THE MIRAGE OF VALUE-NEUTRALITY IN THE BEHAVIORISMS OF J.B. WATSON AND B.F. SKINNER: THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL VALUE AREAS

Mufid J. Hannush

The Issue of Value-Neutrality in the Social and Psychological Sciences'

In recent years the value-neutrality of science in general (McClelland, 1970; Rudner, 1970; Habermas, 1971 ; Mitroff,1974; Slaate,1974) and social science in particular (Schoeck & Wiggins, 1960; Gouldner, 1962; Buss, 1975; Foss, 1977; Sampson, 1981) has been brought to question. It is held that as a human endeavor science is intimately linked to basic human interests and values; that science cannot be wholly disentangled from the personality of the scientist or from the cultural context in which he operates. Since his declaration of intellectual independence from his philosophical heritage, the scientific psychologist has for the most part modeled himself after the natural scientist (Giorgi, 1970a). For him psychological science, like physical science, must be value-free. Like the natural '\ scientist, the psychological scientist believes that in order for him to give an objective description of the psychological phenomenon he is studying he has to minimize if not eliminate himself or his presence. But in contradistinction to the natural scientist, for the scientific psychologist . the task of eliminating his presence is doubly difficult because in psychology the psyche (consciousness) is at the same time the observer and the observed. But in spite of the fact that the attempt to live up to the value-free ideal has necessitated the trivialization of psychology's subject matter, the traditional psychologist still believes that a positive value-free psychological science is possible. When psychology perfects its method then it will produce value-free psychological facts. The

43 44 traditional scientific psychologist considers his position within the social world- his sociopsychological values, as irrelevant to his psychological theorizing and to the unfolding of his psychological research activity. More and more psychologists today are refusing to resonate to the positivistic tune of value-neutrality. There have been urgent calls for a sociology of psychological knowledge (Buss, 1975), and a psychology of psychological knowledge in the fields of personality psychology (Atwood & Tomkins, 1976; Helson & Mitchell, 1978; Stolorow & Atwood, 1979) and psychohistory (deMause, 1975; Mazlish, 1976). Once again these voices affirm the essential tie between psychological knowledge and existential human values. For Buss ( 1975) the goal of a sociology of psychological knowledge is to understand the role of extrascientific values in the birth, development and death of psychological theories. Mazlish (1976) describes the discipline of psychohistory as an extension of the sociology of knowledge which includes the psychology of knowledge. Atwood and Tomkins (1976) and Stolorow and Atwood (1979) state that every personality theorist looks at the human situation from his own unique individual perspective. Each theorist relies on his own life as a major source of empirical material. Other people resonating to his ideas are equally affected by subjective and personal factors. It is not surprising, therefore, to find different frameworks explaining the nature of personality. And there is no agreement among these different conceptual frameworks. A science of personality will achieve a greater degree of agreement and generality when it begins to turn back on itself and question its own psychological foundations. One way to do this is to make systematically explicit the implicit subjective and personal factors that have influenced the personality theory. In their critical coverage of the area of personality in the Annual Review of Psychology, Helson and Mitchel ( 1978) say that although a depression has hit personality psychology there is a new field on the horizon which promises a resolution to the dilemma of depression. This new field, the psychology of knowledge, "could lead to a body of research with considerable conceptual and methodological possibilities" and "it could give psychobiography, psychohistory, and the study of lives a structured place in which to develop" (p. 558).

The Goal of and the Challenge to Value-Neutrality in theBehaviorisms of J.B. Watson and B.F. Skinner

Behaviorism is committed to a positivistic theory of science. It wants to explain the uniformities of behavior in a supposedly value-free manner. It holds the view that values and prejudices are to be excluded