Reconciling Competing Nationalisms Immigration and the Politics of Belonging in Belgium
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Charlotte Luks Reconciling Competing Nationalisms Immigration and the Politics of Belonging in Belgium Charlotte Luks 1 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms Table of Contents I. Maps and Figures p. 3 II. Introduction p. 6 III. Chapter 1 Parallel Histories: Migrants and Natives p. 14 IV. Chapter 2 Histories Intersect: The Multicultural Decades p. 45 V. Chapter 3 How did Multiculturalism Fail? p. 62 VI. Chapter 4 The Assimilation Imperative p. 79 VII. Conclusion p. 100 VIII. Bibliography p. 108 2 Charlotte Luks Maps and Figures Fig 1.1 The language line runs latitudinally through Belgium with Flanders to the north, Wallonia to the south, the German speaking region to the south-east, and the bi-lingual, though primarily Francophone, Brussels just north of the language line in Flanders1 Fig 1.2 This 1617 map depicts the federation of Belgian provinces represented by the symbol of the lion. The provinces were under Spanish rule at the time, as they would be until 17133 Fig 1.3 This statue of Belgian hero Ambiorix was erected in Tongeren shortly after Belgian independence in 1830 amidst an atmosphere of immense nationalistic fervor2 1 A House Divided, http://news.bbcimg.co.uk/media/images/48069000/ gif/_48069269_belgium_flemish226x170.gif 3 Pieter van den Keere, “Leo Belgicus”, (1617) 2 Statue of Ambiorix, http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/th http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/th umb/f/f9/1617_Leo_Belgicus_Kaerius.jpg/725px- umb/c/cf/Ambiorix.jpg/450px-Ambiorix.jpg 1617_Leo_Belgicus_Kaerius.jpg 3 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms Fig 1.4 In 1956 a coal-mine fire killed 262 miners at Marcinelle, who were laid to rest in this tomb. A fire broke out underground, rescue workers did not reach the deepest levels of the mine until two weeks later. Upon resurfacing, rescue workers said simply, “tutti cadaveri,” (all corpses). This tragedy soured relations between Italy and Belgium and shortly after, the 4 guest worker agreement ended. Fig 3.1 In 1968, Flemish students at the Katholieke Univeristeit Leuven engaged in extended protests against the Walloon presence at the university. The resulting division of the university led to the restructuring of the government, the resulting instability of which would eventually lead to the collapse of the federal government in 20106 Fig 3.2 Following a hate crime in 2006, residents of Antwerp put up street signs reading Zonder Haat Straat (Street without hate). In response, Vlaams Belang put up signs reading Zonder Jihad Straat (Street without Jihad)5 4 Massimo Valicchia, “The Tombs of Dead Men at Marcinelle,” (2012), Photograph, http://static0.demotix.com/sites/default/files/image cache/a_scale_large/1500-4/photos/1351800084- marcinelle-tragedy-50-years-ago- remembered_1565904.jpg 5 Zonder Haat Straat, 6 Walen Go Home, http://1.standaardcdn.be/Assets/Images_Upload/20 http://arthurbarbe.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/wa 07/05/30/lob300507-3.jpg len-go-home.jpg 4 Charlotte Luks Fig 4.1 Extreme right party Vlaams Belang is currently the most popular party in Flanders. Here Vlaams Belang activists can be seen bearing signs which read, “Islam can harm your freedom…stop immigration.”7 Fig 4.2 Bloed, Bodem, Eer en Trouw is a neo-Nazi, terrorist organization in Belgium responsible for countless hate crimes as well as elaborate terrorist plots. Here members are pictured giving the Nazi salute9 Fig 4.3 Sharia4Belgium leader Fouad Belkacem walks past a protester whose sign reads “respect for the host country”8 7 Vlaams Belang Protesters, http://s1.gva.be/ahimgpath/assets_img_gvl/2009/0 9/28/712623/vlaams-belang-groter-dan-sp-a-n-va- springt-over-open-vld-id812135-1000x800-n.jpg 8 Respect het Gastland, http://s1.gva.be/ahimgpath/assets_img_gva/2012/0 9 Bloed, Bodem, Eer en Trouw, 3/30/2202821/uitspraak-sharia4belgium-op-4-mei- http://static1.hln.be/static/photo/2009/17/13/4/me id2774109-1000x800-n.jpg dia_xl_558769.jpg 5 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms Introduction Historically speaking, different states have always had nationality laws and perceptions of belonging, both codified and unofficial. Across Europe these modes of nationalism and belonging have taken different forms. Europe has never advertised itself as an immigrant nation, nor is it a Melting Pot; belonging in Europe has strict definitions which leave no room for the democratization of culture. France, for example has, since roughly the French revolution, followed a form of republican nationalism. In the French model, a person may belong to the greater polity and be considered a citizen of France if he or she follows a set of values, namely, public participation in the republican, secular state and abiding by the idea that in order for all members of the state to be equal, they must also be the same and follow the same ideals.10 In this way, the politics of belonging in France revolve around the soil (jus soli); a physical presence in the state as well as a more abstract participation in the state. In contrast, the German model of belonging has historically been one attached to blood (jus sanguine), a model which is based not upon where a person is born or their physical place in the state but rather their historical and ethnic claims to national belonging. The German ethnic model has historically presented itself in ways completely distinct from official state borders. For example, people of German heritage who resided outside of state borders had claims to German citizenship while people of foreign descent, for example German-born descendents of Turkish 10 Gerard Noiriel, The French melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship and National Identity, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988) 6 Charlotte Luks guest workers, could not access legal rights of German citizenship.11 Crucial to these modes of nationalism in each respective state is the concept of a unified state and people to which one can claim belonging. This perception of a historically unified state must not always be accurate; neither France nor Germany have long-standing traditions of unification, however, the idea that there is a singular France, Germany, etc., is crucial to determining who does and does not belong. These nationality laws have been complicated in recent decades with the implementation of the European Union. European member-states no longer have ultimate autonomy in areas of naturalization and citizenship. As borders become deregulated and the laws and economies of respective states become tied to each other and unified to some extent under a singular unifying body, politics of identity become more complex. In the case of citizenship law, autonomy remains in the hands of the states, as citizenship in an EU state results in EU citizenship but state citizenship is determined on a state-by-state basis.12 However, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights grants every person the right to citizenship in some state, which has resulted in a change to policies of nationality in Europe. Currently, every EU member-state allows citizenship through birth in the country (though some have restrictions such as a minimum time of residency for the parents, or birth rights given only to refugees, those who are stateless or adopted).13 Many countries additionally have jus sanguine a patre et a matre laws (again, some with restrictions, such as a time limit on registration for children 11 Maarten Vink and Gerard-Rene de Groot, “Birthright Citizenship: Trends and Regulations in Europe” EUDO Citizenship Observatory 8(2010) 12 Ibid, 25 13 Ibid, 34 7 Reconciling Competing Nationalisms born abroad or restrictions on out of wedlock births).14 In the last decades, nationality laws have become more homogenized across the European Union; no longer dependent on single modes of nationalism but allowing for multiple standards for legal belonging in the state. Legal citizenship is only one component of belonging in a certain state. A person who finds themselves with EU citizenship may not be seen as belonging to the European identity by others in Europe. These politics of belonging are dictated not by passports or visas but rather by perceptions of who is European, politics dictated not by the state but by the populous. While politicians and political theorists alike have long grappled with immigration laws and policies, history often overlooks the place of the immigrant in history.15 History and historiography hold important roles in the realm of belonging, as participation in the European historical narrative is often a prerequisite to participation in the contemporary moment. The crucial role of the migrant is often overlooked in examinations of Europe; in the last century alone, immigrant populations have not only bolstered but maintained the strong European economy. Regardless of their support of Europe, many immigrant populations in Europe, particularly those with visible differences in skin color, religion or language, have been marginalized and refused full rights of equality in both the social and political spheres across the continent. In contemporary Europe, immigrants and their descendants are expected to fully assimilate to the model European, as envisioned by respective states. The ultimate goal of the assimilation imperative designed by European states is that immigrants adopt the language, culture, and values of the countries in which they reside while abandoning those of their home countries. 14 Ibid, 34 15 Noiriel, The French Melting Pot, 21 8 Charlotte Luks The assimilation imperative has spread across Western Europe as a largely homogenous policy designed to enhance a greater European culture and unity. In most cases, these policies are introduced into countries which, while distinct in many ways, share many crucial features which allow the assimilation imperative some degree of legitimacy within the state. This is not, however the case in Belgium. Belgium, a small state north of France and south of the Netherlands, is often overlooked due to its small size and relative lack of influence.