politics and social life Behavior and attitudes in terms of:  approach toward individual, groups, government)  predisposition, trust/distrust, conflict/cooperate  rules, processes, outcomes, institutions Post-1945 Political participation in terms of: Political  party and election systems Culture  political activity, electoral support and alignment Civil society in terms of:  relations with the state  diversity, independence, development  driving mindset Institutional culture in terms of:  authority and decision-making  distribution of power  representativeness  governance and policy-making Attitude toward change  among population Intervened to effect change in terms of: Allied  values and beliefs, behavior and attitudes Actions  election and party system, civil society  institutional development Changed their political culture in terms of: Actions of  values and beliefs, behavior and attitudes; Elite and  election and party system, civil society; Population  institutional development; Sources of democratic political culture: Sources of non-democratic political culture:  the shift in all the elements of political culture was  in Germany, was influenced by exogenous and initiated by the Allied Powers but it was embraced and endogenous factors such as international

advanced further by the population; economic crisis, authoritarian tradition; Dynamics Countries were characterized by the shift: of  in Japan, was influenced by endogenous factors such  from an authoritarian toward a fully democratic political Change as the military and the rise of nationalism; culture; The attitude of elites toward the change differs  In Germany, both the elite and the population embraced the change;  In Japan, only the Emperor and people embraced the change; the old elites resisted it; after the purge of the old elites, the new elites fearing of being left out of power and decision-making joined the change;

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Table A5.11 Detailed Similarities and Differences in Pre-1945 Political Culture Germany and Japan.

Indicators Germany Japan Displaying Similarities

On authority and government: On authority and government:  blind and unconditional obedience, support, and  blind and unconditional obedience, devotion, and devotion to the Fuhrer; loyalty to the Emperor;  submission to the central authority,  submission to the central authority, control, censure, Values  authoritarianism restrictions, manipulation, suppression, indoctrination, and On individual liberties and freedoms: nationalism, militarism Beliefs  priority of the group and nation over individual  authoritarian; liberty; On individual liberties and freedoms:  collective discipline,  priority to the hierarchy, social harmony, duty,  racial superiority obligation, harmony duty-emotions, good morals and On civic duty, individual responsibility: manners, proper place, piety, diligence, respect for  hierarchical loyalty: local elites-Nazi Party-Fyrher; elders;  discrimination and ideological indoctrination  racial superiority On participation in politics and social life: On Civic duty, individual responsibility:  passivity over activism,  hierarchical loyalty: family-community-elites-nation- Emperor; On participation in politics and social life:  non-participation, resignation, conformism, herd-like mentality, rebellion, anarchy;

Elites and population: Elites and population:  display the same patterns toward others  display the same patterns with slight differences toward (individuals, groups, government), of others (individuals, groups, government), of predisposition (trust cooperation or distrust, predisposition (trust cooperation or distrust, conflict), conflict), and toward rules, processes and and toward rules, processes and institutions (respect or institutions (respect or not); not); Show toward others: Show toward others:  intolerance to others and to diversity; Elites  hatred and anti-Semitist racism;  intolerance, brutality, nationalist racism, power-driven Behavior Predisposition reflects: aggressiveness; and  aggressiveness; Population Attitudes  conflict-prone attitudes;  imitation of and submission to elites;  obedience to authority;  attachment, trust, and loyalty to home, family, Rules, processes, outcomes, institution show Emperor;  obedience, trust, and submission to authority;  emotionality, self-dramatization, self-destruction,  violence and political intimidation; strong sense of responsibility;  ideological indoctrination; Predisposition reflects: Elites  trust and loyalty to the Emperor only;  local and personal loyalty;  factionalism, distrust, and lack of cooperation; Population  tolerance, individual sacrifice, herd-mentality, obedience, affection, harmony, charity, diligence,  inferiority, credulousness, superstition; Rules, processes, outcomes, institution show: Elites  compromising among themselves,  enforcement toward masses;  politics and governance is a domain of elites; Population  view authority as legitimate and support it unconditionally  view politics and government as an elite way to exploit masses.  misrepresenting, regimented, inflexible way of thinking

In terms of relations with the state In terms of relations with the state:  identical with state ideology;  in the 1920s, identical with the goals of the militarist Civil In terms of diversity and development: elite and state; Society  no diversity  silent toward state actions;

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 limited to pro-Nazi groups and organizations In terms of diversity and development:  supported by Nazi state  few in number, underdeveloped, factionalized; In terms of driving mindset: In terms of driving mindset:  driven by Nazi ideology, exclusion of others,  reflected and responded to elite interests, the ruling militarist spirit and authoritarian mindset; elite and the wishes of the Emperor;

In terms of authority and decision-making: In terms of authority and decision-making:  centered on the Leader/Fuhrer;  centered on the Emperor;  excluding character, limited to the Fuhrer only;  excluding character, limited to the Emperor and the  authoritarian and hierarchical decision-making Genro (the founding fathers); style;  authoritarian and hierarchical decision-making style; In terms of distribution of power: In terms of distribution of power:  centralization of power;  culture of power centralization; Institutional  power exercise was a function of nationalism and  military and civilian elites compete; Culture militarism;  linked to nation-building, nationalism, militarism; and In terms of political representativeness: In terms of political representativeness: Patterns  skewed representation;  limited representative character; In terms of drive behind governance and policy- In terms of drive behind governance and policy making: making:  nationalism, militarist orientation;  indoctrination and warlike orientation;  domination of militarist circles;  wishful thinking rather than rationality;  superiority of Japanese race;  domination of militarist circles;  control over bureaucracy and propaganda;

Among the elites characterized by: Among the elites characterized by:  viewed the change as a function of nationalist  viewed change as a function of purposes, coming from agenda; the elites  during 1918-1930s, followed the conditions  embraced it when initiated by themselves, and resisted Attitude imposed by international community, accepted it when was demanded from below; toward change in the positive direction of democratic  during Early Meiji and Taisho periods, embraced the Change Weimar republic; change in the positive direction of nation-building;  during 1930-1944 associated itself with the change  during 1930s-1940s, embraced the change to the to the negative direction of nationalist, aggressive, negative direction of militarism and aggression; authoritarian state, society and politics;  negative direction and continuing onward; Among the population characterized by:  viewed the change linked to the upper classes Among the population characterized by:  followed and embraced the change initiated and  viewed the change linked to the upper classes rather carried out by the elites; than to themselves;

Displaying Differences

Party system and elections reflected: Party system and elections reflected:  changing from a multiparty, fragmented one to one  increasingly controlled by the military elite but still dominated by the Nazi party; characterized by competition among parties; Political  voting and election results controlled by the Nazi  during 1930s-1940s suppressed by arrests, dissolution Participation party; of parties, faked elections; Political activity reflected: Political activity reflected:  anti-Nazi activities are suppressed;  allowed, though limited to elites only and few  no alternative channels of participation are population segments; allowed;  individuals are allowed to participate and express  only pro-Nazi activities are allowed; themselves in various parties, groups, organizations,  characterized by violence against anti-Nazi voices; media outlets; Electoral support and alignment reflected:  characterized by both peaceful and violent forms;  dominated by the Nazi party; Electoral support and alignment reflected:  reflects social, cultural, class, and religious  spread between parties but during 1930s-1940s leans cleavages; toward militarist circles;

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Table A5.12 Detailed Similarities and Differences in Post-1945 Political Culture, Germany and Japan

Indicators Germany Japan Displaying Similarities

Influenced values and beliefs through: Influenced values and beliefs through:  physical presence, personal encounters, American  propagating American ideas on the relations state- art, pop culture, educational and cultural individual, liberties and freedom, and property rights exchanges;  spreading American art, pop culture and the education  ideas on relations state-individual, freedom; system;  attention to German religious institutions; Influenced behavior and attitudes through Influenced behavior and attitudes through:  changing the approach from aloofness and selectiveness to  changing the approach from pursuing punitive constructing healthy relations and cooperation with the actions (collective guilt charges, reeducation) to Emperor, government and bureaucratic administration; inviting Germans to cooperate, listening and Rebuilt the election and party system through: deferring to their suggestions, and conveying  helped creation of democratic parties; American culture, values and ideas;  supported the rise of new democratic political elites; Allied Rebuilt the election and party System through: Helped the revival of the civil society through: Actions  creation of democratic parties;  cleansing the public sphere from militarist mindset and  providing support for the rise of new democratic ideas; political elites;  making present US ideas, values, mindset, practices, and Helped revival of the civil society through: culture;  cleansing the public sphere, organizations, and Helped a new institutional culture through: media from Nazi ideas, practices and culture;  restructuring power system along democratic practices;  helping the reemergence of new democratic oriented organization, media and public debate;  instilling Western ideas, values, practices, mindset, culture and establishing informal and formal networks of bilateral organizations,  allowing Germans to become a part of American lifestyle in military bases; Helped new institutional culture through:  structuring a democratic power sharing system;  pressing for democratic practices;

In terms of values and beliefs: In terms of values and beliefs:  embraced Western values,  moved to and embraced democratic values and belief of  created space for advancement of youth, criticism off the government, individual liberty and  listened to progressive intellectuals, practical equality, civic duty, and active citizenship; businessmen, democratic voices; In Terms of behavior and attitudes:  integrated working class into the new system,  moved to and embraced pacifism and pacifist behavior,  excluded extremist groups from participation in spirit of cooperation and trust, accommodation, stronger democratic processes social and political conscience; In Terms of behavior and attitudes: In terms of election and party system:  changed from viewing the Allied with fear to  supported the political parties created by the right and the admiring them, increasing contacts, commerce, left; cooperation, tourist exchanges with West,  moved to hold regular, free, fair elections following the US values, attitudes, as a model; In terms of civil society: Elite  appreciated individual rights and freedom, joined  created and activated their own civic groups and and new parties, actively participated; organization, revived their own public sphere; Population  trusted in government not individual leaders. In terms of institutional culture: Actions  abandoned nationalism and embraced democracy  managed problems, issues, decision-making, and crisis as the preferred form of government; without retorting to authoritarian methods and attitudes. In terms of election and party system: In terms of attitude toward change:  created their own political parties  moved from some resistance, reluctance to embrace of  developed their political preferences democratic dynamics, developments and change; In terms of civil society:  created their own civil society, public sphere.  revived it along the ―American way of life‖ In terms of institutional culture:  managed problems, issues, decision-making, and crisis without retorting to authoritarian methods and attitudes. In terms of attitude toward change:  moved from some resistance, reluctance to embracement of democratic change;

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On authority and government: On authority and government:  changed from showing unconditional obedience to  changed their loyalty from the emperor, nationalism, and becoming critical toward the government; military power to the defense of democracy, parliamentary On individual liberties and freedoms: rule, reforms and peace;  accepted the respect for individual rights, liberty,  took a critical stance to government and linked its Values equality; legitimacy to people‘s well-being; and On civic duty, individual responsibility: On individual liberties and freedoms: Beliefs  developed a sense of civic duty and individual  preserved the core Japanese values of loyalty and sincerity responsibility; but individual liberty and equality are also valued; On participation in politics and social life: On civic duty, individual responsibility:  changed from being detached and nonparticipating  developed a sense of civic duty and responsibility against to democratic citizenship and active participation; nationalism, militarism and war; On participation in politics and social life:  developed active participation, in defense of democracy, parliamentary rule and peace;

Democratized in their Patterns Democratized in their Patterns Toward others: Toward others:  tolerant toward opinions of others and diversity;  from militarist, aggressive to pacifist, peaceful;  protection for nonconformist individuals and  loyalty, tolerance, active participation; critical groups; Predisposition:  from resentment and fear toward hope and  accommodating attitude; harmonious relations with others;  cooperation outside and across the parties;  from nationalism to friendly attitudes; Rules, processes, outcomes, institutions:  views of historical leaders and government re-  respect for rules, institutions, process, outcome, legitimacy Behavior evaluated and changed; on a democratic basis; and Predisposition:  stronger social and political conscience, citizen activism; Attitudes  based on trust in new German leaders;

 from authoritarian thinking and behavior, distrust, outright skepticism, rejection of government, and non-participation habit, dissatisfaction, political apathy to democratic thinking, trust, acceptance of government, active participation, satisfaction;  recognized the responsibility of the genocide committed; Rules, processes, outcomes, institutions:  respect for new democratic rules, procedures, and outcomes;  from authoritarianism to social humanism;  from retreatment into private life, distrust, fight for survival, a without-me attitude, to active and civic behavior;  from fractured identity toward a civic, peaceful and democratic one;

Active, massive, democratic; Active, massive, democratic; Party system and elections: Party system and elections:  provide channels of participation through  provide channels of participation through parties, groups, multiparty system, groups, interests; organizations, media; Political Political activity: Political activity: Participation  the individual moves from apathy, non-  the individual moves from a democratic-authoritarian- participation, to active involvement in politics, Fascist, radical and ideological form of participation to working in campaigns, lobbying, questioning fully democratic, peaceful forms; government and leadership;  driven by democratic civic norms and behavior; Electoral support and alignment:  democratic institutions and practices supported:  electorate realigned from right and left parties Electoral support and alignment: toward the center;  alignment without class antagonism, ideological divisions, reliance on parties, factions, bureaucracy;

Vibrant, developed, democratic, active; Vibrant, developed, democratic, active; Relations with the state Relations with the state  intellectuals, public figures, and social groups take  independent of the state and political elites; a critic stance toward the government;  take a critic stance toward the government; Civil Diversity and development Diversity and development Society  large number of public and civic organizations,  greater number of organizations and groups; membership, and activity;  greater number of areas of activism;  active participation in various movements; Driving mindset  acts on behalf of public interest;

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Driving mindset  diverse, oriented toward public affairs;  discuss issues linked to democratization and  advanced their own agenda; Germany‘s modernization deficits;  shapes public opinion;  against militarism, disarmament, left-right extremism;  defend public interest, social and human rights, social self-determination, freedom;

Democratic; Democratic; Authority and decision-making: Authority and decision-making:  hierarchical but based on expression of free will,  hierarchical but based on expression of free will, consultative; consultative; Institutional  balanced, inclusive;  inclusive policy and decision making; Culture Power distribution: Power distribution: and  power shared and exercised through a system of  democratic power structure and distribution; Patterns checks and balances; Political representativeness: Political representativeness:  institutions representative;  institutions representative;  opened up to true, free competition;  reflects people‘s will; Drive behind governance and policy-making: Drive behind governance and policy-making:  pacifist orientation;  opened to group interests and change;  opened up to interests from various groups;  adaptable to new situations, social demands and  based on cooperation; pressures; Displaying Differences

Both the elites and the population embraced new The elites and the population showed a different stance democratic change; toward new democratic change; Attitude Among elites: Among elites: toward  slight reluctance by older generation;  the Emperor embraced the new change Change Among the population:  elites resisted, then, embraced the change only because of  openness to change and transformation by younger the pressures by the US; generations; Among the population:  all social groups and individuals embraced the defeat, democratization processes and changes;

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Table A5.13 A Summary of the Dynamics and Changes in the Political Culture of Italy

Pre-1943 Italy Post-1943 Italy On authority and government: On authority and government:  obedient toward government but lacked loyalty toward  antagonistic toward government, struggled whether a authority; monarchy or republic was better but accepted the On individual freedom and liberties: republic;  equality and liberty suppressed by nationalism and the On individual freedom and liberties: influence of the Catholic Church;  start to cherish liberty and equality even though Values On civic duty, individual responsibility: internalization reflects the influence of nationalism, and  no sense of civic duty but localism, apathy, clientelism, Marxism, and the Catholic Church; Beliefs discourage of independent thinking, ideological On civic duty, individual responsibility: brainwashing;  struggle with the past, in the North more than in South, On participation in politics and social life: but characterized by a steady increase;  parochial, isolated, fragmented, alienated; On participation in politics and social life:  in the South political clientelism, in the North class  struggle with the lack of interest in participation, being solidarity, political consciousness; informed and expose to political campaigns but characterized by a steady increase; Toward others: Toward others:  reflects the fear, insecurity, discontent, radical, clashes  continue to be critical, fragmented, polarized, sectarian between old/new elites, peasant classes; but not violent and exclusionary; Behavior  authoritarian, suppressive and violent; In terms of predisposition: and In terms of predisposition:  suffers from past heritage of suspiciousness, distrust, Attitudes  distrust, discontent, individualism, inability to antagonism, isolationism but also displays signs of overcome factionalism and to compromise; cooperation and trust; On rules, processes, outcomes, institutions: On rules, processes, outcomes, institution:  discontent and lack of confidence with institutions  characterized by institutional cooperation, respect for government, ruling elite and political system; rules, institutions, process, and government; Parties and election system: Parties and election system:  channeled increasingly through the Fascist Party and  channeled through parties of the left and the right; away from other parties; Political activity: Political activity:  reflects the clash left-right ideology, capitalist-Communist  reflects political instability, conflicting attitudes, world and intra-party factions; Political frustration, aversion, division of society and lack of  Communists: pro changes through institutions not Participation national unity; revolution, democracy not class struggle, national unity Electoral support and alignment: and cooperation not a political agenda;  rural and working people shift their allegiance to  Christian Democrats: believed in electoral politics, mass Mussolini and his Fascist party; and interclass party, broad electoral support and consensus, family values, middle class;  Liberals, believed in politics of elite not masses; Electoral support and alignment:  struggle between alignment with Communists or Christian Democrats, expected recovery, reforms; Relations with the state: Relations with the state:  closely linked to and dependent on the state  increasingly independent of the state; Diversity and development: Diversity and development: Civil  public and civic organizations absent or only a few;  re-vitalized by associations involved in politics; Society Driving mindset: Driving mindset:  reflects the Fascist ideology, rural-urban conflict,  activism and participation in social movements, and polarization, and the state of permanent crisis; political issues; Authority and decision-making: Authority and decision-making:  weak, inefficient, unable to take political actions;  authority based on elections and competition Power distribution:  decision-making based on institutional cooperation;  concentrated in the hands of Mussolini, Power distribution: Institutional Political representativeness:  distributed among many institutional centers, Culture  governments, institutions, represented the interests of Political representativeness: pro-fascist groups,  representative parliament and government; Drive behind governance and policy-making: Drive behind governance and policy-making:  pre-Fascist governments driven by factions rendering  reflect ―partitocrazi‖, the control of legislative and them ineffective in dealing with issues; executive by party leaders and bureaucrats, and large,  Fascist policies driven by nationalism, expansion; cumbersome policy-making and bureaucracy; Elites and population: Elites and population: Attitude  both embraced the change toward Fascism  both embraced Christian democracy of family morality, toward anti-Communism, commitment to capitalist system Change representative democracy, attention to middle class

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Table A5.14 A Summary of Dynamics and Change in the Political Culture in South Korea

1945 - 1995 Among the elites Among the population

On authority and government: On authority and government:  authoritarian view;  from submissive to becoming critical of them; On liberties and freedom: On liberties and freedom:  views itself detached from them;  Confucian values of collectivism, hierarchy, are 1945  refuses to acknowledge and embrace them; strong but notions of individualism and equality also - On civic duty and responsibilities: develop; 1949  identifies them with respect, loyalty, On civic duty and responsibilities: obedience toward leaders, authority, and the  identified them with respect, loyalty, obedience state; toward leaders, authority and the state; On participation: On participation:  views it as limited to narrow elite circles;  characterized mostly by individualism, silence to Values injustices, lack of engagement; and Beliefs On authority and government: On authority and government:

 until 1980s, authoritarian view pushing back  view government and authority as illegitimate;

any criticism;  become a strong critic of them;

 after 1985, move toward a democratic view;  pressure for government democratization; On liberties and freedom: On liberties and freedom:  until 1980s refuses to acknowledge them;  move beyond Confucian values, strengthen embrace

 after 1985 moves gradually to acknowledge for them and making them the basis of political and respect them; action; 1950 On civic duty and responsibilities: On civic duty and responsibilities: -  until 1980s continues to identify them with  redefine civic duty from respect and obedience 1990 respect, loyalty, obedience toward leaders, toward the leaders to obligation for freedom and authority, and the state; justice;  after 1985, moves toward viewing them as a On participation: part of the democratic society;  change from patrimonial-clientelist, provincial On participation: loyalties, personal following toward active civic  until 1980s continues to limit it to few participation. narrow elites and suppresses any form of  young Koreans are disillusioned with older mass participation; generation, grow more active, often violent;

Among the elites in terms of Among the population in terms of

Attitude toward others: Attitude toward others:  sectarian  disobedient and critical toward authority;  factionalist  critical toward the military government;  exclusionary Predisposition: 1945  nationalist  inclusive and collectivist mindset; - Predisposition:  in favor of harmonious but fair social relations; 1949  distrust Rules, processes, outcomes, institutions:

 lack of cooperative spirit  demands put forward for fairness and transparency in

Rules, process, outcomes, institutions: the selection of leadership and government;

 driven by the view of the submission to  open up to respect rules, process and institutions; Behavior authority as more important than the process and and institutions Attitudes Attitude toward others: Attitude toward others:  until the 1980s, kept a repressive and  took the form of solidarity among various social excluding attitude; groups and strong criticism toward the governments  after 1985 forced to democratize; and leadership; Predisposition: Predisposition:  until the 1980s rejected political demands,  increased and intensified cooperation among various suppressed any social movement and social groups and organizations against the 1950 demands from society; suppressive character of the governments of Rhee, -  after 1985, forced to open up to cooperation Park and Chun; 1990 and reliance on rules and institutions; On rules, processes, outcomes, institutions: Rules, process, outcome, institutions:  until the 1980s, increased its pressures and demands  until the 1980s continued to be to the ruling elite for respecting the rules, processes, characterized by exclusion, struggle for outcomes and institutions; power, demand for submission;  after 1985, characterized by the respect of the rules,  after 1985, forced to play according to rules, process, outcomes and institutions; and respect the process, outcomes and institutions;

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Among the elites in terms of: Among the population in terms of:

Parties and election system: Parties and election system:  created more than 60 political parties;  become followers of political parties; 1945  dominated by rivalries between elite Political activity: - groupings;  driven by anti-Japanese sentiments and aspiration for 1949 Political activity: self-governance;  dominated by the extreme right groups Electoral support and alignment:  oriented toward the establish of the control  distributed among the right and left political over the country; groupings; Electoral support and alignment: Political  mostly among landlord population; Participation

Parties and election system: Parties and election system:

 after 1961 until the 1980s put under the  increase their support for the political parties of the domination of the extreme right by the center and moderate right; ruling elites; Political activity: Political activity:  grow in criticism and opposition toward the 1950  only activity fitting the ruling elite agenda governments of Rhee, Park, Chun; - allowed;  characterized by pressures and demands to end the 1990  any other political activity suppressed; authoritarian regime; Electoral support and alignment: Electoral support and alignment:  until 1980s, held under control through  until 1980s, goes increasingly toward the political corrupt and repressive methods; parties that opposed the authoritarian character of the  after 1985, the old elite associated with the governments; extreme right lost any significant electoral  after 1985, starts to be distributed among the parties support it enjoyed before; of center right and center left;

Relations with the elites Relations with the population

1945 Characterized by: Characterized by: -  just emerging civil society;  civil society emerging from various walks and 1949  mutual cooperation for constructing the interests among the Korean population; political system;  emerging civil society tries to express the interests of Civil  relations of independent stances; the population; Society Characterized by: Characterized by: 1950  pressures and suppression by elites  growing allegiance to various social groups opposing - representing the groupings of extreme right the authoritarian regime; 1990 and in control of the government and he  includes in its organizations individuals from various state walks of life;  orientation running in the opposite direction from the ruling elites;

Among the elites Among the population

Authority and decision-making: Authority and Decision-Making:  viewed in authoritarian terms  viewed in national terms 1945 Power distribution: Power distribution: -  centralized at the hands of the president  demanded and expected to be democratic 1949 Political representativeness: Political representativeness:  skewed, lacking, distorted  demanded and aspired to be fair and true Governance and policy-making: Governance and policy-making: Institutional  driven by anti-communist orientation  expected be driven by national agenda Culture and Authority and decision-making: Authority and decision-making: Patterns  until 1980s, viewed, obtained and exercised  start to view them increasingly in terms of

in authoritarian ways; democratic standards and parameters;

 after 1985, forced to democratize; Power distribution:

Power distribution:  concentration of power in the hands of the President  until 1980s, centralized at the hands of the only increasingly opposed; president (Park, Chun) and exercised in Political representativeness: 1950 authoritarian ways;  fight for free and fair elections and a representative -  after 1985, distributed and balanced among government increases; 1990 branches of the government; Governance and policy-making: Political representativeness:  viewed and demanded increasingly that both of them  until 1980s, representativeness distorted reflect and give importance not only to economic through fraud and unfair elections; development objectives but also to the political  after 1985, forced to accept fairness of aspect of society and governance. representativeness; 323

Governance and policy-making:  until 1980s, driven by economic goals  after 1985, the drive combines and reflects economic/political dimensions;

Among the elites Among the population 1945 Characterized by: Characterized by: -  resistance toward embracing democratic  the embrace of the change for democracy 1949 change and values; Attitude Characterized by: Characterized by: toward 1950  until 1980s, resistance continues to any  persistence and determination to make Korean Change - change toward democracy; society and politics democratic 1990  after 1985, forced to embrace the change toward democracy;

(-) The 1945-1948 Occupation Period: 1945: United States occupy South Korea; 1945 - 1946: More than 70 political parties emerge; 1946 - 1947: The Joint Commission invites 39 political parties and 396 social organizations from civil society to contribute in preparing the forthcoming elections; 1948: Elections are held under the UN supervision. The US South declares creation of the Republic of South Korea (August 18). Syngman Rhee is recognized as the President of South Korea; (-) The 1949-1953 Korean War: 1949: Provocations between North and South Korean forces take place; 1950 - 1953: Korean War; (-) The 1948-1960 Authoritarian Period under Syngman Rhee and Yi Kibung: 1954: Syngman Rhee amends constitution, removes two terms limits; March 1960: Vice-president Yi Kibung is elected president; April 1960: students protest against fraud March elections, demand political reforms, 142 killed; Rhee and Kibung are forced to resign; (-) The 1960-1961 Democratic Interlude under Ho Chong, Yun Po-Son, Chang Myon: April-July 1960: Ho Chong leads transitional government; exiles Rhee, arrests Rhee administration members and replaces army generals; Overall June 1960: The National Assembly restores freedom of speech, press, association; Political July 1960: New elections are held, bicameral parliament is formed; Dynamics August 1960: Yun Po-Son is elected president, Chang Myon prime minister; Chang Myon government faces and criticism by forces on the right and the left; Changes (-) The 1961-1985 Authoritarian Period under Park Chung Hee, Chun Doo Hwan: May 1961: Major General Park Chung Hee overthrows Chang government, declares himself president. Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) arrests anyone opposing the change, limits political rights and civil liberties, freedom of press, speech and parties; 1972: Park declares martial law, closes National Assembly, universities, suspends political activity, imposes censorship, imposes new constitution, removes term limits for president; 1979: KCIA director assassinates Park; Chun Doo Hwan, Head of Defense Security Command, seizes power, suspends constitution and political activity, closes universities, imposes censorship, outlaws any activity and criticism against the government; 1980: Chun sends troops into Kwangju to suppress student demonstrations, kills 200 students; 50,000 people join students in protests, their uprising is squashed by the army; 1985: Chun is forced to declare a cleanup campaign to weed out corruption in government and society; removes 8000 officials from posts in government, KCIA, state-owed enterprise, banks, closes 172 periodicals, launches a re-education program; restores some political rights; (-) The 1985-1987 Period of Transition to a Weak Democratic Regime under Roh Tae Woo: 1986: Opposition grows, 1987: Chun chooses as his successor Roh Tae Woo, a former general who agrees to the opposition demands to hold direct presidential elections, release political prisoners, and guarantee various rights; December 1987: Presidential elections are held; Roh is elected president; his governance combines limited democratic reforms with the maintenance of some controls because of security threat from Communist North; (-) The 1988-1995 Period of Democratization and Democratization of Democracy: 1990: Trials for crimes of Chun regime take place; in June 1990 a law for compensation of victims is adopted; 1992: New elections are held; Kim Young Sam (opposition leader) is elected president; October 1994: Seoul District Prosecutor‘s Office finds that Chun and Roh engaged in premeditated military rebellion in 1979; 1995: Korean democracy is definitively consolidated;

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Table A5.15 A Summary of Similarities and Differences of Security Environment Germany and Japan

SIMILARITIES DIFFERENCES Indicators between Germany and Japan between Germany and Japan

Similar in four aspects: One difference:  realist conceptualization before 1945;  The primary national interest (unification vs.  pre-1945 national interests run against the US national rehabilitation); National interests; Interests  re-conceptualization along democratic realism after 1945;  post-1945 national interests are conceptualized in harmony with US national interests;

Similar in five aspects One difference:  realist foreign policy before 1945;  Focus (integration, Franco-German relations,  pre-1945 foreign policy in conflict with US foreign NATO vs. military non-engagement, pacifism); Foreign policy; Policy  democratic foreign policy after 1945;  post-1945foreign policy in harmony with US foreign policy;  post-1945 foreign policy strategies are complementary and similar to US foreign policy strategies;

Similar in three aspects No significant differences View  after 1945, similar to the US view of post-1945 of international politics and security; International  after 1945, similar point of view about post-1945 Politics stability and peace; Security  after 1945, similar principles guiding the behavior of and the policy-makers in the context of post- 1945 Stability international politics and security;

Management Similarities in two aspects: No significant differences of  Similarities in the view and approach of regime Neighborly differences with the US view and approach; Relations  Similarities in terms of strategies and tactics used by and the US in dealing with countries with different Regime regimes, namely the Communist regimes in Europe Differences and Asia;

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Table A5.16 Detailed Similarities and Differences in National Interests, Germany and Japan

Indicators GERMANY JAPAN Displaying Similarities The pre-1945 German national interests: The pre-1945 Japanese national interests:  reflect the influence of ―continental realism;‖  reflects a realist view and nationalist framework;  are framed within a nationalist framework;  are a function of nation-building, development of Before  are a function of building state political power; defensive and offensive military capabilities, imperialist 1945:  are identified with the pursuit of militarization and aspirations, security concerns and economic interests; buildup of military capabilities to advance the  are aimed at stopping the intimidation of Japan by western National nationalist agenda; powers, getting rid of semi-colonial status, defending interests  aim at territorial expansion and control in Europe, territory, consolidating independence, displaying power, conflict Africa, Asia; becoming an imperial power and pursuing expansion in with The pre-1945 US national interests: Asia; the US  alternate between various priorities;  are identified with the achievement of sustained economic  are framed by various schools or groups; growth, acquisition of resources military buildup,

 consist of commercial interests, economic freedom realignment and expansionism; and stability, democratic ideas; The US national interests:  reflect national well-being and security concerns;  alternate between commercial interests, access to economic resources in Asia and democratic ideas; The post-1945 German national interests: The post-1945 Japanese national interests: = are re-conceptualized reflecting: = are re-conceptualized reflecting:  the WWII defeat;  the WWII defeat;  the US occupation;  the US occupation;  the rise of the Communist threat; = are oriented toward  being the frontline of the Cold War;  cultivation of a peaceful, anti-militarist image; = are oriented toward:  regaining sovereignty;  economic integration into Western Europe;  re-integration of Japan in Asia and the world;  political commitment to the Western Alliance;  becoming a democratic nation and an economic  military membership in NATO; powerhouse;

 unification and serving as a West-East bridge; = consist of:

= consist of:  politically, renouncing war, turning into a pacifist

 Adenauer: integration, relations with the US and country, becoming passive in global politics;

France, commitment to the West and membership in  economically, paying reparations, working for recovery After NATO; and growth, opening to foreign trade and producing for 1945: export;  Erhard, Keisinger, Schmidt, alliance with the US  militarily, disarming, demilitarizing, not engaging National and economic integration; internationally and pursuing self-defense based on interests  Brandt: détente and East-West coexistence; collective security; in harmony  Kohl: alliance with the US, Britain, and France, with deeper integration and unification;  in security, becoming a close ally of the US, giving the the US US the right to dispose its land, air and sea forces, The post-1945 US national interests in Europe: keeping order and defending Japan; = are modified reflecting:  the rise of the Soviet Union; The post-1945 US national interests in Asia:  the Communist threat; = are modified reflecting: = are oriented toward:  the defeat of Japan;  managing post-WWII power relations and the rise of  the rise of Communist China and North Korea; the Communist Soviet Union; = are oriented toward  pursuit of the national welfare;  demilitarization of Japan and the region;  defense and spread of freedom and stability of trade;  driving the region away from Communist influence  pursuit of commerce and economic relations;  helping the region economically to lessen the US = consist of: economic burden;  Truman: preserve security, balance of power; = consist of:  Eisenhower: defend freedom;  politically, returning sovereignty to Japan;  Kennedy: balance power, support forces for change;  economically, assisting Japan to recover, increase exports,  Nixon: find compatibility of interests, balance integrate internationally; power, apply mutual restraint;  militarily, providing defense, military protection through military basis and nuclear weapons; Displaying Differences

National  Unification of West and East Germany  Rehabilitation of Japan in Asia. Interests

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Table A5.17 Detailed Similarities and Differences in Foreign Policy of Germany and Japan

Indicators GERMANY JAPAN Similarities German foreign policy based on Realpolitik: Japanese foreign policy based on imperialism:  associated with the Machiavellian view of coercion,  associated with militarism , use of force; free of morals, quest for power, pursuit of interests;  driven initially by the need for international recognition Before 1945:  driven by zero-sum game mindset, nationalist (1860-1880), later by colonial aspirations (1890-1910), ideology not by ethics, morality, ideal, principles, then the notion of Japan‘s supremacy and militarism Foreign benevolence; (1920-1944); policy  pursued expansionism, challenge of the  pursued territorial expansion, local wars, treaties with in opposition to international status quo, military threats, great powers, alliances, challenge of the international US aggressions, annexations, conflict, war; status quo, military buildup; aggression; foreign policy US foreign policy combines realism, idealism: US foreign policy combines realism, idealism:  associated with Wilsonian, Jeffersonian,  associated with Wilsonian, Jacksonian, Jeffersonian Hamiltonian and Jacksonian schools; and Hamiltonian schools;  driven mostly by isolationism; at times, by  driven mostly by isolationism; at times, by intervention intervention and democratic ideals; and democratic ideals;  pursues its interests through peaceful means;  pursues its interests through peaceful means; German foreign policy based on democratic realism: Japanese foreign policy based on democratic pacifism:  combined realism with democratic ideals;  combined pacifism with democratic ideals;  local in its scale of interests;  local in its scale of interest; After 1945:  built on four important elements: relations with US,  built on pacifism , Peace and Security Treaties signed France; threat from the Soviet power; demilitarized with the US; Foreign Germany, integration in Europe;  driven by three goals: peaceful relations with policy  driven by three goals: peaceful neighborly relations, neighbors, rehabilitation in Asia, integration in the in harmony with integration into Western Europe, world; US membership into international institutions; US foreign policy based on democratic realism: foreign policy US foreign policy based on democratic realism:  combines democratic ideals with realism  combines democratic ideals with realism;  shaped by the rise of the Communist threat  global in its scale of interest;  builds upon the strategy of anti-communism and  built on balancing Soviet Union power and containment of the Soviet Union; containment of Communism;  driven by reliance on the alliance with Japan and other  driven by balancing power, defending interests, and bilateral and multilateral alliances in the region; building alliances; German foreign policy pursued strategies: Japanese foreign policy pursued strategies: western orientation (Adenauer 1949-1963) pacifism (1945-1995)  tie Western Germany to the West;  pursue disarmament;  restore the position of Germany in world;  refuse to arm;  ally with the United States;  do not engage militarily in the region and world; After 1945:  reconcile with France; alliance with the US (1945-1995)  promote Western European integration;  side with the US on all major issues; Strategies  integrate Germany to NATO and OEEC;  stay under the US atomic umbrella; similar military restraint (Erhard 1963-1966)  rely on the US in security and economic areas; and dual approach (Keisinger 1966-1969) regional rehabilitation (1945-1995) complementary  pragmatic West/East relations;  normalize relations with the Soviet Union, China, to  collaborate more with US than France; Korea; US strategies  achieve a ―modus vivendi‖ with East Germany,  assist neighbors economically; pursued  erase distrust and WWII image;  ease tensions with the Soviet Union;  keep armament at acceptable levels; economic powerhouse (1945-1990)  do not engage militarily in world affairs;  become member of international economic institutions  soften the approach to the German issue and organizations; new ostpolitik (Brandt 1969-1974)  regain position in world economy;  recognize, cooperate with East Germany;  produce for export, access and gain markets in the US  improve relations with Eastern Europe and Soviet and other countries; Union;  pursue rapprochement; The US foreign policy pursued the strategies: community of peace (Schmidt 1974-1982) rehabilitation (Truman 1945-1952)  improve inter-German relations  democratize Japan;  reduce tensions, initiate dialogue  rehabilitate Japan;  make West Germany a factor of peace in Europe;  give back sovereignty to Japan;  improve relations with France;  revive Japan economically;  push for a European collective security;  reintegrate Japan in Asia and world; advanced integration (Kohl 1982-1998)  make Japan a counterweight to China;  advance interests through deeper integration; containment (Truman 1947-1952)  deepen European integration;  deal with Soviet Union, prevent expansion of its influence, balance its power, modify its behavior,

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 continue ostpolitik and détente; undermine its influence, do not provoke it, do not  strengthen relations with US, France; intervene in its sphere of influence, but show readiness  keep a tough stance toward the Soviet Union; to use force and nuclear weapons if needed; The US pursued the strategies of:  consider some parts of the world as having special containment (Truman 1947-1953) importance to the US security;  prevent expansion, balance power, modify  combine use of deterrents with inducements, nuclear behavior and undermine the Soviet influence; weapons with air, ground, sea forces;  do not provoke or intervene in Soviet sphere of  military buildup regardless of resources, costs, goals influence, but show readiness to use force; and perceptions;  regard some parts of the world as having special  assist Western Europe, exploit tensions within the importance to US security; communist camp;  combine deterrents with inducements, nuclear détente (Nixon-Ford 1970-1979): weapons with air, ground, sea forces;  open up with China;  pursue military buildup regardless of resources,  pursue national interests regardless of ideology; costs, goals and perceptions;  balance the power of Soviet Union by using the rift in  assist Europe, exploit rift in Communist camp; the Communist camp and improving relations with deterrence (Eisenhower 1953-1961): China;  regain initiative from the Soviet Union;  combine massive retaliation with asymmetrical response, nuclear weapons with psychological warfare, covert actions, alliances, negotiations;  lower costs, increase efficiency, keep US strength and competitive ability high;  reduce distinction nuclear-nonnuclear;  support nations fighting for freedom from the Soviet Union and try to overthrow Communist regimes; flexible response (Kennedy-Johnson 1961-1969):  show firm response by diplomacy or war;  balance intervening with and restraint  show readiness to pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, achieve goals at any cost;  use diplomacy to settle disputes, negotiate;  threat to the stability are nationalism, perceptions miscalculations, not nuclear weapons or ideology;  combine nuclear weapons with conventional and unconventional capabilities, strategic missile buildup, alliances, deterrence;  welcome and guide the change. détente (Nixon-Ford 1970-1979):  accept the world as it is, view politics as a free- moral zone, deal with powers in a practical manner  interests consist of vital and peripheral ones;  national interests prevail over ideology;  keep commitments, provide nuclear shield and economic assistance but set US interests first;  power is multidimensional rather than identical with nuclear weapons;  balancing power is difficult and not determined by a single country  support institutions but not at the expense of the balance of power;  contain the Soviet Union through mutual restraint, coexistence, cooperation, negotiations, power balancing and combining pressures with inducements, deterrence with flexibility, ideological rigidity with political pragmatism, strategic withdrawal with tactical escalation;  view the perceptions, hostilities, capabilities, shift in balance of power, asymmetrical responses, not the ideology or military strength, as the threat to peace and stability; Differences Three directions: Two directions: Focus of  European Integration  Demilitarization foreign policy  Franco-German Relations  Pacifism and Non engagement in military affairs  NATO

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Table A5.18 Detailed Similarities and Differences in View of Sources of Security and Stability, Germany and Japan

Indicators GERMANY JAPAN Displaying Similarities Both German and US policy-makers: Both Japanese and US policy-makers: Similarities  analyzed international politics from a neorealist  analyzed international politics from a neorealist with perspective; perspective; the US  viewed post-WWII security and politics as fragile,  viewed post-WWII security in Asia as dominated by perspective reflecting and influenced by the balancing of competition between the US and Soviet Union for of power, diverging and clashing interests, stability, influence and alliances; post-1945 and arms race;  viewed the alliance between the US and Japan as the most world politics  considered Germany to be important to the US important alliance in Asia for both US and Japan security; security and a part of the US perimeter of defense; German policy-makers’ observations: Japanese policy-makers’ observations:  Germany faced two major threats, an attack from  Japan faced the task of rebuilding relations with its the Soviet Union and nuclear holocaust; neighbors;  West Germany‘s survival depends on the US and  Japan‘s defense and economy depends on US military France; power and markets;  the interests of West Germany are best served by  Japan‘s interests are best served by keeping a peaceful, Similarities keeping a low military profile and anti-militarist anti-militarist profile, and accommodating interests with mindset; through bilateral or multilateral cooperation, standing by the US  relations between and unification of East and West and keep strong ties with the US; observations Germany can be better served by knowing and US policy-makers’ observations: about keeping contact with one another;  post-1945 politics and security in Asia depend on and post-1945 US policy-makers’ observations: reflect the threat of a Communist takeover of all of Asia; stability  post-1945 politics and security are characterized  the future of the region depends on the ability of the US to by a delicate balance of power; counter ideologically, politically, economically and  credibility and perceptions matters, at times even militarily the threat from the rise of Communist China more than the real military capabilities; and North Korea;  nuclear weapons matter as deterrence in the long  in the clash between the US led democratic forces and the run, but conventional forces matter as a mean to Communist alliance between the Soviet Union, China and balancing the power in the short run; North Korea, Japan is the most important ally to US  stability reflects both the influence of geopolitics, security and the policy of containment; interests, ideas, ideology, nationalism, leader‘s  US interests and stability in the region can be better personality, predisposition to cooperation and preserved and guaranteed by keeping a strong presence in willingness to resist aggression, balance power, Japan and building alliance with other Asian countries; alliances, and maintain continuity in pursuing certain policies;

German policy-makers are guided by: Japanese policy-makers are guided by: = preserving the West Germany by: = returning Japan in Asia through:  allying with the US;  pursuing demilitarization, disarmament, pacifism;  keeping Germany within NATO;  rehabilitating the political image;  avoiding any confrontation, conventional or  rehabilitating economic ties, offering economic and nuclear, with the Soviet Union; financial assistance, bilateral agreements; Similarities = returning Japan to the world through: with US policy-makers are guided by:  displaying no aspiration for military capabilities and the US = preserving the status quo and stability by: power; in  balancing and diversifying power, militarily,  participating in international institutions, treaties, principles politically, economically, ideologically and negotiations, working for the stability; guiding culturally; the behavior  factoring in the interests, leader‘s personality, US in Asia is guided by these principles: predisposition for cooperation, geopolitical context = preserving the status quo and stability in Asia by: and alliances;  relying on Japan as the major US ally in the region and  relying on democratic alliances rather than Asia‘s bulwark against Communism; autocratic ones;  creating bilateral and multilateral military, political and  pushing for economic development and economic alliances with Asian countries; democratic procedures, also taking into account  containing the spread of Communism and the influence of that economic change and democratization can the Soviet Union and China through an active military, produce as much as instability as they might political, economic, cultural, presence in the region; prevent; Displaying Differences None

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Table A5.19 Detailed Similarities and Differences in Management of Neighborly Relations and Differences in Regime Type, Germany and Japan

Indicators GERMANY JAPAN Displaying Similarities Germany as to the Soviet Union, East Germany: Japan as to the Soviet Union, China, North Korea:  viewed and treated both of them as adversaries;  viewed and treated them with caution and as adversaries;  accepted the status quo and mutual accommodation;  expressed the desire for peaceful coexistence, readiness Similarities  did not pursue escalation of tensions into the use of for assistance and partnership; with force and war;  did not cause tensions but pursued the healing of the war the US The US as to the Soviet Union: wounds and regaining of trust; view  changed over time the viewing of the Soviet Union The US as to the Soviet Union, China, North Korea and from one of an ally under Roosevelt to one of an  saw all of them as adversaries and a potential threat to the approach adversary under Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy; US interests in Asia and Japan but showed caution not to  reflected patience and firmness provoke conflict and war;  did not pursue the escalation of tensions into war;

Germany’s strategies and tactics: Japan’s strategies and tactics: Adenauer with China  did not trust the Soviets and their project of German  handled the issue of two Chinas the same way as the US unification; did;  committed Germany to NATO, alliance with the US;  established diplomatic relations with China;  touted liberal democracy, Christian values, free  intensified economic relations; market, and the rule of law; with North Korea, Erhard  did not recognize it as the sole legitimate Korean  strengthened the alliance with the US; Government (it recognized South Korea)  offered economic aid to the Soviet Union;  viewed North Korea as a potential threat to Japan‘s Brandt security but did not provoke North Korea into a conflict  accepted coexistence with the East Germany; or war; Similarities  normalized and developed diplomatic and commercial  aligned with the US and South Korea during the Korean with relations; war but did not directly participate in the war; the US  renounced violence and demonstrated West German with the Soviet Union strategies peacefulness;  did not succeed in resolving the issue of the Kuril Islands, and  viewed German division as an internal conflict; did not sign a Peace Treaty but pursued the course of tactics  initiated change through cooperation; peaceful political relations and normalized trade relations; Schmidt and Kohl  took a hard-line stance toward the Soviet Union and a US strategies and tactics: soft one toward East Germany; with China  allowed installation of the nuclear missiles in West  supported Taiwan as the sole legitimate representative Germany but developed friendly relations with East government for the Chinese; Germany;  viewed the rise of Communist China as a threat but did not provoke China into war; US strategies and tactics:  strengthened Japan militarily, economically and Roosevelt: politically as a counterweight to China;  contained the Soviet Union by integration and the with North Korea policy of the carrot;  viewed North Korean government as a puppet of the Truman: Soviet Union and China;  balanced Soviet power by creating NATO;  did not provoke it and initially resisted and backed off  limited Soviet ability to influence by aid and from provocations from North Korea; rehabilitating West Germany;  went to war against North Korea when the later attacked  attempted to modify Soviet behavior by putting South Korea; forward pressures for unification of Germany; with the Soviet Union  showed resolve and ability to stand up to the Soviet  pursued the policy of containment Union without forcing a direct conflict;  saw the efforts of the Soviet Union to extend its influence  rearmed Germany, increased the budget in military and in South East Asia as a threat to the US interests and the defense as response to the Soviet threats; countries in the region but did not provoke the Soviet Eisenhower Union;  installed nuclear weapons in West Germany;  responded to Soviet threats by starting a military buildup;  engaged in psychological warfare and covert actions, aided Germany;  built regional alliances. Displaying Differences none

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Table A5.20 A Summary of Dynamics in the Security Environment for Italy

ITALY

Indicators Aspects BEFORE 1945 AFTER 1945

Character and  colonialist-imperialist basis;  democratic realism; Association  similar to Nazi Germany;  similar to the United States;

 the rise of nationalism in Europe;  internally, national, international, Influencing  the rise of revisionist states in international supranational orientations; Factors politics;  externally, Western European initiatives and National the Italian-US relations; interests

 territorial expansion  strong alliance with the US

Orientation  control in Northern Africa, the Balkans;  membership in NATO  European integration Expressed by  Mussolini, Ciano;  De Gaspari and Carlo Sforza; and  military buildup, acquisition of territories  Atlanticism; through: and colonization;  Europeanism;

Character  agressive, imperialist;  democratic realist; and  part of the axis Berlin-Tokyo-Rome;  part of Atlantic Alliance and European Association integration;

Foreign  change international power structure and  build a strong alliance with the US; policy Objectives make Italy a Great Power;  become part of European Integration;  acquire and colonize territories and  membership in international organizations; economic resources;

 ally with Nazi Germany and militarist  make Italy a part of Western Alliance by Japan; moving from neutralism to Atlanticism; Strategies  wage war against Communist and  make Italy part of European integration by democratic countries; moving from geopolitics of Mediterranean to  put the Mediterranean (North Africa, the Western Europe; Balkans) under the control;  containment and anticommunism;

Perspective  Realpolitik and Machiavellianism;  democratic realism; and  close to Nazi Germany and militarist  similar to the United States; Association Japan; View of Observations  reflects the conflict between the revisionist  reflects the bipolar character of post-WWII international on and the status quo powers; world; politics Stability  closely linked to re-division of spheres of  closely linked to the communist threat and and influence and control; the influence of the Soviet Union; security Guiding  make and impose demands upon the  maintain peaceful relations; Principles others;  fend off attempts for a greater influence by of  show willingness to act militarily in the Communist forces and the Soviet Union; Behavior support of the imposed demands;

Perspective  relations of animosity;  adversarial but peaceful relations; and  pro conflict escalation;  pro status-quo; Management Approach  unilateral accommodation;  mutually accommodating; of neighborly relations  solve disputes through conflict and war;  solve territorial and border disputes Strategies  advance threats and demands; peacefully; and  show readiness for waging war;  offer and maintain normal relations; Tactics  rely on the support of Nazi Germany;  show patience and firmness;  rely on the US assistance and mediation;

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