Charlotte Luks
Reconciling Competing Nationalisms Immigration and the Politics of Belonging in Belgium
Charlotte Luks
1 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
Table of Contents
I. Maps and Figures
p. 3
II. Introduction
p. 6
III. Chapter 1
Parallel Histories: Migrants and Natives
p. 14
IV. Chapter 2
Histories Intersect: The Multicultural Decades
p. 45
V. Chapter 3
How did Multiculturalism Fail?
p. 62
VI. Chapter 4
The Assimilation Imperative
p. 79
VII. Conclusion
p. 100
VIII. Bibliography
p. 108
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Maps and Figures
Fig 1.1 The language line runs latitudinally through Belgium with Flanders to the north, Wallonia to the south, the German speaking region to the south-east, and the bi-lingual, though primarily Francophone, Brussels just north of the language line in Flanders1
Fig 1.2 This 1617 map depicts the federation of Belgian provinces represented by the symbol of the lion. The provinces were under Spanish rule at the time, as they would be until 17133
Fig 1.3 This statue of Belgian hero Ambiorix was erected in Tongeren shortly after Belgian independence in 1830 amidst an atmosphere of immense nationalistic fervor2
1 A House Divided, http://news.bbcimg.co.uk/media/images/48069000/ gif/_48069269_belgium_flemish226x170.gif 3 Pieter van den Keere, “Leo Belgicus”, (1617) 2 Statue of Ambiorix, http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/th http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/th umb/f/f9/1617_Leo_Belgicus_Kaerius.jpg/725px- umb/c/cf/Ambiorix.jpg/450px-Ambiorix.jpg 1617_Leo_Belgicus_Kaerius.jpg
3 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
Fig 1.4 In 1956 a coal-mine fire killed 262 miners at Marcinelle, who were laid to rest in this tomb. A fire broke out underground, rescue workers did not reach the deepest levels of the mine until two weeks later. Upon resurfacing, rescue workers said simply, “tutti cadaveri,” (all corpses). This tragedy soured relations between Italy and Belgium and shortly after, the 4 guest worker agreement ended.
Fig 3.1 In 1968, Flemish students at the Katholieke Univeristeit Leuven engaged in extended protests against the Walloon presence at the university. The resulting division of the university led to the restructuring of the government, the resulting instability of which would eventually lead to the
collapse of the federal government in 20106 Fig 3.2 Following a hate crime in 2006, residents of Antwerp put up street signs reading Zonder Haat Straat (Street without hate). In response, Vlaams Belang put up signs reading Zonder Jihad Straat (Street without Jihad)5
4 Massimo Valicchia, “The Tombs of Dead Men at Marcinelle,” (2012), Photograph, http://static0.demotix.com/sites/default/files/image cache/a_scale_large/1500-4/photos/1351800084- marcinelle-tragedy-50-years-ago- remembered_1565904.jpg 5 Zonder Haat Straat, 6 Walen Go Home, http://1.standaardcdn.be/Assets/Images_Upload/20 http://arthurbarbe.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/wa 07/05/30/lob300507-3.jpg len-go-home.jpg
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Fig 4.1 Extreme right party Vlaams Belang is currently the most popular party in Flanders. Here Vlaams Belang activists can be seen bearing signs which read, “Islam can harm your freedom…stop immigration.”7
Fig 4.2 Bloed, Bodem, Eer en Trouw is a neo-Nazi, terrorist organization in Belgium responsible for countless hate crimes as well as elaborate terrorist plots. Here members are pictured giving the Nazi salute9
Fig 4.3 Sharia4Belgium leader Fouad Belkacem walks past a protester whose sign reads “respect for the host country”8
7 Vlaams Belang Protesters, http://s1.gva.be/ahimgpath/assets_img_gvl/2009/0 9/28/712623/vlaams-belang-groter-dan-sp-a-n-va- springt-over-open-vld-id812135-1000x800-n.jpg 8 Respect het Gastland, http://s1.gva.be/ahimgpath/assets_img_gva/2012/0 9 Bloed, Bodem, Eer en Trouw, 3/30/2202821/uitspraak-sharia4belgium-op-4-mei- http://static1.hln.be/static/photo/2009/17/13/4/me id2774109-1000x800-n.jpg dia_xl_558769.jpg
5 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
Introduction
Historically speaking, different states have always had nationality laws and perceptions
of belonging, both codified and unofficial. Across Europe these modes of nationalism and
belonging have taken different forms. Europe has never advertised itself as an immigrant
nation, nor is it a Melting Pot; belonging in Europe has strict definitions which leave no room for the democratization of culture. France, for example has, since roughly the French revolution, followed a form of republican nationalism. In the French model, a person may belong to the greater polity and be considered a citizen of France if he or she follows a set of values, namely, public participation in the republican, secular state and abiding by the idea that in order for all members of the state to be equal, they must also be the same and follow the same ideals.10 In this way, the politics of belonging in France revolve around the soil (jus soli); a physical presence in the state as well as a more abstract participation in the state. In contrast, the German model of belonging has historically been one attached to blood (jus sanguine), a model which is based not upon where a person is born or their physical place in the state but rather their historical and ethnic claims to national belonging. The German ethnic model has historically presented itself in ways completely distinct from official state borders. For example, people of German heritage who resided outside of state borders had claims to German citizenship while people of foreign descent, for example German-born descendents of Turkish
10 Gerard Noiriel, The French melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship and National Identity, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988)
6 Charlotte Luks
guest workers, could not access legal rights of German citizenship.11 Crucial to these modes of
nationalism in each respective state is the concept of a unified state and people to which one
can claim belonging. This perception of a historically unified state must not always be accurate;
neither France nor Germany have long-standing traditions of unification, however, the idea that
there is a singular France, Germany, etc., is crucial to determining who does and does not
belong.
These nationality laws have been complicated in recent decades with the implementation
of the European Union. European member-states no longer have ultimate autonomy in areas of
naturalization and citizenship. As borders become deregulated and the laws and economies of
respective states become tied to each other and unified to some extent under a singular
unifying body, politics of identity become more complex. In the case of citizenship law,
autonomy remains in the hands of the states, as citizenship in an EU state results in EU
citizenship but state citizenship is determined on a state-by-state basis.12 However, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights grants every person the right to citizenship in some
state, which has resulted in a change to policies of nationality in Europe. Currently, every EU
member-state allows citizenship through birth in the country (though some have restrictions
such as a minimum time of residency for the parents, or birth rights given only to refugees,
those who are stateless or adopted).13 Many countries additionally have jus sanguine a patre et
a matre laws (again, some with restrictions, such as a time limit on registration for children
11 Maarten Vink and Gerard-Rene de Groot, “Birthright Citizenship: Trends and Regulations in Europe” EUDO Citizenship Observatory 8(2010) 12 Ibid, 25 13 Ibid, 34
7 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms born abroad or restrictions on out of wedlock births).14 In the last decades, nationality laws have become more homogenized across the European Union; no longer dependent on single modes of nationalism but allowing for multiple standards for legal belonging in the state.
Legal citizenship is only one component of belonging in a certain state. A person who finds themselves with EU citizenship may not be seen as belonging to the European identity by others in Europe. These politics of belonging are dictated not by passports or visas but rather by perceptions of who is European, politics dictated not by the state but by the populous. While politicians and political theorists alike have long grappled with immigration laws and policies, history often overlooks the place of the immigrant in history.15 History and historiography hold important roles in the realm of belonging, as participation in the European historical narrative is often a prerequisite to participation in the contemporary moment. The crucial role of the migrant is often overlooked in examinations of Europe; in the last century alone, immigrant populations have not only bolstered but maintained the strong European economy. Regardless of their support of Europe, many immigrant populations in Europe, particularly those with visible differences in skin color, religion or language, have been marginalized and refused full rights of equality in both the social and political spheres across the continent. In contemporary
Europe, immigrants and their descendants are expected to fully assimilate to the model
European, as envisioned by respective states. The ultimate goal of the assimilation imperative designed by European states is that immigrants adopt the language, culture, and values of the countries in which they reside while abandoning those of their home countries.
14 Ibid, 34 15 Noiriel, The French Melting Pot, 21
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The assimilation imperative has spread across Western Europe as a largely homogenous policy designed to enhance a greater European culture and unity. In most cases, these policies are introduced into countries which, while distinct in many ways, share many crucial features which allow the assimilation imperative some degree of legitimacy within the state. This is not, however the case in Belgium. Belgium, a small state north of France and south of the
Netherlands, is often overlooked due to its small size and relative lack of influence. Belgium is, however, more unique in Western Europe than many would assume. While other states in
Europe have largely homogenous populations or, having distinct cultures within state lines, are fairly integrated, Belgium presents an entirely different landscape. The country is divided along a language-line running through the country. On either side of this line exist two distinct cultures, each with their own language and history. Belonging in each of these cultures is determined by factors of language, culture, ethnicity and, perhaps most importantly, historical participation in the continued struggle against the other culture. The Belgian state has, for centuries, struggled to include both cultures, the Flemish and the Walloon, equally in the state.
If we broaden our scope to the whole of Europe, we see a continent in a state of flux, struggling to reconcile the place of immigrants and natives into a united Europe. In Belgium, however, this project is more complicated. Belgium has consistently been in a state of flux and is attempting to reconcile the competing desires and cultures not only of immigrants and natives, but of disparate cultures within the native population.
While many theorists grapple with the issues facing immigrants and marginalized populations in contemporary Europe, their ideas, while applicable to marginalized populations in Belgium, are not complex enough to engage the intricacies of the Belgian state. In many
9 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
ways, the works of many authors do apply to some aspects of Belgium, in that they deal broadly
with Europe as a whole. Writing about France, Gerard Noiriel engages with the idea that
immigrants have been left out of the discussion of historical belonging and are thereby denied
complete access to the national identity.16 In a similar vein, Fatima El-Tayeb finds that people of
color in Europe, and particularly Germany, have been left out of the European identity. Among
her findings, El-Tayeb argues that since the borders within Europe have been deregulated,
passports are no longer the prime indicator of who belongs, replaced by physical appearance
where European almost exclusively translates to “white.”17 John Crowley finds that foreign populations within Europe, when denied true potential for assimilation and mainstream political participation, form their own ethnic enclaves, distinct from a broader European culture.18 These and other findings can all be seen in Belgium and have an important role to
play in the lives of immigrants and their descendants. However, such broad principles, designed
to characterize Europe en masse fail to connect with the unique concerns facing migrants to
Belgium.
The purpose of this paper is to attempt to fill in some of the gaps left by European
immigration theory when it is applied to Belgium. Belgium is an entirely unique case study and
while it has enacted many of the policies which can be seen across Europe, the environment
into which these policies have been introduced is distinct from the rest of Europe. As this paper
will discuss, migrants into Belgium occupy a precarious space on the fringe of society while
simultaneously being necessary to the economic and social structures of the state. In recent
16 Noiriel, The French Melting Pot, 12 17 Fatime El-Tayeb, European Others: Queering Ethnicity in Postnational Europe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011) 18 John Crowley, “The Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities” International Political Science Review 22(2001)
10 Charlotte Luks
years, immigration has come to the forefront as a political issue because, according to public
rhetoric, immigrants are seen to threaten Belgian culture. However, within Belgium, there is an
understanding of the word “Belgian” as a hollow vessel, to be contextually filled on an
individual basis. One is Belgian by virtue of being Flemish or Walloon, thereby making up a part
of greater Belgium. To be simply “Belgian” means nothing, you are Flemish or Walloon. That is,
until you are faced with outsiders. Public outcry decrees that immigrants are undesirable
because they threaten Belgian culture, that they stand inherently opposite of what is means to
be Belgian, but what does it mean to be Belgian?
Roadmap
In the following paper I hope to fill in some of the gaps left in European immigration
theory when it is applied to Belgium. In order to do so, I have divided my argument into four
chapters. In order to address the context which is necessary for the understanding of the
current political climate in Belgium, the first chapter concerns itself with the parallel histories
within the Belgian state: those of native Belgians and those of immigrants to Belgium. While the
bulk of this work is concerned with the conflicts which occur when the stories and desires of
these two populations intersect, it is important to understand the two as somewhat isolated, as
this is the position in which historiography has placed these two populations.
Following the exploration of these isolated histories, I will examine the decades which encompass the first substantial interactions between the two populations on every level of the state; from the political to the social. This time, known as the multicultural decades (roughly
1960-1980), was an era of great strides towards the democratization of culture in Europe. This
11 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
was somewhat the case in Belgium, though the internal conflict between the Flemish and
Walloons greatly overshadowed political concessions to foreign populations. Regardless, as will
be discussed in the second chapter, these decades were a time of relative success in terms of
intersections between foreign and native bodies within the Belgian state.
The third chapter will attempt to grapple with the reasons for the sudden end of the
multicultural decades and the failure of the policies enacted at this time. Not only did these
policies fail, they directly contributed to the creation of an assimilation state, the principles of
which stand inherently opposite to those of multiculturalism. This correlation is important to
understand because today’s assimilation politics did not arise in a vacuum but were instead the
result of dissatisfaction with the policies of the previous decades.
The fourth and final chapter will bring us into the present day; the assimilation era. This chapter will begin by explaining the republican values on which the assimilation imperative is based, before addressing the concerns which are inherent to the project of coercive assimilation. Finally, I will examine the evidence of the failure of assimilation politics within the
Belgian state.
Belgium may be a small, relatively insignificant state within a greater European Union, but the concerns facing migrants there reflect greater concerns across the continent. With its conflicting cultures and social instability, Belgium could be viewed as a microcosm of Europe, one which in fact holds the capital of the European Union within its borders. If we can understand the issues that are present in Belgium, we can begin to understand how to move
12 Charlotte Luks forward and, hopefully, move towards an inclusive continent which celebrates the democratization of culture.
Before this paper proceeds, it should be noted that the primary goal of this paper is to elucidate the political and social schema of Belgium and the ways in which migrant and native concerns and desires do and do not interact in the Belgian state. There is a notable lack of migrant voice in this work, both for reasons of scope and because immigrants themselves are by and large left out of the discussion of their rights and responsibilities, having policies cast upon them rather than being included in their inception.
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Chapter 1
Parallel Histories: Migrants and Natives
“Horum omnium fortissimi sunt Belgae.”19
-Julius Caesar in Commentarii De Bello Gallico
Political theorist Fatima El-Tayeb writes in her book European Others:
National identity revolves around the production and institutionalization of a common past. Whether minorities find a place in the larger community thus also depends on their relation to its narrative of national origin. In Europe, migrants and their descendants are routinely denied access to this common history. At the same time, they live in the national past as much as the native population, while frequently simultaneously functioning as the Other…Historiography ascribed to “the migrant” (including succeeding generations to the nth degree) a flat, one dimensional existence in which she or he has always just arrived, thus existing only in the present20
El-Tayeb describes the parallel conceptions of history which can be seen in Belgium today.
Migrant history has been intertwined with Belgian history for well over a century, yet migrants
are imagined to lie outside of the native narrative of the Belgian experience. Despite the interconnected nature of Belgian and migrant histories, the two groups do indeed have distinct histories as well. For native Belgians, struggles of oppression and internal struggle existed long
before migrant waves began to come into the country. For migrants, the Belgian desire to keep
migrant populations isolated from native Belgians resulted in the creation of distinct histories
and struggles. The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the issues which arise from the
19 “Of all the Gauls, the Belgians are the Strongest”
C. Julius Caesar. C. Iuli Commentarii Rerum in Gallia Gestarum VII A. Hirti Commentarius VII. T. Rice Holmes. Oxonii. e Typographeo Clarendoniano. 1914. Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis. 20 Fatima El-Tayeb, European Others: Queering Ethnicity in Postnational Europe. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011)
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intersections of migrant and native populations in Belgium. However, before we can hope to
understand these intersecting histories, we must immerse ourselves in the context of their
parallel histories. This chapter will introduce the context of Belgian history from two distinct
perspectives in preparation for the intersections to be discussed in later chapters.
Belgium: A Position of Dependency
The area now known as Belgium has, for centuries, been passed around the powers of
Europe, consistently under the control of outside influences until its independence in 1830 and
even for periods after. Even its independence was allowed only in so much as it benefitted
Britain at the time. The specifics of control are not wholly relevant to this discussion, but it
should be understood that since Caesar first invaded the tribes of Belgae, Belgium has belonged
to someone other than Belgians. The region that has become the Belgian state has always been
politically connected but culturally, it has never been one cohesive nation. The Belgian state is home to two ethnic and linguistic nations that have consistently been pushed together by
European powers. Belgium before the modern era can be understood as a collection of groups forced together under outside rule, struggling to develop and maintain their cultures. The modern era presents a consistent struggle between the two developed nations to function together and apart within the borders drawn for them by the rest of Europe.
A History of Linguistic Tensions
There exists a conception of Europe as somehow concrete in its borders. As the dictators of most borders worldwide, it tends to be imagined that the European borders themselves are stable and progressively determined. While European borders were in flux
15 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
throughout most of the 20th century, between World and Cold wars, it is perceived that they are now largely settled; placed where they were historically and culturally always meant to be.
This worldview, however, overlooks or disregards the struggles of many nations within states throughout Europe. Across the content, there exist myriad native and foreign nationalisms who have been disregarded in the project of state building; cultures which stand apart and often in opposition to the accepted culture purported by the state. One glaring example of this is the
Belgian state.
The situation within Belgium has euphemistically been termed the “community problem:” the problem of uniting two disparate “communities” under one flag and, ideally, one nationalism. These two communities, the Flemish in the north of Belgium and the Walloons in the South, have historically been forcibly united under a variety of conquerors and royal houses from the Franks to the Hapsburgs. Yet this supposed “unity” has been consistently tense, even openly violent at times. Belgium, known for its aptitude for compromise has also been consistently hopeful for a resolution to this “community problem.” Historians, theorists and political commentators throughout history writing about the respective problems of their contemporary spheres parallel each other’s works in on crucial aspect. Almost every piece written about the “community problem” finishes with a nearly identical conclusion: “My conclusion is that, although the Belgian community problem has not been satisfactorily resolved yet, one can be guardedly optimistic that it will be in the…”21 In the 1920s, in the
1930s, the 1950s, the 1980s… and on and on. Each new political maneuver, be it a shift from
federal to regional rule, the advent of bilingual administration, or making higher education
21 R.E.M. Irving, Flemings and Walloons of Belgium (New York: Minority Rights Group, 1980), 3
16 Charlotte Luks
accessible regardless of language, is created as the new great hope to fix decades of internal
tensions. Yet almost two centuries after Belgian independence, the problem persists, but so too
do the state borders.
Belgium can be divided into two sections: the Flemish and the Walloon. While there are
some modern day complications, namely the largely Francophone Brussels area in the Flemish
region and the small German population in the East, the primary struggle can be divided
between the Flemish and Walloons. These two populations are divided along what is known as the “language line,” with the Flemish to the north and Walloons in the south (fig 1.1). The language line can be traced back to the time of Roman conquest and has barely moved since.
Between 58 and 50 BCE, Caesar’s forces conquered Gaul, Belgium included.22 This invasion
resulted in a heavy Roman influence in the Belgian region. Around 350 CE, the Franks began to
invade from the north.23 The Frankish invasion stopped abruptly at what would become the
language line. To date, historians and archeologists have found no reason for this abrupt end to
the invasion. The language line is not set along any sort of natural boundaries: there are no
rivers or mountains, simply an expansive plain. What’s more, there is no evidence of heavy
Roman battalions or defenses along the line. For all intents and purposes, the Franks simply got
tired of invading and stopped along a line which would remain a distinct language line into the
modern era.24 This invasion established the language line by serving as the catalyst for the two
languages which would develop on either side of it. The still Roman region in the south would
remain under the control of the Holy Roman Empire for a time, acquiring the French language
22 Shepard Clough, A History of the Flemish Movement in Belgium (New York: Octagon Books, 1930), 22 23 Ibid, 23 24 Ibid, 26
17 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
of its neighbors to the south but remaining culturally and politically separated by the more
laissez-faire style of government which would be applied there. The Frankish northern half
would become Germanic and developed the Flemish language, barely distinct from the Dutch
spoken further north. This area too would be governed largely by locals within major cities who
answered to authorities in the overarching government, in typical feudal form.25 Here we see
the creation of the two culturally and linguistically disparate nationalities, the Flemish and the
Walloons. Even today, the two cultures remain divided along each side of the language line
with only rare, sporadic cases of intermingling.
Throughout history, internal struggles formed the political structure of lowland Europe
(what is now Belgium and the Netherlands). The area transitioned from feudal rule, to city
states before slowly becoming more amalgamated states.26 Historically, the lowland area was
culturally divided into provincial identities, but the territory en masse passed from one royal
house to another through inheritance and marriage.27 What is now Belgium became officially
divided from the Netherlands in 1581 when the northern United Provinces separated from
Spanish rule, leaving the area to the south as the Spanish Netherlands.28 This divide created the
region now known as Belgium, officially distinct from the Netherlands to the north and France
to the south (fig 1.2).
In 1794, revolutionary France annexed Belgium, imposing undesired secularism, introducing divorce and imposing republican values on the heavily religious Belgian
25 Ibid, 30 26 Ibid, 7 27 Jan Roegiers, “Belgian Liberties and Loyalty to the House of Austria,” in Nationalism in Belgium: Shifting Identities, 1780-1995 ed. Kas Deprez and Louis Vos (New York: Palgrave, 1998)26 28 Ibid, 31
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population.29 More importantly, the French invaders dealt with Belgium as if French was the
only language spoken there. At first, the National Convention decreed that any and all official
testimony, wills, or contracts must be in French upon punishment of 6 months in prison. This
decree proved impractical and shortly after its removal, the question of language was
addressed in French patriot Abbé Grégoire’s widely distributed report. Grégoire was of the
belief that in order to unify France and its newly conquered territory, there must be linguistic
consistency and that all dialects, including German and Flemish, must be eradicated, a theme
which would remain consistent well into the twentieth century. Subsequently, Grégoire
recommended that French be propagated by the press, the theater and the army and that men
should be forbidden to marry unless they could read, write and speak French. France never
went to quite the extreme recommended by Grégoire, but French officials were placed
throughout the country. Even in Flanders French became the national language, translations of
French laws and decrees were allowed only in regions where absolutely no one could
understand French.30 The preferential treatment given to Francophone Walloons further soured Flemish-Walloon relations, setting the tone for the forthcoming political developments.
Following the fall of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815, lowland Europe was granted its
independence as the United Netherlands by the Congress of Vienna.31 For the first time since
Dutch secession in 1581, the lowland provinces were united. This unification would create a
linguistic hierarchy which would find the Francophone Walloons at the bottom of the ladder
and the Flemish still not at the top. The northern lowland regions which had been independent
29 Lode Wis, “The Two Belgian Revolutions,” in Nationalism in Belgium: Shifting Identities, 1780-1995 ed. Kas Deprez and Louis Vos (New York: Palgrave, 1998) 33 30 Clough, “A History,” 42 31 Wils, “The Two Belgian Revolutions,” 40
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for centuries were Dutch speaking and therefore favored the Germanic Flemish over the
Walloons. While this reversed the previous hierarchy, placing Walloons in the position formerly
occupied by the Flemish, the Flemish were not placed in the upper tier. Rather, the Flemish
dialect distinguished the Flemish from the Dutch and put them in a subordinate position to the
Dutch who had been autonomous for centuries.32 The tensions caused by the new hierarchy led to a coup for independence in Brussels in 1830. This would be the true start of the Belgian state.
Building a State, Fabricating a Nation: The Precarious Belgian Narrative
The lowland of Europe now known as Belgium has a long and rich history. In contrast, the Belgian state has a fairly short history, beginning only in 1830. The Belgian state did not arise organically; as far as state-building is concerned, one would be hard-pressed to find more artificial beginnings, particularly in Western Europe. Originating from a coup in Brussels to throw off the yoke of Dutch rule, the state’s existence was permitted only in so much as it benefited the powers of Europe at the time.33 Created by the European powers, namely the
British, the borders of Belgium were drawn as a sort of buffer between France and the rest of
Europe in the wake of the Napoleonic wars. The country was allowed to exist only if it agreed to
be structured as the British mandated, specifically on the condition that Belgium became a
constitutional monarchy. And so, Queen Victoria’s uncle, Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, was
conscripted as king and the project Belgium began.34 Having built the state, it became the task of the state to create the nation. And here we stand, 200 years later with an artificial narrative
32 Clough, “A History,” 37 33 Irving, “Flemings and Walloons,” 3 34 Ibid, 3
20 Charlotte Luks
of nationhood so strong that it has become the motivation for keeping others out, for
solidifying the concept of “Belgian” as some historically and culturally confirmed concept, rather than an artificial construction with political motivations which originated externally.
Every state has a mythology, a national narrative that glorifies the history and culture of the territory while glossing over the less favorable aspects of the state. This myth is a crucial aspect of nationalism. I will by no means claim that Belgium is unique in this aspect. However, it is important to consider how the Belgian myth serves the interest of the state and the country at large. The national heroes of Belgium and the historic moments which define the national spirit have not always existed in these roles; rather, upon the creation of Belgium in 1830, the state began the search for a unified Belgian narrative. This myth served to create a historical account of the Belgian people as a united nation, historically oppressed by various overlords but always united as a people.
When the Belgian state began the project of creating the Belgian nation, it started by searching for a national hero. The most significant result of this search was Ambiorix, the leader of a Gallic tribe in the Belgae region who fought valiantly against Caesar and the invading
Roman troops.35 The accurate history of Ambiorix is not quite the heroic narrative he is currently associated with. In reality, Ambiorix was the leader of one of the tribes of Belgae,
tribes who were constantly at war with each other. He tricked Caesar’s troops into moving their
position under the impression that he would not attack them, at which point he proceeded to
slaughter them. In retaliation, Caesar sent thousands of troops to invade and conquer all of
35 J. Nolet De Brauwere Van Steeland, “Ambiorix: Dichtstuk” (Leuven: Van Linthout en Van Den Zande, 1841)
21 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
Belgae and Ambiorix, evading capture, was never heard from again.36 The truth about Ambiorix was, however, irrelevant to the Belgian state which proceeded to use him as a symbol of
Belgian unity against outside oppressors long before the Belgian state or the linguistic struggle existed. Having found their hero, the state proceeded to erect a statue of Ambiorix in Tongeren, the oldest city in Belgium, despite their having no evidence that he had ever been there (fig
1.3).37 Following this, in 1866, Belgian poet Joannes Carolus Hubertus Nolet de Brauwere van
Steeland wrote an epic poem cataloguing the heroic adventures of Ambiorix.38 The state
encouraged Belgians to rally around this and other national heroes, to promote a sense of
Belgian unity and shared history, a necessary step to preserving the state and the newly created
nation.
While Ambiorix serves as a significant example of Belgian nation building, he was one
among many. In the decades after its creation, the Belgian state created a veritable pantheon
of Belgian heroes. Royal Decree 7 of 1835 stated that the government, “wished to honor the
memory of the Belgians who had contributed to the fame of their fatherland.”39 The types of
Belgians who were considered desirable for such honors can be divided into three categories:
those who had struggled for liberty against various conquerors, such as Jan Breydel and Pieter
de Coninck, who led the Battle of the Golden Spurs against the French in 1302; great rulers
who had ensured Belgian contribution to greater European history, including Emperor Charles
V; and artists and scholars who stood as evidence of Belgian genius, namely Pieter Paul Rubens,
36 William Smith, “Ambiorix,” in Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1867) 138-139 37 Anonymous, “Betooging ten Gunste van de Heyligen Vader,” Den Denderbode, December 2, 1860, 2 38 J. Nolet De Brauwere Van Steeland, “Ambiorix,” 39 Jo Tollebeek and Tom Verschaffel, “Group Portraits with National Heroes: The Pantheon as an Historical Genre in Nineteenth-century Belgium,” National Identities 6(2004), 93
22 Charlotte Luks
easily the most famous of the Belgian painters.40 The Belgian pantheon came in many mediums
as well, statues were erected throughout the country, and paintings were commissioned as well
as patriotic texts. Museums of Belgian history were opened, any empty space in town halls was
filled with busts of famous Belgians.41 By honoring its national heroes, the state appropriated
the heroic traits of those it chose to admire, and in so doing encouraged a national
consciousness and self-confidence.
The proverbial pantheon of heroes which essentially built and maintained the Belgian
narrative would fall apart somewhat in the twentieth century with the growth of separatist
sentiment, but for the decades following Belgian independence it served its purpose. By
propagating a national image of martyrdom in the name of liberty and the genius of the Belgian
people, the state created a shared Belgian history. Rather than depicting the creation of the
Belgian state realistically as the result of strategic maneuvers on the part of Britain, it was cast
as the ultimate victory over 18 centuries worth of conquerors against whom Belgians, not just
the Flemish or Walloons, had struggled for independence and liberty.
Nationalist Fervor Wanes as Separatism Grows
The decades following Belgian independence marked a period of nationalistic fervor;
first the creation of a national narrative followed by enthusiastic celebration of such. While this
narrative and the accompanying nationalism effectively masked internal tensions for some
time, the story of a unified Belgium was short lived as growing domestic concerns reached a
40 Lut Pil, “Painting at the Service of the New Nation State,” in Nationalism in Belgium: Shifting Identities 1780-1995 ed. Kas Deprez and Louis Vos (New York: Palgrave, 1998)43 41 Tollebeek and Verschaeffel, “Group Portraits,” 95
23 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
breaking point. In the contemporary sphere, the Belgian narrative is still important inasmuch as
it justifies the continued unity of the Belgian state. However, the rise of the Flemish movement
and the subsequent federalization of the government have made the glorified mythology of
long-standing Belgian culture somewhat irrelevant in the current political climate.
The original aim of the state was to create a singular Belgian culture and nationalism. In
the decades immediately following independence, this model heavily favored the Walloons.
The Belgian revolutionaries, who were essentially the founders of Belgium, felt that the country
should carry on its business exclusively in French. This was not simply out of a practical desire
to have a single language to accompany the single, unified Belgian narrative, but came from a
place of ethnic tension. Belgian co-founder Charles Rogier took a somewhat practical tone in a
comment to the minister of justice,
Les premiers principes d'une bonne administration sont basés sur l'emploi exclusif d'une langue, et il est évident que la seule langue des Belges doit être le français. Pour arriver à ce résultat, il est nécessaire que toutes les fonctions civiles et militaires soient confiées à des Wallons et à des Luxembourgeois; de cette manière, les Flamands, privés temporairement des avantages attachés à ces emplois, seront contraints d'apprendre le français, et l'on détruira ainsi peu à peu l'élément germanique en Belgique.42
While this attitude perpetuated the centuries of oppression which the Flemish had faced, there
was a practical, republican aspect to his views, in contrast with the comments of another co-
founder, senator Alexandre Gendebien, who declared in 1838 that, “the Flemish are one of the
42 “The first principles of a good administration are based upon the exclusive use of one language, and it is evident that the only language of the Belgians should be French. In order to achieve this result, it is necessary that all civil and military functions are entrusted to Walloons and Luxembourgers; this way, the Flemish, temporarily deprived of the advantages of these offices, will be constrained to learn French, and we will hence destroy bit by bit the Germanic element in Belgium.”
Jacques Leclerc (2008) (in French), Petite histoire de la Belgique et ses conséquences linguistices [Small history of Belgium and their linguistic consequences], Université Laval
24 Charlotte Luks more inferior races on the Earth, just like the Negroes.”43 Politically, the decades following
Belgian independence heavily favored the Walloon population; it was only in the cultural realm that the Flemish began to distinguish themselves.
The original model of nationalism purported by the state, while successful in most regards, preserved linguistic tensions in its pursuit of a new, uniquely Belgian voice. During the mid-1800s, Belgian writers aimed to create a body of patriotic Belgian literature, a means of legitimizing the nation within a greater European culture of artistic excellence.44 For the
Flemish, creating a Belgian identity within the arts was fairly easy, as their language and culture were quite unique. For Walloons, however, creating a distinct literary voice proved difficult, as their Francophone culture placed most literary works within the French model.45 This critique of Walloon works was legitimized in cultural magazines and journals of the time that glorified the Flemish character as unique and inherently Belgian, whereas Walloons were perceived to be under the French influence.46 Flemish authors and linguists were viewed as “soldiers” and
“warriors” to the cause of reviving the long suppressed Flemish culture and language while
Walloons struggled to find their place within a State that increasingly relied on stories and symbols from the North on which to build their national character.47 While literary struggles between the two nationalisms by no means destroyed the national narrative, the struggle highlighted preexisting distinctions within the state, thereby casting doubt upon the national model and serving as a precursor for more serious tensions to come.
43 H. Gaus (2007) Alexander Gendebien en de Organisatie van de Belgiesche Revolutie van 1830 44 Christian Berg, “The Symbolic Deficit. French Literature in Belgium and 19th Century National Sentiment,” in Nationalism in Belgium: Shifting Identities, 1780-1995, ed. Kas Deprez and Louis Vos (New York: Palgrave, 1998)64 45 Ibid, 65 46 Ibid, 67 47 Tollebook and Verschaffel, “Group Portraits,” 95
25 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
The Flemish Movement
The Belgian desire to manifest itself within the European cultural sphere inadvertently
led to the Flemish culture distinguishing itself within the Belgian model. This was an unintended
byproduct of constructing Belgian nationalism and was the beginning of the Flemish movement within Belgium. For the first few decades after independence, Belgium was one single nation, it was only in the second half of the 19th century that a Flemish community began to develop, first in the minds of a few intellectuals and then in the minds of the common people to whom these intellectuals addressed their plea for a Flemish nation.48 The Flemish movement would have its
heyday in the 1960s-70s, but the time leading up to these decades was spotted with various
developments concerning the ever growing community problem.
The Flemish movement began in the form of cultural organizations that sprang up
around Flanders in response to growing oppression of the Flemish within the political sphere.
These cultural organizations would eventually develop into political parties, most significant of
which was the Christian People Party, founded in 1893, which would win its first success in
1898 with the Gelijkheidswet (Equality Law).49 The Gelijkheidswet officially recognized Flemish as equal to French in legal matters and documents.50 From this point, proponents of the
Flemish movement in the Liberal, Catholic and Socialist parties would work together toward
Flemish cultural aims. The Flemish movement would become significantly less unified over the
course of World War I, as the movement became more radicalized.
48 Clough, “A History of the Flemish Movement,” 109 49 Ibid, 35 50 Ibid,49
26 Charlotte Luks
The German invasion in WWI served to split the Flemish movement into two factions.
Some proponents of the Flemish culture welcomed the German invaders, viewing them as
“liberating Germanic brothers.”51 While most of the Flemish population disapproved of collaborators, for their part, the German invaders did, in fact, lend support to the Flemish. Over the course of their occupation, The Germans set Flemish as the sole administrative language
and converted the University of Ghent, in the Flemish region, to Flemish.52 However, German
assistance to the Flemish movement was part of a strategic move to build upon pre-existing
Flemish-Walloon animosity in order to strengthen the German hold on Belgium.53 In the wake
of the First World War, the language reforms were removed and many leaders of the Flemish
movement were prosecuted.54 This response only increased domestic tensions and brought the
community problem further from compromise.
The interwar period brought out many controversies concerning the war which fanned
the flames of the Flemish movement. Most significantly, stories of the treatment of Flemish
soldiers in the French-speaking army began to come out. Rumors spread that a
disproportionate amount of Flemish soldiers were slaughtered during the war because they
could not understand orders.55 The expression, “et pour les Flamands, la meme chose,”
originated from this time. The expression literally means, “and for the Flemish, the same thing,”
and was the manner in which French speaking officers would “translate” orders for Flemish
51 Ibid,77 52 Ibid78 53 Ibid,77 54 Ibid, 78 55 Louis Vos, “The Flemish National Question,” in Nationalism in Belgium: Shifting Identities 1780-1995 ed Kas Deprez and Louis Vos (New York: Palgrave, 1998), 89
27 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
soldiers.56 Further, the exams to become an officer were given only in French and medical
personnel were trained in French. This meant that Flemish soldiers could not ascend beyond
the front, could not understand orders and could not communicate with medical staff, resulting
in disproportionate mortality rates for Flemish soldiers. These and other concerns led to the
creation of the Frontbeweging (Front Movement), which began as an organization of Flemish
soldiers but grew into a political movement.57 These concerns compounded upon increased
frustration with the Royal Family’s poor knowledge of Flemish and the realization that King
Albert I’s support of the bilingual status of Flanders and other Flemish rights were simply
measures to placate his citizens, rather than promises he intended to keep.58 The interwar
period led to the mass organization and politicization of the Flemish movement, resulting in the
first Flemish nationalist party election into office in the 1920s and, finally, in 1931, Flemish
becoming the sole official language of Flanders.59
The second German invasion of Belgium during World War II would result in the end of
the Flemish movement for roughly 20 years. As it had been in WWI, the German strategy was
to exacerbate linguistic tensions by favoring the Flemish. In order to fulfill this goal, Nazi
occupiers released only Flemish prisoners of war and generally favored the Flemish as racially
Germanic components of the occupied territories.60 Very few Flemish nationalists collaborated
with the Nazis during WWII however even that limited involvement resulted in the Flemish
56 Emmanuel Gerard, “The Christian Workers’ Movement as a Mass Foundation of the Flemish Movement,” in Nationalism in Belgium: Shifting Identities 1780-1995 ed. Kas Deprez and Louis Vos (New York: Palgrave, 1998) 131 57 Ibid, 133 58 Kas Deprez, “The Language of the Flemings,” in Nationalism in Belgium: Shifting Identities 1780-1995 ed. Kas Deprez and Louis Vos (New York: Palgrave, 1998) 98 59 Gerard, “The Christian Workers’ Movement,” 133 60 Gerard, “The Christian Workers’ Movement,” 130
28 Charlotte Luks
movement being associated with fascism and the enemy and, as a result, the movement lay
dormant until the 1960s.61
The Flemish movement regained momentum in the early 1960s and the 20 years
following would bring about much long-awaited change for the Flemish region. In 1962, the
linguistic borders were officially drawn, making Wallonia French, Flanders Flemish, and Brussels
bilingual.62 In 1967, a Flemish version of the constitution was officially adopted (for the past
130 years, the Flemish version had simply been a translation with no legal value).63 In the late
60s, all the Belgian political parties divided themselves not only based on ideology but based on language.64 This move resulted in increased fighting over the autonomy of linguistic regions
which in turn resulted in a series of constitutional reforms. The first in 1970 created cultural
communities, as demanded by the Flemish, and constitutional foundations for territorial
regions, a Walloon demand.65 Building from this, in 1980, the cultural communities became the
Communities, and the Flemish and Walloon territories (later followed by Brussels) became the
Regions. Both the Communities and the Regions received their own parliaments and
governments.66 Increased autonomy of the Regions and Communities resulted in a growth in
increasingly separatist and radical parties on both the Flemish and Walloon sides. The earlier
half of the twentieth century was dominated by a left-center government to be replaced by a
right-center government over the course of the 1980s. Economically speaking, Wallonia was
61 Vos, “The Flemish National Question,” 85 62 Rolf Falter, “Belgium’s Peculiar way to Federalism,” in Nationalism in Belgium: Shifting Identities 1780-1995 ed. Kas Deprez and Louis Vos (New York: Palgrave, 1998) 180 63 Ibid, 182 64 Ibid, 183 65 Bart Maddens, Roeland Beerten and Jaak Billiet, “The National Consciousness of the Flemings and the Walloons. An Empirical Investigation,” in Nationalism in Belgium: Shifting Identities 1780-1995 ed. Kas Deprez and Louis Vos (New York: Palgrave, 1998) 200 66 Ibid, 202
29 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
dominant for most of the twentieth century, but recent decades have seen Flanders take the
upper hand. Increasing tensions within a structurally unsound government would result in the total collapse of the federal government in 2010.67 While the government has since been
reinstated, the reform process is still in progress and the future of Belgium as a single state
remains in question.
A Misguided State
At the time of Belgian independence, the Belgian state constructed a narrative of a
singular, united Belgian history: a story of Belgians fighting for liberty, equality and dignity
against 18 centuries worth of external oppressors. This narrative served the country well for
some time and, to some extent, still functions in some roles. The Belgian narrative is, to a large
extent, the only remaining justification for the continued unity of the Belgian state. For this
reason, the storyline cannot stand up to any critique: if one were to begin to unravel the
Belgian narrative, the Belgian state may well unravel along with it. What I see as the grand irony
in this story is that the Belgian state worked so hard to construct the story of Ambiorix to reflect their vision of a unified Belgium, when the true story of Ambiorix is the true story of
Belgium. Ambiorix was the leader of one of the tribes of Belgae who hoped to benefit from an
outside oppressor in his goal of acquiring hegemony over the other tribes of Belgae. This is the
single thread that can be seen throughout the Belgian narrative: opposing linguistic
communities vying for supremacy at the expense of the other community’s dignity and
equality. Belgium may have gained independence in 1830, but the linguistic communities in
Belgium did not gain institutionalized equality or equal claims to “Belgian-ness” until well into
67 Ibid, 199
30 Charlotte Luks
the 20th century. The future of the Belgian state is uncertain, but what more can be expected from a state with a history so precariously balanced upon an artificial narrative and centuries worth of internal tensions? These internal tensions were further complicated by the intersections of native histories and migrant stories, a complicated confrontation largely because migrant and native histories were perceived as so distinct that they could not intersect.
These intersections will be addressed throughout the remainder of this paper, but first we must examine the history of immigration in the Belgian state.
Isolated Histories: Belgian Migrant History
The last few centuries have seen complications to the Belgian political sphere by
immigrant populations moving into the Country. Post-war migration flows led to the immense
diversification of Western Europe in terms of the cultures, languages and religions to be found
there. Compared to the Nordic regions of Europe, immigration into Western Europe has been
numerically low, yet with mostly stagnant population growth of native Europeans, the
percentage of foreigners is little more than a rough measure of the cultural, human and
national changes to the population.68 Over the course of the 20th century, Belgium participated
in what can, in hindsight, be seen as a uniform trend of migration across the continent, taking
place in four phases. The first phase took place immediately after the war and can be
characterized by the return of military troops and the dispersal of displaced persons. This phase
is followed by the second, taking place between 1948 and 1964, marking a time of free
movement within the European community. Phase three, 1965-1972, was the guest-worker
68 Harold Runblom “Swedish Multiculturalism in a Comparative European Perspective,” Sociological Forum 9(1994) 626
31 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms period, during which time bilateral agreements brought vast amounts of guest laborers to
Europe. The final phase, 1973-1988, marks the end of guest-worker programs and increased restrictions on immigration though, due largely to family reunification schemes, the tide of migration was hardly stemmed. Following these four phases of active migration has been a period of increased restrictions and regulations regarding migration.69 Belgium too experienced these patterns of migration and multiculturalism, though in its own unique way
Waves of Migrants
In contrast with many Western countries, Belgium was never broadly perceived as a country of immigrants, neither as a receiving nor sending state. Quite the opposite of most
Western European states, Belgium did not send large groups of immigrants throughout the world. While there are no concentrated populations of Belgians residing in the United States, as one might find with Irish or Portuguese nationals, and most world citizens would have a hard time naming the country from which Belgium receives most of its immigrants, Belgium is not without its own, though admittedly limited, immigration history. In order to understand the issues facing immigrants in contemporary Belgium, it is crucial to understand who those immigrants are and where they come from.
An Emigrant Nation (1830-1918)
Early in its history, Belgium experienced fairly little migration, leaning more towards emigration. In the second half of the 19th century, Belgium faced a consistent migrant deficit,
69 Ibid, 627
32 Charlotte Luks
with the flow reversing only at the turn of the century.70 From the first period of its
independence up and into the 20th century, these migration flows moved almost exclusively in
and out of neighboring countries.71 At this time, Belgian emigrants moved mostly to France in
either seasonal labor flows or permanently. Of all French naturalizations in 1886, 43% were of
Belgian origin.72 France and Belgium have been historically entwined for reasons of language
and geographic location as well as occasional occupation. Prior to World War I, Belgium had a relatively consistent foreign population of 2-3%. Of these, 90% came from the neighboring countries of France, Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom. 73 Most
of these immigrants were blue collar workers with the few exceptions of those who had come
to study at Belgium’s universities or those seeking political asylum in the progressive, safe
haven offered by the state.74 At this time, migration to Belgium was exclusively the result of personal initiative rather than collective, industrial recruitment. Subsequently, immigrants integrated with relative ease and were able to become an integral part of their communities.
From Trickle to Flow (The Interwar Period)
The interwar period marked an important time of transition in Belgian immigration politics, with the introduction of migrants from outside of neighboring countries and a shift from industry to state regulation of migrants. Beginning at the end of WWI, Belgian coal mines began actively recruiting workers from outside of Northern Europe, beginning first in Poland
70Hassan Boussetta et al. “Cycles of Post-War Immigration and the Development of Policy on Immigrants in Belgium (1945-2000). An Introductory Overview,” in Multicultural Policies and Modes of Citizenship in Belgium: The Cases of Antwerp, Liege and Brussels, ed. Dirk Jacobs (Brussels: Universite LLibre de Bruxelles, 4 71R. Lewin ed, La Belgique et ses Immigres. Les Politiques Manquees. (Brussels: De Boeck Universite, 1997) 15 72 J. Stengers, “De Immigratie van 1830 tot 1950: Cijfermateriaal” in Geschiedenis van het Eigen Volk. De Vreemdeling in Belgie van Prehistorie tot Nu, ed. A. Morelli (Leuven: Kritak) 106 73 A. Martens, 25 Jaar Wegwerparbeiders: Het Belgisch Immigratiebeleid na 1945 (Leuven: KU Leuven, 1973), 131 74 Martens, “25 Jaar Wegwerparbeiders,” 137-138
33 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
before incorporating Italians, Yugoslavs, Czechs, Hungarians, Algerians and Moroccans.75
Following the end of the First World War, migration flows were regulated by industry itself,
based on supply and demand. During times of labor shortage, industrial recruitment of
migrants was stimulated but blocked during times of unemployment. Increasingly throughout
the 1930s, the government stepped in to regulate the migration market; issuing restrictive laws
and a system of work permits and quotas. In 1936, the state introduced a double system of
work permits regulating migration by sector in accordance with national interests.76 This new
policy required both the employer and the foreign migrant to acquire immigration permits,
thereby allowing the state to regulate not only migrant flows but also the sectors to which they
would flow. Previously, industrial recruiters and employers had controlled the course of
immigration in accordance with the needs of respective industries, but by the end of the
interwar period, the state had taken control in the name of national interest.
The increasingly regulated trajectory of the interwar period marked a crucial point in
both the regulation of migration flows and the social perception of migrant populations.
Where prior migration had been composed of independently motivated permanent settlers,
migrants were now seen as a temporary, foreign work force. The Belgian government therefore
introduced no reception or integration policies.77 This refusal to actively support or participate in integration efforts stemmed from a stubborn perception of migrants as a temporary work force, rather than a permanent demographic shift. Despite this increasingly naïve perception,
75 F. Caestecker, “De Centraaleuropese Mijnwerkers in Belgie” in Geschiedenis van het Eigen Volk. De Vreemdeling in Belgie van Prehistorie tot Nu, ed. A. Morelli (Leuven: Kritak) 166 76 Martens, “25 Jaar Wegwerparbeiders,” 140-141 77 P. Blaise and A. Martens. “Des Immiges a Integrer. Choix Poliques et Modalites Insitutionelles” in Courrier Hebdomodaire du CRISP 1992
34 Charlotte Luks however, the 20 year interwar period marked a turn in Belgian demographics: from an emigrant nation with a consistent migrant deficit, Belgium became a country with a 4.1% foreign population in 1937.78 While in 1920 84% of foreigners came from neighboring countries, this number dropped to 51% by 1938.79 The interwar period was only the beginning of the flood of migrants who would come to Belgium over the course of the 20th century, not only from
Western Europe but from the rest of Europe and even the rest of the world.
An Influx of Italians (1945-1956)
Following the Second World War, many Western European countries were faced with enormous labor shortages resulting from the immense loss of life experienced under total war.
While the allied powers clamored to recruit the many displaced persons throughout Europe to their labor force, Belgium was without clout and, managing to recruit only 23,000 miners amongst Eastern European displaced persons, was forced to look elsewhere for a labor force to rebuild its crippled economy.80 The government decided that, as coal had built the Belgian economy in the past, it would rebuild it in this time of crisis. Unfortunately, even with improved working conditions, favorable legal status for miners, and compulsory reintegration of former miners, there was still a shortage of workers for the mines.81 Originally, German prisoners of war were used as forced labor in the mines, with 46,000 working in the mines in January of
1946. However, May 1947 would mark the release of prisoners of war to Germany and, in
78 Martens, “25 Jaar Wegwerparbeiders,” 127 79 Martens, “25 Jaar Wegwerparbeiders,” 131 80 Caestecker, “De Centraaleuropese Mijnwerker,” 168 81 Lewin, “La Belgique,” 20
35 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms anticipation of this development, Belgium began negotiations on a guest worker agreement with Italy.82
In 1946, the first bilateral guest worker program was initiated and, in exchange for a percentage of Belgian coal to be sold to Italy, 2000 new guest workers left Milan bound for
Belgium every week.83 Between 1946 and 1949, over 77,000 (predominantly Northern) Italian workers arrived in Belgian mining towns, almost exclusively in Wallonia.84 These Italians, some as young as 7, came to Belgium in hopes of improving their economic status. While the state had promised to improve working conditions and social status for miners in the time of labor shortage, there was no need to fulfill these promises in the wake of the Italian guest worker agreement. As a result, the steady flow of migrants continued to be necessary due to the high dropout rate of laborers due to unfavorable conditions.85 Workers were crowded into dormitories close to the mines, mines in which unsafe conditions pushed some workers back to
Italy and some less lucky to the grave. Italian migration would continue in droves throughout the 1950s, with brief exceptions between 1949-1950 and 1952-1955 as the result of cyclical recessions and pressure from trade unions.86 Despite these brief discontinuations of immigration, tens of thousands of Italian laborers came to Belgium in this period, originally recruited as miners but turning to additional industries after 1955.87 In this year, foreign recruitment extended to the steel and construction industries, leading to vacancies in the
82 Martens, “25 Jaar Wegwerparbeiders,” 161
83 A. Morelli, “De Immigratie van Italianen in Belgie in de 19de en 20st eeuw,” in Geschiedenis van het Eigen Volk. De Vreemdeling in Belgie van de Prehistorie tot nu.”, ed. A. Morelli. (Leuven: Kritak, 1993) 202 84 Martens, “25 Jaar Wegwerparbeiders,” 163 85 Ibid, 102 86 Ibid, 101 87 Ibid, 103
36 Charlotte Luks
mining sector.88 The diversification of Italian laborers catalyzed the deterioration of the Belgian-
Italian trade agreement in the latter half of the 1950s.
In the mid-1950s, the bilateral mining agreement between Italy and Belgium began to
weaken, prompting Belgium to look elsewhere for its laborer and effectively ending the special
relationship between the two countries. The Belgian mining industry experienced two major
tragedies in the mid-20th century. In 1956, 7 Italian miners lost their lives in an accident at a
mine in Quaregnon and later that year 262 miners, 136 Italian, lost their lives at Marcinelle (fig
1.4).89 A coal wall caught fire deep within the mine at Marcinelle, trapping hundreds. When
rescue workers reached the deepest levels of the mine two weeks later, they reported back to
the families waiting above in Italian, “tutti cadaveri,” only corpses. In response to these
disasters, the Italian government demanded better working conditions for Italian guest workers
in Belgium.90 Over the previous year, Italian workers had begun dispersing throughout the
Belgian labor market and miners had begun to come in from other countries. Subsequently,
Belgium was no longer as dependent on Italian workers and, rather than meet the Italian government’s demands, began to recruit more actively in other countries.91 This marked the
88 Ibid, 103 89 Morelli, “De Immigratie van Italianen,” 206 90 Lewin, “La Belgique,” 22 91 Indeed, no adjustments were made to the mines whatsoever, a Belgian newspaper at the time commented, “Het doek is definitief gevallen over de mijnramp van Marcinelle. De ministers Rey and Troclet hebben verlicht gezucht: ze zijn er goedkoop vanaf gekomen…Neen, het debat over de mijnramp te Marcinelle is niet de mooiste bladzijde uit onze politieke geschiedenis. Vier maanden geleden, onder de druk van een algemene verontwaardiging, warden ingrijpende hervormingen in het vooruitzicht gesteld en ontroerende beloften gedaan. Intussen is er heel wat gebeurd…en de regering heft hiervan dankbaar gebruik gemaakt.” We have officially moved past the mine disaster at Marcinelle. The ministers Rey and Troclet can breathe easy: they got off easy…no, the debate about the tragedy is not the nicest page of political history. 4 months ago, under pressure of general responsibility big changes and reforms were suggested and moving promises were made. In the meantime much has happened…and the government has used these more recent events gratefully. J.P. Grimeau, “De Immigratiegollven en de Spreiding van Vreemdeling in Belgie,” in Geschiedenis van het Eigen Volk, De Vreemdeling in Belgie van de Prehistorie tot nu, ed. A. Morelli (Leuven: Kritak, 1993) 118
37 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
end of Italian dominance in the Belgian foreign labor force. Between 1948 and 1958, an average
of 48.5% of Belgian immigration originated in Italy, a number which would drop significantly
over the course of the 1960s.92
The mid-century period was a time of change in Belgian migration patterns. Individual migration gave way to labor flows which in turn became country-specific. This was not only a
time of demographic shifts but of shifts in integration practice. When small numbers of
individually motivated migrants settle in a region, assimilation occurs with relative ease as
families settle into long-established communities and neighborhoods of native Belgians.93 By
contrast, later migrant waves in Belgium moved into mining towns and neighborhoods created
exclusively for their use, many of which were not towns at all but rather unused prisoner of war
camps. These communities did not exist to stimulate integration, but rather to deter it. Guest
workers were not expected to stay, they were expected to work and eventually leave.94 In
1947, a newspaper printed a message to Italian guest workers, telling them to remain calm and cooperative despite their rough conditions as the country was in danger and needed to be rebuilt on their backs.95 Further, in the wake of the Second World War, the Belgian populace was not particularly favorable to an Italian presence. One newspaper from 1947 commented on the bilateral agreement, “Kolen voor Italie man. Juist als in 1942, toen alle 10 minuten een trein
met Belgiesche kolen den Brennerpas doorreed. Dat is zoogezegd in ruil voor fascistische
92 Ibid 120 93 Bousetta, “Cycles of Post-War Immigration,” 6 94 Bousetta, “Cycles of Post-War Immigration,” 7 95 “De vrouw hoest, de kinderen hebben griep. Gijzelve moet met koude koffie naar uw werk. Zwijg dat ge zweet man.Lijdt armoe. Rillen van kou maar blijf kalm en braaf. Het land is in gevaar. De economie moet gered worden op uw rug.” The wife coughs, the children have the flu. You yourself must go to work with cold coffee. Be silent about your sweating, man. Shiver from the cold but stay quiet and cooperative. The land is in danger. The economy must be saved on your back.”
38 Charlotte Luks arbeidskrachten.”96 Belgian citizens, while not particularly welcoming of “fascist” Italian or other migrant workers, did understand that the economy depended on these guest workers and would tolerate their presence for some decades until periods of economic decline and unemployment later in the century. In the period of 1946-1960, the few integration efforts that existed were created not by the Belgian state or people, but by trade unions and immigrant organizations supported by political or religious groups from the sending countries.97 This fact is crucial to the understanding of Belgian perception of immigrants throughout the rest of the century: the Belgian populace expected migrant workers to come to Belgium and rebuild the economy on their backs but it was neither their right nor their privilege to receive social aid from the host state. This was not exclusive to Italians, the Italian bilateral agreement was the first of many with similar conditions. The period of Italian guest workers introduced bilateral labor agreements to Belgium and set the tone for future integration efforts, or lack thereof, for migrant laborers.
Mediterranean Expansion (1956-1973)
Prompted largely by the Italian government’s demands for increased safety measures in the wake of the Marcinelle and Quaregnon tragedies, Belgian industries and the state began actively recruiting migrant labor in other Mediterranean regions. Throughout this period,
Belgium would continue to search for sending countries, consistently expanding its migrant base throughout the Mediterranean and beyond.
96 Lamidesis, “Uit het Geeraardsbergdesche,” 2 “Coal for Italy man. Just like in 1942, when every a ten minutes a train with Belgian coal road through the Brenner Pass. This was, they said, in exchange for fascist laborers.” 97 Martens, “25 Jaar Wegwerparbeiders,” 189
39 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
While Italians had had something of a monopoly over guest labor prior to 1956, the
labor demographic diversified significantly throughout the middle of the century. Belgium
began slowly recruiting laborers from Spain and Greece in 1956, immediately following the
country’s retreat from the Italian agreement. Between 1955 and 1956, 5000 workers were
recruited from these countries.98 In November 1956, a bilateral agreement was signed with
Spain, followed by an agreement with Greece in August 1957. These agreements resulted in the
recruitment of 12,000 workers in 1957. 99 Foreign recruitment ended briefly from 1958-1961 as
the result of cyclical recession, pressure from mining unions and the shutting down of some
mines under environmental policies.100 1962 brought shortages of low-skilled laborers in a
variety of sectors throughout the country. Subsequently, foreign recruitment was reinstated
and expanded to include bilateral agreements with Morocco and Turkey (1964) and later
Tunisia and Algeria (1969, 1970 respectively).101 The largest group of migrant laborers to settle in Belgium in the 1960s were Moroccan, replacing Italians as the largest proportional group of foreigners.102 Between 1962 and 1971, 260,000 foreigners emigrated out of Belgium with
544,000 migrating in. The resulting migration surplus of 284,000 people increased the foreign
population from 379,528 in 1958 to 716,237 in 1970-7% of the total population.103
Increased migration flows not only shifted population demographics on a national scale,
rather, a significant amount of internal shifting occurred in the mid-20th century. Foreign labor
98 Martens, “25 Jaar wegwerparbeiders,” 210 99 Ibid, 211 100 Bousetta, “Cycles of Post-War Immigration,” 7 101 R. Atar, “De Geschiedenis van de Maghrebijnse Immigratie in Belgie,” in Geschiedenis van het Eigen Volk, De Vreemdeling in Belgie van de Prehistorie tot nu, ed. A. Morelli (Leuven: Kritak, 1993) 302 102 Ibid, 303 103 Martens, “25 Jaar Wegwerparbeiders,” 47-50
40 Charlotte Luks
forces had originally been recruited almost exclusively into the mining industry. Migrants,
therefore, tended to be very localized: living near the mines in which they worked and very
rarely venturing out of these areas. However, as the century progressed, migrant labor became
increasingly diversified, not only in terms of country of origin but in sectors of industry. No
longer were migrants restricted to the mines of Wallonia and they settled increasingly in the
Flemish regions of Gent and Antwerp as well as Brussels.104 It was Brussels which experienced
the most significant demographic shift during this period, experiencing many changes which
would be enhanced throughout the rest of the 20th century. Brussels as the Belgian capital, and later the European capital, was and is an important political area in Belgium however its population became increasingly incongruent with the overall Belgian population over the second half of the century. Native Belgians moved into the suburbs, leaving the vacuum to be filled by blue-collar foreign migrants and Eurocrats alike.105 The city would become increasingly
international, to the extent that it gained a great deal of autonomy within Belgium, acquiring its
own regional government on par with the Flemish and Walloon regional governing bodies as its
population would become as unique as either ethnic nation. The diversification of Brussels,
already a French speaking capital located in the Flemish speaking region of Belgium, would
come to create tensions involving both the community problem and anti-immigration concerns.
In contrast to previous eras, the Belgian state began to take a more active role in
integration efforts in the mid-20th century, though largely as a side effect of related economic schemes. Immigration policy was largely determined by cyclical economic needs and efforts
104 Ibid, 65 105 C. Kesteloot, k. Peleman and T. Roesems, “Terres d’exil en Belgique,” in La Belgique et ses Immigres. Les Politiques Manqee ed. Coenen and Lewin. (Brussels: De Boeck Universite, 1997) 34039
41 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
towards integration were motivated mostly by the demand for labor and the need to appear
desirable to migrant workers.106 There was however an important shift in political thinking in
this era; due to policies of family reunification and the diversification of migrant labor,
foreigners began to be thought of not as temporary workers, but immigrants.107 That is to say,
rather than the isolated towns of male miners in the post-war periods, entire families were
coming to Belgium and laborers were dispersed throughout the country’s towns and industrial
sectors. Indeed, throughout the 1960s, many immigrants were non-active dependants, part of a
political ploy to attract laborers as well as an attempt by the Walloon government to use
immigrants for demographic purposes.108 Subsequently, many regional governments, particularly in mining towns, set up integration and reception services for immigrants. Slowly, formal venues for political participation came into existence for immigrants, including local advisory boards. In 1967, non-Belgian EEC laborers were granted equal rights to participate in social elections and, following pressure from trade unions; non-EEC workers were extended this
right in 1971.109 While the Belgian state was, in many regards, reluctant to introduce
integration institutions, the increased presence of permanent immigrants as well as their
descendents necessitated increased efforts towards integration in the middle of the century. It
should be noted, however, that the introduction of integration policies were a top-down
scheme introduced by the government in the interest of the economy, not by the Belgian
populace.
106 Martens, “25 Jaar Wegwerparbeider,” 243 107 Ibid, 221 108 A. Sauvy, Rapport sur le Probleme de l’Economie et de la Population en Wallonie (Liege: Editions du Conseil Economique Wallon, 1962) 109 A. Poncin and S. Wolf, “Elections Sociales 1975” in Courrier Hebdomadaire du CRISP (Brussels: CRISP, 1975) 17
42 Charlotte Luks
The Sudden End (1974-1988)
After nearly a century of escalation of migration which took Belgium from an emigrant
nation to one with a 7% foreign population, active recruitment of guest workers and new
immigration was put to a stop. In the early 70s, Belgium faced a recession and, as with previous
recessions, immigrants were the first source of apprehension in a failing economy. In August
1974, the government put an end to all new immigration and recruitment of non-EEC guest
workers, with the exception of some specialized workers.110 This did not put an end to all
foreign immigration however, as family reunification policies were still in place. The ban on new
immigration from outside of Europe brought a resurgence of immigration from neighboring
countries: while immigrants from neighboring countries and the UK had only accounted for
about 24% of migration between 1962-66, this number grew to 36% between 1967-82.111 This
period also marked the beginning of the end for the strides towards acceptance and equality by
immigrant groups throughout the 20th century, a phenomenon to be discussed further in the
paper. It is reasonable that Belgium has not acquired the reputation of a nation of immigrants,
considering its immigration history lasted only a few decades. Immigration is, of course, not
completely at a halt in Belgium currently, but the country no longer welcomes large groups of
laborers and issues concerning immigrants in the contemporary era are largely directed at
second and third generation descendents of the original guest workers who rebuilt Belgium
after the War. In contrast with countries such as Germany where subsequent generations of
Turkish Migrants were not granted citizenship rights for decades, people born in Belgium have
110 Boussetta, “Cycles of Post-War Immigration,” 9 111 Grimeau, “De Immigratiegolven,” 119
43 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms rights of citizenship, however, Belgian society ascribes to the nth generation immigrant the perpetual label of “foreigner,” creating for migrants and their descendants an inescapable label.
Conclusion
The histories discussed in this chapter have been the respective stories of Belgian migrants and natives; however the themes which can be seen here have many similarities.
Most striking is the fact that the Flemish, Walloons and migrants from across the globe have struggled for equal participation in the Belgian political and social spheres. These parallel concerns have complicated modern immigration politics. In some decades, the efforts of natives to acquire equality have resulted in the needs of migrants being overshadowed. At other times, migrants are pushed to the forefront as scapegoats by the two disparate linguistic communities bonding together to fight against outsiders. The last 50 years have seen the formerly distinct lives of migrants and natives intersect aggressively within the political sphere, and it is this intersection which will be the focus of the following chapters.
44 Charlotte Luks
Chapter 2
Histories Intersect: The Multicultural Decades
“Multiculturalism is first and foremost about
Developing new models of democratic
Citizenship, grounded in human-rights ideals”112
- Will Kymlicka
The waves of migrants flocking into Belgium was not a phenomenon unique to Belgium
but was experienced by most, if not all, of Western Europe throughout the twentieth century.
The tragic and widespread loss of life which resulted from both World Wars at the beginning of
the century left an enormous vacuum of labor in all European industries. European powers
scrambled to find labor through various channels. The British turned largely to subjects of the
crown from their many colonial holdings in the West Indies, South East Asia and elsewhere
while Germany depended predominantly on a bilateral trade agreement with Turkey, though it
had previously relied on Italians and Yugoslavs.113 Regardless of where countries turned for
their foreign labor forces, the result was very much the same; the continent was experiencing
an influx of foreigners. Europe is not and has never been a stranger to migration; movements of
people have been consistent across the continent for thousands of years.114 However, for the
first time, countless people were coming in consistent flows from all over the world in a very
112 Will Kymlicka Multiculturalism: Success, Failure and the Future (Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2012) 9 113 Stephen Castles, “The Guest Worker in Western Europe-An Obituary,” International Migration Review20(1986) : 762 114 Anthony Pagden, People and Empires: A Short History of European Migration Exploration and Conquest from Greece to the Present (New York: Random House, 2007) 9
45 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
short period of time. As the century progressed, this influx caused a series of concerns across
the continent, both real and imagined. The arrival of strangers sparked deep concerns in the
dominant population, who feared their culture and dominance were being threatened.115 This
fear was compounded by the rapid decolonization which took place throughout the mid
century and beyond.116 Most importantly, Europeans had to learn to deal with the fact that the
workers they had imported to bolster and revive their economies were not the temporary
visitors they had hoped they would be and what’s more, those migrants were beginning to
demand rights.
The 1970s brought a wave of multiculturalism across the European continent. Policies
were created to include new foreign migrants and to keep up with a Europe that was becoming
multicultural faster than official policy and public sentiment could keep up. The multicultural
decades would mark the time when immigrants and natives began to be confronted with each
other’s needs and demands.
Towards Multiculturalism
Over the course of the 20th century, most Western European states experienced parallel
patterns of migration and immigration politics. Broadly speaking, Europe experienced phases of
movement first with displaced persons, then with intra-European movement, and finally guest
worker agreements. These waves of movement occurred in tandem with policies governing the
movement of people and their treatment within the political and social spheres of respective
115 Will Kymlicka Multiculturalism: Success, Failure and the Future (Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2012) 9 116 Ibid, 6
46 Charlotte Luks
countries and the European community as a whole. From roughly 1970 to 1990, most of the
European continent experienced a period of multiculturalism in which laws and social policies
were expanded to embrace and accept diversity to a greater extent than had previously been
seen in modern Europe. Belgium too experienced these patterns of migration and
multiculturalism, though in its own unique way.
Having examined the specifics of migration phases as they relate to Belgian immigration
waves, we will now turn to the final phase and, specifically, the political climate of the era from
1973-1988 in both Belgium and, more broadly, Europe. In this time period, there was a marked
shift in European democracies towards increased recognition of diversity through the
introduction of multiculturalism policies.117 For these few decades, earlier concepts of homogenous nationhood were reevaluated in favor of increased understanding of difference and an acceptance of the realities of globalism and imperial pasts. Many European countries, namely Germany and the United Kingdom, faced in an influx of immigrants during this period in the form of Turkish guest workers and residents of former colonies, respectively.118 The move to multiculturalism was mainly a response to pressure from these groups who, at this point, had become an economic necessity in Europe as a result of labor shortages following the
Second World War and whose children and grandchildren had become fixtures of the population and labor market moving into the latter half of the century.119 Regardless of the
motivation for the move toward multiculturalism, these progressive policies were lauded at
117 Kymlicka, “Multiculturalism,” 12 118 Pagden, “People and Empires,” 12 119 Bousetta, “Cycles of Post-War Immigration,” 10
47 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms both the domestic level and by many international organizations.120 For the most part, multiculturalism was practiced as official policy but was largely a top-down concept; implemented by governments but never fully reaching the public to an extent that would suggest total inclusion of difference in the social sphere.121 Regardless of the ultimate success of multiculturalism policy, the multicultural decades stand as an important moment in
European history, if only to demonstrate the stark contrast to the assimilation politics in the decades to follow.
Motivations for Multiculturalism
The crucial, albeit brief, period of multicultural policies would not have occurred without a very specific combination of political and demographic factors which had built up over the first half of the twentieth century. The most basic and indirect of these conditions was the aftermath of World War II. Coming out of the Age of Empire, Europe had not been particularly diversity-friendly, having spent the past few centuries pillaging and subjugating most of the known world.122 These European states had been building up strong nationalistic identities, creating clear lines of who was and who wasn’t and, inevitably, leading to not one but two World Wars. The devastation left by World War Two as well as the ease with which entire populations were dehumanized and destroyed in the name of nationalism led to a shift in the public perception of nationalism. Europeans began to see the danger of overt and excessive nationalism and the destruction that it could cause. This of course did not signify an end to all nationalism by any means but allowed a small window of opportunity for the introduction of
120 Kymlicka, “Multiculturalism,” 3 121 Ibid, 15 122 Pagden, “People and Empires,”
48 Charlotte Luks
some diversity or, at the very least, an awareness of the dangers of institutionalized racism and
discrimination as official policy.123 This slight progression in public thought laid the groundwork
for the conditions of multiculturalism.
World War II also had the effect of necessitating the many immigrant laborers who
would later demand multicultural policies in order to maintain some sort of internal cohesion within the European States. The initial treatment of migrant labor groups was another essential piece of the multiculturalism puzzle. Migrants were brought in as guest workers, either through bilateral agreements with third-party countries or through active recruitment in colonial holdings of the state.124 In this stage of immigration policy, European states actively
encouraged migrants to maintain their own cultures rather than assimilate, through localization of populations and active deterrence of linguistic or cultural assimilation. This was with the assumption that they would be returning to their home countries and that maintenance of original culture would facilitate repatriation at a later date.125 States even celebrated the
different cultures within their borders, largely as a form of propaganda to convince migrant
laborers to come to their shores in a time when migrant labor was in high demand all across
Europe. This initial superficial form of cultural celebration and diversity would later lead to
more comprehensive multiculturalism within the political sphere.
The condition of guest workers reached a crossroads in the mid-20th century which
would act as the catalyst for the multicultural decades. Migrants had been funneled into Europe
with the purpose of rebuilding the economy and then sending these migrants on their way. In
123 Ibid, 22 124 Boussetta, “Cycles of Post-War Immigration,” 8 125 Ibid, 10
49 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
order to stimulate interest in migration, culture and diversity were celebrated in superficial
ways, which is to say that benign aspects of varying cultures such as dress and cuisine were
celebrated while more significant concerns of migrant groups such as general subjugation and
economic concerns were overlooked entirely.126 As far as most governments were concerned, celebration of diversity would encourage migrant productivity and morale but more significant changes in policy were unnecessary as migrants would not be staying long.127 However, around
the middle of the century, it became clear that guest workers were not just guests and that,
already, family reunification schemes had resulted in second and third generations of migrants
demanding greater participation and representation in the governments of, what was to them,
their home country, not host country. Governments, realizing not only that guest workers had
become a fixed part of the population but that the European economy was all but entirely
dependent on their contribution, had little choice but to make concessions to migrant
demands. Further, the rapid decolonization which occurred throughout the mid-century stood
as quite a shock to the imperial establishment. Subsequently, governments were more inclined
to support multicultural policy, if only to placate the workers who were essentially holding up
the economy.128This was the true start of the multicultural era.
From the 1970s until the late 80s, multiculturalist policies swept through Europe. For
this short time, most Western European countries introduced reforms which encouraged and celebrated difference while also offering small concessions towards political participation for
126 Kymlicka, “Multiculturalism,” 5 127 Boussetta, “Cycles of Post-War Immigration,” 14 128 Boussetta, “Cycles of Post-War Immigration,” 15
50 Charlotte Luks
immigrants and various minority groups.129 Though the form of multiculturalism practiced left
much to be desired, it stood as a stark contrast to contemporary assimilation politics which
demand uniformity as a prerequisite to belonging.
Multiculturalism hits Belgium
Though the foreign population rates ranged immensely throughout Western Europe, by the time multiculturalism had fully ended around 1992, Belgium boasted the second highest relative foreign population after Sweden at 9.1%, far higher than more famously diverse countries such as the United Kingdom, which only had 3.3%.130 Due to the variance in foreign
populations as well as the demographics of those foreigners, multiculturalism took unique
forms in each respective country. This was especially the case in Belgium which, at the time, was dealing with internal issues of culture between the Flemish and Walloon ethnic
nationalities. For this reason, while immigration concerns tended to be preeminent political
issues throughout most of Europe at the time, they were pushed more to the background in
Belgium. Though immigrant inclusion may not have been the foremost political concern in
Belgium, it remained a concern and Belgium presented its own forms of MCP over the course of
the multicultural decades.
Political Concessions for Foreigners
Over the roughly 30 year span of the multicultural decades, the Belgian state made
concessions to foreign factions within its population in regards to their legal status and rights
129 Ibid, 8 130 Runblom, “Swedish Multiculturalism,” 626
51 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
of political participation. These rights were fought for primarily by unions and other
organizations of laborers, and these MCPs focused heavily on representation within the
government. The slogan for one such labor organization states, “Geen kruimels maar
rechten!131” emphasizing the importance of tangible rights rather than superficial gestures.132
There were also moves towards social multiculturalism, which will be discussed later in the
chapter.
The rights of foreigners within Belgium were primarily determined through the Law of
1980, a comprehensive piece of legislation which defined the legal access of non-native
residents to territory and residence and the standards of expulsion. This law applied to all foreign residents and was subsequently more overarching than country-specific treaties and
tended to grant more rights than international conventions including, but not limited to, the
Geneva Convention and the Rome Statute.133 The foremost principle codified in the law of 1980
was the requirement of permits for all foreign citizens; both residency and right to work required authorization in the form of visas and permits respectively. Subsequently, there was no free access to the labor market as work permits had to be acquired prior to arrival in the country.134 Permission to reside or work was under the jurisdiction of various Ministries who
could take the national labor market and national interests in consideration.135 Though to some
extent restrictive, this law benefitted immigrants in that it codified standards, abandoning the
131 “not crumbs but rights!” 132 Anonymous. “Lebbeke in z’n Weekedaugs Dingen Achie Vermeiren op z’n Best.” De Voorpost, December 9 1988, 14 133 Boussetta, “Cycles of Post-Wat Immigration,” 21 134 Ibid, 21 135 Ibid, 21
52 Charlotte Luks
discretionary methods of the past.136 Further, it allowed foreigners with permits more rights
than others and those who were granted permanent resident status had free access to the
labor market and enjoyed heightened levels of protection against expulsion.137 Beyond this law,
workers who had come through the various pre-existing bilateral agreements had the right of
family reunification.138
Arguably the most important development of the multicultural decades in Europe was the
extension of voting rights to a greater portion of the population. Up until 1976, not all Belgians
enjoyed these rights. Naturalized Belgian citizens or citizens through marriage were allowed to
vote only at the municipal level until this time.139 While this expansion was significant, it was
one of few large progressions made in this time in terms of regional or federal voting rights. The
Maastricht Treaty of 1992 required EU citizens be granted the right to vote in municipal
elections in every EU country.140 However, Belgium was granted an exception to this condition:
in municipalities where over 20% of the electorate was EU-foreign, a condition of residency (of
maximum 6 years) could be instated in order to deter the potential disruptions of the ‘foreign
vote’ on an already fragile linguistic power-struggle within Belgium.141 The eventual result of
these laws and treaties granted suffrage to naturalized Belgian citizens and, after some years,
EU residents. Ultimately, the multicultural decades expanded voting rights in Belgium, though
perhaps with more contingencies than were present in the rest of Europe.
136 Ibid, 22 137 Ibid, 22 138 Ibid, 22 139 Ibid, 23 140 European Union, Treaty on European Union, Treaty of Maastricht, 7 February 1992, Official Journal of the European Communities C 325/5; 24 December 2002 141 Ibid
53 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
Voting rights and enfranchisement standards were far more lenient within the social
governments than regional governments.142 The Law of January 28, 1963, allowed for the social
enfranchisement of all foreigners in possession of a work permit. Foreigners were also allowed
to stand as candidates in these elections, with the condition that they had been working in the
same sector for five years (this number was only 3 years for native Belgians).143 This provision would be modified in 1967 to state that Belgian and EU nationals had a 3 year waiting period while non-EEC foreigners and stateless persons had a 5 year waiting time.144 The inequity in
waiting time before standing in elections would be removed in 1971 and the final decree
regarding social elections in 1975 would remove the provision requiring the nationality of
foreign workers to be stated on the ballot.145 The social realm, relative to the regional or
federal areas of government, made far more progress regarding voting rights in the second half
of the 20th century. In many ways, the social realm was more relevant to the lives of immigrant
laborers as it dealt with issues of remuneration and social protection. However, lack of suffrage
in the regions left immigrants without mainstream political agency.
Social Multiculturalism
As discussed in the previous sections, Belgium participated in a common European theme of migration and multicultural policies throughout the 20th century. The previous
sections discussed the institutionalized forms of multicultural policies which, while crucial to
immigrant populations in terms of codified rights and responsibilities, were not the most visible
142 As explained in earlier chapters, the Belgian government is divided into a series of regional and cultural/social governments in addition to the federal government. 143 Boussetta, “Cycles of Post-War Immigration,” 24 144 Ibid, 24 145 Ibid, 24
54 Charlotte Luks form of multiculturalism. Beginning in the 1970s, Belgium made strides towards social multiculturalism: an enterprise driven by NGOs and non-profits with state interference coming mostly in the form of funding.146 The goal of cultural democracy to be achieved through multiculturalism was motivated largely by the recent past. There was a clear desire to remove the country from the fascism of the Second World War as well as the state culture of communist countries and the market-regulated culture of the United States.147 Regardless of these and other motivations, discussed earlier, multicultural policies began to spring up throughout Belgium, introduced by the Community governments. While the Federal and
Regional governments had introduced the policies discussed earlier, matters of culture, education, welfare, language usage and inter-community cooperation fell to the Community governments, which funded the creation of bodies and structures responsible for the celebration of diversity within the Belgian communities.148
Cultural Policies
The third constitutional review of 1971 codified the definition of culture and the responsibilities of the three cultural governments.149 From the overarching perspective of the national constitution, the responsibilities of the cultural governments are as follows:
• Protection and promotion of language
• Encouragement of research training
• Fine arts, including theater and cinema
146 Council of Europe/ERICarts, “Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe, 13th Edition”, 2012: 4 147 Ibid 7 148 Regional governments are divided based on geography, community governments are based in language 149 Council of Europe/ERICarts 4
55 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
• Cultural heritage, museums and other cultural scientific institutions
• Libraries, record libraries, and similar services
• Radio and television broadcasting (with the exception of governmental communications
and commercial advertising)
• Youth policy
• Continuing education and cultural animation
• Physical education, sport and outdoor life
• Leisure and tourism150
When examining social multiculturalism in Belgium, it is necessary to examine the
policies of each community, as it is the communities which hold power over the social spheres
of their respective linguistic groups, rather than the federal or regional governments. The
community governments, while seemingly trivial, are not to be underestimated. As is the case
with the regional as well as federal governments, community governments have a great deal of
autonomy, to the extent that they are authorized to engage in international agreements and
treaties independent of the federal government.151 As a result, multiculturalism in the social sphere took different forms in the Flemish, Franco-phone and German communities,
respectively.
While each community falls under the national charter of responsibilities for community governments, prioritization of responsibilities differs in each respective region. Flemish community policy is based on core values which differ from those of the other two
150 Ibid, 5 151 Ibid, 2
56 Charlotte Luks
communities. Of greatest importance to the Flemish cultural government are issues of equal
rights for all inhabitants with simultaneous diversity in cultural offerings and government
measures to correct market distortions.152 The French community favors active support of artistic creation as well as support for broadcasting and press assistance.153 The small German community is most nuanced in its governmental support, prioritizing amateur arts and folklore
activities.154 While each region prioritizes differently, all three place heavy worth on supporting cultural democracy: introducing different art forms to different audiences, and the preservation of cultural heritage.155
Pursuit of Multiculturalism: Community Specific
The decline of multiculturalism was a greater European trend, as its creation had been.
While the reasons for the failure of multicultural policies en masse will be discussed in the next
chapter, the characteristics which led to their decline within the Belgian communities took
three distinct forms. The decline of multiculturalism should primarily be seen as a greater
Belgian and European phenomenon but let us first examine the nature of multiculturalism in
each community.
Flemish Community
Multiculturalism in Flanders reached its end in 1980, ending before the rest of Europe.
Prior to 1980, the Christian-Democrat ministers of culture operated under a goal of the democratization of culture. That is to say, the government hoped to include the many cultures
152 Ibid, 12 153 Ibid, 14 154 Ibid, 20 155 Ibid, 17
57 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms and cultural aspects throughout its region in the greater schema of culture. In pursuit of this goal, the cultural ministers provided libraries and cultural centers throughout Flanders as well as offering cultural celebrations. Beginning in 1980, the goal of the community government shifted immensely in tandem with the economic climate. Between 1981 and 1992, economic crisis struck Flanders. As a result, the overall budget of the region was reduced and with it the budget of the community government.156 The combination of budget cuts and the overall trend in the government from the democratization of culture to cultural management resulted in more oversight on the part of the government in the affairs of cultural institutions. From this point, cultural policies in Flanders no longer centered on a democratization of culture but rather, the very specific presentation of Flemish culture, to be approved and maintained by the government.157 It should be noted that this was not the only reason for the decline of multiculturalism, but this aspect of the decline was unique to the Flemish region.
French Community
The French community experienced the failure of multiculturalism largely through the imposition of assimilation politics on the national level. From a region-specific perspective, the
French community fared well in terms of multiculturalism on the part of the community government. This phenomenon can be attributed to the fact that the Walloons did not experience the Flemish economic crisis of the 1980s and their population was far more saturated with foreigners as a result of their extensive mining history.158 The French community modeled its rule after the Council of Europe and created a permanent democratic cultural and
156 Ibid, 2 157 Ibid, 2 158 Ibid, 17
58 Charlotte Luks
education policy. This resulted in a boom of multiculturalism in the 1970s and 1980s, with the
creation of significant support mechanisms (both in terms of regulation and financial support)
of libraries, youth centers, community television, group expression and creativity, theater, and
continuing adult education.159 The beginning of the assimilation polity in Belgium would shift
the focus of these policies and institutions towards the promotion of Walloon and, by
extension, Belgian culture, but these institutions would remain intact.160
Germany Community
The participation of the German community in the multicultural era is negligible in the broader scheme of Belgian politics. While the French and Flemish communities were given autonomy in the 1970s constitutional reform process, the German speaking community acquired limited authority until the 1990s.
Conclusion
Immigration into and within Europe is not a new concept; it has been studied and theorized about on countless occasions. However, conjectures about transcontinental
European trends are not sufficient if one hopes to understand the issues which concern immigrants to Belgium, specifically. Immigrants to Belgium have come from many countries:
early immigration primarily involved neighboring Western European countries before bilateral
guest worker agreements brought laborers from Southern and Eastern Europe, as well as
Northern Africa. These trends themselves were not unique to Belgium, most European
159 Ibid, 22 160 Ibid, 13
59 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms countries experienced waves of migrants in similar patterns. What makes Belgium truly unique is not only the migrants who came in, but the country and political climate they came into.
The brief history provided in this chapter elucidates contemporary immigration-policy trends to some extent. Immigrants to Belgium did not benefit from Multicultural Policies and the Multicultural Decades to quite the extent that immigrants to other European states did.
This can be attributed to the fact that immigrants were seen to threaten the precarious balance of cultures already in Belgium. This perception was reified by the broader European community when it exempted Belgium from certain provisions in treaties in order to circumvent internal tensions. To some extent, the multicultural decades in Belgium also forgot about immigrants.
While immigrants were denied many rights as an active result of the community problem, other rights were denied them simply because migrants were not a primary concern at a time when there was already so much internal tension. As we will see in the coming chapters, this situation is exemplary of the position of immigrants in Belgium: first to be blamed for internal issues, last to receive the benefits of living in Belgium.
While it is true that immigrants to Belgium did not have quite the luxuries of immigrants to various other Western European countries, they were not without rights. The multicultural decades did bring many advances, as described earlier in this chapter. The multicultural decades were a time of celebration of diversity, regardless of the economic motivations.
However, in the early 1990s, the multicultural decades would come to a sudden and abrupt halt, in favor of assimilation politics. Before we can discuss the concerns of the assimilation
60 Charlotte Luks imperative and the toll it takes on immigrants, we must understand why multiculturalism failed, as will be addressed in the next chapter.
61 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
Chapter 3
Why did Multiculturalism Fail?
“Before we can decide whether to celebrate or lament
The fall of multiculturalism, we first need to make sure
We know what multiculturalism has in fact been.” 161
-Migration Policy Institute
From the early 1970s up to the early 1990s, Europe experienced a time of growth in terms of policies aimed at the inclusion and celebration of diversity and democracy of culture within the liberal state. In the early 90s, there was a sudden, abrupt shift from multicultural
policies to assimilation politics. While migrant populations had been actively deterred from integrating for the past few decades, assimilation suddenly became imperative to belonging and inclusion. As it had done throughout the 20th century, Belgium followed the greater
European trend out of multiculturalism and into assimilation. While many of the reasons for the
failure of multiculturalism were seen across the continent, other factors were specific to the
Belgian political climate of the time. The next chapter will explore the pitfalls of the assimilation imperative, but first we will explore the reasons for multiculturalism’s end.
161 161 Will Kymlicka Multiculturalism: Success, Failure and the Future (Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2012) 9
62 Charlotte Luks
Multiculturalism Fails at the Hands of Multicultural Policies
The term multiculturalism is one with many definitions and real-world implications. I
have purposefully chosen not to define the term up until this point because the form of
multiculturalism purported by European states in the latter half of the 20th century was largely
undefined and mostly a clumsy attempt at appeasing many disparate populations within
Europe. In its broadest terms, multiculturalism is the goal of creating a society and a polity in
which many cultures can coexist.162 The best way to define the European model of
multiculturalism during the multicultural decades is to examine it against the assimilation
politics currently being practiced. Current assimilation politics stem from a republican model in
which a state can only operate successfully if the governed population is homogenous in culture
and language.163 While this model takes different forms in different states and has different motivations, the republican ideals from which it stems theorize that if there is an acknowledgement or celebration of difference, there will inevitably be a hierarchy of said difference.164 In contrast, multiculturalism aims to celebrate and understand difference in a democratic fashion. In this model, the state is strengthened by the unification of many different cultures and viewpoints, rather than weakened by it. Multicultural policies should not necessarily be conflated with multiculturalism. While multiculturalism by definition is the successful coexistence of different cultures, multicultural policies are the tools through which this end goal is reached, or at least attempted. To say that multiculturalism in Europe failed is
162 Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, eds., Multiculturalism and the Welfare State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 5 163 Pierre Birnbaum and Tracy B. Strong, “From Multiculturalism to Nationalism,” Political Theory 24(1996) 37 164 Roger Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1992) 50
63 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms to say that the policies which were implemented never reached a point of true multiculturalism. The following chapter will examine the failures of these policies, both in terms of the policies themselves as well as the the context in which they were presented, and the reasons why they proved unsuccessful.
No Room for Third Party Nationalisms
Multiculturalism in Europe failed largely by virtue of the types of multicultural policies enacted by the state. This is also true of Belgium, though there were more complicated factors at play in the Belgian state. Not only were the multicultural policies inadequate and inept in their attempt to create a pervasive multiculturalism, the nature of the society into which these policies were introduced created a treacherous path to their success. While Belgium did participate in the wider scheme of European multiculturalism, its participation was limited in regard to foreigners. Arguably, this development can be contributed to internal tensions within
Belgium. Belgium’s own ‘community problem’ was the foremost political issue of the time, greatly overshadowing issues of immigration. While the country may have made concessions in terms of foreign involvement in political processes, these strides were limited by the Belgian community problem and, when third party nationalisms created too much of a perceived threat to Belgian unity, multicultural policies were replaced with the assimilation imperative.
Long before the Belgian state existed, the Walloon and Flemish nationalities had been at odds. The two groups have been involved in a centuries long power struggle, with various conquerors and rulers favoring one group or the other, determined largely by the preferred language of the time. Under French rule, for example, the French speaking Walloons were put
64 Charlotte Luks
in positions of power while the Dutch Speaking Flemish were favored under Dutch rule.165 Even
after independence in 1830, conflicts continued to arise over perceived access to equal claims
of “Belgian-ness.” While the rest of Europe focused on ways in which to include foreign factions
of their population in the European community, Belgium was struggling to appease its two
nationalisms in various aspects of public life.
After centuries of struggles, the “community problem” reached a head in 1968 at the KU
Leuven (Catholic University of Leuven). The KUL, one of Europe’s oldest universities, has been
the scene of incredible destruction since its creation in 1425. Many of its manuscripts were
stolen and brought to Paris when French revolutionaries shut down the university. The library
was bombed by Germans in WWI, only to be rebuilt by Americans in the interwar period and then burned down during the Second World War.166 The events of 1968, however, would not
only divide the library, but the entire country. Despite being in the Flemish region of Belgium,
the KUL had historically been a French-speaking institution, due to the belief that French was
the language of the intellectual class.167 Angered by the Walloon monopoly over higher education in the Flemish region, Flemish students demanded that the Walloons leave Flanders.
As the result of extended marches and sometimes violent protests, the KUL became Flemish
and a new French school was started on the Walloon campus of Louvain-la-Neuve (fig 3.1).168 In order to start the new school, the library’s 1.6 million books were divided, with odd-numbered books staying in the old library and even-numbered books being sent to the new Walloon
165 Shepard Clough, A History of the Flemish Movement in Belgium (New York: Octagon Books, 1930) 166 Anonymous. “The Trouble with Flanders: Why Belgium’s Unendeing Linguistic Dispute Matters to Europe.” The Economist, Jan 27 2011, 51 167 Jan Baptist Chrysostomus Verlooy Verhandeling op D’Onacht Der Moederlyke Tael in de Nederlanden (Netherlands: Nabu Press, 1788) 15 168 Anonymous, “The Trouble with Flanders,” 51
65 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
Campus.169 The student protests led not only to the division of one of Europe’s oldest universities but to the division of one of Western Europe’s newest governments.
The division of the University triggered an avalanche of partitions throughout the
Belgian state. As both new universities were Catholic, the school divide subsequently divided the Catholic Church into Francophone and Flemish halves. As a result, the Conservative Catholic party divided as well. This would soon be followed by a separation of both the liberal and social parties. Following these developments, Belgian politics became incredibly divisive, with each party arguing not only for its ideology but for its language group.170 Subsequently, the federal
government was pulled apart into a central government, three regional governments with
power equal to the central government, and three community, language-based
governments.171 These changes would make the country nearly ungovernable, as evidenced by the total collapse of the Belgian government in June 2010.172 What started as a student protest resulted in the Belgian state becoming, as stated in The Economist, “a hollowed-out shell, with a little-loved flag and a forlorn sovereign, Albert II, who could yet end up as the last king of the
Belgians-indeed, the last Belgian.”173
These divisions and new structures by no means solved the community problem, as can
clearly be seen in contentious modern politics. However, the school division as well as the
introduction of regional governments with equal power to the federal government, while
structurally unsound, granted equal access to power to both the Flemish and the Walloons, and
169 Ibid, 51 170 “The Trouble with Flanders” 51 171 Ibid, 51 172 Ibid, 51 173 “The Trouble with Flanders” 51
66 Charlotte Luks
later the small German-speaking population within Belgium as well as the moderately autonomous Brussels region.174 In light of the upheaval caused by the community problem during the multicultural era, the lack of concessions towards foreign residents makes sense.
Belgium participated in the multicultural decades mostly through concessions to its own multicultural population, rather than to foreign residents. The precarious balance of power which exists in Belgium did not allow for the multicultural decades to continue. For much of the multicultural decades, migrants went largely forgotten within the political sphere as the community problem held public attention. Near the end of the multicultural decades,
concessions to foreign populations were seen to threaten the newfound equality of the Flemish
and Walloon cultures. As we proceed to examine the multicultural policies aimed at the
inclusion of foreign populations within Belgium, we must remember the context into which
these policies were introduced. While these policies had many shortcomings, they had limited
potential for success within the Belgian state.
The 3-S Model of Multiculturalism
The main critique of the multicultural decades within Europe by scholars has been that
the wrong kinds of multicultural policies were implemented. As we have seen, multiculturalism
has a rather broad definition and the means by which it can be reached are many. Studies have
shown that, when implemented effectively and correctly, multicultural policies have enormous
benefits to immigrant and marginalized populations as well as to the dominant population.
174 Brussels autonomy is a huge point of contention for many Belgians who feel it is unconstitutional to grant Brussels its own government and political autonomy
67 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
However, most of these positive outcomes were not seen in Europe due to the style of
multicultural policies introduced during the 1970s and 80s.
When implemented correctly, multiculturalism has the potential to strengthen a country
in a variety of ways. Most importantly, multiculturalism enhances national unity. When
immigrant populations feel included and celebrated within a new country, they are more likely
to become citizens and become active in politics within mainstream methods such as voting
and standing for election.175 When marginalized populations have tangible political agency
within a state, they are more likely to feel connected to the state and take on the identity of
their host state, thereby becoming more likely to integrate than to maintain distinct, isolated
ethnic enclaves.176 Further, immigrants who are allowed plurality and maintain transnational
activities are likely to be better educated, longer residents of the host country, and more likely
to be involved in local politics.177 Effective multiculturalism reduces hate and racism, which has
the potential to divide a nation, by encouraging cooperation and respect and promoting
cultural understanding.178 From an innovation stand point, multiculturalism brings together new ideas and cultures and has the potential to enhance the culture of the host nation.179 The
successes of multiculturalism have been well documented in countries such as Canada, which are considered multiculturalism success stories, in contrast to Europe. When implemented
175 Kymlicka, “Success, Failure,” 2 176 Ibid, 3 177 Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, Multiculturalism and the Welfare State, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 6 178 John Crowley, “The Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities,” International Political Science Review 22(2001), 107 179 Kymlicka, “Success, Failure,” 17
68 Charlotte Luks correctly, studies show that multicultural policies strengthen the state and even lead to assimilation of immigrant groups.
While there is evidence for the benefits of effective multiculturalism, these benefits never quite reached fruition within Europe. This can largely be attributed to the failings within multicultural policies. In her book After Multiculturalism, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown characterizes the style of multiculturalism practiced in Europe as reflective of what she calls the “3-s model.”
The 3 s’s: Saris, Steel drums and Samosas, describes a model of multiculturalism which takes the, “familiar markers of ethnic groups-clothing, cuisine and music-and treats them as authentic practices to be preserved by their members and safely consumed by others.”180 In so doing, states take the benign aspects of marginalized cultures and celebrate them in regulated ways- through education, cultural festivals and so forth. This model is inherently problematic in that it is not comprehensive and ends up acting as a detriment to the goal of multiculturalism.
One critique of the 3-s model is that it celebrates the benign aspects of marginalized cultures while overlooking substantive concerns of marginalization. While states put on cultural fairs and other events to celebrate the difference within their borders, they fail to address socio-economic concerns of migrants.181 Further, while these types of policies create greater access within the broader population to some of the aspects of foreign cultures, they do not allow for greater access to political agency for the people of the celebrated cultures.182 This has also been termed the “misdiagnosis effect,” in that it leads people to falsely assume that the problems facing minorities are based in the misrecognition of their culture, thereby
180 Kymlicka, “Success, Failure,” 3 181 Ibid, 5 182 Banting and Kymlicka, “multiculturalism,” 13
69 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
encouraging even more recognition of ethnic identity through shallow practices.183 This
misdiagnosis entirely overlooks the true problems facing minority populations. The shallow
policies of multiculturalism enacted by European states during the multicultural era did not
encourage any sort of substantive multiculturalism because they failed to incorporate
immigrants into the politics of the state.
Another major critique of the 3-s model addresses the way that it deals with the cultures it
aims to promote. The focus on the “authenticity” of culture has two major pitfalls. First, it casts
culture as being static; presuming that members of an ethnicity have a singular, inert culture
creates a distinction between those who inherently belong and those who do not.184 By
emphasizing difference in this way, states run the risk of creating parallel realities within the
country; of immigrants and natives living in isolated cultures which cannot change or mingle.
Second, the aspects of culture which are selected for celebration tend to be those aspects
which are least controversial, for example cuisine rather than a practice such as forced
marriage.185 By selecting the aspects of culture by which certain ethnic groups will be identified, states essentially “Disneyfy” marginalized populations while failing to address the conflicts which may arise when more substantive cultural practices conflict with those purported by the state and its natives.186 Alibhai-Brown’s analysis of multiculturalism in Europe creates a framework for its failure which can be seen in practice throughout Europe, Belgium included.
Dominance Threatened
183 Ibid, 14 184 Kymlicka, “Success, Failure,” 5 185 Ibid, 5 186 Ibid, 6
70 Charlotte Luks
The failure of multiculturalism within Europe, and more specifically Belgium, cannot be
attributed to a single cause. The model of multicultural policy purported by the state was not sufficient to meet the needs of either the dominant population or marginalized groups. When
Belgium transitioned into assimilation politics in the early 1990s, multicultural policies had failed to address the needs of both groups and in fact catalyzed the need for an assimilation imperative. Assimilation policies were introduced by the dominant group, Belgian natives, in response to multicultural policies. MCPs failed in this regard largely because they were too visible, and thereby created a perceived threat to the hegemony of native Belgians, many of whom had only recently become a part of the dominant group.
A significant factor in the dominant group within Belgium’s rejection of multicultural policies was what Will Kymlicka calls the “corroding effect.”187 As he describes, the welfare
state is dependent upon solidarity between citizens of the state. That is to say, citizens of a
state are more willing to support redistribution if they can trust and relate to other citizens of
the state, particularly those in need of welfare. However, multicultural policies such as those
which fall within the framework of the 3-s model emphasize difference and in so doing corrode
trust and solidarity to the point where the members of the state with an economic advantage
are repelled by the idea of redistributing their wealth to others within the state who they now
perceive to be different from themselves.188 From a more practical standpoint, 3-s policies
corrode the welfare state by putting money and effort into recognition of marginalized group
rather than redistribution of wealth to marginalized groups.189 As a result, dominant parties
187 Banting and Kymlicka, “Multiculturalism,” 11 188 Ibid, 11 189 Ibid, 11
71 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
lose faith in the welfare state while marginalized groups see fewer benefits from the welfare
state.
The most significant feature of the transition from multiculturalism to assimilation was a
change in political power. The multicultural era was dominated by a socialist-leaning
government, while right-leaning parties dominate the assimilation era.190 This change in rule
was in part the result of growing concern regarding immigrants within Belgium. Negative public perception of immigrants and their demand for rights was reflected in the way Belgium voted, but this public sentiment arose out of multicultural policies. A major failing of multicultural
policies were that they were “too visible.”191 In practice, 3-s multiculturalism does little more
than celebrate difference without any substantial change to the country’s cultural or political
structure. However, this celebration of difference is intentionally visible and pervasive within
the media as well as in schools. As a result, the dominant groups within the nation, in this case native Belgians, feel that their culture is threatened and that they will be asked to change to accommodate the cultures of immigrants.192 This perceived threat led to the assimilation polity
which requires immigrants to become like native Belgians, without Belgians surrendering any
aspect of their culture. While the idea that multiculturalism would require Belgians to surrender
their identity is a misconception of what multicultural policies have the potential to achieve,
misconceptions backed by (misplaced) frustrations and the voting power of native Belgians
would lead to the regime change which ushered in the assimilation era.
190 Jacobs, “Niewkomers,” 3 191 Kymlicka, “Success, Failure,” 12 192 Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, After Multiculturalism,(UK: Blackwell Publishers, 2001) 49
72 Charlotte Luks
Issues of corrosion and visibility were common throughout the greater European decline
of multiculturalism; however the results of these issues were exaggerated by the Belgian
community problem. In the first decade of the multicultural era, Belgium was immersed in
internal strife regarding the equality of native populations. Following the climax of the Flemish
movement in Leuven in 1968, the Flemish and Walloons were finally equal in a substantial,
codified manner for the first time in the region’s history. Prior to 1968, the community problem
obscured multiculturalism and the struggle of immigrants towards political participation and
agency. After native Belgians were finally granted equality, however, immigration concerns
were pushed to the forefront. At this point, visibility became a greater concern because of the
delicate balance of power within the state as well as tensions stemming from a Flemish
population which, having just been granted full rights, was hesitant to extend these rights to
non-Belgians. Furthermore, newfound equality in the name of a singular Belgian nation was strengthened by a communal desire to preserve Belgian culture in the face of increased diversity within the state.193
Multicultural policies within Europe and especially in Belgium were formulated in such a
way that the dominant group within Belgium felt threatened by the democratization of culture
within the state. While the ultimate goal of multiculturalism is a cohesive nation which is
strengthened by difference, the tools through which Belgium attempted to achieve this goal
failed to create cohesion but rather divided the nation by creating a perceived threat to the
193 Anne Morelli and Jean-Philippe Schreiber, “Are Immigrants the last Belgians?” in Nationalism in Belgium: Shifting Identities 1780-1995 (New York: Palgrave, 1998) 255
73 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms hegemonic population within the state which enjoyed voting rights and held the power to end the multicultural decades.
Celebrating the Benign, Overlooking the Substantive
While it would be easy to lament the decline of multiculturalism at the hands of the native population of Belgium, the policies which were enacted in the name of multiculturalism were not only insufficient for native Belgians, but also for the marginalized populations which were intended to benefit from these policies. When implemented correctly, multicultural policies have the potential to incorporate immigrant populations into the political sphere as well as foster a connection to the host state. However, the shallow policies employed in Belgium only further marginalized immigrant populations and neglected to engage with the substantial economic and political concerns of immigrant groups.
As discussed earlier, the 3-s model of multiculturalism has the tendency to celebrate the benign features of diversity within the state. In Belgium, this could be seen through the many cultural festivals created throughout the state as well as the introduction of cultural studies within primary education.194 Cultural organizations began to spring up throughout the state, making efforts towards a multicultural society and advocating for the creation of a ministry position dealing exclusively with the problems faced by immigrants.195 However, celebrating culture does not address the more substantive concerns of immigrants. While their cultures
194 Council of Europe/ERICarts, “Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe,” 13th edition 2012. 28 195 Anonymous, “Multikulturele Jongerendag,”De Voorpost, October 9, 1992. 8
74 Charlotte Luks
were being celebrated and the visibility of their difference was increased, their access to
political rights remained stagnant and largely nonexistent.196 John Crowley comments that:
Immigrants may be expected to have both distinctive interests and specific modes of access to the political process (especially, of course, when formal political rights are not available to them). Their children and later descendents, on the other hand, will tend either to become indistinguishable from the rest of the population, or, being distinguishable, to coalesce as an ethnic group.197
This was indeed the case in Belgium, where multicultural policies encouraged the creation of
distinct ethnic communities with internal leadership rather than integration of second and third
generation immigrants. However, ethnic leaders in most regards failed to reduce the political
powerlessness of their constituents.198 Multiculturalism in Belgium did not fulfill its promise of democratizing culture and incorporating immigrants into the Belgian state, rather, it created a spectacle of difference while neglecting to grant rights or agency to marginalized Belgian immigrants.
In many ways, multiculturalism was lauded as a success for immigrant populations within
Belgium, particularly Italians. Italians have become a “model for integration” within Belgium, one which Maghreb migrants should aspire to. While it would be easy to point to some changes of the period, such as the fact that Italians now live throughout the country and work in all sectors of the economy, rather than living in prisoner of war camps and working in coal mines, these changes mask problems which remain prevalent.199 Claims of the “Italian success story,”
ignore the fact that fieldwork shows that Italian is still an ethnic category within Belgium,
196 Marco Martiniello, “Ethnic Leadership, ethnic communities’ political powerlessness and the state in Belgium” Ethnic and Racial Studies 16(1993) 238 197 Crowley, “Political Participation,” 107 198 Martiniello, “Ethnic Leadership,” 239 199 Ibid, 236
75 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms demonstrative of the fact that true integration was never achieved.200 Relative to native
Belgians, Italians, no matter which generation of immigrant they are, are disadvantaged in the realms of socio-professional position, juridical-political status, access to education and housing as well as general prejudice. 201 However, relative to Turkish and Moroccan populations in
Belgium, Italians do indeed enjoy a privileged position.202 The improvements in the lives of
Italians since World War II are often lauded as proof of the success of multiculturalism however, as stated by Marco Martiniello:
This incontestable improvement of the Italians’ position in Belgian society is much more the result of general improvements that have affected the whole of Belgian society since World War II, and of a collection of individual and familial efforts, than it is of the collective action of an Italian community organized around its leaders in the Belgian state and polity. In that sense, the Italian community as such is still as politically powerless as it was in the past.203
Upon first glance, it could be assumed that a country as naturally diverse as Belgium would be in a better position for successful multiculturalism than a state with a homogenous population. However, this has not been the case. The policies implemented to further the goal of multiculturalism were insufficient; neglecting to improve the political power of immigrant populations and corroding the sense of unity and trust within the state as a whole. Rather than creating a democratization of culture, multicultural policies exacerbated preexisting divisions within a country struggling to unite disparate nations.
Policies Crumble
200 Ibid, 235 201 Ibid, 236 202 Ibid, 246 203 Ibid, 246
76 Charlotte Luks
Tensions building over multicultural policies within Europe manifested in a slow move
away from the goal of multiculturalism and towards the goal of assimilation. This was reflected
within the Belgian political sphere by policies which increasingly aimed to homogenize the
population and xenophobic laws which had previously been illegal being condoned and
institutionalized.204 Within Europe as a whole the discourse relating to immigrants began to shift from one of rights to one of duties, ushering in the age of assimilation.
As anti-immigration sentiment began to rise in Belgium, citizens increasingly supported more conservative practices.205 In the decade prior to 1980, immigrant groups had been
fighting for the codification of their legal status and the enfranchisement of non-nationals on
the local level.206 Increasing demands for rights in combination with the ever-growing visibility
of marginalized populations through multicultural practices led to a push-back from native
Belgian populations against immigrant demands. While immigrants did see their status
regulated within the law, this concession mostly favored the dominant population who could
now address the place of immigrants within the law.207 As a further step, many politicians
began successfully employing xenophobic rhetoric within their platforms, leading to a center-
right government coming to power in 1980.208 In 1984, a bill was introduced which placed
restrictions on the settlement of non-EU nationals within regions which already had high rates
of foreign occupation. Prior to this new law, Mayor Nols of Brussels had led a xenophobic
campaign to bar foreign nationals from settling in the Schaerbeek region of Brussels, a futile
204 Jacobs,” Nieuwkomers,” 167 205 Ibid, 57 206 A. Rea “Mouvements Sociaux, Partis et Integration,” in La Belgique et ses immigres. Les Politiques Manquees, (Bruxelles: De Boek Universite, 1997) 60 207 Ibid, 68 208 Grimeau, “De Immigratiegolven,” 119
77 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
campaign within the political climate of the time. However, following the law of 1984, this
practice became not only legal, but condoned.209 Popular support of such developments led
Belgian politicians to stray from pro-immigrant rhetoric, for fear of a backlash from the far
right.210 These fears were warranted, as demonstrated by the unprecedented success of the
radical-right party Vlaams Blok (Flemish Block) in 1987, a party whose platform focused largely on the purification of Flanders and the preservation of the Flemish culture.211 The great hope of multiculturalism in Belgium was eventually destroyed by the multicultural policies employed to its end.
Conclusion
The project of multiculturalism in Belgium met with an abrupt end in the early 1990s.
While the move to assimilation would prove detrimental to immigrant populations,
multiculturalism was doomed from the start. Throughout the multicultural decades, Belgium
was immersed in a power struggle between the Flemish and Walloon populations, a struggle
which greatly overshadowed the concerns of immigrants. Furthermore, the policies which were
implemented toward the goal of multiculturalism in Belgium were shallow and ultimately
ineffective. When we consider the fact that inadequate policies were introduced into an
unreceptive environment, we can see why multiculturalism failed. The end of multiculturalism
ushered in the age of assimilation, an inherently coercive concept which has caused rifts
throughout the country, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
209 Jacobs, “Nieuwkomers,” 167 210 Bousetta et al, “Multicultural Policies,” 9 211 Vlaams Blok received 18% of the vote in an election in Antwerp in 1987
78 Charlotte Luks
Chapter 4
The Assimilation Imperative
“Debates about the state of Europe emphasize
That essential to the success of the continental union
Beyond mere economic and bureaucratic centralization
Is a sense of a transnational European identity,
Based on common values, rooted in a common
Past, distinguishing the continent from the rest of
The world and connecting nations with vastly
Different cultures”212
-Fatima El-Tayeb
As we have seen, Belgium progressed towards multiculturalism before official policy
shifted abruptly to assimilation politics. What exactly is the project of assimilation, and what
does it mean for immigrants to Belgium?
The assimilation model is one that is inherently at odds with many of the basic tenets of human rights. Forcing immigrants to abandon their cultures and values in order to have any hope of belonging in a new place is inherently coercive and creates divides between those who
“are” and those who “aren’t.” Where such divides exist, hierarchies are inevitable and thus the assimilation imperative invariable places those who are “other” as lesser. In Europe, the assimilation imperative represents an unbalanced equation. To be integrated is to be accepted
212 Fatima El-Tayeb, European Others: Queering Ethnicity in Postnational Europe. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011) 4
79 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms as the same; however those with visible differences in appearance have little hope of ever being accepted as truly European, regardless of the steps they themselves take towards
Europeanization. European minorities have little hope of every being truly accepted as
European yet are consistently resented for “not being European enough.”
The assimilation paradigm is further complicated in Belgium due to complex structures of internal rule. In Belgium, assimilation politics are handled independently by regional governments. Throughout the country, integration has become one of the foremost political issues, leading to resurgence in the influence of radical right parties and laws such as the headscarf ban. The Belgian model of nationalism has been reified into policies which vilify immigrant groups and make their integration a matter of law; of right and wrong.
Immigrants face not only political difficulties in the process of assimilation, but also historical and cultural obstacles. There is a clear mandate that immigrants to Belgium must assimilate to Belgian culture, but what does that mean? Belgium has no one clear, singular culture; to be Belgian is to be either Flemish or Walloon, both of which are ethnic nationalities which cannot be integrated into. Even ethnic Belgians are not “Belgian” as such; they are members of nations which exist within the Belgian State. The requirement of assimilation in
Belgium amounts to an unattainable standard and is, by and large, a lie put forth to justify continued resentment of immigrants and flagrant racism and Islamophobia in social dialogue and Belgian politics.
In an increasingly globalized world, migrants are in a state of uneasy coexistence with host countries hoping to cling to static conceptions of traditional culture. For immigrants to
80 Charlotte Luks
Belgium, this creates a complicated existence, where plurality is denied in favor of a traditional culture: the history of which is artificially constructed and which is by no means universal to all ethnic Belgians.
The Shift into Assimilation Politics
The multicultural decades in Belgium were led by a left-wing government. These
decades saw the growth of progressive, inclusionary policies. However, the end of the
multicultural decades marked the beginning of economic decline in Belgium. By 1992, Belgian
debt accounted for about 130% of the GDP. As is common during times of economic decline,
native Belgians became frustrated by the presence of immigrant communities who had been
made more visible through multicultural policies and were seen to be stealing jobs from
Belgians. 213 The center-right, which had been building support throughout the late 1980s came into power in the early 1990s and enacted policies which officially marked the transition from multiculturalism into assimilation politics. As will be discussed later in this chapter, the new government introduced laws and rhetoric which focused on the requirement that all immigrants assimilate into Belgian culture.
Assimilation Concerns
Every state with a heavy influx of migrants operates under a model of integration or
nationhood. For example, the United States is based off of the “melting-pot” model, in which
213 Agnes van Zanten “Ethnicity and School Performance: Complicating the Immigrant/Involuntary Minority Typology 28 (1997), 360
81 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms plurality is encouraged and affirmative action is employed for minorities.214 The successes and failures of this model, while interesting, are irrelevant to this paper, I use the melting pot model here as a contrast to the model employed in Belgium. The Belgian model of assimilation is based off of the French republican model. The characteristics of the French republican model are as follows215:
• Emphasizes a superior and universal high culture
• Importance of the individual and the individual’s responsibility to integrate
• The emphasis on political belonging, rather than cultural or geographic factors
• The state as a unifying force
The Belgian model of republicanism places heavy emphasis on the first two factors but has, in recent years rejected the last two. In essence, the Belgian model of assimilation emphasizes a single culture, places the onus for integration on the individual, and emphasizes cultural belonging while neglecting the unification of the state which is itself fractured. As opposed to the American model which encourages a democracy of difference (the state becomes stronger when many cultures and backgrounds are unified into the whole, e pluribus unum) the republican model fears that if difference is acknowledged, there will inevitably be a hierarchy of difference and that, therefore, all members of the state and assimilate into the singular cultural model purported by the state.216
214 Ibid, 358 215 Ibid, 353 216 Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood, 52
82 Charlotte Luks
In order to operate in a non-coercive setting while maintaining national interest, the
state must find a balance between the desires for acculturation and pluralism respectively. In this vein, it is not illegitimate for the State to ask its immigrants to adopt the core values of the state such as progressive ideals or a secular public demeanor. However, when the state presumes to control the private sphere in the interest of an assimilation polity by, for example, governing the permissibility of religious garb in public settings, the state has stepped into the boundaries of denying plurality and coercive assimilation practices.
Inherently Coercive
The most problematic aspect of the assimilation politics being practiced in Europe is that they are inherently coercive and subsequently at odds with many basic tenants of human rights. From a theoretical standpoint, this coercion can be found indirectly: immigrants are expected to abandon their old culture and language in favor of the state culture and language if they hope to be accepted within public spheres. In this sense, no one is forcing the migrant to assimilate, but their failure to do so would result in few opportunities for education, housing, jobs and ultimately acceptance, which is where the coercive factor comes to play. International human rights law guarantees freedom of religion, association and choice, yet the assimilation politics practiced throughout Europe deny migrants these rights if they hope to access their other rights such as rights to life, work and shelter. Practically speaking, many assimilation policies are directly coercive in that they maintain the republican ideal of individual onus for integration by requiring migrants to pay for language and culture classes as a requirement of
83 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
inclusion.217 Assimilation policies at play in Europe today deny migrants plurality through coercive methods as prerequisites for belonging in the state.
Unbalanced equation
The assimilation paradigm within Europe is, at its core, an unbalanced equation. By definition, to assimilate is to be accepted as the same. This presents a project in two parts. First, in order to assimilate, a migrant must make steps towards adopting the culture of their host country. In some countries, such as the United States, the assimilation imperative allows for plurality, for example, an immigrant to America could be an African-American, Italian-American,
etc., and still be understood to have integrated. However, the republican model of assimilation
politics practiced in Europe does not allow for plurality: only total assimilation meets the
requirements of the assimilation imperative.218 The second part of the assimilation equation is
that the immigrant in question must be accepted as the same. What this means is that
regardless of the steps taken by the immigrant, they themselves do not have total control over
whether or not they have assimilated.
Scholar Fatima El-Tayeb finds this to be a problematic aspect of assimilation politics in
Europe. El-Tayeb finds that for marginalized groups within Europe with visible differences such
as skin color, language or customs, assimilation is an unattainable standard. In Europe
particularly, discussion of integration takes on an overtly racialized tone, justified by the
requirement all foreign nationals have to assimilate. El-Tayeb finds that “rather than entering
217 Christian Joppke, “Transformation of Immigrant Integration in Western Europe: Civic Integration and Antidiscrimination Politicis in the Netherlands, France and Germany,” World Politics 59(2007), 5 218 Ibid, 7
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new territory, debates around identity and political rights are frequently sidetracked by
discussions around the Europe fitness of particular racialized groups, as if minorities could by
returned to their place of origin if they fail to pass the compatibility test(as, of course, within
this setup, they inevitably will.)”219We can see the validity of El-Tayeb’s findings throughout
Europe, where nth generation immigrants continued to be labeled as ethnically “other,” despite
their own active participation within the host county’s political and social spheres and, often, total lack of ties to their country of origin. The European model of assimilation creates an unending cycle of migrants trying in vain to integrate as European while Europe denies immigrants inclusion and simultaneously resents them for not being European enough.
Assimilation creates divides
The ultimate goal of the republican assimilation model is to create a homogenous state which will operate without hierarchies. However, as with multiculturalism, the end goal can only be achieved if the policies implemented to its end are successful. In the case of assimilation, the policies at play have not been successful up to this point. Governments advocating for a homogenous, integrated society have introduced policies which essentially criminalize difference in order to ensure that citizens of the state adhere to state culture. This has cast difference as a matter of legal and illegal which in itself creates reified hierarchies of who does and does not belong. This in turn has resulted in increased divisions within respective states, be they radical right groups, ethnic enclaves, or other distinct populations who have been divided by assimilation politics. In this sense, assimilation policies have failed in their primary directive: to create a single, unified state free of difference and prejudice.
219 El-Tayeb, European Others, 3
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Inherent Contradictions in Belgian Assimilation Politics
The shift into assimilation politics from multicultural policies was quite abrupt in
Belgium. While disenchantment with multiculturalism had presented a steady decline in public
support of policies, assimilation imperatives entered the political realm quite abruptly in the
early 1990s. This created a difficult situation for migrant populations. As we have seen,
immigrants were actively deterred from integrating: they were encouraged to keep their own
languages and cultures in hopes that they would reintegrate into their former countries easily
upon their return. However, when laws suddenly came into effect which required immigrants
to assimilate into the language and culture of Belgium, they were at a distinct disadvantage.
Suddenly shifting from isolated immigrant enclaves, as constructed by the state, to assimilation
imperatives created an impossible climate for immigrant populations.
Social concerns aside, the assimilation paradigm in Belgium specifically provides a nearly
impossible landscape for cultural integration. Most countries in Western Europe operate under a scheme of assimilation; however there is one significant difference in Belgium. In countries such as the Netherlands or France, assimilation is difficult or impossible for migrants with visible differences, but there remains a clear model of what one should aspire to integrate too.
There is a clear model of the Dutch or French citizen, and what that looks like. However, as we have seen in previous chapter, the Belgian cultural landscape is far from homogenous. Rather the “Belgian culture” is comprised of two distinct ethnic nationalities. In practice, this means that to be “Belgian” means very little within the state borders, one is either Flemish, Walloon or an outsider. As political scholars Anne Morelli and Jean-Philippe Schrieber describe: “In present-
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day Belgium one cannot be both Flemish and Walloon. One cannot even have a good
relationship with both linguistic communities without being suspected of being a renegade or,
as some would have it, a traitor or enemy agent.”220 While this outlook is particularly dramatic,
the fact remains that in order to belong, migrants are held to two conflicting yet equally
unattainable standards. First, the migrant is expected to uphold “Belgian culture,” as immigration is seen as a primary threat to the decline of said culture. However, there is no singular Belgian culture, native Belgians themselves could not be seen to uphold this fiction and the expectation that immigrants do so amounts to an unattainable standard. Second, barring the ability to practice Belgian culture, immigrants are expected to choose a side, as it were.
That is to say, depending on their geographic locations, immigrants can be expected to integrate into either the Walloon or Flemish nationality. This brings its own difficulties, namely, these two nations are ethnic groups which cannot simply be assimilated into. Further, these two nations base their standards of belonging on participation in the historical conflict between
the two nations which has defined each.221 Some have argued that immigrants can be seen as
the last true Belgians; the last population to uphold the idea of a united country with pride in a
singular Belgium and royalist tendencies.222 This outlook, while perhaps a positive outlook on
the role of immigrants in Belgium, does not change the fact that immigrants are, by and large, politically powerless in Belgium and that despite their potential support of a singular Belgian state, integration policies are in the hands of the regions and the determination as to whether or not they have assimilated lies in the hands of native Belgians. Ironically, the assimilation
220 Anne Morelli and Jean-Philippe Schrieber, “Are Immigrants the Last Belgians?” in Nationalism in Belgium: Shifting Identities, 1780-1995 ed. Kas Deprez and Louis Vos (New York: Palgrave, 1998) 298 221 Ibid, 299 222 Ibid, 298
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imperative has in fact unified the country in one sense; for once it is not the Flemish and
Walloon fighting each other, but a united Belgian front standing against immigrants.
The Failures of Assimilation Politics in Practice in Belgium
In 2009, the Council of Europe released a report describing the persistence of racism
and xenophobia within Belgium, both within institutions and the general social sphere.223 The
incidents highlighted in the report as well as others which were not discussed are
demonstrative of the failure of assimilation politics. Rather than uniting the country under one
distinctive culture, assimilation has created divides which can be seen throughout the country,
to the detriment of immigrant communities as well as national unity.
More Division than Unity
Regardless of the problematic aspects of assimilation politics practiced in Belgium, the
republican ideals upon which assimilation policies are based reflect an earnest desire to create
a unified state free of racial and cultural hierarchies. Unfortunately in practice these laws have
primarily exacerbated racial tensions and created more significant divides within Belgian
society. These divides can be seen in the increased incidence of organizing in Belgium on all
sides of the political spectrum. The last decade has also seen a surge in ethno-religiously
affiliated organizations and political parties.
The lack of political agency aggravated by the assimilation imperative encourages the
creation of ethnic enclaves as a substitute for mainstream political participation. In most cases,
223 Report by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas Mannarberg, on his visit to Belgium 15-19 December 2008, CommDH (2009) 14
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these organizations rally around community needs, labor concerns, simple arbitration and other
local concerns. Organizations such as these, while to some extent encouraging division more
than unity, are beneficial to both the state and to immigrant communities. The state benefits
financially from having small claims handled outside of state courts and these peaceful immigrant organizations placate tensions caused by the state’s divisive policies. For immigrant communities, ethno-religious organizations are a way to create agency within a system that denies those with visible differences the rights and privileges of native Belgians. Such organizations, while indicative of the failure of the assimilation polity in achieving the goals of integration politics, are not the most visible form of immigrant coalitions.
While many immigrant organizations are nearly invisible; dealing with their own communities without attempting to influence state politics, some organizations have responded to the increasing marginalization of assimilation politics and become more extremist than the traditional immigrant groups. One primary organization which stands out in Belgium is
Sharia4Belgium, which has become an ugly face of immigration in Belgium. Sharia4Belgium is an incredibly visible organization which advocates for an Islamist state in Belgium and denounces democracy. The group and its spokesperson Fouad Belkacem have been responsible for a series of controversial moves: saying that they are praying for Osama Bin Laden, advocating the death penalty for LGBT individuals, and threatening the lives of many of
Belgium’s politicians.224 The group has also opened a Sharia court in Antwerp, thereby undermining state authority by dealing with both civil and criminal concerns extrajudicially.225
224 “Sharia4Belgium: het Duistere Verleden van Fouad Belkacem” Humo, June 7, 2010 225 Ibid
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While organizations such as Sharia4Belgium are beneficial to the state in the sense that free
speech is a foundation of the liberal state, they are the most visible ethno-religious organization
and thereby become the face of difference in Belgium. Sharia4Belgium is both violent and
resistant to integrating into Belgian culture, simultaneously demonstrating why assimilation
politics are necessary and why they do not work.
Radical Right Parties and Neo-Nazi Groups
The transition into assimilation politics was intertwined with a transition into a right-
leaning government in Belgium. The decades since have seen a resurgence in the power of
radical-right parties as well as the incidence of extremist groups in the country. These two
respective groups represent separate yet equally troubling trends within the country. As radical right parties gain popularity and power, their xenophobic rhetoric gains traction resulting in increasingly problematic laws being put into place, further widening the gap between natives and foreigners. These parties are in part supported by extremist, neo-Nazi groups which, while lacking in political clout, encourage an environment of fear by perpetrating hate-crimes and terrorizing those who they deem as lesser than native Belgians.
The most visible extreme party in Belgium today, one which has been mentioned throughout this paper, is Vlaams Belang. Vlaams Belang is the new face of a party which has existed since 1978 as Vlaams Blok, the most militant wing of the Flemish Movement. During its tenure as Vlaams Blok, mainstream parties were hesitant to form coalitions with the party, leading to the cordon sanitaire in 1989, an agreement which blocked the party from entering any level of government. In 2004, the Court of Appeals in Ghent ruled that the party sanctioned
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discrimination and, in so doing, violated the 1981 anti-racism law. Following this ruling, the party reorganized five days later as Vlaams Belang.226 The official party platform demands an
end to all immigration into the country, argues that integration is impossible for anyone with an
Islamic background, and demands deportation for anyone who cannot fully assimilate into
Belgian culture without any semblance of their former culture.227 What is most troubling about
this party is that it has become the single most popular Flemish party, supported by one in four
Flemish voters.228 This party is representative of the ugly face of assimilation politics; its own
platform argues both that immigrants can never fully assimilate, and that those who cannot
assimilate must be deported (fig 4.2). This is the main failure of assimilation: not only are
immigrants stripped of their rights to plurality, they have little hope of ever being truly
accepted as Belgian. Despite its extreme views, Vlaams Belang remains an increasingly popular political party with significant clout.
Parties like Vlaams Belang represent one side of the extreme-right spectrum. Such
parties, while extremist, have popular support and operate largely within mainstream politics.
On the other side of the spectrum are extreme-right neo-Nazi groups such as the Flemish group
Bloed, Bodem, Eer en Trouw (Blood, Soil, Honor and Loyalty.) BBET is a splinter group from the
Flemish branch of the Nazi skinhead group Blood and Honor and is both a terrorist and white-
nationalist organization (fig 4.3). In 2007, Belgian police raided army barracks and private
homes following a two year investigation into the group which had managed to infiltrate the
military and had amassed a cache of weapons and bombs. The group had been planning an
226 Jan Erk, “From Vlaams Blok to Vlaams Belang: The Belgian Far-Right Renames Itself.” West European Politics 28(2005) 1 227 “Vlaams Belang Programma,” Last modified 2012, http://www.vlaamsbelang.be/files/200806_programma.pdf 228 Lieven De Winter, Interview in Le Soir, 2004, 6
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extensive terrorist attack with the goal of destabilizing the country. Most troubling about this
attack was the plan to enact a “false flag” operation: murdering far-right politician Filip
Dewinter in hopes of the attack being blamed on Islamists and encouraging further
marginalization and open hostility toward Belgium’s Muslim minority.229 Such groups foster an
atmosphere of hatred and fear, an atmosphere which is then codified by political parties such as Vlaams Belang. While neo-Nazi groups are a small minority in Belgium, their more mainstream counterparts continue to gain support in Belgian politics. It should be noted that while such political parties and extreme-right organizations can be found throughout Belgium, they are predominantly in the Flemish region, where a Flemish-nationalist rhetoric transitions
easily into one of xenophobia.
Xenophobic Laws and the Illegality of Difference
While multicultural policies to some degree celebrated difference and acknowledged the benefits of the unification of culture, assimilation politics require the propagation of one singular culture: the Belgian culture purported by the state and Belgian natives. Assimilation politics are not simply a matter of political rhetoric or national sentiment, but instead have been codified into law, effectively making plurality and difference a matter of illegality and reifying the assimilation imperative.
One famous example of a xenophobic law, one which has sprung up throughout Europe, is the face-veil ban. Belgium became the second country in Europe, after France, to introduce such a law in 2011. The law forbids any clothing that obscures the identity of the wearer in
229 Anonymous, “Belgium Police Hold 17 in ‘Plot’” BBC News, September 7, 2006
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public upon punishment of 150 Euros and up to 7 days in jail. The law has had mixed reactions from both the domestic and international community. Many native Belgians support the law, arguing that the veil represents aspects of Islam which do not treat men and women equally and as such are inherently in opposition with progressive, European values.230 Taking that logic
a step further, Vlaams Belang has offered a 250 Euro bounty to anyone who reports someone wearing a niqab to the police.231 Many within the Muslim community have been resistant to
the new law. The most notable example would be the riots which broke out in the Molenbeek
region of Brussels in response to a woman being arrested upon refusing to remove her face
veil. When confronted with police officers, the woman in question head-butted an officer,
breaking his nose, and in the aftermath, over 100 people surrounded the police station,
throwing metal barriers and trash cans.232 The international community has also commented
on this, and other similar laws. Amnesty International notes that the law violates international
human rights law which guarantees rights of freedom of expression and freedom of religion.233
The introduction of the law and the responses to it have increased tensions within Belgium.
Rather than unifying the country under a single, assimilated identity, the law has codified the
illegality of difference and encouraged a divide between those who push immigrants to
assimilate and those clinging on to their own traditions and cultures, with often violent results.
As of March of this year, Belgian politicians have submitted a proposal to limit the power or
impeach elected officials who they deem as “Muslim extremist.” Alain Destexche, a liberal
member of the Federation Wallonia-Brussels, and Deputy Mayor Phillippe Pivin of Koekelberg
230 “Belgian Ban on Full Veils Comes into Force,” BBC News Europe, July 23, 2011 231 “Belgium: 250 Euro Bounty for Reporting a Veiled Woman,” Zee News, June 6, 2012 232 “Brussels Police Attacked by Islamists,” Euro News, January 6, 2012 233 “Belgium Full Face Ban would Breach International Law,” Amnesty International News, April 22, 2010
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introduced the law which is now open for signatures from parliament. The law would exclude
extremist parties from a range of political functions. Destexche cited as his reason for
introducing the law: “The people of the Islamic party do not want to be mixed with others in
public transport and other communal places. They advocate getting married and wearing a veil
at 12 years old, based on Islamic law.”234 This law suggests that politicians who subscribe to
Muslim extremism are incapable of functioning within a liberal, democratic society and should
therefore be banned from doing so. Ironically, law makers cite anti-racism laws directed at the
far-right as justification for this proposed law, saying, “The Islam-elected party has refused to
shake hands with Molenbeek Mayor Francoise Schepmans. I feel that some people do not
understand how similar this is to the behavior of the extreme right, and how they are creating
their own isolated community.”235One could argue that such laws which limit the Muslim community’s access to mainstream political agency are at least partially responsible for the
creation of these “isolated communities,” and that using anti-racist rhetoric to incite more
racism is a detriment to the unification of the Belgian community.
De Facto Segregation
The law addressed in the section above, while now open for signatures, has not yet
been passed. Most of the concerns of racism facing immigrants, particularly Muslim and Arabic
immigrants have not been institutionalized concerns. Rather, the political and social climate
234 Katerina Nikolas, “Belgium Porposes Limiting Influence of Islamic Political Party,” Digital Journal, March 11, 2013
235 Ibid, 1
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within Belgium has resulted in many cases of de facto segregation, particularly in the realms of
education, labor, and housing.
The Belgian school system is structured in such a way that the choice of schooling is an
absolute right, whether it is catholic school, public school or otherwise. However, this right
does not play out equally: in many cases Catholic schools offer the best education and, while
they are technically open to anyone, many such schools have schemes to keep out
“undesirables,” such as mandating a school uniform which conflicts with the mandates of
religious dress for some non-Catholics, or proof of baptism upon entrance.236 Further, many
Arabic immigrants find that their languages are not taught in schools. While some immigrant languages such as Spanish or Italian are taught in most, if not all, schools because of their current position as “status languages,” (in contrast with their status less than 50 years ago), higher level schools have been resistant to introducing Turkish or Arabic Language classes as they are seen to be reflective “concentrations schools” (schools with more than 50% minorities) which are presumed to be poorer learning environments. For many immigrant families who aspire to total integration into Belgian society, schools are seen as the vehicles for integration and upward mobility. As a result, many of these families opt out of concentration schools.237
However the majority of minorities in Belgium do not have this option, resulting from poverty
or lack of upward mobility, and the cycle of de facto segregation in Belgium continues. While
these statistics are centered largely on Moroccan and Turkish populations in Belgium, even
236 Michael Merry, “Social Exclusion of Muslim Youth in Flemish and French-Speaking Belgian Schools,” Comparative Education Review49(2005) 18 237 Ibid, 22
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Italian immigrants still face these issues: Italian youth are concentrated mostly in technical high
schools and are underrepresented at Universities.238
De facto segregation in schools is not an isolated phenomenon, rather, these concerns result in disparities within the labor market. While the rate of male Belgians occupying unskilled and semi-skilled manual jobs is 47%, this number jumps to 69-76% for Italians, 88% for
Moroccans and 92% for Turks. In terms of unemployment, 6.4% of Belgian males are unemployed, as opposed to 15% of Italians, 20% of Turks and 25% of Moroccans. Disparities in access to the labor market are reflected in the housing market, where 35% of Belgians own their own houses while only 27% of Italians, 12.5% of Turks and 9.5% of Moroccans do.239 These
figures show a very distinct hierarchy within Belgian society, with natives at the top, Moroccans
and Turks at the bottom and Italians holding a sort of intermediary position between the two.
This ethnic hierarchy is the opposite result assimilation politics hoped to achieve: rather than
creating a homogenous population, it enforced a hierarchy of difference through de facto segregation.
Racist Attacks
The decades which encompass the assimilation polity within Belgium have seen an increase in the incidence of racist attacks.240 The distinct divisions created within the state by
the assimilation polity justify “othering” within official rhetoric and have contributed to well-
documented incidences of hate-crimes. One famous example is that of the hate-crime enacted
238 Martiniello, Ethnic Leadership, 236 239 Ibid, 238 240 Jolien Janzing. “Archief: Hans Van Themsche: Portret van een Killer.” Humo, May 7, 2012, 1
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by Hans Van Themsche in Antwerp in 2006. On May 11 of that year, 18 year old Van Temsche
took to the streets and shot a pregnant Malian woman and the 2-year old Belgian girl in her
care, killing both, before moving on to wound a Turkish woman sitting on a bench nearby.241
Van Themsche was frustrated by personal concerns in his life and in his first hearing, confessed
that he purposefully aimed his frustrations at immigrants.242 Upon searching his belongings,
police officers found extreme-right propaganda, fitting for the murderer who was a member of
the radical-right party Vlaams Belang.243 The murders elicited conflicting responses from the city. Following the attacks, many people placed signs constructed in the style of street signs in their windows which read “zonder haat straat” (no-hate street), which in turn led to Vlaams
Belang posting similar signs reading “zonder Jihad straat” (no-Jihad street) (fig 4.4).244 The initial response of Antwerp’s residents offers hope for a better Belgium but the fact that
Vlaams Belang, an accepted and even popular political party, can make these signs and propagate hate-rhetoric in support of hate-crimes demonstrates the climate of fear and anger which assimilation politics encourage.
The anti-immigrant and Islamophobic rhetoric which runs rampant in Belgium is not limited to political parties or individual citizens, but rather is present in many if not all of the institutions which exist to aid all residents of Belgium. The report by the European Commission found that there was clear evidence of racial profiling in the police force as well as a refusal to accept claims by minority groups in regards to racism or hate-incidents.245 Further, human
241 Ibid, 2 242 Ibid, 3 243 Ibid, 2 244 Anonymous. “Herdoop de Meir tot Zonder Haat Straat.” Het Nieuwsblad June 14, 2008, 1 245 Report by the Council of Europe, 32
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rights NGOs working in the country have found that victims of hate-crimes are unlikely to
report these incidents to the police for fear of forceful resistance to their claims.246 Assimilation
politics were supposed to improve national unity by removing difference and, subsequently, the
hierarchy of difference. However, it is clear that the distinctions made by assimilation politics as
well as the unlawfulness of difference have resulted in increased animosity towards immigrant
populations.
Conclusion
In its ideal form, assimilation is the project of creating a homogenous population with
the goal of eradicating hierarchies of difference within a state. As with multiculturalism, that
ideal is not always the end result of the policies implemented to reach its end. In the case of
assimilation politics in Belgium, what began as an attempt to propagate a singular Belgian
culture in which natives and immigrants alike can participate, resulted in a coercive project
which spawned a climate of fear and difference. Assimilation policies currently in practice
within the Belgian state create clear distinctions between those who belong and those who
don’t. These are not informal markers but rather codified matters of right and wrong:
difference has become a matter of illegality in the framework of a desirable homogeneity
within the Belgian cultural model. Unfortunately, the Belgian cultural model is little more than a
fiction created by the state, first to unite the country, and then to justify the exclusion of migrants within the political and social spheres of the state. By casting participation in a universal Belgian culture as an imperative to belonging, Belgium propagates a Belgian fiction of
246 Ibid, 28
98 Charlotte Luks unity which immigrants cannot hope to navigate. Due to the reified illegality of difference, when immigrants fail to assimilate, as they inevitably will, they are faced with consequences, both legal and illegal, which are condoned by the xenophobic rhetoric of the assimilation era.
Rather than promoting national unity, the assimilation imperative has seen an increase in political and ethno-religious divisions within the state and fostered a climate of fear and uncertainty.
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Conclusion
The previous chapters address events beginning several hundred years ago, from which
I have selected the moments, events and concepts that I believe have shaped the current
climate of belonging in the Belgian state. The overall theme of this work can be seen as an
examination of the conflicts that occur when migrant and native interests intersect and the two
populations are confronted with the needs and desires of the other. As examined in the first
chapter, one major reason for the clashes which occur when these two respective groups
intersect is that European history and historiography view these two groups as distinct and
isolated. Despite the fact that immigrant groups have been a staple of the European population
for centuries and that, by legal definition, subsequent generations of original migrants are
European, the migrant and his descendants are consistently seen as having just arrived, separate from the historical struggles and successes of the native population. Outside of matters of pure legality, many European societies, Belgium included, define the belonging of a group by their participation in the historical narrative of the state or nation. In this regard, it is
difficult for immigrant populations to reach this level of inclusivity when they are perceived to
lie outside of that narrative. These perceptions create an illusion of two parallel histories, that
of natives and migrants, within the state. While history demonstrates that this is not the case,
there is some truth to this idea in that it is something of a self-fulfilling prophecy; projecting
parallel histories creates divisions within society which in turn result in distinct struggles and
stories for each population. Despite the separation of historical narratives, the stories of
Belgians and immigrants to Belgium share similar themes. While Flemish and Walloon
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populations fought against each other for dominance or equal recognition within the Belgian
state, migrants struggled for participation and agency as well as equal claims to belonging in
Belgium. Despite the differences in their respective stories, Flemish, Walloons and migrants struggled for agency and belonging in a state which has tried and repeatedly failed to reconcile their competing nationalisms.
The early decades of the twentieth century onwards mark the most significant modern time of immigration reform and regulation. Western Europe en masse followed in fairly uniform trends in this regard as well as others. As a continent, Europe moved through periods of labor shortage and guest-worker programs in the 1940s. Following this came a time of economic surplus, left of right governments and multiculturalism. Belgium followed the rest of Europe into the multicultural decades; a time of purported inclusivity and democratization of culture.
Unfortunately, as has been the trend throughout the modern era, what was perhaps appropriate for the rest of Europe was not quite complex enough to deal with the intricacies of the Belgian state. The Belgian attempt at multiculturalism was weak at best largely because it was difficult to create a comprehensive multiculturalism in a country where the native populations were still vying for equal footing and political agency. Further, the attempts at multiculturalism enacted by the state were motivated not by an earnest desire for a multicultural state, but rather were enacted because the Belgian narrative was being violently confronted by the needs of migrant populations whose labor was in effect holding up the
Belgian economy.
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While greatly overshadowed by the internal community problem, the policies enacted towards a pervasive multiculturalism during the multicultural decades were a feeble attempt at uniting and celebrating difference within the Belgian state. These shallow policies did little more than highlight the differences of immigrant populations while failing to address the substantive concerns facing these populations such as economic marginalization and social oppression. The manner in which the state emphasized the cultural differences of migrants not only created distinct divides between those who were inherently different and foreign and those who were “normal,” or Belgian, it created a perceived threat to the hegemony of the dominant, native population. In response to the failures of the multicultural decades, native populations with political agency and clout demanded a move into an assimilation polity.
The transition into assimilation politics, marked by the transition into a right-center government was, again, a universal European trend. The assimilation imperative is structured around a strict republican model of homogeneity within a state in order to subvert difference and the hierarchies which inevitably follow. While the desire to rid a state of hierarchies of difference is a respectable and perhaps necessary goal, the creation of an assimilation state within Belgium, and perhaps Europe as a whole, failed in many of the same veins that the multicultural decades did. While assimilation is the ultimate goal, as multiculturalism had been prior, in order to reach this end, the policies enacted must be effective and comprehensive. The policies at the heart of the assimilation movement do not encourage assimilation so much as creating a coercive environment in which assimilation is imperative to belonging and the onus of assimilation is placed squarely on the migrant. Rather than creating an environment of inclusivity in which the immigrants themselves wish to become a part of the host-country and
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to naturalize into a welcoming environment, current assimilation policies require total
assimilation and make difference a matter of illegality; of right and wrong. Rather than creating a united country, these policies have, in practice, created more divisions within an already fractured country. The decades which encompass the assimilation era have seen an increase in the incidence of hate crimes, of institutionalized racism and of radical right parties, neo-Nazi groups and radicalized immigrant organizations as well as ethnic enclaves. By creating an environment in which assimilation is not encouraged or achieved over time but rather demanded immediately, the assimilation era has failed in its primary goal of creating a unified
Belgian culture. Europe, a beacon of progressivity, in fact regressed over the course of the twentieth century, beginning with a scheme of multiculturalism before demanding homogeneity of its increasingly diverse population.
Regardless of the failures of the policies implemented towards the goal of assimilation, the environment into which these policies are introduced is itself the main reason for the failure of an assimilation state. While the assimilation imperative may be appropriate in more homogenized European states, the fractured nature of the Belgian state creates an impossible environment for the true success of assimilation. The assimilation imperative demands integration into Belgian culture, as increased immigration and difference is seen to threaten this culture. However, this demand is a fabricated claim at the legitimacy of the policies enacted in the last two decades. After centuries of internal conflict, the Flemish and Walloon populations have come together in a united fight against immigrants, masking the xenophobia of their policies and rhetoric with a false nostalgia for a lost Belgian culture. The word “Belgian” is, however, meaningless; simply a hollow vessel to be contextually filled by whoever is using it
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at the time. To be Belgian is to be either Flemish or Walloon, one cannot be both and
subsequently there simply is no universal Belgian culture. To demand of immigrants total
integration into “Belgian culture” is to create a standard of belonging which can never be met.
It is this impossible standard which has created the justification for increased animosity
towards anyone who is considered different and the resulting fracturing of an already broken
state.
Moving Forward
The last chapters have addressed the failures of the immigration policies enacted by the
Belgian state over the past century. However, I would be remiss if I left you as the reader with
the idea that this is a hopeless situation. While it is true that the policies enacted in Belgium
have largely failed in their goals, both towards multiculturalism and assimilation, Belgium is in a unique position for potential success moving forward. While many states with claimed homogeneity remain, and will for the foreseeable future, stubborn in their demand for the continuation of a homogenized state, Belgium has the potential to step outside of greater
European trends in the future. Belgium is an inherently fractured state, in many regards it is
quite incomprehensible that it still exists as a singular state. In the last century however,
Belgium has made enormous strides towards the equality of native populations. In many regards, this move towards multiculturalism ended at native Belgians, but this does not mean that this must necessarily be the case in the future.
As was extensively discussed in this paper, the multicultural decades are over. However, just because the multicultural decades are over does not mean that multiculturalism is dead.
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While policies towards assimilation continue to be at the forefront of immigration politics in the
current era, there remain social institutions which are dedicated to the democratization of
culture. According to the Multicultural Policy Index of Queen’s University, Belgium has improved its multiculturalism scores over the past 30 years based on standards of:
• legislative affirmation of multiculturalism
• adoption of multiculturalism in school curriculum
• the inclusion of ethnic representation in the media
• exemptions from dress codes
• allowing of dual citizenship
• the funding of ethnic group organizations
• funding of bilingual education
• affirmative action
While the improvement in overall scores has been slow, going from a 1 in 1980 to a 5.5 in 2010
(on a scale of 1-8), there is an upward trajectory; only in the realm of dress code did Belgium receive absolutely no points. The fact that Belgium scores higher now than it did at the height of the multicultural decades suggests a promising future for Belgian multiculturalism and inclusion.247 In the context of Europe, Belgium ranks fairly high: evenly scored with the United
Kingdom, below Sweden and Finland; with 7 and 6 points respectively and far above Denmark;
which scored a 0. However, it is important to not take these numbers at face value. Countries
may score 0, .5 or 1 point for each of the standards listed above. However, in order to gain a
247 Multiculturalism Policies in Contemporary Democracies: Belgium, (Ontario: Queens University), 2010
105 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms point, there must simply be some example of each within the state. In Belgium, where these initiatives are handled regionally rather than federally, the existence of a multicultural policy in one region does not guarantee access to this right or policy throughout the country. Further, many multicultural policies such as bilingual education are aimed at the domestic Belgian nationalities and do not necessarily include immigrant minorities. In this regard, while any improvement in multiculturalism is a step in the right direction, simply checking off boxes on a rubric of multiculturalism is no promise of actual on the ground changes for immigrant minorities. Additionally, just because there is one example of a standard of multiculturalism present in the state, does not mean that immigrant populations across the country benefit or that these policies engage with the diversity within the immigrant population in Belgium.
Despite the end of the multicultural decades, there have been some quiet moves towards a multicultural state, even on the part of the government. In 2003, the government issued a policy agreement entitled, “A Creative and Solitary Belgium” which commits the government to investigate a shared citizenship with the goal of encouraging the autonomy of migrant populations and avoiding discrimination, followed in 2004 by the creation of a
Commission for Intercultural Dialogue.248 Such bodies encourage a plurality and inclusivity which would motivate migrants to assimilate and naturalize simply because they feel respected and attached to their host country, not because they have been forced to do so. In this way, successful multiculturalism has the potential to achieve the aims of assimilation politics, without the coercive element. While these moves have had little impact thus far, the simple creation of these initiatives marks a move towards a more inclusive nation which, with
248 Ibid,3
106 Charlotte Luks
extensive efforts, could succeed in creating a pervasive multiculturalism, not just for the
Flemish and the Walloon, but the entire Belgian population and perhaps moving toward this
end will in fact create a universal culture of inclusivity which Belgium currently lacks. While I am
hesitant to be overly optimistic about a country which has yet to resolve its own internal
conflicts, I would be equally remiss to dismiss the Belgian situation as a lost cause and, in
keeping with the theme of papers in this ilk, “my conclusion is that, although the Belgian
community problem has not been satisfactorily resolved yet, one can be guardedly optimistic that it will be in the future.”
107 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms
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Conclusion
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