The Paradox of Regulatory Development in China The Case of the Electricity Industry by Chung-min Tsai A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Lowell Dittmer, Chair Professor Steven K. Vogel Professor You-tien Hsing Spring 2010 The Paradox of Regulatory Development in China The Case of the Electricity Industry © 2010 by Chung-min Tsai Abstract The Paradox of Regulatory Development in China The Case of the Electricity Industry by Chung-min Tsai Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Berkeley Professor Lowell Dittmer, Chair This study focuses on regulatory development in China. I seek to explain the following question: Why have Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) failed to function? While an IRA, defined by its institutional autonomy and specialized authority, is regarded as the most effective regulatory device, my research demonstrates that an IRA in fact runs a higher risk of being captured in transition economies. I distinguish between independence in form and independence in practice. I argue that a regulatory agency requires practical independence in order to make state regulation work and formal independence has produced regulatory capture. I construct an analytical model of ―embedded regulation dynamics‖ to illuminate how the IRAs are besieged by other government entities and vulnerable to capture by business groups. I conclude that the IRA model has limited applicability in the Chinese context. China‘s State Electricity Regulatory Commission is created as a model IRA for other industries, but its poor performance and regulatory capture reveal the reality behind the myth of the IRA. The SERC suffers from insufficient regulatory authority and its operational abilities have been ironically restricted by its institutional autonomy. Moreover, the power enterprises with different ownership structures delineate the various routes by which the industry can involve itself in the policy-making process. Consequently, the IRA is captured indirectly by the industry through state administrative procedures and institutional defects. Moreover, a comparison to the regulatory situation in the civil aviation and telecommunications industries illuminates that the regulatory agencies are able to function effectively and ensure a stable market and promote competition without organizational autonomy. 1 To my parents i Table of Contents List of Tables and Figures iv Abbreviations v 1. Introduction 1 1. Introduction 1 2. Why Does the Development of a Regulatory System Matter in China? 3 3. Regulatory Predicaments in the Electricity Industry 7 4. In Search of a Prescription 11 5. Organization of Dissertation 16 2. Why the Independent Regulatory Agency Gets Captured: A Theoretical 18 Framework 1. Independent Regulatory Agencies and Regulatory Independence 18 2. Creation of IRAs and Emergence of Embedded Regulation 21 3. Regulatory Development in the Chinese Industrial Sector 25 4. Regulatory Development and the Creation of IRAs in the Chinese 30 Industrial Reform 5. Various Paths for the Evolution of State Regulation 33 3. The Evolution of Regulatory System in China‘s Electricity Industry: A Historical 39 Review 1. Monopolizing the Industry: Nationalizing the Sector and Faltering 39 between Centralization and Decentralization 1949~1978 2. Revitalizing the Industry: Bringing the Government back in 43 1979~1985 3. Liberalizing the Industry: Breaking up the State Monopoly and 45 Opening up Power Generation 1985~1997 4. Restructuring the Industry (I): Moving toward the Market 1997~2002 48 5. Restructuring the Industry (II): Establishing a Modern Regulatory 52 System 2002~ 4. The Politics of Regulatory Development: A Hybrid Regulatory Authority 54 1. The Political and Economic Context of Regulatory Development 54 2. The State Electricity Regulatory Commission: the Independent 58 Regulatory Agency That Wasn‘t 3. A Fragmented Regulatory Framework: Dispersed Authority and 65 Conflicting Interests 5. Business Involvement and Indirect Regulatory Capture 83 1. A Detour Toward Business Lobbying 83 2. The State Grid Corporation and Its Subsidiaries: Intransigent 86 ii Subordinates 3. The Big Five: Different Expansion Paths Leading to Oligopoly 93 4. Local State Power Companies: The Local Conspirators 100 5. Independent Power Producers: The Vanishing Competitors 106 6. The Varieties of State Regulation 111 1. Civil Aviation Industry: Running against the Trend 111 2. Telecommunications Industry: Effective Regulation by a Government 118 Ministry 7. Conclusion 127 1. Powering Regulatory Capture in the Electricity Industry 127 2. Cross-Sectoral Comparisons and Hypotheses Revisited 129 3. Lessons for the Study of Regulation and Chinese Political Economy 131 References 133 iii List of Tables and Figures Tables 2-1: A Typology of Independent Regulatory Agencies 21 2-2: Major Regulatory Agencies in Selected Industries 33 2-3: Regulatory Development in the Selected Industries 37 Figures 1-1: Elasticity Ratio and Power Shortage in China 2000-2008 8 1-2: Utilization Hours of Power Equipment and Installed Generating Capacity 9 2-1: The Embedded Regulation Dynamics 23 2-2: The Embedded Regulation Dynamics in the Chinese Context 25 2-3: Reform Progress and Market Development in Various Industries 28 2-4: Unbundling of Monopoly Industries 34 3-1: Supervisory Framework in the Power Industry Before 1979 43 3-2. Transition of Central Authority of the Power Industry 1979~1998 48 3-3. Industrial Structure of the Power Industry 1997~2002 49 4-1: Current Supervisory Structure of China‘s Electricity Industry 67 5-1: Business Lobbying and Regulatory Capture in China 84 5-2: Increase in Installed Capacity of the Big Five 96 iv Abbreviations Civil Aviation Administration of China CAAC Chinese Communist Party CCP China Eastern Airlines CEA China Electricity Council CEC China Guodian Corporation CGDC China Huadian Corporation CHDC China Power Investment Corporation CPIC China Southern Airlines CSA China Southern Power Grid CSPG Employee Stock Ownership Plan ESOP Independent Power Producer IPP Independent Regulatory Agency IRA Ministry of Electricity Industry MEI Ministry of Energy MOE Ministry of Environmental Protection MEP Ministry of Finance MOF Ministry of Information Industry MII Ministry of Industry and Information Technology MIIT Ministry of Post and Telecommunications MPT Ministry of Water Resources and Electricity MWRE National Development and Reform Commission NDRC National Energy Administration NEA National Energy Commission NEC National Energy Leading Group NELG National People‘s Congress NPC Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party ODCCP Provincial Development and Reform Commission PDRC State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission SASAC State Development Planning Commission SDPC State Environmental Protection Administration SEPA State Economic and Trade Commission SETC State Electricity Regulatory Commission SERC State-owned Enterprise SOE State Grid Corporation SGC State Power Corporation of China SPCC Ultra-high Voltage UHV v CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION A healthy supervision scheme is crucial following the government‘s weekend move to break up the State Power Corp of China……A failure in supervision will spoil the whole reform……A regulatory commission will also be established to become an industry watchdog. It is supposed to stipulate the rules of the industry and suggest electricity tariff rates to the State Development Planning Commission……the watchdog will be capable of overseeing the industry. China Daily, December 31, 2002 Reforms of the mainland‘s electricity sector aimed at breaking the monopoly of the power conglomerates have failed because of inadequate government support and an ineffective regulatory system, an industry watchdog report says. South China Morning Post, December 19, 2005 I. Introduction ―The electricity reform was doomed,‖ argues an industry veteran in a report, entitled ―Power Sector Reform in China was Basically Unsuccessful,‖ to the State Council.1 His criticism centers on the fact that regulatory oversight has been ineffective while the central government has met strong resistance to invoking competition. When the Chinese government promulgated the ―Circular Concerning the Reform of the Electricity Industry Structure (Dianli tizhi gaige fang‟an de tongzhi)‖2 in 2002, it signified a historical milestone and turning point not only in the power industry but across industrial sectors in China. The document showed the state‘s determination and defined a concrete agenda for the first time to reform the regulatory system and to introduce an independent regulatory agency (IRA), the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC). Subsequent progress, however, has not proceeded as proposed and stagnation and uncertainty have followed. Even though the electricity industry has been comprehensively restructured twice and acquired an IRA, I argue that China‘s electricity reform has not advanced but rather regressed. State initiation of liberalization has not resulted in better market development and greater competition, and the efforts to end the monopoly have actually 1 ―Zhongguo dianli gongye tizhi gaige jiben bu chenggong (Power Sector Reform in China was Basically Unsuccessful),‖ 21 Shiii Jingji Baodao (21 Century Business Herald), December 17, 2005, http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20051217/10262206701.shtml,