The Role of the Arctic Council Observer States in the Arctic

FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES

Bachelor's Thesis

ANETA ROTHOVÁ

Supervisor: Mgr. Barbora Padrtová, Ph.D.

Department of International Relations and European Studies International Relations

Brno 2019/2020

THE ROLE OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL OBSERVER STATES IN THE ARCTIC

Bibliographic Record

Author: Aneta Rothová Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University Department of International Relations and Euro- pean Studies Title of Thesis: The Role of the Arctic Council Observer States in the Arctic Degree Programme: International Relations Supervisor: Mgr. Barbora Padrtová, Ph.D. Academic Year: 2019/2020 Number of Pages: 71 Keywords: Arctic, Arctic Council, Observer States, Arctic Po- licies, Asian States, European States, Climate Change, Northern Sea Route, Energy Resources THE ROLE OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL OBSERVER STATES IN THE ARCTIC

Abstract

Since the establishment of the Arctic Council (AC) in 1996, thirteen non- Arctic states and numerous inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations have joint the forum as Observers. Although the impact of the thirteen Observer States on the decision-making in the Arctic is limited, they are invited to participate on the regular Arctic Council ministerial meetings as well as in the AC working groups. Despite the remo- teness from the Arctic of some Observers States, eg. Italy, India or Sin- gapore, they try to pursue their own strategies and interests there. The aim of this thesis is to explore comprehensively what is the role of these AC Observers, what are their interests and strategies, as well as their actual activities in the Arctic.

THE ROLE OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL OBSERVER STATES IN THE ARCTIC

Statutory Declaration

I hereby declare that I have written the submitted Bachelor's Thesis concerning the topic of The Role of the Arctic Council Observer States in the Arctic independently. All the sources used for the purpose of finishing this thesis have been adequately referenced and are listed in the Bibliography.

In Brno 6 December 2019

...... Aneta Rothová

THE ROLE OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL OBSERVER STATES IN THE ARCTIC

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor Mgr. Barbora Padrtová, Ph.D. for her professional, yet sympathetic approach, her patience, and her very valuable pieces of advice. I would also like to thank my mum and my friends for their support.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents

List of Maps 9

List of Terms and Acronyms 11

1 Introduction 13

2 Metodology 16 2.1 Literature rewiev ...... 16 2.2 Goals and research question ...... 17 2.3 Conceptualisation of the Arctic ...... 17 2.4 Metodology ...... 18 2.5 Data collection ...... 18

3 The Role of the Observer States within the Arctic Council 20

4 Federal Republic of Germany 23 4.1 To assume more responsibility – German Arctic Strategy ...... 23 4.2 German Arctic science: Understanding of the effects of processes in the Arctic on global cimate ...... 24 4.3 Arctic gas to reduce the negative impact on the environment? ...... 26 4.4 Summary ...... 27

5 French Republic 28 5.1 “The Great Challenge of the Arctic” – French Arctic Strategy .... 28 5.2 French-German cooperation and the military ...... 29 5.3 LNG and tourism ...... 30 5.4 Summary ...... 31

6 Italian Republic 32 6.1 Italian strategy: Sustainable development ...... 32 6.2 Scientific diplomacy ...... 33 6.3 Arctic business ...... 34

5 TABLE OF CONTENTS

6.4 Summary ...... 35

7 Japan 36 7.1 Japan’s outlook – The Northern Sea Route ...... 36 7.2 Japan and sustainability ...... 37 7.3 Japan’s never-ending hunt for energy resources? ...... 38 7.4 Summary ...... 39

8 The Netherlands 41 8.1 The Netherlands – The “niche operator” ...... 41 8.2 Research and diplomacy ...... 42 8.3 LNG and Chinese Belt and Road ...... 43 8.4 Summary ...... 44

9 People’s Republic of China 45 9.1 China as a “Near-Arctic State”, the “Polar Silk Road” and Greenland’s minerals ...... 45 9.2 Research, diplomacy and the military ...... 47 9.3 Summary ...... 48

10 Poland 49 10.1 Policy without policy guidelines ...... 49 10.2 International cooperation in polar research ...... 49 10.3 The “mediator” ...... 50 10.4 Economic interests ...... 51 10.5 Summary ...... 51

11 Republic of India 52 11.1 The importance of monsoons ...... 52 11.2 Scientific engagement ...... 53 11.3 “Environmental stewardship” of the third largest oil consumer in the world? ...... 54 11.4 Summary ...... 55

6 TABLE OF CONTENTS

12 Republic of Korea 56 12.1 The Northern Sea Route – South Korea’s Arctic Policy ...... 56 12.2 South Korea’s regional cooperation ...... 58 12.3 Summary ...... 59

13 Republic of Singapore 60 13.1 Flooding as a result of global warming ...... 60 13.2 The “Global City” approach ...... 61 13.3 The “Arctic export” ...... 62 13.4 Summary ...... 63

14 Spain 64 14.1 “Guidelines for a Spanish Polar Strategy”: science diplomacy .. 64 14.2 Spanish research, fishing and Russian LNG...... 65 14.3 Summary ...... 66

15 Switzerland 68 15.1 The “vertical Arctic” and the climate change ...... 68 15.2 Summary ...... 69

16 The United Kingdom 71 16.1 The UK government’s “vision of a Global Britain” and environmental protection ...... 71 16.2 Britain’s active Arctic research and defense ...... 72 16.3 Oil, diamonds and minerals ...... 73 16.4 Summary ...... 74

17 Conclusion 75

Bibliography 77

LIST OF MAPS

List of Maps

Map no. 1 - Map of Arctic Council Member and Observer States

Source: Arctic Portal, 2016, https://arcticportal.org/maps-arctic-council.

9 LIST OF MAPS

Map no. 2 - Map of the Arctic boundaries

Source: GRID-Arendal, 2013, http://grid-arendal.herokuapp.com/resources/8387.

10 LIST OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS

List of Terms and Acronyms

AC – Arctic Council ACAP – Arctic Contamination Action Programme AEPS – Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy AMAP – Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme ASFR – Arctic Security Forces Roundtable AVI – Advisory Council on International Affairs AWI – Alfred Wegener Institute BEAC – Barents Euro-Arctic Council CAFF – Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna CBSS – Council of the Baltic Sea States EPB – European Polar Board EPPR – Emergency, Prevention, Preparedness and Re- sponse EU – European Union IASC – International Arctic Science Committee IEA – International Energy Agency IMO – International Maritime Organization IPEV – Institut Polaire Français Paul-Émile Victor MARPOL – International Convention for the Prevention of Pollutionfrom Ships MOSAiC – Multidisciplinary Drifting Observatory for the Study of Arctic Climate NAFO – Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization NEAFC – North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission NSR – Northern Sea Route

11 LIST OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS

OSPAR – Convention for the Protection of the Marine Envi- ronment ofthe North-East Atlantic PAME – Protection of Arctic Marine Environment SAR – Search and Rescue SDWG – Sustainable Development Working Group TFAMC – Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation TFICA – Task Force on Improved Connectivity in the Arctic UN – United Nations US – United States UNCLOS – United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention on Cli- mate Change WMO – World Meteorological Organization

12 INTRODUCTION

1 Introduction

“Let the North of the globe, the Arctic, become a zone of peace” (Gorbachev 1987 cit. In Barentsinfo.org, n.d.), said Mikhail Gorbachev in his speech in Murmansk on October 1, 1987. In particular, he added, “we attach special importance to the cooperation of the northern countries in environmental protection“(Ibid.). At the time, some of Russia’s regions beyond the Arctic Circle, such as Novaya Zemlya, were polluted by heavy metals from military activities, mining and other industrial activities in the Urals and Siberia (Gal- asso, Siegel and Kravitz 2000, 851). Moreover, air pollution in Russian Arctic and sub-Arctic regions caused by nickel smelting, paper production and radioactive fallout of Chernobyl explosion was reaching high levels (Young 1998, 54-55; Graczyk and Koivurova 2015, 299). Studies later showed that industrial activities in Russian Arctic and sub-Arctic may had been affecting public health (Revich 1995). A few years after the Chernobyl catastrophe, another tragedy ocurred – the tanker Exxon Val- dez hit a reef in Alaskan waters, subsequently causing the largest oil spill in US waters at the time (Galt, Lehr and Payton 1991, 202). In response to these problems and to foster cooperation in the region, eight Arctic States (Canada, Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States) signed the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) four years after the Gorbachev’s speech (Graczyk and Koivurova 2015, 300-301). Among its main goals, besides protection of the Arctic ecosystem, was total elimination of pollution in the Arctic (Bloom 1999, 713). In 1996, the AEPS signatory states gathe- red in Ottawa to establish the Arctic Council (AC), an “intergovernmental forum promoting cooperation […] in particular on issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic” (AC 2015j). Along the eight Arctic States who became members of the AC, permanent participation and “full consultation rights in connection with the Council’s negotiations and decisions” (AC 2015f) are currently granted to six organizations representing Arctic indigenous peoples. Non-Arctic states, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations may become Observers. To this day, there are thirteen countries which have received the permanent Observer status (in alphabetical order): Federal Republic of Germany (1998), French Republic (2000), Italian Republic (2013), Japan (2013), The Netherlands (1998), People’s Republic of

13 INTRODUCTION

China (2013), Poland (1998), Republic of India (2013), Republic of Korea (2013), Republic of Singapore (2013), Spain (2006), Switzerland (2017), and the United Kingdom (1998). (AC 2015f) (See map no. 1) And the countries are “queueing up”: around the same time Switzerland applied for its Observer status to the AC, Greece, Mongolia, and Turkey were also interested in joining the AC (Knecht 2015), but without success. In 2009, the EU also applied for the AC Observer status, but it has still not been granted one (Chater 2016, 178). The reason is that the decision on the EU’s application, dependant solely on the consensus of the eight Arctic States, was blocked by Canada in 2013, and is currently being blocked by Russia. The first blocking was a result of the Inuit pressure on Canadian government when the EU imposed a ban on trading seal products, one of the most important sources of the Inuit livelihood (Chater 2016, 178-179). Russia’s blocking of the EU’s application is generally believed to be “related with the sanctions imposed by Brussels following Rus- sia’s annexation of the Crimea” (Staalesen 2019d), as they “were designed, amongst other things, to hit Russian economic activity in the Arctic” (De- pledge and Tulupov 2016). Nevertheless, sanctions aside, Russia does not see any benefit of admitting the EU to the AC. The most significant contribution of the EU there would probably be an attempt to impose stricter regulations on activities such as hydrocarbon extraction or fishing, which would go against Russian economic interests in the region. (Ibid.) The reason why ever more international actors are interested in the Arctic is simple; due to global warming, the ice in the Arctic Ocean is rap- idly melting and it is expected to be fully melted as early as in 2040 (Hosa 2018), which means that the geopolitical and geo-economic importance of the Arctic is constantly growing (FFO 2013, 1). It is no coincidence that all of the Asian Observer States joined the Council only in 2013. Furthermore, the Arctic is not only rich in fish. After the US Geologi- cal Society published its survey on energy resources of the Arctic in 2008, everyone seems to be concerned about the 410 billion barrels of oil, natural gas and LNG deposits beyond the Arctic Circle that should represent 22% of undiscovered deposits of fossil fuels in the world (Hough 2013, 19). “The region is also believed to be rich in metals such as copper, nickel, zinc and rare earths” (FFO 2013, 6). Last but not least, ice-free Arctic shipping routes would make transportation of goods between Europe, North America and East Asia much faster (The Headquarters 2015, 5).

14 INTRODUCTION

However, on the side of all the opportunities, there are the negative impacts of the global warming that are affecting the Arctic twice as much as the other parts of the world (Guidelines 2016, 9). Nevertheless, concerns are rising among the Arctic States about what concequences could admission of new Observer States have on the authority of the Arctic States and the overall functioning of the AC (Lackenbauer 2014, 24). Already the acceptance of four Asian states in 2013 has met with reluctance of some Arctic stakeholders as they were worried that economic interests of those Observer States could overshadow the importance of protection of the Arctic environment (Lacken- bauer 2014, 24-25; Chater 2016, 173). Finally, the AC welcomed the four Asian countries, partially to prevent them from creating a parallel platform, rivalling to the Council (Tonami 2016, 27).

15 METODOLOGY

2 Metodology

This chapter presents theoretical framework and research purposes of the bachelor thesis; methodology and the type of data that was collected for these purposes.

2.1 Literature rewiev

“The literature about the Arctic is getting more and more extensive in the last decades. The main reason are the global changes which bring not only new opportunities such as natural resources extraction or new possible transport routes, but also challenges“ (Ficová 2019, 3). However, the pre- valent part of the literature focuses on the eight Arctic States (Canada, Finland, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, the United States, Russia and Swe- den) and their mutual relations, their engagement in the Arctic region, or studies the AC itself. Significant number of publications is devoted to Arc- tic indigenous peoples or the environmental changes. AC Observer States remain largely understudied, especially the European ones. One of the biggest concerns regarding the Arctic today is Chinese involvement in the region. Consequently, most of writings concerning the AC Observers focus on China or on the Asian Observer States in general (India, Japan, Korea, and Singapore). The major publication on Asian Observer States is Asian foreign policy in a changing arctic: The diplomacy of Economy and Science at New Frontiers (2016) by A. Tonami, examining Arctic policies of China, Japan, Republic of Korea, Singapore and India. Another important author on the topic, M. Bennett has focused on South Korea’s and Singapore’s role in the Arctic in The Maritime Tiger: Explor- ing South Korea’s Interests and Role in the Arctic (2014) and Singapore: The “Global City” in a Globalizing Arctic (2016). From European states, P. Graczyk (2012) and Śmieszek, Łuszczuk, Stępień and Graczyk (2015) specialize in analysing Poland’s approach towards the Arctic and recommend Poland’s government to publish an official strategy for the region. In case of other states, eg. France or Ger- many, the few publications are often outdated, such as The European Un- ion Arctic Policy and National Interests of France and Germany: Internal and External Policy Coherence at Stake? (2013) by C. Pelaudeix and T. Ro- don.

16 METODOLOGY

One of the most valuable sources of information related to the topic of this thesis are the web pages of The Arctic Institute dedicated to each AC Observer State’s historical, economic and political engagement in the Arctic, and A. Chater’s Explaining Non-Arctic States in the Arctic Council (2016), where he examines chronological evolution of the role of non-Arctic states within the AC. However, although there exist literature related to the topic of this thesis, it forms only partial contribution since European AC Observer States remain understudied. The existing literature creates disbalance between the level of knowledge about the Asian states’ interests and Eu- ropean states’ interests in the region. Moreover, there is no publication describing the overall involvement of all thirteen Observer States at the same time, which further allows comparasion on regional level as well as between the regions.

2.2 Goals and research question

The goal of this thesis is to fill the above-mentioned gap, examine and describe the role the thirteen AC Observer States play in the Arctic, and how they approach to the changes that are occurying in the region. To this end, the aim of this thesis is to analyse Arctic policies of the Observer States, their interests and activities in the region.

The research question is following: What is the role of the Arctic Council Observer States in the Arctic?

2.3 Conceptualisation of the Arctic

When addressing the Arctic, synonyms like High North, Extreme North or just North are often used in literature. However, they usually refer to the same area around the North Pole. (Ficová 2019, 18) Although many definitions of the Arctic exist, it is generally defined as the area north of the Arctic Circle (66° 33’N) (Arctic Centre, n.d.). For instance, according to the definition of the AC’s Arctic Monito- ring Assessment Program (AMAP), the Arctic extends north of the 51.1°N in North America, comprising a part of the sub-Arctic areas (AMAP, n.d.(a)). “Other Arctic Council working groups such as Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) and Emergency, Prevention, Preparedness

17 METODOLOGY and Response (EPPR), and the Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR) developed their own boundaries“ (GRID-Arendal 2013) to be consistent with focus of their activities (Ibid.) (See map no. 2). In some cases, only to the Arctic Ocean is referred to as to the Arctic (See eg. Guidelines 2016, 7 or Rottem cit. In Tømmerbakke and Trellevik 2019). However, in accordance with the academic understanding, in this thesis, the Arctic is concidered the area north of the Arctic Circle (66° 33’N).

2.4 Metodology

This thesis is a descriptive analysis. Thus, in this thesis, metodology of descriptive research will be used. According to Purdy and Popan (2018), descriptive research serves “to describe behaviors, situations, events, and results” (Purdy and Popan 2018) and “is not intended to make theoretical predictions or explain cause and effect” (Ibid.). Descriptive research may be qualitative and use case study as a tool (Ibid.). A case study allows researchers to “examine a wide range of factors related to a particular case” (Ibid.) and recognize “unusual aspects of individual cases” (Ibid.). Additionally, case study in descriptive research may be conducted on a singles case or on a larger group of individual cases (Ibid.). In this thesis, descriptive research will be conducted in a study of 13 states (cases), whose role in the Arctic will be analysed: Federal Republic of Germany, French Republic, Italian Republic, Japan, The Netherlands, People’s Republic of China, Poland, Republic of India, Republic of Korea, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Each chapter will be devoted to one AC Observer State with a short description of its historical ties to the Arctic, its Arctic strategy, and its activities concerning the region as well as in the region. This thesis will also pay attention to activities of the major business stakeholders from Observer States in the Arctic. Because of the nature of the governance regime in the Arctic, bilateral cooperation and commercial activities may form a substantial part of states’ involvement in the Arctic matters.

2.5 Data collection

As a result of insufficient amount of relevant secondary literature on the topic of this thesis, the data used in this analysis will be collected preva- lently from primary sources: official Arctic strategies of the governments

18 METODOLOGY of the AC Observer States, press releases, newspaper articles and maga- zines, research institutions websites, websites of think-tanks specialised in Arctic issues, web pages of involved business actors and web pages of the Arctic Council. Additionally, secondary sources will be used for ana- lysation of those states that are covered by adequate secondary literature (eg. China, India, Poland and Singapore).

19 THE ROLE OF THE OBSERVER STATES WITHIN THE ARCTIC COUNCIL

3 The Role of the Observer States within the Arctic Council

The role of AC Observers in general is limited. “Decisions at all levels in the Arctic Council are the exclusive right and responsibility of the eight Arctic States with the involvement of the Permanent Participants” (AC 2015f). Therefore, a state can obtain the Observer status only if “the Council determines [that the state] can contribute to its work” (Ibid.). And even though “the primary role of observers is to observe the work of the Arctic Council” (Ibid.) the main form of their contribution should be their engagement in one of the six Working Groups of the Arctic Council (Ibid.): Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG), Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP), Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) and Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR). They may attend the Working Groups meetings and participate in their projects (AC 2015k). AMAP was established under AEPS in 1991 as one of first Working Groups along with PAME (AMAP, n.d.(b); PAME, n.d.). AMAP’s experts measure the extent and the impact of Arctic pollution (eg. presence of heavy metals, acidification or ozone depletion), determine its sources and advise governments of the Arctic States on how to response to the contamination of the environment (AC 2015b). On the other hand, “measures related to the protection of the Arctic marine [and coastal] environment[s]” (AC 2015g) are part of the PAME’s mandate. SDWG was created in 1998 and is concerned with a wide range of issues, for example Arctic Human Health, sustainable economic activities, education and cultural heritage of Arctic peoples, management of natural resources (including the living organisms), adaptation to climate change and infrastructure development (AC 2015h). ACAP, originally an AC plan, transformed into a Working Group in 2006, operates to reduce global emission of pollutants (eg. micro- plactics) and hence prevent and eliminate the pollution of the Arctic (AC 2015a). Monitoring of the Arctic biodiversity and its conservation is the mandate of the CAFF (AC 2015c), while coordination of projects related to crisis management capacity building is the main responsibility of the EPPR working group (AC 2015c).

20 THE ROLE OF THE OBSERVER STATES WITHIN THE ARCTIC COUNCIL

Provided that an Observer State has been invited to such meeting, it can participate in meetings of the Task Forces and the Expert Groups, the AC’s other subsidiary bodies (AC 2015f). “The Task Forces are appointed at the [Arctic States] Ministerial meetings to work on specific issues for a limited amount of time […] [and] are active until they have produced the desired results” (AC 2015i). There should currently exist two active Task Forces today that were active during the Finnish Chairmanship in the period of 2017-2019 until Finland was succeeded by Iceland in May 2019: Task Force on Arctic Ma- rine Cooperation (TFAMC) and Task Force on Improved Connectivity in the Arctic (TFICA). (AC 2015j) Expert Groups are established to carry out specific missions. There is only one Expert Group today: Expert Group on Black Carbon and Methane. (AC 2015e) In meetings of these subsidiary bodies, the invited Observer States are allowed to pronounce their statements and views related to the discussed matters (AC 2015f). “Observers may [also] propose projects through an Arctic State or a Permanent Participant“ (Ibid.) and "submit written statements at Ministerial meetings“ (Ibid.), the highest level meetings of the Arctic States representatives held biennially with rotating chairmanship. Finally, if activities of an Observer State are not in accordance with the principles of the Declaration on the Establishment of the Council, the State’s observer status may be suspended (AC 2013, Article 37). At first, AC Observers were supposed to be admitted for only two year period between the Ministerial meetings (Bloom 1999, 720). Today, all Observer States hold permanent Observer status, but it must be re- affirmed every four years (AC 2013, Annex 2, Article 5). Since all Arctic development depends entirely on consensus of eight AC Members, some Observers, such as Germany or Japan, suggest that it would be worth considering to let the thirteen Observer States have bigger say (FFO 2013, 13; The Headquarters 2015, 8). Negotiations of Agreement on Enhancing Arctic Scientific Cooperation held in Ottawa in 2016 were an example of a bigger Observers’ involvement in the decision-making process, as they participated in preparation of the final document (Filimonova and Kri- vokhizh 2016). However, some Observers go even further and perceive the Arctic as global commons – “resource domains that do not fall within the jurisdiction of any one country” (Buck 1998, 5-6), such as “the high seas and deep seabed minerals, the atmosphere, and space” (Buck 1998, 1), “to which all nations have legal access” (Buck 1998, 6). This “opens up

21 THE ROLE OF THE OBSERVER STATES WITHIN THE ARCTIC COUNCIL opportunities they might otherwise be excluded from” (Burke 2018). While this view may be legitimate regarding the international waters and the seabed outside the respective Exclusive Economic Zones of the Arctic coastal states, i.e. outside 200 nautical miles (370 km from) the coast, regulated by the UNCLOS (Gümplová 2015; Byers 2009, 90-91), vast territories beyond the Arctic Circle are subject to Arctic States’s sovereign rights. (Burke 2018) Since all states applying for the AC Observer status must “[r]ecognize Arctic States' sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic” (AC 2015f), regarding the Arctic as the global commons makes their position problematic. It also appears very improbable that the Arctic States would agree with this view and let the Arctic governance come any closer to Antarctic-Treaty-like regime1. (Nanda 2019) On the other hand, since the sovereignty principle prevails in the Arctic, Ob- servers may search for bigger involvement and hence influence in the region through bilateral relations with the Arctic States, not only in the field of scientific cooperation, but also in infrastructure development or natural resources extraction.

1 Article IV of The Antarctic Treaty explicitely states: “No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force“ (Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty 1959). Based on the Antarctic Treaty, An- tarctica should serve for peaceful and scientific purposes only (Gümplová 2015).

22 FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

4 Federal Republic of Germany

Throughout the years, Germany has proved to be a real “international actor in the High North” (FFO 2013, 5). It has been present in polar areas since the middle of the 19th century when German scientists started their first expeditions into the region (Belov 2016, 85). About a century later, in the summer of 1980, Alfred Wegener Institute (AWI), to these days one of the most significant world research institutions for the Arctic, was founded (Belov 2016, 86; FFO 2013, 9). Thanks to the long tradition of polar research, Germany became one of the first AC Observer States, along with the Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom. All four states joined the forum in 1998 although each of them had already been present at the Council’s Declaration signing ceremony in Ottawa in 1996. (AC 2015f)

4.1 To assume more responsibility – German Arctic Strategy

Despite the obvious interest in the region, until recently, Germany did not have any clear program of action (Belov 2016, 87). The Federal Gov- ernment published its first Guidelines of the Germany Arctic policy: As- sume responsibility, seize opportunities, only in 2013. Germany then believed it could develop an ultra-modern environmentally friendly maritime technology that would make possible extraction of Arctic natural resources in an ecologically sustainable manner (FFO 2013, 6). However, influenced by the Paris Agreement and the UN 2030 Agenda and with the worsening state of the environment resulting from climate change, the Federal Foreign Office (FFO) developed a new policy document - Germany’s Arctic Policy Guidelines: Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future, published in 2018. It is consistent with the previous document in many aspects, such as the commitment to the international legal documents, such as the UNCLOS of 1982, the MAR- POL Convention or the OSPAR Convention (Belov 2016, 87), and the security matters. (FFO 2013; 2018) On the other hand, in contrast with the previous document, where Germany was looking at the Arctic mainly from the perspective of economic opportunities, now “climate and environmental protection is a key

23 FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY element of Germany’s Arctic policy“ (FFO 2018, 13), Germany aims to reduce its „release of persistent organic pollutants and mercury into the environment“ (FFO 2018, 14) and take action against the black carbon emissions and marine litter (Ibid., 13-14). As regards to the environmental protection, “the Federal Government advocates the designation of protected areas” (FFO 2018, 15) to safeguard the region’s biological diversity and is urging for legally binding rules for the extraction of natural resources (FFO 2018, 19). To prevent environmental damage and pollution, Germany is even advocating for a complete ban of heavy fuel oil in the Arctic (FFO 2018, 20). Great attention is paid to sustainability (FFO 2018, 33-34). For instance, ships should navigate in compliance with the so-called Polar Code, a set of technical regulations which entered in force in 2017 and that Germany had helped design (FFO 2013, 14; FFO 2018, 18, 20). It is apparent that the Federal Government reviewed its stance on Arctic energy resources. Although “sustainable supply of raw materials [is] of great importance for Germany” (FFO 2018, 34), the country is interested only in the natural gas from Norway and Russia as it “is considered to be a relatively low emission fossil fuel that can help reduce emissions of air pollutants in the transition to a climate neutral energy supply” (FFO 2018, 34). In security questions, Germany “rejects any attempt to militarise the Arctic“ (FFO 2018, 42), and wishes that the Arctic remain a “conflict free region“ (FFO 2018, 24). Therefore it is a proponent of more intense involvement of NATO and the EU in the Arctic matters (FFO 2018, 25).

4.2 German Arctic science: Understanding of the effects of processes in the Arctic on global cimate

Along with the development of a coherent policy, “German participation [in the AC] has [also] substantially increased during the past few years” (German Arctic Office, n.d.). Today, Germany is officially represented in the AC by its FFO and German national experts from half a dozen German research institutions participate in all AC Working Groups, the TFAMC as well as in the Expert Group on Black Carbon and Methane (German Arctic Office, n.d.). The main goal of German polar research is to understand what role the Arctic plays in the global climate system (FFO 2018, 27). Since Germany was one of the non-Arctic States that helped set up the

24 FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

IASC (Machowski 1993, 202), many German experts are now members of its working groups (IASC, n.d. (b)). Moreover, the Helmholtz centre is also member of the EPB (EPB, n.d. (b)). “The Federal Government actively supports the activities of the Inter- national Maritime Organization” (FFO 2018, 13) and the WMO with its new initiative, the Arctic Regional Climate Centre Network (Ibid.). As Germany wishes to resolve any tensions in the region peacefully, it participates in the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable, semi-annual meetings with the Arctic countries, the UK and the Netherlands, whose aim is to improve communication among the states concerned (Apan, n.d.). Germany is a member of the Svalbard Treaty of 1920, one of the main legal basis for Arctic cooperation establishing the status of Svalbard Islands as a part of Norway (The Svalbard Treaty 1920, Article 1). The country is also an observer in the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (Belov 2016, 87) and is involved in the work of the Nordic Council (FFO 2013, 10); both frameworks for cooperation in northern regions focused on sustainable development (BEAC, n.d.(a); Nordic Co-operation, n.d.). Since 2003, Germany runs research stations on Svalbard jointly with France (AWIPEV, n.d.), and with Russia it runs a station on the island Sa- moylovsky (Belov 2016, 86). For Arctic and Antarctic research, Germany possess of an icebreaker Polarstern and two airplanes - Polar 5 and Polar 6, specially modified for flying in extremely cold weather and landing on the ice (AWI 2018). All vehicles are operated by the AWI (FFO 2018, 27; AWI 2018). On 20 September 2019, when the Polarstern left Tromsø to navigate north, Germany together with Britain, China, France, Japan, Russia, USA and 12 other countries launched probably the largest polar expedition in central Arctic ever. The Multidisciplinary Drifting Observatory for the Study of Arctic Climate (MOSAiC) expedition should last one year, comprise 600 scientists and cost around €130m-€140m. The aim is to observe the processes in the Arctic with the changing seasons to understand what global implications they may have in the future. (Associ- ated Press in Berlin 2019; Amos 2019)

25 FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

4.3 Arctic gas to reduce the negative impact on the environment?

Regarding business activities, “Germany has the third-largest merchant marine in the world and the world’s largest fleet of container ships” (FFO 2013, 8). Thus, no wonder that Germany as a “global leader“ in shipbuilding (FFO 2013, 9) and with Hamburg being the second biggest port in Europe (Port of Hamburg, n.d.) has a great interest in the development of Arctic shipping lanes and the coastal federal lands of Hamburg, Bre- men, Brandenburg, and Schleswig-Holstein also contribute to the funding of polar research (Belov 2016, 86). Moreover, despite the EU sanctions on Russia because of the Ukra- ine conflict, German and Russian energy companies continue their cooperation on gas production in the Russian Arctic (Belov 2016, 90). Con- sistent with its strategy to use more natural gas instead of oil, Germany increased its gas imports from Russia’s Gazprom from 53.4 billion cubic meters in 2017 to 58.5 billion cubic meters in 2018 (Gazprom 2019). To ensure even bigger natural gas supply from Russia (Erlanger 2019), Ger- man government supports construction of the Nord Stream II pipeline, “a 760-mile (1,225-km) pipeline project to ship gas from Russia under the Baltic Sea to Germany” (Holland and Gardner 2019). The Nord Stream II has caused political tensions in Europe, but also between the EU and the United States, since the pipeline could make Germany dependent on Rus- sia (Holland and Gardner 2019) and exclude Poland and Ukraine from substantial transit profits (Erlanger 2019). Since 2003 when they set up a joint venture in the Urengoyskoye field, Gazprom and German company BASF have been jointly working on hydrocarbon production in Russian Arctic. Wintershall, a subsidiary of BASF even obtained a 25 % stake in two new blocks of the Urengoyskoye field which is now under pilot development. (Gazprom, n.d.(a)) Another project under development is the Arctic Yuzhno-Russkoye gas field where Wintershall and E.ON SE, another German company, are involved, too (Gazprom, n.d.(b)). Besides Russia, part of gas supply destined to Germany originates from Norway which has eighteen gas fields in the Norwegian Sea and two in the Barents Sea. (Adomaitis 2019; Norwegian Petroleum, n.d.)

26 FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

4.4 Summary

German is one of four permanent AC Observer States, gaining its observer status in 1998. In the Arctic, it is interested mainly in research of polar ecosystems that is linked to global climate change. German polar expeditions started already in the 19th century (Belov 2016, 86), which results in a strong base of Arctic science in Germany. German AWI is one of the most recognized polar research institutions in the world (FFO 2013, 9), which is currently leading the biggest multinational Arctic scientific expedition ever (Amos 2019). Germany’s most recent policy document dedicated to the Arctic published in 2018, proves that Germany’s attention is shifting from economic opportunities of the Arctic to assuming more responsibility in environmental protection and sustainable development of the region. From economic perspective, Germany is interested mainly in Arctic shipping and imports of Russian LNG since the country views natural gas as the best energy source to be used in transition to renewable energy (FFO 2018, 34). The German Federal government wishes the Arctic be a “conflict free region“ (FFO 2018, 24)

27 FRENCH REPUBLIC

5 French Republic

Many of the AC Observer States were first present in Antarctica and only later redirected their focus on the Arctic. French Republic is one of them. (The Arctic Institute, n.d.(b)) It has been present in the Arctic since Jean- Baptiste Charcot and Paul-Emile Victor started their expeditions in the beginning of the 20th century (MAEDI 2016, 4). In 1963, “France was the first country to set up […] a scientific research base in the Arctic archipel- ago of Svalbard” (MAEDI 2016, 17). In 1990, France received an invita- tion to become observer of the BEAC (Pelaudeix and Rodon 2013, 67). “In 1992, the Institut Polaire Français Paul-Émile Victor (IPEV) – a public interest group composed of nine public and parastatal organisations – was founded” (The Arctic Institute, n.d.(b)). Finally, a year before France became an AC Observer in 2000 (AC 2015f), the IPEV set up the French Charles Rabot research station in Ny-Ålesund, where it studies atmospheric and life sciences (Kings Bay, n.d.).

5.1 “The Great Challenge of the Arctic” – French Arctic Strategy

Following the recent tradition of AC Observers to issue governmental Arctic strategies launched probably by South Korea in 2013 (Bennett 2014, 887; Tonami 2016, 75), French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and In- ternational Development (MAEDI) published The Great Challenge of the Arctic: National Roadmap for the Arctic in 2016. It contains a set of “rec- ommendations” for French Arctic conduct in fields of research, diplomacy, commerce, safety of navigation, environmental safety and sustainable development (MAEDI 2016). First of all, France looks at the Arctic through the concept of “global common interest”, which means that states’ national interests should be subordinated to global challenges such as global warming or environmental protection (MAEDI 2016, 12, 19, 46). In 2015, then-President of France François Hollande called “for implementation of special, more stringent environmental safety standards in the Arctic where French ope- rators are present“ (Hollande cit. In MAEDI 2016, 60). According to the National Roadmap these standards should comprise “ambitious environmental standards for oil drilling in the polar regions” (MAEDI 2016, 28)

28 FRENCH REPUBLIC and measures for sustainable fishing (Ibid., 58). Moreover, France, similarly to for example South Korea, is an advocate of the so-called “green growth“ concept (Ibid., 27; Tonami 2016, 80) In fact, the National Road- map explicitely states that “[t]he Arctic is a laboratory for new technologies in information and communication, robotics, automation, airborne systems and sensors“(MAEDI 2016, 27). Even though the French government expressed support for companies with “technological expertise for the mining of resources“ (MAEDI 2016, 28), France seems to be more interested in its share of influence in Arctic regional governance than in the natural resources or shipping ( The Arctic Institute, n.d.(a)). Given the nature of Arctic governance regime, France declares respect to the Arctic States’ sovereignty rights and the UNCLOS, however, at the same time asks „greater participation“ of Observer States within the AC and wants to be more active in all organisations invested in regulation of the Arctic issues. (MAEDI 2016, 46, 57, 58). The main French contribution to these organisations should be scientific research whose funding should be increased. (MAEDI 2016, 19- 20) Additionally, French Ministère Des Armées (Ministry for the Armed Forces) published another strategy-like document on the Arctic in 2019: France and the New Strategic Challenges in the Arctic. It immediately sparked controversy as the Minister for the Armed Forces, Florence Parly writes in the preamble that “the Arctic belongs to no one“ (Parly 2019 cit. In. Ministère Des Armées 2019). (Tømmerbakke and Trellevik 2019) This is not a new point of view among the AC Observers; the Netherlands or India would agree; the problem is that it is in contra- diction with the AC principles and that more and more countries start to share this view, which could result in a conflict in the future.

5.2 French-German cooperation and the military

From the diplomatic perspective, France was the first non-Arctic country to appoint an “Ambassador for the poles“ in 2009 (MAEDI 2016, 12; The Arctic Institute, n.d.(b)), and has strong understanging of the Arctic issues with Germany, which Belov calls “the French-German tandem” (Be- lov 2016, 88). Naturally, both countries are advocates of increased involvement of the EU in the Arctic (FFO 2018, 42; MAEDI 2016, 52-53).

29 FRENCH REPUBLIC

Besides the AC, where France is actively involved in the CAFF’s CBird expert group focused on monitoring Arctic seabirds (CAFF, n.d.(a)); French National Centre for Scientific Research is a member of the IASC (IASC, n.d.(a)) and together with IPEV also a member of the EPB (EPB, n.d.(b)) Finally, according the Ministère Des Armées, France is gradually increasing its contribution to the Arctic Challenge military exercises since 2015, being the second largest contributor in 2019. French military also participated in the Trident Juncture 18 exercise, in air policing missions over Island and in various drills in extremly cold weather. (Ministère Des Armées 2019) Also, in 2019, French vessel Rhône was the first non-Rus- sian military vessel to sail through the NSR without Russian assistance (Ministère Des Armées 2019). Finally, according to the Arctic Institute, “French submarines routinely patrol in the Arctic Ocean, with French Next Generation Device-Launching Nuclear Submarines (SNLE-NG)” (The Arc- tic Institute, n.d.(a)).

5.3 LNG and tourism

Although French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Develop- ment states that prospects of Arctic business do not seem profitable enough yet for French companies, there is more than a dozane of enter- prises from France operating in Canadian, Norwegian and Russian Arctic (MAEDI 2016, 27). The largest of them is certainly the energy giant Total. In addition to the 20% stake that the company holds in Arctic Yamal LNG project in Russia, in March 2019, Total acquired a 10% stake in one of the most important energy projects under development – the LNG 2 project on the Yamal and Gydan peninsulas in Russian Arctic. Moreover, as Staalesen (2019a) points out, the company’s actual stake in the project will be even higher – around 21.6%, given the company’s stake in Russian Novatek to which the majority of the project belongs. Importance of natural gas from Arctic Russia is rising as it is an energy source with lower emissions (Stanley, Pearman and Yin 2018) and many countries like Germany, In- dia, Japan, Singapore or South Korea aim for resource diversification. Start of production at Utrennye natural gas field is planned on 2023. Sub- sequently, the LNG will be transported in ice-class carriers to Asia and Europe throught the NSR. (Staalesen 2019a)

30 FRENCH REPUBLIC

Another major French stakeholder in the Arctic is also the cruise company Ponant (MAEDI 2016, 27). Ponant reportedly commissioned Romanian company Vard to build the world’s first icebreaking cruise ship. The ship “powered by a hybrid […] (LNG) and battery propulsion system to reduce emissions by up to 85 percent” (Humpert 2019d) should start to transport tourists to the North Pole in 2021, raising concerns about both human and environmental security. (Ibid.) An interesting fact is that while the big Arctic contratcs are being underway, in August 2019, French President Emanuel Macron urged on shippers to not use the NSR because of its adverse impacts on the environment. “This route will kill us in the end, because this route may well be quicker, but it is the consequence of our past irresponsibility” (Macron 2019 cit. In Regan and Reznik 2019), he said. (Regan and Reznik 2019)

5.4 Summary

Famous French explorers reached the Arctic only in the beginning of the 20th century, since France had been more interested in exploring the Ant- arctic at first (The Arctic Institute, n.d.(b)). France became an Observer State to the AC in 2000 and today the French-German cooperation on Arctic issues is very strong (Belov 2016, 88). The French energy giant Total is involved Russian LNG projects, and Ponant plans to launch cruise travels for tourists (Humpert 2019d). However, France views the Arctic through the lenses of “global common interest”, which means that protection of Arctic environment should be favoured over economic ambitions (MAEDI 2016). French Minister for the Armed Forces even said that “the Arctic belongs to no one“ (Parly 2019 cit. In. Ministère Des Armées 2019). This view is not legally well-founded, but it is indicative of French interest in military security of the Arctic, as is also evident from French increased military activity in the region.

31 ITALIAN REPUBLIC

6 Italian Republic

Although Italy’s Arctic engagement may take many by surprise, the country has strong historical legacy in the region (The Arctic Institute, n.d.(e)). The first Italian scientific expedition was the Umberto Nobile’s flight from Rome to Alaska across the Arctic Ocean in 1926. He and two other men – Roald Amundsen (Norway) and Lincoln Ellsworth (USA), became then the first three men to reach the North Pole. (MFIC 2015, 2; Nobile 1959) In 1997, Italy’s National Research Council established a research centre Dirigibile Italia in Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard (Kings Bay, n.d.; MFIC 2015, 2). After seven years of waiting (Chater 2016, 178), Italy finally became an AC Observer in 2013, along with a group of five Asian states (AC 2015f). Italian government sees “a number of similarities” (MFIC 2015, 7) between the Alps and the Arctic, a feature called the “vertical Arctic” in Switzerland (Estermann 2019 cit. In Sharp 2019).

6.1 Italian strategy: Sustainable development

Although historically, Italian presence in the Arctic was motivated mostly by individual scientific curiosity, today it is motivated by the global warming (MFIC 2015, 2-3). In 2015, Italian Ministry of Foreign Af- fairs and International Cooperation (MFIC), published a draft version of Italian Arctic policy Towards an Italian strategy for the Arctic: National Guidelines. The document presents five dimensions of Italian approach: political, environmental, human, scientific, and economic; but the under- lying theme of the whole strategy is sustainability. (MFIC 2015) In the political dimension, for Italy, the AC is the main platform for addressing Arctic as well as certain global issues, such as the global warming; while for scientific cooperation, bilateral relations with the Arctic States are crucial. Italy also stresses the importance of international tre- aties and rules applying on the region, such as the Svalbard Treaty, the UNCLOS, the MARPOL, the Convention on Biological Diversity or the Con- vention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution. Moreover, Italian focus on sustainable development of the Arctic is inspired by the EU’s environmental policy. (MFIC 2015, 3, 4, 6, 13)

32 ITALIAN REPUBLIC

Italy is the only Observer State whose Arctic strategy pays special attention to sustainable urban development and socio-economic conditions of indigenous communities in the Arctic, whose well-being is thre- atened by lack of infrastructure, biodiversity loss and loss of arable soil in the region, similarly to people living in Italian Alpine areas (MFIC 2015, 10). In the environmental and economic dimensions, Italian approach is similar to that of Germany or Japan – protection of marine environment and reduction of air pollution are all of substantial importance (MFIC 2015, 7-9), as well as respect to the environment when exploiting Arctic energy resources (MFIC 2015, 15-16). While Italian scientific activities in the Arctic should continue to be focused on research of climate change, in terms of technology, Italy believes to have rich experience in maritime engineering, such as development of offshore oil and gas, and satellite observation. Arctic research should continue to be coordinated with international scientific organizations where Italy should be more present in the future. Italy with France even advocate a plan to increase EU’s presence in the region through strengthening of the European Arctic infrastructures. (MFIC 2015, 13- 16)

6.2 Scientific diplomacy

Likewise all European AC Observer States, Italy’s role in the Arctic is covered partially by diplomacy and mostly by scientific diplomacy. Italian government appoints a special diplomatic representative to represent the country on Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) meetings of the AC (MFIC 2015, 5) and is an observer of the BEAC, a cooperative platform for sustainable development in the region around the Barents Sea (BEAC n.d.(a,b)). Conferences Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle are other two impactful forums to discuss Arctic matters (Lagutina 2016, 140). On top of that, Italy as a maritime state that usually engages in initiatives related to the ocean “played an active role in the drafting of Directive no. 30/2013/EU of June 12, 2013 on safety of offshore oil and gas operations” (MFIC 2015, 5) which applies to the Arctic as well. Additionally, Italian MFIC organizes and co-organizes international conferences attended by SAOs or Ambassadors of AC Member States,

33 ITALIAN REPUBLIC such as was for example the Arctic connections: A trust building Arctic cooperation on Energy, Security and Blue Economy in October 2019. (MFIC 2015, 6; SIOI – UNA Italy 2019) From international scientific cooperation related to the Arctic, four main Italian research institutions participate in the AC Working Groups, notably the AMAP and SDWG (Ministerio dell’Ambiente 2019); the Nati- onal Research Council is also member of the IASC, the EPB, and European Climate Research Alliance. (MFIC 2015, 5, 12, 14) In addition to the Dirigibile Italia research station, in 2009, the CNR decided to build the Amundsen-Nobile Climate Change Tower in Ny-Åle- sund as well. Although its main purpose is observation of the atmospheric boundary layer, it may serve for a variety of other research initiatives. (Kings Bay, n.d.) Finally, Italy disposes of a polar research vessel called OGS Explora, which should be operational until the 2028 (MFIC 2015, 12).

6.3 Arctic business

Eni S.p.A is probably the biggest Italian energy company that has various development and production projects in the Arctic (Nordea 2017, 17). “Together with Norway’s Equinor, Eni has developed the Goliat field – the world’s most northern offshore platform” (The Arctic Institute, n.d.(f)) for oil production in the Barents Sea. The company is also involved in hydrocarbon extraction in Russian Siberia in Samburgkoye field, where it holds 30% stake in SeverEnergia, a joint venture between Eni, Novatek, Gaz- promneft and Enel (Eni 2012). On top of that, Eni owns and operates the Nikaitchuq oilfield in Alaska, only 3m off the coast in the Beaufort Sea (Offshore Technology, n.d.) and a licence for hydrocarbon exploration in Greenland (Eni, n.d.). Another active business is Italian shipbuilding company Fincantieri. In 2013, the company signed an agreement with Russian Krylov State Research Centre on developing a drill ship able to operate in ice up to 1.5 metres thick and temperatures of -40°C, the two major complications in accessing the Arctic resources. (Fincantieri 2013) The company was also interested in building an icebreaker for US Coast Guard (Humpert 2019c).

34 ITALIAN REPUBLIC

Italy’s rich experience in satellite observation is owed to Leonardo S.p.A, an aerospace and security company by 30.2% owned by Italian Mi- nistry of Economy and Finance (Leonardo 2018). It is the only representative of the industrial sector to participate in the EU-funded Arctic and North Atlantic Security and Emergency Preparedness Network, a project focused environmental protection and navigational safety led by Norway. Leonardo will deliver satellite monitoring, SAR helicopters, dro- nes and sensors. (Leonardo 2019) The Leonardo Company has also a long history of relations with China, to which it has sold around 200 helicopters to date. In 2017, PRIC ordered a light intermediate helicopter to operate from new Chinese ice breaker both in the Arctic and Antarctic. (Leonardo 2017). Finally, the most recent Italian business activity regarding the Arctic is Italian bank Intesa Sanpaolo’s interest in financing the Russian No- vatek’s liquefied natural gas project LNG-2 (Kiselyova 2019) on Gydan Peninsula in Russian Arctic which should start production in 2023. (Swagath 2019; NS ENERGY 2019) Another Italian company, Saipem, a leader in engineering, drilling and construction, has already invested in the project; it will hold a share of approximately €2.2 billion (Saipem 2019).

6.4 Summary

Italian approach to the Arctic is very similar to the German. Both countries have been present in the Arctic since the 19th century and because of the climate change, both pay great attention to environmental protection and sustainable development of the region. Italy and Germany are engaged in the same international diplomatic and scientific forums. Ital- ian energy leaders Eni S.p.A and Saipem, shipbuilding company Fincant- ieri, and aerospace company Leonardo S.p.A are very actively involved in the Arctic business.

35 JAPAN

7 Japan

Unlike what many would believe, Asian states have been engaged in the Arctic matters much longer than just in the recent years (Stokke 2013, 474). First Japanese footsteps in the Arctic could be traced back to 1950s, when Japan started its Arctic research (The Headquarters 2015, 4). How- ever, the Arctic Environment Research Center with a research centre on Svalbard were founded only in 1990 (National Institute of Polar Re- search, n.d.; Kings Bay, n.d.) Despite the long-lasting interest in the developments in the Arctic and participation in the projects of the IASC already in the 1990s, Japan applied to receive the AC Observer status only in 2009 (The Arctic Insti- tute, n.d.(i)). The application was accepted during the AC Kiruna Minis- terial meeting in 2013 (AC 2015f) and today Japan suggests “expanding the role of AC observers” (The Headquarters 2015, 8).

7.1 Japan’s outlook – The Northern Sea Route

The same year Japan was admitted to the AC, Japan’s government designed the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, fundaments of later adopted Ja- pan’s Arctic Policy that states specific goals. First of all, Japan as a country frequently affected by earthquakes and tsunami, is mostly concerned with effects that the changing conditions in Arctic environment could have on the occurrence of extreme weather events (The Headquarters 2015, 3). Therefore, Japan believes that to address negative consequences of climate change, the country should, focus its research on studying the “Arctic warming” and its global implications (Ibid.). Furthermore, Japan wants to contribute to the Arctic research using its technological leadership. The government reportedly plans to deploy sophisticated satellites and build a research vessel with autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV) to conduct improved observations of the Arctic areas both on the surface and underwater. (The Headqu- arters 2015, 7) International cooperation is essential for Japan – it is one of the biggest funders of intergovernmental organizations (Hammond 2017). Japan’s Arctic Policy explicitly states that “[t]here is a need for Japan to be involved […] in formulating international agreements and rules regarding

36 JAPAN the Arctic” (The Headquarters 2015, 5). Additionally, under provisions of a pacifist constitution (Ikeshima 2016, 459, 461), Japan’s government is against strengthened military presence of any state in the Arctic (The Headquarters 2015, 6). Key point of Japan’s Arctic policy is the Northern Sea Route, a shipping route from Europe to East Asia crossing Russian Arctic. If the route was navigable for most of cargo ships and oil and LNG transporters, it would become essential for Japan’s economy, since import of resources and export of goods would be cheaper, faster and safer than through Suez and Panama Canals. (The Arctic Institute, n.d.(h); Fridtjof Nansen Insti- tute, n.d.) That is why Japan’s policy outlook pays special attention to the research of NSR’s feasibility and preparation of related infrastructure (The Headquarters 2015, 9), even though Japan assessed the NSR as “not ready yet for safe and reliable use” (The Headquarters 2015, 5). Finally, just like all the other Observers, Japan is aware of resource wealth that the Arctic holds and hence is supporting its exploitation, however in a sustainable way with respect to the protection of the nature (The Headquarters 2015, 1,8,9).

7.2 Japan and sustainability

As a maritime state composed of several islands, Japan has long been interested in the NSR (MFA of Japan 2010). Already in 1993, Japan along with Russia and Norway jointly ran a six-year International Northern Sea Route Program destined to examine the NSR's potential. Even though the project ended in 1999 and the results were transmitted to relevant business stakeholders, Japan’s research on the NSR continued. (Fridtjof Nan- sen Institute, n.d.; The Arctic Institute, n.d.(h)) As a result, in late 2012, the first tanker loaded with LNG successfully arrived from Norway to Ja- pan, sailing through the NSR (Stokke 2013, 474; The Arctic Institute, n.d.(h)). “By 2013, Norway sent two shipments of oil products to Japan using the NSR” (The Arctic Institute, n.d.(h)). According to T. Ikeshima, it is the Japan’s “relationship with Russia [that] will decide future success of the NSR” (Ikeshima 2016, 460). However, apart from the NSR, one of the biggest Japan’s research attempts today is the Japanese Arctic Challenge for Sustainability Project (ArCS) for the period of 2015-2020. The aim of the project is to distribute knowledge on climate and environmental change, advise policy makers

37 JAPAN on possible future developments and promote research on sustainability. (ArCS, n.d.(a)) Since these aims are corresponding with the main goal of German Arctic research, the ArCS will conduct observations as part of the German-led MOSAiC expedition in 2019 (ArCS, n.d.(b)). Ja- pan’s serious interest in sustainability can be also proved by its engagement in the BEAC, whose primal focus is on sustainable development and where Japan is the only Asian state to have received the observer status (BEAC n.d.(b)). In the AC, Japan is participating in the CAFF’s CBird Expert Group focused on protection of seabirds along with French, British and Dutch experts (CAFF, n.d.(a)). To prove the weight of its Arctic involvement on the diplomatic level, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) decided to set up an Arctic Task Force in 2010 (MFA of Japan 2010) and create a position of Am- bassador to the Arctic later in March 2013 (The Arctic Institute, n.d.(g)). In 2020, Japan will host the Arctic Science Ministerial meeting and the Arctic Circle forum (Over the Circle 2019b).

7.3 Japan’s never-ending hunt for energy resources?

While Japan has one of the biggest economies in the world, it has no gas or oil reserves; 90% of resources for energy consumption need to be imported (Shiraishi 2017 cit. In Hammond 2017). Before Fukushima disas- ter of 2011, one third of the country used to be powered by nuclear energy; nowadays 71% of Japan’s energy consumption is covered by fossil fuels (WorldData.info, n.d.), namely the LNG. (The Arctic Institute, n.d.(h)) In words of Japan’s former Ambassador to the Arctic, Kazuko Shiraishi, “Japan strives for diversification both in terms of source and type of energy” (Shiraishi 2017 cit. In Hammond 2017) and “the Arctic […] is an important part of that strategy as well” (Ibid.). Since 2013, Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOG- MEC) has been involved in oil exploration east of the Greenland’s shore (The Arctic Institute, n.d.(h); The Headquarters 2015, 9), where, based on the data of the US Geological Society, up to 15% of the Arctic's undiscovered oil and gas reserves should be located (Hough 2013, 20). Addi- tionally, another Japanese company holds 30% stake in Sakhalin-I project for oil and gas extraction on Russian Sakhalin Island near Japan’s north coasts (The Economic Times 2006).

38 JAPAN

However, nowadays, Japan is more interested in natural gas since it is believed to have less emissions (Stanley, Pearman and Yin 2018). Ja- pan is already importing shale gas from North America, and natural gas from Saudi Arabia and the Middle East (Shiraishi 2017 cit. In Hammond 2017), but now it is invested in the development of Arctic gas in Russia, too – in Yamal Peninsula and Gyda Peninsula, a region beyond the Arctic Circle, very rich in natural gas (Staalesen 2019b). In regards to the former, a LNG plant is in the process of construction on the South Tambey Field. Once the construction is finished in 2019, Japanese company Mit- sui & Co. is contracted to ship LNG from Siberian port of Sabetta to Asia and Europe through the NSR. (Shiraishi 2017 cit. In Hammond 2017); MOL Mitsui O.S.K. Lines 2019; Yamal LNG, n.d.; The Arctic Institute, n.d.(h)) Interestingly, since Japan will have to increase its wheat and bar- ley imports because of bad weather in 2018 (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2019), the Sabetta port is also planned to be used to ship grain from Omsk region to Japan through the NSR, replacing the railway transportation (Staalesen 2019b). The second energy project called LNG 2 is situated on Gydan Pe- ninsula, opposite the Yamal Peninsula in Siberia. In July 2019, a Nether- lands-based company formed by Mitsui & Co. and JOGMEC acquired a stake of 10% in the project that should start production in 2023. (Swa- gath 2019; NS ENERGY, n.d.) It is also worth mentioning, in regards to the energy resources, that JOGMEC in cooperation with the US, was involved in exploring methane hydrate energy resources in the Arctic. The potential is great, since the methane hydrate should provide clean-burning natural gas and could be produced from deep-water reserves. According to the Arctic Insti- tute, the tests “shed new light on the feasibility of using this unconventi- onal energy source” (The Arctic Institute, n.d.(h)). (Ibid.)

7.4 Summary

Japan was one of five Asian states admitted to the AC in 2013, but its presence in the Arctic dates back to the 1950s (The Headquarters 2015, 4). According to Japan’s Arctic Policy of 2015, Japan wants to study Arctic environment to protect itself from extreme weather events in the future and remain involved in Arctic rule-making. Japan stresses the im-

39 JAPAN portance of the NSR, which could bring substantial profit to Japan’s economy (The Arctic Institute, n.d.(h)). Additionally, Japan is an advocate of sustainability, and since it is an energy-demanding country with no energy resources (Shiraishi 2017 cit. In Hammond 2017), Japan started to be interested in LNG imports from Russian Arctic, as natural gas is believed to have less emissions (Stanley, Pearman and Yin 2018).

40 THE NETHERLANDS

8 The Netherlands

Although “[t]he Netherlands is perhaps among the most underestimated and certainly the most understudied state [of the] observers to the AC“ (Knecht 2017, 176), the Dutch consider their country “a leader in international polar climate research“ (NWO 2014, 14). Historically, the Neth- erlands has been involved in Polar Regions even longer than Germany. Even though the Netherlands was at first oriented mostly on the Antarc- tic (Knecht 2017, 176), it was the Dutch explorer Willem Barentsz who discovered Svalbard in 1596. Since then, the Dutch have been engaged in the Arctic fish trade (The Arctic Institute, n.d.(l)). The country became an AC Observer in 1998 (AC 2015f) and calls itself “a niche operator in polar research” (NWO 2014, 19), as the scope of Dutch research is relatively limited, but its expertise in some of the specific fields is substantial (Ibid.).

8.1 The Netherlands – The “niche operator”

Current Dutch policy towards the Arctic is based on a document titled Pole Position - NL 2.0: Strategy for the Netherlands Polar Programme 2016-2020 fashioned by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Re- search (NWO), an updated version of the Master Plan for Pole Position – NL published for the period of 2011-2015 (NWO 2014, 5). Since the document was created by the NWO, it is oriented almost exclusively on Arc- tic research priorities. Of the major concern for the Netherlands is melting of the ice in Po- lar Regions, the rise of sea level, and the possibility of change in the Gulf Stream (NWO 2014, 14). According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “[t]he rate of sea level rise since the mid-19th century has been larger than the mean rate during the previous two millennia […]” (IPCC 2013 cit. In NWO 2014, 9). Thus the Netherlands wants to invest in the research of the melting of both Greenlandic and Antarctic ice caps and its possible impact on the Western Europe (NWO 2014, 9, 13, 14). Furthermore, the country aims to gain more understanding of the Arctic peoples and legal conditions for operating in the areas; improve risk management measures (NWO 2014, 16), and study the polar processes and their impacts on the world ecosystem (NWO 2014, 13).

41 THE NETHERLANDS

Although the Netherlands considers the Arctic the “Global Com- mons” (NWO 2014, 7), to be able to influence its fate regarding the effects of the climate change, it is essential for the Netherlands to keep "the position of the Netherlands within the Arctic consultation structure” (AVI 2014 cit. in NWO 2014, 13). However the country must then increase its polar research funding, which has been concidered very small (NWO 2014, 27).

8.2 Research and diplomacy

According to data of S. Knecht, the Netherlands is an active Observer to the AC, between 1998 and 2015, scientists from the Arctic Centre of the University of Groningen were contributing to the work of AMAP, SDWG and CAFF working groups (Knecht 2017, 176; EU-PolarNet, n.d.(a)). Dutch experts also engage in the IASC and European Framework programmes (NWO 2014, 21). The monarchy is a signatory to the Svalbard Treaty of 1920 (The Arctic Institute, n.d.(j)), an observer to the BEAC (BEAC, n.d. (b)) and also a member of the EPB (NWO 2014, 20). The Dutch polar research is renowned for specialization in glaciology and oceanography (NWO 2014, 19). The Arctic Centre of the Uni- versity of Groningen also owns and operates an Arctic station in Ny-Åle- sund, Svalbard, but has no polar icebreaker on his own (The Arctic Insti- tute, n.d.(l)). Hence, the Dutch polar research is dependent on the international cooperation. For about 15 years, the most important partner for the Arctic Centre was the German AWI that often lends its icebreaker Po- larstern to Dutch researchers. (NWO 2014, 19) To show its commitment to the Arctic development, the Netherlands established a position of an Arctic Ambassador, however, relatively late, only in 2016 (Over the Circle 2018b). Before extending collaboration with Russia, the countries first had to settle their dispute of 2013 when activists from Greenpeace, head- quartered in Amsterdam, embarked the Netherlands flag ship Arctic Sun- rise and attempted to board Gazprom’s Prirazlomnaya oil platform to protest against drilling in the Pechora Sea. Russian coastguard re- sponded by arresting the activists at gun point and towed the ship to the port of Murmansk which resulted in the Netherlands filing a case at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. (Associated Press

42 THE NETHERLANDS

2013; Brown 2013; Government of the Netherlands 2019; Aljazeera 2013) The dispute was finally settled in 2019 when the governments of Russia and the Netherlands released an “amicable” joint statement “on scientific cooperation in the Russian Arctic region and the settlement of a dispute” (Government of the Netherlands 2019). In the future, the two states should jointly fund Russian-Dutch polar expeditions. (Ibid.) How- ever, this does not mean that the Netherlands is not concerned with possible Russian militarisation of the Arctic. The kingdom is very active in NATO’s military exercises in the Northern Europe, such as the Trident Juncture of 2018. (Over the Circle 2018b)

8.3 LNG and Chinese Belt and Road

Just like the other countries with seafaring tradition, the Kingdom of Netherlands recognizes not only the challenges of the Arctic, but also the economic opportunities stemming from Arctic transportation. With Rot- terdam being the biggest port in Europe and sixth of the ten biggest ports in the world (Ship Technology 2013), the opening of the Northern Sea Route could be of essential importance to the Dutch economy (The Arctic Institute, n.d.(k)). Not only “Rotterdam remains a primary destination for Russian oil tankers“ (Over the Circle 2018b), it could also become an important part of Chinese Polar Silk Road, a part of its Belt and Road initiative. In 2013, China’s COSCO’s cargo vessel sent to reach Rotterdam through the NSR to test its navigability, arrived successfully to its final destination. The preparatory works have evidently already begun since in 2016 “Cosco [...] purchased a thirty-five percent stake of the Euromax Terminal at the Rotterdam Port“ (Over the Circle 2018b) and “the Rotter- dam Port Authority signed an agreement with the Bank of China to jointly develop investment and infrastructure opportunities“ (Over the Circle 2018b). On the other hand, Arctic drilling hasn’t proved fruitful to the Neth- erlands. In 2013, the Royal Dutch Shell opened its Burger J well to explore oil and gas in the Chukchi Sea, Alaska, but as it was deemed dry, the company abandoned drilling in the area. (Nordea 2017, 3) Nevertheless, Shell owns a 27.5% stake in the Sakhalin-2 project for oil and gas exploitation in Russian offshore and onshore sub-Arctic. The project was launched in 2009 and currently should supply “about 4% of the world’s [...]

43 THE NETHERLANDS

(LNG) market“ (Shell, n.d.). It is supposed “to become a regional oil and LNG hub“ (Ibid.).

8.4 Summary

The Netherlands’ presence in the Arctic is often underestimated, but the kingdom has a strong scientific presence in the region (Knecht 2017, 176). The future of the country depends on the rising of global sea-level, thus the main focus of the Netherlands’ Arcitc research is on melting ice in the Polar Regions in result of the climate change. The Netherlands views the Arctic as “Global Commons” and considers international cooperation regarding the Arctic as crucial. (NWO 2014, 7) It is one of the “oldest” AC Observer States, admitted in 1998. In economic dimension, the NSR is the most important opportunity for the Dutch ports, where Chinese companies have started to be invested recently, probably in prospects of future Arctic shipping (Over the Circle 2018b). Furthermore, the Dutch company Shell invested in oil and gas expoitation in Russian sub-Arctic (Shell, n.d.).

44 PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

9 People’s Republic of China

“The People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s official engagement with the Arctic began with the signing of the Svalbard Treaty in 1925” (Tonami 2016, 20), but the country was not very active in the region until 1990s (Ibid.). In 1989 China established its Polar Research Institute (PRIC) (PRIC, n.d.) and ten years later “sent its first official Arctic research expedition”(To- nami 2016, 21). In 1996, China became a member of the IASC. In addition to its first icebreaker Xue Long purchased in 1994, since 2004, China has also been operating its own Arctic research station – the Yellow River Sta- tion on Svalbard. Seven years after submitting its application for the AC observer status and five years of attending the AC meetings, China became an Observer in 2013. (Chater 2016, 179-180; The State Council 2018; Tonami 2016, 20-21) The PRC has become certainly the most studied, and the most redoubtable AC Observer State. As soon as China submitted its application, concerns aroused about Chinese economic interests in the Arctic, notably the hydrocarbons, minerals and shipping routes (Zengerle 2013). Russia saw a new rival in China (Chater 2016, 1792), but now it welcomes the PRC’s investments in the region (Katakey and Kennedy 2013). However, other countries, eg. the United States, remain skeptical (Havnes and Se- land 2019).“The Pentagon warned […] that China could use its civilian research presence in the Arctic to strengthen its military presence, including by deploying submarines to the region as a deterrent against nuclear at- tacks ” said US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in Finland in June 2019 (Pompeo 2019 cit. In Johnson 2019).

9.1 China as a “Near-Arctic State”, the “Polar Silk Road” and Greenland’s minerals

China published the first China’s Arctic Policy only in 2018. The white paper describes the PRC as a “Near-Arctic State”, a state close to the Arctic Circle, that changes in Arctic environment “have a direct impact” on (The State Council 2018). In particular, climate change could have negative

2 Source of the original author‘s information is an interview with Finnish foreign affairs official and Council representative conducted in 2013

45 PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA impacts on China’s agriculture and on people living in the coastal areas (Wen 2009, 11; Nicholls, Herweijer, and Hallegatte 2007, 5). Although not explicitely stated, because China reaffirms its adherence to the UNCLOS and the Svalbard Treaty, it is apparent from the white paper that the PRC regards the Arctic as a global common. China positions itself in a role of “a responsible major country” (The State Coun- cil 2018) that should “contribute to peace, stability and sustainable development in the Arctic” (Ibid.). Besides an active role that China wishes to have in Arctic governance, the main focus of China’s Arctic policy is on: scientific research, environmental protection, climate change, management of Arctic fisheries, development of a “Polar Silk Road”, technological advancement and exploitation of energy and mineral resources of the region. Finally, it suggests that technical innovation could be used to develop “clean energy” in the region. (Ibid.) Development of infrastructure for the “Polar Silk Road”, part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, is seen as the most prominent aspect of future commercial activities in the Arctic. Hence, the PRC calls for the freedom of navigation in Arctic waters (Ibid.) and China’s “national carrier COSCO has sent up to 30 vessels through the Arctic over the past 4 years” (Humpert 2019e). A. Tonami argues that for China, the Arctic is much more important from the economic point of view than from the political one (Tonami 2016, 38). China is trying to secure vast volumes of energy supply by foreign investments (Tonami 2016, 22). In 2014, Russian Novatek agreed to supply China with LNG from Arctic Yamal project for the next 20 years (RT 2014). Moreover, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) holds 20% stake in Yamal LNG and in 2016, Novatek sold a 9.9% stake in the project to China’s Silk Road Fund (NOVATEK 2016). “This suggests that approximately a third of the LNG development project in the Russian North would be owned by Chinese state” (Tonami 2016, 27). Additionally, in 2019, the CNPC and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) both acquired 10% stakes in Novatek’s new Arctic project on Gydan Peninsula (Humpert 2019b). China has also already constructed its first of four planned LNG tankers to transport LNG from Yamal (Staalesen 2019c). Apart from Chinese-Russian partnership in the Arctic, China is interested in Greenland, believed to be rich in minerals that may be eastier to access thanks to the global warming. China’s Shenghe Resources holds

46 PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA a 12.5% stake in Australian-run project on establishing a uranium and rare earth elements mine in Kvanefjeld and other Chinese company participates on zinc and lead mining. (Lanteigne and Shi 2019; ABN News- wire 2017) In 2018, the CNPC and the CNOOC expressed interest in oil and gas exploration in the west Greenland, starting 2021 (Over the Circle 2018a) and two Chinese companies were interested in investing in airports of Nuuk, Greenland’s capital (Matzen and Daly 2018). However, Chinese investment in Greenland’s infrastructure was not welcomed because of Greenland’s specific political position between Denmark, Greenland’s own independence, and the US that has an airbase in Thule (Bennett 2018b).

9.2 Research, diplomacy and the military

Although the PRC’s interest and activities in the Arctic are rising, China has historically favoured the Antarctic (Tonami 2016, 24). First two years after China’s admission to the AC, the new Observer was not very active in the Council’s working groups, nor often present at the Council’s meetings (Knecht 2015). However, in 2016 and 2018, the country re- ported participation in ACAP, AMAP, CAFF and PAME working groups and presence in all AC meetings (Xiaoning 2016; Linlin 2018, 4-5). “China […] actively participates in monitoring and assessing local climatic and environmental changes” (The State Council 2018). Tonami (2016) argues that one of the reasons for China’s need to understand the effects of climate change on China, is to prevent civil unrest that could be spurred by natural catastrophes (Tonami 2016, 33). The PRIC, under the Ministry of Land Resources, is the only polar research institution of China. It runs the China-Nordic Arctic Research Center that is focused on cooperation with recognized Arctic research institutions from Nordic countries. (Tonami 2016, 23, 30) In fact, China enjoys very good relations with Iceland (Tonami 2016, 27). China at- tends the Arctic Circle conferences, an initiative launched in 2013 on the Iceland’s President’s proposal (Ibid.), the Arctic Frontier conferences (The State Council 2018), and is a party to the Trilateral High-Level Dia- logue on the Arctic, annual meetings of representatives from China, Japan

47 PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA and Republic of Korea (Bennett 2017). Chinese Ministry of Foreign Af- fairs appointed the first Special Representative for Arctic Affairs in 2016 (Linlin 2018, 4). According to Havnes and Seland (2019), China has recently started to mention the Arctic more often in relation with its security. For instance, China’s national security law of 2015 suggests “that China must defend its national security interests everywhere, including outer space and the polar ice caps” (Panda 2015). Moreover, various recent Chinese activities in the region could be used to support the military. China has been testing radio communication along the NSR since 2016 and plans to have launched 44 satellites to support Arctic navigation by 2020. China also has a satellite ground base in Sweden and plans to build another one in Greenland. (Humpert 2019e) In the beginning of 2019, China announced its plan to build a nuclear icebreaker, a type of vessel that is currently only in possession of Russia. By the time China’s nuclear icebreaker will enter into service, it should be the second largest icebreaker in the world. (Humpert 2019a)

9.3 Summary

The PRC is the most studied and the most redoubtable Observer State to the AC. It is mainly China’s interest in raw materials of the Arctic and its deployment of technology, such as satellites, that are causing the biggest concers. Chinese state-backed companies invest in Russian LNG extraction, but also in Greenland’s minerals, which has potential to cause political tensions (see Bennett 2018b; Lanteigne and Shi 2019). It is apparent that China, given its rise and power, positions itself as a state that should have influence over the Arctic matters (Tonami 2016, 35). The PRC de- votes its polar research to understanding of the climate change since it could negatively affect China’s agriculture (Wen 2009, 11). As China declares to be a “Near-Arctic State”, from economic persective, development of the NSR is the most significant opportunity for large Chinese ports. However, according to the PRC’s official Arctic strategy, its main goal is to “contribute to peace, stability and sustainable development in the Arctic” (The State Council 2018).

48 POLAND

10 Poland

Poland has a special position of the only state from the Eastern Europe and the former Soviet bloc that is involved in the Arctic consultative structures (Graczyk 2012, 150). It is “by virtue” of signing the Svalbard Treaty in 1931 that Poland’s Arctic journey began (Graczyk 2012, 139). Poland was first an observer to the AEPS (The Arctic Institute, n.d.(m)) and in 1998, it officially became one of the first AC Observers (AC 2015f). Poland’s involvement in the Arctic was, compared to other European states, rather modest “until 2006/2007 when a policy shift towards as- sumption of a more ambitious role could be observed“ (Graczyk 2012, 139). However, “Poland [still] has neither vital nor direct political and economic interests in the Arctic” (Śmieszek, Łuszczuk, Stępień and Graczyk 2015, 1). Its primal focus is on the scientific research in the region (The Arctic Institute, n.d.(m)).

10.1 Policy without policy guidelines

Despite the fact that Poland has a long tradition of Arctic engagement, to these days its government has not developed a coherent Arctic strategy. However, it can be concluded that Poland recognizes the AC as the most important forum to discuss Arctic affairs (Borkowski 2010; Szpunar 2011), especially navigation and natural resources, and that “it should be further strengthened” (Graczyk 2012, 146). The country also recognizes the existing international regulations applying for the Arctic area, such as the UNCLOS, and the freedom of scientific research (Borkowski, 2011). For Poland, engagement in the EU Arctic policy is of substantial importance (Ibid.), since it is a large platform through which the government can communicate its interests and have an impact on Arctic affairs. The rest of Poland’s approach towards the Arctic is apparent from its activities.

10.2 International cooperation in polar research

First of all, Poland is commited to many international organizations that coordinate the Arctic scientific activities. Besides the AC working groups, Polish experts participate in the work of the IASC, which Poland helped

49 POLAND establish in 1990 (Machowski, 1993, 202), the Sustaining Arctic Observ- ing Networks, and the Svalbard Science Forum. (Graczyk 2012, 142, 145) Committee on Polar Research of the Polish Academy of Sciences, the main coordinator of Polish polar research, is also member of the EPB (Polska Akademia Nauk, n.d.; Graczyk 2012, 142). Polish polar scientists hold a special position in the Arctic research community. The Stanislaw Siedlecki Research Station in Hornsund, Sval- bard, established in 1950s is only “one of two permanently manned stations of the European Union member states, along with the joint French-Ger- man Arctic Research Base AWIPEV in Ny-Ålesund, and the only non-Arctic state station outside the international scientific research and monitoring base operated by the Norwegian government-driven company ‘Kings Bay’” (Graczyk 2012, 145). The Hornsund station is even used by NASA and the WMO to collect data about aerosols levels and ozone layer (Graczyk 2012, 145). Moreover, “Poland has a research vessel […] Oceania that is used for research expeditions in the European Arctic” (The Arctic Institute, n.d.(o)).

10.3 The “mediator”

In sphere of diplomacy, Poland has been an observer to the BEAC since 1993 and a full member state of the CBSS (Graczyk 2012, 142). As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) states, “multilateral cooperation concerning the two poles can enhance [Poland’s] overall security and international standing“ (MFA, n.d.). Secondly, what is also evident from Polish activities concerning the Arctic is its increasing activity as a mediator (Schroeder 2004, 78-79) between Arctic and non-Arctic states and organisations (Graczyk 2012, 140). Exactly for this purpose, Poland‘s MFA has been organising the so- called Warsaw Format Meetings, where AC Observers can discuss Arctic matters among themselves, but also with the current chair of the AC. So far, there has been four such meetings, in 2010, 2013, 2015 and 2018. (Śmieszek, Łuszczuk, Stępień and Graczyk 2015, 2; The Arctic Institute, n.d.(m)) “In 2006 a new special post was created within the MFA’s Department of Legal and Treaty Affairs to deal with the Arctic and Antarctic affairs. It later evolved to the position of “Ambassador for Polar Affairs”“ (Graczyk 2012, 144). In 2011, the MFA even created a special Polar Task Force

50 POLAND which is composed of both scientists and government officials to discuss and set priorities of Polish polar policy (Graczyk 2012, 145; The Arctic Institute, n.d.(m)), yet, as mentioned before, Polish government has not issued any official policy document concerning the Arctic.

10.4 Economic interests

In the business sector, Polish activities in the Arctic are relatively limited. Unlike many other Observers, Poland does not have any ambitious economic interests there. Polish state-run company KGHM, a large copper and silver producer, owns mining assets in Canada. However, those assets are currently frozen, because they require large investments. (Bar- teczko 2019) Other Polish mining companies should reportedly partake in resource extraction in Greenland and the Barents Sea. The private sector has also participated on the construction of the Melkøya LNG plant in Norway and is involved in fishing in the North Atlantic. (The Arctic Insti- tute, n.d.(n); Śmieszek, Łuszczuk, Stępień and Graczyk 2015, 4) It is also worth noting that since Poland joined the EU, Poles seeking work abroad has formed one of the biggest groups of immigrants in Iceland and Nor- way (Bazilchuk 2019; The Arctic Institute, n.d.(n)).

10.5 Summary

“Poland has neither vital nor direct political and economic interests in the Arctic” (Śmieszek, Łuszczuk, Stępień and Graczyk 2015, 1), yet was one of the first countries to become AC Observers in 1998. Poland is involved in many other organisations for Arctic scientific and policy cooperation and has a role of a mediator between Arctic and non-Arctic states and organisations (Schroeder 2004, 78-79; Graczyk 2012, 140). In the private sector, Polish companies participated in the construction of the Melkøya LNG plant in Norway and are involved in fishing in the North Atlantic (The Arctic Institute, n.d.(n)). To these days, the Polish government has not issued an Arctic strategy.

51 REPUBLIC OF INDIA

11 Republic of India

Looking at the map of the world, India seems to be the furthest country engaged in the AC. However, “Indians themselves do not feel they are alien to the Arctic thanks to a popular belief that the Aryans originated in the Arctic region” (Tonami 2016, 108). Moreover, the Himalayas in the north of the country are often referred to as “The Third Pole” since nowhere else in the world, can be found such amount of snow, except the two poles (ICIMOD, n.d.). “Although India is one of the fourteen original High Con- tracting Parties of the 1920 Svalbard Treaty” (Tonami 2016, 107), it started its polar research in Antarctica and tends to look at the Arctic sometimes through the same lenses (Tonami 2016, 109; Nanda 2019). India’s interests in the Arctic are mainly scientific (Chaturvedi 2014, 75). India opened its Arctic research centre Himadri in Ny-Ålesund, Sval- bard only in 2008, relatively late, compared to other Observer States, and five years before submitting its application to the AC. The republic acquired its Observer status in 2013 along with China, Italy, Japan, Korea and Singapore, but in contrast to some of them, India’s Arctic policy has shown little progress. (Tonami 2016, 107, 108, 110)

11.1 The importance of monsoons

Out of five Asian new-joiners of the AC, neither Singapore nor India have published formal documents dedicated to their Arctic policies and even though India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) states that “India’s interests in the Arctic region are scientific, environmental, commercial as well as strategic” (MEA 2013), Singapore’s strategic interests seem to be much clearer (see Chaturvedi 2014, 75). As M. Ch. Miller puts it, “India rarely engages in long-term thinking about its foreign policy goals” (Miller 2013, 14). The Ministry is focused on: the study of connections between the Arctic climate and the monsoons, the impact of global warming on the Arctic sea ice, and the impact of the glaciers-melting on the sea-level rising (MEA 2013). Such focus seems to be legitimate given that India is the second biggest country in the world in terms of population (World Population Review, n.d.) and most of its natural boundaries constitute of the long coastline. India’s 1.3 billion inhabitants (Ibid.) have a high demand on food production and thus India’s economy still relies heavily on

52 REPUBLIC OF INDIA agriculture “which according to 2016 figures contributes 23 percent to In- dia’s GDP and employs 59 percent of India’s workforce” (Ramesh 2018) and is highly dependent on monsoons. (Nanda 2019, 1) From geopolitical perspective, India, as many AC Observers, perceives the Arctic as the global commons (Tonami 2016, 109) and India’s engagement in the Arctic can be seen as a consequence of rivalry with China in attempt to gain territories (Miller 2013; Tonami 2016, 109), but while China has an advantageous geographic location, India is too distant from the Arctic to benefit from the NSR (Sinha, Gupta 2014; see also Nanda 2019, 9). Thus, India is naturally the only Asian AC Observer state oriented more on the ecological dimension of the Arctic (Sinha and Gupta 2014, 883), which India could leverage to strenghten its international standing (Nanda 2019, 14) as India is pressured by developed countries to tackle its carbon emissions (Chaturvedi 2013, 56).

11.2 Scientific engagement

Despite India’s proclaimed scientific interests in the Arctic, and although it has expertise to contribute especially to the ACAP, CAFF, PAME or the SDWG (Chaturvedi 2014, 78), it is little active in the AC Working Groups (Tonami 2016, 110). Additionally, India’s presence in other diplomatic- scientific forums outside the AC, such as the Arctic Frontiers, has been also very occasional (Gewelt 2016, 61; Nanda 2019, 16). On the other hand, India is member of the IASC’s Council and in 2018 it even renamed its National Centre for Antarctic and Ocean Research (under the Ministry of Earth Sciences) to National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research (NCPOR) to demonstrate its commitment to the Arctic (Koshy 2018; The Arctic Institute, n.d.(c)). To upgrade its polar research, the country also plans to purchase an icebreaker (Ministry of Earth Sciences 2018). However, so far the NCPOR has contracted FESCO Trans- portation Group to use its icebreaker only in connection to the Antarctic research station (Sea News 2018). (Nanda 2019, 7) Nevertheless, alto- gether, India’s signals about how high priority is the Arctic seem to be mixed (Gewelt 2016, 61).

53 REPUBLIC OF INDIA

11.3 “Environmental stewardship” of the third largest oil consumer in the world?

From economic point of view, none Arctic natural resources are interesting for India, except for hydrocarbons and minerals (Nanda 2019). Ac- cording to International Energy Agency (IEA), in 2030, India’s total energy demand should represent 8% of the world’s total energy demand (IEA 2009, 76). Its need for energy supplies and a long tradition of oppo- sition towards dependency on any other country (Nanda 2019, 8), dating back to the Non-Alignment Movement, brings India to the Russian Arctic. While Norway is probably India’s most important partner in research activities, and even runs a Norwegian Programme for Research Coopera- tion with India (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018), Russia is the key partner in energy business (Lunev 2012). It is an important relation given India’s third place among the world’s largest crude oil import- ers and consumers (Lee 2019). “In 2002, the state-owned ONGC Videsh (OVL) bought a 20 percent stake in the Sakhalin-I project [for oil extraction] on Sakhalin Island in the Russian sub-Arctic North Pacific“ (The Arctic Institute, n.d.(d)), where for example a Japanese company has a 30% stake, too (The Economic Times 2006). The OVL also acquired a 26-percent stake in Russian Vankorneft, a Rosneft’s subsidiary that owns and operates Vankor field for oil and gas extraction south of Yamal Peninsula in Russian Siberia (Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited, n.d.). However, since India is trying to take a role in “environmental stewardship“ (Nanda 2019, 16), it has, similarly to Germany, Japan or the Netherlands, started to focus more on LNG imports (Ramesh 2018), as burning natural gas is deemed less harmful to the environment than burning oil (Stanley, Pearman, Yin 2018). India started to import LNG from Russia in 2018 following an agreement between the Gas Authority of In- dia Ltd. and Russia’s Gazprom on 20-year natural gas supply (ET Bureau 2018, The Arctic Institute, n.d.(d)). According to Prime Minister Naren- dra Modi, natural gas should represent around 15% of India’s energy mix in 2030, compared to today’s 6%. On the other hand oil imports should decrease from 80% to 67% in 2022. (Lee 2019) Finally, D. Nanda (2019) suggests that Arctic minerals such as gold, copper or uranium, could stimulate India’s technology production in the future (Nanda 2019, 9).

54 REPUBLIC OF INDIA

11.4 Summary

Since 2013, India is one of five Asian AC Observer States, but unlike other active Asian Observers, India has not published an Arctic strategy yet. In the Arctic, India is oriented at scientific research of climate change that could affect monsoons that India’s agriculture is dependent on. Also, there is a threat of the Arctic ice-melt and subsequent sea-level rising for India’s population on coast. (Nanda 2019, 1; MEA 2013) India as the world’s third largest crude oil consumer (Lee 2019) aims for diversification of energy resources, so India invested in oil extraction in Russian sub-Arctic and natural gas supply from Russia (Nanda 2019, 8).

55 REPUBLIC OF KOREA

12 Republic of Korea

“[A] model observer member of the Arctic Council” (Grimsson 2015 cit. In Byung-se 2015) is how Iceland’s President Grimsson described Republic of Korea in 2015 (Byung-se 2015). However, the country has earned this title in relatively short time since South Korea was first interested more in the South Pole than the North. It was only in 2001 that Korean Arctic Scientific Committee was created. The Dasan research station in Ny-Åle- sund, Svalbard was opened the following year (Kings Bay, n.d.). Since Ko- rea built its first polar research vessel Araon in 2009, its activity in the region increased quickly and in 2013, the country became permanent Observer of the AC. (Tonami 2016, 73-75) Today, Korea’s interest in the Arctic is so intense that S. Knecht describes the country as “The Overa- chiever” (Knecht 2017, 179).

12.1 The Northern Sea Route – South Korea’s Arctic Policy

“In the policy arena, South Korea identified the Arctic as a priority before the AC welcomed South Korea as one of the new Observers” (Tonami 2016, 79) and when the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries published the Pan- Government Arctic Policy Master Plan in 2013, the Republic of Korea became the first non-Arctic state to formulate a coherent Arctic policy guidelines (Bennett 2014, 887; Tonami 2016, 75). Meanwhile, seven ministries and four research institutes were cooperating to construct the Basic Arctic Policy, a more concrete plan for 2013-2017 announced later that year (Tonami 2016, 76). Korea promotes sustainable development of the Arctic region and its plan is to be even more active in the AC as well as in other organisations such as the IASC or organisations for fisheries management. Korea wants to build an icebreaker and expand its Arctic research initiatives on climate change– the country even suggests creating a “Polar Research In- ternational Cooperation Center” with the Arctic States. Deepened cooperation is proposed also in relation to China and Japan, and the Arctic indigenous peoples. (MOF, MOFA, MOTIE et. all 2013) From economic point of view, essential importance of the Northern Sea Route is apparent. Korea’s aim is to determine viability of the NSR

56 REPUBLIC OF KOREA and be prepared for its use in terms of development of Arctic infrastructure, but also in terms of adjustments of its own ports. To this end, a part of Korea’s plan is to promote commercial activities in the region among maritime industry stakeholders and improve navigational safety measures. The second major economic interest of South Korea is future Arctic mining and deepwater drilling, it is interested for example in research of gas hydrate in the Arctic Ocean. (MOF, MOFA, MOTIE et. all 2013) In fact, it seems that for Korea, the ideal would be a combination of both – shipping the Arctic resources to Korean ports through the NSR (Tonami 2016, 80). Because of a historical tradition of the country, among the AC Ob- server States, South Korea’s foreign policy is particularly interconnected with interests of big corporations, such as shipping companies Hanjin and Hyundai; shipbuilders such as Samsung, DSME and STX; and energy companies, namely the state-owned KOGAS. (Tonami 2016, 83-84; Ben- nett 2014, 890) Given that around 99.8 per cent of South Korea’s imports and ex- ports is shipped to the country on sea (Cullinane and Song 1998) and that Korea is the fifth biggest crude oil importer in the world (Kwasawneh 2017) importance of the NSR for Korea is obvious. Korean ports such as Port of Busan, world’s 10th largest port in 2013 (Ship Technology 2013) or the Ulsan Port, the second largest refinery in the world (Tonami 2016, 85) could compete with Singapore’s position of East Asian oil and logis- tical hub (Kwasawneh 2017; Tonami 2016, 85). However, when Hyundai tested feasibility of the NSR in 2013, the outcomes were unsatisfying (To- nami 2016, 84). Secondly, “Korea does not produce oil” (Tonami 2016, 85) and about 80% of its oil supply is imported from the Middle East (Iglauer 2012). To diversify Korea’s energy supply, KOGAS holds a 20% stake in Umiak gas field in Canada (Tonami 2016, 79, 85-86; KOGAS Canada Ltd. 2012). In addition, expertise in marine engineering is another important factor of Korea’s Arctic involvement (Bennett 2014, 894). For instance, DSME was commissioned to build the world’s first ice-breaking tanker to transport LNG from the Yamal gas fields (The Korea Economic Daily 2015).

57 REPUBLIC OF KOREA

12.2 South Korea’s regional cooperation

To be consistent with the pre-defined aims, South Korea is indeed very active in the AC – between 2013 and 2015, the country’s representatives were present at all AMAP and SDGW meetings and almost all EPPR and PAME meetings (Knecht 2017, 179; Tonami 2016, 83). Two years after its neighbour Japan, Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs appointed its first Arctic Ambassador (Hwang 2015). Korea is also a full member of the IASC since 2002 (Tonami 2016, 74). Secondly, South Korea was successful also in applying its vision of Asian cooperation within the AC. In 2015, China, Japan and Korea signed a Joint Declaration for Peace and Cooperation in Northeast Asia and although it is not apparent from the title, Arctic issues are comprised in the declaration, too. The next year, Soul hosted the first Trilateral High-Level Dialogue on the Arctic with participation of Arctic ambassadors of the three countries. Since then, organisation of the annual meeting rotate among the three countries with the most recent dialogue being held in Busan, South Korea in June 2019 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019). (Bennett 2017) What the three countries have in common, besides concerns about the climate change, is their view of the Arctic, especially the Arctic Ocean, as a globall common and their cooperation serves as a good tool to undermine the importance of sovereignty rights in the Arctic and legitimize their own involvement (Bennett 2017; Tonami 2016, 14). However, this approach is very likely to stay only in the level of advocacy. Except the trilateral dialogue, the country enjoys special relations with Russia, probably the most important AC Member State (Tonami 2016, 77) in terms of the most viable promise of future Arctic engagement. In 2017, South Korea launched The Presidential Committee on Northern Economic Cooperation, a government agency overwatched by Korean President (The Presidential Committee, n.d. (b)), focused on development of Eurasian cooperation from Korean Peninsula to Belarus (The Presidential Committee, n.d. (c)). Russian Arctic is part of this very ambitious initiative; according to the 9-BRIDGE Strategy of the Commit- tee, Korea wants to invest in Russian Arctic to develop the NSR infrastructure and increase LNG imports from Russia (The Presidential Committee, n.d. (a)). Finally, Korea’s promotion of sustainable development in the Arctic is believed to be part of the so-called “global green growth” (Lee 2013)

58 REPUBLIC OF KOREA that “regards environmental protection and economic growth not as mu- tually exclusive” (Tonami 2016, 80), but rather interrelated (Ibid.) and would help Korea look like “a responsible global citizen” (Bennett 2014, 895).

12.3 Summary

South Korea was admitted to the AC in 2013 and is one of its most active Observer States (Knecht 2017). Korea’s most important goals in the Arc- tic are: to strenghten its Arctic research on climate change, develop the NSR and extract Arctic energy resources, but Korea is also promoting sustainability. (MOF, MOFA, MOTIE et. all 2013). Korea is active in the AC, but on the other hand established a trilateral forum with China and Japan, and an ambitious regional cooperation with Russia. Korea’s Arctic policy is interconnected with interests of comapnies like DSME, Samsung and KOGAS that are involved in extraction of Arcitc gas and building of LNG tankers (Tonami 2016).

59 REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE

13 Republic of Singapore

Among all the AC Observer States, Singapore stands out. Not only because with its total area of 719.2 km2, which is about 3.5 times the size of Washington D.C. (CIA 2019), the city-state is the 19th smallest country in the world (McMullan 2019); but also because of how the connotations of its Arctic involvement does not follow the usual pattern. In contrast to for example Switzerland, which is focused almost exclusively on polar research in the Arctic; Singapore is concentrated almost exclusively on its economic opportunities (Schulze 2017; The Arctic Institute, n.d.(r)). It is not surprising then that Singapore does not have any history of polar research and it only started to engage in the Arctic in the early 2000s (The Arctic Institute, n.d.(r); Storey 2014). In 2013, Singapore was in a group of five Asian states to enter the AC as permanent Observers (AC 2015), but unlike all the other Observer States, it has not even set up its Arctic research station on Svalbard or elsewhere (The Arctic Institute, n.d.(r)).

13.1 Flooding as a result of global warming

Despite the recent trend among the Observer States to issue official Arc- tic strategies, Singapore is one of few countries that have not done so. Nevertheless, in case of Singapore, this fact does not represent a lack of coherent approach to the region. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, Min- ister of State Sam Tan Chin Siong, and other government officials often put forward five main areas that are of concern for Singapore in relation to the Arctic (Bennett 2018a, 291). It is the climate change and Singa- pore’s vulnerability “as a low-laying island less than fifteen meters above sea level” (Storey 2014, 66); freedom of navigation in general terms; Arc- tic economic potential; Singapore’s contribution with its expertise in some areas; and “the fact that Singapore serves as a stopping point during the annual migration of Arctic shorebirds” (Bennett 2018a, 291). (Ibid.) As it is believed, Singapore is worried about the land loss, floods and water scarcity (Storey 2014: 66) while exploring the viability of the NSR as potential threat to the main source of Singapore’s livelihood – shipping through the Strait of Malacca, one of the world’s strategically most important transport checkpoints (Energy Information Administration

60 REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE

2017). Since the NSR would make shipping from Europe to Asia much faster, ports in China, South Korea or Japan could overshadow Singapore. (see Ramberg 2010; Ho 2011; Watters and Tonami 2012; Fang 2015; Storey 2014, 67) Singapore used to be the world’s largest port, but in the last few years its primacy has been overtaken by Shanghai (Tonami 2016, 103). Now seven of ten biggest ports in the world are on China’s coast (Ship Technology 2013). Moreover, given the prominence of the NSR in Japan’s Arctic policy, Japanese ports could also become more important in the future. And even though Singapore is a tiny city-state “with no natural resources” (Permanent Mission 2015, 2), rather than extracting them from the Arctic, it is interested in providing the necessary technologies, such as drilling platforms; and other sorts of maritime expertise (Chen 2015; Storey 2014, 67; Storey 2016). However, M. Bennett (2018a) argues that Singapore’s application for the AC observer status in 2011 (The Arctic Institute, n.d.(p)) was part of a wider “Global City” strategy (Bennett 2018a).

13.2 The “Global City” approach

As mentioned before, Singapore is a city-state with no natural resources, no hinterland. Therefore, ever since its creation, the state had to look for its hinterland in the rest of the world and there certainly was no other better way to do it than to develop into a world-class maritime hub. (Ben- nett 2018a, 290) That is why “[i]n 1972, cabinet member and future Dep- uty Prime Minister Sinnathamby Rajaratnam declared Singapore to be a “Global City”” (Bennett 2018a, 290) and “for a Global City the world is its hinterland” (Rajaratnam 1972, 8) he said. And so the Arctic too. (Bennett 2018a) The “Global City” approach consists of two ways of action: Singa- pore’s active engagement in global governance forums and overseas investments. (Bennett 2018a, 297, 305; Storey 2014: 66) Prominent role among the forums concerning the Arctic affairs certainly belongs to the AC. Even though Singapore’s scientists do not specialize in polar research, they are “able to offer specific expertise to three of the working groups: the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), and Emergency Prevention, Pre- paredness and Response (EPPR)” (Storey 2014, 68), especially on topics of the migratory birds and oil spills management (Lee 2016).

61 REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE

Since Singapore wishes to become “a global maritime knowledge hub” (Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore 2009), second relevant platform, through which Singapore is trying to be an influential player on the international scene, including the Arctic, is the IMO. Of AC Observer States it was Singapore that, alongside Germany, helped design the Polar Code, a set of mandatory rules for all ships navigating the Arctic which entered into force in 2017. (Bennett 2018a, 300) Moreover, Singapore was an important negotiator of the UNCLOS adopted in 1982 (Storey 2014, 68), one of the fundamental legal frameworks for the Arctic. Apart from conventional bilateral relations with Iceland, Norway, Russia and the US through free trade agreements (Bennett 2018a, 301; Tonami 2016, 99), Singapore’s approach is unique in its cooperation with Arctic indigenous peoples; interestingly limited only to the six AC Permanent Participant organizations (Bennett 2018a, 301). Singapore hosts trainings for them and invests in their infrastructure, all most probably to secure its own future in the Arctic. (Bennett 2018a, 298, 302, 303; The Arctic Institute, n.d.(p))

13.3 The “Arctic export”

“Whereas most non-Arctic states have an interest in importing natural resources extracted from the Arctic, Singapore is more interested in export- ing its own expertise and technologies to the region” (The Arctic Institute, n.d.(r)). Since 1960s, when Singapore gained its independence, ship engineering (including ship repair) has become one of the most significant sectors of the country’s economy. Subsequently, in 1980s, high-tech engineering was added. Now Singapore can benefit from combining both. (Bennett 2018a, 296; Storey 2014, 69) Its major government-linked company, Keppel Corporation, has already built seven ice-class vessels, including two ice-breakers, for Russian Lukoil to support its drilling activities in the Arctic (Bennett 2018a, 299; Storey 2014, 69). Additionally, in 2012, the company paired with American ConocoPhillips to construct ice-capable, mobile drilling platforms, so called jack-up rigs, which were supposed to be used in the Beaufort Sea (Storey 2014, 69; The Arctic In- stitute, n.d.(r)). “Singapore’s OME [offshore and marine engineering] sector accounts for 70% of the world’s jack-up rig-building market” (Tonami 2016, 101), but the world’s demand for this kind of construction has so far been very low (Storey 2014, 69).

62 REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE

Nevertheless, the demand for Arctic tourism is rising and so Singa- pore has come up with an innovative solution. The Keppel Corporation presented a concept of “an Arctic Hub, a floating structure which will al- low tourists to disembark and visit the Arctic while minimising their impact on the fragile environment” (Aziz Merchant 2019 cit. In. Tan 2019) and bringing money influx to the indigenous communities (Ibid.) to which Singapore is a well-respected partner. However, the impact on the environment is questionable. (Tan 2019)

13.4 Summary

Unlike most of the AC Observer States, Singapore is not primarily focused on polar research. The country was admitted to the AC in 2013, but since then has not issued a policy guidelines towards the region. However, the main Singapore’s concerns are about the global sea-rising and about the competitive nature of the NSR (Storey 2014). Singapore is also interested in delivering ship engineering knowledge and technologies for Arctic resource extraction. Singapore makes great efforts to be an influential player in global governance forums that are related to its interests and is a major investor in Arctic infrastructure. Finally, Singapore’s unique ap- proachputs great emphasize on building empathy ties with indigenous peoples, to secure its own future in the Arctic. (Bennett 2018a)

63 SPAIN

14 Spain

About half a century after Chistopher Columbus disembarked in North America, other Spanish explorers started to sail north of Newfoundland to search for the new land and the Northwest Passage. In the 18th century, Spanish merchants were also hunting whales in Svalbard area. (Guidelines 2016, 7-8). However, Spain did not set up any research infrastructure in the Arctic. In fact, Spain together with Singapore are the only two AC Observer States that to these days have not done so. (Ibid.; The Arctic Institute, n.d.(r)) It was the Antarctic that was historically central to Spanish polar research. Spain became a Consultative Party to the Ant- arctic Treaty in 1988 and operates two research bases on the continent. (Guidelines 2016, 5) Although Spain has been part of the AC more than ten years longer than Switzerland, since 2006 (Guidelines 2016, 5), interests of both states in the Arctic are very similar – almost exclusively scientific (Schulze 2017). Both countries also remain equally understudied in terms of their Arctic involvement.

14.1 “Guidelines for a Spanish Polar Strategy”: science diplomacy

Arctic policy of Spain is anchored in the document titled Guidelines for a Spanish Polar Strategy published in 2016, devoted to both Polar Regions at the same time (The Arctic Institute, n.d.(s)). Based on the document, Spain views the Arctic the same way Michail Gorbachev did in 1987, as a “zone of peace” (Gorbachev 1987 cit. In Barentsinfo.org, n.d.). And the peace thus must be preserved. (Guidelines 2016, 10-11, 13) In fact, Spain’s approach to the Arctic is in many aspects similar to the stated approach of its partners from the EU – France and Germany. One of Spain’s priorities is to stay present in all organisations that have impact on the Arctic development, such as the AC or the IASC. Spain also further reasserts its adherence to the regulations important for the region, such as the OSPAR, the MARPOL Convention on navigation, the NEAFC and the NAFO, the UNFCCC as well as the UNCLOS. (Guidelines 2016, 14, 5)

64 SPAIN

Spain’s main interests in the Arctic are protection of the environment, sustainable development and scientific research. Scientific research in fact, is fundamental, “as it can be transformed into essential political capital enabling effective action and supporting the presence of Spain in polar institutions and bodies, enabling it to defend both its own interests and global interests“ (Guidelines 2016, 10). Spain wants to further focus on Arctic oceanography and study of “[t]he impact of climate change on human populations in the Arctic” (Ibid., 20) One of the main goals is also to develop partnerships on sharing the Arctic research infrastructure such as the research basis (Ibid., 27). Except scientific research and environmental protection, one of the major Spanish interests in the Arctic is similarly to Germany and Japan, sustainable fishing and creation of protected marine areas (Guidelines 2016, 31). Finally, Spain is concerned about the Northern Sea Route. For many AC Observer States, the NSR represents economic opportunities in terms of trade development, however, for Spain the NSR is a competition. It would reorient the shipping to the North while Spanish ports profit from being important stopping points in transport rutes through the Strait of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal, If it happens, the only option “for the south- ern ports is to improve their land accessibility” (Guidelines 2016, 34), according to Spain. (Ibid., 33-34)

14.2 Spanish research, fishing and Russian LNG

Spanish activities in the Arctic are coordinated by the Spanish Polar Committee, the Polar Authority of Spain. It is an administrative body within the Ministry of Science and Innovation, founded in 1998, which currently represents Spain in the AC. (The Arctic Institute, n.d.(s); Guide- lines 2016, 5) In 2016, for instance, Spain participated mainly in the AMAP, ACAP, SDWG, CAFF and PAME Working Groups as well as in the Expert Group on Black Carbon and Methane and CAFF’s Arctic Migratory Birds Initia- tive. Spanish experts studied for example Arctic birds migrating to Africa through Spain, monitored sea ice in the Arctic Ocean through using GPS, and participated in the EU-PolarNet project. Spanish Oceanographic In- stitute monitors Arctic fishing and level of actual biodiversity of fish re- soures in the region. (Muñoz de Laborde 2016, 2-4) Spain is also one of

65 SPAIN

19 countries currently participating in a German-led MOSAiC expedition to study for example Arctic ice conditions (Over the Circle 2019a). Span- ish polar research has the Oceanographic Research Vessel Hespérides and the support vessel Las Palmas of Spanish Navy at its disposal, but both ships has so far been employed mainly in Antarctica (Guidelines 2016, 5, 26; The Arctic Institute, n.d.(s)). Like all European states that are Observers to the AC, Spain too is a member of the IASC and the EPB (Guidelines 2016, 6) a platform for cooperation and coordination of European Arctic and Antarctic research (EPB, n.d. (a)). The country is also an observer to the CBSS (Guidelines 2016, 14). However, Spain is the only European AC Observer State that is still not an observer to the Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation framework (BEAC n.d.(b)). Spain’s economic activity in the Arctic is not very extensive. In fact it is almost exclusively limited to fishing, traditional for Spain. However, according to Arctic Institute, Arctic fishing may be endangered by Arctic States’ claims on their continental shelves extentions in international waters. If their claims were legitimised, based on UNCLOS, Arctic fishing would become restricted in favor of those states. (The Arctic Institute, n.d.(t)) From energy sector, only Spanish Repsol is engaged in the Arctic. The company owns exploration rights in Norway, Alaska and Canada; in Norway it has also rights for drilling. (Nordea 2017, 16) In 2019, Repsol signed a 15-year contract for LNG supply with Russian Novatek. Since there is no pipeline connecting Spain to Russia, gas from LNG 2 project will be transported to Spain by ships and subsequently distributed to other parts of Iberian Peninsula; what could strengthen Repsol’s position in energy market. (NS Energy Staff Writer 2019)

14.3 Summary

Spain has historically favoured Antarctic over the Arctic, it joined the AC only in 2006. According to Spain’s Arctic strategy of 2016, Spain’s goals in the Arctic are: international cooperation, scientific research, fishing, environmental protection, and peaceful development of the region. In contrast to countries like Japan, South Korea or China, for Medi- terranean ports of Spain the Arctic shipping could become a competition. (Guidelines 2016) Spain is very active in Arctic science, but less active in

66 SPAIN

Arctic commerce, with the exception of long-term fishing (The Arctic In- stitute, n.d.(t)). Only recently, a Spanish company has successfuly secured LNG supply from Russian Arctic to Iberian Peninsula (NS Energy Staff Writer 2019).

67 SWITZERLAND

15 Switzerland

Some countries, like Singapore or China, have many economic interests in the Arctic; some countries are less interested, like for example Poland or Spain; and some have no economic interests in the Arctic at all. Swit- zerland is one of them. The Swiss have been undertaking polar expeditions since the 19th century (SFDFA 2015, 6) and their “interests and activities [in the Arctic] are almost exclusively limited to science“ (Schulze 2017). The only other Switzerland’s interest in the Arctic is its international standing. Switzerland is the latest AC Observer State, admitted in 2017 (AC 2015f) and the only state engaged in the AC that has no coast and therefore no tradition of seafaring. This may be one of the reasons, why Switzerland is not yet interested in economic potential of the Arctic. The other reason may be the fact that up to 39% of the country’s energy consumption is covered by nuclear and hydro-electricity power (Market Intelligence 2016). However, since the government wants to phase out nuclear power till 2034 and reduce Switzerland’s oil consumption (Mar- ket Intelligence 2016), it seems like Switzerland might need to increase its gas imports in the future, too, similarly to Germany, the Netherlands or India.

15.1 The “vertical Arctic” and the climate change

Until finishing this chapter, Swiss government has not published a policy document on the Arctic. However, at the Arctic Circle Assembly in Ice- land in October 2019, the Head of the Sectoral Foreign Policies Division, Swiss Ambassador Stefan Estermann, outlined six main focus areas of the Swiss Arctic strategy (Sharp 2019): “supporting research institutions, promoting international scientific cooperation, leveraging private sector capacity, engaging in the international dialogue in the Arctic, addressing climate change, and showing solidarity with Indigenous peoples” (Ester- mann cit. In Sharp 2019). Through participation in the AC, Switzerland wants to “actively contribute to stability and peace in the world” (Burkhalter 2015 cit. In SFDFA 2015, 5), become more visible on the international stage and gain knowledge, especially about the climate change (Sharp 2019).

68 SWITZERLAND

Switzerland has started to be more concerned about the climate change recently (Sharp 2019) since it has witnessed the ice-melting on its own – on its alpine glaciers. “Like in the Arctic, the temperature in the Alps rises twice as fast as the global average” (Flückiger 2017 cit. In AC 2017), says Ambassador Stefan Flückiger, Coordinator of Arctic Policies of Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (SFDFA). For example, “Switzerland's Pizol glacier […] has lost 80% of its volume since 2006” (Foulkes 2019) and the Aletsch, the biggest glacier in the Alps, situated in Switzerland, could completely disappear by the end of the century (Ibid.). Moreover, the Swiss Alps suffer from erosion subsequent to ice- melt (Over the Circle 2019b). For this reason, Ambassador Flückiger adds, Switzerland, as a new Observer to the AC wants to participate namely in the AMAP, PAME and SDWG working groups, concerned with the climate change research (AC 2017). Swiss researchers can contribute with their expertise in glaciology, namely from studying Greenland’s ice cap, Antarctic snow, and sea ice; but also with their expertise in biology, and study of the atmospheric cir- culation (SFDFA 2015). Four main institutions engaged in polar research in Switzerland are united in Swiss Polar Institute based in Lausanne, which was created in 2016 to prove Switzerland’s long involvement in polar research and to support Switzerland’s AC application. (EU-Polar- Net, n.d.(b)) Switzerland is also represented in the EPB (EPB, n.d.(b)) and in the IASC (IASC, n.d. (a)). Today, Switzerland is one of the nineteen countries participating in the grand MOSAiC expedition led by German AWI to study processes in the Arctic environment and their impact on the global climate (Over the Circle 2019a; Associated Press in Berlin 2019; Amos 2019). Although not a coastal state, Switzerland could be greatly affected by climate change in the future. In words of the Ambassador Stefan Es- termann, “the only hope we have is massive technological innovation, to find alternatives to fossil fuels and carbon” (Estermann cit. In Sharp 2019).

15.2 Summary

Switzerland is the “youngest” Observer State to the AC, admitted in 2017. Even thought Switzerland does not have an Arctic Strategy, the country

69 SWITZERLAND has been showing interest in the Arctic science ever since its admission to the Council. Switzerland’s main goal is to understand causes and effects of climate change, because, as a result of the global warming (Sharp 2019), the largest alpine glaciers are melting just like the Arctic ice (Foul- kes 2019). This is also the reason why the Swiss call their country the “vertical Arctic” (Estermann 2019 cit. In Sharp 2019).

70 THE UNITED KINGDOM

16 The United Kingdom

The UK’s interest in the Arctic has been discontinuous. Starting in the 15th century when searching for maritime routes, the British discovered Arctic fishing, hunting and fur trading in North America and Russia. They stayed present in the North American Arctic till 1880 when “the United Kingdom […] gave up its remaining Arctic territories to Canada” (The Arc- tic Institute, n.d.(u)). After that, the United Kingdom was more interested in Antarctica until the First World War, when the Arctic became strategically important. (Ibid.) In 1991, the British Natural Environment Re- search Council established a UK research station in Ny-Ålesund (FCO 2018, 11) and in 1998, the UK became one of the first Observer States to the AC together with Germany, Poland and The Netherlands (AC 2015f). Today, Sir Alan Duncan, British Minister of State for the Polar Regions, says the UK wishes “to remain a good neighbour to the Arctic“ (Duncan 2018 cit. In FCO 2018, 2) even after UK’s departure from the EU (Ibid.). Meanwhile, Scotland, opposed to Brexit and seeking independance on the UK, published its own Arctic strategy in September 2019, stating that the Arctic and Scotland “share deep cultural and social links as well as similar challenges and outlooks“ (The Scottish Government 2019, 5).

16.1 The UK government’s “vision of a Global Britain” and environmental protection

The UK was one of the first countries to publish their Arctic policies. In 2013, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) issued Britain’s first strategy for the Arctic – Adapting To Change: UK policy towards the Arctic. The strategy was updated in 2018 and according to the British government, the new document, Beyond the Ice: UK policy towards the Arctic, sets three principal goals: to strengthen UK’s influence in the world through (scientific) engagement in the Arctic, to contribute to environmental and human protection, and to promote sustainable use of Arctic resources (FCO 2018, 4). The UK government has developed “a vision of a Global Britain“ (FCO 2018, 3), a country that is actively engaged in addressing global governance issues. In accordance with this vision, “the Arctic Council is [seen as]

71 THE UNITED KINGDOM the pre-eminent intergovernmental regional forum for discussing sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic“(FCO 2018, 7). The UK also reaffirms its commitement to other international regulations for the region, such as the UNCLOS, the Polar Code, and the OSPAR. Finally, joint scientific projects are seen as an efficient tool of international cooperation that the UK government will continue to support. (FCO 2018, 3, 7, 8, 11-14, 25) In the area of environmental protection, the UK considers itself “an international champion for the protection of our planet“ (FCO 2018, 16). The UK aims to reduce its overal emissions as well as emissions from shipping, and reduce the amount of litter in the Arctic Ocean. To protect the Arctic maritime environment, the UK suggests designation of extended protected areas and entirely opposes commercial whaleing in the region. (FCO 2018, 15-20) The UK government is supportive of the companies’ investments in sustainable Arctic business. It advises the UK to be prepared for the Arc- tic shipping in the future. (FCO 2018, 23)

16.2 Britain’s active Arctic research and defense

Britain is very active in Arctic scientific research; only scientists from the US, Russia and Canada publish higher volume of Arctic research papers than UK experts (FCO 2018, 11). In the AC, the UK has been contributing to the CAFF with its expertise on waterbirds; the PAME and the Task Force on Black Carbon (FCO 2018, 21, 7). The UK is a partner of CAFF‘s Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program and a member of CAFF‘s Circumpolar Seabird Expert Group (CAFF, n.d.(a,b)). Through AC‘s PAME, the UK was also involved in preparation of the IMO’s Polar Code (FCO 2018, 7). Except the AC, the UK is involved in many other international scientific organisations and intiatives. For instance, the country is a member of the IASC, the EPB and the EU’s EU-PolarNet project. (FCO 2018, 13) In fact, many of the research projects that the UK has been involved in are focusing on the marine environment. For example, the UK led the Ice, Cli- mate, Economics – Arctic Research on Change project, a four year programme on Arctic sea ice, where many other AC Observer States participated as well. (CORDIS 2017; FCO 2018, 13) Today, the UK is part of Ger- man-led MOSAiC expedition, and leads the 2017-2022 Changing Arctic

72 THE UNITED KINGDOM

Ocean Programme (FCO 2018, 14). The UK disposes of three ships – RRS James Cook, RRS Discovery, and RRS Sir David Attenborough, and of seven aircraft deployable in extremely cold conditions of Arctic research. The RRS Sir David Attenborough was only launched in September 2019 and is specially equipped with airborn and marine autonomous unmanned ve- hicle (AUVs) and platforms. (FCO 2018, 13; British Antarctic Survey, n.d.) After all, UK’s future scientific involvement in the Arctic will to some degree depend on EU’s financial contributions to British research after Britain’s departure from the EU (Depledge, Dodds and Kennedy-Pipe 2019, 38). Although an Observer State to the AC since 1998, the UK appointed its first Minister for the Polar Regions only after the publication of UK’s first Arctic strategy. However, it is the Head of Polar Regions Department of the FCO who represents the UK in the AC, and the Arctic Circle and Arctic Frontiers annual conferences. (FCO 2018, 7, 9) In addition to these discussion forums, the UK is an observer to the BEAC (BEAC n.d.(b)). Finally, as mentioned in the Beyond the Ice strategy, there are concerns in the British government about Russian military presence in the Arctic. According to the UK Ministry of Defense, Russian Federation has recently increased activity of its submarines in the Arctic, which is seen as a “threat” (MoD and Williamson 2018), and is planning to build 100 new facilities in the region (Ibid.). In response, “[i]n 2018, a Royal Navy submarine took part in ICEX [Ice Exercise] with the US Navy” (Ibid.) in addition to the Royal Marines’ annual drills in Norway. In 2019, RAF Typhoon jets will be patroling over Iceland in NATO’s Air Policing Mis- sion and in 2020, Arctic security should be reinforced by the deployment of new P-8 Poseidon aircraft. (Ibid.; RAF 2019)

16.3 Oil, diamonds and minerals

British Petroleum (BP), the major British energy company, has a long history in the Arctic, but not a good reputation (Davies 2019). Before the company sold all its assets in Alaska to private company Helicorp in Au- gust 2019, it held a 26% stake in the Prudhoe Bay in North Slope since 1977. (BP 2019) In the 2000s, BP caused three major oil spills in the region. (Noreda 2017, 8; Davies 2019) BP was involved in the construction of the Trans Alaska Pipeline and held stakes in other eight energy projects in Alaska, making BP an important stakeholder in the region, before

73 THE UNITED KINGDOM it decided to leave (BP 2019). However, the BP still owns a 19.75% stake in Russian Rosnef (Nordea 2017, 8) and partners with Italian Eni to explore hydrocarbons off the coast of north-east Greenland (Macalister 2014). Another energy company from the UK active in the Arctic is Cairn Energy – the company is exploring the Barents Sea. (Nordea 2017, 14) The British are also mining for minerals in the Arctic. Rio Tinto is mining diamonds in the North Slave Region in Canada. The Diavik Dia- mond Mine produces around 6-7 million carats of gem-quality diamonds a year and declares that its activities are respectful to both indigineous peoples and the environment. (Nordea 2017, 32; RioTinto, n.d.) Since 2011, mining company AngloAmerican have been extracting copper, nickel and platinum from Sakkati deposit near Sodankylä in Finnish Lapland 150km north the Arctic Circle. The company reportedly uses special technology to minimize environmental damage. (An- gloAmerican, n.d.) Finally, the UK has been supportive of the insurance sector in which it considers British firms to have valuable expertise. For example, Lloyd’s of London conducted a study in 2012 to assess risks of possible future operations of Arctic businesses (FCO 2013, 28).

16.4 Summary

British involvement in the Arctic dates back to the 15th century and since 1998, the country is an Observer State to the AC. According to the UK government, the Arctic is a part of the “vision of a Global Britain” (FCO 2018, 3) and a region that requires strict environmental protection. (FCO 2018) The UK has an extensive Arctic scientific research, namely of the marine environment, and is involved in many other international organisations and intiatives dedicated to the Arctic. The UK Ministry of Defense sees Russian submarines in the Arctic as a “threat” (MoD and Williamson 2018) and hence is reinforcing UK military activity in the region, too. British companies are also very active in Arctic business. BP was long extracting oil in Alaska and other companies are mining for diamonds and minerals in Canada and Finland.

74 CONCLUSION

17 Conclusion

The purpose of this bachelor thesis is to examine the role of the AC Ob- server States in the Arctic. There are thirteen non-Arctic countries to have received the AC observer status: Germany, France, India, Italy, Ja- pan, The Netherlands, People’s Republic of China, Poland, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. There is an insufficient amount of literature on these states’ involvement in the Arctic, especially on the European ones that are, except Switzerland, the AC Ob- servers much longer than the Asian ones. Arctic strategies of the governments of the AC Observer States, articles, research institutions websites, and articles in academic journals were analysed in the thesis to understand interests and activity of these states in the Arctic. It can be concluded that the prominent role of the Observer States is in the field of scientific research, which is, after all, enshrined in their AC Observer status. The research of all Observer States is driven by the climate change since most of them would be directly affected by it (eg. The Netherlands, India, China or Singapore could be flooded; in Switzer- land the alpine glaciers are melting). Secondly, the Observer States are advocates of protection of the Arcit environment and can contribute to designation of rules such as the Polar Code of the IMO. In general, Euro- pean states almost exclusively focus on polar science in the Arctic while Asian states, with the exception of India and Singapore, see a big opportunity in Arctic shipping and are investors in construction of Arctic infrastructure for future Arctic business. Given the importance of sovereignty principle in Arctic governance, Observers can operate in the Arctic on bilateral basis. In this sense, Russia seems to be the most important partner for them as it is the most willing to develop new oil and gas fields in the Arctic. Companies from almost all AC Observer States, with the exception of Switzerland and the UK, are invested in LNG production in Russian Arctic. All Observer States declare commitment to sustainability, so the interest in natural gas stems from its lower emissions. However, it “is still a fossil fuel with significant greenhouse gas emissions on combus- tion” (Stanley, Pearman, Yin 2018) and the risk of spills is also an environmental threat, so the commitments to sustainability are questionable (Ibid.). Also, the Arctic is agreed to be a region of peace, but the tensions about its militarisations are rising. Even some of the Observers that are

75 CONCLUSION

NATO members, eg. France and the UK, are increasing their military presence in the Arctic. In short, the role of the AC Observer States in the Arctic is much more extensive than their role in the AC. Moreover, there is a growing tendency among these states to consider the Arctic as a global common, so that they could assume even bigger role there. The question is how their role will be used in the years to come. Will it be to keep the peace, and safeguard the biodiversity in the region or will commercial interests be stronger?

76 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bibliography

1. ABN Newswire. 2017. “Ironbark Zinc Limited (ASX:IBG) (OTCMKTS:IRBGY) Agreement with China Nonferrous.” Press. January 31, 2017. Accessed November 30, 2019. https://www.abnnewswire.net/press/en/86809/. 2. Adomaitis, Nerijus. 2019. “Germany's coal phase-out plan a boost for Norwegian gas -lobby group.“ Reuters, January 28, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-norway-gas/ger- manys-coal-phase-out-plan-a-boost-for-norwegian-gas-lobby- group-idUSKCN1PM1ZO. 3. Advisory Council on International Affairs. 2014. “The Future of the Arctic Region.” 4. AMAP. n.d.(a). “Geographical coverage.” About. Accessed No- vember 4, 2019. https://www.amap.no/about/geographical- coverage. 5. AMAP. n.d.(b). “Welcome to AMAP.” About. Accessed Novem- ber 11, 2019. https://www.amap.no/about. 6. Aljazeera. 2013. “Russia frees Greenpeace activists on bail.” Aljazeera, November 22, 2013. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2013/11/russia- frees-greenpeace-activists-bail-201311229514726461.html. 7. Amos, Jonathan. 2019. “Climate change: Polarstern leaves for 'biggest ever' Arctic expedition.” BCC, September 21, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-49760460. 8. AngloAmerican. n.d. “Anglo American and the Sakatti Project.” https://finland.angloamerican.com/~/media/Files/A/Anglo- American-Finland/documents/anglo-american-sakatti-project.pdf. 9. Associated Press in Berlin. 2019. “Climate scientists prepare for largest ever Arctic expedition.“ The Guardian, September 20, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/science/2019/sep/20/climate-scientists-prepare-largest-ever- arctic-expedition.

77 BIBLIOGRAPHY

10. Apan. n.d. “Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR).” Case Studies. Accessed November 2, 2019. https://www.apan.org/pages/case-study-asfr. 11. Arctic Centre. n.d. “Arctic Region.” University of Lapland. Ac- cessed November 4, 2019. https://www.arcticcen- tre.org/EN/arcticregion. 12. Arctic Challenge for Sustainability, n.d.(a). “About Us.” About ArCS. Accessed November 3, 2019. https://www.arcs- pro.jp/en/about/. 13. Arctic Challenge for Sustainability n.d.(b). “The Arctic Cruise by the Oceanographic Research Vessel Mirai in 2019.” Home. Accessed November 3, 2019. https://www.arcs-pro.jp/en/mi- rai2019/. 14. Arctic Council. 2013. Arctic Council Rules of Procedure. Arctic Council Secretariat: Tromsø, Norway. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/940/2015-09- 01_Rules_of_Procedure_website_version.pdf?sequence=1&is- Allowed=y. 15. Arctic Council. 2015a. “About ACAP.” ACAP MENU. Last Up- dated: June 5, 2019. Accessed October 3, 2019. https://arctic- council.org/index.php/en/acap-home. 16. Arctic Council. 2015b. “Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Pro- gramme (AMAP).” About Us: Working Groups. Last Updated: June 19, 2018. Accessed October 3, 2019. https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/amap. 17. Arctic Council. 2015c. “Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF).” About Us: Working Groups. Last Updated: September 10, 2015. Accessed October 3, 2019. https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/caff. 18. Arctic Council. 2015d. “Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR).” About Us: Working Groups. Last Up- dated: October 13, 2017. Accessed October 3, 2019. https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working- groups/eppr. 19. Arctic Council. 2015e. “Expert Group on Black Carbon and Me- thane.” Last Updated: October 21, 2019. Accessed October 3,

78 BIBLIOGRAPHY

2019. https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/expert- groups/339-egbcm. 20. Arctic Council. 2015f. “Observers.” About us. Last updated: July 31, 2019. Accessed November 2, 2019. https://arctic- council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/observers. 21. Arctic Council. 2015g. “Protection of the Arctic Marine Envi- ronment (PAME).” About Us: Working Groups. Last Updated: September 10, 2018. Accessed October 3, 2019. https://arctic- council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/pame. 22. Arctic Council. 2015h. “Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG).” About Us: Working Groups. Last Updated: June 12, 2019. Accessed October 3, 2019. https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/sdwg. 23. Arctic Council. 2015i. “Task Forces of the Arctic Council.” About Us: Other Subsidiary Bodies. Last Updated: May 23, 2019. Accessed October 3, 2019. https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/subsidiary-bodies/task-forces. 24. Arctic Council. 2015j. “The Arctic Council: A backgrounder.” About Us. Last updated: September 13, 2019. Accessed Sep- tember 18, 2019. https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us. 25. Arctic Council. 2015k. “Working Groups.” About Us. Last updated: September 10, 2015. Accessed September 18, 2019. https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working- groups. 26. Arctic Council. 2017. “New Observer: Switzerland.” News and Events. Last updated: October 3, 2017. Accessed October 23, 2019. https://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/our- work2/8-news-and-events/471-observer-switzerland. 27. Associated Press. 2013. “Netherlands asks sea law tribunal to order Russia to release Greenpeace ship and activists.” The Washington Post, October 22, 2018. https://archive.is/20131022090132/http://www.washing- tonpost.com/world/europe/netherlands-asks-sea-law-tribunal-to-order-russia-to-release-greenpeace-ship-and-activists/2013/10/21/e68980dc-3ab3-11e3-b0e7- 716179a2c2c7_story.html.

79 BIBLIOGRAPHY

28. AWI. 2018. “Research aircraft Polar 5 and Polar 6.” Expedi- tion: Aircraft. Last update: June 12, 2018. Accessed November 2, 2019. https://www.awi.de/en/expedition/aircraft/polar-5- 6.html. 29. AWIPEV. n.d. “AWIPEV Base: French - German Arctic Research Base at Ny-Ålesund / Spitsbergen.” Accessed November 7, 2019. https://www.awipev.eu/. 30. Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation. n.d.(a). “Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region.” About us. Accessed November 2, 2019. https://www.barentscooperation.org/en/About 31. Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation. n.d.(b). “Members of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Barents Regional Coun- cil.” About us. Accessed November 2, 2019. https://www.barentscooperation.org/en/About/Members 32. Barentsinfo.org. n.d. “Mikhail Gorbachev’s Speech in Mur- mansk at the ceremonial meeting on the occasion of the presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star Medal to the city of Murmansk.” Retrieved from Novosti Press Agency: Moscow, 1987, 23-31. Accessed November 4, 2019. https://www.barentsinfo.fi/docs/Gorbachev_speech.pdf. 33. Barteczko, Agnieszka. 2019. “Copper producer KGHM may freeze more mines in Canada, U.S.: CEO.” Reuters, April 10, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kghm-investment/copper-producer-kghm-may-freeze-more-mines-in- canada-u-s-ceo-idUSKCN1RM179. 34. Bazilchuk, Nancy. 2019. “When a flood of immigrant workers becomes a trickle.” Sciencenorway, June 18, 2019. https://sciencenorway.no/employment-forskningno-immigrants/when- a-flood-of-immigrant-workers-becomes-a-trickle/1554782. 35. Belov, Vladislav V. 2016. “Germany’s strategy for the Arctic.” Arctic and North 24: 85-92. doi: 10.17238/issn2221- 2698.2016.24.96. 36. Bennett, Mia M. 2014. “The Maritime Tiger: Exploring South Korea’S Interests And Role In The Arctic.” Strategic Analy- sis 38 (6): 886-903. doi:10.1080/09700161.2014.952935. 37. Bennett, Mia. 2017. “China, Japan and South Korea hold their own Arctic dialogue.” Arctic Today, June 15, 2017.

80 BIBLIOGRAPHY

https://www.arctictoday.com/china-japan-and-south-korea- hold-their-own-arctic-dialogue/. 38. Bennett, Mia M. 2018a. “Singapore: The “Global City” in a Glob- alizing Arctic.” Journal of Borderlands Studies 33 (2): 289-310. doi: 10.1080/08865655.2017.1367708. 39. Bennett, Mia M. 2018b. “Controversy over Greenland airports shows China still unwelcome in the Arctic.” Cryopolitics, Sep- tember 12, 2018. http://www.cryopolitics.com/2018/09/12/controversy-greenland-airports/. 40. Bloom, Evan T. 1999. “Establishment of the Arctic Council.” The American Journal of International Law 93 (3): 712-722. doi: 10.2307/2555272. 41. Borkowski, Jan. 2010. “Statement at the Arctic Council Deputy Ministerial Meeting.” Copenhagen, Denmark. May 27, 2010. 42. Borkowski, Jan. 2011. “Odpowiedź sekretarza stanu w Minis- terstwie Spraw Zagranicznych - z upoważnienia ministra - na interpelację nr 20265 w sprawie roli i miejsca Arktyki w poli- tyce zagranicznej Polski.“ Febrary 21, 2011. Accessed Novem- ber 25, 2019. http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/IZ6.nsf/main/5227F2FE. 43. BP. 2019. “BP to sell Alaska business to Hilcorp.” News and In- sights: Press Releases. August 27, 2019. Accessed November 30, 2019. https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/news- and-insights/press-releases/bp-to-sell-alaska-business-to- hilcorp.html. 44. British Antarctic Survey. n.d. “RSS Sir David Attenborough.” Polar Operations. Accessed November 14, 2019. https://www.bas.ac.uk/polar-operations/sites-and-facilities/facility/rrs-sir-david-attenborough/. 45. Brown, Jonathan. 2013. “Russia arrests 30 environmental activists during Arctic protest.” Independent, September 20, 2013. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home- news/russia-arrests-30-environmental-activists-during-arctic-protest-8830165.html. 46. Buck, Susan J. 1998. The Global Commons: An Introduction. Washington, Dc: Island Press.

81 BIBLIOGRAPHY

47. Burke, Danita C. 2018. “Why the Arctic isn’t a ‘global commons’.” The Conversation, April 8, 2018. https://theconversa- tion.com/why-the-arctic-isnt-a-global-commons-93976. 48. Byers, Michael. 2009. Who owns the Arctic?: understanding sovereignty disputes in the North. Vancouver: Douglas & McIn- tyre. 49. Byung-se, Yun. 2015. “Dinner Remarks at the Commemorative Event to Mark 2nd Anniversary of ROK’s Accession to Arctic Council.” July 7, 2017. Accessed November 30, 2019. http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5689/view.do?seq=3185 81&srchFr=&srchTo=&srch- Word=&srchTp=&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1 =0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&com- pany_nm=. 50. CAFF, n.d. (a). “CBird Members.” Seabirds (CBird). Accessed November 3, 2019. https://www.caff.is/seabirds-cbird/cbird- members. 51. CAFF, n.d. (b). “CBMP Partners.” Home. Accessed November 13, 2019. https://www.caff.is/cbmp-partners. 52. Chater, Andrew. 2016. “Explaining Non-Arctic States in the Arctic Council.” Strategic Analysis, 40 (3): 173-184. doi: 10.1080/09700161.2016.1165467. 53. Chaturvedi, Sanjay. 2013. “China and India in the ‘Receding’ Arctic: Rhetoric, Routes and Resources.” Jadavpur Journal of International Relations 17 (1): 56. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0973598414524126. 54. Chaturvedi, Sanjay. 2014. “India’s Arctic Engagement: Chal- lenges and Opportunities.” Asia Policy 18, 73-80. ISSN 15590968. 55. Chen, G. 2015. “Asian Economic Interests in the Arctic–Singa- pore’s Perspective.” In Asian Countries and the Arctic Future, edited by Leiv Lunde, Jian Yang and Iselin Stensdal, 203–16. Singapore: World Scientific. 56. CIA- Central Intelligence Agency. 2019. “East Asia/Southeast Asia: Singapore.” The World Factbook. Last updated: October 29, 2019. Accessed November 3, 2019.

82 BIBLIOGRAPHY

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- factbook/geos/sn.html. 57. CORDIS. 2017. “Ice, Climate, and Economics - Arctic Research on Change.” European Commission. Last updated: December 18, 2017. Accessed November 14, 2019. https://cordis.eu- ropa.eu/project/rcn/110891/factsheet/en. 58. Cullinane, Kevin and Dong-Wook Song. 1998. “Container terminals in South Korea: problems and panaceas.” Maritime Pol- icy and Management 25 (1): 63-80. doi: 10.1080/03088839800000045. 59. Davies, Rob. 2019. “BP pushed for Arctic drilling rights after Trump's election.” The Guardian, May 19, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/may/19/bp- pushed-for-arctic-drilling-rights-after-trump-election. 60. Depledge, Duncan and Dmitriy Tulupov. 2016. “EU-Russia relations in the Arctic on ice.” European Council on Foreign Rela- tions, May 17, 2016. https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commen- tary_eu_russia_relations_in_the_arctic_on_ice. 61. Depledge, Duncan, Klaus Dodds and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe. 2019. “The UK’s Defence Arctic Strategy.” The RUSI Journal 164 (1): 28-39. doi: 10.1080/03071847.2019.1605015. 62. Devikaa Nanda. 2019. “India’s Arctic Potential.” Observer Re- search Foundation, ORF Occasional Paper 186, February 2019. https://www.orfonline.org/research/indias-arctic-potential- 48263/#_edn43. 63. Energy Information Administration. 2017. “WORLD OIL TRANSIT CHOKEPOINTS.” Analysis. Last updated: July 25, 2017. Accessed December 5, 2019. https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.php?RegionTopicID=WOTC. 64. Eni. 2012. “Eni starts Gas production in Western Siberia.” Press Releases. April 20, 2012. Accessed November 25, 2019. https://www.eni.com/en_IT/media/2012/04/eni-starts-gas- production-in-western-siberia. 65. Eni. n.d. “Eni currently operates in Greenlands in the Up- stream sector.” Accessed November 25, 2019.

83 BIBLIOGRAPHY

https://www.eni.com/en_IT/results.page?question=what+does+eni+do+in+greenland%3F. 66. Erlanger, Steven. 2019. “Pipelines from Russia Cross Political Lines.” The New York Times, October 7, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/07/business/energy-environment/gas-nord-stream-pipeline.html. 67. ET Bureau. 2018. “India begins importing LNG from Russia.” The Economic Times, June 4, 2018. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/oil-gas/india-begins-importing-lng-from-russia/articleshow/64449583.cms. 68. EU-PolarNet. n.d. (a). “A glimpse on: Dutch Polar Research.” European Polar Science: Europe and the Polar Regions: Dutch Polar Research. Accessed October 23, 2019. https://www.eu- polarnet.eu/european-polar-science/europe-and-the-polar- regions/dutch-polar-research/. 69. EU-PolarNet. n.d. (b). “The Swiss Polar Institute.” European Polar Science: Europe and the Polar Regions: Swiss Polar Re- search. Accessed October 23, 2019. https://www.eu-polarnet.eu/european-polar-science/europe-and-the-polar-regions/swiss-polar-research/. 70. European Polar Board. n.d.(a). “European Polar Board.“ Ac- cessed October 23, 2019. http://www.europeanpolar- board.org/. 71. European Polar Board. n.d.(b). “Membership.“ Organisation. Accessed November 2, 2019. http://www.europeanpolar- board.org/organisation/membership/. 72. Fang, Y. 2015. “The Arctic From Singapore’s Perspective: A Blessing or a Curse?” In International Cooperation in the Devel- opment of Russia’s Far East and Siberia edited by J. Huang and A. Korolev, 185–201. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. 73. Federal Foreign Office. 2013. “Guidelines of the Germany Arctic policy: Assume responsibility, seize opportunities.” https://www.bmel.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Interna- tional/Leitlinien-Arktispolitik.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. 74. Federal Foreign Office. 2018. “Germany’s Arctic Policy Guide- lines: Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future.” https://www.auswaertiges-

84 BIBLIOGRAPHY

amt.de/blob/2240002/eb0b681be9415118ca87bc8e215c0cf 4/190821-arktisleitlinien-download-data.pdf. 75. Ficová, Adéla. 2019. “Norwegian Perception of Russia in the Arctic.” Master thesis. Masaryk University, Brno. https://is.muni.cz/th/agn91/Ficova_thesis.pdf. 76. Filimonova, Nadezhda and Svetlana Krivokhizh. 2016. “How Asian Countries Are Making Their Way Into the Arctic.” The Diplomat, October 29, 2016. https://thediplomat.com/2016/10/how-asian-countries-are-making-their- way-into-the-arctic/. 77. Fincantieri. 2013. “Fincantieri: Enhanced technology partnership with Russia focusing on innovation.” Press Releases. No- vember 26, 2013. Accessed November 25, 2019. https://www.fincantieri.com/en/media/press-releases/2013/000533/. 78. Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 2013. “Adapting To Change: UK policy towards the Arctic.” https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/at- tachment_data/file/251216/Adapting_To_Change_UK_pol- icy_towards_the_Arctic.pdf. 79. Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 2018. “Beyond the Ice: UK policy towards the Arctic.” https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach- ment_data/file/697251/beyond-the-ice-uk-policy-towards- the-arctic.pdf. 80. Foulkes, Imogen. 2019. “Swiss election: Why melting Alps could create a green wave.” BBC, October 19, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-49926929. 81. Fridtjof Nansen Institute, n.d. “International Northern Sea Route Programme (INSROP).” Projects. Accessed November 3, 2019. https://www.fni.no/projects/international-northern- sea-route-programme-insrop-article318-277.html. 82. Galasso, Jennifer Lee, Frederic R. Siegel and Joseph H. Kravitz. 2000. “Heavy Metals in Eight 1965 Cores from the Novaya Zemlya Trough, Kara Sea, Russian Arctic.“ Marine Pollution Bulletin , 40 (10), 839-852. doi: 10.1016/S0025- 326X(00)00080-1. ISSN 0025326X.

85 BIBLIOGRAPHY

83. Galt, Jerry A., William J. Lehr and Debra Payton. 1991. “Fate and transport of the Exxon Valdez oil spill: Part 4.” Environ- mental Science and Technology 25 (2): 202. https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/es00014a001. 84. Gazprom. 2019. “Gazprom and BASF discuss cooperation on gas production and Nord Stream 2 project.” Media: News and events. June 6, 2019. Accessed November 2, 2019. https://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2019/june/arti- cle481971/. 85. Gazprom. n.d.(a). “Urengoyskoye field: The world’s largest field at the time of discovery.” Projects. https://www.gazprom.com/projects/urengoyskoye/. 86. Gazprom. n.d.(b). “Yuzhno-Russkoye field: Testament of Effi- cient Russian-European Cooperation.“ Projects. Accessed No- vember 2, 2019. https://www.gazprom.com/projects/yuzhno-russkoye/. 87. German Arctic Office. n.d. “Arctic Council.” Policy Advice. Ac- cessed November 2, 2019. https://www.arctic-office.de/en/policy-advice/arctic-council/. 88. Gewelt, Alexander Engedal. 2016. “India in the Arctic: Science, Geopolitics and Soft Power.” Master’s Thesis, University of Oslo. 89. Government of the Netherlands. 2019. “Joint Statement of Russian Federation and The Kingdom of the Netherlands on Scientific Cooperation in the Arctic Region and the Settlement of a Dispute.” Diplomatic Statement. May 17, 2019. Accessed November 28, 2019. https://www.government.nl/documents/diplomatic-statements/2019/05/17/joint-statement- of-the-russian-federation-and-the-kingdom-of-the-netherlands-on-scientific-cooperation-in-the-russian-arctic-region- and-the-settlement-of-a-dispute. 90. Graczyk, Piotr. 2012. “Poland and the Arctic: Between Science and Diplomacy.” Arctic Yearbook 2012: 139-155. https://arc- ticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2012/Scholarly_Pa- pers/8.Graczyk.pdf. 91. Graczyk, Piotr and Timo Koivurova. 2015. “The Arctic Coun- cil.” In Handbook of the Politics of the Arctic, edited by Leif

86 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Christian Jensen and Geir Hønneland, 298-328. Edward Elgar Publishing: Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA. 92. GRID-Arendal. 2013. “Boundaries of the Arctic Council Work- ing Groups.” Resources. Accessed November 4, 2019. http://grid-arendal.herokuapp.com/resources/8387. 93. Guidelines for a Spanish Polar Strategy. 2016. http://www.ciencia.gob.es/stfls/MICINN/Investi- gacion/FICHEROS/Comite_Polar_definitivo/Directrices_es- trategia_polar_espanola.pdf. 94. Gümplová, Petra. 2015. “Komu patří Severní pól?“ Česká pozice, May 9, 2015. http://ceskapozice.lidovky.cz/komu- patri-severni-pol-0b8/tema.aspx?c=A150429_182016_pozice- tema_lube. 95. Hammond, Joseph. 2018. “Interview With Japan’s Arctic Am- bassador: Kazuko Shiraishi on Japan’s approach to the Arctic region.” The Diplomat, March 8, 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/interview-with-japans-arctic-ambassador/. 96. Havnes, Heljar and Johan Martin Seland. 2019. “The Increas- ing Security Focus in China’s Arctic Policy.” The Arctic Insti- tute, July 16, 2019. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/increasing-security-focus-china-arctic-policy/. 97. Ho, Joshua. 2011. “The Arctic Meltdown and Its Implication for Ports and Shipping in Asia.” In Arctic Security in an Age of Cli- mate Change edited by J. Kraska, 33-44. Cambridge University Press. 98. Holland, Steve and Timothy Gardner. 2019. “Trump considering sanctions over Russia's Nord Stream 2 natgas pipeline.” Reuters, June 12, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us- gazprom-nordstream-usa/trump-considering-sanctions-over- russias-nord-stream-2-natgas-pipeline-idUSKCN1TD267. 99. Hosa, Joanna. 2018. “Has Russia Already Won the Scramble for the Arctic?” The Maritime Executive, October 28, 2018. https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/has-russia- already-won-the-scramble-for-the-arctic. 100. Hough, Peter. 2013. International politics of the Arctic: coming in from the cold. London: Routledge.

87 BIBLIOGRAPHY

101. Humpert, Malte. 2019a. “China to Use First Atomic Icebreaker as Test for Future Nuclear Aircraft Carriers.” High North News, March 22, 2019. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/china- use-first-atomic-icebreaker-test-future-nuclear-aircraft-carriers. 102. Humpert, Malte. 2019b. “China Acquires 20 Percent Stake in Novatek’s Latest Arctic LNG Project.” High North News, April 29, 2019. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/china-acquires-20-percent-stake-novateks-latest-arctic-lng-project. 103. Humpert, Malte. 2019c. “U.S. Coast Guard Awards Contract for New Polar Class Icebreaker.” High North News, April 30, 2019. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/us-coast-guard-awards- contract-new-polar-class-icebreaker. 104. Humpert, Malte. 2019d. “French Cruise Ship Set to Travel to North Pole in 2021.” High North News, May 22, 2019. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/french-cruise-ship-set- travel-north-pole-2021. 105. Humpert, Malte. 2019e. “China Looking to Expand Satellite Coverage in Arctic, Experts Warn Of Military Purpose.” High North News, September 4, 2019. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/china-looking-expand-satellite-coverage-arctic- experts-warn-military-purpose. 106. Hwang, Sehee. 2015. “Improvement of South Korea’s Maritime Safety System After the Sinking of MV Sewol.” From the Oceans, January 19, 2015. 107. ICIMOD, n.d. “What is the Third Pole?” Foundation Home. Ac- cessed November 3, 2019. http://www.icimod.org/?q=3487. 108. Iglauer, Philip. 2012. “US Presidential Politics Plays into Anti- Iran Sanctions.” The Korea Times, January 18, 2012. http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/na- tion/2012/01/113_103133.html. 109. Ikeshima, Taisaku. 2016. “Japan's role as an Asian observer state within and outside the Arctic Council's framework.” Po- lar Science 10 (3): 458 – 462. doi: 10.1016/j.polar.2016.07.006. ISSN 18739652. 110. International Arctic Science Committee. n.d. (a). “IASC Council Members.” IASC: Organisation: Council. Accessed October 23,

88 BIBLIOGRAPHY

2019. https://iasc.info/iasc/organization/council/council- members. 111. International Arctic Science Committee. n.d. (b). “IASC Work- ing Groups.” IASC: Organisation. Accessed November 2, 2019. https://iasc.info/working-groups. 112. International Energy Agency. 2009. “World Energy Outlook.” https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/weo2009.pdf. 113. IPCC. 2013. Summary for Policy Makers. Working Group I. 114. Johnson, Simon. 2019. “Pompeo: Russia is "aggressive" in Arc- tic, China's work there also needs watching.” Reuters, May 6, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-finland-arctic- council/pompeo-russia-is-aggressive-in-arctic-chinas-work- there-also-needs-watching-idUSKCN1SC1AY. 115. Katakey, Rakteem and Will Kennedy. 2013. “Russia Lets China Into Arctic Rush as Energy Giants Embrace.” Bloomberg, March 23, 2013. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-25/russia-cuts-china-into-arctic-oil-rush-as-energy-giants-embrace. 116. Kings Bay. n.d. “Research Stations in Ny-Ålesund.” Research. Accessed November 2, 2019. https://kingsbay.no/research/research_stations/. 117. Kiselyova, Maria. 2019. “Italy's Intesa says it considers financing Novatek-led Arctic LNG-2.” Reuters, October 10, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-novatek-lng-intesa- sanpaolo/italys-intesa-says-it-considers-financing-novatek- led-arctic-lng-2-idUSKBN1WP17M. 118. Knecht, Sebastian. 2015. “New Observers Queuing Up: Why the Arctic Council should expand – and expel.” The Arctic Insti- tute, April 20, 2015. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/new- observers-queuing-up/. 119. Knecht, Sebastian. 2017. “Exploring Different Levels of Stake- holder Activity in International Institutions: Late Bloomers, Reegular Visitors and Overachievers in Arctic Council Work- ing Groups.” In Governing Arctic Change: Global Perspectives, edited by Kathrin Keil and Sebastian Knecht, 163-182. Lon- don: Palgrave Macmillan.

89 BIBLIOGRAPHY

120. KOGAS Canada Ltd. 2012. “HOME ABOUT – Business Activi- ties.” Accessed November 30, 2019. http://kogascanada.com/. 121. Koshy, Jacob. 2018. “India to expand polar research to the Arctic as well.” The Hindu, July 19, 2018. https://www.the- hindu.com/sci-tech/energy-and-environment/india-to-expand-polar-research-to-arctic-as-well/article24463607.ece. 122. Kwasawneh, Roslan. 2017. “S. Korea easing rules at oil terminals in effort to become trade hub.” Reuters, July 20, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/southkorea-oilstorage/s- korea-easing-rules-at-oil-terminals-in-effort-to-become- trade-hub-idUSL4N1JY35N. 123. Lackenbauer, Whitney P. 2014. “Canada and the Asian Obser- vers to the Arctic Council: Anxiety and Opportunity.“ Asia Po- licy 18 (July 2014): 22-29. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24905272. 124. Lagutina, Maria L. 2016. “Strategy of the Italian Republic in the Arctic.” Arctic and North 24: 135-144. doi: 10.17238/issn2221-2698.2016.24.155. 125. Lanteigne, Marc and Mingming Shi. 2019. “China Steps up Its Mining Interests in Greenland.” The Diplomat, February 12, 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/china-steps-up-its- mining-interests-in-greenland/. 126. Lee, Byong-hyun. 2013. “Korea’s Arctic Policy: A Korean Route Towards the Arctic Frontier.” Arctic Frontiers 2013. Tromsø, Norway. 127. Lee, Galen. 2016. “Singapore’s 2016 Observer Activities Re- port.” Arctic Council Archive, November 30, 2016. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/1863/EDOCS-4021-v1A-2016-11-30_Singa- pore_Observer_activity_report.PDF?sequence=1&isAl- lowed=y. 128. Lee, Yen Nee. 2019. “Russia can help India to be less dependent on oil, says Indian energy minister.” CNBC, October 4, 2019. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/04/russia-can-help- india-be-less-dependent-on-oil-indian-energy-minister.html.

90 BIBLIOGRAPHY

129. Leonardo. 2017. “AW169 to support Chinese Polar Scientific Exploration Missions.” Media & Sories: Press Releases. Octo- ber 3, 2017. Accessed November 28, 2019. https://www.leo- nardocompany.com/en/press-release-detail/-/detail/aw169- china-helitech17. 130. Leonardo. 2018. “Publication lists of candidates for the ap- pointment of the Board of Statutory Auditors.Proposed reso- lution by the shareholder Ministry of Economy and Finance to the Shareholders' Meeting.” Media & Sories: Press Releases. April 19, 2018. Accessed November 28, 2019. https://www.le- onardocompany.com/en/press-release-detail/-/detail/colle- gio-sindacale-liste-nomina. 131. Leonardo. 2019. “Leonardo to participate in ARCSAR, the EU's project to improve security and sustainable development in the Arctic.” Media & Sories: Press Releases. February 25, 2019. Accessed November 28, 2019. https://www.leonardocom- pany.com/en/press-release-detail/-/detail/leonardo-to-participate-in-arcsar-25-02-19. 132. Linlin, Li. 2018. “Observer Review Report.” Arctic Council Ar- chive, May 31, 2018. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/2251/CHINA_2018-05_Review-Re- port.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 133. Lunev, Sergey. 2012. “India goes to the Arctic." Russia Beyond, April 6, 2012. https://www.rbth.com/articles/2012/04/06/india_goes_to_the_arctic_15389. 134. Macalister, Terry. 2014. “BP wins first Greenland drilling con- cession despite chequered record.” The Guardian, January 4, 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jan/03/bp-wins-first-greenland-drilling-deepwater-horizon. 135. Machowski, Jacek. 1993. “IASC as legal framework of international scientific cooperation in the Arctic.” Polish Polar Re- search. 14 (2), 177-207. 136. Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore. 2009. “Fact Sheet on the 3rd Maritime R&D Advisory Panel.” Accessed November 30, 2019. https://www.mpa.gov.sg/web/wcm/connect/www/5161f3c6-f43c-4832-8d37-9d8f8b73d13d/an- nex_1.pdf?MOD=AJPERES

91 BIBLIOGRAPHY

137. Market Intelligence. 2016. “Energy Statistics Report: Switzer- land.” Energy Market Price, June 2016. https://www.ener- gymarketprice.com/products/access_SwitzerlandEnergySta- tistics.pdf. 138. Matzen, Erik and Tom Daly. 2018. “Greenland's courting of China for airport projects worries Denmark.” Reuters, March 22, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-arctic- greenland/greenlands-courting-of-china-for-airport-projects- worries-denmark-idUSKBN1GY25Y. 139. McMullan, Richard. 2019. “The 10 Smallest Countries In The World.” World Atlas: World Facts. Last updated: July 25, 2019. Accessed October 25, 2019. https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-10-smallest-countries-in-the-world.html. 140. Miller, Manjari Chatterjee. 2013. “India's Feeble Foreign Pol- icy: A Would-Be Great Power Resists Its Own Rise.” Foreign Af- fairs 92 (3): 14-19. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23526832. 141. Ministerio dell’Ambiente e della Tutella del Territorio e del Mar. 2019. “Consiglio Artico.” Last updated: March 20, 2019. https://www.minambiente.it/pagina/consiglio-artico. 142. Ministère Des Affaires Etrangères et du Développement Inter- national. 2016. “The Great Challenge of the Arctic: National Roadmap for the Arctic.” https://www.diplo- matie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/frna_-_eng_-interne_-_prepa_-_17-06- pm-bd-pdf_cle02695b.pdf. 143. Ministère Des Armées. 2019. “France and the New Strategic Challenges in the Arctic.” 144. Ministry of Defence and Gavin Williamson. 2018. “Defence Secretary announces new Defence Arctic Strategy.“ Gover- nment of the United Kingdom. September 30, 2018. Accessed November 30, 2019. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-secretary-announces-new-defence-arctic-strategy. 145. Ministry of Earth Sciences. 2018. “Construction of Polar Re- search Vessel.” Polar Science and Cryosphere. Last updated: August 14, 2018. Accessed November 3, 2019. https://moes.gov.in/programmes/indian-scientific-endeav- ors-arctic.

92 BIBLIOGRAPHY

146. Ministry of External Affairs. 2013. “India and the Arctic.” Pub- lic Diplomacy. June 10, 2013. Accessed November 3, 2019. https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?21812/In- dia+and+the+Arctic. 147. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2019. “The Fourth Trilateral High- Level Dialogue on the Arctic, Busan, June 25-26, 2019.” Press Releases. June 27, 2019. Accessed November 6, 2019. http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=3205 74&srchFr=&srchTo=&srch- Word=&srchTp=&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1 =0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm. 148. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. n.d. “The Arctic & the Antarctic.” Other Continents. Accessed November 25, 2019. https://www.msz.gov.pl/en/p/msz_en/foreign_pol- icy/other_continents/arctic_antarctic/. 149. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. 2015. “Towards an Italian Strategy for the Arctic: National Guidelines.” https://www.esteri.it/mae/resource/doc/2016/06/strategy_for_the_arctic_may_2016.pdf. 150. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2010. “Launching of the Arctic Task Force (ATF).” September 2, 2010. https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2010/9/0902_01.html. 151. MOF, MOFA, MOTIE et. all. 2013. “Arctic Policy of Republic of Korea.” http://library.arcticportal.org/1902/1/Arctic_Pol- icy_of_the_Republic_of_Korea.pdf. 152. MOL Mitsui O.S.K. Lines. 2019. “LNG Carrier for Yamal LNG Project Named LNG DUBHE: The first LNG carrier out of four built in China for the project.” Press Release. September 25, 2019. https://www.mol.co.jp/en/pr/2019/19060.html. 153. Muñoz de Laborde, Juan Luis. 2016. “Observer Activity Re- port.” Arctic Council Archive, November 2016. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/1858/EDOCS-4016-v1A-2016-11-23_Spain_Ob- server_activity_report.PDF?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 154. National Institute of Polar Research. n.d. “Arctic Environment Research Center.” Facility/Collaboration. Accessed November

93 BIBLIOGRAPHY

3, 2019. https://www.nipr.ac.jp/english/collaborative_re- search/arctic.html. 155. Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research. 2014. “Pole Position - NL 2.0: Strategy for the Netherlands Polar Pro- gramme 2016-2020.” https://www.nwo.nl/en/documents/alw/netherlands-polar-programme---strategy---pole- position---nl-2.0. 156. Nicholls, R.J, C. Herweijer and S. Hallegatte. 2007. “Ranking of the World’s Cities Most Exposed to Coastal Flooding Today and in the Future.” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, France. https://climate-adapt.eea.eu- ropa.eu/metadata/publications/ranking-of-the-worlds-cities- to-coastal-flooding/11240357. 157. Nobile U. 1959. Gli Italiani al Polo Nord. Arnoldo Mondadori. 158. Nordea. 2017. “Analyses of Key Companies having Business Operations in the Arctic: Extract of the report Climate Change in the Arctic.” https://insights.nordea.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Analyses-of-Key-Companies-having-Business- Operating-In-the-Arctic_0.pdf. 159. Nordic Co-operation. n.d. “Welcome to the Nordic Co-operation.” Accessed November 2, 2019. https://www.nor- den.org/en. 160. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2018. “Norway-India in the New Year.” Norway in India. January 2, 2018. Accessed No- vember 3, 2019. https://www.norway.no/en/india/norway- india/news-and-events/new-delhi/news/norway-india-relations/. 161. Norwegian Petroleum. n.d. “Fields.” Facts. Accessed November 2, 2019. https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/facts/field/. 162. NOVATEK. 2016. “NOVATEK and China's Silk Road Fund Con- clude Selling 9.9% Stake in Yamal LNG.” Press Releases and Events. March 15, 2016. Accessed November 24, 2019. http://www.novatek.ru/en/press/releases/index.php?id_4=1165. 163. NS ENERGY. n.d. “Arctic LNG 2 Project.” NS Energy. Accessed November 3, 2019. https://www.nsenergybusiness.com/projects/arctic-lng-2-project/.

94 BIBLIOGRAPHY

164. NS Energy Staff Writer. 2019. “NOVATEK and Repsol sign heads of agreement for LNG supply from Arctic LNG 2.” NS En- ergy, April 3, 2019. https://www.nsenergybusiness.com/news/novatek-and-repsol-sign-heads-of-agreement-for-lng-supply-from-arctic-lng-2/. 165. Offshore Technology. n.d. “The Nikaitchuq Oil Field Project, Usa.” Accessed November 25, 2019. https://www.offshore- technology.com/projects/nikaitchuqoilfieldal/. 166. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited, n.d. “ONGC Videsh Limited – Working globally for the Energy Security of India.” ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL). Accessed November 3, 2019. https://www.ongcindia.com/wps/wcm/connect/en/about- ongc/subsidiaries/ongc-videsh-limited/. 167. Over the Circle. 2018a. “Do Oil and Water Mix? Emerging China-Greenland Resource Cooperation.” overthecircle, No- vember 2, 2018. https://overthecircle.com/2018/11/02/do- oil-and-water-mix-emerging-china-greenland-resource-cooperation/. 168. Over the Circle. 2018b. “The Netherlands in the Arctic: Clear Skies and Choppy Waters.” overthecircle, November 18, 2018. https://overthecircle.com/2018/11/18/the-netherlands-in- the-arctic-clear-skies-and-choppy-waters/. 169. Over the Circle. 2019a. “By Any Other Name? Defining an Arc- tic Stakeholder is Becoming More Complex.” overthecircle, Oc- tober 7, 2019. https://overthecircle.com/2019/10/07/by- any-other-name-defining-an-arctic-stakeholder-is-becoming- more-complex/. 170. Over the Circle. 2019b. “The Arctic Circle 2019: Greenland in the Centre Seat.” overthecircle, October 14, 2019. https://overthecircle.com/2019/10/14/the-arctic-circle- 2019-greenland-in-the-centre-seat/. 171. PAME. n.d. “About PAME.” PAME. Accessed November 11, 2019. https://www.pame.is/index.php/shortcode/about-us. 172. Panda, Ankit. 2015. “The Truth About China’s New National Security Law.” The Diplomat, July 01, 2015. https://thediplomat.com/2015/07/the-truth-about-chinas-new-national-security-law/.

95 BIBLIOGRAPHY

173. Pelaudeix, Cecile and Thierry Rodon. 2013. “The European Union Arctic Policy and National Interests of France and Ger- many: Internal and External Policy Coherence at Stake?” The Northern Review 37 (Fall 2013): 57–85. https://thenorthern- review.ca/index.php/nr/article/view/285/282. 174. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Singapore to the United Nations. 2015. “Singapore’s Response to the International Sea- bed Authority’s Report on Developing a Regulatory Frame- work for Mineral Exploitation in the Area. New York.” https://www.isa.org.jm/sites/default/files/singapore- govt.pdf. 175. Polar Research Institute of China. n.d. “Who we are.” About Us. Accessed November 30, 2019. http://www.pric.org.cn/EN/detail/sub.aspx?c=29. 176. Polska Akademia Nauk. n.d. “The Committee on Polar Re- search of the Polish Academy of Sciences.” Accessed Novem- ber 25, 2019. http://www.kbp.pan.pl/index.php?lang=en. 177. Port of Hamburg. n.d. “Port of Hamburg: Port Statistics.” Ac- cessed November 2, 2019. https://www.hamburg.com/port/. 178. Purdy, Elizabeth Rholetter and Elena Popan. 2018. “Descrip- tive Research”. Online. Salem Press Encyclopedia. Accessed No- vember 27, 2019. https://eds.a.ebscohost.com/eds/detail/detail?vid=1&sid=7b37ec9b-d0ed-476a-bdf2- 816ce8bade98%40sdc-v-sessmgr01&bdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlP- Wl- wLGNvb2tpZSx1aWQmbGFuZz1jcyZzaXRlPWVkcy1saXZlJnNjb 3BlPXNpdGU%3d#AN=113931140&db=ers. 179. Royal Air Force. 2019. “Royal Air Force Jets to Patrol Icelandic Skies for NATO.” RAF News. November 13, 2019. Accessed No- vember 27, 2019. https://www.raf.mod.uk/news/articles/royal-air-force-jets-to-patrol-icelandic-skies-for-nato/. 180. Rajaratnam, Sinnathamby R. 1972. “Singapore: Global City.” Speech to Singapore Press Club, February 6, 1972. National Archives of Singapore. 181. Ramberg, B. 2010. “Climatic Change and Singapore – Scenario by 2050. The International Conference on Vision and

96 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Roadmap for R&D Priorities in Maritime Environment, Tech- nology, Business, Policy and Security. Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. 182. Ramesh, Rashmi. 2018. “India’s Arctic Engagement: Shifting from Scientific to Strategic Interests?” South Asian Voices, Sep- tember 25, 2018. https://southasianvoices.org/indias-arctic- engagement-shifting-from-scientific-to-strategic-interests/. 183. Regan, James and Irina Reznik. 2019. “Macron Asks Shippers to Shun Arctic Route to Protect Environment.” Bloomberg, Au- gust 24, 2019. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-24/macron-asks-shippers-to-shun-arctic-route- to-protect-environment. 184. Revich, Boris A. 1995. “Public health and ambient air pollution in Arctic and Subarctic cities of Russia.“ Science of The To- tal Environment 160-161: 585-592. doi: 10.1016/0048- 9697(95)04393-F. ISSN 00489697. 185. RioTinto. n.d. “Our businesses in Canada.” Global home: Can- ada. Accessed November 11, 2019. https://www.riotinto.com/canada/our-businesses-in-canada-17276.aspx. 186. RT. 2014. “Key Russia-China deals.” RT, May 21, 2014. 187. Saipem. 2019. “Saipem joins the JV for the realization of the Arctic LNG2 project with a share worth approximately 2.2 billion Euro.” Press Releases. August 2, 2019. Accessed Novem- ber 27, 2019. https://www.saipem.com/en/media/press-releases/2019-08-02/saipem-joins-jv-realization-arctic-lng2- project-share-worth. 188. Sea News. 2018. “FESCO Icebreaker to Serve Indian Antarctic Stations.” Sea News, October 22, 2018. https://seanews.ru/en/2018/10/22/en-fesco-icebreaker-to- serve-indian-antarctic-stations/. 189. Schroeder, Paul W. 2004. Systems, Stability, and Statecraft: Es- says on the International History of Modern Europe. Basing- stoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 190. Schulze, Vincent-Gregor. 2017. “Arctic Strategies Round-up 2017.” German Arctic Office, Alfred Wegener Institute, Helm- hotz Center for Polar and Marine Research. http://www.arctic-office.de/en/in-focus/arctic-strategies-round-up/.

97 BIBLIOGRAPHY

191. Sharp, Gregory. 2019. “The Swiss Arctic Policy Draw Parallels Between the High Altitude of the Alps and the Arctic.” High North News, October 18, 2019. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/swiss-arctic-policy-draw-parallels-between- high-altitude-alps-and-arctic. 192. Shell. n.d. “SAKHALIN-2 – AN OVERVIEW.” About us: Our major projects. Accessed November 28, 2019. https://www.shell.com/about-us/major-projects/sakhalin/sakhalin-an-overview.html. 193. Ship Technology. 2013. “The world’s 10 biggest ports.” Ship Technology, October 13, 2013. https://www.ship-technology.com/features/feature-the-worlds-10-biggest-ports/. 194. Sinha, Uttam Kumar and Arvind Gupta. 2014. “The Arctic and India: Strategic Awareness and Scientific Engagement.” Strate- gic Analysis 38 (6): 872-885. DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2014.952945. 195. SIOI – UNA Italy. 2019. “The Arctic Awareness Week – SIOI Rome, 1-4 October, 2019.” News. September 13, 2019. Ac- cessed November 27, 2019. https://www.sioi.org/arctic-connections-the-international-symposium-to-promote-cooperation-on-arctic-issues-2/. 196. Śmieszek, Małgorzata, Michał Łuszczuk, Adam Stępień and Pi- otr Graczyk. 2015. “Poland’s Policy towards the Arctic: Key Ar- eas and Priority Actions.” Polish Institute of International Af- fairs (PISM) Policy Paper 11 (113), May 2015. https://www.re- searchgate.net/publication/282121644_Poland's_Policy_to- wards_the_Arctic_Key_Areas_and_Priority_Actions. 197. Szpunar, M. 2011. “Wystąpienie Podsekretarza Stanu Pana Macieja Szpunara na polsko-kanadyjskiej konferencji ar- ktycznej.“ Warsaw, Poland. February 24, 2011. 198. Staalesen, Atle. 2019a. “Frenchmen sign landmark deal with Novatek, boost presence in Russian Arctic.” The Barents Ob- server, March 05, 2019. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic-industry-and-energy/2019/03/frenchmen-sign-landmark-deal-novatek-boosts-presence-russian. 199. Staalesen, Atle. 2019b. “Siberian governor plans to use river, Arctic sea route to ship grain to Japan.” Arctic Today, August 1,

98 BIBLIOGRAPHY

2019. https://www.arctictoday.com/siberian-governor-plans- to-use-river-arctic-sea-route-to-ship-grain-to-japan/. 200. Staalesen, Atle. 2019c. “China’s first Yamal LNG tanker is soon on its way to Murmansk.” The Barents Observer, September 27, 2019. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and- energy/2019/09/chinas-first-yamal-lng-tanker-sets-course- murmansk. 201. Staalesen, Atle. 2019d. “Brussels seeks new solid ground in melting Arctic.” The Barents Observer, October 15, 2019. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2019/10/brussels-seeks-new-solid-ground-melting-arctic. 202. Stanley, Fiona, Graeme Pearman and Richard Yin. 2018. “Don't believe the hype on natural gas. It's a fossil fuel just like coal.” The Guardian, April 17, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/17/dont-believe-the- hype-on-natural-gas-its-a-fossil-fuel-just-like-coal. 203. Stokke, Olav S. 2013. “The Promise of Involvement: Asia in the Arctic.” Strategic Analysis 37 (4): 474-479. doi: 10.1080/09700161.2013.802520. 204. Storey, Ian. 2014. “The Arctic Novice: Singapore and the High North.” Asia Policy 18 (1): 66–72. https://search.proquest.com/docview/1688071736?ac- countid=16531. 205. Storey, Ian. 2016. “Singapore and the Arctic: Tropical Country, Polar Interests.” In Asia and the Arctic, edited by Vijay Sakhuja and Kapil Narula, 63–74. Singapore: Springer Singapore. 206. Swagath, BV. 2019. “Mitsui, JOGMEC to buy 10% stake in No- vatek’s Arctic LNG 2 project.” NS ENERGY, July 1, 2019. https://www.nsenergybusiness.com/news/mitsui-jogmec- arctic-lng-2-project/. 207. Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. 2015. “Swiss polar research: Pioneering spirit, passion and excellence.” https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/publications/Science/Schweizer_Polarforschung_EN.pdf. 208. Tan, Audrey. 2019. “Melting sea ice sparks debate on tourism and shipping in the Arctic.” The Straits Times, January 23,

99 BIBLIOGRAPHY

2019. https://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/melting- sea-ice-sparks-debate-on-tourism-and-shipping-in-the-arctic. 209. Tan, Sam. 2016. “What is the Connection between Singapore and the Arctic Region?” Today, May 23, 2016. https://www.to- dayonline.com/commentary/what-connection-between-singapore-and-arctic-region. 210. The Antarctic Treaty. 1959. https://documents.ats.aq/keydocs/vol_1/vol1_2_AT_Antarc- tic_Treaty_e.pdf. 211. The Arctic Institute. n.d.(a). “France: Arctic Policy.” Countries. Accessed November 30, 2019. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/france/. 212. The Arctic Institute. n.d.(b). “France: History.” Countries. Ac- cessed November 30, 2019. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/france/. 213. The Arctic Institute. n.d.(c). “India: Arctic Policy.” Countries. Accessed November 3, 2019. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/india/. 214. The Arctic Institute. n.d.(d). “India: Economy.” Countries. Ac- cessed November 3, 2019. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/india/. 215. The Arctic Institute. n.d.(e). “Italy: Arctic Policy.” Countries. Accessed November 3, 2019. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/italy/. 216. The Arctic Institute. n.d.(f). “Italy: History.” Countries. Ac- cessed November 3, 2019. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/italy/. 217. The Arctic Institute. n.d.(g). “Japan: Arctic Policy.” Countries. Accessed November 30, 2019. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/japan/. 218. The Arctic Institute. n.d.(h). “Japan: Economy.” Countries. Ac- cessed November 30, 2019. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/japan/. 219. The Arctic Institute. n.d.(i). “Japan: History.” Countries. Ac- cessed November 30, 2019. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/japan/.

100 BIBLIOGRAPHY

220. The Arctic Institute. n.d.(j). “Netherlands: Arctic Policy.” Coun- tries. Accessed November 30, 2019. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/netherlands/. 221. The Arctic Institute. n.d.(k). “Netherlands: Economy.” Coun- tries. Accessed November 30, 2019. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/netherlands/. 222. The Arctic Institute. n.d.(l). “Netherlands: History.” Countries. Accessed November 30, 2019. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/netherlands/. 223. The Arctic Institute. n.d.(m). “Poland: Arctic Policy.” Coun- tries. Accessed November 30, 2019. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/poland/. 224. The Arctic Institute. n.d.(n). “Poland: Economy.” Countries. Ac- cessed November 30, 2019. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/poland/. 225. The Arctic Institute. n.d.(o). “Poland: History.” Countries. Ac- cessed November 30, 2019. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/poland/. 226. The Arctic Institute. n.d.(p). “Singapore: Arctic Policy.” Coun- tries. Accessed October 25, 2019. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/singapore/. 227. The Arctic Institute. n.d.(q). “Singapore: Economy.” Countries. Accessed October 25, 2019. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/singapore/. 228. The Arctic Institute. n.d.(r). “Singapore: History.” Countries. Accessed October 25, 2019. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/singapore/. 229. The Arctic Institute. n.d.(s). “Spain: Arctic Policy.” Countries. Accessed November 30, 2019. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/spain/. 230. The Arctic Institute. n.d.(t). “Spain: Economy.” Countries. Ac- cessed November 30, 2019. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/spain/. 231. The Arctic Institute. n.d.(u). “United Kingdom: History.” Coun- tries. Accessed November 30, 2019. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/united-kingdom/.

101 BIBLIOGRAPHY

232. The Economic Times. 2006. “ONGC receives oil shipment from Sakhalin-I Russia.” The Economic Times, November 30, 2016. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/oil- gas/ongc-receives-oil-shipment-from-sakhalin-i-russia/articleshow/655170.cms?from=mdr. 233. The Headquarters for Ocean Policy. 2015. “Japan’s Arctic Pol- icy.” http://ams.hi.is/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/JAPANS- ARCTIC-POLICY.pdf. 234. The Korea Economic Daily. 2015. “The Arctic, Economic Op- portunities and the Stage of Global Cooperation.” The Korea Economic Daily. 235. The Presidential Committee on Northern Economic Coopera- tion. n.d.(a). “9-BRIDGE: Gas.” Vision, Strategy. Accessed No- vember 24, 2019. http://www.bukbang.go.kr/bukbang_en/vi- sion_policy/9-bridge/. 236. The Presidential Committee on Northern Economic Coopera- tion. n.d.(b). “Introduction, Promotion.” Accessed November 24, 2019. http://www.bukbang.go.kr/bukbang_en/about_pr/about_pr/. 237. The Presidential Committee on Northern Economic Coopera- tion. n.d.(c). “Region-Specific Strategies.” Vision, Strategy. Ac- cessed November 24, 2019. http://www.bukbang.go.kr/bukbang_en/vision_policy/strategy/. 238. The Scottish Government. 2019. “Arctic Connections: Scot- land’s Arctic Policy Framework.” https://www.gov.scot/bina- ries/content/documents/govscot/publications/publication/2019/09/arctic-connections-scotlands-arctic-policy- framework/documents/arctic-connections-scotlands-arctic- policy-framework/arctic-connections-scotlands-arctic-policy- framework/govscot%3Adocument/arctic-connections-scotlands-arctic-policy-framework.pdf. 239. The State Council Information Office. 2018. “China’s Arctic Policy.” http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_pa- per/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm.

102 BIBLIOGRAPHY

240. The Svalbard Treaty - Treaty between Norway, The United States of America, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the Nether- lands, Great Britain and Ireland and the British overseas Do- minions and Sweden concerning Spitsbergen signed in Paris 9th February 1920. http://library.arcticportal.org/1909/1/The_Svalbard_Treaty_9ssFy.pdf. 241. Tonami, Aki. 2016. Asian foreign policy in a changing arctic: The diplomacy of Economy and Science at New Frontiers. Lon- don: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-1-137-53745-4. 242. Tømmerbakke, Siri Gulliksen and Amund Trellevik. 2019. “France Compares the Arctic to the Middle East, Claims Region Belongs to No-One.” High North News, October 1, 2019. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/france-compares-arctic-middle-east-claims-region-belongs-no-one. 243. USDA Foreign Agricultural Service. 2019. “GAIN Report Num- ber: JA9028.” Global Agricultural Information Network. March 15, 2019. Accessed November 3, 2019. https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/report/download- reportbyfilename?filename=Grain%20and%20Feed%20An- nual_Tokyo_Japan_3-15-2019.pdf. 244. Watters, S. and A. Tonami. 2012. “Singapore: An Emerging Arc- tic Actor.” Arctic Yearbook 1: 105–14. 245. Wen, Dale Jiajun. 2009. “Climate Change and China: Technol- ogy, Market and Beyond.”Focus on the Global South, Occasional Paper 6. https://understandchinaenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Dale-Wen-Climate-Change-in-China.pdf. 246. World Population Review. n.d. “Total Population by Country 2019.” Accessed November 3, 2019. http://worldpopulation- review.com/countries/. 247. WorldData.info. n.d. “Energy consumption in Japan.” Asia. Ac- cessed November 3, 2019. https://www.worlddata.info/asia/japan/energy-consumption.php. 248. Xiaoning, Yang. 2016. “Observer Activity Report.” Arctic Coun- cil Archive, November 25, 2016. https://oaarchive.arctic- council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/1860/EDOCS-4018-v1-

103 BIBLIOGRAPHY

2016-11-26_China_Observer_activity_report.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 249. Yamal LNG. n.d. “About the Project.” Project. Accessed Novem- ber 3, 2019. http://yamallng.ru/en/project/about/. 250. Young, Oran R. 1998. Creating Regimes : Arctic Accords and In- ternational Governance. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=1814592&site=bsi-live. 251. Zengerle, Patricia. 2013. “China granted observer seat on Arc- tic governing council.” Reuters, May 15, 2013. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-arctic-council/china- granted-observer-seat-on-arctic-governing-council- idUSBRE94E0IJ20130515

104