Contemporary Auditing, 8Th
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Interviewed Bernard L. Madoffat the Metropolitan Correctional Center, 150 Park Row, New York, NY
This document contains information that has been collected in connection with an investigation conducted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Office of Inspector General (OIG). It contains confidential, privileged and sensitive information and should not be recopied or distributed without the express consent of the GIG. Interview of Bernard L. Madoff At approximately 3:00pm on June 17, 2009, Inspector General H. David Kotz and DeputyInspector General Noelle Frangipaneinterviewed Bernard L. Madoffat the Metropolitan Correctional Center, 150 Park Row, New York, NY. Madoff was accompanied by his attorney, Ira Lee Sorkin of the firm of Dickstein Shapiro, LLP, as well as an associate from that firm, Nicole DeBello. The interview began with IG Kotz advising Madoff of the general nature of the OIG investigation, and advising that we were investigating interactions the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had with Madoff and his firm, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLP (BLM), going back to 1992. At that point, Sorkin advised Madoff that his only obligation was to tell the truth during the interview. The interview began with Madoff stating that the prosecutor and trustee in the criminal case "misunderstood" things he said during the proffer, and as a result, there is a lot of misinformation being circulated about this scandal, however, he added, "I'm not saying I'm not guilty." 2006 Exam: Madoff recalled that with respect to the 2006 OCIE exam, "two young fellows," (Lamore and Ostrow) came in "under the guise of doing a routine exam;" He said that during that time period, sweeps were being done of hedge funds that focused on ~-ont- running, and that was why he believed Ostrow and Lamore were at BLM. -
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT of NEW YORK ------X
Case 1:09-cr-00213-DC Document 230 Filed 06/04/20 Page 1 of 16 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : - v - : MEMORANDUM DECISION BERNARD L. MADOFF, : 09 Cr. 213 (DC) Defendant. : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x APPEARANCES: BRANDON SAMPLE PLC Attorney for Defendant By: Brandon Sample, Esq. P.O. Box 250 Rutland, VT 05702 AUDREY STRAUSS, Esq. Attorney for the United States, Acting Under Authority Conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 515 By: Drew Skinner, Esq. Louis A. Pellegrino, Esq. Assistant United States Attorneys One St. Andrews Plaza New York, NY 10007 CHIN, Circuit Judge: On March 12, 2009, defendant Bernard L. Madoff pleaded guilty to 11 counts of securities fraud and related crimes. On June 29, 2009, I sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of 150 years. Mr. Madoff now moves for a reduction in sentence and "compassionate release" pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as modified by the First Step Act (the "FSA"), Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (Dec. 21, 2018). He Case 1:09-cr-00213-DC Document 230 Filed 06/04/20 Page 2 of 16 contends that he suffers from "end-stage renal disease" and other serious medical conditions and that, as a consequence, he has a life expectancy of less than 18 months. Def. Motion at 2-3. Accordingly, he asks that the Court show him "mercy and compassion" and release him so that he is not incarcerated for "his final months on this earth." Id. at 25, 26. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied. -
Heuristics & Cognitive Biases
McCombs Knowledge To Go November 11, 2014 Corporate Governance and Corporate Fraud by Grace Renbarger Lecturer, Department of Business, Government and Society Agenda . What is Corporate Fraud? . What are the Consequences? . How Big is the Problem? . Who Commits Corporate Fraud? . Why do People Engage in Fraud? . How can Fraud be Prevented? . What is the Role of Corporate Governance in Preventing Corporate Fraud? What is “Corporate Fraud”? What is “Corporate Fraud”? . Concept of “fraud” is very broad . Legal Definition: A false representation of a matter of fact—whether by words or by conduct, by false or misleading statements, or by concealment of what should have been disclosed—that deceives and is intended to deceive another so that the individual will act upon it to his or her legal injury. Type of “White Collar” crime . Usually committed for personal or institutional gain. What is “Corporate Fraud”? . Occurs in wide variety of ways: . theft of cash, physical assets or confidential information . misuse of accounts . procurement fraud . payroll fraud . financial accounting misstatements . inappropriate journal vouchers . suspense accounting fraud . fraudulent expense claims . false employment credentials . bribery and corruption . money laundering . Can be committed by individuals employed by the corporation (internal) or by outsiders (external) . Victims can be the corporation itself or others (e.g., investors) What is “Corporate Fraud”? Focus today is on internal fraud Source: Chartered Institute of Management Accountants Consequences of Fraud . Criminal liability . Securities fraud . Insider trading . Tax evasion . Racketeering/RICO . Mail and wire fraud . Bribery . Money laundering . Obstruction of justice Consequences of Fraud . Individual officers, employees and agents criminally prosecuted for their own conduct . -
Merging the SEC and CFTC - a Clash of Cultures
Florida International University College of Law eCollections Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 2009 Merging the SEC and CFTC - A Clash of Cultures Jerry W. Markham Florida International University College of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/faculty_publications Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons Recommended Citation Jerry W. Markham, Merging the SEC and CFTC - A Clash of Cultures, 78 U. Cin. L. Rev. 537, 612 (2009). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at eCollections. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of eCollections. For more information, please contact [email protected]. +(,121/,1( Citation: Jerry W. Markham, Merging the SEC and CFTC - A Clash of Cultures, 78 U. Cin. L. Rev. 537 (2009) Provided by: FIU College of Law Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline Tue May 1 10:36:12 2018 -- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license agreement available at https://heinonline.org/HOL/License -- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text. -- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your HeinOnline license, please use: Copyright Information Use QR Code reader to send PDF to your smartphone or tablet device MERGING THE SEC AND CFTC-A CLASH OF CULTURES Jerry W. Markham* I. INTRODUCTION The massive subprime losses at Citigroup, UBS, Bank of America, Wachovia, Washington Mutual, and other banks astounded the financial world. Equally shocking were the failures of Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Bear Steams. -
Strengthening the Sec's Vital Enforcement
S. HRG. 111–175 STRENGTHENING THE SEC’S VITAL ENFORCEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITIES, INSURANCE, AND INVESTMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ON EXAMINING THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF THE SECURITIES AND EX- CHANGE COMMISSION IN PROTECTING INVESTORS BY AGGRESSIVELY ENFORCING FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS MAY 7, 2009 Printed for the use of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs ( Available at: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate05sh.html U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 53–779 PDF WASHINGTON : 2009 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut, Chairman TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama JACK REED, Rhode Island ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York JIM BUNNING, Kentucky EVAN BAYH, Indiana MIKE CRAPO, Idaho ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey MEL MARTINEZ, Florida DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii BOB CORKER, Tennessee SHERROD BROWN, Ohio JIM DEMINT, South Carolina JON TESTER, Montana DAVID VITTER, Louisiana HERB KOHL, Wisconsin MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska MARK R. WARNER, Virginia KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado EDWARD SILVERMAN, Staff Director WILLIAM D. DUHNKE, Republican Staff Director DAWN RATLIFF, Chief Clerk DEVIN HARTLEY, Hearing Clerk SHELVIN SIMMONS, IT Director JIM CROWELL, Editor SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITIES, INSURANCE, AND INVESTMENT JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman JIM BUNNING, Kentucky, Ranking Republican Member TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota MEL MARTINEZ, Florida CHARLES E. -
JP Jeanneret Associates, Inc. Et Al. 09-CV-03907-Amended Complaint
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK IN RE J.P. JEANNERET ASSOCIATES, INC., et aL Master - . 'vr 3 VI Li \ - 7- '! This Document Relates to: ERISA Actions tLJ u.S. s - D. N.Y° CASHIE'RS FIRST AMENDED CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACT1NCOMPtAT Plaintiffs Boards of Trustees ("Trustees -) of the Buffalo Laborers Security Fund, Welfare Fund and Welfare Staff Fund (collectively, the "Buffalo Laborers Plans -), in their respective capacities as fiduciaries of the plans, allege the following on behalf of the Buffalo Laborers Plans and all others similarly situated: BACKGROUND I. This consolidated class action is brought pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. ("ERISA"), seeking legal and equitable relief, including restitution, for the Buffalo Laborers Plans and similarly-situated ERISA plans (the "Class Members," also collectively referred to herein as the -ERISA Plans" or the "Plans") that, as a result of imprudent and unlawful conduct by Defendants (as defined below), lost substantial amounts of money through the fraudulent investment scheme orchestrated by Bernard L. Madoff ("Madoff") and Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC ("Madoff Securities"). 2. This case arises from a massive, fraudulent scheme that was orchestrated by Madoff through his investment firm, Madoff Securities, and others. The scheme was facilitated by Defendants, who, in breach of their fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiffs and to the other Class Members, caused and permitted the ERISA Plans" assets to be invested with Madoff Securities. 1 The fraudulent investment scheme carried out by Madoff and Madoff Securities is well- documented as the largest Ponzi scheme in history. -
The Roberts Court and Securities Class Actions: Reaffirming Basic Principles Eric Alan Isaacson
The University of Akron IdeaExchange@UAkron Akron Law Review Akron Law Journals October 2015 The Roberts Court and Securities Class Actions: Reaffirming Basic Principles Eric Alan Isaacson Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be important as we plan further development of our repository. Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview Part of the Litigation Commons Recommended Citation Isaacson, Eric Alan (2015) "The Roberts Court and Securities Class Actions: Reaffirming Basic Principles," Akron Law Review: Vol. 48 : Iss. 4 , Article 8. Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss4/8 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the institutional repository of The nivU ersity of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. Isaacson: Securities Class Action THE ROBERTS COURT AND SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS: REAFFIRMING BASIC PRINCIPLES Eric Alan Isaacson* I. Introduction ....................................................................... 924 II. The Roberts Court Record: Sometimes Quite Hospitable to Class Proceedings ........................................ 926 III. Background of the Roberts Court’s Securities Class- Action Decisions: The 1988 Rehnquist Court Basic v. Levinson Decision And the Presumption -
Evolution Or Revolution? Distributed Ledger Technologies in Financial Services
Evolution or revolution? Distributed ledger technologies in financial services Anil Savio Kavuri1 and Alistair Milne2 (There are two versions of this paper: a short summary report of 16 pages plus references; the full research report of 121 pages plus references.) 1 Loughborough University and Australian National University. [email protected] 2 Loughborough University. [email protected] Evolution or revolution? Distributed ledger technologies in financial services Contents of full report 1 Introduction to the full report ............................................................................................... 2 2 Distributed ledgers: basic concepts and supporting technologies. ...................................... 5 2.1 Definitions ....................................................................................................................... 5 2.2 The component technologies used in distributed ledgers ............................................. 7 2.3 How the technologies are combined: the database ‘stack’ ........................................... 8 3 Applications of distributed ledgers in financial services ..................................................... 11 3.1 Fourteen areas of application....................................................................................... 11 3.2 Seven case studies ........................................................................................................ 38 4 Distributed ledgers: the adoption decision ........................................................................ -
Did Repeal of Glass-Steagall for Citigroup Exacerbate the Crisis?
ETHICS Curtis C. Verschoor, CMA, Editor Did Repeal of Glass-Steagall for Citigroup Exacerbate Freed from the restrictions of the Glass-Steagall Act, giant bank- the Crisis? holding companies appear to have been focused more on industry should be recognized as Citibank and Travelers Group. In meeting the expectations of Wall at least a quasi-public utility, exist- addition to the traditional bank- Street analysts than on protect- ing in large part for the benefit of ing services, this $140 billion ing depositors’ funds from risk. depositors who need to have con- umbrella encompassed brokerage, tinuing confidence that their investment banking, and several funds are safe. insurance companies, including mid the finger-pointing After the savings and loan disas- Travelers. Agoing on in regard to the cur- ter caused the previous banking More recently, urged on by for- rent banking crisis, it seems that debacle, the FDIC Improvement mer U.S. Treasury Secretary we may be forgetting who the real Act of 1991 mandated that insured Robert Rubin, Citigroup’s director culprits are. Should we blame the institutions employ adequate con- and chair of its Executive Com- bungling bureaucrats in Fannie trols to manage their risks in order mittee, Citi acquired heavy expo- Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal to maintain the safety and sound- sure to Collateralized Debt Oblig- Reserve, the Securities & Exchange ations (CDOs) based on subprime Commission (SEC), and the Trea- mortgages. By 2006, Citi had sury Department? Or are the regu- It will take a major become the second largest under- lators (perhaps they should be overhaul of business writer of CDOs. -
Table 1 Is Extracted from Who Audits America 2000 and 2005 Data, Which Is Based on For-Profit Publicly Held Companies
Journal of Forensic & Investigative Accounting Vol. 1, Issue 1 Bernard Madoff and the Solo Auditor Red Flag Ross D. Fuerman* In hindsight, there were what Gregoriou and Lhabitant (2008) call a “riot of red flags” hinting that Bernard Madoff was committing fraud. First, the typical separation of duties was missing. A normal hedge fund uses an investment manager to manage the assets, a broker to execute trades, a fund administrator to calculate the net asset values, and a custodian to have custody of the assets. Often, each of these four is separate and independent from the others. It reduces the risk of fraud, just like separation of duties within a company enhances internal control and reduces the risk of fraud. The Madoff organization performed all four of these functions. Second, the fees charged by Madoff were unusual. Madoff charged no management or performance fee, just a market rate commission on each trade. This made it easy for feeder fund operators to charge a management fee of about 2% and a performance fee of about 20% and encouraged them to send as much investor funds to Madoff as they could. This also made them disinclined to let conscientious due diligence slow down the flow of funds. Third, the corporate governance of the Madoff organization was compromised by having all the key players be members of Madoff‟s family. His brother was the chief compliance officer. His nephew was the director of administration. His sons were directors. His niece was the general counsel and rules compliance attorney. * Dr. Fuerman is Associate Professor at Suffolk University. -
The Madoff Fraud
MVE220 Financial Risk The Madoff Fraud Shahin Zarrabi – 9111194354 Lennart Lundberg – 9106102115 Abstract: A short explanation of the Ponzi scheme carried out by Bernard Madoff, the explanation to how it could go on for such a long period of time and an investigation on how it could be prevented in the future. The report were written jointly by the group members and the analysis was made from discussion within the group 1. Introduction Since the ascent of money, different techniques have been developed and carried out to fool people of their assets. These methods have evolved together with advances in technology, and some have proved to be more efficient than other. One of the largest of these schemes ever carried out occurred in modern times in the United States, it was uncovered as recently as in late 2008. The man behind it managed to keep the scheme running for over 15 years in one of most monitored economic systems in the world. The man in charge of the operation, Bernard L. Madoff, got arrested for his scheme and pled guilty to the embezzling of billions of US dollars. It struck many as unimaginable how such a fraud could occur in an environment so carefully controlled by regulations and supervised by different institutions. The uncovering of the scheme rose questions on how this could go undetected for such a long time, and what could be done to avoid similar situations in the future. This report gives an insight on how the Madoff fraud was carried out, how it could go unnoticed for so long and if similar frauds could be prevented in the future. -
The Dangers of Affinity Fraud
Georgia Southern University Journal of Forensic Studies in Accounting and Business Vol. 3 No. 1 Fall 2011 pp. 33-46 BIRDS OF THE SAME FEATHER: THE DANGERS OF AFFINITY FRAUD Frank S. Perri Purdue University Calumet Richard G. Brody University of New Mexico ABSTRACT: The authors discuss the concept of affinity fraud, the ease with which it is perpetrated, and the difficulty fraud victims encounter in reconciling the “special trust” they believe they shared with this white-collar criminal. Additionally, the paper challenges misconceptions as to the homogenous criminal nature of white-collar criminals as it relates to (1) the behavioral factors that facilitate these offenders in committing affinity fraud, and (2) the motivation for these offenders to resort to violence, and makes recommendations on what individuals can do to protect themselves from the allure of affinity fraud. Keywords: Affinity fraud, Ponzi schemes, Due diligence, Fraud detection homicide INTRODUCTION In this article, the authors examine what affinity fraud entails, explore the difficulties in overcoming this type of fraud, and present an example of a community that was the victim of affinity fraud. This article offers a unique perspective on affinity fraud because, not only was the community financially devastated, but its members were the targets of violence by those that perpetrated the fraud upon them. It is crucial to understand the behavioral traits of these fraud offenders, together with white- collar criminal dispositions in general, since it has been only recently that the forensic accounting and business community have started to explore the relationship between destructive individual behavioral traits and fraud.