Durham E-Theses Parliament and the control of British foreign policy 1900-1914: with special reference to the European alliance systems Al-Ghailany, Yusuf A.M. How to cite: Al-Ghailany, Yusuf A.M. (1992) Parliament and the control of British foreign policy 1900-1914: with special reference to the European alliance systems, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/6115/ Use policy The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details. Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP e-mail: [email protected] Tel: +44 0191 334 6107 http://etheses.dur.ac.uk 2 YUSUF A.M. AL-GHAILANY PARLIAMENT AND THE CONTROL OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1900-1914 : with special reference to the European alliance systems Thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts University of Durham 1992 2 2 DEC 1992 CONTENTS ABSTRACT INTRODUCTION CHAPTER ONE - THE DEBATE ON THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE OF 1902 1.1 The Negotiation of the Alliance 1.2 The Anglo-Japanese Alliance Debated CHAPTER TWO - THE ANGLO-FRENCH ENTENTE OF 1904... 2.1 Growth of the Anglo-French Understanding 2.2 The Anglo-French Agreement: 8th April 1904 2.3 The Debate on the Anglo-French Agreement CHAPTER THREE - BRITAIN, RUSSIA AND THE 'FORWARD POLICY' THE CASE OF TIBET, 1904 3.1 The Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Asia to 1904 3.2 The Tibetan Question and the Younghusband Expedition 3.3 The Debate 'East India Revenues (Tibet)', 13 April 1904 CHAPTER FOUR - PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1904-1907 4.1 Britain and the Crisis of 1905 4.2 The Negotiation of the Anglo- Russian Agreements of August 1907 4.3 Parliament and Foreign Affairs 1904-1907 CHAPTER FIVE - THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION OF AUGUST 1907 5.1 The Anglo-Russian Convention and the Balance of Power in Europe ... 5.2 The Anglo-^Russian Convention Debated, February 1908 ... 5.3 Radical Disenchantment with the Russian Connection : the Persia Debate of March 1909 CHAPTER SIX - THE ANGLO-GERMAN ANTAGONISM : THE NAVAL QUESTION 1909 6.1 Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 6.2 The Debate on the Naval Estimates, March 1909 6.3 The Conservative Motion of Censure : 29 March 1909 CHAPTER SEVEN - PARLIAMENT AND THE BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE : THE DEBATE OF NOVEMBER- DECEMBER 1911 7.1 Parliament and Foreign Affairs 1909-1911 7.2 The Debate of 27 November 1911: Grey on the Defensive 7.3 The Resumed Debate, 14 December 1911 The Radical Offensive 7.4 The Radicals and Foreign Policy in 1912 EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION - BRITISH ENTRY INTO THE WAR OF 1914 1. Parliament and Foreign Affairs 1912-1914 2. Grey's Statement and the Debate of 3 August 1914 3. Conclusion : The House of Commons and the Balance of Power NOTES BIBLIOGRAPHY (i) ABSTRACT In 1900, when the other European great powers were already involved in two antagonistic alliance systems, Britain remained uncommitted and isolated; in 1914, she entered the continental war on the side of one of those alliances and against the other. This thesis studies this evolution from isolation to commitment from the perspective of Parliamentary opinion, discusses what the opinion of Members of Parliament was on this momentous transition, and seeks to elucidate the question of the extent to which Parliament was informed of the objectives and methods of British policy, and the extent to which it was able to influence or control them. The main primary source used is therefore Hansard, The Parliamentary Debates (4th and 5th Series). A full discussion is offered of all of the main debates in the House of Commons between 1900 and 1914 on foreign policy, and particular attention is paid to Parliamentary opinion on the 'balance of power' in Europe and on Britain's evolving relations with the two European alliance systems. The important question is raised of the extent to which Parliament was adequately informed of important developments such as the developing military commitment to France, the growth of the Anglo-Russian connection, and the failure to reach an understanding with Germany; and the extent to which it was therefore able to influence the vital developments which led to Britain's entry into the war of 1914. An argument is offered to show that, although there was from 1909 onwards a spirited Radical campaign in Parliament against the government's policy, the majority on all sides in Parliament supported that policy and was in favour of the balance-of-power policies which led Britain into war in 1914. * * * INTRODUCTION 1 INTRODUCTION This study of the extent of Parliamentary control over British foreign policy in the years before the First World War seeks to establish how far Parliamentary opinion on the one hand, and the conduct of foreign policy by the Executive on the other, were the two faces of the same coin. It may be argued that indeed they could not be separated, and that the Government could not pursue a policy which did not have the strong support of a substantial majority in the House of Commons, since in the final analysis it was Parliament which had to vote the funds which financed the execution of policy, and which would have to vote the funds for a war if the Government's handling of foreign affairs should take Britain into war (as indeed was to happen in August 1914).^ On the other hand, it is equally clear that the conduct of foreign policy remained,within the general understanding of Britain's unwritten constitution, a jealously guarded part of the Royal prerogative, exercised on the Sovereign's behalf by the government of the day, and conducted by the Foreign Secretary assisted by the Foreign Office and Britain's diplomatic representatives abroad. Although treaties were generally made public, they did not depend on Parliamentary approval in order for their ratification to be effective; although governments made much diplomatic information available to Parliament in the form of Command Papers or Blue Books, it was they who 2 controlled that information and selected what should be published. By their very nature, diplomatic negotiations had to be conducted in secrecy if they were to have much prospect of success, and it was only when they had come to fruition that their outcome would be communicated to Parliament. From this point of view, it must therefore appear that there was little that the House of Commons could do to exercise detailed supervision over the day-to-day running of foreign policy; the most that it could do was to attempt to set the overall parameters within which policy was conducted, and to comment on the results. During the period from 1900 to 1914, Britain's position in the European balance of power moved from 'splendid isolation' to an increasing involvement in Continental affairs and an increasing commitment to one side of the European balance, the Franco-Russian Alliance, this process of course culminating in the ultimate Continental policy of entry into the European land war, and the despatch of the British Expeditionary Force in 1914. By the beginning of our period, the other five European great powers were already divided into two competing alliance systems: the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria- Hungary and Italy (since 1882) and the Dual Alliance of France and Russia (since 1894). Britain remained uncommitted, and her adhesion to one or other of those systems was the last and perhaps the greatest remaining prize in the diplomacy of 3 Europe. Around the turn of the century, while the Boer War (1899-1992) made Britain's isolation appear dangerous and the cause of much weakness in her European and in her imperial situation, it was Germany which was making the running in urging the British to end their isolation by joining the Triple Alliance; but this opportunity, if it ever really existed outside the imagination of the German Emperor and a few British enthusiasts like Joseph Chamberlain (the Secretary 2 of State for the Colonies), was missed. Instead, starting with the Anglo-French entente of 1904, and continuing with the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, British policy appeared to draw closer to the Franco-Russian Alliance, first of all in imperial and colonial questions, but subsequently (and most noticeably after 1909) in European affairs also. In part this was seen to be the natural consequence of the rise of the German naval challenge to Britain's traditional naval supremacy (the necessary precondition for the maintenance of 'splendid isolation'): it was indeed during Britain's most obvious period of isolation, during the Boer War, that Germany's Second Navy Law of 1900 made manifest her ambition to construct a powerful, compact and modern battle fleet which would enable her to exercise naval leverage against the existing dominant naval power, Great Britain. The Second Navy Law was translated into English and published by the navalist publisher, Brassey, even before it had been formally approved by the Reichstag, so it is obvious that it was well known to British public and political opinion from the outset.