SEAPO Proceedings of the Third National Seminar o tralian Naval Institute AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

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ISSN 0813-9210 SEAPOWER '84

Proceedings of the Third National Seminar of the Australian Naval Institute

Held at University House and the H.C. Coombes Lecture Theatre, AND

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Page 2 — Seapower '84 CONTENTS Editorial 5 Programme 7 Patron's Address -The Governor-General 9 The Strategic Setting -DrT.B. Millar 13 A Legal and Diplomatic View -Mr R.L.Harry 23 An Indian Ocean Perspective -Vice Admiral M.P. AwatilN (Rtd) 31 A Personal View -MrW.B. Pritchett 43 Community Involvement — Sir Charles Court 51 Industry's View -MrJ.F. Kirk 64 An Economist's View — Professor J.W. Freebairn 75 The Naval View — Vice Admiral D.W. Leach RAN 89 A Decision Maker's View — Right Honorable I.M. Sinclair 101 Open Forum — Mr P. Mirchandani 113 Summing Up — Admiral Sir A. Synnot RAN (Rtd) 129 Closing Remarks — Commodore I.B. James RAN 135 List of Those Attending 136 List of Officials ... 140

Articles or condensations of articles are not to be reprinted or reproduced without the permission of the Institute. Extracts may be quoted for the purposes of research, review or comment provided the source is acknowledged.

The Front Cover: 'Stop your ship, I will board you' Credit: Lieutenant Commander Ian Week/ey, RAN

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Page 4 — Seapower '84 EDITORIAL

The contents herein consist, in all but one case, of the transcripts of the proceedings of the third national seminar of the Australian Naval Institute. Minor editorial changes only have been made to those transcripts, in some cases by the authors, but otherwise by the editor; I take this opportunity to thank all speakers — either for their generosity in letting me print as I saw fit, or for taking time to look over their transcripts. I would also like to thank Lawscripts of Melbourne for their friendly cooperation and efficient service. Introductions to some of the speakers, where those introductions were of sufficient length, are included as a biographical aid. With all respect to the speakers concerned, the others were presumably well enough known to the Seminar audience at least — as Commodore Robertson said 'The following speaker needs no introduction from me!' There was not always time for a discussion period at the end of a presentation, but where there was, it has been included (with the exception of the non-transcript). One of the aims of the Australian Naval Institute is to promote discussion on maritime affairs. Those who attended the Seminar but did not get chance to ask a question, and those to whom these papers are new, are invited to continue the discussion in the pages of the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute. All contributions, whether letter or article, will be welcome. Finally, readers are reminded that the Australian Naval Institute expresses no views of its own: the views expressed in the papers are solely those of their authors. G. CUTTS Hon Editor

Seapower '84 — Page 5 — Seapower '84 SEAPOWER '84

AUSTRALIA'S MARITIME INTERESTS

PROGRAMME Friday, 27th April, 1984

Opening Remarks — Commodore I.B. James, AM, RAN. President, Australian Naval Institute.

Patron's Address and — His Excellency The Right Honourable Official Opening Sir Ninian Stephen, AK, GCMG, GCVO.KBE, KStJ Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Force.

The Strategic Setting — Dr T.B. Millar, AO. Australian National University.

A Legal and Diplomatic — Mr R.L. Harry, AC, CBE. Former Diplomat. View

An Indian Ocean Vice Admiral M.P. Awati, PVSM, VrC, Indian Navy (Ret) Perspective Former Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief Western Naval Command.

A Personal View Mr W.B. Pritchett AO, Secretary, Department of Defence, 1979-1984.

After Dinner Address Sir Charles Court, AK, KCMG, OBE. Former Premier of Western Australia.

Saturday, 28th April, 1984

Industry's View — Mr J.F. Kirk, Chairman and Managing Director, Esso Australia Ltd.

An Economist's View — Professor J.W. Freebairn, Chief Economist, Business Council of Australia.

The Naval View — Vice Admiral D.W. Leach, AO, CBE, MVO, RAN. Chief of Naval Staff.

A Decision Maker's View — The Rt Hon I.M. Sinclair, MP. Opposition Spokesman on Defence.

Open Forum — Chairman: Mr P. Mirchandani.

Summing Up Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot, KBE, AO, RAN (Ret). Former Chief of Defence Force Staff.

Closing Remarks — ANI President.

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His Excellency The Right Honourable Sir Ninian Stephen AK GCMG GCVO KBE KStJ Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Force

Commodore I.B. James: Your Excellencies, to read in your programme note that — and I distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. quote — 'Discussion will be unconstrained by On behalf of the Council of the Australian any consideration other than time and good Naval Institute, it is my pleasure to welcome manners'. you to Seapower '84. Consistent with the Since Sydney supporters of Rugby aims of the Institute, that is, the advancement League assure me that these are the two of knowledge and promotion of discussion considerations that alone dictate the conduct related to naval and maritime affairs, the of that game, you are clearly in for two Council has deliberately chosen a broad stimulating days of discussion. There will, theme for this, our third seminar. Considera- however, surely be unanimous agreement on tion of Australia's maritime interests will be one matter; that is, that as an island continent against a background of enduring features of with great oceans on east and west and with Australia's geo-strategic situation and the to the south, across particularly inhospitable vital importance of the sea to our national seas, the Antarctic continent of as yet largely security and prosperity. We are fortunate to unknown potential, the sea around us is and have a distinguished panel of speakers to always will be of major importance to Aus- address the theme from widely differing tralia. The geography of our continent has so perspectives. We are optimistic that their far proved neither, I think, an undiluted views will provide the catalyst for informed blessing nor an unqualified handicap. and vigorous discussion, both at the seminar This rather equivocal character which our and beyond. To provide additional opportun- isolation possesses has meant that the ex- ity for questions and seminar discussion, you traordinary advances in transport and in will see from the programme that Saturday communications which have this century so afternoon has been set aside for an open much altered the general picture, seem to me forum. The Institute is privileged to have the nevertheless to have brought in their train Governor-General as its Patron, and it is with consequences which are neither universally particular pleasure that I welcome you, your adverse nor wholly favourable. We have Excellency, to Seapower '84 and invite you to gained very much in terms of ready access to open the proceedings. the rest of the world and its happenings, but at the same time we have lost something of the security which our extreme isolation gave us. Of course, at the time of first settlement, our isolation from the European world and in The first two national seminars orga- particular from the United Kingdom was nised by the Australian Naval Institute were regarded as very much of an asset, if not by opened by my predecessor as Governor- those here at least those at home. The General and I am delighted to be able to difficulties of transporting convicts across the continue this rather short-lived tradition by oceans were great indeed, but that at least opening this, the third seminar — Seapower ensured that the return of prodigal sons was '84. This seminar, with its theme 'Australia's most unlikely. Maritime Interests', will hear from speakers The story of Australia's defence prob- having quite differing perspectives concern- lems as seen through 19th century eyes is ing the importance of the sea to our national well enough known — the fear of attack from interests. Experts in their respective fields, the French in the early days of settlement and some of their views may be much at variance persisting long afterwards, and from the with those of others here and I was intrigued 1850s, the fear of attack by the Russians.

Seapower '84 — Page 9 Civilian Australia sometimes forgets how in familiar to all maritime nations, of the seas the second half of the 19th century the around us being more than just a means of Australian colonies were encouraged to and conducting our trade with others, but as did provide a measure of their own naval equally capable of being a medium of trans- defence, always of course in conjunction with port or of concealment for any foreign power the continued protection of the Royal Navy. I that might wish to do us ill. If seminars such believe that Her Majesty's Victorian Ship as this can do anything to make good these CERBERUS was reputed to be in her time the losses, they will have done Australia a signal most powerful ship in our hemisphere. This service. familiar story of defence measures of the last Nineteenth century Australia was acutely century serves perhaps as a reminder that the aware not only of the sea as a means of protection of our roughly 20,000 kilometres of contact with the world beyond, but also of it coastline has always been an enormously as creating the risk of naval attack by vessels difficult problem, just as threats to our ocean of hostile powers, and we owe some, indeed trading routes and to safe access by vessels a great deal, of our most attractive historic to our ports remain weighty matters in any architecture to this fear. Without it we would defence scenario for Australia. have neither Pinchgut in Sydney Harbour, nor The vast bulk of our imports and exports Fort Queenscliff in Victoria; and Newcastle, are still carried by sea; I am told by value Fremantle and many another sea port would roughly 90 per cent. Any serious threat to our be historically and architecturally the poorer. trade routes and to our ports would very There is, of course, additionally and quite quickly bring home to all of us how important suddenly, a new dimension which has the sea is to our lives. The initial European emerged in the context of the ocean about us. settlement of this continent being entirely by The sea bed on our Continental Shelf has sea, it is also not too many decades ago that become of vital economic importance to us, all immigrants to Australia came by sea. the first manifestations of this being the There was a great consciousness of Australia immense significance of off-shore oil. We as a maritime nation, of how much the sea proclaimed our sovereign rights over millions and ships meant to Australian colonists of the of square kilometres of our Continental Shelf, last century. All of them having reached the almost as if to compensate for those millions shores after months' long voyages were, of square kilometres on land which are once here, still very largely dependent on the rendered more or less useless to man by lack sea — wholly dependent for news of home, of water. Very welcome indeed our indige- for the arrival of friends and relatives, for nous off-shore oil has been, but at least to a much of their supplies and for all their layman such as myself in matters of defence, literature — upon the ships and the sea. Even its vulnerability to attack would seem to have travel within Australia was wherever possible created another possible target of great eco- undertaken coastwise by ship for want of nomic importance. The presence of these oil good, or indeed any, roads and because of platforms, vulnerable man-made off-shore the inhospitable hinterland which so often islands, is, if anything, a more dramatic and had to be traversed. hence, to the layman, a more convincing So consciousness of the sea and its ships demonstration of the need for effective de- was a strong feature of 19th century Austra- fensive counter-measures than any number lian life, and the holiday dreams of Austra- of ports prone to immobilisation by the laying lians of even forty years ago always began of hostile mine fields. with a trip to Europe by sea in a great white It is the development in Australia of a liner with perhaps a love affair or lounging consciousness of all this to which a seminar leisure, depending on taste or perhaps on like Seapower '84 can so usefully contribute. capabilities, as an expected incident of the It provides the forum for Servicemen, voyage. And now all this has changed. Nearly academics and others with an abiding in- all who enter or who leave Australia do so by terest in maritime issues to discuss questions air, and this enormously lessens any instinc- of vital importance to this nation, and to open tive national perception of our maritime in- up those questions for consideration by the terests. We have lost, I believe, in large public at large. In this confident expectation measure, our consciousness that we are a that this conference, despite the complexity maritime nation, dependent like all other of some of the issues and the need for expert islands upon the seas around us for our contribution to inform the opinions of those major means of transportation; and we have of use who are less knowledgeable, will make to a degree also perhaps lost our conscious- a significant contribution, I have great plea- ness that as an island we also pay the price, sure in officially opening Seapower '84.

Page 10 — Seapower '84 •a a I

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by Dr T.B. Millar AO Australian National University

Commodore J.A. Robertson: Your Excellen- Mr Chairman, Your Excellencies, disting- cies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentle- uished guests, ladies and gentlemen. After men. I am sure most of us have been quietly that introduction I just cannot wait to hear amused at seminars like this by people who what I am going to say. In fact, I did try to join say The next distinguished speaker needs no the Navy and I got as far as Adelaide from introduction from me' and they then go on to Perth when an unsympathetic Naval doctor speak doggedly and interminably, it seems. threw me out on the grounds that I had just Well, Dr Millar needs no introduction from broken my arm, which seemed to me me, but you are going to suffer, anyway. I first irrelevant to joining the Navy, but he did not came across Dr Millar through his ground- think so. So I joined the Army instead. It is breaking book Australia's Defence in 1964, just over twenty years since, as our chairman when my fairly rabid Australian nationalism said, I first gave a public lecture and then was being fanned to a brighter blaze on an produced a book on Australia's strategic exchange posting in Singapore. I do not know situation and defence needs, and I do not how many of you have recently read or know how many lectures and articles and re-read that landmark in Australian strategic books ever since, but certainly far too many and defence writing, but if you have not, I — I have no doubt about that. urge you to get it out and read it again. Apart I once determined to write a different from the inevitable changes in the Australian book, one about foreign policy generally, and Forces over the intervening twenty years, it my old friend, Professor Macmahon Ball of remains remarkably fresh and pertinent to Melbourne, reviewed it and he started off by this day. saying 'Dr Millar has written another book Dr Millar's call for Australia to be more about Defence and called it "Australia's For- self-reliant in defence matters preceded the eign Policy".' This was not particularly fair, Guam doctrine by five years. Even today, but it did at least bring home the point that Australia's Defence Establishment and the you cannot write about Australia's relations Australian public, in my opinion, have yet to with the outside world without considering catch up to Dr Millar. Since then, he has strategic and defence aspects. As the saying continued to produce other works of endur- is, the general or the admiral sits at the ing quality, notable for their intellectual ambassador's elbow. rigour and moderate scholarly tone, while Any changes to our strategic situation remaining eminently readable. That latter are almost invariably marginal, it seems, at phrase reminds me of, I think it was Quiller the time — shifts of emphasis, the evolution- Couch's saying, 'Hard writing makes easy ary rather than revolutionary. Similarly, de- reading'. When I finally had the pleasure of spite the drama of political announcements, meeting Dr Millar here at the ANU in 1977 he and governments generally tend to announce was no disappointment. Of course he was each change three or four times to get the different — the Millars are if nothing else best value out of them, defence capacity individuals — but he shared his late brother's tends to change gradually with replacements keen perceptions and a characteristic way of or existing kinds of equipment according to puncturing pretentiousness with gentle the continuing conventional wisdom and to humour. the systems phased in or phased out over a I can only hope, sir, that the rest of us can period of years, so it is often difficult to tell catch up to you one day. Ladies and gentle- exactly what we have and what we do not men, Dr Tom Millar. have. Only rarely is there a qualitative shift such as the decision over the aircraft carrier.

Seapower '84 — Page 13 For the most part, the public is only fuzzily rians, academics and the media from within aware of our Defence strength or require- the alliance partners, with one lone Austra- ments. The annual report of the Minister for lian looking on. As we all know from the Defence, if I may say with respect, could to press, there is considerable disquiet within our mutual profit be a great deal more explicit NATO. The massive anti-nuclear demonstra- than it is. I commend the Minister, whom I tions around Europe are in good measure thought was going to be here, to the annual directed against the stationing of American Japanese and West German Ministerial De- intermediate range nuclear weapons on fence Reports, among others, as better mod- European soil, even though they are there els for public information and education. This because the West European governments highly professional audience does not need some years ago asked for them, pressed for me to explain the general basis of our them, to be put there by the United States defence strategic position. The Governor- and thus redress what they saw as an un- General in fact has very ably and succinctly favourable conventional and nuclear super- done it, mentioning the size of the continent; iority by the Soviet Union. the roughly equal size of our exclusive econo- Since that time, fear that a war in Europe mic zone; the long coastline; the location of could begin and that any tactical nuclear centres of population and resources — we are conflict will strike them first has alarmed an archipelago of settlements connected by West Europeans, including the British. In the land; the strength, size, political attitudes and German Federal Republic, according to one nearness of our neighbours; the strength of report, nearly half of all school leavers are our alliances and other international defence opting for conscientious objection to military arrangements. service. The Social Democratic Party of the The fact is that we depend on these long Federal Republic, which until recently was the sea routes for the exports so essential to our Government, is now advertising a retreat daily earnings, to purchase and import the from the hardline policies it had in office and consumer goods and durables, the advanced is considering the possibility of a much- technology and the materials for the high reduced tactical nuclear programme on its living to which most Australians are or would soil and a conventional weapons programme like to become accustomed. Instead of going bearing the label 'Defensive defence'; that is, over once again the generally accepted wis- the use of weapon systems that are able to dom on these aspects, I would like to try operate in a defensive and not an offensive successfully or not to take a fresh look at role, for example, anti-tank guns rather than some parts of it. All of us are conditioned by tanks. our experience and find it easier to predict the While this is both tactically and strategi- past than to predict the future, but if one were cally totally absurd, it does have an ideolog- a visitor from Mars, say, or from Ruritania, or ical appeal. The will of the West German simply an uncommitted objective Australian people is thus less determined than it was a academic, looking at Australia's strategic few years ago. The West Europeans find it situation for the rest of this century, what are almost impossible to sink their nationalisa- the most important factors and what are their tion within a rationalised defence equipment implications? production programme. They would much The East-West Balance rather produce it themselves at far greater At the risk of being a bit controversial or cost than produce it together at far less cost. of making misjudgments, which will un- There is much complaint about the failure of doubtedly be held against me, although not I the United States to consult with its allies on am sure by our chairman, I want to chance major questions. 'Consultation' one of the my arm on some of the main factors. The Europeans said at this conference 'means predominant factor in the strategic situation bringing us into line afterwards'. of Australia, as of everybody else in this The United States itself is troubled by the world today, is the condition of the East-West differences that have appeared between the balance, and I want to talk briefly about that European allies, by what they see as a design — the state of tension between the two super to free-ride on the United States. Some powers and their alliance partners. I have just Europeans have found Mr Reagan's strongly come back from two quite interesting confer- asserted positions not all that less alarming ences, one at Oxford and one in Moscow, at than those of his Soviet counterparts, Mr which the condition of the Western Alliance Brezhnev, Mr Andropov and Mr Chernenko. was subjected to critical review. De Gaulle's cry nearly twenty years ago is The one at Oxford was reviewed by being repeated — the United States will not ministers, officials, opposition parliamenta- commit suicide for Europe. The Soviet Gov-

Page 14 — Seapower '84 ernment has threatened fire and brimstone populations of Poland, Hungary or Romania. on Western Europe while at the same time Nor even perhaps on Czechoslovakia, Bulgar- there is considerable relaxation of tension ia and the German Democratic Republic. In between East and West Germany. any case, there is surely no territorial, econo- Greece and Turkey remain at odds. The mic or strategic gain which could conceivably British Labour Party platform is to eject warrant the Soviet launching of a war of any United States' bases from Britain. The Scan- kind in Europe; a war for which there must be dinavians, especially Denmark, have a semi- a high expectation, not least on grounds of neutralist policy. This is a combination of NATO strategy, that it would escalate into a circumstances that has aroused fear through- nuclear Armageddon. out the Western Alliance that it is beginning Nuclear war between the super powers, to disintegrate, a process which, of course, while the most feared of wars, seems to me Soviet foreign policy is designed to encour- the least likely of wars. Yet, as we have seen, age. Simultaneously, most Europeans seem beneath the umbrella of that Damoclean to fear that the Soviet Union might at any contingency, how pervasive is the resort to time use its regional superiority and its rough force in many places. How often also have we strategic intercontinental parity to launch a assumed from our blinkered concentration new military offensive, either in Europe or on the present that it will continue pretty elsewhere — perhaps the Gulf or the Middle much unchanged, and how clearly has the East. world these past twenty years or so taught us As a sideline, I was interested to discover that, somewhere, the unpredictable is more at the conference that apart from one or two likely than the predictable, the revolutionary of the Americans, no-one was at all con- more likely than the evolutionary. cerned at the possibility that the Soviet Union I still find nuclear war anywhere ex- might take targets of opportunity in Africa, tremely unlikely, but I consider it entirely the Indian Ocean, South, South-East, or East possible that the shifting relations between Asia, or indeed the Pacific. There was even the members of both alliances will lead to some derision of the notion that the Soviet different relations between the alliances and Union might seek to dominate the straits that we will see a rearrangement over the between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans. It next twenty years or so of the pattern of seemed irrelevant to the problems of Euro- power. Some day, and I said this to a Polish pean NATO, so near and narrow has their audience in 1979, some day the Russians will vision become. go home from Eastern Europe and the Amer- A western defensive alliance will, of icans will go home from Western Europe. The course, only be needed so long as the West Solidarity movement in Poland was unique at feels that there is a threat to be defended the time, but it was a manifestation of the against. All the evidence indicates that the forces at work, not only within that commun- USSR will continue for the unforeseeable ist state; in several others, there are changes future to expand its military capacities and to the economic system and to the degree of their global deployment, will remain an un- deference to Soviet power. satisfied political power, will continue to The Soviet bloc will one day break up. dominate Eastern Europe by force, will pre- Now, if and when it does so, it could be a vent by every means at its disposal the time of great danger, but it need not be unification of the two Germanys, except on cataclysmic. It could evolve, perhaps it could terms unacceptable to the West — that is, only evolve, in parallel with the shifting of Soviet domination of West Germany — and priorities within the West. One day or that it will take targets of opportunity where- another, I believe this will happen and while I ver it can. In these circumstances, I believe suspect it will be early in the next century, it that the Western Alliance will retain for some could be before the end of this one, and that years a firm core of mutual interests which, is only seventeen years away. When it occurs, while not producing the most effective unity it will change the whole global pattern of of action and policy, will nevertheless keep it power. I would like to think we have begun in together. this country to think of that. In the meantime, The Soviet bloc itself must remain an we cannot ignore the Soviet presence in the enigma for us and indeed for the Soviet Indian Ocean and the Pacific, and the possible Union. The Warsaw Pact is an alliance held scenarios for tension or conflict there. together by a whip and that is a very uncer- The Indian Ocean tain basis for solidarity. No Soviet Govern- We have a very distinguished Indian ment could count with complete assurance admiral here with us today, Admiral Awati, on the support of the armed forces and civil and in articles written for the Bombay Daily

Seapower '84 — Page 75 last September, extracts of which were re- ern powers over the free flow of oil to the printed in the February 1984 issue of the West; that is, if the Soviet Union were to seek Journal of this Institute, Admiral Awati wrote to interdict such flow by political or military these words: The Soviet Union looks upon means. Even so, I do not see India as being in the Indian Ocean as its soft underbelly, to be any way a hostile factor to our Western watched carefully for any hostile moves by enviornment. The fact that India has ex- the opposing camp'. (I attempted to put in a ploded a nuclear device means that it can pun there about 'navel' intelligence watching make nuclear weapons. As we know, Pakistan the soft underbelly, but I decided against has come close to doing the same. If Pakistan it.| The Soviet Union knows that the ballistic- were to proceed to an explosion, which missile-firing nuclear submarines of the would be deeply regrettable, we would then United States lurk in the depths of the Indian have competitive nuclear escalation on the Ocean. It would indeed be hard for the USSR sub-continent which would benefit nobody, to hunt them down. The USSR's counter- injure both countries, and could lead to a strategy, therefore, centres upon interdiction catastrophe. Such an escalation might not of Western oil routes and in establishing directly affect Australia, but it would have political influence in the region, through the incalculable indirect effects on the security use of its naval, air and land forces and by a and stability of our Western region at the very persuasive diplomacy suitably bolstered by a least. low interest economic and military aid pro- South East Asia gramme'. But what of South-East and East Asia and Whether or not this assessment is the Western Pacific generally? In South-East correct, it has some logic to it. One assumes Asia, as distinct from the South-West Pacific, that those elements of the Soviet, American, we seem at present to have about as stable a French, British occasionally, and Australian situation as we could expect in view of the fleets in the Indian Ocean, with all but the various forces bearing upon it. Both China Australian primarily concerned with the and Vietnam would like to be the hegemonial north-west corner, are there because of West- power in South-East Asia. Vietnam occupies ern including Japanese dependence on oil Kampuchea and dominates Laos. China by its from the Gulf States. If earlier forecasts of pressure in the north and its support of the North Sea oil prove correct, Britain also will Khmer Rouge constrains Vietnamese ambi- be taking once again oil from the Gulf, tions: the USSR with over fifty divisions progressively from about the early 1990s. For spread around China's northern borders con- this and other reasons, I foresee a resurgence strains it (China). of Western demand for Arab oil in the next The strength of the Khmer Rouge gives few years and thus an increasing need to Vietnam a rationale for staying in Kam- protect it so far as is possible in terms of its puchea. Vietnam is able to control Indo-China undisputed extraction and export. The Soviet because of the military and economic assist- presence in Afghanistan, of course, is a new ance it receives from the Soviet Union. China factor in this. I think that such protection, stiffens Thailand against Vietnam and re- protection of both extraction and export, will strains the activities of the Thai Communist require far better co-ordinated efforts by the Party. The other ASEAN states sympathise Western countries concerned, including with Thailand's plight, even though there are Japan and Australia. different views as to whether China or Viet- Recently, a European scholar asked me if nam is the most likely threat to the long-term Australia was troubled by India's naval ex- peace of the region. In good measure, be- pansion. I said I was unaware of any concern cause of Vietnam's activities, ASEAN has expressed in official or other informed circles been a remarkably successful regional organ- here; that since the 1920s, Indian-Australian isation, sublimating its internal political prob- relations have been on a sound and friendly lems in favour of a largely unified external footing, and I did not believe India had any front. expansionist ambitions. It did seem to want In the economic terms on which it was to be the dominant nation in its own area and founded, ASEAN has not been particularly that is understandable. It did not want to be effective; but the world beats a path to its too close to the Soviet Union or to be an door because of its political cohesion, and it agent of Soviet policies. I suppose one must is a strong force for regional stability. Can we still ask the question to which Admiral Awati expect that this rough regional balance, might like to offer some comment later, as to which has given us in Australia during recent where India would stand in the event of years a sense that the world is a quite tension between the Soviet Union and West- comfortable place after all in which to live —

Page 16 — Seapower '84 Dr Millar delivers his address Courtesy: Defence PR can we expect that rough regional balance to Soviet use of former US naval and air bases continue indefinitely? Although that might in the south, and the erection of Soviet seem desirable, I believe it is too optimistic, communications and interception facilities. for the simple reason that there are too many This has changed the strategic balance in this factors with their own kinetic energy, like a region more than anything since the fall of series of footballers of different sizes all Dien Bien Phu exactly thirty years ago. It has kicking away at the same ball from different given the Soviet Union the capacity for directions. For a time the correlation of surveillance from India to the Philippines and resolution of these forces may keep the ball Northern Australia, an area including the stationary, but eventually one or more of the Malaysian and Indonesian straits, the Amer- players may kick harder or in a slightly ican bases of Clark Field and Subic Bay, and different direction and the ball shifts its the air bases in Northern Australia, including position or flies off out of control. North-West Cape. I am not trying and certainly would not Soviet aircraft could carry out interdic- wish to predict the break-up of ASEAN or the tion operations through much of this area, outbreak of some new conflict in the region and conventionally powered naval forces between China and Australia, but I am merely operating from Cam Ranh Bay would also trying to suggest that the present stability have much greater mobility than when based must by its nature be assumed to be more previously on Vladivostok or Nahodka. What fragile than it appears. This does not presup- this means is that the United States and the pose necessarily any change must be for the Soviet Union are now direct and roughly worse, but there are many more disadvan- equal power competitors in an area which tageous than advantageous possibilities. hitherto had been significantly dominated by The only really troublesome aspect of the the United States; an area that includes, of present balance in South-East Asia, of course, course, the vital junction between the Indian is the relationship between Vietnam and the and Pacific Oceans. The recent deployment of Soviet Union. Vietnam has long inclined to a second Soviet carrier into the Pacific has the USSR as a protection against the vast and further improved Soviet naval capacity in that restless presence of its Chinese neighbour. In ocean. The Soviet naval ship-building prog- 1978, it joined Comecon and signed a Treaty ramme indicates a continuing increase in its of Friendship and indeed alliance with the outreach in all three major oceans, although USSR, but it seems to have been the Chinese not notably in the Indian Ocean. Its missile invasion of February 1979, which the United deployments in the eastern region give it a States apparently and (if so) unwisely encour- capacity to annihilate US bases in Japan and aged, that sealed Vietnam's agreement to the the Philippines, as well as bases in China.

Seapower '84 — Page 17 Now all this does not mean that the Although no country except the United States Soviet Union will be able to dominate the has had the capacity to invade and occupy Western Pacific in peace or war. Of all the Australia, certainly, because of ANZUS, our states in this region, only North Korea and security has had a firmer physical and Vietnam are politically sympathetic to the psychological base during this whole period. USSR. The rest are either opposed to the Signed in 1951, ANZUS has had many advan- extension of Soviet power or wary of it. It has tages for Australia and given substantial a poor diplomatic record, concentrating on reassurance to most Australians. Let us be the mailed fist and tending to its own dis- clear that, for 33 years, ANZUS has been a advantage to forget about the velvet glove. luxury, a bonus, not a necessity; not some- Looking out on its Pacific neighbourhood, it thing we should have had as of right. It cannot feel comfortable with the United has added to our sense of dependence States, Japan, South Korea, Australia and and affected our flexibility towards foreign New Zealand actively opposed to it, and most powers both positively and negatively. of the other states passively opposed to it. I believe that American power in the Nevertheless, by its accumulated military Pacific, derived from two major fleets, one in power — naval, army, air and missiles — and the west and one in the east, and the bases in by the establishment of a new command in Japan, the Philippines, Guam, and Tinian, as the Far East, for the first time in Russian or well as Honolulu — I believe that that power Soviet history it is in a position, if necessary, is necessary today as a counterweight to to fight a war on two fronts, east and west. Soviet power, but the situation is not static. That has been historically the enormous Soviet policies of intimidation towards problem of Russia. This is a marked change in Japan, presumably designed to frighten that the global strategic situation and balance of country into neutrality, have had the reverse power. There are still vast problems of com- effect of driving it and keeping it firmly within munication between the Soviet east and the American alliance. A more accommodat- west. Even so it operates at both extremities ing Soviet attitude and shifts within the on interior lines and thus has a freedom or Japanese polity could produce a different flexibility of movement at both. relationship with the United States. That, as we know, is not the case with the The United States bases in the Philip- United States in its relations with Asia and pines are subject to an increasingly fragile Europe, where it operates on exterior lines domestic situation. As we all know, the and must send major reinforcements or United States has been looking at alternative forces of men and supplies by long and possibilities for the location of those bases. vulnerable sea routes through submarine Their replacement elsewhere at the existing infested waters. The matter, of course, is a size and level of sophistication would be great deal more complex than that, but those enormously expensive and geographically facts nevertheless remain. difficult, and I suspect it would not occur. Probably, the United States would have to Role of the US improve Tinian, but it is much further from May I take up one further major item, and whatever action might be expected and with that is the role and capacity of the United out the necessary population and infrastruc- States in Australia's strategic situation. I am ture. Australia could not, and I suspect on not going to talk about Australia's own electoral grounds would not, offer compara- defence capacities; there are several good ble accommodations. The United States Paci- books on the subject! fic defence force anchored to Honolulu, It is quite clear that all the non- Guam and Tinian would be far less effective Communist states in East and South-East in countering Soviet power in this region. Asia and the South-West Pacific, except Can we assume in those or indeed in perhaps Burma and Bangladesh, look to the existing circumstances that the Australian- United States as their guarantor against American security relationship will remain as Soviet and perhaps even Chinese pressures it is forever? Obviously we cannot so assume or threats. Since 1941, here in Australia, we and we should not expect it to do so. have seen our survival as a nation as being America's interests will change, its need of dependent on American protection. That was facilities in Australia will change. Probably by true for the last four years of the war. It has early in the next century, that is within twenty not been true since that time, for the simple or so years, it will cease to need Pine Gap, reason that no nation has threatened us. Nurrungar, and North-West Cape. We must Might Australia without ANZUS have prepare well in advance for that eventuality. been threatened? Well, we cannot tell. Australians also need to continually reassess

Page 18 — Seapower '84 in terms of their own national interest and electorate and its parliamentary respresenta- sovereignty the nature of their relationship tives so that they may do something to meet with the United States, as we must do with those changes which will undoubtedly come. other powers. A sizeable group of New Zealanders want to opt out of ANZUS and a Labour govern- ment there just might do so. One cannot tell the effect such a decision would have on the DISCUSSION Australia-United States situation. Capt P.W. Coombs: I was wondering, Dr Millar, at your conferences abroad whether Questions to be Answered the enormous American deficit which looks Now there are many aspects of our as though it may still be increasing was strategic setting that I have not had time to considered to influence their application of address, which you may like to raise in foreign policy in Europe? question time or tomorrow afternoon, includ- Dr Millar: That particular point was not made. ing the growing pressure of population on There was rather concern about US economic resources across our region: some 2,000 imperialism in terms of, for example, selling people were added to the population of our of large quantities of wheat to the Soviet area since I began to speak; or the attraction Union while trying to do its best to prevent to outside powers of the maritime and sea- the Europeans from selling pipelines to the bed resources within the EEZ of the Pacific Soviet Union — that kind of thing. There was mini-states, who are, of course, so economi- a general concern on economic questions but cally and politically vulnerable; or the ques- it did not relate only to the United States. tion of resources in Antarctic waters, as well After all, the European states have under- as the possible competition for the resources taken to expand their conventional defence of Antarctica itself, to which the Governor- by 3 per cent a year and there was some General referred, once the technology of reference to the fact that I do not think any extraction becomes more economical. Will one of them has managed to do that. The we see, may we not see, irrespective of the economic questions were not in fact the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, major questions of the conference, which which unfortunately the United States has were political questions, questions of will and not yet signed — may we not see a bloody capacity, of co-operation. scramble for these resources? Commodore Robertson: If there is no other I have not talked about threats. A Par- question at the moment I would like to ask liamentary Committee has written a sensible one, sir. An American friend of mine, seeing although obviously speculative report on that what is going on in Europe, said 'If we can subject. I see no immediate threats to Austra- live with a Communist China, maybe we can lia's physical security, but we are not talking live with a Communist Europe'. Would you about the immediate, which is in the process regard the growth of these activities in of disappearing even as we talk here. Will we Europe as perhaps forcing greater isolation, find in some future time of tension, when the or the growth of isolation, in the United United States may have other preoccupa- States? tions, that the elimination of naval fixed wing Dr Millar: There is no doubt that there is a combat aircraft, or the tiny size of our mer- good deal of concern in the United States chant fleet, has given us a serious, perhaps a about the level of will in Western Europe, the decisive, disadvantage? notion that Western Europe is being 'Finlan- Will Australians have the will and the dised', as they say; that is, made into coun- foresight and the economic and technological tries whose foreign policies are largely com- strength to act in time to meet a less comfort- patible with those of the Soviet Union. I think able strategic context? Dare we assume that this is a misconception of the situation, both within the next 43 years, that is in a time for West Germany and for the other states, equal to that which has elapsed since Pearl and there is a very strong anti-communist Harbour, that the world including our region feeling, a very strong sense of independence will not have altered as much as it did during in each of these states. that earlier period? We are in the process of Within Western Germany there is a long- becoming a different country in a different ing, a nostalgia, for a united Germany, but the setting. As with a child, we do not always see people I have talked to in government there the changes going on under our noses. particularly, and in institutes, in the Federal Perhaps conferences like this will raise the Republic, do not really see any likelihood of level of awareness among the Australian this coming about. They cannot see the

Seapower '84 — Page 19 Soviet Union as agreeing to Eastern Germany Treasury would find it difficult. I think that in becoming once again a unit with Western terms of influence we can only influence Germany. The enormous fear of German through the general bodies which are being revanchism, as they call it in the Soviet set up such as the one under the United Union, is such that I am sure it would prevent Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, and any real rapprochement between East and other bodies specifically related to Antarctica. West except in the context of a far wider There are probably people here who know rearrangement within the whole of Europe. more about this than I do but there is the But the Americans do have this sense question, of course, that unless such arrange- that they are being traded on, they are being ments are worked out in advance and the taken too lightly, that the Europeans are not policing of such arrangements is managed spending what they should, and so on. The (and we would want, I am sure, to be part of Europeans have different kinds of concerns. that) then there could be, as there could be in But it is, after all, the Europeans over whose the South-West Pacific, as I mentioned, a soil and against whose homes and families bloody scramble for those resources in which and cities any war is going to be fought. It is the superpowers and other major powers, understandable that they should have a grea- such as Japan, would want to have a very ter sense of caution about taking actions considerable say. which might lead to such a catastrophe. Radm J.D. Stevens: Stevens, RAN, retired. Commander C.J. Skinner: Chris Skinner, The nub of the nuclear warfare problem, as I Navy. Dr Millar, in view of the very large part understand it, lies in the inability of the NATO of the Antarctic continent that Australia lays powers to dispose of the USSR tank forces claim to, and in view of the apparently and I think you said, Dr Millar, that any way of reasonable probability of finding extensive doing this without a nuclear bomb was very mineral and other resources in that area, difficult. In fact it was discarded by NATO, what do you see as the way ahead for and I am a bit surprised to hear that, in view Australia both in the enforcement of any of the developments which have been going claims we may have to the land mass and on with PGMs and so on. I would have secondly in our influence on the trade routes thought that science could come up with that would come into being carrying those something which was not so devastating as a resource materials from Antarctica to other tactical nuclear weapon but perhaps enough parts of the world? to deter tank warfare on the scale that is Dr Millar: Australia has agreed under the envisaged in Europe. In your travels have you 1959 Antarctic Treaty to freeze, if I can use the heard that point of view or heard it dis- word, all claims to Antarctic Territory, and I cussed? am quite sure that there is no real considera- Dr Millar: Yes, there are groups who work tion in the Department of Defence or Foreign within NATO looking at the whole question of Affairs that we have the slightest likelihood the updating, modernising, of conventional ever of obtaining acknowledged sovereignty forces, including precision guided missiles over those parts of Antarctica to which we for use against the very considerable Soviet have laid claim, some of it fairly dubious tank superiority, as you say, and indeed in claim; so that I think we go along with most other aspects of conventional warfare. I do of the states concerned who see this as being not think that they have arrived at a position an area to be held in trust, as it were, for the where they feel they have a satisfactory common purpose of mankind, even though answer to that problem. They are at the there will be some kind of scramble for moment discussing not being able to defeat access to those resources. the Soviet tank forces, but to be able to hold There is a great deal of international legal them up a bit longer while negotiations, working out; a lot has gone on, more will go discussion and so on can go on before the on. The treaty is being reconsidered, as it has resort to either battlefield or intermediate to be, within the 30 years. So that I am quite range nuclear forces. Such a delay would lift sure we will be part of the process of the threshold of nuclear war, and that is the managing the extraction of those resources. sort of thing which is currently being discus- We will not be in any way re-asserting our sed, I understand, within NATO at various title to any of that territory or to the resources levels and within the armaments industries of within that territory, although I understand NATO. But I did not hear anything which there are officers within Treasury who would suggested that they had yet arrived at the like to see us do so. answer. To do so would require such an enor- Mr K. Forsey: Keith Forsey, Department of mous expenditure on Defence that even Transport. Dr Millar, almost as a throw-away

Page 20 — Seapower '84 remark at the end of your talk you suggested use of the Cockburn Sound facility in that the small size of the Australian Merchant Australia owned by the Navy, and certainly fleet may be a significant factor in some that view has received a certain amount of future conflict. I just wondered — you did support in various circles. mention earlier in your talk the importance of I wonder would you address what the Australian trade -- I just wanted to know implications might be for people and coun- exactly what you were thinking about in tries in the region were that to be an option those terms. Was it in support of the Navy, or considered by the Australian Government was it in fact in support of the continuance of and, perhaps more pertinently, what you trading, or did you have some other context? think the implications might be for the Dr Millar: I raised it because it is in people's Australian people? minds. I have seen articles about it in learned Dr Millar: I do not think I used the phrase naval journals and I have looked at the 'American bases in Australia'. I have been question a bit in terms of world Merchant schooled by my relatives and friends in the Naval fleets including tanker fleets. Now, Armed Forces too long to use that word. A there is no doubt that in times of peace, any facility is not a base, it is something quite nation will send its merchant shipping where- different, and these are not bases in the ver it can get a cargo and they are not one bit proper use of that term. The point is, of worried about ideology. Nevertheless one course, that we have offered more use to the has to consider the situation in the event of Americans of Australian facilities and they war and which merchant or tanker units refused, as I understand it. They have taken might be available to a country and I simply up some aspects, Darwin and so on, but not raised the question, not because I have a particularly Cockburn Sound although they definite answer, but because I know it is a make some use of Cockburn Sound now. question in people's minds, and I think it They have not wanted to home port in ought to be, where the very small size of Cockburn Sound because it is so far south. It Australian registered merchant shipping is too far away from where the action is likely could come to be, in a country so dependent to be. I do not understand that there is any on overseas resources, a strategic disadvan- other real base in Australia of which the tage. Similarly, I raised the question — and I Americans might wish to make use. If they have not given a definitive answer because I are going to suffer from a reduction of their do not know it — about the question of fighter base facilities throughout the Western Pacific naval combat aircraft out at sea beyond the (and I suggest that that is entirely possible range of ground based planes. and would completely revolutionise their My point really is that the world is changing position in the Western Pacific) then I do not around us and we are not quick enough to think they are going to come to Australia to notice what those changes are and how they replace them. might affect us. We look at the world and we As I said to you, I think it would be an think it is going to stay as it is and the one electoral problem for whatever Australian thing we do know is that it is not going to stay government was in power if the question of a as it is. It is going to change, and some of the base as distinct from a facility became some- changes are going to be unfriendly to us and I thing which the United States wanted us to think we have got to look at these much more offer. In the event that there were further carefully. I am quite sure chaps up in Russell American facilities in this country or even are doing all that, but a lot more people need American bases in this country or the use of to be thinking about it besides them and to be our bases by Americans, that would un- talking to the politicians who take the deci- doubtedly have some effect across our sions, after all, about these matters. region, but for most countries I do not believe Commander A.M.R. Brecht: Commander Alan it would have an unfriendly effect, a dis- Brecht, member of the Institute. Dr Millar, you advantageous effect. spoke a little about the possible consequ- The Indonesians, for example, would see ences for the region if America were to this as being a strengthening of the Western withdraw from her bases in Australia. I position, a strengthening of the final fallback wonder if you would just give us your opinion position for them if necessary. I have talked in of what might happen if the reverse occurred all the non-communist capitals of South-East and it increased them. What I have in mind is Asia to officials and people in government. that there has been speculation for quite They do not object to our being a member of some time, and particularly fuelled by the the American Alliance. They can see advan- American presence in the Indian Ocean, that tage in it. They do not want to be members of it may be worthwhile for America to make an American Alliance but they want the

Seapower '84 — Page 21 American Seventh Fleet just over the horizon, the position they did; for example, about the just in case. northern islands, the island which Japan had Capt J.G. Longden: Dr Millar, during your owned in the Kurils. I said to them 'Would it discussion and earlier comments you con- not pay you, in fact, to make some conces- trasted the relationship of the Soviet Union sion to Japan on these islands' and the with the countries of Western Europe and official I spoke to said 'Every rock we have, with Japan where the Soviet Union adopts a we hold'; and that, of course, is their whole much more intimidating posture and aggres- philosophy. sive posture which has caused the Japanese I was there only last week, and talking to to move towards rearmament. You also people on the same point, and they all said noted that a change of diplomacy by the virtually the same thing: 'That is our territory Soviet Union could reverse this. Do you see and we are going to hang on to it'. Whether it any likelihood of the Soviet Union seeing the produces the best political arrangement is errors in its diplomatic ways as far as Japan is irrelevant. They act out of a form of intimida- concerned and what is the likelihood of Japan tion as they do against Sweden, for example, being receptive to such overture? continuous intimidation. In the case of Japan, of course, it is much Dr Millar: I do not think I used the word more obvious intimidation. Every day, Soviet 'reverse' but I did suggest it could be quite fighters fly at the Japanese coastline and turn different, if the Russians changed their atti- off just before the three-mile limit and Soviet tude and if there were, as I said, a change intelligence ships sit just outside the twelve- within the Japanese polity, within the mile limit monitoring everything, and they fly Japanese political system. There are no planes round and round and round Japan all doubt neutralist tendencies within Japan as the time, in a process of intimidation. Now, well as national chauvinistic tendencies. you know, it is the case of the wind rather Quite a lot of Japanese do not like being the than the sun trying to get the coat off. client of the United States. They quite like the What the Japanese reaction would be to wealth which the United States/Japan trade a different Soviet policy is hard to tell in relationship has brought to most Japanese advance, but I am quite sure it would have an but they do not always like the political effect and I think also Japan would very much dependence. like to engage in some of the joint venture I was in Moscow about five years ago enterprises in Siberia which the Soviet Union and talking to an official on the Far Eastern has proposed but which do seem to be, on desk of the Soviet Foreign Ministry on that security terms, perhaps not in the interests of very question and I asked him why they took Japan or the West.

Page 22 — Seapower '84 A LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC VIEW

By Mr R.L Harry AC CBE Former Diplomat

Commander D.J. Campbell: Your Excellen- and we welcome you, sir, to Seapower '84 cies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentle- and it is my privilege to invite you to address men. When we were casting about for a the seminar. speaker to address the legal and diplomatic view in the context of Australia's maritime interests, our choice very naturally fell upon Mr Ralph Harry because there can be nobody Your Excellencies, Mr Chairman, Mr better qualified. Mr Harry retired a few years President, ladies and gentlemen. I wish I had ago, following a most distinguished career of had General Millar at my elbow when I was more than three decades in Australia's Dip- an ambassador! He has given us a compre- lomatic Service. He has served variously as hensive view of the strategic situation and Consul-General, High Commissioner and that is a very comprehensive thing. It seems Ambassador, including a term as Australia's to cover every aspect of international rela- Ambassador and Permanent Representative tions and the diplomatic situation and it has to the United Nations in New York. eased my task. I feel rather like General He has been a delegate to many interna- Macarthur in the fable. The story went, during tional bodies, one of which was the third the Second World War, that General Macar- United Nations Conference on the Law of the thur had been shipwrecked along with Admir- Sea. He has negotiated on Australia's behalf al Nimitz and as the rescue boat was coming on Antarctica, and with Indonesia on seabed to pick them up Nimitz said to Macarthur matters. From his Rhodes Scholarship in 'Douglas, just one thing. Don't tell the boys in 1938, to his appointment as a Companion of the Navy that I can't swim', and Macarthur the Order of Australia in 1980 and indeed said 'All right, Chester, as long as you don't beyond — he has since been a director of the tell the Army I can't walk on the water'. Please Australian Institute of International Affairs — do not tell the boys in Foreign Affairs that I he has achieved singular distinction in his have forgotten how to tread on eggshells. field and that is why we wanted him; and yet Strategic analysis deals with power and when we approached him, he was initially capacity and assumes an intention to use it, hesitant, if not reluctant. however unlikely that may be. Law seeks to He said that since his retirement he had sublimate conflict, and diplomacy seeks to developed a very strong personal conviction avoid it. In a world with a superabundance of that Australia's principal interest is what he nuclear weapons and a state of precariously called 'positive internationalism', and by that balanced power and deterrence, as described he meant the promotion of a more organised by Dr Millar, Australia's major maritime in- community of nations as the basis for inter- terest is the establishment and maintenance national law. He wondered at first how this of a better organised international commun- might find application to our seminar, but ity. Such a community requires a comprehen- upon reflection he felt that it could add a most sive and equitable international law of the important element to our debate, particularly sea, defined boundaries, rules not only for in an analysis of handling disputes or pre- navigation and overflight but also for the venting disputes and conflicts. protection of the marine environment, and The Council, of course, was delighted to for the exploitation of the resources of the have Mr Harry on those or any other terms water column and the seabed. Such a com-

Seapower '84 — Page 23 munity also requires an infrastructure of the international language in discourse relat- common ethics and machinery for com- ing to the law of the sea — but I must return munication and co-operation. now to my main theme. When I speak of a world community I do Diplomatically, historically - - and we not, of course, advocate a Utopian world state must consider here reversing Admiral even if that might permit a universal navy or Mahan: the influence of history on sea power no navy at all, but equally I do not believe that — Australia has sought the protection of its international peace and security can be per- maritime interests through multilateral or manently achieved through limited co- bilateral associations. At first, this was operation between the very disparate, though through the British Empire and the Royal theoretically equal, sovereign states which Navy, then in an association with the allied constitute the existing United Nations. Our powers of the First World War when the national survival and welfare, indeed the Japanese Navy, as I recall, escorted the AIF survival and welfare of mankind, depend less from Albany in Western Australia. Next came on the number of our fighting ships than on the League of Nations, promoter of naval the achievement of a much more structured treaties; then the United Nations, allies in organisation for the preservation of global World War 2 and post-war organisation; and security and stability. now we fall back to the defensive alliances of Without ditching sovereignty and the the Western world. nation state, we must aim at the real solidar- ity and prompt community action to reduce The United Nations the tensions of inequality and overcrowding Let us consider first the latest effort at and to prevent breaches of world peace and international organisation, the United Na- to maintain international order. During the tions. The United Nations charter did not long years of negotiation in the UN Law of the produce a united world any more than our Sea Conference, we learned that countries constitution transformed the Australian col- poor in resources do not readily accept onies into a united nation overnight or since, claims of others for the unfettered sovereign- but it has facilitated economic and social ty or the free-for-all of the seas. co-operation and it should not be underesti- A colleague of mine once described the mated even in the area of security. Under the old law of the sea as the nautical equivalent United Nations charter, the Security Council of the law of the jungle. Stability in the can, is entitled to, call upon the members of oceans requires agreement if we are to have the organisation to give effect to its decisions a world community, not only on rates and by applying measures, including interruption duties but also on concepts like reasonable of sea communication. The Council may take access, equitable sharing of revenues, due action by air, sea or land forces, including care in exercising rights and considerate demonstrations, blockade and other opera- restraint in the use of the living and non- tions, and all members have undertaken to living resources of the sea. It is my personal make available armed forces and are re- belief, and of course all of this is personal quired, we sometimes forget, to hold avail- because I have no brief for the Government able, national Air Force contingents. or anyone else, my personal belief is that a Unfortunately, the implementing agree- world community in which the seas will be ments required to put this system of collec- used only for peaceful purposes requires tive security into force have never been much more efficiency and equality of com- concluded or have remained dead letters. munication between nations and individuals Action to restrain the smaller powers from across the geographical and ideological armed conflict has been inhibited by the use frontiers. of the veto by the great power permanent I think it is great that Dr Millar can go to members on behalf of their clients, so apart Ditchley and go to Moscow and talk to his from the non-typical case of UN operations in opposite numbers and I am glad he has done Korea, there has been only relatively minor so. I only wish there were more of that. For peacekeeping action. Few naval forces have the United Nations Convention on the Law of been placed under UN command though the Sea, the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, some have been used to transport troops and Russian and Spanish texts are all supposed to equipment for UN operations. It is almost be equally authentic, and yet half the dele- always preferable that interposing forces gates still had the disadvantage of negotiat- should be under UN rather than national ing on their vital maritime interests in a auspices. language not their own. I personally have As ambassador to the United Nations, I been conducting a pilot project on the use of recommended that Australia, which had

Page 24— Seapower '84 made a useful contribution of observers in took a significantly different view, as I under- the Middle East and police in Cyprus, should stand it, from New Zealand, of the position of send helicopters for use with the UN Force in its naval officers serving on secondment with Sinai. I also suggested that we should give a the British Royal Navy. lead by assuming our practice of earmarking Then came that visit of INVINCIBLE to forces for UN use. Such forces enable com- Sydney and the complicated diplomatic batants to cool off and give time for negotia- negotiations which resulted on the issue of tion and I see no reason why forces in notification of nuclear weapons, but already it readiness should not include naval units. was clear 43 years ago that Australia could no Traditionalists may argue that we have no longer rely on Commonwealth naval co- ships to spare from Australian and neigh- operation for its security and that it must look bouring waters. I recall that when Indonesia to America 'free of any pangs as to our became independent, Australia was invited to traditional links with the United Kingdom', supply a military mission. The Army said it and now we have prenatally excised from our had no officers to spare and the Indonesians national anthem the lines 'With all her faults turned to the USSR for training and equip- we love her still, Britannia rules the waves', ment. though the ABC is not allowed to call them Attachment of Australian naval units to Poms. the UN peacekeeping force, apart from its contribution to world peace, could be a ANZUS valuable experience for the RAN in the arts of It was not until nearly 10 years after John fully international naval co-operation and in Curtin's declaration of independence that the the conduct of the kind of operations which ANZUS Alliance was formalised in the Secur- may be increasingly required as the world ity Treaty between Australia, New Zealand becomes more and more economically and and the United States on 1 September 1951. socially interdependent; UN actions to do Tom Millar has mentioned that and I am sure effectively what the American, French, Italian most of you are familiar with the broad thrust and other action tried to achieve in the of the instrument, but let me remind you of Lebanon, and UN forces in Sinai, rather than the precise wordings of Article 4 and Article 5 American forces. which are directly relevant to our naval commitment and the reciprocal commitment The Commonwealth of the United States and New Zealand. Australia has also through the years Article 4 reads: participated in co-operative security action in 'Each party recognises that an armed the British Commonwealth. The decision to attack in the Pacific area on any of the keep an Australian Company in Butterworth parties would be dangerous to its own and to rotate fighter aircraft through Malaysia peace and safety and declares that it is a reminder of this history. Commonwealth would act to meet the common danger in co-operation is facilitated by a common lan- accordance with its constitutional pro- guage, traditions and, though I understand cesses.' this is diminishing, by compatible equipment Article 5 follows: and doctrine. Commonwealth leaders wear 'For the purpose of Article 4, an armed the old college tie of the IDC. Meetings of attack on any of the parties is deemed to Commonwealth Heads of Government are include an armed attack on its armed made more productive by the ability of the forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Prime Ministers to go into weekend retreat Pacific.' without their Sir Humphrey at their elbow to But this is, of course, only the formal manipulate them, because they all speak basis of Australia's relationship with the mutually comprehensive brands of English. United States in the Pacific area. Again, our In contrast, each Minister of the Euro- co-operation is facilitated by similar lan- pean Community has, and often exercises the guages and lifestyles, though this similarity right to speak in his or her own language. I do can sometimes be deceptive. not know how Margaret Thatcher's German The relationship is partly a business is, but when I knew him Helmut Kohl had very partnership in which there is no such thing as little English. But in any event, the modern a free lunch, but it is not a mere insurance Commonwealth of Nations is not an alliance. policy on which we pay periodic premiums, The navies of the countries of the Common- still less a policy on which the US collects at wealth serve the maritime interests of their maturity. Our expectation that in the event of independent governments. This was under- an attack on Australia in the Pacific or on lined during the Falklands war when Australia island territories under our jurisdiction there,

Seapower '84 — Page 25 that the US administration would act effec- together with rules for delimitation of zones tively, securing the necessary approval of where these are shared between two states. Congress, derives not only from the legal At this point I should like to underline the obligation but also from a realistic appraisal importance for Australia of reaching agree- of our common ethical concepts and world ment with its neighbours on common mari- outlook as well as our common strategic time boundaries. We need, for example, to interest. pursue negotiations with Indonesia to fill the It is these same common interests in gap in our important seabed boundary in the outlook which give a reasonable assurance of Timor Sea. Again, the administrative arrange- American support and co-operation for the ments preliminary to the entry into force of benefit of Australia's maritime interests in the Torres Strait Treaty need to be finalised in waters north of Australia, though these could consultation with the Queensland Govern- perhaps be interpreted as part of the Pacific ment, and as soon as Australia has ratified area and even in the Indian Ocean with which the Law of the Sea Convention we shall also this seminar is particularly concerned. Dr need to define, draft and clear with the Millar has, I think, dealt with the question of Commission on the limits of the Continental what may happen if the Americans no longer Shelf and lodge with the UN our claims to need their facilities in Australia and perhaps if sectors of Continental Shelf beyond 200 they seek greater facilities. nautical miles at the outer edge of the There remains the question of occasions Continental Margin. or periods when an American administration Only when all Australia's marine bound- develops attitudes and objectives which the aries have been firmly established will final Australian people do not share. The US Navy arrangements be possible for the policing could become the instrument of what we and protection of those boundaries and for would regard as unethical, unwise or even the assignment of detailed administrative unlawful policies. Then we have to weigh our responsibilities. Apart from the special cir- short term desire to distance Australia from cumstances of the island populations of US action, to say in an area outside the Pacific Papua New Guinea in the Torres Strait area like the Caribbean Sea, with our interest in and their fishing needs and the needs of maintaining in the long term an intimate and environmental protection, there would seem confident relationship with the United States. no legal, political or diplomatic reason why Without going too far in contingency specula- Australia should not claim the full 12 nautical tion, I would observe that it is clearly easier mile territorial sea and the full 200 nautical for Australia to resist proposals for diploma- mile economic zone. There was a suggestion tic support to the United States in the Atlantic early in the negotiations that, in some places, Ocean or the Mediterranean Sea than in the a 100 mile zone would cover Australia's Indian Ocean, and in the Pacific we are most fishing requirements, but there is no need for likely to share US concerns, as we did in such self-denial. The fact that Australia will Vietnam, though we may occasionally need have obligations of scientific research into to counsel restraint. the fish populations, will be required to In the last resort, however, Australia determine the optimum catch and will need must ready itself to protect its own marine to police and enforce Australian or State interests, to declare and secure recognition of regulations does not outweigh the desirabil- its maritime boundaries, to assert its rights ity of extending to the maximum permitted under international law and to have them limit the area of Australian sovereignty over recognised and to deal, if necessary by naval the resources of the Continental Shelf and action, with attempts by other countries to jurisdiction over the exploitation of resources infringe or diminish those rights. in the water. The Australian Government signed the Maritime Law Law of the Sea Convention. It considered Let us now turn to the major legal that, on balance, the text had incorporated framework for our maritime interests as it is provisions satisfactory for us, not only on emerging. The Law of the Sea Convention of marine boundaries but also on issues like 1982, unlike two earlier UN Conventions, sets navigation on the high seas or in the territo- out precise limits to the breadth of the rial sea and passage through archipelagos territorial sea, 12 nautical miles, and codifies and straits. On some questions, the Austra- rules governing the baselines from which the lian delegation, brilliantly led in the later territorial sea is measured. It creates a con- stages by my colleague Keith Brennan, had tiguous zone, maximum 24 miles, an exclu- been pursuing alliance interests; that is, to sive economic zone, maximum 200 miles, ensure that the ships of our major ally could

Page 26 — Seapower '84 operate effectively for the maintenance of the along with them the United Kingdom and the nuclear deterrent. I believe we carried out our Federal Republic. duty in that respect. The Law of the Sea Convention contains In pursuing Australia's national interests important provisions on the protection of the we sometimes had to accept compromises. marine environment. It requires states to That is inevitable when you are negotiating avoid pollution of the sea, whether from land with 160 sovereign states. I was once accused based sources like rivers and outflow of by the late Rex Connor of wanting to give effluent, or from ships in and aircraft over the away Australia's Continental Shelf. His mot- sea. The International Maritime Organisation to, encouraged by Sir Lennox Hewitt, was like had, of course, already covered much that official in Moscow, 'Every rock we have through its Marine Environment Protection we hold'. All I had reported was that we Committee and Marine Safety Committee. would have to make some concession by way The safety of large tankers is an impor- of revenue sharing if we wanted an interna- tant environmental interest. So is the preven- tionally recognised title to the Continental tion of dumping, particularly of radioactive Shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the waste. Now special provisions to protect the coast. In the event, we accepted Article 82, environment in our region are being drafted which provides that after a five-year morator- by the Pacific Regional Environmental Prog- ium there will be payments of 1 per cent, ramme known as PREP. It is in Australia's rising to 7 per cent in the twelfth year, based interests to support all these international on value or volume of production. I do not efforts. We must not only preserve our fisher- think it was a bad deal for the title we got. The ies and our reef and other of our assets in our United States, as you know, has not signed own economic zone; we must also give the Convention, nor has the United Kingdom technical and other assistance to our neigh- or Federal Republic of Germany, though bours in the Pacific, and this is perhaps China, France, Japan and the USSR all have. another task for our Navy. The US difficulties relate primarily to the In connection with the Pacific I should regime established by the Convention for the recall without elaboration that several of the exploitation of the metallic nodules on the island countries, including Papua New deep seabed in the area beyond the econo- Guinea and other good friends of Australia, mic zone and beyond the outer Continental are promoting the idea of a nuclear free zone Shelf. President Reagan's negotiators were and Australia has given qualified support in not prepared to accept the constitution and the Pacific forum to this general objective but the provisions for financing an International subject always to our treaty obligations. This Seabed Authority and mining enterprise. is not a purely symbolic campaign like the They held out for less hampered operations resolution to make the ACT a nuclear free by their mining companies. The developing zone. countries, for their part, unfortunately were The islands are most concerned about not prepared to continue the process of the fish which are so important to their amending the text to meet US economies. It may be possible, I think, at apprehensions. United States non- some stage, when the area is no longer participation is, of course, a blow for the required for the movement of ships constitut- development of international law and it is to ing part of the nuclear deterrent, and that day be hoped that the United States and its should come, to conclude some such agree- conservative industrialised friends will not, as ment. they have sometimes hinted that they might, set up a syndicate to mine without regard to The Indian Ocean the Convention, but I do not think there is any I come now to the Indian Ocean. Aust- likelihood of a bloody scramble for resources ralia has for many years been a member of in that area. the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the What we hope, is that in the present Indian Ocean. This was set up in 1972 with 15 stage of negotiations, which has already members, to follow up a General Assembly opened in the Preparatory Commission of the declaration on the Indian Ocean as a zone of Convention, that the US need for reassur- peace. Sitting on the Committee between ance, that the wide powers of the Internation- 1975 and 1978,1 found it useful as a reminder al Seabed Authority will be sensibly exer- to the US and USSR of the need for restraint cised and, hopefully, if this can be achieved in their Indian Ocean rivalry and we were able through the regulations being drafted by the to use reassurances which we got from our Preparatory Commission, the Americans can American and Russian colleagues to dis- find it possible to sign the Convention, and suade the more enthusiastic littoral and

Sea power '84 — Page 27 hinterland countries around the Indian Ocean Antarctic Territory. I say the Australian from pressing for immediately unrealistic and Antarctic Territory because it is so by Act of provocative UN action. In recent years, the the Australian Parliament and every Austra- Committee has been enlarged to include, lian ambassador naturally obeys the law and inter alia, the permanent members of the we refer to it not as a claim but as our Security Council and major maritime users. It Territory. I may say that under the Antarctic is now trying to harmonise views and prepare Treaty that claim was in a sense frozen but it the agenda for a conference on the Indian was in no way withdrawn. What was frozen Ocean, tentatively scheduled for the first part was any action by any other power in our of 1985. Of course, it was tentatively sche- Territory which might affect our claim of title. duled, I think, for 1979, 1980, 1981, so it may Equally, of course, we undertook not to not come off, but it is a possibility. press any additional claims during the dura- Australia's general foreign policy on the tion of the treaty. Now, the question of the Indian Ocean was stated by the Minister for extent to which the Antarctic Territory ex- Foreign Affairs on 17 January. Mr Hayden tends, and our obligations to it extend into said, as you recall, that together with the the sea areas adjacent to the Antarctic conti- Pacific Ocean and the region to Australia's nent, is bound up with the future of that north, the Indian Ocean was an area of treaty. In our view -- I think this is the strategic significance to Australia; in particu- Government view though I cannot speak for lar, the Government had an enduring respon- them — extensions of maritime boundaries sibility to protect Australia's western coast- permitted by the Law of the Sea Convention line and our offshore resources interests and would not be new claims but merely the deep interest in the territories of Christmas application of current international law to Island and the Cocos Islands. Since then the areas of sea adjacent to our territory. Cocos Islanders have chosen to be an integral So much for the legal position. However, part of Australia. Mr Hayden added that I agree with Dr Millar that the best way in Australia also had an interest, shared with which we can protect Australian real interests our allies, in ensuring secure lines of com- in the Southern Ocean may well be through munications for its trade with, and civil positive international co-operation in the aviation traffic through, the region and in framework of the Antarctic Treaty. That promoting regional concern for peace and method has already been used in the agree- stability. ment for the protection and management of Under the guidelines approved by the the marine living resources and the parties Government, Australia would, he said, recog- are edging towards agreement on a regime nise the importance of Australia's status as for the exploitation of non-renewable re- an independent but aligned Indian Ocean sources, including the hydrocarbons believed littoral state, both for the pursuance of our to be in the Continental Shelf. In this connec- own interests and those of our allies. Second, tion it might be feasible and advisable, and I continue to play an active role in the United think this should certainly be considered, for Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian the Antarctic consultative parties, the coun- Ocean, maintain the goal of the resumption tries with experience in the Antarctic, a group of United States Soviet talks on arms limita- which now includes India and with China tion in the region and support other arms about to take over a base from New Zealand limitation initiatives where these accord with and conduct a scientific programme also Australia's assessment of its own interests joining the club, this group might seek a and those of the region as a whole. It is a trusteeship or a mandate from the United fairly diplomatic statement. Third, seek to Nations. This would be somewhat different give greater attention to the development of from the post-World War II trusteeships in relations with Indian Ocean island states and, that there is no indigenous human population to a lesser extent, East African states, by requiring care and preparation for independ- broadening our links with these countries ence. The basis would be responsibility for through, for example, cultural exchange and the protection of that unique environment visits by the establishment of a regular including the marine environment in the pattern of naval visits; that is something 200-mile economic zone and Continental concrete. Shelf pertinent to the Trust Territory. I think that would be a positive action that we could The Antarctic take. Let us turn now to the Antarctic which These possibilities underline yet once was mentioned at question time and the again the need for naval co-operation and question of the future of the Australian facilitating and supporting Australian scien-

Page 28 — Seapower '84 tific work in the Southern Ocean and Antarc- has reaffirmed the longstanding international tica, including fishery studies, oceanographic duty of states to co-operate in the repression surveying, climatological and other research of piracy on the high seas outside national into resources. That need will continue even jurisdiction. There is also a duty to give if the Department of Science and Technology mutual assistance in fighting the traffic in secures the necessary funds to build equip- drugs contained in the Convention. I am sure ment and maintain a specialised Antarctic that the Australian Navy could make a useful ship for the Australian expedition and bases. contribution to the deterrence in detection and indeed dealing with international crimes Fishing in South-East Asia as well as in our own zone. I have mentioned briefly Australian We have a strong interest, finally, in fisheries rights under international law. The effective dispute settlement and in upholding rights conferred on Australia, which may, the prestige and effectiveness of the Interna- under our Constitution in some case, be tional Court of Justice and other international exercised or administered by State Govern- tribunals. The development of the interna- ments, will be precise and extensive, and I tional community through law, and the con- hope we shall be able to ratify the Convention solidation of the law of the sea in particular, well before it comes into force, in other words would be set back if the rights of states were to be one of the states whose ratification has deliberately infringed or duties neglected, some effect on bringing it into force. That will particularly in the marine context. Here I tread be 12 months after the deposit of the 60th on eggshells. ratification. Seaborne interventions and even the If Australian fishermen cannot them- mining of harbours may in some extreme selves take the optimum catch in toto we circumstances be justified in support of shall have an obligation to allow fishermen of genuine struggles for freedom or independ- other countries to participate under fair con- ence, but such actions should preferably be ditions. Subject to the special needs of our taken not unilaterally or clandestinely but neighbours, it seems to me that it would with the authority of the competent organ of facilitate control if we could fill our obligation the world community, the Security Council of through joint ventures which would bring the United Nations. If, because of the veto, an responsible fishing enterprises to our zone, emergency is judged to require anticipation rather than throwing the zone open to fishing of UN approval, the power concerned should by a large number of small, sundry fishing surely welcome scrutiny of its action by world vessels difficult to police. Nations which opinion and by the International Court rather depend on fish for most of their protein, like than avoiding debate and looking for devices Japan, have an interest in orderly manage- to evade jurisdiction. Erosion of respect for ment and usually have the necessary exper- international law must be of concern to tise. anyone who believes, as I do, in positive internationalism and extension of the rule of Infringements of Maritime Law law. Mr Chairman, I suggested earlier that it Mr Chairman, I hope I have been able to was more important that international law transmit something of my conviction that, at should be certain and that it should be least for diplomats and lawyers, it is through observed, than that its contents should be the evolution of world community law that ideal in terms of particular Australian in- the ultimate assurance of our maritime in- terests. That is true not only of boundaries terests must be sought. But the world as it and resources but of maritime law in general. stands is a fairly unruly place. Even states Australia has been active in seeking improve- with traditions of observance of international ment of the UN legislative process, that is law, lose patience with the slow processes of procedures for the negotiation of general diplomacy. Other states, for whom the re- conventions likely to develop international volution is the supreme law, flout the rules of law. international conduct by interfering in the One such area covers international affairs of other states, using their diplomatic agreements to prevent me hijacking of premises as bases for terror and force. Clear- aircraft and ships. A meeting recently in ly, countries like Australia must retain an Canberra urged the Government to co- adequate capacity for self-defence, including operate with other countries in efforts to the defence of sea approaches. A navy to suppress piracy in the South China Sea police adjacent waters is no violation of the where boat people from Vietnam had been admonition of the Convention that the high under attack. The Law of the Sea Convention seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes.

Seapower '84 — Page 29 We were reminded last night that the protection of our maritime interests, our Australian national anthem includes the line sea-girt country needs the Navy and if we 'Our home is girt by sea'. The same verse give it the ships and the men I am sure it will speaks of freedom and of work. For the carry on with the job.

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Page 30 — Seapower '84 AN INDIAN OCEAN PERSPECTIVE

by Vice Admiral M.P. Awati PVSM VrC Indian Navy (Retd)

RADM R.C. Swan: Mr President, disting- look forward to hearing from him now, uished guests, ladies and gentlemen. It is an speaking to us on the subject of an Indian honour and indeed a great pleasure for me to Ocean perspective. Vice-Admiral Awati. introduce Vice-Admiral Awati to you this afternoon. I have known him for a consider- able time. Our first acquaintance went back to 1953, and I did spend three months sharing Let me say at once that I consider it a the same cabin with another admiral in the great honour to be invited to speak on an Indian Navy who was his immediate boss — Indian Ocean perspective before such a dis- or has been over many years, so I have some tinguished gathering. What I am going to say association with Vice-Admiral Awati. He has is a personal view and may not be construed just concluded a very distinguished career in even remotely as the view of my Govern- the Indian Navy which of course started off as ment, nor indeed the view of the sea Service the Royal Indian Navy. to which I belonged until recently. I have He had numerous commands, important made great efforts to be objective, but total commands, and when he reached the rank of objectivity on a subject like this one, a subject commodore in 1972 he was the Naval Officer which concerns a developing situation in in Charge of Goa. He was a student at the one's own back yard, is obviously quite Royal College of Defence Studies on the impossible. Some subjectivity is bound to same course as myself in 1975 when we got creep in. to know each other quite well. He was This is my very first visit and exposure to appointed commandant of the National De- your island continent. Its vastness and its fence Academy. He was the Flag Officer emptiness, its climatic variety and its con- Commanding the Western Fleet in 1977/78 trasts are staggering to the Indian mind, vast and I had the privilege to be in command of and varied as India is. I have known a few MELBOURNE when we returned from the Australians in my days, most of them with Spit Head Review and I spent a very challeng- salt in their veins and a few who have been ing and interesting professional four or five concerned with diplomacy and government. days with the Indian Fleet on that occasion. They have all been very open, expansive He then went off to be Chief of Naval people, happy, outgoing and full of joie de Personnel and then returned to Bombay as vivre, reflections of their great and good the Commander-in-Chief, Western Com- environment, mirror images of space and mand. He has many interests outside the energy of the lucky country to which they Navy, some of which include being the belong. The achievements of Australian chairman of the Maritime History Society and sporting energies are a legend around the he was the founder of the Maritime Museum world. These energies have now helped to in Bombay. He has a great interest in sport, in install the America's Cup at the Royal Perth. I trekking, in anything which has a challenge. wish I could have gone and seen it, but He is a great yachtsman. Anyway, through unfortunately time will not permit. the professional relationships which he has One is also struck by the forthright, even cultivated over many years with now senior unconventional, approach of Australians to officers in the Navies and indeed the Defence living and doing, and also to imbibing. In Forces of both the western and eastern which other country would one witness the countries and through his own endeavours spectacle of a beer belly competition prom- and interests, he has a very interesting in- oted by the provincial premier! Your singular sight into maritime and defence affairs. We credentials therefore encourage me to table

Seapower '84 — Page 31 my views with full and I hope useful candour. convened in New Delhi. One hundred coun- You are going to have some controversial tries attended and a number sent observers. remarks from this desk this afternoon and I Forty of these one hundred are littoral or am sure the object is clear to you. hinterland states of the Indian Ocean. Be- tween them they account for thirty per cent of The Indian Ocean World the world population. The oil wealth of this Australia is both a Pacific and an Indian region is enormous. Fifty six and a half per Ocean nation, albeit it has taken you a little cent of the world's proven reserves amount- time to become aware of your Indian Ocean ing to 640 billion barrels are to be found in the identity — naturally perhaps as the majority if north west quadrant of the Indian Ocean. not all of the Indian Ocean littoral countries Besides this, the region is rich in the gold, have nothing else in common with Australia chrome, copper, iron ore, bauxite, vanadium and also because the majority of Australians and platinum group of metals which are live along the Pacific littoral. The vast spaces critical to the advanced technologies of the of Australia, the limitless natural resources, developed world. Looking only at oil, eighty coupled with a thinly spread population, to eighty five per cent of the oil imported by European in origin, a climate of continental the west and by Japan flows from the Gulf. proportions, have moulded your attitudes, Historically, therefore, I believe there your economic perceptions and your may be more than a mere superficial similar- strategic thinking. There could be little doubt ity between 1498 and 1984. In that earlier of the political stability and the economic century, the extra-regional incursion into this health of Australia and one could confidently area was to oust the Muslim middlemen from predict a tremendous burst of energy and the lucrative but also essential trade - wealth from you during the next 100 years. essential to the otherwise bland European Australia has been amply endowed by nature cuisine — in Indian Ocean spices, especially and by geography. in black pepper. This was the black gold so As an Indian Ocean power, Australia is much prized by the Portuguese. Now the one of only two nations which do not belong battle is for black oil, the latter day black gold. to the developing world of the ocean or of the Portuguese caravelles with high poops have south. The other is South Africa. Geographi- given way to American carriers with high cally it is far removed to the southern rim of profiles. The Russians are here too, ostens- this ocean which allows it to avoid the ibly to keep an eye on the Americans. The turbulence in which the poverty ridden world balance of power or the sphere of influence of the Indian Ocean finds itself. This turbu- game of the powerful is once again the lence is a result of the vagaries of the central theme, mostly at the cost of the weak. economics of resources, the problems of But now the weak are not willing to sit back development after a period of retardation, and do nothing. They are aware and they population explosion, the internal unrest and understand the power game. They are not the internecine distrust and warfare among content to let the events take a course which these countries fuelled by the machinations is patently detrimental to their national in- of the extra-regional northern powers for terests. their own ends. The great powers collect the In his recent book Ashok Kapur, who produce and the commodities of the littoral is an observer of the Indian Ocean scene, has states of the Indian Ocean to sustain their this to say about the newfound awareness of standards of living. the Indian Ocean world — and I quote if I This is the basic raison d'etre of the may: north/south conflict, the struggle for produce The Indian Ocean world was, for over and the resultant influence which would flow 300 years, a plaything of the Europeans from access to the resources of the south. and then of the super powers. For the Diego Garcia, Afghanistan, the leasing by the northern states, interventions of all great powers of bases on the littoral and real kinds were within the rules of the game, estate in the hinterland to situate com- indeed it was necessary to export north- munication, satellite guidance and intelli- ern rivalries to the south so that northern gence gathering stations and other defence peace could be preserved. The balance of support facilities, flow from this basic appe- power principle was applied in defence tite and competition for raw materials; but of European intervention in the south. more about bases and leases later. Thus the south was essential for northern Just over a year ago, in March 1983, the international system maintenance. The Seventh Conference of Heads of State or south was peripheral in the sense that Government of the Non-Aligned Countries the organisation and distribution of inter-

— Seapower '84 national power was essentially located in the contiguity of the Indian Ocean to it and and managed by northern states. But the the closed character of that ocean, integrates south, although peripheral as an interna- the whole system of the North Indian Ocean tional actor, was not peripheral as a in a dangerously compact manner, danger- source of resources, land, manpower and ous to those who will not understand its as a playground for northern powers'. significance. When considered in relation to He goes on to state that the Indian Ocean the tremendous advances made in mecha- world wished to avoid being a plaything in nised and missile warfare, in satellite recon- the post-1945 international system. Until re- naissance, in electromagnetic surveillance cently, however, the wish exceeded the and other related arts and crafts in recent power to enforce the wish. The answer may years, this geography has decisive implica- now have come in the form of southern tions for the central balance of power be- managed resources diplomacy, militarisation tween the USA and the USSR. The modern and possibly nuclearisation. Through these missile, interncontinental in range, has ac- means, they hope to interfere in super power cess to all parts of the Asiatic Soviet Repub- planning. lics, and beyond, from the northern part of As I sat and wrote my notes for this the Indian Ocean. address in Canberra in April, it was March in The United States can use this fact to Bombay and both the ambient temperature advantage for strategic weapon deployment and the strategic one in the northern part of against the vast European land mass. It this, the third largest segment of the world cannot be similarly used against the United ocean, was rising. It is still rising. The Iran/ States which is in a different hemisphere Iraq war now in its fourth year has entered its altogether. This geography of the North Indi- most dangerous phase. The Iraqis are thre- an Ocean has led to some interesting and atening to blast Iranian oil terminals. The historic consequences in the encounter be- Iranians threaten to retaliate by blocking the tween Europe and Asia, starting with the Straits of Hormuz with their Navy, thereby Portuguese experience. It is worth noting one stopping the flow of oil to the west and to such consequence which seems to have had Japan. The fleets of the west have massed in an abiding influence on history. The Portu- the Straits of Hormuz to prevent this. They guese of the 14th and the 15th centuries were declare that they will intervene if the freedom a special breed of people. They were gripped of passage of the straits were to be curtailed by a crusading zeal and a religion which or denied to them and to others. The USSR taught them to distinguish good from evil, will not stand by idly. It will use its position in black from white and the straight from the Afghanistan to advantage, to counter any devious. They had an idea, and that idea took western move to intervene in the straits. them to the Indian Ocean and to India around Commentators trace the present situation to the Cape. the Russian occupation of Afghanistan in Whilst the Indian Ocean peoples, the December 1979. That is a plausible view, or Arabs and the Indians principally, had had a one view anyway, but perhaps the begin- long and successful oceanic tradition, they nings could be traced to the immediate post had never stumbled upon the concept of war era or years when in 1946 Russia had to control of the seas to the exclusion of all withdraw from the Iranian Azerbaijan re- others. This essentially European and zealous portedly under a nuclear threat from Presi- Christian doctrine came with the Portuguese. dent Harry Truman. Perhaps! In enforcing this concept, they were to use the Theory of the Straits. Where they got hold The Geography of the Indian Ocean of this theory in enforcing their doctrine of If one is really to comprehend the com- exclusivity is still a matter of considerable plex strategic situation in the North Indian argument among historians. Perhaps their Ocean, one must first understand the peculiar long association with the Arab navigators geography of this body of water and its had made them aware of this strategic fact. It littoral, for geography is really the hand- is also possible that great cartographers as maiden of strategy, at least here. I must the Portuguese were, they had appreciated apologise to those of you who have read my the closed character of the northern part of article (Journal of the ANI, Vol 10 No 1, the Indian Ocean, the entry to which could be February 1984), because some of what I am controlled by guarding the entry point going to say is possibly a repetition, including through the few straits leading into it. the soft underbelly which we will try and Combining the correct identification of cover up if we can. the geographical nexuses in Asia with the The geography of central and upper Asia, idea of their capture and subsequent enforce-

Seapower '84 — Page 33 ment of Portuguese monopoly in the Indian lisation in South Asia. That the huge arms Ocean, was certainly a remarkable insight on pile in Pakistan would eventually be directed the part of King Manuel and his advisors. The against India is a reasonable assumption and scale of the scheme was breathtaking for, as one which the USA must have drawn from Winius tells us 'as few as were the Portu- past experience. guese, as numerous as were the Asians and Maybe I am wrong in assessing this, but the Arabs and the Muslims, and as vast as perhaps keeping India from reaching a power were the areas involved, it seems preposter- status commensurate with its geographic ous that Manuel and his advisors would have location, size and development is a sensible had the nerve to entertain the idea, let alone aim for the super powers, particularly a super put it into effect'. Put it into effect they did, power which is interested in the status quo. and those littoral peoples who believed in live There is nothing Machiavellian about it. and let live knew soon enough that they were Indian progress towards a major power sta- vassals to a European state and monarch. tus cannot suit the objectives of these powers They were to remain thus subjected to the for this area for the very simple reason that Dutch, the French and finally the English in the emergence of another major power on succession. this scene adds to the complications of Someone said the other day that there is accommodating it and dealing with it. It is always a danger in imagining the past and problematic enough to have to deal with remembering the future, but the littoral states China. To add India to it would be most of the Indian Ocean do imagine the past inconvenient. That eventuality must be pre- today and with good reason. The contest for vented, or must at least be delayed. The the control of the nodal points of the Indian arming of Pakistan by the US makes sense if Ocean is once again the central theme in looked at from these assumptions. The ex- 1984, as I mentioned a little while ago. The planation given by a leading US diplomat that fleets of the US and the USSR in this ocean if the United States were to deal only with the are the two main contestants. The winner, if democracies it would be lonesome is quite a there is one, will once again control the plausible explanation. destinies of the littoral states. There can be However, there is in Pakistan today an little doubt about that. Historical evidence, influential body of opinion which opposes indeed experience, weighs in favour of the confrontation with the USSR. Exacerbating littoral point of view that, as in the past, the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan western and northern hemisphere nations has merely added to the refugee population want to corner the commodity markets of the of Afghans in Pakistan. Historically there is Indian Ocean littoral for themselves to sus- not much love lost between the Afghans and tain their technologies and their standard of the Muslims of the sub-continent. Pakistan is living. The chief among these commodities, the inheritor of that legacy and knows this as I mentioned, is oil. There are others like very well. A distinguished Pakistani diplomat rare metals and chrome which are important has this to say of this historical experience of to missile and space technologies. the sub-continent and once again I quote: 'A cool dispassionate historic look at Division Between India and Pakistan Pak-Afghan relations would show what To this end the old economic order must exactly we owe the Afghans who, in the be sustained through the exploitation of the last 3,000 years, have either freely religious and cultural schisms which have allowed invaders to enter our land or always been present in the ancient societies have joined these influxes to the extent of the Indian Ocean littoral and hinterland. that some Afghan tribes such as the Division between, as for example, India and Dakkzais and the Suris have vanished Pakistan have been fuelled by the doctrines from Afghanistan and have settled in the so well practised in the past and now taken sub-continent. There is no record of any over almost lock, stock and barrel by the Afghan ever going back. While many super powers. Olaf Caroe was the high priest Indian Muslims fought for the Afghans of this thinking and practice. His 'Wells of against the British during the first Afghan Power' thesis would like to see Pakistan as a war — 1838-1842 — this favour was gendarme of the Middle East. The unwilling- never returned. Instead, during the Great ness of Pakistan to discuss Afghanistan as an Mutiny of 1857, those of our revolution- issue with the Afghans and with the Russians ary ancestors who fled to Afghanistan is actively supported in the west. The massive were sold back by the Afghans to the arms aid to Pakistan by the USA is certain to British for the price of Rupees 50 if they further the policy of continuing the destabi- had a rifle, or Rupees 30 if they had none,

Page 34 — Seapower '84 i - 5

HMAS MELBOURNE 4 Oct 77 (p 42 refers) Courtesy: J. Mortimer to be suitably dealt with in regimental super powers maintain their technological squares. During the Khilafat Movement, superiority and therefore their hegemony over 20,000 Muslims from the sub- over the lesser powers and lesser peoples. continent, mostly from the Punjab and They view their exclusive pax over the Indian the Sind, went on Hijrat to Afghanistan. Ocean as essential to their strategy of world They were pushed out, some to the primacy. USSR where a few small Punjabi speak- The fact that, fired by such misguided ing communities still exist, or back, liter- hubris, they are helping to upset the balance ally without shirts on their backs.' of power and thereby destabilise the equa- Since 1947, the Afghans have continued their tions between them occurs to them not at all. irredentist claims to Pakistan territory and The urgings of the less powerful to them to have pursued an active policy of inciting yoke their energies to revitalise and restruc- destabilisation and subversion in Pakistan. ture world economy therefore fall on deaf Pakistan knows that Afghan policies vis- ears. a vis herself have little relation to who rules I believe it is necessary for us to under- in Kabul. The short point is that it may be stand how this contest between the US and convenient for Pakistan to flourish a Soviet the USSR has developed. In the immediate threat to it, to attract United States military post war years, the United States established aid or on the other side to make a conveni- and maintained a small naval force in the ence of that argument, but thinking Pakistanis Persian Gulf. It consisted of, as it does today, know that they would eventually have to a tender and two destroyer escorts based at establish a dialogue with the Soviet Union the then British Protectorate of Bahrain. The and Afghanistan to negotiate Soviet with- Indian Ocean was then a peaceful backwater drawal from that country and Afghan recog- and no one except an occasional Alan Villiers nition of the Durand Line as the international bothered about it. It remained the romantic border. Pakistan should then have to live with domain of the gentle trade winds and the life the regime which the Soviets leave behind in giving monsoons. Europe was then busy with Afghanistan. In the view of many Pakistanis, its sixes and sevens. NATO, which concerned better a Finlandised Afghanistan than a itself with holding the red tide in Europe, had Polandised Pakistan! The attitudes of the drawn an arbitrary line along the latitude of super powers, the United States and the Cape Bojador, the western extremity of Soviet Union, are in many important respects Africa, to demarcate its responsibilities. indistinguishable. Indeed, they run parallel — South of that line was of no consequence to only they are wrapped in their respective NATO. The Indian Ocean was therefore iso- ideologies. lated from politics and posturing between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Clash of the Giants There was, besides, no great power resi- While the United States claims that its dent on the shores of this ocean, as indeed presence in the Indian Ocean is really for the there is none today. It was the origin, as it is benefit of the free societies who want to today, of most of the oil and much of the remain free, free usually from the imposition commodity traffic to Europe and the West. of the will of the people upon the ruling Japan was picking up as a nett importer of military elites, the Soviet Union denies that it the Indian Ocean's wealth of raw materials. has any design on West Asian oil, maintains Oil flowed west and east at thirty cents a that its presence in Afghanistan is at the barrel. The Arabs and the Iranians had no instance of the Afghans themselves, those choice in a buyer's market. When Mossadegh Afghans at any rate who have the reins of protested by nationalising the Anglo-Iranian power in their hands. It claims like the USA Oil Company, he was quickly suppressed by that it will continue to ply all the oceans of the his fellow Iranian, the Shah-en-Shah with the world which are nobody's private property. In help of his allies from outside Iran. The this clash of the giants who play realpol/tik to American writ, if it did not actually run where carve out their respective spheres of influ- once the British had only a few years earlier, ence, the littoral countries have become did at least predominate. pawns. It is the appreciation of the great The Russian Navy was not important, powers that the Indian Ocean is going to be of even to the Russians themselves. Kruschev momentous consequence to the world com- had once derided his admirals as fit only to munity in the 21st century. This stretch of the decorate their respective Flag bridges. There world ocean has in its inner space and its is an apocryphal story that I would like to tell hinterland vast riches of raw materials which you of this period about some top Russian will be of decisive consequence in helping the admirals who had boarded an Aeroflot flight

Page 36 — Seapower '84 from Moscow for Leningrad. The next morn- home of about a thousand fisherfolk and ing at the Leningrad Naval Base, two sailors coconut pickers who had been there for were aghast to read that this Aeroflot flight several generations. with its valuable cargo had crashed. 'Was These people were made to move out of anyone saved?' asked one anxious sailor. the island between 1968 and 1971 through a 'Yes' replied the other 'the Soviet Navy'. number of measures. Licences to pick coco- Sergei Gorshkov was an exception to the nuts and to fish were not renewed by the general run of Russian Navy men of this Chagos Agalega Company, the initial lease period. He was busy studying the history of holders. Finally, the remnants were told they the Russian Navy, analysing the causes of its would either move out or remain and starve. many debacles. He was especially interested Most of them now eke out a miserable living in a gentleman called Zinovy Rodzeshtvensky in a miserable existence in a place in Mauri- and his defeat at Tsushima in 1905. He was to tius, the suburb of Port Louis called Roche write his magnum opus, that is Gorshkov, Bois. Mauritius was given some money by The Sea Power of the State', soon after that. the British government to detach the island of Then in 1962 came Cuba. It was a great Diego Garcia from Mauritius' jurisdiction watershed for the Soviet Navy. It sent Krus- when the British Indian Ocean Territory was chev packing with his arid continental out- formed in 1965 by an Order in Council. The look, and forced the USSR to look at the British Government received a considerable oceans around it which made Eurasia the sum of money in a financial trade off — I great world island. Gorshkov was now set to believe it was about $14 million — from the put his theories to the test. He was deter- United States when it purchased the Polaris mined to make the Soviet Navy's presence missiles for its FBM submarine programme felt in all the oceans of the world and register to compensate Britain for the cost of moving its influence. Detente, however, was still in out the inhabitants of the island and to pay off fashion after Cuba. If the importance of the the government of Mauritius. This was part of Indian Ocean in the politics of detente was at a secret deal between the two governments all realised it was only as an area to be when the fifty year lease was signed in 1966. scrupulously shielded from great power rival- In 1972, after a prolonged and acrimo- ries. The United States had all along aspired nious debate, the Congress finally sanctioned to inheriting the British imperial mantle east the construction of a base on Diego Garcia in of Suez and wished to secure for itself phases. The first phase was completed in the suitable bases. It had identified Diego Garcia first quarter of 1982 to make this island a first as early as 1959 as an ideal location for a class aero-naval base. The capabilities of this central base. It was seen as the Malta of the base I do not have to tell a professional Indian Ocean. audience like this one. Of course, Diego From 1959 to 1966, however, Diego Gar- Garcia has now the great advantage of no cia remained in the collective subconscious indigenous population which can cause of the United States Naval Staff in the abs- political or social problems for the United ence of Congressional support. When finally States in the future. For all practical purposes, the United Kingdom Government decided to therefore, this base is in a category by itself, withdraw from east of Suez it made a far- free from the pressures to which other bases sighted arrangement for an allied presence in are subject. The United States has fortified its the Indian Ocean after Britain's departure. It is presence here with agreements of a number apparent now that these arrangements were of littoral states for use of their ports and mainly to help the United States Government harbours for refuelling and repairs, for R&R acquire a lease of the island of Diego Garcia and for other facilities. These facilities are for the purpose of constructing a base. Initial- spread evenly all along the periphery of the ly, there was considerable opposition from North Indian Ocean. the Congress of the United States to the The USSR on the other hand, since 1967 construction of base facilities on Diego Gar- has relied principally on strengthening its cia. The administration therefore had to pare political and economic relations with the down its plans and programmes for Diego littoral hinterland and island countries of the Garcia to a communication facility. The whole ocean to achieve its aims which, in many project almost collapsed on the question of respects, as I mentioned, are identical to whether or not the island was inhabited. The those of its rival. Most of its bases are Pentagon, the Department of the Navy and concentrated in the north west quadrant of the administration resorted to much dis- the ocean, which is a distinct disadvantage to similation, if you like, on this question. It is it, in and around the Red Sea and the Horn of now well known that the island was in fact the Africa. Through its failure to appreciate the

Seapower '84 — Page 37 intensity of Somali feeling over the Ogaden Airborne Divisions, 24th Mechanised Infantry and then by openly supporting the new Brigade, a total of about 50,000 troops. Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, the USSR in These soldiers will be spearheaded 1977 lost the use of Berbera to the United by three United States Marine Corps Am- States. Earlier, this same Berbera had helped phibious Brigades comprising another 50,000 to promote the United States administr- men supported by their aviation and logistic ation's case for Diego Garcia before the support elements. A dozen ships of the United States Senate. A delegation of sena- military sealift command with prepositioned tors led by a Senator Bartlett had visited stores and equipment have moved into the Berbera to the chagrin of the Soviets, whilst Indian Ocean. The Central Command has its the Soviets were still in occupation by the eyes and ears well located all about the way, and gone away convinced that the periphery. Two very sophisticated installa- strength of the Soviet position there required tions to which Dr Millar referred are in countervailing action by the United States Australia operated by the National Security Government somewhere in the Indian Ocean. Agency of the United States, the idea being to Besides its facilities in Ethiopia and the provide the United States very accurate in- country called PDRY — Peoples Democratic formation on Soviet missile locations and test Republic of Yemen — and its very consider- firings of missiles. These stations provide the able force now in Afghanistan since early national and technical means of verification 1980, the USSR maintained a series of deep to the National Security Agency in terms of sea buoy moorings off the islands of Socotra, the unratified SALT 2 agreement. Satellite Seychelles, Mauritius and even off Diego reconnaissance and information on adver- Garcia. The facilities the USSR Navy enjoys at sary movements and deployment are con- Cam Ranh Bay, as was mentioned to us just stantly checked out by the Long Range Mari- now by Dr Millar, in Vietnam, although time Patrol aircarft operating from various strictly not in the Indian Ocean, do have a bases in the ocean. considerable influence in sustaining the I believe that the sophistication in USSR force levels in that ocean. command control and communication line up of the United States forces in the Indian Super Power Force Levels Ocean is indeed a formidable one. To the best The force levels of the rival navies vary of my knowledge the Soviets have not match- considerably over a calendar year. Soviet ed it with their organisation. However, a little and American ships deployed in the Indian while ago Dr Millar did mention to us — and I Ocean are drawn almost entirely from their did not know about it I must say — that the respective Pacific Fleets. The United States Soviets have now established similar facili- Navy now has on permanent station one ties on the territory of Vietnam. That some- aircraft carrier with its attendant screening what changes the equation. But I believe that and support ships cruising the ocean. When in ships, too, the Soviets are behind the deployed here this force is based on Diego United States Navy in both quality and ship Garcia. Its deployment would take it into the days. Relying as they have to on their Pacific sensitive northern part where the force would Fleet for their Indian Ocean deployments, remain for a considerable part of the year on they have not been able to match the US patrol or on exercise. The powerful relay Navy in materials. This is because the Soviet station, as you know for yourselves, in North Pacific Fleet has a lower priority for newer West Cape lends credence to the belief that vessels than the Black Sea or the Mediterra- the United States Navy is probably in a nean Fleets of the Soviet Union. Once in a position to operate its large 18,000 ton Ohio while the modern aircraft carriers, KIEV and Class FBM submarines in this ocean. It is MINSK (and possibly now the NOVOROS assumed that the multiple warheads of the S/SK) have made long sallies into the ocean Trident missiles are targeted on Soviet milit- on flag showing or display cruises, if you like ary and other targets in European and Asiatic to put it that way. Soviet states. Recently, and with the forma- We also know that, in 1981, their support tion of the United States Central Command vessel, the IVAN ROGOV, the modern with its headquarters in Florida, the US forces amphibious support ship, was also deployed in the Indian Ocean have a guiding hand here, but by and large the permanent pre- behind them. The Rapid Deployment Force sence of the Soviet Navy here is represented can now co-ordinate its moves with the naval by older ships of the KYNDA and the KASHIN forces and be used as an on-call fire brigade classes and submarines of the FOXTROT anywhere in this area. This Force now con- class. There have been unconfirmed reports sists of the United States 101st and 82nd that at least one FBM submarine of the new

Page 38 — Seapower '84 TYPHOON class will be deployed in the Australian Influences Indian Ocean. This submarine is reported to Coming now, gentlemen and ladies, to be of 30,000 tons displacement, it can dive your own, your very own, part of the world, deeper and move faster underwater than any the United States has invoked the ANZUS that the US currently has in its inventory. Pact, so in Australia you have allowed it to However, my own assessment is that the situate some key bases and facilities on USSR would probably not waste its limited Australian territory. My information on these TYPHOON force in the Indian Ocean. They facilities is based almost entirely on Dr De- would obtain far richer dividends in the smond Ball's book and his articles in various Atlantic, the North Sea and the Pacific. Here, journals, and therefore I could do no better in the Indian Ocean, the USSR would deploy than to quote from his little book. He says: its ASW submarines to dog the large Amer- 'Although it is not apparent from official ican FBM boats. descriptions of the American installa- The main problem confronting the Soviet tions in Australia, these installations Union in the Indian Ocean is of course bases. have enormous strategic significance. The quality of ships, as I have mentioned, is The official position is that none of the also well below the USSR's priority fleet, that installations is part of weapon systems is, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean and that none of them is of any military Fleets. The United States is far better placed significance. This position can only be both with respect to bases and quality of its honestly held by recourse to the most vessels. I believe that with the allied Euro- idiosyncratic strategic language. That pean navies present in the Indian Ocean, the profound strategic implications derive gap between the West and the USSR which is from the American installations in already fairly wide becomes wider. This is Australia is in fact incontrovertible and what a US commentator has to say on this to that extent they could be targets in subject, and once again I quote: any strategic nuclear exchange.' The Australian contribution to the order of The Soviet Union's naval deployments battle of the West in the Indian Ocean is in the Indian Ocean reflect the fact that its significant. Australia is an outpost of the naval resources are finite. The bases developed north in the deep south, with a available to the USSR in the area general- small population of 15 million in a sub- ly lack infrastructure. The USSR has no continent of immense proportions. As experi- facility like Diego Garcia, nor could it rely enced by the Japanese in World War II, she on its allies to provide the sort of facilities has quite naturally remained true to her that American forces would and do enjoy European culture and inclinations. Australia, in the Philippines, Australia and conceiv- therefore, has had to depend first on Britain ably South Africa. Besides, the USA's and now on the United States as a guarantor general advantage is that it has access to of her existence as a state which prizes its ports over the four quadrants of the European heritage. Indian Ocean. The USSR's access to Throughout World War II and since then ports and bases tends to be restricted to there has been active British, United States the north west quadrant. Thus the US's and Australian get together in certain defence advantage and the USSR's weakness in support operations. As the US need to gather the Indian Ocean area at present is strategic intelligence of a potential adversity essentially a matter of bases. It is also has increased, the possibility of the US important to realise historically how National Security Agency coming to Australia much importance the United States has became a certainty. By the mid-1960s, the placed on its Pacific Fleet and the re- North West Cape installation was in service latively low priority that the Soviet Pacific followed by the Rhyolite and KH 11 program- Fleet in the Far East has had. As it is from mes at Pine Gap and Nurrungar. These last both super powers' Pacific forces that two installations could not have been placed Indian Ocean deployments are made, anywhere but in Australia if the United States this historical difference has great im- were to gain the full benefit from their plications for the relative balance of respective missions. As Dr Desmond Ball naval power in the Indian Ocean.' says, and I quote once again: This is a United States naval observer talking. This geographic factor has two impor- As of today, therefore, the balance of naval tant consequences. One is simply the power in the Indian Ocean lies firmly with the great number and variety of US defence United States. The US Navy is very much the scientific and intelligence facilities in 'cock of the walk.' Australia. The other consequence derives

Seapower '84 — Page 39 from the fact that facilities in Australia have succeeded the United Kingdom as Aus- are essential to some American defence tralia's ally in the post 1960 era. This alliance scientific and intelligence operations. is independent of which party rules in Can- These installations, many of them of con- berra and it is clearly a constant in Australia's siderable value to Australia also, may have foreign and defence policies. However, I do put constraints on Australia's defence and believe that within the limits of this constant, foreign policies. To that extent, Australia's Australia could and should exercise a certain freedom to participate in regional co- flexibility which would allow her elbow room operation has been circumscribed, in some to manoeuvre, to make friends and strike respects severely so. Australian room for other alliances if possible and establish areas manoeuvre as part and parcel of an Indian of mutual trust between her and other Indian Ocean community is therefore limited. It is Ocean powers, which need not disturb the unlikely that as an active participant in the basic assumptions of her policies. Perhaps Western Alliance for defence and strategic the zone of peace and the nuclear free zone in collaboration, she would be accepted as a the Indian Ocean are two such areas. part of that community by the dominant In deciding the kind of maritime forces grouping of the non-aligned countries which Australia should possess, the deciding factor dot the littoral of the Indian Ocean. This would clearly be the situation Australia per- preference for being a part of extra-regional ceives she would have to face by herself in interests must of course depend on Austra- defending her sea lines of communications. lia's own perception of her security environ- As Lieutenant Commander Willis tells us in ment. None can deny to Australia the choice his article in the most recent issue of the of her allies. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute (Feb The maritime interests of Australia stem 84): from her geography first and foremost; from 'Australia is one of the world's largest her growing overseas trade with several trading nations and is heavily dependent Indian and Pacific Ocean littoral states espe- on merchant shipping for conduct of this cially Japan, China and the United States; trade. Some fifty ports are involved in Australia's desire to exploit the seabed re- overseas trading, handling some 12,000 sources under the new Law of the Sea ships per year, over 95 per cent of which convention; the defence of the farflung island are foreign owned. The capacity to effec- territories in the Southern Indian Ocean; and tively protect our shipping as well as that finally the oil which she has to import from of our trading partners must be the first the Gulf to sustain her industries — hopefully priority in our maritime strategy. This not for long though. Her strategic nexus with capacity should be visible to our trading the United Kingdom and now with the United partners and owners of shipping carrying States is important to her, as I mentioned, as our trade or there could be a loss of an outpost of European Culture in the alien interest on the part of merchantmen to milieu of the Indian Ocean communities continue to come here.' which are racially, culturally and in the vast The principle alliance is to be looked upon, majority of cases politically also so utterly personally as I see it, as a fallback position if different from her. Australia is unable to manage a developing In protecting her sea lines of communica- defence situation on her own. There could be tion, Australia cannot be wholly self reliant of course covert assistance in reconnaissance despite her affluence and technological prog- and intelligence information from the United ress. With a population of 15 million, this States, the kind Britain received or obtained theme seems to come up over and over during the Falklands campaign. Australian again. In a continent of almost 8 million policy makers undoubtedly realise that a square kilometres and an extensive coastline premature involvement of the United States of over 19,000 kilometres, she has to rely on a in the defence of Australia, and in this I powerful ally to help her defend herself. It is include the defence of island territories, in the nature of underpopulated, technologi- would only vitiate the strategic situation by cally advanced, affluent societies to be politi- inviting inevitable Soviet intervention on the cally either neutral or be part of a powerful side of the adversary. One could think of quite alliance to survive as national entities. Aus- a few such situations where Washington tralia cannot be neutral, although recently I might be alarmed at the premature invoking read a book on armed neutrality for Australia of ANZUS. The US would probably want to - I do not think it is a feasible proposition. be assured that Australia were doing every- She has therefore to opt for a powerful ally. It thing within her own power and that the was natural that the United States should endurance in conventional capability had

Page 40 — Sea power '84 been reached before it was called upon to Christian communities from Greece and assist by raising the stakes. Once again I Yugoslavia, Poland and Italy and people from quote from Lieutenant Commander Willis: older non-Christian societies of China and 'Political self reliance stems from the South East Asia. recognition that the ANZUS Treaty no This new thinking had its political man- longer represents the same security ifestation in the election of a Labor govern- blanket that it did when it was first signed ment in the 1970s which implemented a new in 1951. The Guam doctrine of 1969 go-ahead policy for Australia with regard to espoused by President Nixon and the its relations with its Asian neighbours, its United States' withdrawal of forces from involvement in military alliances and its inter- Vietnam in 1971 caused doubts to be nal policies with regard to the weaker sec- expressed about the relevance of the tions of the Australian society. The constants, ANZUS Treaty. The message from the of course, in Australian perceptions must US was that it would protect the allies obviously hold fast. No Australian Govern- against nuclear threats but it expects its ment can ignore them, but without doubt allies to bear a greater share of their own political attitudes are changing. Australian defence burdens.' national identity is finally emerging, as I see I must thank Lieutenant Commander Willis it, as this penultimate decade of our century for giving me some talking points. comes to its climax, and the future remains In this context should I venture to say an exciting prospect. that Australia's ORBAT' of maritime forces may appear to be a trifle inadequate or DISCUSSION lopsided for the task or for the tripwire test to an independent but an interested observer CORE J.A. Robertson: Robertson, Australian like myself. I would not go along with those Navy Retired. In making a comparison of the who hold that if the Navy is to fight outside US and the USSR forces in the Indian Ocean, Air Force air defence cover they had best do sir, might we not look at it rather than so under the air umbrella of a United States comparing ship by ship and unit by unit and Navy battle group and its associated Air base by base, should we not look at it from Force. I am not sure this is a tenable view if the point of view that their missions are Australia is to have a credible self reliant different. As I understand it, the Soviet Un- defence posture. There is one other point I ion's strategic mission is sea denial. The would like to make with regard to credibility. I United States mission is sea assertion, and so advert to the United States defence support you need vastly different forces, and to make installations on Australian territory. These a comparison ship by ship is to fall into the undoubtedly exercise important influence on old mistakes that were made in the 20s and Australian thinking on matters defence, mari- 30s of assuming that the fleets were going to time or otherwise. There are two aspects of meet in great battles. Would you like to this matter which bear consideration; first, comment on that? that these installations commit the United VADM M.P. Awati: Yes, I can comment on States automatically to the defence of Austra- that very simply: that you are right and what I lia and second, that such US commitment is said was deliberately weighted to create a necessary for Australia's defence. certain amount of controversy and raise Personally, I do not think or believe that questions. But there is a limit to what you say. today in 1984 either of these assumptions Sea supremacy also includes sea denial, and hold good in the formulation of Australian a force which is supreme at sea, as proposed foreign and therefore defence policies. I may, by the Assistant Under-Secretary for Defence of course, be totally wrong. I see Australia as Preparedness — the one who is responsible a nascent Indian Ocean power, increasingly for the entire concept of the US Navy's aware of her neighbours in the Indian Ocean. deployment in the Indian Ocean from 1966 She is convinced that her future is linked with onwards — it is quite clear that the United the future Indian Ocean community in many States Navy today is not only supreme in the important respects. The old ties with Britain Indian Ocean but it has forces to deny the use and Europe, and to some extent with the of this ocean to the Russians at the appropri- United States, are weakening and with them ate moment. So I believe the sea supremacy the old Anglo-Saxon or North European mission inevitably includes a good deal of norms and mores. Australia is developing her sea denial capability. Am I right or would you own distinct personality, a mixture of old and object to that? new European culture leavened by the new CORE J.A. Robertson: No, I would not say so, immigrants from Catholic and Orthodox 1 Order of Battle

Seaponer '84 — Page 41 sir, because I believe that if you are trying to in the Indian Ocean would be most welcome move traffic around the world that is a to Indian Ocean littoral states, countries, different problem from trying to prevent it provided it is operating as a totally self moving. After all, the weapons of choice for contained independent group, taskforce — sea denial, I would suggest, are our maritime task group — and not in any way dependent strike aircraft, submarines and mines. on eitherthe United States Navy or the Soviet VADM M.P. Awati: I meant sea denial from Navy for supply and support. the point of view of combat forces, that is, of CMDR G.F. McLennan: Sir, the approach you picking the Soviet ships out of the Indian took in your speech today gave me the Ocean and deny them the use of their sea impression that the Indian Ocean is the last denial mission, or the employment of their frontier of the East West confrontation and sea denial mission. I believe this would be you gave as the main reason for that the black obviously the way that the 7th Fleet comman- gold which is no longer pepper but now the der, or the future 5th Fleet commander, oil of the Middle East. When that black gold would look at his deployment. goes, what would you foresee as the situation CMDR C.J. Skinner: Skinner, sir, Navy. You in the Indian Ocean? Do you believe that we did not say a great deal about the north east will ever return to the days of calm and peace Indian Ocean and particularly the building of or will we continue to have a major con- naval and other bases in the island groups frontation in that area? Furthermore, could there, particularly Port Blair. I wonder if you you tell us what you would see as India's role would comment on the role of that expansion should the major powers withdraw from that of capability in that area? area? VADM M.P. Awati: The north east Indian VADM M.P. Awati: A very interesting ques- Ocean is just as much in the fray, or in the tion indeed. Here we must once again im- frying pan or whatever it is, as the north and agine the past. This liquid black gold is not the north west, and our development of a going to exhaust itself, certainly in the days of base at Port Blair is to be viewed from that your grandchildren or my great grandchil- angle. We have been trying to develop this dren — maybe another 150 years, maybe 100 for some years, but money and finances and years plus — so one must really look into the bureaucracy stops us from doing it. At the 22nd century for that sort of thing to happen. moment we have a small facility there of What the Indian Ocean then will supply by repairs, of alongside berths and what have way of commodities will really depend on you. If you have not visited Port Blair you what one finds on the seabed. The great must go and see for yourself. It is a very argument until very recently was the man- lovely harbour, very good for sailing or ganese nodules in the Indian Ocean, sup- yachting. The entire Japanese fleet apparent- posed to be very rich, but already that has ly, Kirita's fleet after its sweep of the Indian been overtaken by the sulphide deposits on Ocean, of the Bay of Bengal, sat in Port Blair the Chilean coast and in the United States — theNavyBayasit was called — forawhole Gulf and to that extent I think what we were fortnight repairing and recuperating in 1942, told a little while ago about the conflict in early 1942. There is nothing very secret concerning the enterprise may have already about what is there in Port Blair and I hope been upstaged. But coming back to the Indian the Royal Australian Navy will send a squad- Ocean, I think once the oil runs out or we find ron around there to visit us. alternative sources of energy — maybe hyd- CORE J.S. Dickson: Could I just follow that rogen from the sea or whatever or sun's one up, sir, by asking what would you like to energy — obviously the importance of the see Australia's maritime contribution to the Indian Ocean as a commodity supplier will Indian Ocean region be and would you assess run down to that extent. But the Indian Ocean that a more continuous presence there would is also a provider of some important metals be welcomed or resented by the countries to the advanced technologies, the missile around the Indian Ocean littoral? technologies of the world, and that will VACM M.P. Awati: It would be welcomed, continue. Maybe by then a number of the but only as Australian Navy — not as part of a Indian Ocean states and powers themselves US taskforce. It would be most welcome, as will be requiring these metals for their own indeed Admiral Swan will tell you —when he missile forces — God forbid it should happen, and I got together some years ago and tried but the trends are that we are moving in that to prove that we are compatible; we operated direction of advancement, either through our aircraft from each other's carriers, the transfer of technology or indigenous de- VIKRANJ and the MELBOURNE. So I think velopment of these technologies which will the presence of a Royal Australian Naval Fleet require these raw materials from the oceans.

Page 42 — Seapower '84 A PERSONAL VIEW

by Mr W.B. Pritchett AO Former Secretary, Department of Defence

I feel that I might stand here this evening We are indeed badly in need of profes- rather on false pretences, because the orga- sional, military input to the further develop- nisers of the Symposium first asked me to ment of the strategic guidance. We can all speak to "The Defence View" respecting welcome, therefore, the prospect of greater Sea-Power, not appreciating, I think, that by achievement with the recent strengthening of the time the Symposium took place I should the office of the Chief of the Defence Force (as have no official view, but should be speaking I am glad he is to be titled in future). as a private citizen and free man. However, If we are going to progress with the they courteously persisted in their invitation development of a national maritime strategy, and suggested that I might give a "Personal and to derive our force structure from it, it is View". desirable that we shed all assumptions, pre- On that score, too, I feel somewhat conceptions, received wisdom and hallowed embarrassed because my rather disjointed doctrine. It is not enough to sweep an expan- comments and queries will be all too familiar sive arm across the watery map and proclaim to those of you with whom I have worked in 'Obviously we must do this and possess that recent years. Nevertheless, even the process out to so many 100s or 1000s of miles', or to of questioning, or rubbishing, what I have to invoke the importance of our maritime trade. say could stimulate more substantial and We can hold no truths to be self-evident, but comprehensive statements on the signifi- all must be thought through and tested in our cance of Sea Power for Australia into the own national discussions. I suggest that we Twenty-First Century. I do not purport to can find it helpful always to start with the make such a statement myself, and it would question, 'Why do we need a navy at all?'. be presumptuous of me to try to do so. As far This is not the question that we heard put as I know, such a statement does not exist with lugubrious irony after the carrier de- today. In my experience, we are usually too cision. It is a serious and proper question. If readily satisfied with sweeping generalisa- the taxpayers are to be asked to part with tions that could do for the naval force of large sums of money to fund our maritime almost any nation; or we content ourselves defence effort, and if they are to be confident with factitious argumentation worked up to that that money will be responsibly adminis- support some particular force structure or tered by competent professionals, we must resources bid. We have yet to produce an be ready at all times to give convincing original naval thinker, our Australian Gor- answers to this question. The disturbing shkov, and doctrine indigenous to our own ignorance and incomprehension of Austra- national circumstances. A good deal of what lian defence interests and problems evident we hear seems still to be strongly influenced in recent journalistic and other comment on by the perceptions and preoccupations of our the so-called Strategic Basis Paper leak sug- 'great and powerful friends'. A disproportion- gest, among other things, that we might not ate amount of attention is given to narrower have been doing too well in this respect — and shorter term naval interests at the ex- even allowing for the Sisyphean nature of the pense of more fundamental and abiding task. issues of our maritime strategy. Our problem is compounded by factors beyond our national situation. The large technological developments of recent de- cades have made great inroads into tradition- al concepts about sea-power. Over all hangs (Time precluded the delivery of this paper in full) the imponderable nuclear factor.

Seapower '84 — Page 43 Admiral Gorshkov says that "the main, an even wider sense. It is a mark of most universal and effective kinds of forces of sovereignty and of intent to protect the fleet have become submarines and air- sovereignty. Even if we were to entrust our craft". It seems common ground between security to a Zone of Peace, as I heard on TV a Soviet and U.S. maritime authorities that, speaker advocating a few nights ago, pre- despite the ever increasingly complex and sumably that zone would have to be policed. expensive defensive systems with which they How else would we discourage the Serpent are fitted, the role of the vulnerable surface from intrusion or deal with him should he combatant, once conflict has started, is going enter uninvited? to be at best extremely limited. Yet the Soviet Beyond these essentially, but not entirely taxpayer has funded some remarkable sur- peacetime tasks, the strategic guidance says face ships, the rationale for which is widely that we should provide against low-level seen as obscure. contingencies, and a basis for the expansion No doubt the lack of significant maritime of our Defence Force should there be indica- conflict since World War 2 has much to do tions of adverse change in our security with the confused state of maritime doctrine prospects. We may think of low-level con- today and with uncertainties about force- tingencies as situations usually involving the structure rationale. It seems generally use of military force, but to a very limited accepted, however, that concepts of sea degree and with the object of exerting politic- supremacy and sea control now can have al pressure rather than inflicting military validity only in a most limited sense, amount- damage. ing in fact to "sea denial". The question of contingencies, whether If we start with consideration of our own low-level or more serious, presents problems national circumstances, we are, we can for the defence planner, for we are blessed agree, surrounded by water. Certain essential with friendly neighbours at the present time tasks flow from this. Let me mention, for and foreseeably. None wishes us harm or, example: anyway, gives the slightest sign of ever • hydrography, an essential activity if we thinking of using military pressure against us are to have the mastery of our geogra- - leaving aside all questions of capability. phy necessary to its policing, protection These circumstances must have significance and exploitation, especially military ex- for the political and defence policies and ploitation. programs that government adopts, i.e. what • support of national legislation and inter- we actually do and fund in our defence effort. national law, convention or treaty gov- However improbability and remoteness are erning sea areas variously under our not reasons for us to avoid hypotheses about sovereign jurisdiction, e.g. respecting possible changes for the worse in some fishing, health, customs and pollution. future, at present simply imaginary period, • protection of offshore assets and polic- and to use these hypotheses to study military ing of sovereignty. problems and requirements and to de- • civil-support tasks such as Search and velop doctrine to cope with them. One thing Rescue, and the display of a protective is constant in our strategic situation - presence to the remoter, isolated settle- geography. Our defence planning must be ments on our long coastline. founded on study of that and its potential. • research into our maritime environment Capability is not an end in itself, but should and the systems and operating proce- be driven by strategic principles. dures required for military operations The sea is a medium peculiarly suited to there. low-level acts of aggression. Simply an am- Not all these tasks are given to the maritime biguous alien presence could be an attack elements of our Defence Force, But Defence, upon sovereignty, requiring response; and and specifically naval involvement is likely to there is a range of more or less violent continue essential. harassment that need not involve the ex- Moreover, without a navy certain basic treme sensitivities of incursion onto our land conventions governing relations between territory or the large escalation involved in air states could come to be flouted, e.g. the response from (relatively expensive) display requirement to seek permission for entry by a or shadowing or feint to actual attack by foreign warship into our territorial waters or gunfire, missile or bomb. the requirement not to implant devices on What we are talking about are such acts our sea bed or reefs without our permission. as harassment of: The possession of a naval force-in-being • our fishermen is part of the relationship between nations in • off-shore installations

Page 44 — Sea power '84 • sea traffic, civil or military, in areas of our mands for ship inspection. When we say jurisdiction e.g. by close shadowing or "denied to us" we have to ask what that manoeuvring means. Does it mean, e.g., only ships under • unauthorised incursions and acts of the Australian flag or all ships transiting the intimidation straits en route to or from Australian ports? • sovereignty violations or challenge Just to pose this question indicates the • feints of one sort or another. significant political and practical difficulties Such acts do not constitute acts of war and for the closers of the straits: the contingency justify sinking ships or bombing ports. Given must be one of the less credible. However, capability, a risk of escalation would be setting these complications unrealistically inherent; but we could reasonably expect aside, we have a nice problem in the exercise that these situations would not be allowed to of sea-power. escalate to war. We can be sure, however, At one extreme we could, I suppose, do that there would be a call for a robust nothing but make diplomatic protest and response, along with a requirement to keep it divert shipping to other routes. At the other limited and controlled. We should know what extreme we could ready ourselves to try to we would do, how we would handle these fight a way through, come what may. In situations, what military choices would be between, there could be a series of graded advised to government. Moreover, if we steps - clearly are competent to deal with these types • simply putting ships through in defiance of incidents, then that is a significant dis- of the ban; couragement to their ever happening at all. • putting ships through under naval The point about limitation and control is escort, but of a modest kind, such as a an important one. In the circumstances that mine-sweeper; we are postulating, military combat and milit- • escalating the naval escort or putting one ary victory in the conventional sense are not or more naval units through. dominant considerations. The military leader The situation is one of probe and bluff, but or commander is very much the agent of with important stakes and hazard for both political policy, for certain political effects and sides. influence are major objectives. Amid the calculation of the conse- These acts of harassment could readily quences and costs for either side of overstep- be carried out from neighbouring territories, ping the mark, we may note again the tight but also by more distant countries should political control to be expected, and the limits they have the capacity and motivation to for both sides on what might be achieved at project their power to our waters. acceptable cost by combat. The problem for Of course, there are many ways in which both is how to handle the situation so as to pressure can be brought against us by a win the first blink. dissatisfied foreign government — for exam- In this hypothetical situation we are ple, by staying away from our wool sales. The using sea-power to assert rights and to make type of military or quasi-military harassment clear that it could cost to deny them to us. that we have been hypothesising would have The other situation that I want to touch penalties for the perpetrator in terms of costs, on is the use of sea-power for diplomatic and risks, political and perhaps strategic reper- strategic projection. I consider that there are cussions internationally. But these acts are strict limits to the benefits for Australia from credible, and they are readily mounted given this usage. Take diplomatic projection to the necessary political preconditions. Let me distant lands. It is fine to have our ships visit repeat that — given the necessary political and say "Hello — we are friends". But there is preconditions. So our first defence require- not much to it if that is all there is to it. Our ment is a wise and effective Foreign Affairs hosts, will want to know what's the follow-up administration. — what do we want to trade, or intend to Moving away from harassment in our give. "Your ship says you care about us. own waters to other peace-time acts in- Great! Now prove it." volving sea-power, there are two situations Occasional naval visits can help sup- about which I like to speak briefly. port wider programs for the promotion of First, passage through straits. Still in the relations; but they cannot promote these area of hypothesis and low-level contingen- relations themselves, let alone substitute for cies, and well short of open conflict, it could them. So if all we can think of or want to do is be that passage through straits to which we to send a ship, better spend the money were entitled under international law was one elsewhere. day denied to us or molested, e.g. by de- I have similar doubts about the use of

Seapower '84 — Page 45 sea power for distant strategic projection. be involved and to secure political or more What we are saying in this case is, "Look. tangible lodgement in the S.W. Pacific region, This ship you see is merely the token of much what then might be the nation's perception — more substantial forces that we can deploy to and the calls on our sea power? The hypoth- help you or — as the case may be — to hurt esis is remote, but bears pondering. We you, if such and such happens". But it is ought to have some idea of what military nonsense for Australia to show the flag in this options would be open to the Government in way to distant countries, when we do not in various contingencies in the S.W. Pacific. fact have the sort of forces to affect their So far I have been trying to suggest some circumstances significantly, nor the interest basic circumstances and considerations that to become militarily embroiled in distant need to be taken into account in the develop- regions. (It is only in our political moralism ment of our national thinking about sea that we are an imperialist power.) power and our vulnerabilities to it and re- This does not mean that we would not quirements of it. Although sea power in a join in some international action, as we have maritime role might be involved in this in the North West Indian Ocean. But in this situation or that, particularly respecting sur- case our prime political target is likely to be veillance, the sort of operations mentioned other members of the party, especially the would seem to be predominantly naval. They senior member, rather than the object of the could be carried out by ships of no great size gesture. or sophistication. The effectiveness of our So I am sceptical about the value of use of sea-power would derive rather from long-range naval deployments beyond our our understanding of it, and skilful strategic own area of primary interest — although I and tactical use of it in the circumstances acknowledge that our Ambassadors usually postulated. like them and that they can help Service Let us now turn to situations of greater morale and training. They might even offer substance respecting both motivation and opportunity in exercises for us to show our capability — still in the regional setting, and professional competence, which is no bad still, of course, purely hypothetical. Indeed thing at any time. the situations now contemplated are very The situation is different nearer home difficult to envisage; but they arise from the where naval visits are part of a well- potential of our geography and so warrant established, diverse and organic relationship. investigation. They denote community of certain strategic I do not intend to propose scenarios but interests and our wish to be part of the merely to indicate possible situations and security politics of our neighbouring regions. tasks. Again, they can advertise our professional Mine counter-measures would seem to competence. All these things are important in command high priority given the ease with regions whose proximity makes them highly which mines can be laid and that it has only relevant to our security. to be thought that they might be laid for I shall not elaborate respecting South precautionary counter measures to be called East Asia. Respecting the South West Pacific, for. Mining, however, is a very serious act, the projection of sea-power serves all the also with impact upon the entire international purposes that I have mentioned, but the maritime community. It would be hard to situation has special problems and is more justify except in circumstances of really major speculative, requiring closer consideration by and desperate conflict. Government. I offer only a few comments. It is similarly unlikely that a regional Generally the communities are very power would risk antagonising the interna- small. Frequency of visits needs careful tional community by other indiscriminate thought — as does what we want our visits to attacks against shipping. And what about say, and what they might be taken to say — shipping to and from its own ports? But our which could be two different things. military shipping and military-escorted ship- There have been suggestions from time ping, perhaps our coastal shipping and ship- to time that our sea power should include ping in proclaimed zones could be vulner- capability to carry some troops and aircraft to able. ASW operations would therefore seem a "trouble spot". Is regional intervention part necessary from the start at focal points and at of our strategy? Crude intervention to prop certain coastal areas and ocean approaches. one political group against another seems In considering the ASW contingency a great unlikely to command support in the admini- deal would depend on the submarine stration of the nation. However, if an un- strength and capability of the other side, friendly external power were or were likely to bearing in mind the three or four to one-on-

Page 46— Seapower '84 station ratio and the requirement for pro- out to sea — one conventional concept - submarine reconnaissance if effective anti- obviously relates to the endurance of the shipping operations are to be maintained by larger vessels. But my feeling is that the the foe requirement for them needs much closer ASW operations have tended to domin- definition in terms of our own national ate our maritime perceptions. They are, of strategic circumstances, which includes the course, a fundamental dimension of sea regional strategies and capabilities that might power; but our requirements need to be seen be ranged against us and the advent of in the perspective of our own circumstances high-capability alternative systems in our and not through the eyes of, e.g. the British inventory. What is the unique quality offered RN, with its proper concern for Atlantic lines by the larger ship and why is that quality of communication. If our defence posture is important to us? to be rational, simplistic statements about the I have not mentioned carriage and escort importance of overseas trade are no substi- of long-distance transports or support of tute for detailed analaysis of credible threats, amphibious and land operations. We can of the range of effective counter-measures envisage such operations to points in our open to us and of factors of probability and own coastline. And the possibility of trans- timing. Defence investment in peacetime is port to neighbouring regional territories can- largely about insurance. We must be pre- not be ruled out. I myself, however, do not pared to make judgements about probabili- envisage this as did an American colleague ties and degrees of risk and to select our some years back, who suggested to me that insurance options accordingly. It is hard to our Defence Force might best be modelled on see attack upon our ocean trade being the the U.S. Marines — i.e. for over-the-beach profitable strategy for a regional adversary — assaults in our neighbouring regions. I have diverse routing alone would enormously never felt that our Force should be structured complicate his task, and closer in his sub- essentially for projection and intervention. marines would enter areas of high risk. Structuring for our national purposes will, of An important task for our sea power course, give important elements of our Force could be the interdiction of hostile surface capability for projection if the Government shipping. Such shipping would be vulnerable wants this. to attack by our submarines and perhaps Sea-power continues to have major im- missile-armed patrol boats, but especially portance in regional conflict — i.e. limited from the air, guided initially by our over-the- war — beyond the lesser contingencies. In- horizon radar. (The submarines in fact might creasingly air in a maritime role becomes an be deployed on surveillance and ASW opera- integral element of sea power in surveillance, tions, rather than strike.) reconnaissance, air-defence, ASW and strike Some of these considerations apply to roles. I believe that the nation is entitled to ourselves. Air cover could be expected for expect the closest cooperation between our our surface combatants if they had to venture air and naval Services, and evidence that they within range of enemy air, e.g. when escort- are working together in their exercises, com- ing shipping to a northern port; but there mand, and other preparations, to maximise could well be questions about putting high our national sea power. value units at risk. The strategic guidance tells us that, on all Blockade operations against an offshore rational calculations, conflict between the territory beyond hostile air range could suit Super Powers is improbable. When we are these units, say to protect the territory or to talking about war-making, history suggests deny the enemy supply and reinforcement that rationality has little to do with it. Howev- had he seized it. er, it is reasonable to expect that, rational or However, respecting the larger and more not, politicians and their military advisers are sophisticated units, in the regional circum- going to be given pause by the high risk of stances that we are hypothesising one finds catastrophic devastation inherent in conflict oneself asking, 'Where are these ships? What between nuclear powers. It seems a safe are they doing, and why? Could their work be assumption that they know a good deal more done adequately or as well or better by lesser about this than even Dr Caldicott and the units and or by other elements of our mari- peace-marchers. time force, sea and air?' Much attention is Is there anything we in Australia can do paid to the defence of those units. But to in respect of our sea power to reinforce this deploy a unit, or units, whose prime achieve- risk of catastrophe and the avoidance of ment is self-defence does not make much conflict that arises from it? We may be able, sense. The role of escort or interdiction far "over time" as they used to say, and at great

Seapower '84 — Page 47 financial, political and other costs to develop required to provide a platform for nuclear and deploy a sea system capable undetected weapons. At the present time and prospec- of launching nuclear warheads with range tively as far ahead as we can assess the against inland targets. future, I believe that such a requirement is not But if we were, would this contribute to likely to be proposed to Government for avoidance of war between the Super Powers? consideration. However, as Professor Millar Would it contribute to Australia's security reminded us, as the years roll by circum- from Super Power attack? stances can change. I myself have always believed the answer I might note in passing that nuclear to both questions to be "no". Any increment propulsion is a separate question. The Australia might add to the huge U.S. arsenal Whitlam Government ensured that Austra- would have no significance in deterrence of lia's treaty rights in this respect were not the USSR. Indeed, our possession of such a impaired by the Safeguards regime entered capability could complicate U.S. strategy and into under the NPT. Perhaps these rights have attract direct Soviet hostility and pressure since been surrendered or curtailed — and against us. that might not matter given what seems to be Given an unrealistic postulate of a bi- the prohibitive costs of nuclear propulsion lateral confrontation between the USSR and systems: It seems desirable, however, that Australia (and I don't mean some low-level our naval professionals keep informed of maritime push and shove), it is perhaps developments so that if, one day, significant conceivable that our possession of a surviv- advantages offer regarding cost and perform- able nuclear capability might gain us some ance, Government might be so advised. negotiating mileage. It might even gain us a If Australia's Defence Force can play no measure of security if our partner in this part in the nuclear stand-off between the tense relationship thought the benefits from Super Powers, what about the deterrence or attacking us not worth the risk of damaging conduct of a conventional war? retaliation. However, in the more realistic I have always found it very difficult to context of a Super-Power confrontation, no- envisage conventional conflict - - as we body is going to be much influenced by our understand that historically — between the relatively trivial capacity. We should probably Super Powers, certainly of any duration, never know if our systems had worked. because of the imponderable risk that the Australian nuclear platforms in the con- party getting the worst of it would resort to text of the Super-Power confrontation do not nuclear weapons. (Perhaps it will all be make sense to me. changed by the introduction of the new high What about a regional nuclear role? technology weapons but at this time we must Successive Defence administrations have re- leave that to later assessment.) jected this. But it is worth recalling that when The low credibility of conventional con- Australia strongly supported the Nuclear flict is no argument, however, against deterr- Non-Proliferation Treaty in the major U.N. ence. Without deterrence the Soviet Navy, debates of 1968, it stated its understanding e.g., might not directly attack NATO or other that acceptance of the self-denying ordinance western shipping for fear of retaliation regarding nuclear weaponry assumed an elsehwere (and it has its own substantial international regime protective of nations' mercantile marine); but it would be free to security. If that assumption failed, then na- conduct a range of activities detrimental to tions would have to think again about their western interests — and why should the U.S. Treaty obligations. have to rely upon escalation? So there is a Governments owe it to us all to keep requirement to show capability to respond themselves expertly informed about regional effectively to aggressive maritime opera- — and other — developments relevant to the tions. Also, such response has political nation's security and to make decisions to effects in the international community that promote and protect that security. No region- can be just as important, or more so, in the al nation at this time seems likely to pose us Super Powers' competition. with a nuclear threat. But we cannot simply However, the maintenance of deterrence, rule out the possibility for ever. From a the improbability of limitation of conflict to Defence point of view — and let us readily the sea, the range of other options over time acknowledge that at this time that point of for damage to western interests at less risk view might be overruled by other points of and cost, and the questionable relevance of view influential in our polity - - from a conventional maritime operations should Defence point of view we cannot responsibly nuclear exchange begin, all suggest that say that the Defence Force could never be historical images of maritime conflict offer

Page 48 — Seapower '84 little guidance to us in the modern world. lian sea-power in this wider strategic dimen- Even so, while Australian Governments sion beyond our own primarily national con- maintain the alliance with the United States cerns. and accept a place in the strategic camp Difficult questions are involved. De- opposed to the USSR, then we have obliga- mands for inter-operability, which is an tions to support and cooperate with our ally. expensive word as Tange would have said, What support and cooperation is a matter for with our U.S. ally, for example, should be Government from time to time: at present considered not against some vague assump- our maritime surveillance patrols, support of tion of combined operations in future conflict, US naval deployments by reception of ship but against explicit views about the character visits and our own Indian Ocean deployments and extent of our involvement in peace-time might be noted. deterrence and political operations, having We have to acknowledge that although regard to the insurance we seek for our our activity might have little military signifi- national contingencies. The choice is not a cance it can be important politically in many simple either or; but we should, I believe, ways. For example, it can help a U.S. Admini- avoid being swept uncritically along on a tide stration attract support for its maritime of alliance politics, with little question as to operations. It can to some extent enhance the realities and benefit, and national capacities political impact of those operations by wide- and interests. ning their political base, and this can contri- What I have tried to suggest in these bute to the limitation of Soviet influence. If comments is that our thinking about sea- the competition between the Super Powers in power is not as well developed, up-to-date which our alliance declares an Australian and comprehending of our national circum- interest and position — is politically and not stances as is desirable. I offer my comments militarily shaped, military capacity and activ- not in any sense as a final word, but as a ity still contribute. There is a place for Austra- stimulus to that thinking.

HMAS GERALDTON 8 Mar 84 Courtesy: Navy PR

Seapower '84 - - Page 49 Page 50 — Seapower '84 COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT The After Dinner Address by Sir Charles Court AK KCMG QBE Former Premier of Western Australia

Commodore I.B. James: Ladies and gentle- it was a matter of personal and economic men, it is my privilege, as President, to survival, and the only way to do that was to introduce Sir Charles Court, and to welcome stick together. There was a further important him on your behalf as our after dinner consideration at that time for those responsi- speaker. He needs no introduction. Sir ble for the defence of our country, and that Charles has been a household name in was the fact that we had little danger of a Australia for many years, respected for his substantial number of people being a poten- initiative, drive and dedication, and for his tial fifth column with a serious ideological many achievements, particularly in Western commitment to a potential enemy. At that Australia, and as Premier for eight years. He time, Defence thinking was oriented more on brings a wealth of experience and an impor- fighting our battles in somebody else's back- tant perspective to this seminar. We look yard rather than having to defend our country forward with particular interest to your on our own soil. At that time also, war address, sir. I have no doubt that your views seemed so remote from our homes and from will be stimulating, and for some perhaps, the direct personal danger to our families. even controversial. The dramatic suddenness with which this changed before and during the Second World War is something about which we should continually remind ourselves and particularly Mr President, and the other participants those who insist that there is no serious in the seminar. outside threat to our nation in the foreseeable I have a very simple message, and I make future. This is dangerous thinking. no apologies for it. All of it you will have heard before, but somebody outside the Adequate Preparation Services occasionally has to say some of I have a very simplistic approach to these things. You will find out at the end of Defence. In private life, I believe in insuring my remarks that the main message I want to adequately all the tangible assets I have and get across is we have got to get the commun- also all the other things that are insurable ity back to understand what Defence is all risks. At the same time, I fervently hope I will about. My attitude to Defence and the three not need the insurance. It is not a question of Services has changed markedly since my whether you can afford insurance; you just pre-war civilian days. I had the view pos- cannot afford to be without it. Now, Defence sessed by most people in the community in is an enormously big version of that simple those days, that the Services were not very insurance philosophy. Our whole country and efficient, not very bright, they were ponder- our whole people are at risk. It is no good ous, they were unimaginative. Nevertheless, looking to the insurance company after the at that time there was a very strong public event if you have failed to make a proper feeling that the nation had to have a strong contract. Likewise, if you have not planned Defence Force capable of defending our land. your defences well and invested ahead in You must remember that at that time we personnel, training, ships, aircraft, weapons, were not all that far from the First World War equipment, transport, communications and and there were strong feelings of patriotism support facilities, there is literally nothing you that could be very easily stirred at that can do in an emergency if it arises except time. You also want to remember the Great hope that the Lord is on your side, and I Depression was still with us, and all Austra- remind you that the Good Book says the Lord lians came together during that time because helps them that help themselves.

Seapower '84 — Page 5! And as equipment becomes more soph- land like ours. It is something that takes isticated and technology more advanced, the decades to build up into a capable compo- time for its acquisition and the time for nent, well able to operate alone or co-operate training in its use gets longer and longer — it with our allies, but it can be destroyed compounds, it is not a simple extension of overnight fn one simple Cabinet decision. The the time. If you move about, as I have done impact on morale is obvious. Other compo- over the years, and still have to, you find that nents in the Services start saying, 'Who is the people who dread war the most are those going to be the next?'. Likewise, I want to say, who have been in one. These same people with all the emphasis I can, that we are too understand best and they advocate the mean-minded in our attitude towards our strongest, the importance of adequate de- Reserve Forces. The political and the Treas- fence preparedness in terms of equipment ury resonse always is These things take and training. prodigious sums of money, there are other It was with my previous civilian attitude political priorities', and you know the things that I enlisted in World War II. I quickly that go on and on. realised how dependent we were on the pathetically small but very capable group of professional soldiers -- and I am talking The Value of Preparation about the Army, because that is where I was What they are really saying is that with - some from Duntroon, some from the old our present thinking, the adequate defence of Australian Instructional Corps; and these our country is beyond our capacity, we only were supplemented by those who had served intend to go through the motions of appear- as volunteers in the militia. There were even ing to do something about it, and hope for the some old salts from the First World War who best. Now, I have a great respect for the good had a contribution to make. As much as we sense of the average citizen. If something is civilian Servicemen might have been critical explained in straightforward, honest to good- of the professionals when we first joined up, ness terms, they have an amazing capacity to we soon found that their numbers, their understand what it is all about and to accept knowledge, their training, their dedication, sacrifice. But first, there must be a clear determined how far and how fast the nation demonstration of the political will, the could dilute the trained talent and thus ex- political will to defend our country, and this pand the Services. can only come from Governments, and hope- The problems of the Navy, the problems fully with bipartisan political support. It must of the Air Force, were even greater, because be a genuine long-term total commitment. of the complexities of their Services, the very The community also expects a curtailment of specialised nature of their Services. But ex- some of the other Government expenditure pand they did, and they played their part in a where there is obvious extravagance and great and glorious but very costly allied waste, to avoid the taxpayer having to carry victory. In all of this, we must never overlook the whole, the whole of the extra Defence bill. the fact that the vessels, the aircraft, the They will accept some, they will accept a weapons and the communications with substantial amount, but they do not like which we finished World War II were only a accepting the extra amount if they have got to shadow of the sophistication and high tech- bear the whole burden when there are other nology of today and the future. Before some- inefficiencies and waste. body says 'What we did for World War II, we Some people are quick to point out that can do again', I want to get in first and say, the time spent by some Service personnel — with all the emphasis I can, we cannot do it Navy, Army, Air Force — in the Services is again. Things have changed, the whole ball comparatively short. Some leave at the end game is different. Time, money, access to of their first term. And I remind these people equipment and technology, will defeat us that many would stay in the Services longer if unless we are right up with the field before a the policy for the future of the Services were crisis comes. But all of this adds up to my more certain and the community understand- personal conviction that we are not realistic ing of Defence were stronger. Also we must in the current size of our professional and emphasise that their departure from the reserve Defence Forces, their equipment and Services is not a loss to the nation. Their their training. training is an important and a valuable invest- For instance, no argument has yet been ment which stays with us long after those advanced to convince me, as a citizen, that people leave the Services. we can dispense with a Fleet Air Arm as part Their basic training and their skills can be of a tough flexible Defence Force needed for a quickly updated in an emergency. In the

Page 52 — Seapower '84 meantime, the community is the better. The were going to be denied equipment from community is the better for the influx of other nations. They did it so well that they are trained and disciplined citizens in their midst now selling their technology to the Amer- who understand what Defence is all about. icans. This is even more so in respect of the high skills that are developed in the Services in the Dependability of Logistic Support training of apprentices. This is a great invest- Governments have never addressed ment, which has never been properly asses- themselves properly to the real anatomy and sed, never been properly understood or the dependability of the civilian essential appreciated. These young men and women support available to the Defence Forces. You are well trained in their technical skills, their do not have to be a student of the various education is greatly improved whilst they are ideologies to realise that there are some who being trained. The nation finishes up with seek to weaken the family, social and institu- well-educated, well-oriented, well-disciplined tional structures within the nation, destroy and skilled people, and if they do not con- respect for authority, and cause divisions and tinue in the Services they go out into the disaffection within the community. Also, community to add something very special in when you have the responsibility of leading a today's economic climate to the economical Government, you become very conscious, if development and the growth of the nation. you have got any sense, that in reality many This applies particularly to those who are of the essential community services are in the trained in the maintenance and the repair of hands of a few, and not in the hands of the today's sophisticated electronic and com- management or in the hands of the profes- puterised types of equipment. I do not know sional staff. These people have power far where we would be without them. And they beyond that understood by many people in are still available as a valuable reserve in a positions of responsibility throughout Aust- crisis, while they make a valuable contribu- ralia. It is vital to the defence of the country tion to the nation in the meantime. They are that the essential services of power, of water, not a loss. We need more of them, and we do of sewerage, drainage, transport, fuel, com- not talk enough about it, we do not value it munications, medical, essential engineering, properly. and other backup services, function efficient- We are not dealing today with the De- ly to keep the community supplied, to main- fence Forces based on the traditional type of tain community morale, and back up the sailor, soldier or airman of the last war, as I Armed Services when they are committed to knew them. Although, in the final encounter, operations. let me emphasise, the Servicemen on the We have already seen a handful of ground, in the ships, in the aircraft are militant people deny an essential service to indispensable if success is to be achieved. the community, not once but many times. The Falklands made this clear, in spite of And if I were the Prime Minister, and his advanced technology. However, we are lock- Government, and if I were one of the Heads of ed into high technology in which the educa- the Services, I would be spending a lot of tion, the training, the commitment of techni- time working out how reliably these essential cians and academics are very much part of services can and will, or will not function, in the Defence effort, regardless of how close or times of crisis. It is no good assuming that how far away from the enemy, or whether patriotism, self-preservation, or the national they wear a uniform. The classic example of urgency at the time, would change things so this is in Israel. The contribution of Technion far as certain key people are concerned. — Technion being the famous Institute of It is quite different to what it was before Technology in Israel — has made it possible, the previous war. There is little purpose in where necessary, for their Defence Forces to having the best trained, the best equipped, keep ahead and independent of technology the bravest Armed Services in the world, if needed for their very survival. It has been a the nation is not going to be able to supply very dramatic story, I do not know that we essential services to its people and its understand it. And we should understand it Defence Forces in the time of crisis. This is better. I do my best to get our own Institute of not something that you can sweep under the Technology to go and look at Technion, look carpet. It is not a nice thing, it is not an easy at the history of Technion, and see what they thing, and it cannot be swept under the did to make it possible for that nation to carpet. It is something that has to be flushed survive not only in terms of their economic out into the open. I did my best with it. If I was development but more particularly in respect there, I would still be at it, because it has got of some of the matters of defence where they to be brought out into the open.

Seapower '84 — Page 53 The Indian Ocean responded wonderfully. The protesters have This brings me to the critical question of been comparatively few, and even if they the Indian Ocean and the importance of our become more organised, reflecting a national maritime interests. I have been outspoken on and a world pattern I am sorry to say, they the question of adequate defence of Western should not be allowed to deviate us from the Australia. I am also conscious of the fact that main purpose, namely, the defence of our the very size of our state and the smallness nation. We have to remind the nation and the and sparseness of the population, together Western world that the Indian Ocean carries with our capacity to produce huge quantities more tonnage than any other ocean in the of food, of natural fibre, minerals, metals and world, and tonnage of a vital nature. energy, makes us — that is, Western Australia Therefore, an Australian Navy and Air — a very tempting prize for anyone really Force presence of appropriate size, capacity determined to challenge our ownership. and range, working closely with our allies, Our contribution to the economic and with appropriate land forces in Western prosperity and stability of the nation is out of Australia, is a vital part of the economic as all proportion to our numbers, and let us face well as the military security of the area: and the fact squarely, there has not been a we often forget that it is vital to the economic Federal Government which has been pre- security of our state and of the nation. It pared to think of Western Australia adequate- might surprise some of you to know that ly in terms of its economic and strategic value although we are only 8 per cent of the to Australia. Always the political clout of the population, we earn 20 per cent of the eastern states, with particular reference to nation's exports, and this will increase to 30 New South Wales and Victoria has prevailed. per cent by 1990 if the right policies are And I want to say that this is equally marked followed and we start exporting LNG plus in terms of Defence. I was heartened, tempor- additional agricultural, mineral and industrial arily I might add, early in the term of Prime products. We have very sophisticated pet- Minister Fraser when he started to take a roleum platforms and rigs off our coast. We personal interest in our concern in Western have long offshore and onshore natural gas Australia about our defence. There was the pipelines, with more to come, and these have memorable day that Admiral Hayward and to be protected. We have known huge natural Malcolm Fraser, and myself as Premier, spent gas reserves off our coast, extending over at my request on USS OKLAHOMA CITY, in hundreds of miles, some 800 miles. You Fremantle Harbour, in April 1976. I picked might say that everywhere along that 800 well, because I did not know when Admiral miles you can find natural gas, and further Harward came there that day, as the Com- out to sea as well. That stretches from Barrow mander of the US 7th Fleet, he was about to Island right through to the very north of our leave us and become the Chief of Naval state, with hopefully oil in large quantities to Operations for the US Navy. I appreciated the be discovered and supplement our existing frankness and the professionalism with oil finds. It is a very great prize, a prize by which he and his staff, and the Australian world standards, and unfortunately at the naval personnel present, explained the situa- moment most of it, of course, is in the sea. tion in the Indian Ocean and the strength of But it is some 800 miles from Barrow right to the Soviet involvement in this and other parts the north up to the area which is now in of the world. At the same time, it was controversy over the East Timor boundary. explained that you can only deploy the The vulnerability of these petroleum in- United States Forces at a certain density at stallations, our fishing industry, our major any one time, and the question of priorities northern resource export ports is obvious, as must of course inevitably raise its head from is our accessibility for those who have ulter- time to time. I mention that for a purpose, ior motives, whether it be drug runners, because I find every time this question of the illegal fishermen, illegal migrants or activity of the USSR in the Indian Ocean is saboteurs. raised, it is played down, and every time after I do not ignore the significance of the that, it has been proved that their strength is Pacific and other oceans that surround Aust- much greater than has been claimed at the ralia, but I think it is fair for me to concentrate time. on the significance of the Indian Ocean. We I make no apologies for encouraging the have had a very august visitor dealing with Americans to send nuclear and conventional that particular matter today in a very capable ships to Western Australia, and I assured way, but I look at it from a different angle to them that their Servicemen would be wel- what he does. It is very important that we comed. The people of Western Australia have have the opportunity at this seminar to look

Page 54 — Seapower at the total view so far as the Indian Ocean is ably establish a bridgehead in a remote part concerned. I feel it is my duty to emphasise of the country and have a long supply line. the vulnerability of Western Australia and the But against this, you must realise that the importance of WA to the nation and, can I invader has the advantage of surprise, pre- emphasise, to the free world. We often forget meditation, commitment. Unless, of course, the value of Australia as a whole, because of our intelligence and surveillance, with the its food, its fibre, its minerals, its energy that ability to deploy our forces and to intercept, it can produce in surplus, its value to the free has been stepped up many times on what it is world and not only to its own economy. at the present time. The sea has always been a vital part of It is unrealistic to expect the Navy to do Australia's existence. Its national significance their proper work off our coast and deeper has been lost on the general public in recent into the Indian Ocean with their present times because of the increasing use of air establishment, especially without a modern travel. Now is the time to rekindle the interest aircraft carrier and without adequate RAAF in the sea, as we hopefully seek to awaken a support in Western Australia. It might make greater public interest in modern Defence good sense, from a Treasury point of view, to needs. It is a case of 'horses for courses', and undertake coastal surveillance on the cheap therefore the Defence developments along in the way that has been announced in the our coast should be tailor made, with modern last few weeks, including an expanded role installations, equipment and capabilities to for the police, but are we doing the right thing ensure adequate surveillance with adequate by the Services, by the three Services? Are backup. What is effective for surveillance and we not being shortsighted in denying them coastal interception, of course, is quite diffe- the equipment and practical training and rent to what is needed to operate in co- experience, ready for a day when that work operation with our allies deep into the Indian will be done in earnest in a much more Ocean. But I emphasise, we must have both. serious way than now, important though it We must let any would-be invader or intruder might be now? know that there is a plausible deterrent, the And even if it is more costly, and might sea, land and air capacity to deal quickly and appear to involve more resources, it is effectively with any persons or force that sensible to use the Services, all three Ser- might decide to try and establish a beach- vices, including the Reserves where appropri- head or other illegal presence in our country. ate, to have the day-to-day experience in surveillance, and interpreting the results by Defence Needs following through with the apprehension and STIRLING naval facility in Cockburn other duties that come from surveillance. I Sound is very welcome, but we must not rest have a saying that I inherited from a very easy until we get major docking facilities for tough general I served under: 'There is no ship surveys and repairs, capable of handling substitute for rehearsal'. Substitute for 're- the naval and merchant marine vessels that hearsal', call it training, call it what you will, it operate off our coast. We are too important is the same thing. and too far from the nearest facilities for this Australia is a big place, and getting from to be ignored indefinitely. There is an aspect east to west has a serious time and space of this that we cannot ignore: we are no problem, as well as a serious logistic prob- longer competitive in this country. We have lem. We also have the problems of training got to get back to being competitive so we people to operate in remote areas, and to can get into this business of ship surveying, give logistical support in those remote areas. ship repairing, ship building and a host of And these areas are sparsely populated; other things that we have got to be able to do there are just not the people there to be competitively as part of the building of our picked up and engaged or recruited at the nation and as part of the defence of this time, they just cannot supply the numbers nation. Our vast coastline and developments that you need for the defence of those areas, demand greatly expanded Navy, Army and either by way of recruitment and training for Air Force installations well located in the the Reserve Forces or for the local logistic north-west and Kimberley; also, the perma- support. And these defences, I remind you, nent personnel, the equipment, and the cannot be supplied overnight. The important weapons must be capable of quick buildup. thing is to make a commitment, a genuine I want to deal with the possible invader. commitment that is going to be honoured by Everyone assumes that the disadvantages successive Governments, and which the peo- are all with the invader. To an extent, that is ple will understand and will accept as a true, especially as the invader will presum- burden that is necessary for the security of

Seapower '84 — Page 55 their country, of themselves, and of their ernments determined to give Aborigines in- families. creased areas of inalienable freehold titles to land, with virtual control over all minerals. Development of Community Awareness And this includes — and I emphasise this — Part of a sound Defence programme in this includes some land with access to the the modern concept in Australia as we see it sea. You might think that is of no significance, today — bearing in mind that we were so but I hope when you reflect on it you will see different in previous wars to say the people of why. Europe and some of the other countries This is at a time when we should be where they have had war in their backyard for doing everything to unite us because of our centuries -- but part of a sound Defence economic problems, because of our other programme must be to develop a greater problems. This divisive issue is gaining community awareness of the need. And there momentum, and not because of the Abor- is going to be increasing difficulty as the last igines themselves and not only from within global war drifts into the distance. There will Australia. I would shudder to be the Prime be fewer people who have experienced war Minister or the Commander in Chief of the and all its horrors and who know the tragedy Forces trying to conduct a full scale defence of being unprepared. There is nothing so sad of Australia with a minority claiming special as to see untrained people forced into battle. rights for large parts of the continent. If the And most people, particularly the young, are present inquiry in my own state comes to being fed a dangerous line that Australia has fruition, and the author of the inquiry and the no foreseeable threat and therefore Defence Government behind the inquiry have their is a low priority and even a nonsense. It is say, about 50 per cent of our state will be later than you think! given inalienable freehold titles and with the The cleverest piece of current Soviet right to veto all mining. propaganda promulgated has been to get the You do not have to be very smart to slogan 'Better red than dead' chanted and realise the end result of that, particularly in repeated around the world. It is cunning, it is view of the conference last year at AND when dangerous. Its sinister overtones must be the question of sovereignty raised its ugly exposed. And I want to remind you, in case it head. It will be a tough task to get the has escaped you, that it is a flow on from the nation-wide appreciation of what Defence is earlier very successful, very cunning, Soviet all about, including its cost and the sacrifices propaganda to induce people to shy away involved, but we cannot continue on the from talking about communists and com- present stop go basis. I think if it is explained munism for fear that they would be branded properly to the public they will accept the as 'looking for reds under every bed'. They need for adequate defence and they will have have got that promulgated so well over two had enough of the present arrangements. decades that people who should be talking The present arrangements must bewilder our about it in certain places, even within the friends, amuse and delight our potential Liberal Party itself, will not talk about it for enemies. A genuine commitment to a sound fear they would be sneered at because they programme and policy can be more impor- are looking for reds under every bed. That is tant than the speed with which that program- how deep it has become and how dangerous me is to be implemented. It is one of the it has become. At the same time, we are greatest single deterrents to potential ene- going through a whole range of things at the mies, because it would declare a firm resolve social and political level which can only result to defend our country. in serious divisions in our community. Exercise Kangaroo 83 was the most im- What seems to be overlooked is the fact portant exercise of its kind ever undertaken in that Australia is and always will be something Western Australia. From what one has been different. It has to be developed. In other able to glean, much has been learned from it. words, it has to have its own brand of The big query is, what will be done about the cohesiveness and nationhood, when there is lessons that have been learned? I was dis- a nation as big as continental USA with only appointed at the lack of top level State 15 million people, the population of Holland. Government Ministerial enthusiasm, interest We had this once, through 'mateship', but it is and participation, although there was getting harder to identify this wonderful old wonderful participation by the police, by the spirit which came out of the pioneer days, State Emergency Services. I heave nothing came out of Anzac, came out of two World but good reports of the co-operation. Wars, and has served us very well. We The State Governments have to realise see the Commonwealth and four State Gov- that they have a vital role to play and they

Paye 56 — Seapower '84 USS LOCK WOOD visits HMAS STIRLING whilst taking part in K83. Courtesy: Navy PR cannot dismiss Defence as solely a Federal inadequate availability of equipment and matter. There are so many things to be done training and the degree of realistic practical by the State Governments to support the work that is currently possible, compared Forces and to support the Commonwealth with what is needed to achieve optimum Government in its overall Defence Policy, and efficiency and effectiveness. we just have to get the message across that Volunteers, as most of you will know, we cannot assume that 'She'll be right, mate'. have something that is rather special. They like to be worked hard and put under press- Reserve Forces and Ancillary Services ure; those who do not like it will quickly I am a great believer in strong Reserve get out, but the others will love it. I watched Forces. These are more than trained men and with interest the enthusiasm with which women. Some people get the idea that they NORFORCE was established in Darwin and are just a statistic within the Forces and are how it operated in a very vigorous way just a trained Serviceman or a Service- throughout the area under its responsibility. I woman, but they are a living demonstration would like to feel that this and other units of to the community that there are people all three Services are able to train and prepared to volunteer to defend their country. exercise in a vigorous way and not be I see it, and know the effects of it. When you curtailed by lack of equipment, fuel, ammuni- have a unit in some of these northern towns, tion and other things that make for realism in for instance, it is dramatic the effect on that wide-ranging training exercises. community that there are people prepared to Side by side with this, there are the put on a uniform, to be trained and give their ancillary services, which are often under- time, and volunteer as a member of the estimated and neglected in Defence planning Reserve Forces. I am concerned about the and training. I believe in the need for strong,

Seapower '84 — Page 57 well-trained and well-disciplined police capacity to be an ever increasing supplier. forces which enjoy complete understanding Even ignoring the great economic advan- and can co-operate with the Defence Forces. I tages, the real advantages of an Allied pre- have seen it at work. The same can be said of sence in times of peace are for smooth fire brigades, ambulance services and the integration of command systems, with ob- State Emergency Services; each has its role vious improvements in operational effective- to play in times of peace and war. Coin- ness. It would also be a salutary message to cidental with this is the need to keep legisla- potential enemies. tion under constant review at State and I submit there is no alternative but to be Federal levels to ensure it is realistic and prepared and rely on the strength of the effective in giving authority and protection to preparedness of ourselves and our allies, and the Armed and the Ancillary Services in their to demonstrate the firmness of our resolve, if training and in their operational roles. we intend, and want, to do all in our power to I will be surprised if out of Kangaroo '83 prevent a major international war ever hap- there is not a list as long as your arm of things pening. This is the message we have got to that should be done so as to make sure that, get across to the community. The strength of before it is too late, some of these things are the Western world in post-war years is the covered in legislation, because there is a only reason, the only reason, why the Soviet tendency when things drift into the distance has not been bolder and more imperialistic to forget about them. But I hope your orga- than it has been. But if we had not have had nisation, your Institute, can do its part to the resolute approach by the Americans, not make sure that these things are not just always at the same level as perhaps at the forgotten, and people do keep under review present time, but if we had not have had that the need for legislation to be brought up to resolute commitment to Defence, we certain- date so as to enable the Forces to function ly would have had a much more grim situa- properly both in training and in operations. tion than we have today. But the only answer they know is preparedness. The Russians Allied forces make no bones about it; they parade their I move on to another phase of Defence. I strength. They parade their navy, their army, refer to the desirability of having Allied their air force, because they do not want a Forces operating and training in Australia in a nuclear war; no one is going to win it, but, substantial way in times of peace. I know it is they want to make sure that we know that not a popular subject. Reasons are advanced they are prepared, that they are making the against this, and they have usually been fairly sacrifice, they are getting the technology and shallow and emotive. We know, and the improving all the time to make sure that they world knows, that we would not have a are right up with the rest of the field. chance in a major conflict without strong And so we can take a leaf out of their allies as in 1939-45. We will not have the books, and parade what we are doing. But I same amount of time in future as we had in come back to the point that we have got to World War II. When you look back on it, we get this message across to our community, thought it was pretty grim then, but it was a because the Soviet white ant machine never fairly leisurely affair compared with what you stops, it never rests. They take full advantage are going to have today. of our democratic freedom in this country What we need to demonstrate to the rest and other countries and never, never rest. We of the world, and especially to our allies, is have to make up our minds that the time has that we ourselves are going to do all we come when we are going to do something should be doing, and on an increasing basis. about it. After that, we can then with confidence and Our decision is not a difficult one. We decency expect to get the help that we need either surrender our freedom to an ideology from our allies. But I emphasise we need to which Australians would find abhorrent, or demonstrate that we ourselves are doing all we do the only other thing that is left to us. we should be doing, and, I also emphasise, There are no two, three, four or five alterna- on an ever increasing basis. tives at all. There is only the one, and that is Fortunately, we have a trump card. We to make it clear that we are not going to have a great significance to the rest of submit meekly, but rather are we going to the world that we can exploit because of the join with our allies in a very realistic way. essentials we are able to supply in the way of I will just touch on a subject that some- minerals, metals, energy, plus food and natu- body might like to take up at a later stage. We ral fibres. And it is important to the rest of the live in the most vital part of the whole world. world that we maintain and expand our When you think of the Asia Pacific region, it is

Page 58 — Seapower '84 the only part of the world, if it is properly led standing what it is all about or is not prepared and it gets its act together, that can really lead to accept the burdens that go with it, if it is the world out of its present economic mess — properly explained. and it is not out of its mess yet by a long, long That is probably the greatest single De- way. But we have everything. When you look fence challenge we have got at the moment, at the Asian/Pacific region, and you look at to get back to the people, to get them to what is in that region, and you realise that the understand what Defence is all about, just Americans are already doing more business what it means to this country, what it means in the Asian/Pacific region than they do in the to their future security. You will find if it is Atlantic region you start to see the potential. properly presented and there is a political will People often do not understand and do not to defend the country, that it will have an bother to ascertain these things, but if you electric effect throughout this community. Do combine the Americans with all the Asian not sell the Australian short. He is capable if it Pacific region, and all the potential — and is told to him straight down the line, told to what we have to offer as a nation, if only we him honestly, told to him simply. He will have got the good sense to stop destroying understand, and he will understand that there ourselves from within — and you see clearly is a cost that goes with it. there is a great prospect for the world. My other point is, do not try and do It could be the most exciting time in things on the cheap; it is the dearest way in world history, and it is going to bring the finish. Also, we must make a commitment tremendous challenges from a Defence point with community support to achieve what is of view, because that is where you are going necessary over a period of years. Do not try to see the real impact of the maritime and do it too quickly, but resolve that it is services of this nation being pushed into going to be done. And having caught up on service and becoming more and more critical. our needs even though it takes several years However, I just mention that in passing, to do it, resolve never to allow it to get in because we are not just talking about Aust- arrears again. ralia as we see it today, we are talking about My final word, therefore, is you will never something that could be more wonderful achieve a Defence Policy and programme than anything we have had in the past, if only worthy of the name, and worthy of Australia, we have the initiative, the get up and go, and until you get the community involved, and it we can get the leadership to join with the becomes a really big issue for Governments people such as the Japanese, with the Amer- and Oppositions to have to justify their icans, to make sure that the whole of this Defence Policies at the elections. In the past, region can be put to work and get a in the last few years in particular, Defence has tremendous impetus and give leadership to been a long, long way down the list. In the the rest of the world. And we could not have interests of the nation, we have got to get it the same problems about potential enemies right up to the top of the list. in our region then, because everybody will be part of a team, and that is the more positive way to do it.

CONCLUSION DISCUSSION All I have said adds up to this: we have got to determine what is needed for our Leut T. Fink: Tom Fink, Naval Reserve from Defence and have got to determine how best Sydney. I would like to thank Sir Charles for it can be achieved. We do not want the his kind remarks concerning Reserve Forces second best. If you look for the second best, and I am glad that someone notices us you will get the tenth best, always. You Navy sometimes. I would like to take issue with people and the experts amongst you should you, sir, on the matter of key personnel in know what is the best solution, and that is the civilian industries and their attitude to war. one that has got to be gone after. It is Perhaps we have got some bad eggs now in amazing how close you can go to it every our power stations and railways and the like, time if you know what you want, you know but we have certainly heard stories in the last what is the best, instead of being prepared to war about the wharf labourers and ships settle for the third, fourth or fifth best. being loaded or attempting to be loaded on You have got to determine how best it the way to New Guinea. I do not think things can be achieved and go for it. And I want to were as good as perhaps they might have make this plea; do not assume that the been then and all one needs is flexibility and average Australian is incapable of under- will.

Seapower '84 — Page 59 On the subject of national will, while we I do not think that the average citizen today look to the problems that might be caused by understands how quickly and dramatically the Soviet Union and we look again to our things changed in World War II. We were north and hope that economic progress there drifting along, with our forces over in the will drag us upwards as well, are we looking Middle East and in Europe, and war seemed a closely enough at some of our northern long, long way away. Then all of a sudden it neighbours and will the public be ready one was in our backyard. People forget that many day to call a stop to the appeasement of at people were killed at Broome, many were least one of our neighbours, and if that killed at Darwin. We had the problem of requires some action on the part of our Sydney Harbour. We know the drama of the Armed Forces, will we be ready? Coral Sea battle. But all of this happened so Sir Charles Court: Well if I can deal with the quickly. We will not get the same amount of first one about key personnel in industry, I do warning next time; we will not have time to not think the message that I was trying to get bring troops back from the Middle East and across has been received. If it is just a matter for a Prime Minister to go on his hands and of brawn you can always do something about knees and say to the Americans 'Please come it; however, I am more concerned about and save us'. That sort of thing will not things much more crucial than that. Take happen next time. It will hit us with a power stations, for instance. When I first suddenness, if it happens at all — and Heaven became a Minister, if you had a bit of forbit it does happen — but it will hit us with a industrial trouble you managed to keep the suddenness in which there will be no time to plants going because you would say to the start to think and plan. You have got to be staff 'In you go' and as long as it did not last ready then. So I just would not like to be too long you kept at least half or two-thirds specific about any particular northern neigh- and sometimes the whole of the power bour, but I would like to feel that whoever it going. The fact that you could function was a is, wherever they are from, that we are ready tremendous plus, it was a tremendous and prepared for it. strength that you had. Today, of course, that You just cannot wait today with the long is impossible because we have gone into lead times that exist. You just cannot wait much bigger units. In Western Australia when until you can identify an enemy. You just I first became a Minister, a 30 megawatt unit have to be ready, to have a Force that is so was a big unit; today, it is 200 MW and we good, so flexible, that whether it fights alone want even bigger ones. In New South Wales or whether it fights alongside somebody else you would have bigger still. it is going to be able to make sure that it looks There is now a much more sophisticated so good and it is so good that the enemy situation, and that has got into the hands of never takes us on. comparatively few people and there is very Micln C. Maxworthy: Chris Maxworthy, sir, little you can do. It is no good just saying that RAN. A large part of your address this you are going to put in a hundred people or evening was dealing with making the public you are going to get the Army or the Navy, or more aware of the case for Defence and somebody else in to do it, because they could increasing its commitment to Defence. I not do anything and would not know what to would like to ask you the question that, since do — even the staff do not know how to you are largely preaching to a converted operate or shut some of the plants down, the audience, and our section of society does not plants get so sophisticated and the staff have like to raise the issue of Defence, and you got so far removed from day to day opera- pointed out that it was not a large priority in tions. That is the sort of thing I was getting at most parties' platforms — then what do we because if these key installations are not do? Do we take the case to the people, speak going to function in a crisis, then you are up publicly? I think you will find there are a lot going to be in a terrible mess and your Armed of people here this evening who have a Forces just will not be able to function and the tendency not to speak out for fear that it is morale of the people will go down. When you going to compromise their careers and for are defending your own country on your own the fact that the Navy, the Army and the Air soil, the morale of the people is tremendously Force have to be seen to be apolitical. So I important. would just like to ask you to comment, how Talking about our northern neighbours, I do we actually bring our case to the public? would not like to express a point of view Sir Charles Court: I am very conscious of the unless I knew exactly who was involved, but I fact that if you are a serving officer, be it work on the basis that as friendly as they are, Navy, Army or Air Force, you are gagged to a you still have to be ready for the unexpected. very large extent. There are some brave ones

Page 60 — Seapower '84 and some get away with it, some do not. We inaugural award for quality and achievement are talking about a community attitude and awarded by Brian Howe a few weeks ago for that is why I felt I should bring in this new our efforts in churning out one of these boats note from somebody who is not a Service- every fourteen weeks. I am very well aware of man — one who does not have to be nice to the potential and capability of the average anybody about this particular issue and can Australian to get down, and Sir Charles Court speak frankly about it. We want the older says, he likes to be pushed and when under people to convey their experience, the people such pressure he yields of his best, and I who have been through a war and are able to would wager you all that the Australian is the convey their experience to their families, their best guy on earth. But we do not use them. grandchildren and so on, that is important. I am'wondering, Sir Charles, if you have Their influence carries more weight than a formula for how you would suggest we most people realise; but we have got to get go about cranking up our manufacturing people, business people, intelligent people, industry again to get it back into the system who are prepared to carry the banner. People where Australia can in fact become the like you, the retired ones in particular, can, I leader. I believe that we can not only build but believe do their part in organising others to we can design our every material need for the understand this. Navy and the Defence Forces, and I am very You would be surprised at the effect mindful that today there are some people as you drop that pebble in the pond; the here from overseas companies representing eddying circles go out and can have a manufacturers, including submarines, and I tremendous effect. You have to make a believe we could undertake that task if we concerted approach, an organised, con- were given the time and if the Government sidered approach to the political wings and would back us and have the courage to eventually, if you can get somebody to make accept what we churned out. I believe, given this an issue, a real issue -- not just a that opportunity, we could produce the goods trumped-up thing for a few votes at election and certainly in a smaller way I have been time, but a real issue — you will be surprised driving very hard through the door, trying to at how quickly the message gets around and have the produce that we manufacture to an how important it can become. I sense, rightly overseas design severed, such that we can or wrongly, that there is a first glimmer of get out into the marketplace and sell. The hope at the moment that the media might be greatest problem that I find when I go out into starting to understand that Defence does that overseas marketplace is 'Do you have a need a bit of a help, so I do not despair. proven product of your own design?' and I know it is not going to be easy. There regrettably I say 'No, it's a beautiful brochure, are going to be plenty of people to ridicule it's almost like the one that we build, but I it. You will hear all these slogans against it; haven't yet proven it'. And if we get the you have a very well organised group of Government and Navy and all of you people people against practically anything to do with here to back us 100 per cent and give us a go, Defence, anything to do with the institutions we would give you a product that was better of this country. But I have a slogan that I used than the rest of the world. We would get into when I was in office which I used to almost the marketplace and we would go places. make my members chant and that is 'Noise is Sir Charles, you are a very respected not numbers'. Just because some people get person and it is great to have you here around and make a great deal of noise, tonight, and I am wondering if you could give everyone gets the idea there is a great army some enlightenment and some formulas for of them. But have you ever looked at them? If how we might go about such a campaign. you get close to them they run away. Do not Sir Charles Court: Congratulations on what get the idea that because they hit the head- you have done. I have heard of the record that lines, because they are always on the TV, you have and I agree with you about the because they make a lot of noise, that there Australian workman; there is nothing wrong are many of them. with the quality of his work, if he is properly Mr G. Fry: Gordon Fry. Sir Charles, I live in led. If you can get them enthused and get North Queensland and for those of you who them away from some of these terrible forces do not know, that is one of the last mainland that I have had to contend with over the last states under private rule. In that state, my 20-odd years, there is no-one will beat them occupation is to build patrol boats for the and they can, through productivity, cope with Australian Navy. Some of you would prob- the wage structure that we have. ably be aware, and proudly I say to you, that I It is time we got back and talked to the was the person who was able to receive the people of Australia. You see, Governments

Seapower '84— Page 6! and employer bodies, only talk to unions and plate and you will find that it is often made Governments and employer organisations under licence in Kobe or somewhere in like Confederation of Industry, Chambers of Japan. They have no pride about it. They can Commerce, ACTU and so on. It is twenty make it better, they can make it cheaper and years since we stopped talking to the men they can make a profit, even though they and women that work in the place, that do the have to pay the American firm for the know- work. They only get the cockeyed version that how to do it. I might add they learn fast, and comes from somebody else, a third party, so before very long they get one of their own and the whole thrust of my remarks was to that is better, but they have no scruples about get back to talking to the people about how it at all. far we were in front and now how far we have So do not worry too much about who got behind, and how easy it could be for us to designed the thing. If we can design a better catch up. There is plenty of work to be done if one, well, for goodness sake, let us do it and we are competitive. People who think we let us sell it here. But on the other hand do not have been through a recession just have no be too proud about it. If you are getting idea what the Depression was like. The last business, you grab it. seven, eight, ten years in Australia have been LCDR B. Willis: Lieutenant Commander Bob a roaring boom compared with the position Willis, Navy. Sir Charles, you will be well when I first came into government in 1959 in aware that about two years ago the Western Western Australia. Australian government took an initiative and We have learned over our way to build appointed a panel of retired senior officers as the modules for the oil platform rigs, but we advisors to State Government. Would you had no sooner got this wonderful order and care to comment on the effectiveness such a started to build them than an Industrial panel has in providing advice to the State Arbitration Commission Order put the cost of Government and influencing business and the NW Shelf project up $700 million — $700 community groups? million in one Order! The grounds given by Sir Charles Court: I have to plead that I could the Industrial Commissioner were that it was not, because it happened after my retirement a prestige project, therefore the workers and I never had occasion to follow it through, should share in it. And here we are trying to but I can only say that while I was there I did compete with the rest of the world! So my not need a panel. I have always enjoyed a short answer is, we must get back in this very strong relationship with all the com- country to talking to the people, the men and manders over there, whether they be Navy, the women in the workforce; they will under- Army or Air Force, and I found them extreme- stand clearly that if the boss is not making a ly good value. They were good to me and profit, their job is not safe, they will under- kept me well-informed and were very co- stand it. But people have stopped talking operative in times of natural disasters, which about it, they have stopped talking to these I always regarded as a good time to exercise very people in the workforce who can change the Services. No, I cannot tell you what was things. the outcome of that panel, but I felt at the I should imagine in your organisation time when it was announced it was rather and from what I have read about it from strange because I had such wonderful co- another publication at the time you got an operation from the serving chiefs of the three award, you are very close to your men. If we Services whilst I was a Minister for twelve can only get back to this in the mines, in the years and then Premier for eight years, factories, you will find that productivity can without having to set up a separate body of improve. It is just like Defence, we have to retired people. re-sell the obvious; we have to go and re-sell Admiral Stevens: Stevens, RAN, retired. Sir, it all again and it is not going to be easy. On you mentioned the value of Western Aust the question of overseas design, I would not ralia to the nation. Could you say how strong let that worry you too much. As long as you is this secession movement? are getting orders I could not care who Sir Charles Court: Well, I am rather unique designed the darn thing. You keep making it because I was involved in the secession better and competitively. movement in 1934 and we had our bands and Can I just tell you, if you go and look in our banners and we really had the time of our the mining industry throughout the world life — there was not much else to do in Perth and look at the heavy equipment there, and at that time! But the secession movement is you see big things made by names like Ellis not strong. Sometimes it does raise its head, Chalmers, and famous names like that — that but it is just when people get so fed up that is in the big type. But you look at the little they say 'Well, why don't we secede?' But I do

Page 62 — Seapower '84 not think in their hearts they want to be Sir Charles Court: The answer is a very anything but real Australians. They do not simple straightforward one. I readily concede mind if they carry the rest of the nation on the excellence of the work that was done by their backs, but they do like you to say thank Australian engineers on the North-West Shelf you sometimes — just say thank you, even if Project and on many other projects. I think you say it quietly with your tongue in your the questioner would know that it was largely cheek! because of the conditions that were laid Mr J. White: John White, Eglo Engineering. down by myself when we negotiated the Sir Charles, I enjoyed very much your return project that we had such a large input, but I to the basics, because I think it is something have to also say we did not have as big an we desperately need in this country if we are input as I wanted. I did have to concede that to achieve our national identity and to we were going into something that was being achieve a recovery of our industrial base. I done for the first time at that level and I had to want to return to Mr Don Fry's question and concede, therefore, that there would be some your response in particular on design, be- things that would have to rely on design from cause I think it is of fundamental importance overseas. Nevertheless, the condition was to the achivement of these goals. I was an that there had to be a big Australian input. engineer who was involved in the North-West However, as I have explained to the Shelf development in Western Australia and consulting engineers on many occasions, you in particular I looked after the design of the do not want to try and go too fast. It is platforms and also the gas plant in its later amazing how quickly you can get there if you stages, and I will say the reason why that make haste slowly; by grasping the nettles, project was so successful was that we as a such as they did on that occasion, doing the group of Australian engineers were involved wonderful work that was done on that occa- from the very outset of the project in the sion, when the next project comes up, each design. one should have a bigger Australian input. Now, we used a lot of foreign expertise But that is up to the people themselves. I also and we used a lot of foreign equipment, as said to the consulting engineers 'Don't wait you rightly point out, but we project- for a job to come to Western Australia. managed the project from its very inception You've had this experience, you have done to succeed in Western Australia and we this tremendous work in the alumina indus- should not belittle the importance of us being try, you have done this tremendous work in involved in the design process. You stress the the iron ore industry, you have done it in the importance of industrial infrastructure and nickel industry, you have done it now in the you stress the need to defend the prize we North-West Shelf. Go out into the world and have here in Australia. This includes the sell your expertise, because it is as good as Defence personnel on equipment, but also the rest of the world has'. We can build these the industrial infrastructure. As I said, as an things, we can design these things but we engineer who was involved in some of these have to get out into the rest of the world. major resource projects I put it to you all that There is one corollary to this, and that is we can also build our major Defence equip- the fact that we have got to get our industrial ment projects in this country, and economi- costs and our industrial working conditions cally. However, to do this we need a national down to a bit of sanity. You cannot have the policy and a national commitment, and that leave we have got, you cannot have the leave must come from the Government and also loadings we have got, you cannot have the from the Defence and Defence Support De- penalty rates we have got and still be com- partments, and it must be absolutely com- petitive. There just is not that much money in mitted. the world. This does not include a basic belief that anything that is big and complex has to be obtained from overseas. So, therefore, Sir Charles, as a person who was instrumental in getting the North-West Shelf project going, and saw a group of Australian engineers succeed in it despite numerous industrial problems which were handled in the end, I would like your comments on how we could achieve this turn-around in attitude whereby we do start to govern the developments and equipment supply in our own country.

Seapower '84 — Page 63 INDUSTRY'S VIEW

by Mr J.F. Kirk Chairman and Managing Director Esso Aust. Ltd.

Capt P.G.V. Dechaineux: Sir Charles, ladies Firstly, I will cover the direct contribution and gentlemen, it is indeed with great plea- to the economy by way of commercial ship- sure that I introduce Mr Kirk to you this ping, fishing and tourism. Secondly, I will morning. He is the chairman and managing focus on the strategic and economic depend- director of Esso which is a subsidiary of ence of Australia on three industries which Exxon which is the largest company in the take place in our coastal waters or utilise our world, and such a distinguished person is sea lanes and which could not satisfactorily going to make our talk very much more operate without a secure maritime province. rounded indeed. He was born in Newcastle, I will highlight offshore oil and gas and spent the war in the Navy, which is very production, not simply because I am most much applicable to our seminar. His career familiar with it but because a secure supply of has been entirely in oil, in black gold, as we petroleum fuels is important to everyone. I heard yesterday. This morning he is going to will also discuss coastal shipping, looking at be talking to us on the importance of sea the importance of coastal movements of bulk lanes to Australia and as such why those sea solids and liquids which feed much of our lanes should be protected. With pleasure, I major land based industry. Finally, I shall deal introduce Mr Kirk. with the shipping of Australia's imports and exports with particular emphasis on energy commodities because of their bulk value and strategic importance. I will demonstrate the My theme today is The Protection of high dependence Australia has on this inter- Australia's Commercial Maritime Interests', national trade. but I should say at the outset that, whilst I am well-placed to discuss the petroleum indus- Commercial Shipping, Fishing and Tourism try, I do not lay claim to be an expert on some First, a quick overview of the direct of the other industries that I will cover in my contribution of commercial shipping to the paper. Australia spends a lot on Defence. The Australian economy. I do not anticipate that I budget appropriation for 19831984 is just will get questions on the economy because I over $5 billion of which I think the Navy share am not an economist and our next speaker was just over a billion. It did not seem to be will cover that. Although data is scarce, it is quite a fair split but that is the way it is, I estimated that revenue from coastal freight is understand. currently about $3 billion per year (when I say That would seem to be a large amount to 'billion', of course I am talking a thousand most people. However, I believe it should be million), that is, a third of Australia's total viewed in the context of the resources and freight revenue or about 2 per cent of GDP. industries which are being protected. The The industry has a lot of capital invested in Defence budget can be likened to an insur- ships, ports and support facilities. In 1983, for ance policy. I hope today to give you an idea example, the Australian fleet consisted of 104 of the nature and value of the goods that ships totalling 3.3 million deadweight tonnes need insurance and that you people are of which 79 were Australian owned. covering. To do so I plan to review the scope, The biggest Australian shipping com- size and locations of Australia's maritime pany is the Government owned ANL with industries, to demonstrate their strategic and about 1.2 million deadweight tonnes. There economic importance and to show areas of are two other major groups; firstly, 11 oil highest commercial priority for naval de- tankers, just over 0.5 million deadweight fence. tonnes (nine of these a re oil company owned)

Page 64 — Seapower '84 and secondly, there are nine interstate iron 50,000 passengers, with an average cruise ore and coal carriers totalling about 0.7 duration of 15 days. There has been a change million deadweight tonnes, and these are in the pattern of sea travel. Emphasis has owned and operated by BMP and other swung away from long distance liner private sector companies. In total, ANL, the voyages to short cruising holidays. Whereas oil industry and interstate iron ore and coal 28 per cent of total short term international carriers make up 75 per cent of the Australian passenger movements in 1962 were by sea, fleet on a tonnage basis. In 1982, the last this market share is now less than 1 per cent, details available, the industry provided direct a legacy of the jet aircraft and increased time employment for about 4,000 seamen and pressures. The only sea passenger service of 8,000 waterside workers. any significance that is left in Australia is That was the employment that comes across Bass Strait. from those people, but there was also em- The other major area of maritime tourist ployment generated by the construction and activity is the coastal waters of Queensland. maintenance of ships, port facilities and other Although figures are not readily available, it maritime capital investments. The industry is estimated that the seaside and the Great makes an even larger indirect contribution to Barrier Reef resorts and the game fishing the economy and this affects the security of business generate earnings in excess of $500 employment of many more people and this is million per annum. An increasing number of because of the dependence of other indus- international visitors are being attracted to tries on our sea transport, and I will say more these facilities providing foreign exchange about this indirect contribution later. earnings. The second maritime industry that I wish Map 1 shows the maritime areas in which to discuss is commercial fishing. The indus- the three industries — commercial shipping, try's annual revenue was estimated at $440 fishing and tourism — take place. I will look at million in 1982 1983, with prawns and rock coastal and international shipping move- lobsters each contributing a third of the total. ments in detail a little later but clearly much 84 per cent of total production, about $370 of the commercial shipping activity services million worth, was exported, with half of the major cities and their ports, and the coal these exports going to Japan and a third to ports on our southern and eastern coasts the US. They are quite interesting statistics. between Whyalla and Townsville. The Navy's patrol boats have a relevant role The fishing industry works in most of our for this industry and they have the job of coastal waters, while tourism is focussed on protecting Australian waters within the 200- our major east coast city ports and the length mile limit against poaching by foreign fisher- of the Queensland coast. In total, the direct men and this is no doubt a daunting task contribution of these three industries to the because it is a very large area involved. economy is quite substantial. They produce It is also not simply a matter of routine, an annual revenue of over $4 billion, about 3 as demonstrated by the incident in which per cent of GDP. They are also a significant HMAS TOWNSV/LLE had to put a shot across source of employment and largely Australian the bow of a foreign fishing vessel attempting owned. These industries alone warrant signi- to escape from Cairns. The Navy's role in ficant maritime protection on the basis of protecting the fishing industry is certainly their direct contribution to the economy, but well appreciated. there is much more that r. ?ds protection and Now I wish to turn to the industry which I would now like to consider some other uses the sea for the provision of pleasure — major industries on which Australia has a tourism. The maritime component of the strategic and economic dependence and tourism industry comprises sea travel and the which in turn depend on a secure maritime coastal and reef resort business. While they province. are relatively small businesses, they are fast growing. They are also both important as The Petroleum Industry both labour intensive sources of employ- The one with which I am most familiar, ment, with sea travel services alone esti- the petroleum industry, depends heavily on mated to employ about 2,500 people; annual direct protection of its operations on the revenue from sea travel was about $96 Continental Shelf and on security for both its million in 1981. Of this, approximately 92 per coastal and overseas shipping operations. cent or $88 million was derived from pleasure You can see the location of the industry's cruises. offshore production operations on the map. Three operators, P & O, Sitmar and The Esso BMP joint venture in Bass Strait Minghua, undertook 61 cruises, carried contributes approximately 90 per cent of

Seapower '84 — Page 65 indigenous oil production and it also pro- ple Bay and Abbot Point with a ninth, Port vides all of Victoria's natural gas require- Clinton, in the Shoalwater Bay area of ments. Queensland, being mooted for the 1980s. There is also the Barrow Island field, the Remaining reserves of natural gas are Jabiru oil discovery which will likely begin shown at 3.8 billion barrels of oil equivalent, production in about two years, and the first and all these are converted to oil equivalency stage of the giant North-West Shelf gas so that you get the exact picture for each, and project which will being supplying gas to that is about 22 trillion cubic feet — a lot of Perth this year and on which so much is gas. Apart from Bass Strait, large reserves resultant from the activities of Sir Charles have been discovered off North-Western Court. Late in the decade, the second stage Australia as a result of oil exploration but will produce from North-West Shelf liquifed most are unlikely to be developed to meet natural gas for export to Japan. A very large domestic demand for many years. While part of the Continental Shelf, particularly in development of the North Ranking field to the north-west, offers oil and gas exploration supply the Western Australian market is potential. economically viable in conjunction with LNG, The industry is, of course, a major one. transportation to the eastern states where Revenue generated from oil and gas produc- most of the future demand exists is feasible tion last year was around $6 billion. About $5 in an engineering sense but at the moment billion of that was generated by Bass Strait. would be enormously expensive. The refiners and marketers and Government However, in the long term this is a excises on petroleum products add about possibility either via a trans-Australia pipeline another $6 billion to that revenue by the time or by coastal shipment as LNG. Additional these products are sold to the consumer and, export-oriented liquid natural gas, LNG, pro- if you read the papers last week, you will see jects are a most likely alternative in the that the Government is about to take another medium and long term but so many potential 300 million from Esso BMP from the Fortes- projects are now under consideration in cue field. South-East Asia and in the Middle East that To emphasise the importance of oil in the the world LNG market promises to be highly Australian energy scene, let us look at how competitive and probably oversupplied. Au- finely balanced the supply demand picture is, stralian projects apart from the current de- and this is for oil, compared to other indige- velopment at the north-west, may not be nous energy commodities. The top row of economically viable for quite some time. Chart 1 shows what energy reserves we have Given the market difficulties, it is impera- and the bottom row shows what we need tive that security of supply be guaranteed. through the year 2000, what we will consume LNG is not easily stored, so supply disrup- through the year 2000. The reserves are those tions can be extremely costly. It is estimated existing now and do not include any estimate that about 100 round trips to Japan will be for new discoveries. required each year to fulfil a six million tonne As you can see, reserves other than per annum export contract. The protection of crude oil range from adequate to plentiful the shipping lanes from Western Australia to even allowing for exports. Australia is thus in Asia as well as the offshore platforms and the fortunate position of having the reserves land based facilities will be vital in ensuring to become a nett exporter of energy. It is Australia's role as a reliable supplier of LNG. already a major world exporter of uranium, Finally, let us look at oil. Although Aust- for which all production is sold overseas. ralia is well endowed in non-oil energy While uranium exports are relatively small at resources, the charts show our oil reserves only 3,300 tonnes, that is 3,300 tonnes per are not sufficient to meet forecast consump- annum, they provide export earnings of over tion. A major strategic and economic chal- $300 million. lenge for Australia will be the maintenance of We are also the second largest coal a high level of oil sufficiency. exporter in the world. The volume of coal Chart 2 shows the dramatic difference exports has increased from 15 million tonnes having our own supply of oil could make. The in 1968 to 60m a year in 1983 and currently discovery and development of the major Bass provides export earnings of around $3 billion Strait oil fields in the sixties transformed our per annum. Naturally, massive investment oil supply outlook almost overnight, and just has been made in port and loading facilities in time for Australia to ride out the oil shocks all along the east coast. There are now eight of the seventies relatively unscathed. The coal ports at Wollongong, Sydney, Newcas- lucky country was never more lucky. Only the tle, Brisbane, Gladstone, Hay Point, Dalrym- size and relative ease of development of the

Page 66 — Seapower '84 AUSTRALIA'S KNOWN REMAINING RESERVES OF PRIMARY ENERGY RESERVES IN BILLIONS OF BARRELS OF OIL EQUIVALENT. OIL INCLUDES CONDENSATE

LPG OIL GAS URANIUM

PRIMARY ENERGY EXPECTED TO BE CONSUMED IN AUSTRALIA AND EXPORTED OVER PERIOD 1983-2000 so AUSTRALIA LTD JANUARY 1984

.PETROLEUM FACILITIES IN THE BASS STRAIT - GIPPSLAND AREA

AUSTRALIAN CRUDE OIL DEMAND AND SUPPLY WITH NEW DISCOVERIES I

1995 2000

Chart 3 All diagrams courtesy Esso Australia

Seapower '84 — Page 67 Bass Strait fields, if you could ever call 70 Chart 2 comes from one area, Bass Strait. The metres of water in Bass Strait easy, made this strategic importance of that area cannot be possible. overstated. Let us look at the Bass Strait and Without this indigenous production, our Gippsland producing area and its geographic 011 supply risks would be greatly magnified. relationship to the facilities at Barry Beach, The strategic threat of a Middle East supply Westernport and Port Phillip Bay. (Map 2) disruption is ever present and clearly the less The production platforms in Bass Strait we need to rely on foreign oil the better. are linked by crude oil and gas pipelines to However, in the next few years oil production Esso BHP's Gippsland crude oil stabilisation from existing reserves will start to decline and gas processing plants at Longford, and and despite increasing production of crude that is just south of Sale. There, light hydro- and condensate from fields elsewhere than carbons are removed from the incoming Bass Strait, total Australian production from crude oil and passed to the gas processing existing discoveries will start to decline plant. The heavy hydrocarbons are removed rapidly. from the gas and passed to the oil processing Without new discoveries, imports will system. The remaining dry natural gas is sold increase dramatically. In fact we believe it will to the Victorian Gas and Fuel Corporation for be too late to stop some decline in indige- distribution to homes and industries and to nous production in the late eighties unless the State Electricity Commission for the gen- more large fields are found and found very eration of electricity. soon. This is against the odds despite recent Liquid petroleum gas, LPG as it is called, reasonably sized discoveries. Furthermore, and ethane from the gas and crude plants, are unless we make discoveries in the next 10 sent by pipeline to the Long Island Point plant years at double the rate of the last 10 years, at Westernport Bay and there it is used for we face a damaging decline in oil self- fractionisation into the components ethane, sufficiency. propane and butane. The stabilised crude oil The world-over supply is only temporary, with all the light-ends removed is sent by being the result of the deep worldwide reces- pipeline to the crude oil tank farm, also at sion of 1981 through 1983 in conjunction with Long Island Point. From Westernport Bay, worldwide conservation and substitution, in- crude oil is piped to the Melbourne refineries creasing non-OPEC supplies and a significant or shipped to other ports in Australia and inventory reduction. As the world comes out overseas. Ethane is piped across the Bay to of recession we are starting to see excess the Altona petrochemical plant, and liquid supply decrease, demand for OPEC oil in- propane and butane are essentially exported. crease and prices stabilise. In addition, de- Also in the region is the Barry Beach spite the major reduction in oil demand, marine terminal used to construct and service consumption is still outstripping discoveries the offshore platforms and facilities. This on a worldwide basis, as it has during the last complex of producing and treatment facili- 12 years. ties, marine terminals, pipelines, tank farms, Over recent years, much work has been two ports, shipping facilities, three refineries put into investigating synthetic fuels as an and a petrochemical plant is the petroleum option for filling the gap. Lower demand, heartland of Australia and the replacement which has deferred the point of conventional value of the total investment is now over $8 oil supply shortage, and much higher costs billion. for synfuel products than originally thought I do not need to stress to this audience now lead us to believe that they are unlikely the need to protect that. The most vulnerable to play any more role this century, but links in the chain are the offshore platforms. whatever the future for synfuels, the discov- Protection of these platforms is absolutely ery and production of conventional oil must vital. There are currently 11 producing plat- be encouraged. This will only be achieved forms in Bass Strait and a twelfth, Flounder, through an active exploration programme is expected to begin production later this encouraged by suitable Government policies. year. They are situated in an area spanning approximately 4,000 square kilometres. The replacement cost of offshore and onshore Bass Strait facilities is now about $3.6 billion. So far I have discussed Australia's vul- nerability to oil supply disruption in the future The platforms producing gas are shown but let us not forget the present. About 90 per on Map 2 in red and those producing oil in cent of the existing production shown on green. As you can see, about 90 per cent of

Page 68 — Seapower '84 the current oil production from Bass Strait, ties and new production facilities as well as and that is about 70 per cent of Australia's the ongoing requirement for the existing consumption, is produced through six of the Bass Strait and the North-West Shelf facili- platforms; Mackerel about 110,000 barrels a ties. Navy patrol boats may well have to day, Halibut 70, Fortescue 80, Kingfish A 50, cover an even wider area, much of it in the Kingfish B 60 and West Kingfish 30. The remote northern and western coastal waters. strategic risk to the area is highlighted by the What does the forecast of discovery potential fact that most of the oil produced is piped via mean for Australia's level of self-sufficiency? one platform and all of the oil flows through In order to maintain self-sufficiency at one pipeline to the mainland. about the current level through to the year A wayward ship or a determined attack 2000 the Australian Petroleum Exploration could leave Australia reliant on imported oil Association, AREA, has estimated Australia for many months or even years. Replacing a needs about 200 million barrels a year of platform in Bass Strait would cost hundreds discoveries. This would require at least 250 of millions of dollars and take a couple of wells a year at a cost of over $1 billion a year. years. There could also be significant en- Realistically, Esso does not expect the neces- vironmental damage. The cost to the Govern sary exploration to take place fast enough ment in terms of lost revenue, compounded and we estimate that the average discovery by the need for foreign exchange to import rate will only range between 80 and 200 oil, would be significant. In the worst case, million barrels per year during the rest of this where we had to import almost all our century. requirements, the cost would be around $7 Outlaying the necessary amounts of billion per year compared to $2 billion as at money, considering the uncertainty over the the moment. amount of oil to be discovered, is a huge Unfortunately the platforms are in the gamble, carrying with it a high risk of failure middle of what was once the maritime motor- and a high cost for failure. However, I believe way through the Strait. This is now an the industry will be prepared to maximise exclusion zone. However, many ships are investment and take the risk, providing it can unaware of this and outdated charts and see a physically secure operating environ- suspect lightships mean that a constant pat- ment well into the future and that the rewards rol must be mounted. The excellent work of will be adequate. In practice, this means the Navy patrol boats in protecting the Bass maintaining the policies which have encour- Strait platforms from disaster is not widely aged oil exploration since the mid-1970s. recognised. The work is often made very That is, import parity pricing should be unpleasant by the rough and unpredictable continued as also should be the principle of conditions that prevail in this area and I the new policy which provides for new dis- would like to wholeheartedly thank the Navy coveries to pay income tax and royalties only, for its vigilance. and to be free of crude oil excise or resource rent tax. After a major slump in the mid- The Future 1970s, oil exploration recovered strongly and Now let us look again at the future. What reached the record levels of 1982 and 1983 are our chances of finding more oil? Esso's principally because of those policies. In my assessment is that there is a 50 per cent opinion, ensuring our future wellbeing in this chance that Australia's undiscovered oil re- way is just as important as ensuring it sources are 3.7 billion barrels. (Chart 3). That through adequate defence of our resource is a little less than the estimated discoveries areas, of protecting our production facilities up to year end 1983 which was 4.1 billion. We and our infrastructure and also protecting the also believe that there is an 80 per cent nation as a whole. chance of finding 2.8 billion but only a 20 per If a secure environment in which to cent chance of finding 4.9 billion. As I indi- operate and policies encouraging exploration cated earlier, a significant part of the known are maintained, we believe significant oil resources and the assessed potential for production from new discoveries can be discoveries of both oil and gas is offshore. In expected to start in the late 1980s and carry fact, offshore shallow water potential off our through into the next century; but even so, northern and western coasts is thought to be our assessment is that self-sufficiency will fall about twice the level of onshore potential. to around 60 per cent by 2000 compared to 80 There is, therefore, expected to be an per cent today. increasing need to protect exploration activi- But that is the median expectation, the 50

Seapower '84 — Page 69 p -»- f .if*

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Unes are in proportion to the volumes at at moved by tankers Esso Australia Lid September 1983 Map 3

AUSTRALIA'S ENERGY TRADE BALANCE

14000 12000 10000 LNG 8000 URANIUM 6000 LPG 4000 2000 OIL IMPORTS (WITH DISCOVERIES) o rTTTTT" i i i i 1—I—i i iT i i i i r 19801982198419861988199019921994199619982000 Chart 6 »««•»«"»«.« JANUARY 1984

Seapower '84 — Page 71 per cent chance. There is a wide range of depends on exports and or imports through uncertainty about Australia's future oil self- international shipping movements. As a sufficiency as shown by the 20 per cent and resource-rich but industrially limited island 80 per cent probability lines on Chart 3. It is nation, Australia is more dependent on trade important to realise that the security situation relative to the size of its economy than most and Government policy cannot drive the other countries. Exports provide jobs and outcome towards the high side as easily as growth for the economy. Imports, particularly towards the low side. The high side outcome of capital goods, are necessary to supple- is largely dependent on fortuitous circumst- ment our small manufacturing industry. ances outside Government control, such as being lucky enough to beat the odds and find a very large reserve. Trade Balance Although the total monetary value of On the other hand, the low side can exports and imports is important economical- simply be achieved through bad policies. Let ly, the actual tonnage of products traded is of me make one other point to emphasise the more interest to us because of the number of importance of oil production to the Australian shipping movements involved. Chart 5 shows economy and the Government. I have alreay the tonnage of Australia's imports and ex- alluded to the fact that apart from all the other ports by state, the imports on the left and the impacts. Government revenue would be exports on the right. The first point to note is affected in the event of a major supply that the tonnage of exports outweighs that of disruption in Bass Strait. Chart 4 demons- imports by a factor of seven to one. This is, of trates the magnitude of that effect. It shows course, related to the nature of the products the budget deficit each year since 1973/1974 involved. Our exports are mainly low value and there has been a lot of talk about budget added resources whereas our imports are deficits. The chart also shows the heavy mainly high value added, manufactured contribution excise receipts from Esso BHP in goods. Luckily, we are nett exporters of Bass Strait have made to containing the energy measured both by heating value and deficits over the period and shows what the by monetary value and we can afford the deficits would have been without this source present level of petroleum imports. of revenue. This year, Bass Strait will contri- bute about 3.5 to 4.0 billion in excise alone; Let us look at Australia's energy trade when royalties and income tax are also balance in more detail (Chart 6). The total included, total contribution nears $5 billion, value of our energy exports, particularly coal, almost 10 per cent of total Federal Govern- is expected to grow significantly. Energy ment revenue, nearly enough to fund the exports will account for perhaps 25 per cent whole Defence budget. of total export income by the year 2000, but oil could become a problem. As shown I hope I have proved to you the economic earlier, oil production from known reserves and strategic importance of the petroleum will decline and this will happen if nothing is industry and re-emphasised the importance done about exploration. If no further dis- of its protection now and in the future. I coveries are made, increasing imports would would like next to discuss how other major be needed to compensate. industries based on land rely on protection of their sea transport. I have already stressed the need for a secure and favourable environment in order to find this oil; if it is not provided, then you Protection of Other Industries have some further problems, as you can see. Coastal shipping movements are domin- Given that Australia will probably need to ated by natural resources. Although these are import some oil for many years to come, we abundant, many of them are in remote re- should also consider where these imports are gions away from population centres and likely to be sourced and address the question energy supplies. Australia's size dictates that of supply security. Map 3 shows the Middle coastal shipping movements will always play East problem and the problem we will have an important role in putting our natural and what critical shortages will exist if there resources to constructive use. The major is any major disruption in the Middle East. movements of liquid account for about 25 per cent of coastal cargo movements which in turn total 43 million tonnes. The other major Conclusion category of coastal shipping movements is I hope that I have demonstrated to you bulk solids. the vital role that the maritime industries play Similarly, much of Australian industry in determining the health of the Australian

Page 72 — Seapower '84 economy. The direct contribution — ship- my address has increased your awareness of ping, fishing and tourism — is over $4 billion the scope and extent of that vulnerability. The each year. The indirect contribution — oil and need for protection of our maritime industries gas etcetera — over $6 billion per year. These will be of continuing concern. It is vital to industries are strategically and economically Australia's future and it will require proper vulnerable if Australia cannot maintain a planning. I would hope that industry will be secure maritime province both in its coastal able to play a role in this area and I am sure waters and its international sea lanes. that the Australian Naval Institute's seminars I feel that everyone here today would will contribute to that planning effort. recognise that we are vulnerable, and I hope

ESSO G/pps/and Credit: J. Mortimer

Seapower '84 — Page 73 Expanding to meet Australia s growing defence software needs COMMAND, CONTROL & COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS WEAPON & SENSOR PROCESSING FEASIBILITY STUDIES & CONSULTANCY COMPUTER AIDED INSTRUCTION SIMULATION AND TRAINING SYSTEMS PROJECT MANAGEMENT

Page 74 — Seapower '84 AN ECONOMIST'S VIEW

by Professor J.W. Freebairn La Trobe University

RADM W.J. Rourke: Mr President, ladies and as an integral component of Australia's eco- gentlemen, I think 1984 is probably a good nomic growth. year for economists. We have got an eco- Coastal shipping plays a small but impor- nomist now as Vice Chancellor of this uni- tant role in the domestic transport system. versity, we have got an economics graduate Resources of the Continental Shelf include as DCNS, we have got an economics gradu- fishing, oil, minerals and tourist resources. ate, of course, up in the Lodge, and we have Also, part of the development of the Austra- got a real economist to speak to us today. lian economy is dependent on its island Professor John Freebairn is a graduate of status and that we have had a lot of freedom New England University in Agricultural Eco- from exotic diseases and so that is part of our nomics. He got his Masters degree there; he natural resources tied to the marine environ- later took a PhD at the University of California ment. and he is Professor of Agricultural Economics What I would like to do today is try and at La Trobe University. assess our maritime interests in terms of their He also finds time in his busy life to be contribution to our national income and to set the general editor of the Economic Record, out a framework for evaluating the potential the major professional economics journal in benefits and costs of defence of our maritime this country, and he is detached from the La resources. In doing this the paper follows in Trobe University to be chief economist of the four sections. First I would like to discuss in Business Council of Australia. As you can some detail the contributions and nature of judge, for a job like that he is a man of very international trade, coastal trade, protection wide professional interests, but he has been of the mainland from exotic diseases and particularly concerned with studies in macro- pests and continental resources, to the Au- economics and with the general structure of stralian economy. What are the benefits of the Australian economy, and increasingly our maritime resources in terms of giving us today, I think, with the interest that the nation a greater income than we otherwise would has in problems of structural change. have? That is the benefits, if you like. Ladies and gentlemen, to give you an Secondly, I would like to discuss some economist's view, Professor John Freebairn. issues about our shipping policy and in particular should we do our own shipping or should we buy it from overseas suppliers? Thirdly, I make just a few brief comments on Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen. I the costs of protecting our maritime re- feel that some of the things that I wanted to sources, and here I think we need to consider say have already been taken, so I hope you not only the investment that we have in our will bear with some repetition. Since the first maritime defence but we can perhaps ask days of European settlement in Australia, ourselves what sort of maritime defence do shipping and resources of the Continental we need to protect those things that generate Shelf have played a key role in the develop- extra income for us. ment of the Australian economy. Our relative Finally, I want to put forward to you a sort abundance of natural resources, our small of balance sheet of benefits and costs. Now, I and fragmented domestic market and our am neither skilled enough nor foolhardy dependence on overseas machinery, capital enough to try and put numbers on those and knowhow are characteristics which fos- tables but I think they provide a sensible tered the development of international trade framework for looking at how we might make

Seapower '84 — Page 75 decisions as to whether to spend another $2 trade, the market for most of those commod- billion more or $2 billion less on defence of ities would disappear. Where then would you our maritime resources. move your farmers, your iron ore miners, your bauxite miners and so on? Benefits of Maritime Resources It is perhaps important to recognise, Let me turn, then, to the benefits of our though, that, while those exports are really maritime resources, and firstly, international important to Australia, Australia is not a trade. International trade is of fundamental major supplier of many of these commod- importance to the Australian economy. ities. We still have less than 10 per cent of the Cessation of exports and imports of goods world's coal production, less than 10 per cent and services would require a massive restruc- of the world's iron ore production, less than turing of the Australian economy. Further, 10 per cent of its wheat and meat production. trade, by permitting us to export those com- We are big bear when it comes to wool where modities in which we have a comparative we have about 50 per cent of the world's advantage and import those in which we production, bauxite about 40 per cent and have a comparative disadvantage, enables us some of the special mineral sands where we to enjoy a much higher level of living than have nearly 80 per cent, but in general the would otherwise be the case. world could probably get on without our So the real benefit of international trade exports. is that we can sell things that we can produce There is the other side of our trade and easily and cheaply and then exchange those that is imports, and here Australia imports for things that we can produce with more about 17 per cent of its requirements from difficulty and more expensively than other overseas. Over 80 per cent of these imports people. You might compare yourself as an are used as inputs by industry for the produc- individual back in a subsistence environment tion of final products. Important components having to produce all your own food, make are petroleum products and machinery. So a your own clothes, make your own house, large part of the ongoing part of Australian make your own TV, no trade at all; it is a fairly industry is critically dependent on imported grim Robinson Crusoe type world. On the machinery, imported raw materials. other hand, if you can get into the business of Now, even though the Australian eco- trading, if you are a good farmer, you do lots nomy is heavily dependent on international of farming and you exchange that with cloth, trade, its dependence is less than some other with TV sets and so on, then your level of countries. Most of the European countries, income goes up. It is in that context that for example, depend on international trade international trade enables Australia to spe- for over 20 per cent of their gross national cialise on things it is good at, which includes product. In Australia the figure is 15 to 17 per its natural resource industries and some cent. It is, of course, more important than in elements of manufacturing, and to import the US where their trade accounts for only 7 those things that it is not so good at such as per cent and Japan for only 13 per cent. the high technology aerospace type indus- Another interesting aspect is that since tries, cheap labour, textiles and footwear. So the Second World War, almost all major those are the real advantages of trade. developed countries have become in- Let me turn, then, to how important is creasingly dependent on international trade. trade to the Australian economy? Exports In Australia we have stayed the same. Our represent about 15 per cent of our national dependence on international trade has been income. In 1980 1981 this amounted to about fairly constant at 13 to 15 per cent since the $22 billion in value or about 180 million Second World War. A further point of pers- tonnes of freight. Now, most of that freight, pective is that Australian exports amount to over 99 per cent by weight and 94 per cent by only 1.5 per cent of total world exports, so value, was moved by ships. Our exports are what I am trying to argue is that, while trade primarily of agricultural and mining origin. In is important to Australia, it is also very 1981 1982, 46 per cent was agricultural, 36 important to other countries and we are not per cent was mining. the only person who is trying to protect Manufacturing exports are a much smal- international trade. ler part of our total trade. The export market, So the defence of Australia's internation- of course, is critically important to most of the al trade is also going to be supported by other agricultural and mining industries. Over 90 countries wishing to defend their internation- per cent of our wool, iron ore, bauxite, for al trade. I think this becomes more important example, is sold overseas. It does not have a when we recognise the degree of inter- domestic market. If we lost international dependence of world economies. The world

Page 76— Seapower '84 car is just one example. Cars in America, cars attempt to protect everything that moves; in Europe have components from all parts of becuase we have a textile industry, because the globe and basically disruption to interna- we have a footwear industry, we should have tional trade would cause chaos for almost one forever — thank God we were allowed to every industry in every major developed have cars instead of horses and buggies) if country. we have a continuation of those policies, we The reason we have been into this trade will have a lesser dependence on internation- is that it enables us to go in for specialisation, al trade than perhaps is the case at the to enjoy economies of size, to rapidly deploy moment. technological change and it also puts a bit of The final point to come out of interna- competitive ginger into the system. If you tional trade which I will take up is that have a protected economy, there is a tenden- international trade depends on cheap and cy to keep doing the same old thing because efficient sea transport as well as freedom to there is not much competition. There is make that transport operate. A second set of nothing like having those smart Japanese, benefits of our maritime resources to Aust- South Koreans and Americans with new ralia is its coastal trade. Given that Australia products putting the heat on Australian pro- is an island and that most of its people live on ducers to up their game. the coast, it is not surprising that coastal So these are the sorts of benefits that we shipping plays an important role in the get out of international trade. Another feature domestic transport sector. of Australia's trade is that it goes to all points I guess it is perhaps more surprising just of the globe. Our dependence on the United how small a role it does play. In 1978 1979, Kingdom has fallen from about 50 per cent in sea transport accounted for about 47 million the 1950s to now where we only send 3.7 per tonnes of our freight which is only 4 per cent cent of our exports to the UK and get 8 per of the total tonnage of freight moved in this cent of our imports from there. At the same country. That is not a very large amount. time our links with Japan have expanded Coastal sea freight, as Mr Kirk mentioned, is dramatically so that now we send 27 per cent especially important in the long term distant of our exports to Japan and get 20 per cent of transport of bulk cargo, in particular oil and our imports from Japan. iron ore, but also for sugar and grains, and it Overall, less than 20 per cent of our trade is also particularly important for the move- is with Europe and over 60 per cent is with ment of cargo between Tasmania and the countries in the Pacific Basin: North America, mainland; and lest we forget that little island Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the de- on the end of Australia, Tasmanians very veloping countries of South and South-East heavily depend on sea transport. Asia. Looking to the future, it seems to me But when it comes to transport of general that it is likely that international trade would cargo between the large mainland cities, rail continue to grow as an important part of and road transport predominate. Australia, Australia's economic activity. Just how im- unlike Europe and North America, moves portant depends a little bit on economic very little freight via inland waterways and policy. that is largely because of our geography. So If Australia follows the policies of more as Peter Stubbs has observed about Austra- open free trade that is now being advocated lia's coastal shipping, the tonnage carried is by the Prime Minister and has been advo- limited and specialised and there is not a cated by other people in the past, then it is great deal of competition with other modes. It likely that the importance of international is, however, important and virtually indis- trade will grow in the Australian economy pensible in certain trades. from something like the current 15 per cent In an economic sense, it is important to up towards the 20 per cent level, and that will ask ourselves what would happen if we did be an expansion not only of mineral and not have coastal transport. Basically we agricultural exports but a major expansion of would have to move that oil and iron ore manufacturing exports. either by road or rail or by extended pipe- We will get more into the so-called lines, and the economic benefits of having intra-industry trade. BMP, for example, will coastal shipping is the lower freight charge of not try and produce every conceivable type of coastal shipping relative to what we would steel. It will specialise in certain lines of steel have had to pay if it was by road or by and export those, and we will import the pipeline, and so that is the economic benefit. other lines of steel. On the other hand, if It enables shipping, it enables us to move Australia decides to continue what I have resources around the coastline cheaper than often called its mercantilist policies (its by the alternative technique.

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Seapower '84 — Page 79 A third set of advantages of our maritime platforms, that one can fish, without harass- resources is our sea resources and here I will ment and without losses. A fourth area in just briefly summaries what was very well which the coastal or marine resources are presented by Mr Kirk. I suppose one should important to Australia is in quarantine. note though, the enormous size of Australia's Australian agriculture depends in part for coast. If you take the 200 nautical mile its productivity and some of its overseas economic zone, that gives us an area of market on the absence of exotic diseases and coastal water of 6.5 million square miles; that pests. The most important of these, of course, is about the same area as the mainland coast, is foot and mouth disease, but also there is and one would hope there are some fairly freedom from diseases like brucellosis and rich resources in it. tuberculosis. In part, we have favoured ac- One initially thinks of fishing but really cess to the Japanese and North American that is fairly small. The fishing industry, at markets relative to the Latin Americans be- about $400 million a year — well, I guess any cause our livestock industries are free of company would like to have that type of these particular diseases. income but it is really less than a quarter per Further, since we have not had these cent of our national income and Australia's diseases, should they outbreak in Australia fishing resouces, despite the large expanse of they would cause chaos. The Australian lives- water, do not promise to grow very greatly tock industries would have mortality rates 30, over the rest of this century. But it is true to 40 per cent or more. There would be enor- say other countries find our fishing resources mous losses of economic production if these attractive, some of them legally and some diseases were introduced. Many of the coun- illegally. tries to our north have these diseases and What is important is that those small landing of an errant fishing boat with some of fishery resources need to be managed. its domestic animals could easily set off a Fishing is one of those activities in which if burst of foot and mouth disease, and that you let the private system do it by itself they would reduce Australia's agricultural income will overfish it. It is what we call externality dramatically. So part of the protection of our problems. So the proper management of our mainland economic capacity requires marine fishery resources requires some overall Gov- surveillance keeping out overseas exotic dis- ernment guidance on maintaining the level of eases and pests. catch and, in this sense, if we want to continue to gain value of our fishery re- Shipping Policy sources, we have to control the fishing not Let me move now to talk about some only by Australians but also by overseas shipping issues. First the magnitude of the companies. problem. There are about 500 ships servicing Mr Kirk very adequately covered the Australia's international trade at any one time various resources we have in terms of energy and about 80 vessels in the coastal trade. and some of us hope that over the next They serve some 41 major public ports, decades we may find some mineral resources eleven privately owned commercial ports and in our coastal waters. It is likely that in the numerous smaller ones. Again, the interna- future we will see greater utilisation of tional trade goes to all corners of the globe. oceans, including those within Australia's What I am trying to say is, protecting our zone of influence, for the mining of minerals commercial trade interests means looking and the harvesting of food and animal feeds. after a lot of ships and a lot of ports and an All that plankton floating around in the enormous amount of water. It is not some- water is a potential source of food. We have thing you can do with two tugboats. not yet worked out how to use it but I think It is a very large, substantial problem and the next couple of decades may see major I think we have to ask ourselves what sort of technological changes. Then we will be grate- Defence Force can provide protection to ships ful we have got lots of water. Again perhaps that are going all over the place in all we should include coastal and island re- directions at all times. It is also perhaps creational and tourist facilities as part of interesting to look at the various ways our Australia's maritime resources. shipping is organised. As Mr Kirk noted, most In summary, resources on the waters of our export trade goes in the bulk cargo along Australia's 19,000 kilometre coastline ships, most of our import trade goes in the provide an important contribution to the smaller ships, manufactured goods in the country's national income and, as Mr Kirk has liners. said, the realisation of that national income Now, there are quite different ways of depends on security that one can build organising those two industries. The cargo

Page 80 — Seapower '84 shipping industry — that is what we use for Now, we ought to look very seriously at our coal, wheat, sugar, iron ore, bauxite, what is the most efficient way and cheapest fertiliser and oil --is essentially the free way of providing that shipping. So that raises market model that Australian economists like the big question: Should Australia have a to draw on. It is a very competitive industry, larger or smaller shipping industry, when there are lots and lots of countries involved, it basically 95 per cent plus of our international is easy to get into the business, it is interna- trade is carried by overseas ships? The ANL tionally competitive, it is right up on tech- carried about 4 per cent and it rarely makes a nological change and in general it offers us profit. The principal reason why Australian transport costs at very low, efficient and shipping has not expanded further is the fact cheap rates. that it is not able to compete and I would take On the other hand, transport of our the view that until it can compete it should manufactured goods is via liner shipping and not expand. most of these are organised in what we call The wellbeing of the Australian export shipping conferences and they are de facto sector and also the importing sector depends cartels. They fix rates for cargoes and they on keeping ship freight costs as low as agree to provide scheduled services calling at possible. In turn, lower freight costs increase specific points at regular times. Now, there is the levels of trade that are profitable, which in plenty of debate amongst economists as to turn increases exporters' returns and employ- the effect of these cartels or conferences. ment; it also enables importers to keep down Some economists have labelled them as the price of their goods, and so cheaper the greatest monopoly since BMP, others freight rates generally contribute to higher think that really in practice they work some- Australian real income. where near an efficient level. There are three Expanding the Australian shipping indus- observations I would make that suggest to try means diverting resources from other me they are not offering us low cost shipping. industries. Funds tied up in ships are funds These three facts are, that on occasion firms not available for agriculture, schools, metal try to break out of a conference area of manufacturing and so on. Similarly, labour interest by trying to set rates at lower levels; used in ships is labour not available as again, periodically conference members start farmers, schoolteachers, motor mechanics price wars; and finally, every now and again and so on. On economic efficiency grounds, shippers negotiate freight rates outside the where should we best place our resources? shipping conferences. The shipping industry has no better claims So that leads me to believe that freight for receiving a subsidy than other industries rates in the shipping conferences are not as such as shipbuilding, agriculture and educa- low as they might be and Australia, in looking tion. at its maritime interests, should seriously Identical arguments could be made consider whether it wants to consider this against the claims that a shipping industry is shipping conference system or not. Freight required to generate overseas funds and rates are an important cost element to Au- provide employment. These are laudable stralia's export trade. Estimates are that the goals, but what we should ask is should they landed value of our imports include shipping be achieved by expanding our agricultural or costs of about 10 to 12 per cent. In terms of mining industries or by expanding our ship- our 1982 1983 export figures, we paid in the ping industry? In short, I find no persuasive order of $3 billion freight on the transhipment reason for agreeing with the recommenda- in of imports to this country. That is a tions of the recent Crawford Report that we fair-sized industry. should subsidise Australian shipping. It is But freight is even more important to our essentially throwing money down the drain. export industries. In the case of agricultural It is protecting one industry that has no better products anything from 10 to 20 per cent of claims for assistance than other industries. the landed value of our wheat and wool in Personally I am not convinced by the overseas countries is taken up by shipping argument that a domestic shipping industry costs. If you go to coal, something like 25 per is vital for Australia's defence. I ask myself cent of the landed value of coal in Japan is what types of conflict are anticipated in the shipping costs; 40 per cent of its value landed future, how can a new, commercially viable in Europe is shipping costs. So I would civilian industry assist and what types and estimate that somewhere near $5 billion a numbers of ships are required? Without large year is spent on shipping our exports over- subsidies or protection it is doubtful that an seas. That gives us a total expenditure on Australian shipping industry will be price shipping costs of the order of $8 billion. competitive on the international scene.

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Seapower '84 — Page 83 We have no particular advantages in resources is the natural resources; the raising capital at below market rates, our fishing, energy, minerals, tourism. Fourthly, manning levels are well above international we have the benefit of maintaining the dis- levels, the number of seamen we require on a ease and pest-free status of the Australia ship is about double that of the British and mainland. Fifthly, there are what I would call Scandinavian ships and even those guys cost some spillover benefits. These are the availa- more per hour than do those of our competi- bility of Defence naval forces for natural tors. Further, we seem to have no particular disasters; some of the knowledge benefits advantages that suggest that shipping is one they get from mapping out Australia's marine of those industries which Australia should be environment. Sixthly, and perhaps the most actively involved in. So my suggestion is that important, is national security. Australia should look for the most cost effec- Now, the cost, on the other side, is the tive shipping to hire, and use its scarce capital opportunity value of labour, equipment and and labour resources in other industries in other resources devoted to our naval de- which it has a comparative advantage. fence, and I think what we need to ask ourselves is, not only what is the total cost, Costs of Protection but what form of naval defence do we want? The third topic I wanted to look at was, What sort of naval defence will protect our what is the cost of maintaining Australia's international trade? What sort of naval de- maritime resources? Here I would just briefly fence will protect our natural oil and gas comment that Defence requires budgetary industries? What sort of defence will maintain grants and resources which are not then our disease and pest-free status? available for use in other public outlays such It seems to me, if we can think of it in that as health and education or for use in the type of economic context, then you can make private sector such as primary and secondary arguments to the people and to the Govern- industry. ment; should we be spending rather than That is the real cost of Defence. It is $4.8 billion on Defence — $6 billion? or how drawing resources away from producing do you counter the greenies who say you other goods and commodities that we like, to should spend nothing on Defence? What you providing defence support. And it is not have really got to say is 'Look. If you spend trivial. In the 1983 1984 budget, the grant for nothing on Defence, you run the risk of losing Defence was $4.8 billion. That represented this level of economic wellbeing', and of just under 10 per cent of the federal budget course what you try to argue is, if you spend and just under 3 per cent of national income. $4.8 billion on Defence you are returning So, if you like, we have to ask ourselves is yourself more than $4.8 billion. that $4.8 billion worth it in terms of protection of our economic interests?

Balancing Benefits and Costs DISCUSSION Let me, then, try and put the whole story together. What I have in mind is a table: on Mr D.G. Fry: Don Fry from Cairns. Professor, one side we have the benefits, on the other with great interest I listened to you and I side we have the costs. thought that possibly some things were at Benefits I put under six items. Firstly, conflict. You made the statement 'the world benefits for maritime resources include inter- could get on without our exports' and yet I national trade. By being able to import and find the summary of your statement to be, we export we are able to generate higher real should only do the things we are presently incomes than would be the case if we were good at. I would have thought that that was not in the importing and exporting business. somewhat a policy for disaster, and I want to Secondly, it allows coastal shipping and that remind you that 20 years ago we were a lot provides us a lower cost way of transporting better at a lot more in terms of the then world some commodities. But let me add a rider standards, and I suggest that we should be here. To gain the full benefits of international returning and striving to return to that posi- trade and coastal trade we require an efficient tion. and low cost shipping service, and here we I believe we should not be blinded by the can ask some questions about the way we rise in union activities and the lessening of run our coastal shipping, about our manning our effective management over that last 20 levels in particular, and we can ask some years, which I believe is in the main the questions about our addiction to shipping reason why we are presently in the position conferences. A third benefit of our maritime we are. In the defence of this land, it is

Page 84 — Seapower '84 necessary to recognise that some of the you that your economic view does not really industries you advocate should be closed are suit the real situation of the world today if we in fact critical to our defence and continued are to benefit from increasing trade. viability, and I would suggest and hope that Prof J. Freebairn: Well, I beg to differ with not too many people will agree with your you. Breaking down trade in the longer run suggested proposals of closure. I believe, and in aggregate always enables you to have Professor, that we should be taking the lead greater economic wellbeing than otherwise. of Sir Charles Court and telling the people of Now, that does raise two questions about the our problem and uniting and striving to fix practicalities. I said in aggregate and I said in the deficiencies. the longer run. It is true that trade, opening Prof J. Freebairn: I think that the really up trade, will make life difficult for some interesting question there is what industries people and, if you like, let us take the poor old are critical to our defence. One might argue clothing industry. That will contract but I that food is critical, one might argue that it is would not think it would be blown away. clothing, one might argue that it is TV prob- Certainly some people will lose jobs and rammes, shipping, whatever. It seems to me some people will have some sewing that we are such an interconnected economy machines with little use, but people can learn that it is really hard to say any particular new jobs. People do change jobs. Trade is not industry is fundamental. Even the fun- the only thing that is causing change. We damental agricultural industry is critically have technological change going on all the dependent on tractors. time. We do adjust to it. We can adjust to it Where are tractors made in this country? and we get a greater return from it and, in My father bought a John Deere a couple of fact, if you want a big Defence budget, one of years ago. That is by an American company, the great ways is to have a big national made in Sir Charles Court's state, Western income. It is a lot easier to divert money from Australia; it has a French engine, a German a growing pie than to pinch it from a zero sum differential, an Italian something else, it has one. got parts from about a dozen countries. We So a growing national economy is what are interdependent in a big way and I think it you get if you go towards free trade. So as a is very hard to point the finger and say This longer term goal, free trade will increase your industry is critical and this one is not'. national income. Now, the question is Again, how do we defend ourselves? Do whether you should set some adjustment we maintain we have one industry for every- schemes to help people adjust towards that, thing that moves, opens and shuts? Maybe and I think maybe there is a case. Again, if the we should have greater storage of scarce whole economy is going to gain and some materials. It seems to me there are more lose, then perhaps the economy should be a ways than one and I am not at all convinced little bit more benevolent in providing unem- that any particular industry is the critical ployment benefits and retraining benefits to industry. I think any lobbyist could make a help people who lose from change to get plausible case that his or her industry is the themselves set up in a new world. critical industry. Commander C.J. Skinner: Chris Skinner, MIDN C. Maxworthy: Chris Maxworthy, sir, Navy. Professor, one could get the mistaken RAN. You made the point that trade or impression from your remarks that the protection of our trade is something that we ASEAN countries and those of the South- should discourage; in other words that we West Pacific have disappeared from the face should not have barriers or tariff protection in of the earth and that Australia exists in a large order to protect industries, since your justi- interdependent trade system that does not fication is purely economic. However, most of include those countries. Of course, reality is the people here would base their argument different to that and I think it is some 5 per on the fact that we should be prepared for cent or so of our trade is currently with future situations where the economic view- ASEAN and probably some smaller amount point is not the only thing of consideration. with the South-West Pacific. So I would put the point to you, sir, that What do you see is going to happen in trade barriers or the breaking down of them the next couple of decades in the growth of only suits countries when they are in a trade with those countries and what part position of economic gain. For instance, the should Australia play in that growth, if any, United States benefits now from the fact that and what does that imply for sea power and it had protection in the early years, and defence? Japan, similarly, is very reluctant to break Prof J. Freebairn: That is a good question. I down its barriers. So I would put the point to think in a sense the ASEAN countries are

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HMAS JOBRUK during Exercise Kangaroo '83 Courtesy: Navy PR

Page 88 - Seapower '84 THE NAVAL VIEW

By VADM D.W. Leach AO CBE MVO RAN Chief of Naval Staff

Mr President, distinguished guests, service in Australasian waters. The first de- ladies and gentlemen. The public debate on cade after Federation also brought a height- Defence over the past few years has, I ened public awareness of the importance of believe, highlighted a general lack of under- naval affairs, something which has been lost standing within Australia on maritime mat- over the years. ters, a point made very forcefully by Sir In the event, local precaution prevailed Charles Court and Mr Kirk. I therefore wish to and Australia gained a Navy for her own congratulate t.ie Naval Institute on its efforts which preserved a large measure of inde- to promote knowledge of maritime affairs pendence. Nevertheless, the ultimate security through its journal, its regular chapter meet- of Australia continued to be guaranteed by ings and in particular its Seapower seminars. the Royal Navy until 1941 when that role was Professional seminars such as these and the shouldered by the United States Navy. Dur- informed discussion which follows, help raise ing this period, the demands of Australian the level of awareness on maritime defence Defence Policy were relatively simple. The issues which are vital to this country and policy itself was one of dependence on great stimulate interest. and powerful friends, with the Australian My task is to outline Navy's view of contribution to the security relationship con- Australia's maritime interests. It is a view sisting essentially of expeditionary forces which is coloured by our naval heritage and I which would serve under the major allies in see a fairly consistent line developing from all areas where the interests of those allies were the speakers, with a few notable exceptions. I predominantly involved, but where the Au- have chosen as my theme 'Seapower for stralian Government decided to make com- Peace' and I have done so for two reasons. mon cause with them. This policy was based Firstly, there is a widely held misconception on two related premises. Firstly, that it was in that naval forces are useful only in wartime Australia's interests to have Britain and the and secondly, I am convinced that a balanced United States physically committed to our and well prepared Navy will enhance the region and second, that the major allies Australian Defence Forces' deterrent posture would feel so obligated to Australia for its and this will contribute to continued peace assistance that they would be bound to come and stability within our region. We heard to its defence should we ever be threatened. yesterday a very thoughtful historical pers- By the end of the 60s, it was evident that pective from his Excellency The Governor- radical changes had taken place in the fun- General and I would like to add a little to this. damental basis of Australia's national secur- As the 19th century moved towards its ity policy. In July 1967, the British Govern- close, the Australian colonies became in- ment announced a timetable for Britain's final creasingly conscious of their isolation and withdrawal from Asia, and the forces in their need for stronger naval protection. The Malaysia and Singapore, the last to leave, recurring fear of Russia's expansionist policy would be withdrawn by the end of the 70s. On in the Pacific kept the colonies on the alert 25 July 1969, President Nixon announced at and the resultant demand for a co-ordinated Guam that the US ground forces were unlike- defence plan gave impetus to the movements ly to be committed to the Asian mainland towards federation. The first step towards again, a position which was codified in the independence in naval defence was the ac- Nixon doctrine of 1970. The implications for quisition of ships by the individual colonies. Australia were signal. The policies of inde- The second step was the maintenance of a pendence and forward defence were perforce special squadron of the Royal Navy for abandoned in favour of increased self re-

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ALSTHOM-ATLANTIQUE liance and concern for the defence of Aust- In the event of a threat of major conven- ralia itself. tional attack, the aim of our maritime forces From Prime Ministers Gorton to Whitlam and operations should be to defeat the to Fraser this new Defence Policy was aggressor's forces in the vicinity of his bases variously described as Fortress Australia, or staging areas and as far from our coast as Continental Defence, Defence of Australia possible. Only in the last resort should we and Its Interests. What does defence of attempt to defeat his forces in our maritime Australia and its interests mean? This ques- approaches. The preservation of Australian tion was asked yesterday by, I think, Com- sovereignty over our island territories poses mander Youll. Whilst an Australian national potentially great problems for Navy. Christ- strategy has not been stated as such, Austra- mas and Cocos Islands, for example, are the lia's principal national security interests have very limit of the range of land based air. Air been identified as: support of naval and ground forces defend- • the preservation of sovereignty over our ing these islands would be limited if not, in continent, island territories and territorial practical terms, impossible to achieve due to seas and of our sovereign rights and our range and conflicting priorities. Fortunately, resource zones; no threat to our island territories has been • security of overseas and coastal lines of identified, but it is most obscure thinking to communication; suggest that these territories would not be • maintenance of good relations and reduc- strategically important and significant in a tion of tensions with other countries, parti- confrontation or dispute over resources. cularly those in our region; and Although the possibility of a direct • the avoidance of global war. assault on Australian territory is unlikely, this It is against these identified national interests is not true of disputes over resource zones that I will discuss Navy's view. which now comprise 40 per cent of the world's ocean areas. Australia has followed The Preservation of Sovereignty this trend, as you have heard, with a 200 We have heard many times that Australia nautical mile fishing zone and we claim is an island lying between three great oceans exclusive rights over the continental shelf, in - the Southern, the Pacific and the Indian. some cases 500 nautical miles from our Her eastern and northern shores are washed coast. Already there have been disagree- by the Timor, the Arafura, the Coral and the ments over resource zone boundaries, and Tasman Seas, but our land mass is so with the increased emphasis on extracting spacious that many Australians are inclined resources, including oil, from the sea the to have a continental outlook, despite our possibility of disputes increases. It is likely long maritime heritage and geographic situa- that they will be solved, as they have been in tion. It is not a view that is shared by Navy or the past, by diplomatic means. Nevertheless, by many defence commentators. Desmond the potential for conflict remains and the Ball, and we heard of him yesterday, and J.O. Government must therefore have the capabil Langtry, for example, have noted that 'it ity to exercise jurisdiction within these zones. would be the height of foolishness if Australia This is primarily a role for naval forces, were to adopt a military posture which did supported where range permits by Air Force not give priority to holding and preferably assets. destroying an invading force on the high seas The Defence Force also supports the civil or in the air before reaching Australia.' authorities in customs, health, fisheries and In the preservation of our sovereignty, immigration and presently these tasks are this has been a guiding principle in Navy's undertaken by our patrol boats — and thank approach. It is worth reflecting on the fact you, Mr Kirk, for your bouquet for that — and that the great continental powers of Europe, from the P3 Orions of Air Force and, until the though they could conquer the land mass of beginning of this year, by the Fleet Air Arm Europe, have been unable to cross the 22 Tracker aircraft. mile water gap to the UK for almost a thousand years, and as the Channel has Sea Lines of Communication proved such a successful obstacle to invasion Turning now to security of our sea lines of Britain, if the seas and oceans and air of communication, in many contingencies space around us are adequately defended — protection of shipping would be Navy's most and that is vital, otherwise it is just a highway challenging task. Few Australians, and I will for somebody wanting to come - - then except Mr Kirk and Professor Freebairn here, Australia too will be spared incursions and understand the importance of seaborne trade land battles on its soil. to economic wellbeing, yet the Soviet Admir-

Page 92 — Seapower '84 al Gorshkov sees maritime trade as the discussion on maritime trade and they are West's Achilles heel, pointing out that The first, that during a period of conflict air economy of developed capitalist countries transport could meet our strategic transport largely depend on sea transport.' He goes on requirements and secondly, since our trade is to suggest that 'anti-trade and protection of carried in foreign ships — and you saw the trade operations are the most important numbers of the Australian hulls there this constituent part of the efforts of a fleet aimed morning — that any threat could be interna- at undermining the military economic poten- tionalised. The suggestion that air transport tial of the enemy.' could meet our strategic transport require- The peacetime growth of Soviet sea ments is not supported by fact. A Boeing 747, power, encompassing naval capabilities, the for instance, requires two tonnes of fuel for fishing fleet, merchant shipping and marine one tonne of cargo carried and fuel is going and scientific research operations, has enor- to be in short supply, and that is quite apart mously strengthened the Soviet's ability to from the bulk requirements of our industrial wage maritime economic war. This is a and defence efforts during a conflict. The matter for concern for us in Australia since prospects for internationalising threats to our they have not only overtaken previous West- shipping are extremely uncertain. In Austra- ern dominance of merchant shipping, but lia's case, about 95 per cent dependent on they can and have used their sea power to foreign shipping as you have seen, what support unaligned Third World countries. I could be expected to occur is that prior to an noticed in the Canberra Times that Mr Mack outbreak of conflict the insurance and charter takes a more sanguine view of this affair, but I costs would be increased to cover the per- think he is in the strategic studies area for the ceived risk. These costs could be substantial. next five years so perhaps he might change As the level of risk increases, the number of his view. operators and owners prepared to continue What is the magnitude of the problem trading with Australia would begin to dimin- facing us? You have heard something of that ish commensurately with our ability or inabil- this morning. I think everyone agrees that ity to protect their investment, and I think that overseas trade is a vital national interest with is probably one factor in the equation that our exports and imports being equivalent to Professor Freebairn says of the economics of about 35 per cent of our GDP. Australia is a developing our own shipping. If there is major world exporter of food, with increasing nobody else coming here it may be very dependence on particular manufactured arti- economic to have stronger Australian mer- cles and you have heard about our potentially chant shipping. growing dependence on heavy crude. You We are all aware of what happened to have heard some idea of the scale of this: 207 shipping around Europe in the early stages of million tonnes of cargo are carried in and out World War II. The United States, for example, of Australia by sea each year and only, by simply made a prohibited zone around the comparison, 161,000 by air. On an average British Isles and north west Europe and we day, there are 195 merchant ships in our ports should perhaps expect this sort of thing to andabout175intransittoandfromAustralia. happen. The inevitable result would be a loss Sea lines of communication are vulner- of markets to a greater or lesser extent as able to interdiction since they are both long buyers or competitors turned to those not and readily identifiable at considerable dis- engaged in the conflict, and I do not think tances from Australia: on the Cape of Good reliance can be put on long term contracts Hope route, for instance, for at least 4,000 because most of these have force majeure nautical miles and the Persian Gulf, for at penalties. I believe there are two basic re- least 2,000 miles, you can identify that ships quirements for our Navy to be able to protect are coming to Australia. So a potential enemy shipping so far from our coast. Firstly, we has only to deploy his anti-shipping forces must have sufficient ships to be able to near these limits and with some sort of operate from this distance and clearly this intelligence he can reasonably expect to implies an afloat support capability; and intercept our shipping without fear of attack secondly, I believe we must also have a from our land based forces and this would be means of providing anti-submarine warfare a cost effective option for even a regional helicopter support to our escorts. enemy with limited maritime capabilities. Aircraft Carrier Air Transport and Internationalisation Possible ways of providing the support May I digress for a moment to address are currently under investigation within Navy two matters that are frequently raised in and we are working hard on it and in some

Seapuwer '84 — Page 93 - - L

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Seapower '84 — Page 95 circumstances air strike and air defence sup- decisions it has been necessary to make port will be essential. This brings me to the during the past twelve months have been subject of aircraft carriers — probably some difficult. Putting our troubles aside and look- of you have said 'When is he going to get ing at the immediate future, while quite there?' I believe no expression of the Naval properly we give attention to the wartime role view would be complete without some refer- of the Australian Defence Force, the peace- ence to the subject and I would like to assure time role must never be neglected nor its Mr Harry that eggshell walking is not the importance underestimated. Essentially, it is complete preserve of ambassadors. In the to take those steps which hopefully will weeks leading up to my assumption of office prevent armed conflict in the first place. It is as Chief of Naval Staff I looked to the future the Naval view, and I am sure the general with confidence and pleasure. INVINCIBLE view as I previously said, that diplomacy was to join the fleet as the new HMAS should be the principal method of settling AUSTRALIA and while the ship was to func- disputes in this very imperfect world in which tion as a helicopter carrier and the future of we live, a world in which wealth and poverty, naval fixed wing flying was not assured, at abundance and starvation, tolerance and in- least we had a firm base on which to proceed tolerance sit unhappily together. Superim- with our study on the shape of the Navy for posed, as it were, on this are the ideological the next 20 years. differences of the two super powers — the Sadly as it turned out, within days of United States and the USSR - - and the moving into the chair, the British Foreign potential of the vast populations of China and Secretary was stating in the House of Com- India, and overshadowing everything is the mons that 'the use of force in the Falklands spectre of nuclear warfare which in my could not be ruled out' — and, as we all know, opinion the nuclear powers will continue to it was not ruled out. But few could have strive to avoid. foreseen at the time the effect it would have More than any other Service, the Navy on the Royal Australian Navy and I believe on can aid diplomacy. Admiral Gorshkov, and I Australian defence. The group of Argentine make no apology for again quoting this scrap merchants who raised their flag on remarkable man whose perceptions and long South Georgia in March 1982 have a great period in office have made him one of the deal to answer for in more ways than one. In most outstanding military leaders of our the event, INVINCIBLE stayed at home and time, referring in his book, The Sea Power of before the then Government decided on any the State, to the greatly increased activity of replacement an election was called and a new navies in the second half of the 20th century Government was in office. It would be idle to writes: pretend the incoming Government's decision This growth (in naval activity) plus the not to proceed with the carrier project and to colossal growth of the merchant and disband our fixed wing squadrons has not fishing fleets is promoting an increase in had a profound effect on the Navy. Quite the number of contacts at sea between apart from strategic and tactical considera- war ships of different states, between tions which have been widely discussed in war ships and merchant vessels and also the media, personnel problems have caused between local authorities and war ships us a great deal of worry. on calls at ports and foreign states. Such The total number of uniformed personnel contacts in peacetime are particular to has declined and will continue to do so for the highest degree only to one branch of some time to come as the various skills the armed forces of any state, the Navy.' required to support a carrier based Fleet Air On the local scene, responding recently to a Arm are dispersed to other Services or leave newspaper editorial querying the value of the Defence Force as engagements expire. By Australian naval visits to other countries — 1987, it is planned that we will have lost about the Foreign Minister had proposed further 1,900 people and, as many in this audience Navy visits you will remember to ports in the will appreciate, the reduction in numbers has western Indian Ocean — the Federal Presi- had a consequential effect on postings and dent of the Navy League, and he is here advancement and mismatched difficulties in today, I thought said quite wisely: some categories which we are trying hard to The benefits of foreign visits are several. redress. Two or three hundred sailors can have quite an influence on local populations Diplomacy and will often form the only links be- Having said this, my confidence in the tween people in a foreign country and future of the RAN remains firm, but the hard Australia. Our small overseas diplomatic

Page 96 — Seapower '84 HMS INVINCIBLE departing Australia 28 Dec '83 Credit: J. Mortimer missions can only do so much and we cannot and do not ignore the reality of the generally welcome visits by RAN units. power and influence of those countries pos- They are very visible evidence of our sessing nuclear weapons, particularly the interest in a particular country.' United States and the Soviet Union. The I think that is a slightly different view than pervasive influence on defence thinking that taken by Mr Pritchett yesterday, but everywehre of the nuclear deterrent showing the flag in peacetime is time hon- strategies practised by the super powers oured the world over and although nowadays during the last four decades needs no ela- the term is sometimes used derisively there is boration for this audience. The facts are nothing at all to suggest the custom is out of always in mind as we plan our own conven- date. tionally equipped Defence Force. So far as I suggest a NIMITZ is a more thought our naval forces are concerned, since its provoking aid than almost any number of inception in 1911 until almost the present patrol boats or auxiliaries and I think in the day, the Royal Australian Navy has been Australian context our carriers in the past structured around a corps of what I will call, rendered excellent service when representing for want of a better description, fighting Australia abroad. Now, in the more distant ships. The battle cruiser AUSTRALIA at the ports our destroyers and frigates supported beginning, the cruisers up to and including where possible by SUPPLY or STALWART World War II and a little beyond, then the perform this task, and nearer to home in the carriers and more recently the submarines South West Pacific, with its many small island and always the destroyers — they have been communities, the patrol boats increasingly a very visible sharp end of naval defence. represent Australia and they do so very well. The ever increasing complexity of cost of modern frontline war ships, the need to Military Strategy provide our own support facilities and the I now turn to the subject of military infrastructure of a self contained Navy, the strategy which is just as important, indeed it training establishments and the schools and is more important in peace than it is in war. In the stores complexes, housing for the per- war, strategy is often dictated by events, sonnel — the list is endless — have together whereas in peace, governments and their with the matching requirements of the Army advisors have a choice and the strategy they and Air Force placed a considerable demand choose to follow will significantly increase or on the resources of the country. A critical decrease the possibility of involvement in public is conscious of a very large Defence hostilities. To use the words of Admiral Sir establishment ashore and relatively few ships Anthony Synnot: or aircraft or Army equipment to show for it 'It is worth remembering that it is better all, and this concern is understandable. In and more economical from every point of Defence, we must be very careful to see view to deter war rather than plan on things in proper perspective and to ensure winning after it has started.' that the money and effort devoted to support Just as an aside here, I think perhaps if facilities and administration is commensurate Admiral Synnot had had the chance to have with the Defence force produced, a Force been in office for over 30 years, Australia capable of meeting the demands of Govern- might have had its own Gorshkov. ment in a wide variety of circumstances. In general terms, military strategy can be In my view, this means a Navy with the described as being either offensive, in a emphasis on deterrent capability to discour- deterrent rather than aggressive sense, or age anyone who might contemplate interfer- defensive. In the democracies, it is the re- ence with our sea lines of communication or sponsibility of governments to decide the hostile action in our region, and at the same form of strategy to be followed and it need time to provide worthwhile support for the not be wholly offensive or wholly defensive. very much larger but nevertheless stretched More often than not it will be a mix, but here forces of our principal ally, the United States, again the actual mix, where the emphasis is and its worldwide peacekeeping capabilities to lie, is a matter for government. The and activities. This is the expensive and structure of a national defence force or the slower to achieve part of the objective, but way it is being developed usually provides a the expense will be nothing compared to the good indication of the strategic thinking in a cost measured not so much in terms of country and the direction in which it is money but in loss of life and suffering should heading so far as its international rela- we become involved in conflict. We should tionships are concerned. know this by now, but sadly memories are In considering the defence of Australia, shortlived except amongst those who have

Page 98 — Seapower '84 been involved in war. contribute to the Defence Force capability for The defensive part of strategy to which sea denial, but I believe only Naval forces Navy is devoting attention includes the im- have a capability for sea denial and sea provement of surveillance facilities, hydrog- assertion and this is fundamentally important raphic activity as we heard this morning, because war cannot be won by reactive sea methods of dealing with mines and mine denial alone. laying, liaison with the merchant shipping Thirdly, a demonstrable strategic strike industry ranging across ship building and capability is required. Such a capability we ship maintenance facilities to possible war- have in our F111s, but perhaps a similar time use of particular merchant ships and capability could also be achieved, perhaps at ways of handling merchant ships and their less cost, less risk, with greater effect in terms cargoes in times of tension or war. To return of range and ability, to operate covertly by to the subject of deterrence; in the past, the acquisition of cruise missiles for our although costly, war has generally been submarines. accepted as a continuation of politics by other Finally, given our limited national trans- means. However, primarily because of the port infrastructure, particularly in the north, destructive power of modern weapons this is and the north west, and our responsibility for no longer the case and we live in an age of offshore islands, I believe we also require a deterrence. It has even been suggested, demonstrable strategic capability to deploy perhaps with tongue in cheek but certainly and support balanced ground forces in with some justification, that future battle threatened areas, and only Navy can enable honours will refer to battles deferred rather Army to deploy ground forces into than battles won. threatened areas near or far from our coasts without a requirement for staging bases on Deterrence foreign soil or co-operation by friendly gov- Deterrence, and particularly strategic de- ernments for overflight clearances. terrence, has become almost synonymous with a nuclear capability, but there are of Community Understanding course many less drastic forms of deterrence To draw the threads together, Australia which are also more applicable in our region. has a rich and long maritime heritage in Current defence doctrine notes that the which the Royal Navy and since 1911 the essential element of an effective deterrent is a Royal Australian Navy has played a fun- force structure which is seen to be capable of damental role. Despite this, there is a tenden- countering or expanding to counter a per- cy in the community to adopt a continental ceived threat, so that a potential enemy is outlook which recent decisions and state- convinced that the efforts he would have to ments on Defence have perhaps incorrectly expend to achieve his aim would not be underlined. This I describe as the Maginot commensurate with the expected gain. In Line mentality and I leave you to judge the Australia's situation, I see four essential ele- outcome in conflict of adhering to it. Never- ments of deterrence comprising firstly, an theless, Navy has an essential role to play in effective surveillance and reconnaissance the defence of Australia and its interests, the capability such that no potential aggressor security of our sea lines and regional stability. would imagine hostile intentions could be But the development of any Service is concealed. Although this can be provided by affected by the importance it is accorded by a combination of RAAF and Naval forces, its nation. It must enjoy the understanding only submarines are able to operate in this and confidence of the Government and the role covertly. In itself, a capability for covert support and encouragement of the commun- operations enhances our deterrent posture ity, and so it is with the Navy. The acceptance because a potential aggressor never knows of its role in defence is a predominant factor when he is or will be under surveillance, and I in Navy's development. This acceptance is put it to you that air bases around the north of only possible if the political leadership, the Australia with no air warning is rather like Department, the press, industry, trade and playing Blind Man's Buff. community are well informed of its roles and Secondly, a credible capability to imple- functions and I think this seminar is one of the ment sea control measures. You will be things that helps that. As I mentioned, there is aware that the concept of sea control, which a general lack of understanding on maritime Commodore Robertson has spoken so elo- matters without our community and even quently of before, is based on two compo- within some sections of Defence. Despite the nents of sea assertion and sea denial. importance of maritime affairs to our national Although range limited. Air Force assets can wellbeing, this lack of understanding con-

Seapower '84 — Page 99 tinues to hamper our force structure develop- stated that a country with a Navy is potential- ment. ly a neighbour to all countries with coasts and Australia is not in a position to develop a this is particularly appropriate for Australia. Navy to be able to take on a super power. At As a middle ranking power on the edge of the most, medium level contingencies are the both the Asian and the Pacific region, we can accepted standard for planning. However, do much to promote stability and good with maritime defence there seems to be a relations in our sphere of influence. I believe reluctance even to meet this standard. There the present day RAN is particularly well is a tendency to let the matter go by default, suited to supporting this responsibility while relying on international stability and faith in retaining the necessary balance of capabili- allies. In many instances, a Navy is liable to ties for defence should diplomacy fail; but be made to operate on the principles of what without community support and understand- can be afforded rather than on any clearly ing, defence planning and preparedness will worked conception of threat and, as most of remain incomplete with long lead times, you will be aware from recent publicity, expensive equipments and the resulting com- defence development in Australia is ham- plex contractual arrangements with industry. pered in any case by a lack of an identifiable As we have heard from Sir Charles Court, threat. variations in public mood reflected in the Yet it is vital that our naval forces should actions of Government sometimes have provide a credible threshold of deterrence to effect which are not in our long term in- any potential aggressor. Today, the develop- terests. ment of a number of regional navies is I would like to see, and I hope I shall one proceeding rapidly with some of the very best day, wholehearted bipartisan support for military equipment that money can buy. Australia's defence policies; perhaps too During the past three decades, for example, much to ask, but I strongly believe it is five Indian Ocean countries have developed important to achieve as much unity of pur- submarine arms and almost all are acquiring pose as possible in this regard. I hope missile equipped ships and aircraft. Given occasions such as this will be a step in the our geographic position, offshore islands and right direction and meanwhile I am cautiously resource interests, reliance on maritime trade optimistic about the future. The Navy is and diplomatic interests within our region, adopting a positive approach to the period of we must not lag behind. challenge ahead. I do not underestimate the difficulties — they will be as great as we have Conclusion ever had to face — but I am confident with the My presentation has focussed on the great team we have got that we are well theme of Sea Power for Peace. It has been equipped to meet them head on.

Page WO — Seapower '84 A DECISION MAKER'S VIEW

by The Rt Hon I.M. Sinclair MP Opposition Spokesman on Defence

Commodore V.A. Parker: Mr President, dis- Mr Chairman, after that introduction tinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. what else could a politician say but that I think Before introducing the next speaker I would you might well find that there will be a few just crave your indulgence for a short mo- more recruits to your next seminar! Mr ment. When this Institute was being founded, President and distinguished guests and I had some part to play, aided and abetted by ladies and gentlemen. After hearing that very my good friends Alan Robertson and Les Fox excellent expose by the Chief of Naval Staff I and those early members who had the vision wonder if I can open by addressing some of to be part of that formation, against some the wider problems of Defence and then little opposition I might add from some coming back to your particular concerns with unexpected quarters. It is very gratifying to sea power. me to be here at the third seminar, with such I think it is all quite appropriate that in a high level of representation, carrying on the 1984 we start any consideration on any tradition founded in the first two, and also I matter that requires the expenditure of public take the opportunity to remind ANI members funds by realising that what is necessary is particularly, and other people, that the ANI the putting into perspective of the demands does not hold any corporate view itself. It of each of the sectors of required spending, pushes no party line. It is no one's mouth- and balancing them against the other, balanc- piece. The members themselves contribute to ing them against the ideological commit- what they have to say and the members are ments, or the philosophic commitments, of the ones who can encourage public debate the Government for the time being. I think and support by encouraging people to join that it is in that context that so many of the the ANI, and therefore I hope develop sound present difficulties that any Government maritime policies. faces in the time of its budget preparation are The Right Hon Mr Ian Sinclair you all certainly highlighted, when you come to the know. A barrister and lawyer, a grazier, leader big ticket items that are represented by of the National Party, he is Opposition speak- Defence, and sadly it is in that context that I er on defence matters, has been a Federal think many of the quandaries that we now Member of Parliament for the last 21 years, face really do put a very different emphasis to and before that, I understand, was some that that any one of us would prefer to take, years in the New South Wales Parliament. In given the decision without having any finan- previous Governments, he has held port- cial strings to it. folios of ministerial responsibility, his last The second factor that I wanted to put being Minister for Defence. A speaker at the into general context was that if you are last seminar, a Member of Parliament then in looking at the situation of the Australian Opposition, now resides in The Lodge. Defence Force, we certainly need to remem- Perhaps this trend will continue. If so, ber that it is 39 years since World War II came perhaps the next seminar we will find we are to an end and since then we have been swamped with the Members of Parliament. I involved in the Malaysian conflict, in the now introduce our next speaker who is going Korean conflict, in Vietnam and a number of to speak as a decision maker, the Right Hon other exercises within United Nations forces Mr Ian Sinclair. and in multinational forces around the world. The character of the threat to Australia has really been seen more in retrospect than in

Seapower '84 — Page 101 anything that is about us, other than perhaps lying in trying to determine what is happen- in reading about the circumstances that pre- ing in the Navy itself. One of the difficulties I vail in other countries, many of which are a have as Shadow Minister for Defence is long way from here although most of us feel trying to determine just what exactly is they very closely, and often too closely, happening in Navy, and I very much com- impinge on our national interests. In looking mend this Institute for putting on a seminar at the climate of the Department of Defence or a forum of this character, for it is really we therefore need to register that many of its only in this way that those of us who are present assets are ageing, that the circumst- involved in trying to perceive what a Govern- ances of organisation of the Department are ment should be doing for the Services can certainly predicated on the fact that there have any idea of how you see the future and have been changes introduced as a result of how you see the role that you play in it. the implementation of the Tange era in the Regrettably, the Navy like the other two Department and the changes that that im- Services seems extraordinarily reluctant to posed; and then we did have reported to the have very much to do with members of the Government about 14 or 15 months ago the Opposition, at least on an official level, and it report of the Utz Committee, but sadly becomes extraordinarily difficult for us who although the first part of it has been applied, are expected immediately on election to the second part has not, and of course even in Government to be able to take decisions that the second part we have not been able to affect you, to really know what decisions accept that it necessarily went far enough, affect you, to really know what decisions but if it did go part of the way at least some of should be taken and how they can best it should have been implemented by this. balance those demands for funds that I first The product of that is that we have in the spoke of, against other demands for funds. structure of the Defence Department itself, I I talk about the visibility of expectation think, a number of factors which certainly because you would know that at a time when impinge on the ability of the Navy to perform there are very extensive demonstrations for its task and Defence itself to exercise its peace around the world, the perspectives of responsibilities the way it should. So first you how you are going to obtain peace seem to have got dollars, secondly you have got the me to be in a state of limbo for the deterrence ageing of assets and thirdly, you have got the of which Vice Admiral Leach spoke. The way problems that within the Defence Department by which it would certainly in my view there are many matters which I believe need achieve peace is being balanced rather by the very serious re-examination and an applica- forceful advocacy of those who are suggest- tion of some decisions which to date have not ing unilateral disarmament and all the con- been taken. sequences that that imposes upon the We move away from Defence itself then maintenance of the strength of the armed and look at the Navy. In the current climate, it forces; and they certainly impinge on the is easy to see what is wrong with it. Certainly, decision taking process as it affects govern- it is very easy in 1984 and in the political ments, in determining the balance of priori- context of today to see how it is being treated ties between those different sectors who are by the Government and I think it is very right striving for their share of the public sector and proper to fear for its future. This is funds. probably more because of what it has done to It is necessary that the Armed Services the Fleet Air Arm in particular and because, make sure that they do not rely just on as Vice Admiral Leach has just said, the Institutes like this to let those of us who are decisions on the INVINCIBLE that flowed involved in politics, on whatever side, know from the Falklands campaign resulted in a what the position is and know how the circumstance where a political undertaking circumstances of your capabilities might be. given prior to election could have been - To have a reasonable, informed debate were — applied in a way which has certainly means getting reasonable, responsible and reacted to the detriment of the morale and accurate information and certainly as far as I attitude and even the whole raison d'etre of am concerned I find it incredibly difficult to the members of the Royal Australian Navy. obtain that. Indeed, the only source of in- formation that I now find I have access to is Lack of Information the library of the Parliament and it, of course, One of the problems, though, is not just gets what limited public information there in the matter of the perspectives of what has might be — much of that tends to be from happened in terms of the decisions on the newspapers and we all know that we do not fixed wing capability of the Fleet Air Arm, but always accept what is in the newspapers as

Page 102 — Seapower '84 necessarily being accurate. Of course, it is respect to the fixed wing component of the also true that as far as politicians are con- Fleet Air Arm seems to have been rather on cerned I do not think really it is particularly the basis that it was the only way to deny, for appropriate that we need to rely so much on the time being, the Navy the opportunity to illicit information or to be the recipient of express its views about what structure it saw leaks and that tends to be the only basis by around a carrier. It was almost as though it which we come to conclusions about the was a decision based on the fact that the only state of play. way to silence the Navy in terms of forward I certainly do not believe that we should planning was to ensure that there was no only be targets for Government disinforma- likelihood of you being able to retain that tion about the state of our defences, and capability, and by disposing of it, therefore, regrettably in my view some of the informa- you dispose of the carrier argument; there- tion that is being promulgated at the present fore we would look at the circumstances of time by representatives of the Government, how you might exercise your responsibilities and I stress the Government rather than the in a limited way, rather than taking into Armed Forces, seems to me to be in that account properly an option which seems at character. Sadly, as I say, the position of the least to any fairminded observer to be essen- Navy in some circumstances, however, is tial and particularly when it is taken into extremely visible and I know it is of great account that we have had aircraft carriers for concern to all of those who understand the so long. need for a viable Navy and a need for a force Beyond that, of course, you have got the to be able to react to those circumstances fact that the A4 Skyhawks are the only aircraft which Vice Admiral Leach has so forcefully presently in establishments of the three Ser- just illustrated to us. After all, we are an vices with their own inherent ability for island nation and an adequate Navy would air-to-air refueling. Of course, it is also true seem to be a first prerequisite to any defence that the Skyhawks are in service in each of the that we might need to mount, but in my view, countries in ASEAN and that too would seem as of 1984 we do not have an adequate Navy to me to have particular significance in terms to exercise the responsibilities which we have of exercising requirements for the Fleet. It is all seen and which Vice Admiral Leach has acknowledged too that in terms of the econo- just exposed. mics of running aircraft from ALBATROSS at Nowra it would seem far more economic to The Fleet Air Arm use aircraft that are in establishment, that are We have a Navy which at the moment available, than using Mirages based at Wil- seems to me to be running down, where its liamtown with the greater distance that it lies ability to meet the responsibilities which it from the major east coast Fleet training area. has are increasingly in doubt. There has But both the A4 and the Tracker aircraft in already been reference to the decision to our view should have been maintained in scrap the fixed wing component of the Fleet service until the end of their effective service Air Arm. In my view there were two products life or until some decisions had reasonably of that decision which need to be brought to been taken on how the capability that they mind. The first is that I think it is very sad now provide could be effectively replaced, when the decision on the carrier was taken and we do not believe at the moment that not as a result of a proper consideration of they have been effectively replaced by ele- the factors that should have been taken into ments of the RAAF. account in determining whether or not the The aircraft carrier decision we do see in Navy needs a carrier. As you recall, the a different light. We see the problems of the undertaking not to acquire a carrier became INVINCIBLE decision as being a product that I part of a political debate and it was a political believe was a necessary reaction by Australia undertaking of the present Prime Minister, to the character of the relationship between before the election, which he then im- Australia and the United Kingdom, at least as plemented when he was elected to Govern- my side of politics see it, in the post-Falklands ment. Frankly, I think it is a very poor state of circumstance. In our view, the offer to the play when we are in the position where a United Kingdom to retain the INVINCIBLE decision is taken on the basis of a political was the only proper decision that we could undertaking with respect to a major item of have taken in those circumstances and we equipment for the Defence Force or indeed see that decision as having no bearing on any for any one of the areas of Government future requirement there might be with re- responsibility. spect to the acqusition of a carrier for the The second is that the decision with Navy, for a future decision needs to take into

Seapower '84 — Page 103 account the way by which the Navy can best we say that is about five to six nautical miles, exercise its role and its functions and its then in an age when even conventional responsibilities. submarines are capable of launching surface The aircraft decision certainly was taken skimmer missiles with ranges of about 50 against naval advice and in my view without nautical miles, while remaining submerged consideration of the economics of their themselves, it obviously leaves the Fleet maintenance in service. But at least as impor- particularly vulnerable. tantly, of course, is the premature termina- Of course, the Navy lacks any method at tion of the flying careers of the pilots who the moment of gaining long range tactical operated the aircraft and whose skills were intelligence from its own resources apart the product of years of extensive and expen- from submarines, and they are of course far sive training and we all know that sadly these too slow to react to the development of an are soon to be lost to Australia as well as to engagement at sea. Without this intelligence, the Navy, at least in many instances. the Fleet cannot exploit the advantages of its new technology weapons. The Harpoon sur- Helicopters face skimmer we are told, according to public The Government fortunately has not information, has a range of about 50 nautical completely scrapped the Fleet Air Arm and is miles when launched from a ship, yet the going to keep the rotary wing component, but radar horizon of a ship is — what would you this decision seems to be resulting as far as I say? — about 20 nautical miles at most. This am concerned also in a lot of indecision. We effectively, without air support, is now the are told the RAN wil retain existing helicop- maximum range therefore at which the mis- ters and has been promised new ones. The sile can be used. This Government's policy two priorities governing the viability of the argues that the RAAF's Orion should be Fleet Air Arm as a helicopter force at present capable of providing the backup support in are the maintenance of training capability Naval operations and provide indeed all and the provision of an afloat capability. The these services to the Fleet. first problem is largely solved by the decision However, the Orions remain shackled by that we took back in August 1982 to order the insufficient air crews and sadly there seem to Squirrel helicopters. This order, you will be growing signs that they cannot provide all remember, was for 18 aircraft, the last of the service, military and civil, that is being which was due to be delivered in mid-1984 required of them. You would remember in with twelve going to the RAAF and the the Minister for Defence's statement last remainder to the RAN. The urgency associ- November he said: ated with this purchase resulted from the 'Enhancement of this aspect of maritime UH1, the Iriquois, which performed this role operations is one of the highest new developing fatigue problems and running out equipment priorities for the Defence of service life. Force. I expect the assessment of heli- Recently, the present Government copters for operation for the Navy's FFGs announced that a further six Squirrel helicop- and of the opportunities for commonality ters would be purchased for use in the search between these and other Defence Force and rescue role by the RAAF and the RAN helicopter requirements to be completed allowing the UH1B to be phased out of during this current financial year.' service. However, the major decision facing It can be inferred that funding for the helicop- the current Government is how to provide ters was included in last year's estimates and helicopter support to the Fleet at sea. As you that this was to be almost the only major know, the eight Sea King helicopters which equipment procurement decision to be made provided anti-submarine warfare protection in 1983 84. Earlier in that same statement, the to the Fleet are effectively confined to shore Minister complained that budget stringencies bases because there is no combat unit of the meant that there was only $18 million which RAN which can support them at sea, now that would be available to commence new pro- the MELBOURNE has been retired. The FFG jects in 1983 84. He also failed to recognise frigates are the only units designed to oper- that there had of necessity been a very ate helicopters and, therefore, the RAN's significant forward commitment on new efforts have centred on obtaining approval to capital requirements to meet what we saw as procure suitable helicopters for them. This the increasing problems of modernising all project, we believe, is particularly urgent the three Services including the Navy. because as we see it the Fleet has no organic At a Defence seminar in Perth, the then anti-submarine warfare protection beyond CDFS presented data that indicated that the the range of its ship-mounted sonars; and if down payment expected on new helicopter

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Lynx 3 (West/and) RAN Photo

Bell 206 B-1 Kiowa RAN Photo

Seahawk (Sikorsky) RAN Photo

Seapower '84 — Page 105 projects during this financial year was about spend on new equipment programmes is $18 million. Whether this was intended solely already extremely limited within the context for the FFG helicopter project or was intended of the sort of decisions that I see this to encompass the second Squirrel order, Government taking in its future budgets. The totalling approximately $5 million, I am not information supplied at Perth suggests that sure, but in the current state of indecision in something like $50 million only, is going to be the Government on Defence matters there available in the next financial year to spend must be considerable doubt whether the on new capital equipment programmes. promised decision will be made and the If the $18 million allocated this year is not appropriation spent. This arises not only spent, almost a third of next year's room for because we are coming to the end of the initiative will have already been gone and financial year, but from the apparent com- that is going to further delay some of the plication of the selection by interposing com- immediate problems in the structure of the monality considerations. You will remember equipment of the Navy. Potentially more that in January this year, the Minister said damaging, however, I think what is likely in that tenders would soon be called for the the present Government situation is that provision of new utility helicopters for the finance will certainly use the argument that if RAAF. He stressed that approval had not the Navy cannot spend the money that has been given for these helicopters, but that been now allocated to it, then it is rather calling tenders would permit both Navy and doubtful that priority should be given in the Air Force requirements to be examined context of the demands of the other two together, to identify the prospects of a com- Services. Indeed, when you put that into mon purchase. context with the publicised request by the The tender was to be issued worldwide Department of Finance only a fortnight ago and obviously would call forth many re- that the Defence forward estimates need to sponses, implying as it did that the competi- be pruned by something like $600 million, tion was wide open. They have got problems then the position becomes even more serious in the fact that it was wide open, too, for you and of course we have already had state- would recall that in his previous November ments from the Minister for Defence that he is statement he said that they had already unable to give any assurance that the De- narrowed the choice of the naval helicopters fence Vote in the next financial year will even to the Westland Lynx and the Sikorsky Sea- be maintained in real terms. hawk. If this choice is to be maintained, and it was justified by the Minister for he said then Cost Cutting that it would avoid further nugatory effort All these cost cutting operations do have from the other contending companies, it is a very serious effect and I know so many of difficult to see the justification of an open you in the Navy are only too well aware of tender for a project which was said to have them. But the difficulty is to try and make sure been initiated precisely to allow a considera- that the public at large understands that this tion of its relation with the FFG helicopter is going on, and when one looks around and programme. sees the consequences of them I think it The likely consequence — and it is this highlights the necessity for there to be public- that I have spent a little bit of time on because ly supported advocacy for greater funds to be it is the sort of detail that seems to me to be allocated to the Services in general, and, in illustrative of the problems that we have in the present context, to ensure that as the developing adequate sea power within the Government moves into its pre-budget deli- Navy at the moment, and certainly it is berations that there is a recognition that illustrative of some of the problems there are unless there is money provided, all the in trying to see how we are going to be able projections that you have given of your future to meet the future requirements of the Navy requirements are likely to fall even further that at the moment are so handicapped in short of the present state of play. You would having even within its rotary wing capability know that naval ships are tied up at wharves such limitations imposed on it — the likely because they have used their fuel allocation. consequence and the delay on the decision You would know that officers and men are on the helicopter project, when responses to not being transferred to new postings be- the RAAF tender have been evaluated, seems cause there is not enough money to pay the to me to make it doubtful whether there will air fares, and, in spite of the generally excel- be any acquisition, as was originally sug- lent attitude of officers and men, the result gested, before the end of this financial year. has to react adversely on morale. That has other consequences. The capacity to I was horrified by the story that I heard

Paye 106 Scapowcr '84 about postings and so I wrote to the Minister less than deplorable, and why there are and I thought I might in this forum, because it circumstances where funds can be provided is one of the few chances that I have to be in other areas of Government funding but not able to highlight some of the applications of in order to provide an ordinary posting these Government decisions — I might quote requirement for the Navy seems to me to be from his response to me of 4 April, for it so nothing less than a disaster. seriously and presently identifies the con- Of course, there has also been a rundown sequences at the decision level of what is in equipment, in ammunition spares, in spare happening to the Services with which you are parts. Exercising, we all know, has been all concerned. He quotes in this letter of 4 restricted and there is no clear direction as far April: as I am concerned in the general budget 'Due to a higher than expected level of projections at this time. The Navy, as we have expenditure occurring this year against all known, did suffer in its planning through the Permanent Naval Force's salaries the decision not to acquire an aircraft carrier and allowances vote, it will be necessary and the consequential reduction in manpow- to make offsetting savings in other areas er that, as the CNS has explained a moment of operating costs within the Navy so as ago, has led to significant problems in the to contain expenditure within budget allocation of resources as numbers of person- outlays. The reason for this higher ex- nel are being reduced. penditure stems from an unsually high personnel retention rate - Naval Capability (which one would think was obvious in a time In the Opposition, we believe that the of high unemployment anyway) Navy should have an integrated capability 'coupled with the need to reduce normal with fixed and rotary wing aircraft, capable of recruiting levels to meet an approved air attack, defence and reconnaissance. We manpower rundown following the believe the Navy should be equipped with paying off of MELBOURNE and the purpose designed surface vessels and sub- cessation of fixed wing flying in the marines. They should be able to defend our RAN/ coastal approaches and prime sea lanes, Quite properly, the Chief of Naval Staff has extending as they do so far from Australia's referred to the numbers a few moments ago, mainland. but the consequences obviously are not They certainly should have an ability to being applied in a flexible way, nor in terms be able to patrol and operate within the of preserving to the maximum the necessary maritime fishing zone extending 200 miles capability of the Service. I continue: out around the Australian coastline, and they The combined effect of these factors has should also be able to operate in association resulted in a change in the previous ratio with Australian flag merchant vessels as and of senior personnel to junior sailors with when required. In this respect, I know that the former being in receipt of higher pay just before I no longer was Defence Minister a levels. In identifying offsetting savings, it survey was initiated to try and establish the was necessary to reduce the level of capabilities that there were of appropriate expenditure on travel as in several other merchant vessels so that they might well be areas of operating costs, and accordingly integrated in any future defence circumst- only those postings which could be clas- ance into the Royal Australian Navy, in the sified as essential for Service or personal, same way as British merchant vessels were that is compassionate, reasons have into the Royal Navy during the Falklands been allowed to proceed where travel campaign. I have heard nothing of that since. costs would have been involved. It was I only hope that that survey has continued necessary to impose restrictions as soon and the results are there and some analysis as the higher expenditure requirements has been made of the way by which they became known. Since that time a de- might be integrated. tailed examination of all areas of Navy The difficulty, however, is, in part, the expenditure has been carried out and it is structure of our industrial relations in Aust now apparent that the present level of ralia, and all of you in the Navy know so well posting restraint can to some degree be of the difficulties you have had at Garden relaxed for the remainder of this year.' Island and Williamstown over the years, with I regard that sort of advice, and the consequ- the industrial difficulties that have delayed ences that it has on the Navy being able to the refitting and delivery of vessels when retain its capabilities and perform in order to they have gone in for necessary maintenance meet the sea power requirement, as nothing and repairs. Those industrial problems ex-

Seapower '84 — Page; 107 tend into the maritime services, and one of FIRE bombers. They demonstrated above all the difficulties we have in our general availa- that the Soviet now has an ability to co- bility of ships is that because of the condi- ordinate the operations of its naval fleets in tions and the higher cost factors associted the Mediterranean, and off Eastern Asia, with with the Merchant Navy, most of Australia's those in the North Atlantic, and while none of trade is conducted in foreign flag vessels. We us are looking at a circumstance where the have not, therefore, the resources that there Soviets are going to be an immediate threat are available in the United Kingdom, or to Australia, I think given the circumstances indeed in many other of our allied fleets of Afghanistan and given the extent to which around the world. What I would hope we can Vietnam tends to be almost a surrogate of the do is, therefore, to ensure that with those Soviet Union and given the politics of the limited number of flag vessels that are there, Soviet — I must say that I totally disagree particularly those of the Australian National with the assessment that the CNS referred to Line, that we do see to what degree they can by Andrew Mack, that the Soviet Union was be used to supplement the Fleet's require- not leading the arms race — I find it quite ments in given defence emergency condi- incredible that the institute of Strategic and tions. The Navy's mine countermeasure force Defence Studies seems now to be the basis of and anti-submarine warfare capabilities cer- advice to the Government instead of the tainly also need to be strengthened. Armed Forces. But given all those circumst- ances, I think one has to accept that the Foreign Policy consequence of Australia being on its own All these things — it is the running down and not even being able to rely in some and your general capability as we see it - circumstances on our ANZUS partners really have taken place at a time when the Foreign is very serious indeed. Policy of the present Government seems to us to be isolating Australia from our friends Conclusion and our allies. First we have got the problems All we seem to be doing in my view is with the countries of ASEAN. It seems to us upsetting our allies and lowering morale that the Foreign Minister is more intent on among our own serving men and women. developing his relationships with Vietnam From a decision maker's point of view then, I than he is in maintaining the relationships would have to say to you that I am not happy with the countries of the Association of South about the extent to which funds are provided East Asian Nations who are, after all, our for the Defence Force, nor am I happy about closest neighbours. Then we have the disas- the extent to which within the Navy there is ter that followed, in our view, the Govern- an ability for it to meet its prime task. The ment's indecision on the whole question of Government in my view should be telling the non-dry docking of HMS INVINCIBLE. Australians not just how good its Prime That failure to accommodate the reasonable Minister is but what the real Defence situation requirements of the United Kingdom we is and what it intends to do to correct it. The believe has weakened the confidence any problems of Defence in my view are now past neighbour, and certainly our ANZUS part- the point of political point scoring, and while I ners, can have on Australia's ability to pro- would not accept that it is possible to have vide necessary services if they should be any point of view on Defence which goes required in the Australian environment. The across the breadths or the boundaries of the consequence, both of our isolation and of the parties in Australia, I am afraid a bipartisan measures that were taken with respect to policy on Defence is predicated on there INVINCIBLE, as we see it is to isolate Aust- being a common acceptance of the defence ralia today to a greater degree than we have threat and the ways by which there should be ever been before in terms of our defence a reaction to it. capability, and yet we are not being given the As I tried to illustrate to you, at the financial resources to meet that expectation moment from our point of view, we certainly of greater self sufficiency. do not accept that there has been a proper You would have all read at the beginning assessment of the defence threat to Australia of this April that the Soviet exercised three by the present Government. We do not large battle groups in its largest ever naval accept the extent to which there has been exercise in the North Atlantic. They involved isolation from our friends and allies and we the nuclear powered cruiser KIROV, probably do not believe therefore that we can develop I am told the world's most powerful cruiser, a bipartisan approach to Defence which more than two dozen submarines, and large would accommodate the diverse situation numbers of BADGER and supersonic BACK- which this Government has put in place from

Page 108—Seapower '84 that which existed prior to the defeat of the the ability of the Royal Navy to maintain an Government at the March 1983 elections. I adequate carrier force is at least as important think there are now very real and very serious to Australia as it is that we have an adequate problems in exercising the responsibilities of naval force within Australia. So while I would the Royal Australian Navy and meeting the accept that it was perhaps not necessary for general maritime threat situation in waters of the Fraser Government to have offered back interest and of concern to this nation. to the United Kingdom the carrier in the In my view, unless there are adequate terms that we did, I believe that there is in funds provided immediately for the Services, Australia's interests as much a concern for us it is not going to be possible for the Royal to preserve the strength of the Royal Navy as Australian Navy to meet its responsibilities, there is to develop and establish the strength and I am afraid, in spite of the optimism of the of the Royal Australian Navy. Chief of Naval Staff, my pessimism is that With respect to the general subject of there are other forces and factors pushing on where the state of play was on the carrier this Government which seem to me to be by the Government of which I was a member, likely to change its emphasis and make it we had certainly had a preliminary discussion even less likely that the Navy in future will be on a Cabinet submission with respect to the able to maintain even its presently reduced acquisition of a carrier to replace the INVINCI- strength. BLE, it no longer being available. It had not been to Cabinet — it had been at a committee of Cabinet. No decision had been taken on that paper and at the time of the change of DISCUSSION Government there had been no decision Mr K. Forsey (Dept of Transport): The ques- certainly not to acquire a carrier. One of the tion that I would like to ask relates to concerns that I had, and still have, is to know the aircraft carrier question, and I might point whether there are other types of floating out I am a non-naval member here, but it platforms which would be able to provide the seems to me just from my reading of the anti-submarine warfare helicopter fleet sup- newspapers at the time, that the aircraft port requirement, whether there are other carrier problem seemed to stem from that ways and particularly if you are looking at decision by your Government, the then Gov- fixed wing aviation, whether you could pro- ernment, not to go ahead and purchase the vide an adequate platform capability for that INVINCIBLE. I understood that the reason to purpose, and given the landings of the Har- purchase the INVINCIBLE, which after all was riers in quite extraordinary circumstances it a secondhand carrier, stemmed from Austra- would seem that it is possible. In other words, lia's inability to afford a new one and I just from our political point of view we believed wondered at the time that that decison was that it was necessary to examine those other made, had your Government decided that options before any final decision was taken there was some other alternative source of as to whether or not an INVINCIBLE type or a supply — had it made that decision? I would larger carrier should have been acquired. also like to understand what were the reasons Obviously a super carrier is just out of the why that decision was made. You mentioned question. A secondhand carrier seemed to be a special relationship. That seems to me to be an economic and a practical option, but it all more sentiment, for sentimental reaons, comes back to that fundamental question that rather than hard practical reasons, because it I think lies behind the whole of the problems seems to me that we had a contract to of the Defence Force at the moment, that is, purchase a carrier which we could have stuck 39 years down from World War II and the by and we would have in fact had one today. other circumstances of limited warfare make Mr Sinclair: No doubt legally you are correct, it hard for the Defence Force in the minds, that there was a contract, but it was a verbal unfortunately, of most politicians to establish contract — but I think it was a lot more than the same priority as there is for education and sentiment. In my view, Australia's role in health and welfare and all those other im- defence has to be viewed not just as an mediate requirements of the good life to independent isolated nation, and one of my which we have all become so accustomed. concerns about our developing a peculiarly One of the virtues of having this sort of a self sufficient role for our Defence Force is not seminar is that it does help to identify the fact that we need to be self sufficient, but we have that unless there is sufficient resource allo- another role to play and that is with other cated to the Defence Force then there are no countries who have similar interests to us. As options available in terms of the equipment far as the Western deterrence is concerned, that you are going to provide for any of the

Seapower '84 — Page 109 Services. For unless there is adequate and develop new assets in whatever way that money, and unless there is adequate rolling might be suited. money for the capital procurement program- The second thing is that I am sure that me, frankly you are just not going to be able within Defence there needs to be greater to have a Defence Force and that seems to be delegation than there is now. For an orga- one of the real critical crises that I see this nisation which has so many who have been Government, indeed any government, facing trained for so long and so intensively, to be in their budget planning. allowed to spend so little and to exercise so LCDR I.R. Gulliver: Sir, whilst you were little personal responsibility is really mind Minister, did you think that the Tange boggling. I cannot comprehend why we have reorganisation had been successful and if gone to the point we have where you seem to re-elected would you have Defence Central have every decision taken by so many people reorganised? that has to go up so many chains and then Mr Sinclair: You would not like me to send goes off to a committee and comes back that off to a committee, would you? I think again, and the process of deferring decisions that one of the difficulties I had — about two rather than making decisions seems to be days after I was Minister, John Utz came to more symptomatic of the system than any- me and asked if I would give evidence to him thing else. One of the things that I would like to tell him how I would reorganise the to do therefore is find a way that we can Department and while I had had plenty of overcome the present Departmental commit- experience in other departments, as you all tee system which seems to me to be really know so well, Defence is a peculiar animal very wasteful of resources and time. and it takes a little while to learn the ins and I would like to see the system that exists outs of the place. Frankly, at the end of - generally in the United States whereby if after I had been there six or eight months, I somebody has a responsibility, and a vote would have been delighted to have begun last year was X dollrs and the cost escalation again. I think that at the moment there are all is 10 per cent or whatever, you give him X sorts of problems as I see it in the structure of plus 10 per cent and you allocate it to him on the Defence Department, although I believe a monthly basis or some regular basis as fundamentally the Tange reorganisation is a indeed as Sir Charles knows, funds are given lot more efficient than the structure of the to State Governments to spend as a result of Defence Department that preceded it. There the general arrangements between the Com- are obviously continued frictions of which we monwealth and the States. I think it would be are all too well aware between Defence and far better if individual areas were allocated to Defence Support. I believe they have to be a person who has delegated responsibility, resolved, and there are ways by which I can who is given the money that he needs to see they can be properly resolved, but prob- spend in the area and he went ahead and did ably not while you have an equality of his job. I think that is a change that we need to responsibility between two Permanent do. Heads. I think that it is necessary to look at the So, there are a number of individual structure of a Defence Support Department areas where I think things need to be changed as being under perhaps a junior Permanent in the Tange reorganisation. But an immedi- Head, responsible to a Permanent Head, ate requirement is that the Government does responsible to one Minister with a Minister something about the Utz Report. While I do Assisting having a responsibility perhaps in not think it goes far enough, frankly some- that area. thing needs to be done about implementing it However, when we go back into Govern- and the only decisions I have noted is that the ment I would be inclined to look at other Minister, apparently in announcing Sir Philip areas for a Minister Assisting to exercise Bennett's appointment to succeed Air Chief responsibility. There are a number of areas in Marshall Sir Neville McNamara, is to change the Defence infrastructure which I believe are his title. There is a lot more that needs to be really absolutely disastrous at the moment. done than that and I frankly do not think it is The general housing of Servicemen really is good enough for the Government to keep on so sub-standard that one is almost ashamed deferring even those recommendations and to be associated with it, and I think that much the sooner they are implemented I think the of the assets that are there need to be sold. better placed the Services will be to exercise We need to find a way by which we can their present responsibilities. persuade Treasury to accept that when a LCDR F.A. Allica: Mr Sinclair, the MEL- resource is sold, the funds can go back into BOURNE replacement decision has been Defence and be used to acquire new housing going on for many years and I believe that if a

Page 110 — Seapower '84 decision had been taken when it was meant form. My concern is — and I started saying a to be taken, back in the mid-70s, then we few things to you, that I really do find it hard would not have got possibly to where we to get accurate information as a member of eventually did get to — ending up not with a the Opposition. I believe there are alterna- replacement of the carrier. I think it was quite tives to the conventional assessment of the clear to most people, certainly within Navy, sort of, can I call it 'gold plated', carrier that if the replacement of the carrier — if that concept that has existed in the past. Whether decision was deferred, that the hump of it is a converted merchantman, whether it is expenditure if it was allowed to get to the 80s something in the lines of the scheme that would start competing with the acquisition of Carringtons put out on a modification of the Air Force's F18 and it was quite clear that one TOBRUK design, I do not know. But we would had to go. I believe what we really need, or be certainly looking at one of those alterna- what Navy needs, is an indication of what the tives, perhaps rather than something of the way ahead is and I would like to pose three order of the INVINCIBLE. questions to you, sir. What is the Liberal There are other options in terms of Party's position if you were re-elected? putting another order in in the INVINCIBLE Would you actually require a replacement line; there are obviously options that might carrier? If you did so, what replacement time emerge with respect to the British in the frame would you be looking at, bearing in future, but were they to do so, they would mind that it may be some time that a Liberal certainly require funds and your second Party may take to get back into Government? question is where do you get the money. I And thirdly, where, sir, would you obtain think that one thing that has to be done is that those funds, bearing in mind that there will sufficient resources have to be provided to be a lot of other pressures on Defence this country's Defence Force or you are not expenditure to replace a lot of other capabili- going to be able to mount adequate defence. ties that we have lost in the meantime? If, sir, While it is true that if you had taken the your decision is no, that we will not be getting decision 10 years ago you would not have the a carrier, then I believe that Navy should take worry now, in fact as most of you know the that decision and I think we should then get lead time between taking a decision and on with the business of living without a acquiring the capability is such that you carrier and look at alternatives. probably would still be paying for it anyway, Mr Sinclair: Let me start off by saying that I indeed that is a problem in the course of the think you have to get on with the business of next 10 years. There is a mounting escalation living under the present climate and under of expenditure which as I recall reaches its the present Government. I do not accept your present expected peak somewhere about suggestion that it is necessarily going to be 1987 or 1988, so that there is certainly going so long before there is a change of Govern- to be an absolute necessity that Defence ment, however; indeed as an old rugby receives better than just its present vote in player I think the bigger they are the harder real terms to meet its capital programme on they fall. I think what is happening at the the present amount of equipment now moment is that the more the Prime Minister ordered, and what I think we would be doing believes that his present popularity is in Government — and I say 1 think' because genuine, the less likely he is to sustain public obviously until you are looking at the actual support, and certainly the more he is distanc- allocation of votes — we would be providing ing himself from many members of his own a guaranteed percentage of the vote to party, and I think in that lies the core of Defence. perhaps some electoral disaster, hopefully But you have got things like the Denver before not too long. But putting the politics of account which I have never been quite able to that opportunism aside, I think it is necessary understand, and how much money is re- that the Navy gets on with its job under the quired in meeting your foreign military sales present Government and the Navy can do commitment. How much money they require nothing else. you to pay complicates the actual amount It is no use deferring the maybe or that is involved each year in your expendi- whenever the Government will change. Our ture, but I certainly think that it is necessary point of view, and it is not just the Liberal that the Government, whether it is of my point of view, it happens to be a National persuasion or whether it is of the Labor Party point of view too, is that there is persuasion, accepts that there has to be a necessity for there to be integrated fixed wing significant increase in the amount of re- air support for the Fleet. In order to provide sources provided to Defence if the Depart- that you need some sort of a floating plat- ment is going to be able in its three armed

Seapower '84 — Page ! 11 elements to exercise their responsibilities. — I think a bit depends on the decision on That means if you are going to acquire those alternatives, but I would certainly be some sort of a floating platform you are looking to a recommendation of the preferred going to have to provide additional funds to alternative within the first six months of the Defence Department to do so. Time frame being elected to Government.

UH-IB Iroquois RAN Photo

Page 112 — Seapower '84 OPEN FORUM

Chaired by Mr P. Mirchandani

(All speakers except Mr Pritchett)

Commander J.S. Dickson: To compere the defence', 'fortress Australia' and so on. Now, open forum this afternoon and lead our we have further confusion in the publication discussions we are lucky to have the services of the Strategic Basis documents. To us as of a man familiar to ABC TV news-watchers, journalists, the only thing the documents Prakash Mirchandani. I must emphasise that reveal is the total waste of manpower in he is here today in a private capacity, not on producting this damp squib. behalf of the ABC. Since he came to Australia Having criticised them, I am sure the more than four years ago he has taken a keen bureaucratic answer to me is 'Well, Sunshine, interest in, and he has acquired a very good what alternative do you offer?' Well, ladies knowledge of, Defence matters. He is recog- and gentlemen, there is an alternative and it nised as a very perceptive, probing reporter comes from a voice at the Strategic Studies and I know through my own association with Centre here. A year ago at a USI seminar, him over the past year that he is extremely Paul Dibb treated us to a brilliant dissertation keen to promote debate and public discus- on the problem. Here is what I thought he sion of Defence issues. He is, therefore, said. We know the constant factors in Austra- ideally suited to lead this afternoon's open lia's environment. Indeed, speakers after forum. Ladies and gentlemen, Prakash Mir- speakers at seminar after seminar say the chandani. same things — an island continent, a small population, rich energy resources, a small Defence Force —we have heard it all. 70,000- odd people with X amount of equipment. Might I say at the outset that for this There are obvious limitations to what this seminar, which is extremely well attended Force can do. from an observer's point of view, although One thing which has surprised me in the very much by the converted, I am as a discussions which have been held here over journalist very happy that the media were the past two days is the absence of the word invited to disseminate the information about 'ADF', and I find this very curious, because at the Navy, which certainly the Institute wants various briefings that we as journalists have disseminated. I am rather sad to see the attended the concept of the Australian De- absence of people who affect your lives - fence Force as a totality, as a unit, is always Treasury, the Joint Parliamentary Committee presented to us. The Navy point of view, on Foreign Affairs and Defence, members of preaching to the converted, has received the General Staff, and senior RAAF officers great applause, but I do not see any role not masquerading as civilians. proposed either for the RAAF or the Army in Ladies and gentlemen, if there is one this strategy which is being discussed. Any- thread which has emerged over the past 48 way, that is by and by. The current received hours, it is the plea from all areas, except the doctrine is that we are committing our forces civil service, for a national strategy. The Chief to defend Australia and its interests. of Naval Staff addressed the question broadly Right, says Paul Dibb, where, in which this morning, but I think it is high time this document, in what public or private pro- seminar now addressed the question specifi- nouncement, in which seminar, in which cally, and indeed, took the first steps to cubby-hole of that amorphous mass of the formulate such a strategy which could be grey sponge is there a clear definition of developed in a further seminar. The position exactly what are these interests which the has been confused over the years with Defence Force has been called upon to de- phrases like 'forward defence', 'backward fend? The answer to this question, I suggest,

Seapower '84 — Page 113 will probably take this seminar away from the a meaningful deterrent means a force well- confusion of the no threat environment. So trained, sufficiently manned and certainly given the limitations of the Defence Force, adequately equipped to be able to ensure that what I would like to see our distinguished others would not want to attack us. panel address is: today, now, here, define a Mr Mirchandani: What about Paul Dibb's personal idea of what we must defend at all point that you should identify the bottom line costs — the bottom line. The force structure before attempting to deter people from taking and deficiencies in it will logically follow. it? What is essential to Australia? What is it? Is it Mr Sinclair: I think what you have got to do is Papua New Guinea? Is it the protection of our be prepared to allocate enough money, and I sea trade routes? Is it the southern and see the whole of the Federal Government eastern coastal cities, the Brisbane-Adelaide quandary in the progressive reduction in the line? Is it Bass Strait oil? Is it the Jabiru Shelf amount of money that is being provided to or the disputed seabed in Timor? What is the Defence. I mean, we were, in my view, correct bottom line? in moving away from the White Paper assess- Let us not get bogged down in answers, ment of what should have been a bottom line which I am sure everyone will be tempted to and what I am trying to do at the moment in give: 'Well, that's a decision to be taken by framing "our Defence Policy is establish a new the political masters of the time'. Experience bottom line which is achievable. I think it is and those unhappy documents which mas- tremendously important that you in your querade as the Strategic Basis papers tell us interest and your Service, ensure that there is that they rarely address the question, and in an achievable amount of equipment and any case we are talking about defence, which personnel and training that can be seen, for means that politics and diplomacy, by the which funds will be provided. time it is applied, will have failed. So let us Looking at our Defence Vote, the idea of now address the military task — what is our putting 3 per cent of GDP or some sort of a bottom line? What can we simply not afford figure really does not mean enough. I would to lose? Which is that rock which we say like to see a way that we can express it in 'Beyond this and no further', in either a tangible terms, an achievable target. The low-level or medium-level threat? Gentle- White Paper has failed. I am not one who is men, what is your personal view? If I may ask greatly taken by White Papers unless they can Mr Sinclair to start off; rather than take the be achieved, and what I would like to do is military view first, I think Mr Sinclair is see a relationship between money and this singularly qualified to say perhaps even Tarn- deterrent effect that I speak of. My own worth might be sacrificed. assessment is that we probably need to go to Mr Sinclair: Actually, the Army is trying to somewhere about 4 or 5 per cent of GDP as take over Tamworth at the moment. I do not we now stand, at least in the next few years, know that there is a role for the Navy, too. I and then perhaps increasing beyond that, if think that the bottom line is an ability to we are to have anything like the deterrent maintain a deterrent capability and my con- capability that I stress is my bottom line. cern in the presentation of your part of the Mr Mirchandani: Dr Millar, perhaps you ADF bid, if I can use that dreaded word again, would like to come in on the strategic side of is that we are falling below the point where identification of the areas which Paul Dibb we can offer a meaningful deterrent. What I was talking about. was trying to seek as Minister was an assess- Dr Millar: Well, I am a bit worried about this ment of how far we need to go to remain phrase 'bottom line' actually. It sounds jolly ahead of everybody else in our region, yet good. What would we fight for? Now, we with a force capability which was seen to fit in would fight for a lot of things and we would with our allies to supplement that capability, fight for a lot of things sometimes beyond if we should need to defend ourselves. Australian territorial waters, if necessary, I think the conflict at the moment, and I because where do you start defending your find it hard to get away from the base political country? If you are starting at what is now the conflict in which I am involved, but there is a 12 mile limit, then you are starting far too far real problem in that you are losing your back. Mr Sinclair talked about deterrence and, ability at the sharp end in a search to build up of course, that is a good word, and I am your material capability, your re-equipment looking forward to his first budget as our programme, your modernisation; and as you Defence Minister or Finance Minister in the lose your ability at the sharp end, I am afraid next Conservative Government. I am looking you are losing your credibility as a force. So for that 3 or 4 per cent of GDP. I do not feel I my bottom line is a meaningful deterrent and can put a bottom line because my paper and

Page 114 — Seapower '84 my thinking for this conference was towards their two major sea routes to the south-east the end of the century, ie, where are we and south-west from Honshu, they would going? have to multiply their Navy four times, with I can see circumstances in which we appropriate air cover. And they are not going would fight for Papua New Guinea, in which to do that, not in twenty years. Nevertheless, the consensus amongst our defence planners we have to contribute to that capacity. We and amongst the people of this country have to do it in conjunction with allies, we would say we cannot afford to let that go. have to find our allies where we can, and we There may be other circumstances in which will not find them at the last minute. we say we cannot afford to fight for Papua What I felt compelled to say in my paper New Guinea. I do not believe that we here can to you, and I have not got the answers, was determine for the next ten or fifteen years that the situation is going to change, in some what are the things we would have to fight ways unfavourably, during the next fifteen, for. I believe we would have to fight for every twenty or twenty-five years. Therefore, we inch of this continent, because it is not like should be beginning to plan now for the more World War II. In World War II people could unfavourable situation in which we are going draw a Brisbane-Adelaide line and pretty to find ourselves. That means an expenditure much be strategically relevant, because that on Defence and an awareness of Defence and is where the great bulk of our resources lay — a readiness to look at the very real gaps in our of manpower, of industrial production and so current Defence capacity, which we do not at on; not any more. present display. We would have to fight for the north- Mr Mirchandani: I think we are going into west of this country because of what is there. broad areas. I would like to stick with speci- We would have to fight for other parts of the fics. I know it is difficult, given the absence of north. We would have to fight for the uranium threat and so on, but obviously a limited deposits, we could not afford to let someone Defence Force can only do limited things. take them. Would we have to fight for the Perhaps now going on to Sir Charles, and if I Cocos Islands? I do not believe so, and yet may say, Sir Charles, perhaps we could get one could imagine circumstances in which an an answer more appropriate to '60 Minutes' Australian public with a Falklands-like situa- than 'Four Corners' in terms of the panel we tion might feel we cannot afford to let that go, have to go through and the various people because after them, what next? So if you are who want to have a go at you. talking about a bottom line and a strategic Sir Charles Court: I shall be very brief and situation, I say there is no question that the very simple. I accept, not being a professional continent itself and the immediate off-shore and just being one who had to run a State and resources in Bass Strait and off the North- a very difficult State for quite a long time, that West Cape, they are areas which are strategi- we cannot accept anything less than protect- cally vital to this country. ing the complete sovereignty of Australia, the I would also agree with Mr Sinclair about whole of Australia, and to do that I believe the concept of deterrence. We obviously have that we do have to develop a very well- to be able to deter anybody within this region trained, well-equipped, very professional who might have some desire to attack us. I do force that is seen by the rest of the world and not see any country which would have either particularly by those who might be a threat. the desire or the capability in the foreseeable But I suppose in that we have to include the future, but countries become hosts to foreign rest of the world, because we never know powers who may be far stronger than them- who is going to be hosted in one of these selves and we have seen this happen. So we countries that we might not think about at the can foresee that in some circumstances we moment, but we have to have a force that is might feel that we could not afford not to be seen by the rest of the world as a very, very prepared to go to war where a neighbouring capable deterrent. In other words, it will take state was the host to a foreign and hostile on all comers. power. Also, I would be sufficiently selfish to say The notion of deterrence to me also takes that we should take them on as far away from with it the notion of protection of the shipping Australia as we can. There is no question that which we have to have, if this country is to if New Guinea is in danger or even Indonesia survive. We cannot protect our sea lanes on is in danger, we have to get in and make sure our own, there is no question about that. I we fight the battles there and hopefully we have talked to the Japanese about protecting will stop them ever coming to Australia, their sea lanes and for them to do what the because if they are getting within our 200 Americans want them to do in protecting mile limit it is too late. At least that is how I

Seapower '84 — Page 115 see it. You might say, well, how do you go much better use of our Reserves. The Re- about this? First of all you have to get enough serves should be in the structure and instead money to be able to get the professional of the Army's third line of transport, the people and the equipment you need and I Reserves should be looking after that, the come back to what I said last night, you have same way as I think we are trying to do in the just got to reverse the current attitude of the Navy, running patrol boats and they will run community, the indifference of the commun- our minesweepers for us. They have an ity, the complacency of the community. Next actual role and they can expand quickly to time there is an election, Defence has to be a take it up. very, very hot issue and along the lines that I Mr Mirchandani: What I would like to do at have suggested, namely that we are going to this point is throw it open to the house. Take have a very professional force, we are going the right-hand side of the panel. to have a naval force that can go out and be a Commander Webster: Firstly, before I ask a deterrent where it is going to hurt the most question I would like to make a couple of and be the most effective, and that we are pronouncements, since we seem to have going to have an Air Force and an Army to difficulty in answering, if I may say so, your back it up. Then hope like hell we never have specific question. I believe the Australian to use it. Defence Force has to be as powerful as Mr Mirchandani: Admiral, it is you turn. Indonesia and the most powerful nation on When you talked about the strategic situation the Indian Ocean level, if you want a defini- in Australia you said protection of sovereign- tion of how powerful we have to be. Second- ty, international trade routes, reduction of ly, I would like to advance the notion that tension in the neighbourhood and so on. defence in depth begins with attacks on Given the Navy that you have got, can you do enemies' bases. Therefore, I think you can it? start to see the shape of the force that should VADM Leach: It depends what circumstances be provided to meet both those notions. you give me; I would have doubts, and the Finally, how are we going to command further we go it would be very difficult. I it? And I direct the question to Mr Sinclair and would say in answer to the first question: to Admiral Leach. Firstly, Admiral Leach has credible deterrents for the protection of stated in the past that one of his objectives is sovereignty, resources and trade. I would say a Maritime Command. Mr Sinclair has said he in answer to your point about threat, that that wants to see some organisational changes in has been one of the problems we have got Defence, and the current Government has into. We have said there is no threat for stated that they wanted some organisational fifteen years. We have got to identify what is changes. I would just like briefly a reaction to important to us and whether it is Mr Pritch- what a unified command whereby we have a ett's people staying away from the wool permanent Joint Force Commander? For sales; if that is going to be a real worry to us, goodness sake, we do it every time we have a what do we do? Put the sheep on Christmas major exercise, which is supposed to be the Island or something. way we operate in wartime, yet immediately But I do not accept either that the force it is over we disband this body of people who structure will fall into place. That is one of our have taken five weeks even to learn how to problems. I think that people would look and operate in the Joint Forces after we get them say $5 billion is a lot of money, what is there, then we send them away and we go happening to it? And I believe it is being back to our peacetime, dare I say, Sydney- spent in the wrong directions. We are build- Jervis Bay syndrome or whatever. ing the stone frigates. We have a great Mr Mirchandani: Admiral, perhaps you headquarters. We have got enough sharp would like to take that one first. end, we must get the teeth to tail ratio VADM Leach: Well, clearly, anything above a changed. I think that is most important. very minor skirmish in the future is going to Mr Mirchandani: Can I just come in very be Joint. There are no two ways about that, quickly on the teeth to tail ratio. You men- and the way the money is being provided we tioned the figure of 1,900 sailors being taken are being forced to that, and properly so. The away from the Navy because of the loss of second thing is, I see it as very important that MELBOURNE; would you also like to see the there is a Maritime Command established. In corresponding proportion of civilians taken fact, I would have liked to have seen the out of the Defence Department and are you coastal surveillance organisation done this disappointed that they are not? way, ie, put into the Maritime Headquarters VADM Leach: I would, and I am. I think with representatives of trade, customs, police another point, too, is that we have to make and everyone else there; we would provide

Page 116 — Seapower '84 the assets and the augmentation that was really think that, with all due respects to those necessary and then we would move very who have spoken to date, nobody has said smoothly to confrontation or tension when what is a pretty important essential, and that we put in the additional assets — in fact, I is to have a very firm plan, and when I say a think Mr Sinclair very properly said at one firm plan it is a plan that can be changed at stage that it would be a consideration we any time. have a squadron of the FA18s to support the My ideas on the plan would be, and in Navy. order of priority, to have the maximum But I think we need control over the relationship with our allies that can help us assets and it is no good each Service working materially. The second one is to get on side in its own little pocket. I think they have got to as best we can with our immediate neigh- be much more Joint and there has to be the bours and to have a complete intelligence organisation in peace that you need in war; gathering capability. Then there would be as all the gunnery officers here know Si vis protection of all of our resources, both on- pacem para bellum -- if you want peace, shore and off-shore from terrorists and from prepare for war and be organised for it, and nuts. I am not talking about in the event of not get together every two years in a war. Keep up on technology and make sure Kangaroo 83 exercise. you have the producing capability to do it if Mr Mirchandani: Mr Sinclair? you have to quickly. Have sufficient numbers Mr Sinclair: One of the questions that was of fully trained people with the capability of asked of me before was whether I thought the training others. Have the necessary equip- Arthur Tange review of the Defence Depart- ment for the above training and force inde- ment was adequate and I mentioned the Utz pendent co-ordinators, force the inter review. Had I remained Minister, at this stage Departmental people, to properly co- we would have been looking at the whole ordinate. structure of command within the three Ser- If I was the Minister and the three Chiefs vices. I think there is certainly a continued of Staff were fighting, I would fire all three role for a Head in nominal form in each of the and I would continue to fire them until the three armed Services, but having seen the ones that came along got the message. I way in which CINCPAC works in the Amer- would not be old-fashioned. You have to be ican command system, I believe there is ready to change and you have to be ready to much to be commended in our looking at change to meet whatever has to happen, and what should be a command structure for war, then you have to have sufficient capability to not a command structure for peace. As I see make others think. That is the end part of all the present structure, we have developed it that study. Then you have to commit the for a continuation of peace, which we all seek necessary funds. and hope can be preserved. But I think it is I will answer the other question now, foolish to develop a Defence Department and having got that off my soul. The question of three uniformed Services only around the the Jabiru, I guess you are talking about, is maintenance of peace. quite interesting. If you take the line that was I would, therefore, be looking very much agreed between Indonesia and Australia in at a revision of the present command system, that particular area, there is no problem which would take account of Joint Service whatsoever. The line is north of Jabiru, albeit commands, which I think should be per- not that far north. Of course, if you take the manently in place and share equality of rank Cartier and what is the other island out there? with those who are at the head of each of the Ashmore — and change that, the line prob- uniformed Services. ably comes south of Jabiru. Mr Mirchandani: I would like to take it across Now, the question remains that with the to the left-hand side of the panel now, and takeover of Timor there was never an perhaps, Mr Kirk, you could give us an idea of arrangement with Timor and, of course, there how much oil you think and what value there is no line adjoining the line I just mentioned. I is put to that oil in the disputed area of the guess Indonesia now, as determining every- Timor Shelf between Australia and In- thing for Timor, is renegotiating that line, or donesia? will renegotiate, and whether they will want Mr Kirk: That is a difficult question to answer. to renegotiate the other line, I do not know. I was hoping you were going to ask me the Mr Mirchandani: I will ask Mr Harry about original question - I had the answer. that. But the thing is, can you give us an idea Perhaps if I could just have the liberty to of how much money, potential revenue? intrude on what we have been talking about Mr Kirk: I would say Jabiru has probably got before I answer your question? Because I potential revenue of six to ten billion dollars.

Seapower '84 — Page 117 Mr Mirchandani: How does that compare really dealing with pieces of real estate or with Bass Strait? defence of back yards, we are dealing with Mr Kirk: Jabiru is not going to be as big as the maintenance and way of life of a nation, Bass Strait, unless they find a lot more oil, but and the decisions we take are to maintain a Jabiru could well be as big as a Fortescue, it system of law to defend our interests within a could well be as big as — no, not as big as world community, a Commonwealth com- Halibut. It may come eventually, but, you munity, an alliance. Our decision may relate know, the first strike of oil does not really tell more to those things than crossing of particu- you much, you have to ... lar lines. Mr Mirchandani: But it is significant enough Mr Mirchandani: Although there is a lot of to warrant attention being paid to it and a potential money and revenue involved ... to potential source of conflict? both countries? Mr Kirk: Absolutely. Mr Harry: Of course. It is an important area Mr Mirchandani: Mr Harry, could I just quote and I think we should negotiate hard on it, and that is what we should be doing at this from your recent report from Singapore in time. We really should not be talking about the Far-East Economic Review: this in terms of Defence. There is no dispute 'Australia and Indonesia are at logger- on which either side has brandished any- heads over a large disputed area of the thing, it is ... Timor Sea, which some experts believe Mr Mirchandani: But should we be preparing may contain one of the world's two for it, anyway, not necessarily in public dozen major oil fields. Indonesian forums? Foreign Minister Mochtar has described Mr Harry: I think what we must always as untenable and unrealistic Canberra's prepare for in terms of the national Defence claims to the area. Mochtar said in an Forces, of the Navy, is to indicate to the world interview that the formal negotiating at large that we will defend our vital interests. positions of the two countries were so far We do not have to define those vital interests apart it would require high level political in terms of a particular line or even of decision to reach a compromise. He said particular resources. We have to have a he had not seen any readiness from posture which indicates that if our vital Australia's Labor Government to do that. interests are invaded by force, we will defend While Indonesia was willing to continue them. technical talks with Australia on maritime Mr Mirchandani: I would like to take this a boundaries, it was not in a particular little bit beyond that because there is another hurry'. report about the various kerfuffles between A potential source of future conflict? Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, and a Mr Harry: I come from the position that we Jakarta paper has said recently that 'We in should have not just a national strategy but a Indonesia should be more sensitive to Papua national foreign policy and that our whole New Guinea and realise that sometimes we objective should be a consensus between all do take our good neighbour and younger Australians on what are our national vital brother for granted, and then as we become a interests, and on the basic framework within regional power we must take on the responsi- which we defend those interests. I could bilities that come with that burden'. The elaborate on that, but you have asked me a curious thing I do find where I go is, whether question. My answer to it is that under the it is a misconception on the part of the Law of the Sea as it was, as it will be under general Australian people or they have not the Convention, Australia has a continental been well-informed or whatever, every time shelf which extends beyond the line which they say to me 'But Indonesia is our biggest would be made by joining the two ends of the threat. They are going to attack us'. Can we existing gap. I did negotiate another part of discuss that here now? Is Indonesia our the line with the Indonesians and I have biggest threat? talked to Mochtar about this. Mr Harry: Can I talk about that border? Mr If we joined the two ends of the line, it Chairman, I had some part before the inde- would be more or less the same balance of pendence of Papua New Guinea in making negotiation as in the existing line. I think that sure that we got the boundary between is an entirely tenable line for Australia to Papua New Guinea and West Irian properly negotiate hard on. Now, when it comes to determined, agreed and demarcated with saying is this a bottom line, is this a line on markers. We did that because we could which we take a stand in a military sense, foresee that if it was not clear and defined then that is another question. We are not there would be more difficulties. There would

Page 118 — Seapower '84 be difficulties in any event, but it would be wide region of interest around us and the better if there was a clear boundary, and that whole maritime environment. Then we go on was achieved. We also coached the people, from this. Part of the national strategy would the diplomats of Papua New Guinea, before be a national security policy, but we do not independence on how they might tackle have a laid down national strategy at the problems, boundary problems, when they moment. We do not have a laid down occurred. I believe that it is a very good announced national security policy. illustration of the value of having defined So, let me try, as an objective of the boundaries of that kind . . . national security policy, say to maintain re- Mr Mirchandani: Except when people ignore gional stability as a means of avoiding con- them and go across them. flict in our area, with the power to prevent Mr Harry: No, I think it was illustrated then adverse developments in our region which that the boundary was there and when Papua might affect our national security. I know New Guinea, having learned the arts of three or four others, but let us ... diplomacy, promptly reacted, quietly reacted, Mr Mirchandani: But I thought on national insisted, the Indonesians accepted they had strategy we had that outlined by Admiral made a mistake and went back; and on the Leach this morning? flow of refugees in the north, diplomacy has RADM Griffiths: Yes, well I would just like to been quiet and firm. It has been blown up a add to it because I feel we need for the bit, I think, by our friends of the press. There national strategy, a national security policy. are correspondents there who have to report Eventually, if you do not have a national the situation. But is is a good example of the security policy, you will never get the Defence value of certainty. Policy objectives, but without those there is Mr Mirchandani: Sometimes they are biased no point in talking about Defence construc- as well. Mr Harry raised three points earlier tion. on: The need for a national strategy, which I Mr Mirchandani: National security policy? tried to outline one way and the panel Would you like to address that? I did not decided to try another way; the need for a understand that. national foreign policy; the need for a cred- RADM Griffiths: May I just give you three ibly deterrent force. What do these mean? items which I believe could be Defence policy Can we try and define those? Admiral Grif- objectives, and then I think the rest of our fiths? problems would tend to fall out. To provide RADM Griffiths: I am very glad you asked that rapid reaction, tactically viable forces for the question because I have been looking for an support of diplomacy and as a deterrent opportunity to say thank you for introducing within the region; item one. Two, to give a the idea of a bottom line. Unfortunately, the Government a range of military options to bottom line is far above the level that we have deal with the unpredictable crises — and we been discussing at this seminar. I was de- have a lot of those around the world now. lighted that Mr Kirk and Mr Harry both used Thirdly, and very importantly, to provide a the expression 'national strategy'. We must base for expansion in the event of timely have a policy settled at the top. National warning of major threats. If we could only strategy, of course, was raised by Comman- have a laid down Defence policy such as that der Youll yesterday and we did not really get or in that form, then I think sea power a very satisfactory answer to what national problems — what are we going to do, how strategy was from the speaker at the time; I are we going to do it — would tend to fall out. believe that we should set a national strategy, Mr Mirchandani: Before we take it to the we ought to be able to tell people what that panel I would like to get some more thoughts national strategy is, and we should be trying from the floor. Commander Youll? to do so. Commander S.J. Youll: I, with great respect, Let me try this one: To ensure the roundly reject Admiral Griffiths' supposition. survival of Australia as a democratic nation, We have had that for years. I would like to militarily aggressive towards none'. Now, give you one of our national interests and everybody says 'Well, that's old hat'. But I that is the maintenance of trade through the wonder if all the people out there look at it uppper Malaysian straits. However, if we that way? Let me come down — I have a list wanted to do that, under the regime that has of these here, but just let me make another now been established by the Law of the Sea one in our interest — 'maintain regional Convention, which is an international aspira- stability'. Then of course we can look at our tion, we could not do it. In the last six to nine region, and we have been talking about that months, force structure elements have been now for the last couple of days. It is a fairly introduced to our region which have tipped

Seapower '84 — Page 119 the balance and we can no longer do it. It is in the standard of living, including our inabil- not an option for Government. You no longer ity to trade, to design, to build and indeed to can rest assured on that. carry out normal industrial and commercial Mr Mirchandani: Anyone else from the floor? activity. CMDR Skinner: I feel there is a way of getting Mr Mirchandani: It is a fairly wide area. I to grips with this which had not occurred to would like to take this even further. I think we me before, but I have been compelled by the have developed nearly as far as we can this interesting discussion before me. That is, we whole business of national strategy and get- should ask ourselves what will produce con- ting a way towards it. What has always sensus in the people of Australia to agree to interested me is who makes Defence policy? the Defence Forces being mobilised and Certainly, pronouncements come out of employed in warlike activities? I think if you Cabinet, we are told; a vast conglomerate of answer that question and no other questions, committees do sit and provide advice, milit- you then can come to a quite easy list, which ary, etcetera. Ian, perhaps you could tell me, may not be agreed by everybody, but with who exactly does formulate Defence policy some fairly close commonality between va- and on what advice? rious people's lists of what are the things that Mr Sinclair: One of the things that worries me are on the bottom line. in looking at the answer to your first question I would suggest two out of four of and came out of some of the interventions Admiral Leach's national security interests — from the floor is that I think given the one, to protect the preservation of sovereign- international debate on disarmament and the ty. I think if a foreign power set foot on rise in the political profile of the peace Australian soil — I mean soil, I do not mean movement, if you set a bottom line where sea -- that would indeed produce such a you are now trying to draw it, which seems to consensus. I think interference with the Au- me the ability to defend your assets, I think stralian standard of living in a manner that we you are going to lose the battle to have did not agree with would produce it, and I enough resources to have anything at all to think the sort of thing that could produce that fight any battle with. interference is the interference with the sea The reason that I set down the deterrent lines of communication and shipping, on factor as what I saw as my bottom line is that which we have had abundant evidence of our there is at the moment a very real require- dependence. I also heartily agree with the ment in the debate in the community to proposition that if some sort of disagreement explain why it is necessary to have a Defence arose between Australia and another country, Force at all. There are many people in the that the foreign flag carriers that currently community — and I had not realised until I carry our trade would indeed melt away and started talking over this Easter break to a few we would be left very much to our own of my children, who are not really of very devices. radical persuasion but who have been in- I disagree with Dr Millar, who said we volved on campus within university debates, cannot possibly maintain or protect the sea associated with these peace agitators, who lines of communication, because sea asser- are expressing points of view which are tion does not require you to have somebody beginning to attract support from not only my there policing it every moment of every day. children, but from many in the thinking You only need protection when the ships community — who are saying that Australia carrying your vital trade goods are actually can now set the pace by unilateral disarma- passing along those routes, so you take your ment; we need to declare Australia and the policemen along with you. You do not leave Pacific and the Indian Ocean and all around them at every intersection between here and us a nuclear-free zone. Melbourne, if you are trying to protect one They are not looking rationally at an stage coach. argument that I remember Professor Julius The other two items that I would put on Stone expressed to us as young law students the list are the maintenance of international as to the reason why gas was not used prestige. I think it would produce consensus significantly in World War II. He spoke about in this country if we were humiliated, that we the balance of horror and about the extent to should take some military action, and I think which you did not know what the other fellow we should face up to that, discuss it widely in had, and consequently you did not use your the community and then agree or disagree on resource, as neither the Axis nor the Allied whether that is a viable thing. I think finally, powers did gas in World War II, because of and what I have really alluded to at the the fear of the consequences the others might beginning, is any other form of interference do to you. I think if you are looking at the

Page 120 — Seapower '84 bottom line argument, to begin trying to clobber you on the ear' — it is an Australian defend your own resource is to leave the custom, the Anzac reaction, if you like. battle until the battle is lost. Whereas in the older countries of Europe Having said that, I think that in terms of particularly, they have been living with un- who sets Defence policy, it gets to much the pleasant and hostile and unfriendly, unsym- same basis. It is a political argument that pathetic, neighbours for a thousand years, needs to be realised and recognised before and they have learned how to do it. And we you are going to get the money to provide the have to learn how to do it, too. sinews that are going to give you defence We have to learn how to deal, I believe, capability. While Defence policy is set in a with countries — we have to learn to deal way that follows the presentation of reports politically — with the mailed fist certainly from committees and those acceptances by back there, but for the most part we have to Government and then their argument in the learn to do it politically, to do it by daily Parliament, that Defence policy and your negotiation, and this is where I thought Mr Strategic Basis, or your assessment of your Harry had a very important point. Something defence capability, essentially are matters happens on the border of Papua New Guinea. which are resolved in the public forum. We do not have a plan which says 'Okay, you If the public forum is concerned about go a hundred yards further, we launch an Defence and a Government comes down with attack on Jakarta' or something -- or we a Defence Policy, or a Defence Vote, or a launch anything at all. Because there is a Defence Programme, or a sea power capabil- whole range of grey areas which affect our ity, which they see as inadequate, then you security, where it is far cheaper to negotiate, will find Government will change it. At the at least to start with than to react. moment, the way in which our policy, our I think there is a terribly important, a Defence policy, is being set is by a rising basic point here, which relates to whether agitation in the community by what I see as a you feel you have Defence Forces which are communist-led inspiration to deny us the put into process at that point on the line of sinews of self-capability, and I think it is not negotiation or whether you realise that in fact just a matter of looking at the formal structure it is a lot cheaper to negotiate than to fight, of decision taking, but recognising that the and that there are a whole range of areas community at large, and certainly under this where it is absolutely desperately important Government — one which is inclined to that you take your negotiation to the very last support that point of view anyway — is likely moment before you are ready to fight, but to destroy even further the capability you then you have to be ready to fight. have of mounting the effort in which we all Before going on to talk to Admiral Awati, believe. let us just take comment on Dr Millar's point Mr Mirchandani: Dr Millar, do you think that of view. Defence policy should rest on the whims of a Mr M.J. O'Connor: I am Michael O'Connor of democratic process? the Australian Defence Association. The Dr Millar: I certainly believe that the Defence Association I represent has struggled for policy of the country should come from the several years to get the message, especially expressed views of the people at the election the sea power message, over to people at and through the media, and through every large. Sir Charles Court is quite right, there is other means of bringing pressure to bear on a nothing wrong with the people — after all, democratic government. I believe very they shell out $360 per capita and in a family strongly that we have Defence Forces very of my size that comes to a fairly substantial largely to defend the kind of system which we amount for Defence. What we really have to have, the democratic system. There are only do is ask Lenin's key question, 'What has to about a dozen countries in the world that be done?' I suspect there is very little we can have it and I would hate to see it disappear. do with the politicians, with all due respect. Could I just add one little bit that I think is Neither party can be excused for the failures terribly important. I started off life as a of the past eight decades or so. soldier, but what has struck me, studying Let me be clear, the election result last Defence from outside during the last twenty- year drove the final nail into the coffin of the five years or so, has been the extent to which carrier, and that was a bench-mark decision if it has got a lot more complicated than when I ever there was one. But the other nails were was a soldier. We do watch the neighbour- driven in by the inaction of previous Govern- hood very carefully and we have a rather ments, but that still was a product of the volatile temperament about it. We start to say failure of the Defence Department then and 'Well, you go further than that and we'll now to get its act together. Here, I think,

Seapower '84 — Page 121 comes the answer to the question, 'Who go away from this conference and you will go makes Defence policy?' That failure was a back to your jobs in ships, in the Department, product of a decision to surrender any or whatever, but what will you actually do? attempt to patrol our distant strategic en- We have all become aware of the fact that vironment, coming back to the bottom line. Defence is suffering because it is not a high We have an interest in what happens a long priority with the Australian populace. The way from Australia because in that area, the thing is, will you write letters to newspapers? northern islands and so on, lie a number of Will you speak out and do something about air bases from which attacks can be mounted it? I notice a very anti-Government attitude in on the continent, if that is decided. the way that Mr Sinclair was very warmly From our point of view, whenever we received. I think that is condemning, simply raise matters of concern or decision we because we feel the Labor Government is believe to be mistaken — there is this lure at against us. the moment of the current Five-Year Defence I would like to put the thought to you that Plan, but I will not go into that — we talk to it is not against us, but it seeks to represent the Minister. His reply, of course, comes from Australian attitudes. If we do not have the the Department and I suppose many of us support of the Australian people, then the have been in a position where we have Government will not see it as a high priority. written or drafted some of those replies. But So I think you have really got to get away the resentful and hostile nature of the com- from this idea that the Navy is a silent munications show that the Department now Service. Certainly we must guard our secrets, believes itself to be more infallible than the but it is no reason for us to become a eunuch. Pope, and it has managed to convince suc- Mr Mirchandani: In the corner there. cessive Ministers of various political flavours Mr R. Cottrell: I will confess, gentlemen, to of that same infallibility. Not just the tone of working for the Department of Defence. I am answers to our queries, but the tone of also one of the few people who did not spend answers to Parliamentary Questions, as Mr his whole career in the Department, which Sinclair has mentioned himself. may be an exception to the rule. I think that The essential reality is that the best the purpose of the national strategy as it has organised and funded disarmament move- emerged, and Mr Chairman has given to us, ment in Australia is not the 250,000 people is not inappropriate. Clearly there is a link marching the streets a couple of Sundays between the kinds of objective we have as a ago, but the Department of Defence. So the nation and the kinds of Defence Force, the core of the problem really lies across the hill, kind of its effort, the level of effort, that is not among the people or the politicians. I am without doubt. Also there is a link between not competent to say where across the hill the kind of Defence effort and the kind of the problem lies. You know better than I do. national strategy we have on one hand, and But neither the people nor the politicians do the kind of nation we are. much about what goes on in there. The Sir We are, fortunately, still a liberal, demo- Humphreys of the world decide that. The cratic society. That is fundamental. It is part of Department of Defence is, to use a trade the nature of that society that we do not have union term, a closed shop, and there is very our Defence policy or our Defence objective little that outsiders can do about it. Only the dictated from above for the neat reception of people who work there, and that includes a the populace. That is one of the advantages lot of people here, as everyone knows, only that we enjoy. If we do not have agreement, if you can do that while you are there — not we do not have consensus, we should not afterwards; and you have to do it on the job, blame our politicians, although some of us not in forums like this. You have to learn the might like to do a little of that in private. We bureaucratic game of politics and you have to should not blame the other Services and we play it to win, and it may, to misquote Dr should not blame the civilian Department as Millar yesterday, it may be a bloody affair if being entirely responsible for that deficiency. you are going to win on behalf of the people Rather we should look at ourselves. It is a of Australia. product of the society as a whole that we do Mr Mirchandani: Anyone else want to take it not have agreement. further than that? I would also like to make another point. MIDN C. Maxworthy: Just further on that Over the years a number of public documents point, I would like to say that one of the things and innumerable speeches have been made I found interesting about this forum is the by Ministers for Defence, Prime Ministers and way ideas have emerged. I would like to ask Foreign Ministers, setting out some of the or put this idea to you, gentlemen. You will outlines of our Foreign and Defence Policies.

Page 122 — Seapower '84 Those of you who have read them and and in what circumstances? thought of them would have noticed that VADM Awati: I must confess that having there is a good deal of common ground there. listened to this discussion for the last forty- It is not entirely a bleak picture, if I can take odd minutes, if I may with due respect to my some comfort in saying. There is a measure host tell a little story about a little boy who of agreement. There might be differences was watching a gentleman golfer trying to hit about priorities, the order in which we attack a golf ball. He watched for many minutes the certain Departments, the way that we should swing of what you call it, and without actually respond to particular events in the interna- collecting the ball. He was really digging up a tional arena. But there is also some common lot of turf. After about fifteen-odd minutes he ground. observed that the gentleman golfer had stop- Although this is mainly a conference of ped attempting to hit the ball, so the little boy the converted, I would urge you to keep in asked his mother, 'Mummy, he's stopped. Is mind that any defence of Australia must be a it dead?' So I think in the last forty minutes we defence of the whole of Australia — not just have really not been able to get at the bottom in the sense that Sir Charles Court mentioned line. Perhaps there is not one in a system like in terms of geography, but also in terms of ours — I mean by that yours and India's, too. the pluralistic society that Australia is. We In a democracy, it is very difficult to have a should not, by the way we talk about this, bottom line spelt out by any minister or sacrifice the support of the bulk of the ministry or any bureaucrat, because it is very Australian people. We have to consider there difficult to touch bottoms in peacetime. is a multiplicity of interests involved and we Perhaps there is a middle line. I think I have to also consider changes over time, and will leave it at that. I think somebody men- there can be legitimate interests of particular tioned here just now that you have to have groups in our community which have to be multiple lines. I think there is not a bottom taken into account. line for Australia, or for India for that matter, One further point; I think, in view of the at this time, because if you do have a bottom multiplicity and complexity of the issues, it line and you organise for it, perhaps you lose does not serve us well to try to define our your flexibility in a changing situation. Defence Policy in a single phrase, whether it Maybe, I do not know. But to come to your is 'Fortress Australia' or 'Forward Defence'. specific question about balance of power The problems are a little more complex than being essentially against the weak and what that and you should address the complexity has the South done about interference. of the issues we face. I would suggest, too, Well, there is no doubt that the balance of that we would do well in the remaining time power game has to be, one learns from to try and be more forward-looking and to be history of the last five hundred-odd years, the more positive and say what Australia might balance of power game in this ocean is in fact do in terms of sea power over the next few at the expense of the weaker people, the years in terms of a policy, forces and activi weaker nations, and therefore to that extent ties. against the interests of the weaker nations. Mr Mirchandani: What I would like to do now And what are the weak doing about it? Well, is to ask Admiral Awati a question. I know a in the Indian Ocean context, the non-aligned lot of people also want to ask him various movement, thirty of the one hundred mem- questions, but I think I will take the privilege bership belonging to the littoral and hinter- of kicking off myself. Admiral, yesterday you land states of the Indian Ocean, have made a talked about the balance of power between beginning at the New Delhi Conference in the super powers in the Indian Ocean being 1983. I did mention a little bit about it; they essentially detrimental to the weak in the are trying to dissuade the two super powers area. You said the militarisation and nuc- from proceeding with their naval build-up in learisation of the South is a means to inter- the Indian Ocean and to devote a little more fere with this super power balance. Perhaps attention to restructuring the world economy, you could give us an idea or an example of perhaps, or certainly the economies of the when you think the South will probably assert poorer nations. In restructuring the econo- this power and in what circumstances, and mies of the south, the commodity producing what has the South done about regional countries . . . because until and unless the conflicts in its area? Already, given the pow- economies of the southern part of our earth is er, it has not intervened in Afghanistan, in the restructured, there cannot be any prosperity Iran-Iraq conflict, Vietnam-Kampuchea, China in the north. This is a particular point which is Equation, North and South Korea. Two ques- missed out in the developed world. tions: when will the South asserts its power, Aside from that, I cannot see the South

Seapower '84 — Page 123 being able to do very much about it until it ships to visit India. becomes militarised or perhaps nuclearised VADM Awati: Yes, unfortunately. I think the in the long run. You can see the trend, you Defence Minister must direct some of the can see the straws in the wind. Whether it is Australian ships to Bombay again. India or Pakistan now, perhaps Iran — there CORE Adams: When one considers, sir, the were some reports in this morning's paper great association that the Defence or Naval that there is some talk about Iran going powers in the Indian Ocean outside the super nuclear — maybe that way one could force powers had in the sixties — we had a great upon the two super powers a change of and continuing association with the Indian attitude, a change which will demand atten- Navy, which now no longer exists because, I tion to the South. But basically, I think, the would suggest, that the political and diploma- South really must pull up its socks, quite tic forces have contrived on both sides to frankly. I cannot see how we in India can blow arrive at a formula which prevents what I both hot and cold. We have done very little, would call a healthy dialogue between two although we have done a great deal in professional navies, which I think profes- industrialising and trying to improve our sionally seek one another's company be- standards of living, we have done very little in cause they both have a role to play in the improving our demographic equation in Indian Oc'ean. trying to do something about population With that introduction, sir, I have, one growth and all that. question for you which relates to the military But then in a system like ours, it is very scene in India. When one considers the Indian difficult to do it under compulsion. The situation and the long land boundary you Chinese, I understand, have almost reached have with not unfriendly neighbours, the fact zero growth in their population problem. We that you have tragically been involved in have not, we still are hovering about 1.9, conflict since World War II and the fact that almost 2. Some states in India have reached India has particular problems which we do 1.6 per 1,000 growths, which is pretty good, not face, at the same time we have seen the under a voluntary family planning drive. Until Indian Navy rise from a small but significant such time that we do attempt this seriously I power to be a great naval power now in the can see no future, no prospects for the South, Indian Ocean. If one reads the Australian or certainly India's word being taken as a today, the Indian Navy is planning a nuclear gospel by the South. submarine, a force of twenty submarines, Mr Mirchandani: Can I just leave it there for under the Chatterji plan; more ships from the moment, because I know quite a few Soviet Russia; German submarines; jump-jet people want to ask you questions, and take carriers; and naval air power at sea. the questions as they come. How is it, sir, that the naval counsels of VADM Awati: Do not ask me anything about New Delhi have been able to prevail so family planning, I am not an authority on it! successfully in a country which obviously CMDR G.H.C. McNally: McNally, National must have very strong affinity to preserving Insurance Maritime Department, Green- its land borders? Perhaps there is a message mount WA. Mr Chairman, how do we get you have there, which we could adopt. agreement on the bottom line, or money for VADM Awati: Thank you, I will try and the bottom line, the minimum deterrent if we answer that. There is only one soldier here can call it that? from India, so it does not matter. But I must Mr Mirchandani: Sorry, can I just hold you for first of all take a leaf out of Mr Sinclair's book a second? At the moment I just wanted and say what you read in the newspapers is questions directed at Admiral Awati. We will not necessarily true, and having said that I come back to the broader question later. must also educate you about the way the CORE H.J.P. Adams: Adams, financial mem- Indian Navy has grown, and it has grown, and ber. I am delighted to see Admiral Awati here it might grow a little more, notwithstanding and I would like to thank you, sir, as our poverty. But poverty and defence have Commander-in-Chief, Western Command, for really nothing to do with each other, quite the hospitality, sir, that you extended to our frankly, because a poor nation must also ships in 1981 when the DDG Squadron pas- remain independent and maintain its identity, sed through Bombay, and to say when we and the only way it can do so is ensure its arrived there that we always felt amongst security first. Otherwise it will not be a poor, friends, and it is marvellous to see you here, independent nation, it will be a poor depen- sir, and I feel that you can give us help. You dent nation without its freedom. are amongst friends also, here in this country. So I think we must try and remember Regrettably, sir, those ships were the last that. This gentleman has mentioned that it is

Page 124 — Seapower '84 an ambitious programme for a country strug- Chiefs of Staff. gling with poverty. Yes, it is an ambitious Here I must say that the Chiefs of Army programme for a country struggling with and Air Staffs helped the Chief of Naval Staff poverty. But you can do both. We have a very in getting what he wanted, not by allowing long land frontier; today it is manned by not their bit of cake to go across to the Navy, but very friendly nations. Perhaps it is our fault by ensuring that the cake became a little that it is not manned by friendly nations. We bigger and that the Navy took its due share. I should have tried our diplomacy as hard as do not think one need, our neighbours need, Mr Harry has undoubtedly told Australians to fear from this what I call legitimate increase do their jobs. I think if we had done our of Indian Naval power. The whole object is to diplomatic homework properly, we would not deter — we have heard the word 'deter' often be facing China and Pakistan today in the kind enough here — or to make it unacceptable to of stance we are facing them. In fact, we are one or other of the super powers to do battle having the same problems with our other with us without sustaining unacceptable neighbours. Perhaps it is the normal syn- damage. Therefore, they would not push us drome of a large populated powerful country, beyond a certain threshold. in the sense that we are one of the first ten Mr Mirchandani: We have about ten minutes industrialised nations of the world today - left and there is one other point which needs people do not know about it. And side by side to be raised because that is coming as a with the good old bullock cart, we also have general thread. I think I can be rude enough to various other things prescribed for a modern say the time for long preambles now is over, economy. and so is the time for long answers. We will So these little nations around us, have to go through this pretty quickly. The whether it be Ceylon, Bangladesh or Nepal, idea is, how do we tell the community about have to be cajoled by diplomatic means. That the problems and try to broaden this discus- we have not succeeded so far is perhaps an sions so that the pressure can be put on the indication of the failure of our foreign policy. politicians to give our Defence Force whatev- Defence policies usually follow where foreign er it needs, or maybe even more, or not at all, policies lead, but there are countries around depending on which seciton of opinion gains our periphery which have defence-led foreign a hold. I would like the panel very quickly now policies, so somehow we have to deal with to go through ideas of how they feel that the that, too. The land borders do pose this Defence point of view can be put across threat, to raise the Indian Army's strength to persuasively to the community and keep the almost a million people, a million men under answers reasonably brief. Ian, would you arms. Maybe not with sophisticated arms, but start off, please. numbers possibly make up for absence of Mr Sinclair: I think there are several things sophistication. But that does not stop us, or that need to be done. Over lunch we were should not stop us. If we read history right, talking as to why there were not perhaps as we are also a peninsula with a coastline in many Press here and involved and interested. excess of 6,000 or 7,000 kilometres — not as I think that there needs to be a public much as yours, 19,000 kilometres, but 7 or relations section within the Department of 8,000 kilometres is not a small coastline. Defence that is oriented very much to the The lesson of history is very clear to us, Press themselves. I know you have some very that if we ignore that lesson and allow the excellent people who work there, but, really, waters around us to be dominated by one or the emphasis on public relations seems to me other, a third, nation not belonging to the to disguise information rather than to prom- Indian Ocean, then the chances are that the ote it, and I do not think those of you who are nation is going to dictate to us in the long run. in the Service are given enough opportunity Perhaps not physically occupy, because to express your point of view. I think there those days of physical colonisation are gone needs to be a way by which we can accept and cannot be countenanced in this century, that you have a right to your point of view but we will then be subject to the whims and and should be able to express it, and I am fancies of the Soviet Union or the USA, or disappointed that that opportunity has not China, or whoever decides to dominate the been provided sufficiently in the past. Indian Ocean. The very raison d'etre of the Dr Millar: I think there are a lot of things that Indian Navy, I think, is borne out of that, but I could be done that are not being done. I made must tell you that it took our Government a the point in my address that the Defence long, long time to come to this conclusion. Report, the Minister's annual report, really They only woke up to this in the post-1970 conceals far more information than it reveals. period after long years of badgering by the It needs to be far more explicit; we need a far

Seapower '84 — Page 125 more regular White Paper, preferably an in golf and bowls and a few other things. It is annual White Paper, coming out on Defence. I going to be a tough job. think the Ministers concerned have to spend My last point is that it has to be the result a lot more time explaining Defence issues. I of a strategy well planed. It is no good having think the Defence PR section needs to have a one great blitz throughout Australia. It has to more professional and a much wider brief to be well-planned. It will take years to get it speak about Defence questions around the across properly, but the sooner you start, the public. I think the Government could very sooner you will get there, as long as there is usefully subsidise the study of Defence ques- the strategy. So I believe that we do have to tions throughout the community in universi- marshall forces and get community organisa- ties, as it does in the UK. tions that incorporate the young in amongst Here we have one small centre at ANU, those, to get them to understand what it is all which is really very inadequate for a country about, so that when the next election comes, our size. I think the kind of seminars which Defence is a real issue. I suggest to you and Defence has conducted across the nation suggest to Ian Sinclair that it has not really over the past few years are a good thing, but been an issue in an election for a long, long they have been a flash in the pan in each time — not a real issue. When it becomes a place, pretty much. They could be much more real issue, then you know you have won. widely extended. I do not see any reason why Mr Mirchandani: Before I ask Admiral Leach there should not be more seminars of this for his comments, I would like to say as a kind, more public discussions of this kind, journalist that if more senior officers in involving Defence people, civilians and mem- uniform spoke with the forthrightness that bers of the Armed Forces, and these things Admiral Leach has addressed us, not only get reported. I think the newspapers need to today but to journalists in the past, we would have qualified Defence correspondents who get a damn sight more information across. are regularly writing on these matters, where- VADM Leach: Thank you, Prakash. I think it is as for the most part they pick up some happening, there is a change I detect and that journalist who may have an interest in it, but is due to a lot of dedicated people out there. has very little qualifications to speak on them, While you may not all agree with them, you with yourself excepted, sir, if I may say so. must applaud their purpose and the time they Mr Mirchandani: Sir Charles, bearing in mind give to say what they believe, and that is very that the Western Australian Government is helpful. I notice the Bulletin said that they are just spending 6 million dollars on anti- taking a whole Defence issue, or they are smoking and not a lot on defence? going to get contributions, please write in, Sir Charles Court: Well, Mr Chairman, I feel but nobody from them is here. I would like to very strongly that first and foremost the see more involvement of the military. I notice people who are responsible for Defence Mr Pritchett said that there was no military should together, not just as Navy or as Army input. Well, it is very difficult, believe me, and or as Air Force, but together, face up to the what I think we should do more is appear Government of the day and the Opposition of before Parliamentary Joint Committees. the day and say 'Look, the time has come to Maybe it is in camera and maybe they do not find out where you are going and where you hear the eggshells you crunch on, but I think want us to go'. I think you owe it to the there must be more of the military people Government, you owe it to the Opposition, to having a proper input, because I do not at least give them a chance to come out and believe that is happening at the moment; for express themselves, in terms that are accept- example, I did not appear before the Coastal able and can be clearly understood, and get Surveillance Committee. We heard about the away from the gobbledegook. You can never Strategic Basis and how Defence Policy is get the simple solution in one sentence, it is formed; I remember Admiral Peck saying not all that easy, but you can get action that at here many years ago that they went in least points in the right direction. without him ever seeing it, and we do not get The other thing is to make sure that you very long to see it. do set to work systematically to get the Mr Mirchandani: Professor Fairbairn, my community to understand what Defence is all apologies for not having come to you earlier. about, why it is important and particularly the Perhaps you have a thought on this subject? young. The public are not stupid, but you Prof Freebairn: I have nothing to add. have to tell them and there are so many Mr Mirchandani: Mr Kirk? people telling them the wrong things at the Mr Kirk: Just briefly — get your story right, moment, very expertly, very consistently, make sure it is the right story, get it to the they never sleep. But we are all too interested Government, get it to the Opposition, get it to

Page 126 — Seapower '84 the media. You can do it if you get out there the story will spread. and talk to them. They are willing to talk to Mr Mirchandani: I would like to leave it here. you. Get more seminars to do it and then try Thanks very much for joining in this panel getting on the campus to get to the young and thank you to our panel here for answer- people, because once you start to get to them ing the questions.

HMAS AUSTRALIA

Seapower '84 — Page 127 HMAS AUSTRALIA Courtesy: J. Mortimer SUMMING UP

by Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot KBE AO RAN (Rtd) Former Chief of Defence Force Staff

Mr President, ladies and gentlemen. I lifetime had travelled out to Australia by sea, think this meeting, or seminar as we have whereas nowadays if you travel at all you called it, of the ANI has done just what the travel by air. I think that is very true. aims and objectives of the ANI are, which are I think myself that there is another printed in the piece of paper you have in your reason, not quite 19th century; but in our folder. I think it has certainly encouraged lifetime, and the lifetimes of our fathers and discussion and I hope that the discussion will mothers, nearly everybody had a relation not stop when you leave this room. We have who was in the Australian Army — roughly had some ideas from the panel on how to half a million in each war. In the Navy, of further discussion. I might say that I saw it as course, the number was very, very much a very important thing in my days of CNS, but smaller and in the Air Force, it was negligible it was never terribly easy as CNS. It was in the First World War but quite significant in certainly a lot easier as CDFS, although I the Second World War. But I think the Navy cannot say I found it possible to encourage does suffer a bit in that when people talk my counterparts in the Department to speak about 'Defence' they think of the Army. Now, as freely as I did. But my Minister did not that is not terribly sensible for an island shackle me and I kept him informed of what I nation. We certainly need the three Services was doing. But it takes a lot more than that. and I am a Defence man, whether by being I did try to encourage people to speak at converted or by nature I am not sure, but you local meetings in their area, but once again it need the three Services. I think you have to was not terribly easy; but we must try and look at your situation, and we are an island spread the word. There is one thing of continent and, therefore, our maritime in- educating people; there is a second thing of terests must be particularly important. This leadership, and while it is up to all of us to did come out in the one and only defence help educate people, I would like to see more White Paper of recent years. The Governor- leadership from Governments on the Defence General also raised the important point about issue. They tend to be interested when it is an seminars such as this helping to improve the issue, disinterested when it does not seem to consciousness of people. be an issue. Which is a pity, because Govern- From Dr Millar, we had a very good ments only last for three years and therefore run-down of the international scene. He told it has to be of fairly immediate importance; us about the interrelationship of Foreign and Defence planning, Defence procurement, Affairs and Foreign Policy with Defence Poli- training, bringing into service of items, of cy, and he explained this by saying that his course, is much longer than that. So it is book on foreign policy, the first book he had unfortunate we have such a short term for written on foreign policy, when being re- Governments here when we have Defence as viewed, by Dr Macmahon Ball that eminent a very long-term planning matter. man said 'And here is Millar writing on The Governor-General set the scene on Defence again'. But Foreign Policy and De the importance of an island continent to its fence Policy come together in the Defence maritime interests. He pointed out that the Committee and it is important that they population nowadays was much less con- should. scious of those maritime interests than it Dr Millar emphasised that, at times, used to be in the 19th century, and one of the changes may seem slight and slow, but in the reasons he gave, which is a very good one, event they sometimes are very significant. He was that in those days most people travelled went into factors in our strategic situation; by sea and pretty nearly everybody in their the East-West balance; he talked of NATO

Seapower '84 — Page 129 and mentioned something which I think stopping of wars and things like that. He felt should not be forgotten, which is the view of that international law was an area where we the countries of Europe, Western Europe, could do much more and if we had interna- towards NATO, and how De Gaulle explained tional laws they could help to sort out prob- it as 'The US will not commit suicide in lems, rather than people fighting them out. Europe'. I think that is a worry of theirs. The One of the ones he had been involved in US, of course, has the opposite worry. particularly was the Law of the Sea. We have Europe is bleeding them and will take every- had a Law of the Sea for a long time and it has thing they give, and when they, the US, want been useful as far as it has gone, but things support they do not get it. Europe says, 'Well, have changed in the technological sense; we we are not properly consulted' and so it goes are looking at resources from the seabed, oil on. But NATO will continue, not necessarily in and other resources, and the international its present form. law was out of date and inadequate for that. I Dr Millar pointed out we should be ready am sure that if all the countries were signa- for change. He thought that war in Europe tory to the new Law of the Sea, it would help was unlikely, but that the Eastern Bloc could to stop problems developing. break up in about twenty years and that He pointed out the unfortunate fact that would change the situation there quite dra- the United States is not yet a participant in matically, even if slowly. He mentioned nuc- the Law of the Sea. He made a point which I lear proliferation. I think that is a thing that have always felt, that we were perhaps a bit has not been mentioned enough today. It is selfish in Australia in going for the seabed in important, it will be important in the future. the Continental Shelf beyond the 200 nautical He mentioned the importance of Middle East miles limit. Goodness me, we must have a lot oil, which came up again, of course, in other when we go out to 200 nautical miles. I am talks; Soviet bases in Vietnam; and he not quite sure why the good gentlemen he pointed out very succinctly that, for the first was talking about were pushing it so hard. time, the USSR is now able to carry out I think Antarctica is an area where Aust- maritime operations in two oceans. ralia should be more interested and it could He mentioned in some detail the role and be an area where Mr Harry's ideas get an capacity of the United States vis-a-vis Aust- opportunity to be proven. I think elsewhere it ralia, and that, of course, is important. It is is going to be a long time before the rule of important to governments; it is something law can properly operate, but I think in that even if people do not understand in Antarctica there is a good opportunity for it detail they know it is important. The facilities becoming established. As Dr Millar pointed we have which are important to the US, he out, I think we will continue to live in a fairly said, could well be gone in twenty years, at uncomfortable world, otherwise, for some the rate of technological advance. He said time. there was a danger of the US and the ANZUS Vice Admiral Awati then talked to us on Treaty making us lazy about Defence matters, an Indian Ocean perspective, a perspective and he felt that the relationship could poss- from a country closely associated with what I ibly inhibit us sometimes in Foreign Affairs would call the more active part of the Indian matters. In summary, we got a realistic and Ocean — we are in a fairly passive part of the practical strategic setting from Dr Millar, Indian Ocean here, even though Sir Charles rather than a purely academic one or an Court would not always agree — but he gave idealistic one. He left us very much with the us an insight as to how it is seen from that idea that we live in an uncertain world in part of the world. which things can change quickly. There were some parts with which I did Mr Harry then gave us a legal and not entirely agree. He, for instance, empha- diplomatic view. He pointed out that since he sised that raw materials, initially black pepper retired he had become more of an interna- and later black oil, had brought countries, tionalist and, of course, he had a lot of great powers and, later, super powers, to the experience with the United Nations and had area. I think that that is absolutely true, but I been in a good position to think this out wonder nowadays, are not the Arab states clearly himself, I am sure. I do not know very keen to sell their black oil to anybody whether I can properly represent his views on who will pay for it? They have put the price up this, but I will have a try. pretty high and they are making a wonderful Of the United Nations, I think he felt that lot of money out of it, and you can see that it was a good idea, but it was very limited; being spent pretty freely in places like Lon- they have helped in various areas, but the don and New York. So I think that many veto in the Security Council inhibits proper people in those countries are happy to sell

Page 130 — Seapower '84 their raw materials to the super powers; and FASSIP is not quite so wary of military input what nobody wants, whether it be in the as his predecessors. But in my day, military western Indian Ocean, the eastern Indian input was not encouraged, and I think it is Ocean, or the Pacific or anywhere else, is to quite essential. have near them a centre of super power I think that the military side did do a good conflict. I think in the western Indian Ocean job, certainly whenever I was involved in it in there is a centre of unease between the two the last ten years or so, on producing the super powers. They are a bit closely involved Joint Series of publications, JSP(AS) series, in it all and it is probably with this clash of which give operating procedures and tactical super power interests, which are pretty simi- doctrine, and that sort of thing. But they did lar, in that area, which is disliked most by not make much headway on the military people. strategy side because in the Tange Report the He was concerned about US arms to Joint Planning Committee was got rid of. It Pakistan. I think personally I am more con- has never actually died, but the old Joint cerned about nuclear proliferation. I think that Planning Committee had someone from De- could become a real problem in that area. He fence Planning and someone from Foreign ascribed a coherence to US policy which I am Affairs on it and I think it was a fairly useful — not confident exists. I do not think US policy in fact, a very useful — committee that is as coherent as he made it out to be. He produced things. But at the moment, respon- talked of Diego Garcia, which when I was last sibility for most military strategy tends to be there had nothing on it and now, of course, is left with the SIP Division; the military people a base for the RDF — the Rapid Deployment in that division were meant to make their Force. The soldiers etcetera are not there, but input, but I do not think it has worked as well a lot of their equipment is. The RDF has still as it should and I would be happy if people got to prove its usefulness. It is obviously a became less wary of proper military input. cause of concern to nations there and is I thought Mr Pritchett was searching for probably a cause of concern to the Soviet credible threats to justify the Navy and in- Union; but the Soviet Union has short lines of deed to justify the Defence Force; I do not communication to the northern part of the think in present circumstances that that is the area and the United States has tremendously way we should really be thinking. I think we long lines of communication, and relative to can see that there is not one identifiable what the Soviet could deploy in, say, Iran, of credible threat that we should be structuring course the Americans with the RDF could the Defence Force around. Now, in NATO deploy very little. It may be useful from an they have that; they can see across the other American point of view but has yet to be side the Warsaw Pact, and they know that proven. they are structuring their Defence Force basi- He made an interesting comment, which cally to meet an attack from the Warsaw Pact. I thought we should not miss, that Soviet We are in a different situation that should ships, he believed, were behind the United not worry us. What we need, of course, is a States in quality. I think that those of you who deterrent force, a force that will stop other have time to talk to him could learn a bit more people doing things that could lead to war; about it. He also emphasised that the basic and that is what I am sure our Defence Force problem had been eased a lot for the Soviets should be, a force that in the region will help by Cam Ranh Bay. And, of course, we believe to deter war. You can look at what has that Cam Ranh Bay is being used by the happened when people have not done that. Soviets both in the South China Sea, to There is no doubt that the Argentinians quite project power, to collect information and all recently had heard so much about the run- those sort of things, as well as for support in down of the British Navy and what Mr Nott the Indian Ocean. He told us, and I think we was doing selling his aircraft carrier to Aust- should not forget it, that Australia cannot be ralia and things like that that they thought neutral, and he also emphasised that the US there was no chance of Britain really reacting could be embarrassed if asked by Australia to when they landed those people in the Falk- invoke the ANZUS Treaty. lands and South Georgia Island. We then had a talk by Mr Pritchett, who So when you drop your deterrent, when has recently retired after four years as Secret- you show you are losing the will, people ary for Defence. He made a good point of the sometimes get mistaken and they certainly need for more military strategic input and I use that as an opportunity against you. I think can only say that from my time in Defence, a deterrent force, a manifestly obvious, well- that would be a very welcome change; and I known, efficient, capable Defence Force is hope perhaps that is a sign that the new what we require and, because we do not

Sespower '84 — Page 131 know what the threat is going to be, it will you go into details, but I think that is the sort have to be a pretty versatile force that is of thing that people understand. If we are capable of meeting a number of possible going to have an insurance policy, well, we threats; and there are many possible threats have got to pay for it, and that is what we are that could come and, as Dr Millar said, the paying for with Defence. He emphasised the unexpected is what we are really talking importance of economic security as well as about. defence security. Once again this is the sort of Mr Pritchett also pointed out the import- thing that comes together very much in the ance of Naval and Air Force co-operation. Defence Committee where we have the There has been pretty good co-operation at Secretary of the Treasury as well as Secretary the working level between our ships and the of Foreign Affairs, and Secretary of Prime squadrons; and I think we have always had Minister's Department, all involved in good co-operation, helped on by AJASS, strategic policy. between the maritime squadrons and the He told us, and I do not think he meant us anti-submarine ships and the submarines; to forget, the importance of rehearsals, and I but I think what he was really thinking about think Kangaroo '83 which was carried out in is, now we no longer have a carrier, we will Western Australia is the sort of thing he was be using more and more squadrons such as thinking about. He stressed various things; the FA18s for maritime work, for maritime preparedness was one, allied forces using operations, and I, myself, think what we have Western Australian naval facilities was got to look at is perhaps having liaison another, the need for a dock to take warships officers with the maritime squadrons and the and merchant ships in Western Australia, and maritime squadrons having liaison officers the building up if possible of a capability for for FOCAF staff. I know this has been done to encouraging merchant ships to come there a certain extent with the Orion squadrons but and get refitted. I think we have got to take it further. I must move on, rather quickly, I am He mentioned keeping Government op- afraid, to Mr Kirk, who told us many stories. tions open and I think that is part of the He gave us industry's view on our problems versatile Defence Force. You are not sup- and a very good rundown of the place and posed, I do not believe, to have a Defence importance of merchant shipping, the fishing Force that can only do this, and when the industry, and tourism; he went on to talk Government wants it to do that you say to about energy, fuels, etcetera. He gave us them 'I'm sorry, Government, we can't do it'. some startling figures relating to the Federal You must have sufficient versatility so you do Budget and what the deficit would look like if not hem the Government in and they can play it was not for oil. He emphasised above their options. everything else the importance of trade to Now, I think we had better move on to Sir Australia and on a per head basis said we Charles Court. He, subtly perhaps, but not to were up not quite at the front but amongst be overlooked, paid a good plug for the West the leaders. At the end he emphasised the and for that he got a lot of support, because importance of keeping our maritime inde- there are lot of Western Australians in places pendence which he said was vital to Aust- of power around here at the moment. He ralia. emphasised the need to get the community Professor Freebairn then gave us an back to understanding why we need a De- economist's view and I found this very in- fence Force and what it was all about. There teresting. He ran through the peacetime has been since then quite a lot of talk about needs for a Navy and costed the value of it in this and it was gone over fairly heavily in the defence setting in relation to such tings as question time. I can say I agree very much — I trade etcetera. I think that this is the sort of think it is important. analytical view which would appeal to Gov- He emphasised the dramatic suddenness ernments, which we all know are elected for of things that can happen that affect a short periods and want to see value for Defence Force such as the beginning of the money before the next election. last war. We were fighting overseas and it But can one really cost Defence? Surely, seemed to be somebody else's war that we for instance, the cost of the Falklands cam- were sending an expeditionary force to, and paign was out of all proportion to the value of then suddenly the Japanese were in and it the Falklands to Britain and even the cost of was Australia's war. He explained Defence in maintaining the Falklands and their inde- a simple way as a matter of an insurance pendence now is quite out of proportion to policy. Well, I think that is a good practical the value of the Falklands. They could have explanation; it is a bit oversimplified when given every person there $10 million and

Page 132 — Seapower '84 settled them in New Zealand and would have you go to war, but that is not the object, I do had money to spare; but you cannot always not believe. The other thing that was men- cost Defence, although you will find that tioned then, was bipartisan support for De- people such as the Minister for Finance fence and he said how valuable it would be would be very interested in that view and and he urged us all to take a positive want to see that we were getting value for approach to our problems. money on a day-to-day basis. We then had Mr Sinclair who, as Defence So I come back to deterrence, and I think Minister for only a very short time and now as that is the real argument, and I think it is an Opposition Shadow Minister, talked to us of argument that is understood by people and the difficulties of balancing budgets, particu- appeals to people. It is much cheaper, cheap- larly with many big ticket items and aging of er in every way, financially, loss of life, assets. whatever you like to say, to deter a war than He then mentioned the character of to let it start, such as in 1939 when Britain and threat in retrospect. He did not enlarge on France did not deter it and had to spend the that much, but I think what he was saying was next four or five years getting out of it. we all find it easy to look back on the The Chief of Naval Staff then gave us a character of threats but we do not do enough rundown on what he called Sea Power for of looking forward to what the character of Peace. I thought it was rather more than that. new threats could be which will be very Clearly he has had a difficult time as Chief of different. I must say that I am not a believer Naval Staff with the rundown of the Fleet Air that invasion of Australia is likely if we have a Arm, about which he had no power to proper Defence Force. I think there are lots of influence from the point of view of decision other threats we ought to be thinking about. making, and of course it brought with it a lot The third thing he mentioned were orga- of morale problems for him. He gave us a nisational problems and he was drawn out a good rundown of why we need maritime bit on this in question time. He mentioned forces, I thought. He emphasised that we particularly the difficulty he had as leader of should try and stop any enemy as far from the National Party in Opposition of keeping our coast as possible. I think that is the sort of properly briefed on Defence matters; that thought that people are a bit apt to overlook. was something that we did discuss further He said we needed a force structure capable later. And he saw an adequte Navy as a first of expanding, and that of course applies to requirement and particularly a first require- the whole Defence Force, that the force ment of an island nation. structure must be capable of expanding as far He talked on the carrier and the election as possible within the warning time; and it is promise and justified the returning of IN- not always easy to know what amount of VINCIBLE, then and in question time, rather warning time you are going to have. on the basis of keeping the British happy. I He mentioned four essential elements; was a bit cynical about it, I must admit, and surveillance — I think he perhaps left out thought that the Prime Minister of the day electronic surveillance but nowadays it is not was a little bit miffed by Mr Muldoon sending quite so much a security matter as it was and a frigate to relieve a British frigate in the I feel I can mention it; it is a part of the overall Western Indian Ocean to take part in the surveillance, and Jindalee will be part of that Falklands, and the PM was trying to do his bit electronic surveillance shortly -- he men- to keep up with him; but, whatever it was, it tioned sea control, strategic strike and de- was really putting the second last nail in the ployment in support of Army units. He also lid of the coffin, and I think those concerned mentioned that there was a bit of a difference must have realised that when they made that of opinion, between himself and Mr Pritchett, decision. on the value of showing the flag. He talked about the role of merchant Well, if you have a Defence Force for shipping in support of Defence and hoped deterrence I think when you show the flag that we were going ahead with that study, you show it is a Defence Force which other emphasising that the British had been parti- people then know you have got. If you do not cularly successful in that way during the show the flag, if you hide your Defence Force Falklands campaign. He mentioned the prob- — and there is a bit of a feeling in some areas lems of training afloat, the support of a fleet, that you should not show your Defence lack of ASW helicopter support at sea and the Force, it is something that should be hidden overcommitment of the Orion aircraft. in peacetime — well, if you hide it in peace- In summary, he was not happy that the time it will not be a deterrent and it will not Navy was getting or would get enough funds save you going to war. It will be there when to meet its prime tasks. On a bipartisan

Seapower '84 — Page 133 Defence policy, he felt it was not possible and get a bipartisan policy, but the way the I think that I must agree. I think we should aim Government operates, I am afraid, will al- for as much common ground, particularly in ways be a matter that the Opposition does, policy areas, as possible, but the job of the and even should, criticise. Oppositon is to snipe at the Government, to So, gentlemen, I think that the choice by keep the Government honest, to keep them the ANI of our speakers was very fortunate. up to their promises and all those sorts of They gave me an easy job summing up, but I things short of war, you will never get an must apologise for the things that I have not Opposition which will not be criticising the covered that perhaps I should have. I would Government for the way it is doing things. It like to thank the ANI for doing what it can to may agree with what the Government is promote the interests of the public in general trying to do, and that is about as far as we will in defence matters.

HMAS HOBART Courtesy: Navy PR

Page 134— Seapower '84 CLOSING REMARKS

by Commodore I.E. James AO RAN President Australian Naval Institute

I will be as brief as I can, but there are a support of the audience, particularly the couple of things I must say before we close. special representatives, and thank you for Firstly, I echo Admiral Synnot's views. I your participation in discussion both in this believe the aims of the seminar have been room and out of session. This has been achieved and I can only express the wish on important to the success of the seminar. May behalf of the Institute that the debate will I remind the non-members that you can join continue. I would like to thank, on your the Institute and the form is in your folder. It behalf, all our speakers. All are busy and is also appropriate for me to record our important men who have given freely of their gratitude to the Australian National Universi- time. Some have come from far away. ty for once again making available the facili- Gentlemen, we thank you for you stimu- ties for Seapower. lating addresses and your further contribu- Finally, I would like to publicly thank all tions during the debate. I would particularly those — the Seminar Director, members of like to thank Prakash Mirchandani for the very the Institute, their wives, their families and professional way in which he conducted this their friends — who have given freely of their afternoon's open forum, and Admiral Synnot time to make this seminar possible. Ladies for summing up just a moment ago. The and gentlemen, you have all contributed to Council offers all our speakers honorary make Seapower '84 a wide-ranging and membership of the Institute for the coming worthwhile event. It has been our pleasure to year, and as a further token of our apprecia- arrange this seminar. We look forward to tion each will be presented with a small gift at seeing you on the next occasion. I declare the conclusion of the seminar. Seapower '84 closed. We are also very appreciative for the

Seapower '84 — Page 135 LIST OF THOSE ATTENDING Special Representatives Title Name Service or company Mr R.S. Balok Rockwell International Mr T. Bergmann General Electric Mr B.C. Clark Thyssen Mr N. Clavelloux Thomson-CSF Mr A. Dubreuil Thomson-CSF Mr R.H. Kassel Computer Sciences of Australia CMDR J. Mathews RANEM C3 Pty Ltd AVM R. Noble RAAF (Rtd) Rockwell-Collins (Australasia) Dr D.H. Pickrell Rockwell International Mr L. Randell Rockwell Collins (Australasia) Mr E.M. Rawson General Electric Members CMDR K.M. Adams RANR CORE H.J.P. Adams RAN LCDR F.A. Allica RAN Mr G.K. Andrews Janes Fighting Ships CMDR J.S.M. Atkinson IN (Rtd) CORE A.L. Beaumont RAN Mr A. Bergin LCDR B. Bird RAN CAPT P.V. Blackman RAN CMDR C.F. Bolton RAN A CAPT A.H.R. Brecht RAN Mr V. Brice Scientific Management Associates Mr L.W. Brighton Plessey Australia Ltd Mr T. Brinkley British Shipbuilders (Aust) Mr H. McC. E. Brown Bunge Industrial Ltd CORE I.M. Burnside RAN (Rtd) Mr G.C. Calderwood CMDR D.J. Campbell RAN RADM B J Castles RAN (Rtd) SOFMA, Chantiers Dubigeon CORE M.A. McK. Clarke RAN (Rtd) LCDR B.D.H. Clarke RAN LCDR E.J. Coles RANNS CMDR D. Collingridge RAN CAPT S. Comfort RANEM CAPT J. Compton RAN CAPT P.W. Coombs RAN (Rtd) SOFMA CORE O.R. Cooper RAN CMDR P. Coulson RAN LEUT S. Coulson WRANS CMDR A.M. Craig RAN Mr E.J.D. Crone CORE A.R. Cummins RAN CMDR G. Cults RAN CAPT J.R. DaCosta RAN Ms R. Darmody RADM J. Davidson RAN (Rtd) Returned Services League LCDR P.J. Davies RAN CMDR H.L. Daw RAN

Page J36—Seapower '84 CAPT P.G.V. Dechaineux RAN CORE J.S. Dickson RAN LCDR I.K. Donald RAN CAPT H.J. Donohue RAN RADM W.J. Dovers RAN (Rtd) LCDR W.A.G. Dovers RAN LCDR P. Downes WRANS CMDR M.H. Dowsett RAN CMDR G. Early RAN CAPT A.L. Eccleston RAN CMDR R.R.H. Fayle RAN Prof P.T. Fink Chief Defence Scientist Mr T.S. Fink GEC Australia LEUT M.D. Fitzpatrick RAN CAPT L.G. Fox RAN (Rtd) Mr B. Frizell Philips Mr D.G. Fry NQEA Mr H. Grevby Swedish Defence Industries Mr G. Griffiths LCDR I.R. Gulliver RAN CMDR M.H. Hall RAN LEUT G.I. Hamersley RAN CAPT R.G. Harris RAN Mr J. Hazell Krupp (Australia) Pty Ltd Rev M.A. Head SUPRT T.M. Hoare RAN CORE I.F. Holmes RAN CAPT G.P. Hood RAN (Rtd) GEC Diesels Mr R.N. Horspool Mr J.B. Howse RADM M.W. Hudson RAN CAPT A.L. Hunt RAN MIDN W.B. Jacomb RAN CORE I.E. James RAN CORE P.H. James RAN WGCMDR F.O. Janousek, DSO DFC RAAF (Rtd) LCDR R.M. Jemesen RAN CMDR H.G. Julian RANEM Mr J. Koina Mr J. Limoges Thomson-CSF (Australasia) CMDR A.R. Lindsey RANR CMDR V.R. Littlewood RAN CAPT J.G. Longden RAN RADM R.G. Loosli RAN (Rtd) LCDR S.F. MacDougall RANNS Mr D.G. Martin GEC Diesels MIDN C. Maxworthy RAN RADM N.E. McDonald RAN (Rtd) CMDR G.H.C. McNally RAN CAPT J.S. Merrillees RAN Mr A.G. Mitchell CAPT J.O. Morrice RAN CAPT P.M. Mulcare RAN CMDR G.F. McLennan RAN Mr J.E. McMahon CAPT R.J. Nattey RAN Navy League of Australia CMDR P. A. Newcomb RAN CORE I.H. Nicholson RAN (Rtd) CAPT J.A. Noble Great Circle Services

Seapower'84 — Page 137 CMDR I.A. Noble RAN Dr T.J. O'Rourke Mr A. Olivier Kongsberg CMDR D. Oner RAN CORE V.A. Parker RAN (Rtd) CMDR R.J.R. Pennock RAN CAPT J.K. Perrett RAN Mr R.D. Poulton Mr E.A. Power Mr D.I. Price Director, Hawker Pacific LEUT M.L. Proctor RAN CMDR G.L. Purcell RAN CMDR K.P. Railton RANEM CMDR J. Raleigh RAN Mr G. Raymond CAPT B.J. Read RAN Mr S. Reid Siemens Mr I.F. Reynolds RADM I.H. Richards RAN RADM A.J. Robertson RANEM Navy League CORE J.A. Robertson RAN (Rtd) LCDR L.I. Roberts RAN RADM W.J. Rourke RAN Mr P. Scott-Maxwell Mr D.J. Sen CMDR P.J. Shevlin RAN (Rtd) RFA Minehunter Project CMDR C.J. Skinner RAN ADML Sir Victor Smith RAN (Rtd) LCDR J. Spooner RANR RADM J.D. Stevens RAN (Rtd) VADM Sir David Stevenson RAN (Rtd) CMDR M.J. Stock RAN CAPT N.J. Stoker RAN Mr A.M.F. Summers RADM R.C. Swan RAN (Rtd) Mr M. Tannahill GEC Diesels CMDR M.B. Taylor RAN LCDR K.V. Taylor RANR CAPT D.H. Thomson RAN RADM B.T. Treloar RAN Dr G.E. Tulloch Plessey Australia CMDR N.D. Uhlmann WRANS CMDR P.J.S. Usher RANEM Thomson-CSF LCDR I.W. Weekley RAN CAPT G.D. White RAN Mr G.M. Wilkie Motorola Electronics Mr S.C. Williams LCDR R.J. Willis RAN CMDR S.S. Wilson RAN CMDR S.J. Youll RAN Non-Members Mr A. Asquith Mr P.N. Atcherley GPCAPT J.S. Back RAAF Dr D. Ball Head, Strat & Def Studies, ANU Mr M.E. Boadle Commonwealth Steel Co Mr R.H. Bullows Ordnance Factory, Bendigo Mr E. Burtmanis ONA MAJGEN T.F. Cape ARA (Rtd)

Page 138 — Seapower '84 Mr K. Carey Plessey Pacific Defence Systems MAJGEN M.E. Carleton-Smith Head British Defence Liaison Staff Dr G. Cheeseman Secretariat JPC Foreign Affairs & Defence Mr R. Cottrell Dept of Defence Mr C.J. Dale Mr H.G. Dalrymple Mr G. Dangleterre Thomson-CSF CMDR L.J. Dennis RANEM Vickers Cockatoo Dockyard Mr R. Dew Dept of Transport Mr T.C. Dodds NQEA CAPT K.A. Doolan RAN Mr J.A. Duff Godfrey Howden P/L Mr R. Eastwood Dept of Defence Support A/CMDR J.W. Farquar RAN WGCDR P.R. Fisher RAAF Mr K. Forsey Dept of Transport SBLT J.A. Fowler RAN Mr D. Gleeson GPCAPT P.M. Grigg RAAF Mr K.F. Grove Strachan & Henshaw Shi Hanlin Chinese Embassy Mr N. Hardie Krupp (Australia) Pty Ltd CAPT J. Hawley USN Mr B. Hawley Plessey Marine Ltd Mr M. Hill South Aust Dept of State Devpt CORE A.R. Horton RAN Mr S. Houston Strachan & Henshaw Mr B. Howe CSA Dr R.J. Hughes Mr D.P. Hurst RAAF Mr A. Johnson CSA COL H.R.S. Kalkat High Commission of India Mr R.J. Kinsella Mr C.S. Landau Mr L.A. Lavers Mr B. Lovelock CSA Mr K.C. Mannie Ordnance Factory, Bendigo Mr J. Marshall Mr J.F. Mathys LCDR A.T. May RAN CAPT D.J. McDonald Liberian Nautical Inspector Mr A.M.D. Milne Holme Ferranti Computer Systems Mr G. Monaghan CSA Mr J. Mortimer Mr G.G. Mott British Shipbuilders (Aust) Mr T. McGee Mr J. McGregor Dr A.S. Mclntosh Mr C. Newman Mr F.E. Noah British Shipbuilders (Aust) Mr M.J. O'Connor Australian Defence Association GPCAPT B.D. O'Loghlin RAAF LCDR P.J. Dates RAN Mr H.J. Ohff Eglo Engineering Mr A. Page CSA Mr P. Park Hawker Pacific Dr N. Paterson Dept Resources & Energy Mr D.F. Pearce Godfrey Howden P L LEUT S.B.S. Pringle RAN Mr E. Rawson Plessey Marine Ltd

Seapower '84 — Page 139 Mr G.F. Richardson Rockwell International BGDIER C.B.E. Salmon Jr (RL) COL H. Schubart CMDR D.J. Shackleton RAN Mr F. Shadbolt Mr A.J. Shearer COL T.D.V. Situmeang Indonesian Embassy Mr K. Snell SMA Pty Ltd Dr J. Stals Mr D.E. Stout FMC SE Asia, Singapore Mr N.D. Tanswell LCDR C.J. Templeton RAN Mr A.R.T. Turnbull Plessey Australia AIRCDRE M. Turnbull RAAF CAPT B.W. Turner RN Ms L. Valk Dept of Defence Support CORE N.M. Walker RNZN CMDR N. Webster RAN Mr M.J. Welch Mr J.D. White Eglo Engineering Mr R.D.A. Wilson Axel Johnson Mr Woolard Vickers

LIST OF OFFICIALS Seminar Director Commodore M.A. McK. Clarke AM RAN (Rtd) Treasurer (Formerly Commander D.J. Campbell RAN)

Assistant Seminar Directors Commander G. Cutts RAN Lieutenant Commander B.H. Clarke RAN

Registrars Lieutenant Commander E.J. Coles RANNS Commander M.B. Taylor RAN

Speakers' Programmes Lieutenant Commander I.R. Gulliver RAN

VIP Liaison Captain P.G.V. Dechaineux AM RAN

Transport Coordinator Lieutenant Commander R.J. Willis RAN

Caterer Commander G. Earley RAN

Hall Managers Commander M.H. Hall RAN Lieutenant Commander R.M. Jemesen RAN

Insignia Sales Lieutenant S.P. Coulson WRANS Commander P.K. Coulson RAN

Diplomatic Liaison Captain A.L. Eccleston RAN

Press Liaison Commodore J.S. Dickson MBE RAN

Proceedings Advertising Commander LA. Noble RAN

Proceedings Editor Commander G. Cutts RAN Assistant Editor Commander H.L. Daw RAN

Page 140 — Seapower '84 THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

PATRON

His Excellency the Right Honourable Sir Ninian Stephen AK, GCMG, GCVO, KBE, KSt.J Governor-General of Australia

COUNCIL

OFFICE BEARERS COUNCILLORS President Captain A.H.R. Brecht Commodore I.E. James AM Lieutenant Commander B.D.H. Clarke Senior Vice President Lieutenant Commander E.J. Coles RANNS Commodore J.S. Dickson MBE Lieutenant S.D. Coulson WRANS Junior Vice President Commodore A.R. Cummins AM Captain P.G.V. Dechaineux AM Sub-Lieutenant P.M. Davis WRANS Secretary Lieutenant Commander I.R. Gulliver Lieutenant M.D. Fitzpatrick Lieutenant Commander R.M. Jemesen Treasurer Commander M.B. Taylor Commander P.K. Coulson Lieutenant Commander R.J. Willis Journal Editor Commander G. Cutts

PAST PRESIDENTS 1957-77 Commodore V.A. Parker 1977-78 Commodore J.A. Robertson 1978-83 Rear Admiral R.C. Swan AO CBE

HONORARY LIFE MEMBERS Admiral Sir Victor Smith AC KBE CB DSC Vice Admiral Sir David Stevenson AC KBE Commodore V.A. Parker Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot KBE AO Commodore J.A. Robertson Rt Hon Sir Zelman Cowen AK, GCMG, GCVO, KStJ, QC Rear Admiral R.C. Swan AO CBE

Public Officer: Commander D.R. Patterson RANEM • 05.11.82 1 10 : 15 : 17 OWN C 043 DEG S 6 KN TEST D 00 FAULTS P 160 E 10.1 35 S 16.5

CONTACT 12 B 005 DEG R 13.9 KYD C 140 DEG (\ S 16 KN FRIEND SUBM LARGE OBERON ORION

6 THREAT 2 ^ COMBAT 3 CLASS 8 TORPEDO 4 MARKS 9 ADDFCT 5 TACNAV

B 079 DEG 1 16.2 KYD

-Ships