DOCSLIB.ORG

Russian Military Almanac by Tamar A

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Russian Military Almanac by Tamar A Russian Military Almanac By Tamar A. Mehuron, Associate Editor, with Harriet Fast Scott, William F. Scott, and David Markov Organization of the Russian Armed Forces ussia’s armed forces underwent sia’s military districts and three of the four Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN), had more organizational changes fleets participated, as well as the Strategic 10 of the new SS-27 Topol-M missiles during the past year. A new plan Rocket Forces. Belarus defense forces also operationally deployed in 1998, up from two assigned the military districts a took part. Defense Minister Marshal Igor D. deployed at the end of 1997. In 1998, the new status. There are now six Sergeyev stated that Russian military doctrine Strategic Rocket Forces acquired strategic operational strategic commands related to the would change as a result of NATO’s military anti-ballistic missile launchers from the Rmilitary districts: operation in Yugoslavia. transfer of Air Defense Forces assets into Russia’s President retained control over the Strategic Rocket Forces and Air Forces. ■ Southwestern Operational Strategic Com- the power ministries (which have their own At the same time, military space forces and mand (related to the North Caucasus Military military troops) and Ministries of Foreign Af- missile space defense forces, including District) fairs and Justice. Overall direction of Russia’s satellites for communications, navigation, military forces was provided by the Security and intelligence, and systems for obtaining ■ Western OSC (Moscow Military District) Council, a body chaired by the President. and processing information, became less There were five permanent council members: effective due to lack of funding. ■ Northwestern OSC (Leningrad Military the President, Prime Minister, Secretary of the District) Security Council (who was also the director of Air Forces (VVS) acquired airborne the Federal Security Service), and Ministers of early warning and control aircraft and SA-5, ■ Central Asian OSC (Volga–Ural Military Foreign Affairs and Defense. Other members SA-10, and SA-12 Surface-to-Air Missile District) included the Directors of the Federal Security launchers from the consolidation of Air De- Service, Foreign Intelligence Service, Federal fense Forces into Air Forces and Strategic ■ Siberian OSC (Siberian Military District) Border Guard Service, and the Ministers of Rocket Forces, a process that was com- Internal Affairs and Civil Defense and Emer- pleted in late December 1998. Throughout ■ Far Eastern OSC (Far Eastern Military gency Situations. the year, more than 30 air regiments were District) Armed forces under the Ministry of Defense disbanded, resulting in the elimination or consisted of four military services: Strategic movement to reserve status of more than In the event of hostilities, the military dis- Rocket Forces, Air Forces, Navy, and Ground 600 aircraft. The MiG-23 fighter inventory trict commander in each district would have Forces. Their authorized personnel strength was removed from operational service, and operational control of all military personnel in totaled 1,200,000. A general officer in the the inventories of MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters each command, including those of the Border General Staff complained that while the Ministry were reduced. As a result of the reduction Troops and other “power” ministries, aside from of Defense forces were being reduced, military in aircraft units, the newly merged Russian forces directly subordinate to the President: the units of other power structures increased, and Air Forces was able to distribute spares and Strategic Rocket Forces, Air Armies (strategic their cumulative strength totaled 3,500,000. place additional aircraft into operational and transport), and Airborne Troops. The situation throughout the armed forces units. This improved the dismal operational The General Staff would exercise overall remained grim. “Untouchable reserves” of service rates from lows of 30 to 40 percent coordination and direction. This new operational supplies, meaning those for wartime use only, to more than 80 percent for tactical aviation, responsibility is in addition to the military district were used to help meet current needs. Only 70 percent in strategic aviation, and ap- commander’s coordinating administrative and one-third of the weapons in the armed forces proximately 50 percent for transport aircraft. logistical responsibilities for all forces. The were considered modern. The Russian mili- Reductions in the SAM inventories made new plan would give him operational control tary–industrial complex continued to develop the SA-5 and the SA-10 the backbone of the of forces during peacetime exercises and state-of-the-art precision weapons but only in Russian Air Forces’ SAMs and eliminated training, as well. the experimental design and testing stage, not the older SA-2s and SA-3s from operational In June 1999, after the end of NATO production. Aleksey Arbatov, a Duma member, service. Work continued on the creation of air operations in Kosovo, Russian forces said the state “is almost completely oriented a coordinated air defense system. Airborne conducted a strategic command and staff toward strategic nuclear forces for maintaining forces, reserve forces directly subordinate exercise, West-99, on a scale not seen since the nuclear shield. There are no funds left for to the Supreme High Command, were to 1985. Command structures of five of Rus- anything else.” 60 AIR FORCE Magazine / October 1999 be increased from to 32,000 to 37,600. As Russia’s only mobile forces, they served as peacekeepers in a number of hot spots on the Russian rim, such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and with the United Nations. In June 1999, an advance party of 200 Rus- sian airborne troops made an unexpected push into Pristina airport in Kosovo to serve as peacekeepers. Navy (VMF). Currently in production are two new-generation nuclear-powered submarines: the Severodvinsk, the first of the new-generation attack submarines, and Yuriy Dolgorukiy, the first of the Borey (Arctic Wind)–class fleet ballistic missile submarines. In 1998, joint conventional forces were formed in Kaliningrad and the northeast (Kamchatka) and were subordi- nated to Baltic or Pacific Fleet command- ers, respectively. This was done in order to provide greater protection to these two geographically isolated areas. Ground Forces (SV) Main Director- ate was subordinated to the General Staff when its head became a deputy chief of the General Staff in December 1998. The Main Directorate for Combat Training of the Armed Forces remained subordinated to a deputy minister of defense. Four motorized rifle divisions and three separate motorized rifle brigades of the Ground Forces were considered combat ready. Twenty divisions and 10 brigades were manned at from 10 to 50 percent of wartime strength. Personnel strength of the Ground Forces consisted of approximately 360,000 troops, including forces deployed for peacekeeping duties outside Russia. Conscript training was minimal. Photo by Paul Kennedy AIR FORCE Magazine / October 1999 61 Structure of the Russian Armed Forces As of July 27, 1999 President of the Russian Federation—Supreme Commander in Chief Federal Protection Service Security Council Commonwealth of Inde- pendent States Director, Heads of State Council Director, Minister of Minister, Internal Director, Minister, Federal Foreign Intel- Defense Affairs Federal Border Civil Defense Defense Ministers Council Security ligence Service (Marshal I.D. Guard & Emergency Border Guard Com- Service Sergeyev) Service Situations manders Council Chief of Staff for Coordina- tion of Military Coopera- tion Chiefs of Staff Committee Peacekeeping Forces Secretary of Deputy Minister Chief of Gen- Deputy Minister Deputy Minister Reserves of Supreme State–First of Defense & eral Staff–First of Defense & of Defense High Command: Air Defense Deputy Chief of Rear Ser- (Gen. of Army Deputy Minister Chief, Construc- Airborne Forces Coordinating Committee Minister of vices (Logistics) of Defense tion & Billeting V.M. Toporov) Defense (Gen. Col. V.I. (Gen. of Army of Troops Strategic Air Army (Dr. N.V. Isakov) A.V. Kvashnin) (Gen. Col. A.D. Military Transport Avia- Mikhaylov) Kosovan) tion Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces of the Rus- sian Federation Main Directorates: President Supreme Commander in Chief Operations Main Directorate for Com- Organization & bat Training of the Armed Minister of Defense Mobilization Forces Chief of General Staff Military Intelligence Intl. Military Coop- eration Strategic Ground Air Rocket Forces Forces Navy Nuclear Weapons Forces Ground Forces Administrative control Air Forces Navy Operational control of Nuclear Nuclear strategic nuclear forces Forces Forces CINC, Strategic CINC, Air Forces CINC, Navy Military Districts: Operational Strategic Commands: Rocket Forces (Gen. Col. A.M. (Adm. V.I. Kuroyedov) Far Eastern Far Eastern (Gen. Col. V.N. Kornukov) Naval Infantry Leningrad Northwestern Yakovlev) Military Air Force Moscow Western Coast Artillery Military Space Forces& Air Defense North Caucasus Southwestern Fleets: Siberian Siberian Space Missile De- District (Moscow) Baltic Sea (Kaliningrad Volga–Ural Central Asian fense Forces Special Region) Black Sea Northern Pacific (Joint Command of Russian Northeast) Air Forces and Air Defense Flotilla: Caspian Armies Army Aviation Air Defense of KEY Ground Troops Rocket Troops & Artillery Organization Ground Forces Operational command units Forces of Supreme High Command 62 AIR FORCE Magazine / October
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Rossiskaya Zabota (Russian Care)
    Counterpart Foundation, Inc. 910 17"Sbeet,NWSrite328 ~DC#]006 Final Report Partnership Project vwth Rossiskaya Zabota (Russian Care) Submitted to: World Learning, Inc. Table af Contents Executive Summary Program Activities Significance of Activities Comments and Recommendations Attachments Financial Report Russian Care Brochure Board of Trustees Listing . Pilot Project Evaluation Questionnaire Kaliningrad Bakery ~quipmentList CHAP Distributions through Russian Care CHAP Memorandum of Agreement -- February 1996 Photographs from Project Activities Counterpart Foundation Rossiskaya Za bota 9 10 17th Street, NW, #328 Vozdvizhenka ulitsa Washington, DC 20006 Dom 9 Tel. (202) 296-9676 Moscow, Russia 12 10 19 Fax. (202)296-9679 Tel./Fax. (7095) 290-0703 --- - " 7 2=-3z- DOT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY With a subgrant from World Learning in 1993, Counterpart formed a partnership with Rossiskaya Zabota (Russian Care) - an indigenous non-governmental organization (NGO) created in 1992 to address the growing economic and social needs of the Russian military family. Followi~gtwo years of targeted training and technical assistance, Rossiskuya Zabota has emerged as a more effective, self-sufficient social service provider. Through staff development, direct investment in pilot projects, and humanitarian aid for children, Counterpart has helped to increase the viability and capacity of its local partner to design, implement and monitor its own programs. Joint project activities, conducted under the auspices of the World Learning grant, have played a unique role in enabling Rossiskaya Zabota to expand its outreach to greater numbers of high risk children, fpilies, and communities. Building upon the program's success, Counterpart and Rossiskuya Zabota successfully leveraged an additional $1.7 million in financial and in-kind contributions to the initial half-million dollar grant.
    [Show full text]
  • Views of Five Khanh Hoa Viet Cong Prisoners of War On
    —n '(f "’ , • -----~• ... _, ..• .,_~ •.., ~ \ _____,_......:-..a,.\._LrUJ•...:»..---.......,____.....:.... __ -~,.a: -- • ‘17:" '- unsung ... _- ,'. ... .‘ ' . _ l I *-u ’| ,- -. :3??? -" I. *find ".' .' r, “'- 'W'b’FOVe’proved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772377 "T; I. 1: y. _..a 1'. .. I‘ T‘JZ'YI‘H“ '5‘, ‘TO‘FMWS‘EO'OTO‘HH 0877237 iffi%{2?%1.EKHRTJ¢¥Wifififlfifiififlfififi¥33Ru3» u -w.._«whfifififlgfifiVVNfijfifififii§§fifiggflg •• • EO ' ‘ 13526 ' •o PRIORITY 3.3(h)(2)3.3(h)(2 CENTRAL iNTELLIGENCEINTELLIGENCE AGENCYACENCY EO . IN 44916“#916 . IntelligenceIntelligenCe InfInformationonnation Cable 13526 PAGE 1 OF12OF 12 PWig-5(0) ~.5(c) STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MCMC CSECDEF{SECDEP JCS.Ics ARM?ARMY NAVYHAW AIR>AIR) CIA/NMCC NICmc NSANBA SDO500 ONEcm: (Tiny ssgr/zfmnDD/ t BIAEXO mace! OER FBISF319 DCSncs IRSms AID 1A Thts mntcrlnl '9Pcontalnsmin lnforme.tloni BH'ectlngeflectin the NationalNe.Uonol Defense of thothe 'OnttedUnited States wttblnwithin the meanlni;meaning Ofor tbethe EsDlonngeionnge Laws,Lawn. Tlt.leTitle 18,18. t1.B.O.0.3.0. secs.Ehecig fl793z‘ggcgwi and C73.794, tbein: gnégrsntl'IUlllmlB&Onfiaiésg?‘ or revelationreve Titian of wblcbwhich IDin 110.:,an? mannermanor to an unautborlZcdunauthorized per&0nperson 1Bis prohlbltedprohibited byy lnw.law. GROUP I ' !Ild:§::'°l::¥nog:i:n:jI ■d..d•d fro• 0111t0fft0tif N~EMN0 F 155m cl01fllP19•adi111g o,id I dHl011.1 foe a 16011 - ' -- THIS IS AEJNFORMATIONAN NFORMATION REPORT,REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. ---”MT--- -c- -- ·: - I CITE(315% 3.5(c) 5 CONF IALIALE l 0G14os06n+ ' z ~~~~~~ ECONF. A . .. — ' 05 Z DIST[”51- 6 FEBRUARY 1968 COUNTRYcwmm ' SOUTH%MHWUMM‘ VIETNAM 1110/7/09 fl✓wv9545-II 9-13 DOI 3.3(h)(2)3911112) SUBJECT VIEWS OF FIVE KHANH HOA VIET‘JIET CONG PRISONERS OF0F WARMAR ON OBJECTIVES OF CURRENT VC MILITtRYMILITARY ACTI~ITY~ACTIVITYQ ' ' THEIR RESPONSI~ILITIESRESPONSIEILTTIES HAD T~ETHE VC TAKEN NHA C'-.
    [Show full text]
  • Türkçe Öğreniyoruz 3
    TÜRKÇE ÖĞRENİYORUZ 3 Türkçe - İngilizce Anahtar Kitap Türkçe Öğreniyoruz HI Türkçe - İngilizce Anahtar Kitap Nur Yamaç - Isabella Akıncı engin yayınevi TATİL PROGRAMI HOLIDAY PROGRAMME tatil yapmak to have a holiday, to go on holiday aynı şekilde in the same way konuşmak to talk karar vermek to decide ısrar etmek to insist on hem... hem de both... and... (...and..., too) tarihî eser historical works birkaç a few, a couple bir yerde kalmak to stay somewhere yakın yerler nearby places gezmek to go about, to travel, to cruise (on a ship) uzun uzadıya extensively tartışmak to discuss turizm acentesi travel agency bir şey sormak to ask a question dikkatle dinlemek to listen carefully gülerek smilingly, with a smiling face tavsiye etmek to advise yat yacht yata binmek to board a yacht sahil boyunca along the coast antik kent antique city bir şeye rastlamak to come across something ıssız ada desert island gürültü noise kafa dinlemek to rest in a quiet place anlaşmak to come to an agreement MAVİ YOLCULUK THE BLUE CRUISE güneşin doğması sunrise teknek boat uyumak to sleep güneş the sun altın bir küre gibi like a golden sphere gece night karanlık darkness bir şeyi yok etmek to make something disappear köpük foam ilerlemek to move, to go forward rüzgar the wind saç hair bir şeyi okşamak to caress (or stroke) something balık fish güneşin ilk ışıkları the first rays of the sun bir şeyle yarış yapmak to race against something teknenin sağ yanında on the right side of the boat yunus balığı dolphin, porpoise gözlerine inanamak not to be able to believe
    [Show full text]
  • Gerasimov Doctrine’: Why the West Fails to Beat Russia to the Punch
    King’s Research Portal Document Version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Link to publication record in King's Research Portal Citation for published version (APA): Fridman, O. (2019). On ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’: Why the West Fails to Beat Russia to the Punch. Prism, 8(2), 101- 112. Citing this paper Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination, volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections. General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. •Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research. •You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain •You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.
    [Show full text]
  • Factors Influencing Russian Force Modernization Dr
    Changing Character of War Centre Pembroke College, University of Oxford With Axel and Margaret Ax:son Johnson Foundation Factors Influencing Russian Force Modernization Dr. Lester Grau and Charles K. Bartles1 September 2018 A wide-spread Russian perception is that Russia is back as a significant Eurasian power whose opinions and desires need to be understood and accommodated. Russia has regained its national pride, confidence and sense of destiny. Russia still feels threatened from the south and the west and is taking political and military steps to deal with that unease. Historically, Russia feels most secure when it has a strong leader and a strong military. Russians are willing to forego much in order to ensure their security. There are perceived internal and external threats to the Russian state and Russia is addressing these through military reform, military restructuring, force modernization, equipment modernization as well as domestic security restructuring and modernization. Understanding those factors that drive these actions facilitates and potential forms of future war may assist understanding Russian official statements and actions. External Factors The Character of Future War Russia and the Soviet Union have always been primarily a ground power, with the Navy and Air Force functioning as supporting services. After the Second World War, the Soviets believed that future modem warfare would closely resemble the battles they had fought in the last years of the war, albeit with nuclear weapons.2 The military that the Russian Federation inherited in the 1990s had a bloated command structure designed for the command and control of literally thousands of divisions, regiments, and battalions, with the vast majority of these units being ‘skeleton units’ manned by small cadres that would help flesh out the unit with conscripts and reservists in the event of a mass mobilization.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Conventional Armed Forces: on the Verge of Collapse?
    Order Code 97-820 F CRS Issue Brief for Congress Received through the CRS Web Russian Conventional Armed Forces: On the Verge of Collapse? September 4, 1997 (name redacted) Specialist in Russian Affairs Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Russian Conventional Armed Forces: On the Verge of Collapse? Summary All quantitative indicators show a sharp, and in most cases an accelerating, decline in the size of the Russian armed forces. Since 1986, Russian military manpower has decreased by over 70 percent; tanks and other armored vehicles by two-thirds; and artillery, combat aircraft, and surface warships by one-third. Weapons procurement has been plummeting for over a decade. In some key categories, such as aircraft, tanks, and surface warships, procurement has virtually stopped. This has led not only to a decline in present inventory, but implies a long-term crisis of bloc obsolescence in the future. Russian Government decisions and the budget deficit crisis have hit the Ministry of Defense very hard, cutting defense spending drastically and transforming the Defense Ministry into a residual claimant on scarce resources. Many experts believe that if these budgetary constraints continue for 2-3 more years, they must lead either to more drastic force reductions or to military collapse. Military capabilities are also in decline. Reportedly, few, if any, of Russia’s army divisions are combat-ready. Field exercises, flight training, and out-of-area naval deployments have been sharply reduced. Morale is low, partly because of non-payment of servicemen’s salaries. Draft evasion and desertion are rising.
    [Show full text]
  • The North Caucasus: the Challenges of Integration (III), Governance, Elections, Rule of Law
    The North Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration (III), Governance, Elections, Rule of Law Europe Report N°226 | 6 September 2013 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i Recommendations..................................................................................................................... iii I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. Russia between Decentralisation and the “Vertical of Power” ....................................... 3 A. Federative Relations Today ....................................................................................... 4 B. Local Government ...................................................................................................... 6 C. Funding and budgets ................................................................................................. 6 III. Elections ........................................................................................................................... 9 A. State Duma Elections 2011 ........................................................................................ 9 B. Presidential Elections 2012 ......................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • ON the EFFECTIVE USE of PROXY WARFARE by Andrew Lewis Peek Baltimore, Maryland May 2021 © 2021 Andrew Peek All Rights Reserved
    ON THE EFFECTIVE USE OF PROXY WARFARE by Andrew Lewis Peek A dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Baltimore, Maryland May 2021 2021 Andrew Peek All rights reserved Abstract This dissertation asks a simple question: how are states most effectively conducting proxy warfare in the modern international system? It answers this question by conducting a comparative study of the sponsorship of proxy forces. It uses process tracing to examine five cases of proxy warfare and predicts that the differentiation in support for each proxy impacts their utility. In particular, it proposes that increasing the principal-agent distance between sponsors and proxies might correlate with strategic effectiveness. That is, the less directly a proxy is supported and controlled by a sponsor, the more effective the proxy becomes. Strategic effectiveness here is conceptualized as consisting of two key parts: a proxy’s operational capability and a sponsor’s plausible deniability. These should be in inverse relation to each other: the greater and more overt a sponsor’s support is to a proxy, the more capable – better armed, better trained – its proxies should be on the battlefield. However, this close support to such proxies should also make the sponsor’s influence less deniable, and thus incur strategic costs against both it and the proxy. These costs primarily consist of external balancing by rival states, the same way such states would balance against conventional aggression. Conversely, the more deniable such support is – the more indirect and less overt – the less balancing occurs.
    [Show full text]
  • International Crimes in Crimea
    International Crimes in Crimea: An Assessment of Two and a Half Years of Russian Occupation SEPTEMBER 2016 Contents I. Introduction 6 A. Executive summary 6 B. The authors 7 C. Sources of information and methodology of documentation 7 II. Factual Background 8 A. A brief history of the Crimean Peninsula 8 B. Euromaidan 12 C. The invasion of Crimea 15 D. Two and a half years of occupation and the war in Donbas 23 III. Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 27 IV. Contextual elements of international crimes 28 A. War crimes 28 B. Crimes against humanity 34 V. Willful killing, murder and enforced disappearances 38 A. Overview 38 B. The law 38 C. Summary of the evidence 39 D. Documented cases 41 E. Analysis 45 F. Conclusion 45 VI. Torture and other forms of inhuman treatment 46 A. Overview 46 B. The law 46 C. Summary of the evidence 47 D. Documented cases of torture and other forms of inhuman treatment 50 E. Analysis 59 F. Conclusion 59 VII. Illegal detention 60 A. Overview 60 B. The law 60 C. Summary of the evidence 62 D. Documented cases of illegal detention 66 E. Analysis 87 F. Conclusion 87 VIII. Forced displacement 88 A. Overview 88 B. The law 88 C. Summary of evidence 90 D. Analysis 93 E. Conclusion 93 IX. Crimes against public, private and cultural property 94 A. Overview 94 B. The law 94 C. Summary of evidence 96 D. Documented cases 99 E. Analysis 110 F. Conclusion 110 X. Persecution and collective punishment 111 A. Overview 111 B.
    [Show full text]
  • Policing in Federal States
    NEPAL STEPSTONES PROJECTS Policing in Federal States Philipp Fluri and Marlene Urscheler (Eds.) Policing in Federal States Edited by Philipp Fluri and Marlene Urscheler Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) www.dcaf.ch The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces is one of the world’s leading institutions in the areas of security sector reform (SSR) and security sector governance (SSG). DCAF provides in-country advisory support and practical assis- tance programmes, develops and promotes appropriate democratic norms at the international and national levels, advocates good practices and makes policy recommendations to ensure effective democratic governance of the security sector. DCAF’s partners include governments, parliaments, civil society, international organisations and the range of security sector actors such as police, judiciary, intelligence agencies, border security ser- vices and the military. 2011 Policing in Federal States Edited by Philipp Fluri and Marlene Urscheler Geneva, 2011 Philipp Fluri and Marlene Urscheler, eds., Policing in Federal States, Nepal Stepstones Projects Series # 2 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011). Nepal Stepstones Projects Series no. 2 © Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011 Executive publisher: Procon Ltd., <www.procon.bg> Cover design: Angel Nedelchev ISBN 978-92-9222-149-2 PREFACE In this book we will be looking at specimens of federative police or- ganisations. As can be expected, the federative organisation of such states as Germany, Switzerland, the USA, India and Russia will be reflected in their police organisation, though the extremely decentralised approach of Switzerland with hardly any central man- agement structures can hardly serve as a paradigm of ‘the’ federal police organisation.
    [Show full text]
  • Manpower Problems of the Russian Armed Forces
    Conflict Studies Research Centre D62 Manpower Problems of The Russian Armed Forces M J Orr Introduction On 15 January Lt Gen Vasiliy Smirnov, deputy head of the main organization- mobilization directorate of the Russian general staff, announced the preliminary results of the autumn 2001 conscription period. "The plan of the autumn call-up as laid down in the Russian Federation's President's decree No. 148 has been carried out. Between October and December 2001 more than 194,000 Russian citizens, aged from 18 to 27, were sent to the army and fleet … (T)he quality of the conscript contingent is getting worse. Out of every 100 potential conscripts last year the military commissariats were only able to draft 12 young men; the remainder had legal reasons for being excused military service. Today in Russia every third potential conscript proves unfit for service on health grounds … more than 50% of the conscripts sent to the forces have health limitations on their fitness for service."1 Such statements emerge from the organization-mobilization department twice a year, as a sort of ritual bringing the conscription campaign to a close. Each time the decreed quantity of recruits has been found and each time their quality has declined. Within these standardized announcements there is no suggestion that the whole system for recruiting the Russian armed forces is steadily collapsing. Last autumn, however, there were indications that, at long last, the Russian government has accepted that the system must be changed. Programmes to phase out conscription are being considered although it is not clear that the general staff has accepted that a professional army is desirable or practical.
    [Show full text]
  • Soviet Wartime Management: the Role of Civil Defense in Leadership Continuity
    ,...- "'<;.' Ull C.:~Ul" U I .: ..2l. '\:: Central S GkJ ~ Intelligence ~~ Soviet Wartime Management: The Role of Civil Defense in Leadership Continuity Interagency Intelligence Memorandum Volume II-Analysis CIA HISTORiCAL REViEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED Tett Seeret Nll!M 8J-10005JX TCS J6tJI~J December 1983 rn"'' ~,... .._ Top Seuei Nl liM 83-10005JX SOVIET WARTIME MANAGEMENT: THE ROLE OF CIVIL DEF~NSE IN LEADERSHIP CONTINUITY VOLUME II-ANALYSIS Information available as of 25 October 1983 was used in the preparation of this Memorandum. TG& &GQl 8& TeF3 6cu et Tep Sec•o4 CONTENTS Page PURPOSE AND SCOPE....................................................................................... ix KEY JUDGMENTS ............................................................................................... 1 CHAPTER I. SOVIET STRATEGY FOR WARTIME MANAGEMENT...... I-1 A. Soviet Perceptions of Nuclear War ........................................................ I-1 B. Organizational Concepts.......................................................................... I-I CHAPTER II. WARTIME MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE........................... Il-l A. Influence of World War II ............................... :...................................... Il-l B. Peacetime Organizations and F~nctions ................................................ Il-l C. Organizations for the Transition to Wartime........................................ II-7 USSR Defense Council ........................................................................ II-7 Second Departments
    [Show full text]