NCRHP Synthesis 271: Traffic Signal Operations Near Highway-Rail Grade Crossings
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Federal Railroad Administration Office of Safety Headquarters Assigned Accident Investigation Report HQ-2008-96
Federal Railroad Administration Office of Safety Headquarters Assigned Accident Investigation Report HQ-2008-96 Amtrak (ATK) Northbrook, IL December 25, 2008 Note that 49 U.S.C. §20903 provides that no part of an accident or incident report made by the Secretary of Transportation/Federal Railroad Administration under 49 U.S.C. §20902 may be used in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FRA FACTUAL RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT FRA File # HQ-2008-96 FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION 1.Name of Railroad Operating Train #1 1a. Alphabetic Code 1b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. Amtrak [ATK ] ATK 110589 2.Name of Railroad Operating Train #2 2a. Alphabetic Code 2b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. N/A N/A N/A 3.Name of Railroad Operating Train #3 3a. Alphabetic Code 3b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. N/A N/A N/A 4.Name of Railroad Responsible for Track Maintenance: 4a. Alphabetic Code 4b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. Northeast IL Regional Commuter Rail Corp. [NIRC] NIRC USB041 5. U.S. DOT_AAR Grade Crossing Identification Number 6. Date of Accident/Incident 7. Time of Accident/Incident 388037N Month 12 Day 25 Year 2008 07:05:00 AM PM 8. Type of Accident/Indicent 1. Derailment 4. Side collision 7. Hwy-rail crossing 10. Explosion-detonation 13. Other Code (single entry in code box) 2. Head on collision 5. Raking collision 8. RR grade crossing 11. Fire/violent rupture (describe in narrative) 3. Rear end collision 6. Broken Train collision 9. Obstruction 12. Other impacts 07 9. -
A New Signalling System for Automatic Block Signal Between Stations Controlling Through an IP Network
A New Signalling System for Automatic Block Signal between Stations Controlling through an IP Network 1R. Ishima, 1Y. Fukuta, 1M. Matsumoto, 2N. Shimizu, 3H. Soutome, 4M. Mori East Japan Railway Company, Saitama, Japan1; Daido Signal Co.,Ltd., Tokyo, Japan2; Hitachi, Ltd., Hitachinaka, Japan3; Toshiba Corp., Tokyo, Japan4 Abstract This paper describes a new signalling system which controls signalling field devices of automatic block signal between stations through an IP network. The system improves the method of the system already installed to Ichikawaono station on the Musasino line in February 2007. The Logic Controller (LC), placed in a signal house, exchanges the command and feedback data with the Field Controller (FC), placed near each automatic block signal, through the Ethernet Passive Optical Network (E- PON). Following the command data, the FC electrically controls signalling field devices such as signals, track circuits, transponders of the Automatic Train Stop (i.e. Automatic Train Protection) system with Pattern (ATS-P), transponders of the S-type of ATS (ATS-S), and output relays. Only optical fiber cable requires between the LC and the FC. The system has high reliability because the LC, the FC, and the data paths of E-PON are all duplex. The system provides sufficient maintenance information through the IP network. The system can realize higher reliability, less wire-connection- work, less amount of cable, cost cutting, and faster troubleshooting. A prototype system was under evaluation on the Joban Rapid Service line between Mabashi and Kitakashiwa from August 2006 to January 2008. Evaluating the results of the field test, we conclude that the prototype system is technically suitable for signal control. -
Road Level Crossing Protection Equipment
Engineering Procedure Signalling CRN SM 013 ROAD LEVEL CROSSING PROTECTION EQUIPMENT Version 2.0 Issued December 2013 Owner: Principal Signal Engineer Approved by: Stewart Rendell Authorised by: Glenn Dewberry Disclaimer. This document was prepared for use on the CRN Network only. John Holland Rail Pty Ltd makes no warranties, express or implied, that compliance with the contents of this document shall be sufficient to ensure safe systems or work or operation. It is the document user’s sole responsibility to ensure that the copy of the document it is viewing is the current version of the document as in use by JHR. JHR accepts no liability whatsoever in relation to the use of this document by any party, and JHR excludes any liability which arises in any manner by the use of this document. Copyright. The information in this document is protected by Copyright and no part of this document may be reproduced, altered, stored or transmitted by any person without the prior consent of JHR. © JHR UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED Page 1 of 66 Issued December 2013 Version 2.0 CRN Engineering Procedure - Signalling CRN SM 013 Road Level Crossing Protection Equipment Document control Revision Date of Approval Summary of change 1.0 June 1999 RIC Standard SC 07 60 01 00 EQ Version 1.0 June 1999. 1.0 July 2011 Conversion to CRN Signalling Standard CRN SM 013. 2.0 December 2013 Inclusion of Safetran S40 and S60 Mechanisms, reformatting of figures and tables, and updating text Summary of changes from previous version Section Summary of change All Include automated -
Geographic Signaling System (Geo)
FIELD REFERENCE MANUAL GEOGRAPHIC SIGNALING SYSTEM (GEO) JULY 2008 (REVISED SEPTEMBER 2018) DOCUMENT NO. SIG-00-05-09 VERSION D Siemens Mobility 700 East Waterfront Drive Munhall, Pennsylvania 15120 1-800-793-SAFE Copyright © 2008-2018 Siemens Mobility, Inc. All rights reserved PRINTED IN THE U.S.A. PROPRIETARY INFORMATION The material contained herein constitutes proprietary and confidential information, and is the intellectual property of Siemens Mobility, Inc., Rail Automation (Siemens) protected under United States patent, copyright and/or other laws and international treaty provisions. This information and the software it describes are for authorized use only, and may not be: (i) modified, translated, reverse engineered, decompiled, disassembled or used to create derivative works; (ii) copied or reproduced for any reason other than specific application needs; or (iii) rented, leased, lent, sublicensed, distributed, remarketed, or in any way transferred; without the prior written authorization of Siemens. This proprietary notice and any other associated labels may not be removed. TRANSLATIONS The manuals and product information of Siemens Mobility, Inc. are intended to be produced and read in English. Any translation of the manuals and product information are unofficial and can be imprecise and inaccurate in whole or in part. Siemens Mobility, Inc. does not warrant the accuracy, reliability, or timeliness of any information contained in any translation of manual or product information from its original official released version in English and shall not be liable for any losses caused by such reliance on the accuracy, reliability, or timeliness of such information. Any person or entity that relies on translated information does so at his or her own risk. -
Lubomír Macháček: „Zabezpečováka“ Ze Mě Udělala Tragická Mimořádná Událost
ČTVRTLETNÍK AŽD BEZPEČNĚ K CÍLI 1 | 2020 Lubomír Macháček: „Zabezpečováka“ ze mě udělala tragická mimořádná událost REPORTÉR AŽD PRAHA • 1/2018 | 1 | LITOMĚŘICE HORNÍ NÁDRAŽÍ – MOST VLAKEM RYCHLEJI www.svestkovadraha.cz Z OBsAHU 18 • Jízda RYchlosTÍ 200 KM/H POD DOHLEDEM ETCS LEVEL 2 správa železnic zorganizovala na přelomu roku 2019/2020 mezi Břeclaví a Brnem několik testovacích jízd rychlostí 200 km/h. Provedení těchto jízd bylo zajištěno společností ČD cargo a byly vedeny lokomotivou řady 383 (Vectron). Jak probíhal dohled nad vlastní jízdou vlaku mobilní částí ETCS a jaké musely být provedeny úpravy traťové části ETCS z produkce AŽD? 36 • ŠVEstková dráha TEstuje BEZúdržbový provoz Na takzvané Švestkové dráze (Čížkovice–Obrnice) připra- vuje její vlastník společnost AŽD přechod na bezúdržbový provoz. Bude se jednat o první železniční trať v naší zemi, která kromě pravidelných preventivních údržbových zásahů nebude potřebovat ani takzvané pochůzkáře, kteří pravidelně kontrolují technický stav tratě. 40 • Provoz V rekonstruované ŽELEZNIČNÍ stanicI BRNO hlavní nádraží Neustále rostoucí požadavky objednatelů dopravy na množství vlakových spojů a kvalitu jejich dopravního odbavení vyústily v nutnost zásadní investice ve stanici Brno hlavní nádraží. cílem bylo prodloužit životnost do doby výstavby zcela nového nádraží v odsunuté poloze. 56 • ČEŠI naučili sYsTÉM c-ITs varovat řIDIČE PřED BLÍŽÍcÍM sE ŽELEZNIČNÍM PřEJEZDEM Představte si systém v automobilu, který vás upozorní na blížící se přejezd a pokud je ve výstraze, bude vás varovat textovým hlášením a animovanými piktogramy. Tuto novou službu v rámci projektu c-ROADs cZ vytvořily společnosti RADOM a AŽD. ČTVRTLETNÍK REPORTÉR AŽD 1/2020 (vyšlo 30. 3. 2020 v Praze). VYDÁVÁ: AŽD Praha s.r.o., Žirovnická 3146/2, Záběhlice, 106 00 Praha 10, IČ: 48029483, tel.: 267 287 424 REDAKČNÍ RADA: Jiří Dlabaja, šéfredaktor, Ilona Hrečková, zástupkyně šéfredaktora. -
BACKTRACK 22-1 2008:Layout 1 21/11/07 14:14 Page 1
BACKTRACK 22-1 2008:Layout 1 21/11/07 14:14 Page 1 BRITAIN‘S LEADING HISTORICAL RAILWAY JOURNAL VOLUME 22 • NUMBER 1 • JANUARY 2008 • £3.60 IN THIS ISSUE 150 YEARS OF THE SOMERSET & DORSET RAILWAY GWR RAILCARS IN COLOUR THE NORTH CORNWALL LINE THE FURNESS LINE IN COLOUR PENDRAGON BRITISH ENGLISH-ELECTRIC MANUFACTURERS PUBLISHING THE GWR EXPRESS 4-4-0 CLASSES THE COMPREHENSIVE VOICE OF RAILWAY HISTORY BACKTRACK 22-1 2008:Layout 1 21/11/07 15:59 Page 64 THE COMPREHENSIVE VOICE OF RAILWAY HISTORY END OF THE YEAR AT ASHBY JUNCTION A light snowfall lends a crisp feel to this view at Ashby Junction, just north of Nuneaton, on 29th December 1962. Two LMS 4-6-0s, Class 5 No.45058 piloting ‘Jubilee’ No.45592 Indore, whisk the late-running Heysham–London Euston ‘Ulster Express’ past the signal box in a flurry of steam, while 8F 2-8-0 No.48349 waits to bring a freight off the Ashby & Nuneaton line. As the year draws to a close, steam can ponder upon the inexorable march south of the West Coast Main Line electrification. (Tommy Tomalin) PENDRAGON PUBLISHING www.pendragonpublishing.co.uk BACKTRACK 22-1 2008:Layout 1 21/11/07 14:17 Page 4 SOUTHERN GONE WEST A busy scene at Halwill Junction on 31st August 1964. BR Class 4 4-6-0 No.75022 is approaching with the 8.48am from Padstow, THE NORTH CORNWALL while Class 4 2-6-4T No.80037 waits to shape of the ancient Bodmin & Wadebridge proceed with the 10.00 Okehampton–Padstow. -
Station Sign 64” 2 14 Bennet
Boston & Maine Railroad Historical Society Inc. Hardware Collection Tag No. File No: Inventory: Size: Donor: 1 14 West Hollis – Station sign 64” 2 14 Bennett Hall – Station sign 69” Arnold Wilder 3 14 Fitchburg “Wood” Station sign 56” Arnold Wilder 4 14 Woburn “Wood” Station sign 30” Charles Smith 5 14 Danville Junction – Station Sign 96” Anonymous 6 14 West Fitchburg – Station sign 92” Arnold Wilder 7 14 West Hollis – Station sign 72” Arnold Wilder 8 14 Scheghticoke – Station sign 76” Arnold Wilder 9 14 Hubbardston – Station sign 76” Arnold Wilder 10 14 Winchester “Wood” Station sign 68” 11 14 Wedgmere “Wood” Station Sign 56” 12 14 Salem – Station sign 48” 13 14 Whately – Station sign 52”x 11” 14 14 Mt Tom – Station sign 42”x 10 ½” 15 14 Middlesex “Wood” Station sign 54” Carl Byron 16 15 Railway Express Agency - sign 72” 17 15 B&MRR Passenger Waiting Room - sign 32”x 11” 18 15 B&M Outing - sign 23”x 14” 19 15 Yard Limit – sign 16”x 14” 20 15 Notice no Deliveries “Wood” – sign 18”x 24” 21 15 Private Crossing “Plastic” – sign 18”x 6” 22 15 Free Parking “Wood” – sign 24 ½”x 8” 23 15 Railroad Crossing – Sign 36”x 36” 24 15 2 Tracks sign “White /w Black lettering (2 each) 27”x 18” 25 15 Railroad Crossbuck /w reflectors (2 each) 26 14 Lowell Station – sign reproduction Property of the Boston & Maine Railroad Historical Society Boston & Maine Railroad Historical Society Inc. Hardware Collection Tag No. File No: Inventory: Size: Donor: 27 15 Hand Held Stop – sign Donald S. -
Crossing Protection with Indicators for Train Movements
Crossing Protection With Indicators For Train Movements By G. K. Zulandt Assistant Signal Engineer Terminal Railroad Association of St. louis St. louis. Mo. New Installations, on Terminal Railroad Asso ciation of St. Louis, include special color-light This indicator, 50 ft. from the crossing, dwarf signals, known as crossing protection in- . has a key-controller on top dicators, which inform ·enginemen whether f Iash in g -I i g h t signals and gates are operat ing, and give advance notice of time cut-outs main tracks are about 750 ft. long. The fastest train which was checked consumed 24.4 sec. from the tiirie it shunted its approach until it foul .ed the crossing. The flashing-light THE first of seven highway crossing being left open. The new flashing signals operated 4.6 se~-as a .pre gate installations to be made on light signals and gates at Lynch warning before the gates were r~: the Illinois Transfer Railway, oper avenue are controlled automatically leased; and the gates desc~nded 'in ated by the Terminal Railroad As by track circuits but, on account of 10.5 sec. Thus, the.gates were down sociation of St. Louis, has been switching moves. to serve industries, 9.3 sec. before the train arrived at placed in service recently at Lynch and because of other unusual op the crossing . ,Conventional direc avenue in East St. Louis, Ill. A traf erations, special cut-out features are tional stick relays are used to clear fic count for 24 hours over this necessary. , the gates for receding train moves. -
D5.3 EGNSS Target Performance to Meet Railway
D5.3 EGNSS Target Performances to meet railway safety requirements Project acronym: STARS Project full title: Satellite Technology for Advanced Railway Signalling EC Contract No.: (H2020) 687414 Version of the document: 07 Protocol code: STR-WP5-D-ANS-034-06 Responsible partner: ANSALDO Reviewing status: ISSUED Delivery date: 30/04/17 Dissemination level: PUBLIC This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under grant agreement No. 687414 SATELLITE TECHNOLOGY FOR ADVANCED RAILWAY SIGNALLING CHANGE RECORDS Version Date Changes Authors B. Brunetti (ANSALDO STS), N. Kassabian (ANSALDO STS), Salvatore Sabina (ANSALDO STS), Fabio Poli (ANSALDO STS), Alfio Beccaria 1 23.02.2017 First draft, including chapters 1 to 5 (ANSALDO STS), Andrea Carbone (ANSALDO STS), Iban Lopetegi (CAF I+D), Tahir- Ali Klaiq (BT), Stamm Bernhard (SIE), Jean Poumailloux (TAS- F) , Marc Gandara (TAS-F) B. Brunetti (ANSALDO STS), N. Kassabian (ANSALDO STS), Salvatore Sabina 2 10.04.2017 Second draft, including chapters 6 to 7 (ANSALDO STS), Fabio Poli (ANSALDO STS), Iban Lopetegi (CAF I+D), Tahir-Ali Klaiq (BT) B. Brunetti (ANSALDO STS), N. Kassabian (ANSALDO STS), Final revision, taking into account comments 3 18.04.2017 Salvatore Sabina (ANSALDO received STS), Jean Poumailloux (TAS- F) B. Brunetti (ANSALDO STS), N. Kassabian (ANSALDO STS), Salvatore Sabina (ANSALDO STS), Jean Poumailloux (TAS- F), I. Lopetegi (CAF I+D), Tahir- Final revision, taking into account the additional Ali Klaiq (BT), J. Marais comments received and the results of the 4 28.04.2017 (IFSTTAR), J. Beugin phone conferences aimed at discussing such (IFSTTAR), S. -
Developing Standards for New Technology Signal Systems for Rail Transit Applications
Transactions on the Built Environment vol 34, © 1998 WIT Press, www.witpress.com, ISSN 1743-3509 Developing standards for new technology signal systems for rail transit applications A. F. Rumsey Parsons Transportation, New York, U.S.A. Abstract Radio communications-based train control (CBTC) systems, also referred to as transmission-based signalling (TBS) systems, permit more effective utilization of rail transit infrastructure by allowing trains to operate safety at much closer headways, by permitting greater flexibility and greater precision in train control, and by providing continuous safe train separation assurance and overspeed protection. One of the challenges facing transit agencies who are considering the introduction of CBTC systems, however, is the lack of industry standards for this emerging technology, and the current inability of trains equipped with CBTC equipment from one supplier to operate on track equipped with CBTC equipment from a second supplier. This paper reports on the status of two separate initiatives being taken in North America to develop standards for CBTC systems for rail transit applications; one based on a voluntary consensus development approach, and the second based on a competitive procurement approach. 1 Background Conventional signalling and train control systems rely almost exclusively on track circuits to detect the presence of trains. Information on the status of the track ahead is provided to train operators either through wayside signals or trainborne cab signals. Ensuring compliance with the signals is achieved either through strict observance of operating procedures, or through automatic train protection features such as wayside electro-mechanical train stops, or trainborne supervisory equipment linked to the train's braking system. -
WESTRACE First-Line Maintenance Manual 11.0
WESTRACE First-Line Maintenance Manual for WESTRACE MkI WRTOFLMM Issue 11.0 CONTACTING INVENSYS RAIL W http://www.invensysrail.com Asia Pacific ABN 78 000 102 483 179–185 Normanby Rd (Locked Bag 66) South Melbourne Victoria 3205 Australia T +61 1300 724 518 F +61 3 9233 8777 E [email protected] India No. 112–114 Raheja Chambers 12 Museum Road Bangalore 560 001 Karnataka India T +91 80 3058 8763/64 F +91 80 3058 8765 North America 2400 Nelson Miller Parkway Louisville Kentucky 40223 USA T +1 502 618 8800 F +1 502 618 8810 E [email protected] Spain, Portugal and Latin America Avda. de Castilla Apartado de Correos 6 Parque Empresarial (Edif Grecia) 28830 San Fernando de Henares Madrid Spain T +34 9 1675 4212 F +34 9 1656 9840 E [email protected] UK and Northern Europe PO Box 79 Pew Hill Chippenham Wiltshire SN15 1JD UK T +44 1249 44 1441 F +44 1249 65 2322 E [email protected] WESTRACE First-Line Maintenance Manual for WESTRACE MkI Document CI: WRTOFLMM Issue: 11.0 Date of Issue: 03 Dec 2010 Change History: Issue Date Comment Changed Checked Approved 1.0 7/9/94 WRTFGEN. initial issue 2.0 4/4/96 WRTFGEN, CR273 3.0 30/10/96 WRTFGEN, CR319 1.0 16/11/94 WETFWAYE, initial release 2.0 17/12/96 WETFWAYE, CR1385, CR1728, WR348, WR349, WR350 4.0 1/9/00 WRTOFLMM, initial issue. Compiled PGB from WRTFGEN 3.0 and WETFWAYE 2.0 CR333, 334, 379, 394, 395, 402, 404, 405, 406, 407, 440, 454, 502, 515 5.0 3/8/01 Rebuilt to correct faulty 4.0 build PGB 6.0 20/2/03 CR 783, 789, 790 PGB 7.0 11/10/04 CR831 ML DJ WMcD 8.0 12/9/05 CR325, 340, 345, 372, 378 ML SR WMcD 9.0 29/1/07 CR423, 428, 433 ML SR WMcD 10.0 10/2/09 Updated branding ML ML WMcD 11.0 03/12/10 Updated branding MH WMcD WMcD Copyright This document is protected by Copyright and all information contained therein is confidential. -
Federal Railroad Administration Office of Safety Headquarters Assigned Accident Investigation Report HQ-2008-94
Federal Railroad Administration Office of Safety Headquarters Assigned Accident Investigation Report HQ-2008-94 Canadian Pacific (CP) River JCT, MN December 17, 2008 Note that 49 U.S.C. §20903 provides that no part of an accident or incident report made by the Secretary of Transportation/Federal Railroad Administration under 49 U.S.C. §20902 may be used in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FRA FACTUAL RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT FRA File # HQ-2008-94 FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION 1.Name of Railroad Operating Train #1 1a. Alphabetic Code 1b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. SOO Line RR Co. [SOO ] SOO 209549 2.Name of Railroad Operating Train #2 2a. Alphabetic Code 2b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. SOO Line RR Co. [SOO ] SOO 209549 3.Name of Railroad Operating Train #3 3a. Alphabetic Code 3b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. N/A N/A N/A 4.Name of Railroad Responsible for Track Maintenance: 4a. Alphabetic Code 4b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. SOO Line RR Co. [SOO ] SOO 209549 5. U.S. DOT_AAR Grade Crossing Identification Number 6. Date of Accident/Incident 7. Time of Accident/Incident Month 12 Day 17 Year 2008 04:48:00 AM PM 8. Type of Accident/Indicent 1. Derailment 4. Side collision 7. Hwy-rail crossing 10. Explosion-detonation 13. Other Code (single entry in code box) 2. Head on collision 5. Raking collision 8. RR grade crossing 11. Fire/violent rupture (describe in narrative) 3. Rear end collision 6. Broken Train collision 9. Obstruction 12. Other impacts 04 9.