VOLUME 13 ISSUE 1 | WINTER 2019

inFOCUSQUARTERLY How We Fight

Clifford D. May and David Adesnik on a New Counter-Terrorism Strategy | Mackenzie Eaglen on Setting Strategic Priorities | Jonathan Honigman on Israel’s Contributions to U.S. Defense | Stephen D. Bryen on Chinese Cyber Spying | Seth Cropsey on Stopping Russian and Iranian Hegemony | Thomas Taverney on Space Command | James Durso on Alternative Approaches to Afghanistan | Lani Kass on Threats and Strategic Foresight | Yisuo Tzeng on Artificial and Asymmetric Warfare in Asia | Shoshana Bryen reviews Every War Must End

Featuring an Interview with Representative DON BACON (R-NE) LETTER FROM THE PUBLISHER

For history buffs and movie buffs, – Chinese cyber spying and the uses of the 1942-45 Frank Capra series “Why artificial intelligence – are the purview inFOCUS VOLUME 13 | ISSUE 1 We Fight” is a masterpiece. It was part of Stephen Bryen and Yisuo Tseng. There of the American government effort to are familiar issues as well. Seth Cropsey Publisher explain – first to the troops and then to writes on operations of the U.S. Navy Matthew Brooks the public at large – why the generally in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. James Editor isolationist United States was engaging Durso suggests that 17 years in Afghani- Shoshana Bryen Associate Editors in wars in Europe and Asia with allies stan may be enough and proposes a way Michael Johnson that included the communist Soviet out. There is our favorite familiar theme Eric Rozenman Union. Capra took bits as well, as Jonathan Hon- Copy Editors and pieces of informa- igman makes the case for Shari Hillman tion that people under- the financial and national Karen McCormick stood from newsreels and security benefits provided Published by: newspapers (no Facebook to us by our friend and Jewish Policy Center or Twitter) and created a ally, Israel. 50 F Street NW, Suite 100 context for the war. Since Every war must end. Washington, DC 20001. 2001, the United States has found itself JPC Senior Director Shoshana Bryen (202) 638-2411 in a different kind of war while continu- reviews Dr. Fred Iklé’s book of the same Follow us on ing to face traditional threats. This issue name, offering a sobering picture of what JewishPolicyCenter @theJPC of inFOCUS Quarterly examines not happens when countries focus overly on the “why” of American defense, but the the “why” and not enough on the “how” The opinions expressed in inFOCUS do not “how.” And how to do it better. of warfare. necessarily reflect those of the Jewish Policy We interview a retired U.S. Air Force If you appreciate what you’ve read, Center, its board, or its officers. Brigadier General and a Congressman. I encourage you to make a contribution To begin or renew your subscription, please contact us: [email protected] They are the same person. Rep. Don Ba- to the Jewish Policy Center. As always, Cover Image: J.M. Eddins Jr. for the U.S. Air con (R-NE) brings his military insights to you can use our secure site: http://www. Force bear on his role as a member of the House jewishpolicycenter.org/donate.

Armed Services Committee. Sincerely, © 2019 Jewish Policy Center The broad strokes of national de- fense strategy, asymmetric threats and the continuing terror war are addressed www.JewishPolicyCenter.org by Mackenzie Eaglin, Lani Kass, Clifford Matthew Brooks, May and David Adesnik. New threats Publisher

CLIFFORD D. MAY is president of the Foundation for De- district. He is a retired Brigadier General, USAF. (22) fense of Democracies. DAVID ADESNIK, Ph.D., is Director of Research at FDD. (3) Maj. Gen. THOMAS TAVERNEY USAF, (ret.) is former vice commander of Air Force Space Command. (28) Featuring MACKENZIE EAGLEN is a resident fellow at the Ameri- can Enterprise Institute specializing in defense strategy, JAMES DURSO is Managing Director of Corsair LLC. (31) defense budgets, and military readiness. (6) LANI KASS, Ph.D., is Senior Vice President and Corporate JONATHAN HONIGMAN is an educator in Washington, DC. Strategic Advisor for CACI International Inc. and served as (10) Senior Policy Advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of STEPHEN D. BRYEN, Ph.D., is president of SDB Partners, Staff. (35) former Undersecretary of Defense for Trade Security Policy YISUO TZENG, Ph.D., is the acting director of the Institute and head of the Defense Technology Security Agency. (13) for National Defense and Security Research. (38) SETH CROPSEY is the Director of the Center for American Seapower at the Hudson Institute. (17) SHOSHANA BRYEN is Editor of inFOCUS and Senior Direc- tor of the Jewish Policy Center. (41) DON BACON represents Nebraska’s 2nd congressional President Trump’s Counter- Terrorism Strategy by CLIFFORD D. MAY and DAVID ADESNIK

e remain a nation at addition to the elimination of bin Laden, Nor do most wars simply grind to a halt. war.” President Trump’s there was the Arab Spring, widely pre- Instead, they are won or lost. “Conflict new National Strategy sumed to herald an anti-authoritarian resolution” is a fine notion but it often “Wfor Counterterrorism, and pro-democracy turning point in the conceals a hiatus during which at least released in early October, begins with Middle East. A patina of stability in Iraq one side prepares for the next round of that simple statement of fact. Despite provided justification for Obama’s deci- conflict (cf. World War I and World War the West’s victories in the several ma- sion to pull the U.S. military out of that II). As for democracy, it demands vigi- jor wars of the 20th century, the 21st troubled land. The Taliban appeared to lance when confronted with anti-demo- century is not an age of peace. It is yet be on the defensive in Afghanistan. cratic forces. Of which there are many. another age of conflict. At that point, the bloodbath in We don’t like that. It’s more com- Syria had barely begun. A year would ❚❚Fighting Radical Islamists forting to believe, as President Obama pass before the murder of a U.S. ambas- In World War II America defeated asserted on numerous occasions, that sador in Benghazi highlighted the cha- racial supremacists. In the Cold War we “the tide of war is receding.” os in Libya. The Islamic State had not defeated class supremacists. In the cur- For the 44th president, that phrase yet risen from the ashes of al-Qaeda in rent war, the Long War, as it makes sense became both a mantra and an idée fixe Iraq, which had been decimated by the to call it, we face religious supremacists following the May 2, 2011 midnight raid “surge” President Bush ordered with whose theology rules out peaceful co- by U.S. Navy SEALs on Osama bin Lad- Gen. David Petraeus in command. existence. The Obama administration en’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. And when the Islamic State did never grasped this stark reality. Obama initially used the phrase on arise, early in 2014, Obama dismissed it The Trump administration ap- June 23, 2011, in his prime-time address as a “JV” team. The following year, just pears to. At a White House briefing, from the East Room of the White House, before IS terrorists carried out a mas- National Security Advisor John Bolton announcing the first phase of U.S. sacre in Paris, he insisted that, “we have told reporters the principal difference troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan. contained them.” between the new strategy and its prede- That summer, he released his Na- In the early days of his second term, cessor is that the former “recognize[s] tional Strategy for Counterterrorism, which strongly suggested that the end of what the George W. Bush administra- ...if history advises anything it’s that wars seldom tion had called the Global War On Ter- ror was imminent. In his introduction to end by fiat...they are won or lost. the main text, he wrote: “Today, we can say with growing confidence – and with certainty about the outcome – that we Obama sought to formalize the end of the that there’s a terrorist ideology that have put al-Qaeda on the path to defeat.” war by seeking to repeal the Authoriza- we’re confronting.” “Without recogniz- In September, he told the U.N. Gen- tion for Use of Military Force (AUMF) ing that we’re in an ideological strug- eral Assembly: “Let there be no doubt, that Congress passed in 2001. “This war, gle,” Bolton added, “we can’t properly the tide of war is receding.” The phrase like all wars, must end,” President Obama address the terrorist threat.” also cropped up in Obama’s next State of told his audience at the National Defense To be fair, the previous administra- the Union address, and on half a dozen University. “That’s what history advises. tion favored a “war of ideas.” Indeed, it as- other occasions. That’s what our democracy demands.” serted that it was prevailing in this theater. The evidence for this optimistic Actually, if history advises any- “The relevance of al-Qaeda and its analysis was less than conclusive. In thing it’s that wars seldom end by fiat. ideology has been further diminished,”

How We Fight | inFOCUS 3 President Trump addresses the 2018 session of the U.N. General Assembly in New York. (Photo: Joyce N. Boghosian/White House) Obama wrote in his introduction to the to the Balkans to Michigan, Islam is in- – which is not the same as saying they 2011 document. The Arab Spring, he terpreted and practiced in many differ- reject violence. A subset of Islamists, added, had discredited the terrorists’ ent ways. however, may be described as jihadists. ideology by showing how, “In just a few Islam is not a monolith. However, a They believe, as a matter of faith, that short months, [non-violent] movements fanatic minority of Sunni Muslims are de- the path to the future must be cleared by achieved far more political change than termined to make it one – determined to the sword, by waging a holy war to defeat al-Qaeda’s years of violence.” eliminate what they see as heretical prac- and eliminate infidels, apostates, and In fact, as is now apparent, under tices and interpretations of Islamic scrip- heretics. Or, as al-Qaeda leader Ayman Ayman al Zawahiri, successor to bin ture. Day after day, they slaughter Mus- al-Zawahiri phrased it a message timed Laden, al-Qaeda merely evolved. And it lims who disobey or even disagree. The to coincide with the most recent anni- has continued to grow. At the same time, Arabic word for such a theological bully: versary of the 9/11/01 attacks, against tens of thousands of young men, and takfiri. We can and should ask Muslims “the major international criminals – more than a few young women, left be- to stand up to them. Indeed, we have an America being the foremost.” hind relatively safe and comfortable lives obligation to support those who do. Iran’s rulers, though Shiite, not in Europe, the Gulf States, and North In the briefing at which he intro- Sunni, are indisputably jihadists. The Africa to answer the Islamic State’s call duced the new strategy, Amb. Bolton Trump strategy characterizes the Islam- to establish a new caliphate in Syria and noted that, “King Abdullah of Jordan ic Republic as “the most prominent state Iraq. They did this in the belief that they has frequently described the terrorist sponsor of terrorism, through its global were fulfilling their religious duty. threat as a civil war within Islam.” network of operatives and its ongoing The 34-page strategy issued by the Mr. Trump’s new strategy distin- support to an array of terrorist groups.” Trump administration refers to “radi- guishes Islam, the faith of more than a The relationship between radical Is- cal Islamist terrorist groups,” a phrase billion people around the world, from Is- lamists of the Sunni and Shiite varieties President Obama avoided out of fear it lamism, an ideology committed to spread- is complicated. Sunni takfiris view Shiites would offend Muslims and validate the ing a supremacist, intolerant and bellicose as their enemies but they are quite willing terrorists’ claim to represent authentic version of Islam and of Islamic law. Is- to deal with devils when doing so seems and original Islam. lamists seek to re-establish the dominance useful. By the same token, Shiite jihadists President Obama was misguided. Islam enjoyed throughout much of the hate takfiris – whom they accuse of being Muslims are not fools. They know that world for nearly a thousand years. an American creation – but are more ecu- from Asia to the Middle East to Africa Not all Islamists utilize violence menical about Sunnis in general.

4 inFOCUS | Winter 2019 CLIFFORD D. MAY In his White House briefing, Amb. them, that allow them to regenerate, and counter-terrorist strategy is to find part- Bolton remarked that the theocrats in that permit them to adapt.” ners willing and capable enough to share Tehran have been “the world’s central In other words, the use of economic the burden. The administration would banker of international terrorism since weapons will be integral to depriving like America’s allies to be better part- 1979,” adding that “Iran-sponsored ter- both Iran’s rulers and non-state terror- ners, to shoulder more responsibilities. rorist groups such as Lebanese Hezbol- ist groups of the resources they need to “America First does not mean America and lah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic fight effectively over the long run. The alone,” the new strategy notes. Jihad continue to pose a threat to the U.S. Treasury has developed mecha- Burden-sharing has been a peren- DAVID ADESNIK: United States and our interests.” nisms to disrupt terror financing. nial objective, dating back to George W. It is worth noting that Hamas and The Trump administration has in- Bush’s inaugural National Strategy for Palestinian Islamic Jihad are both Sunni dicated it will exert far greater financial Combating Terrorism, released shortly radical organizations, which are glad to pressure on Iran’s rulers. Obama started before the invasion of Iraq in 2003. As work hand-in-glove with the Shiites in lifting that pressure in exchange for an the history of NATO suggests, the search President Trump’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy Tehran. Also, Bolton was not waxing interim nuclear weapons agreement in for an equitable division of labor never rhetorical when he described the Iranian 2013, which the parties finalized two ends. Thankfully, in the struggle against regime as the central banker of interna- years later. Pressure also will be in- the Islamic State, the U.S. partnership tional terrorism. In May, the U.S. Trea- creased on Iranian-backed Hezbollah. with Syrian Kurdish forces has proven sury imposed sanctions on the governor Obama let Hezbollah get up from the to be extremely beneficial, first under of the Central Bank of Iran for his per- mat when he dismantled Project Cas- Obama and then under Trump. sonal role in helping to fund Hezbollah. sandra, the formidable interagency task Other notable components of the force dedicated to disrupting the globe- Trump strategy include continuing to ❚❚War by Other Means spanning criminal enterprise that Hez- detain unlawful combatants at Guan- Successfully fighting wars requires bollah runs to finance its operations. tanamo (once on American soil they staying on a war footing for as long as Terrorist funding also continues to would be legally entitled to all the rights necessary. It means killing enemies. come from Middle Eastern petroleum— of American citizens), “building strong Amb. Bolton said the president also in- the most important source of income borders, strengthening security at all tends to place “an increased emphasis on for Tehran. The administration would ports of entry into the United States, non-kinetic means.” The document can- be well-advised to implement policies to protecting its critical infrastructure, and didly acknowledges, however, that, “we encourage transportation fuel diversifi- facilitating preparedness.” have not developed a prevention archi- cation which can lead to increased U.S. At this moment, the U.S. electrical tecture to thwart terrorist radicalization energy security, if not independence. grid is vulnerable to cyber weapons as and recruitment.” The day before the White House released well as an EMP attack (the detonation In general, the Trump administra- Trump’s new strategy, the price of Brent of a nuclear weapon high above the U.S. tion has been dismissive of the various crude hit a four-year high of more than mainland). Prevention is preferable to cure but we should have a backup plan, one that makes it possible to restore elec- Obama let Hezbollah get up from the mat when tric power within days, not months. he dismantled Project Cassandra, the formidable President Trump’s new strategy is not the last word on counter-terrorism. interagency task force... Our enemies learn and adapt. So must we. Military strategists for millennia have been counseling that, “If you know programs initiated by its predecessor in $86 per barrel, with analysts forecasting the enemy and know yourself, you need the name of countering violent extrem- $100 per barrel in the near future. not fear the result of a hundred battles.” ism, even those based on credible ap- The price has tumbled since then, With the tide of war rising rather than proaches to preventing radicalization. thanks in part to Saudi Arabia’s ef- receding, that’s a conservative estimate This is a situation that it might be helpful forts to maximize production. Yet of the number of battles that lie ahead. to reexamine. a Saudi bailout may not always be a Among the non-kinetic approaches, viable option, for both political and CLIFFORD D. MAY is president of per the new strategy, is to “dismantle economic reasons. the Foundation for Defense of Democ- terrorists’ networks and sever the sourc- Another means of ensuring the racies (FDD), where DAVID ADES- es of strength and support that sustain economic sustainability of the U.S. NIK, Ph.D., is the Director of Research.

How We Fight | inFOCUS 5 Stop Repeating Past Mistakes by MACKENZIE EAGLEN

t is time for a National Defense Strat- our stated defense capabilities and our plan campaigns, conduct global coun- egy (NDS) that seeks to break the actual strength. The wars that planners terterrorism, reassure allies, and pro- mold in honesty, clarity, conciseness, envisioned were not the ones the mili- vide deterrence as operational tempos Iand fresh thinking. Since the end of tary was called upon to fight. remain unwaveringly high. the Cold War a quarter-century ago, A lack of definitional clarity and Meanwhile various missions and ef- NDS documents have repeatedly served policy consensus about terms including forts are being shortchanged, ignored, as opportunities to redefine American “war,” “defeat,” “deny,” and even now or dropped altogether as the supply of force structure and interests globally. “deter,” is far from the only problem American military power is consistently Unfortunately, the most recent gen- with previous strategies. A combination outstripped by the demand for it. Some eration has become increasingly un- of shrinking global posture, force re- uniformed leaders would argue that the moored from the strategic reality the ductions, overly optimistic predictions challenge is broader, and that policymak- country faces. Following the Cold War, about the future, and a deteriorating se- ers expect military power to achieve out- the Pentagon’s force-sizing construct curity environment has led to a crisis of comes beyond its scope. Both interpreta- has gradually become muddled and wa- confidence in defense strategy-making. tions are correct, and each contributes tered down at each iteration – from the The Budget Control Act of 2011 fur- to the lack of credibility in new strategic aspirational objective of fighting two ther compounded the difficulty of align- guidance in the minds of its consumers. wars at once to the declinist “defeat- ing resources with strategy through This lack of faith in defense strategy- and-deny” approach – without enough clear and thoughtful prioritization and making and planning has contributed to substantive debate over the wisdom of adjudication between tradeoffs. The America’s global retreat and the worsen- the progressive abandonment of the need to build a defense program to fit ing international security situation. two-war standard. declining spending caps accelerated the Even before debt reduction became reduction in relevance and scope of Pen- ❚❚Realistic Defense Strategy a Washington priority in 2011, defense tagon strategy documents. The writers of the newest strategy planning had become increasingly di- Even with declining force-sizing need to face some hard truths. • Policymakers cannot wish away the need for a strong American presence ...the Pentagon’ force-sizing construct has gradually in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. This includes understanding America’s become muddled ... from the aspirational objective commitments in the Middle East will of fighting two wars at once to the declinist “defeat- not go away, get easier or eventually be- come a lesser burden on the military. and-deny” approach... • Constructing budgets and then di- vining strategies, as the Budget Control Act has encouraged, is putting the cart vorced from global strategic realities. constructs, U.S. forces have largely con- before the horse. American experiences in Iraq and Af- tinued to do all that they had done under • Pentagon reforms and efficiencies ghanistan exposed the limited utility of previous super-sized strategies. Reduc- are noble goals and should become stan- a force-sizing construct based on wars. tions in force structure proposed in each dard operating procedure to encourage The challenge in prosecuting two large iteration have not resulted in substantive good governance. But the belief that on- stabilization and counterinsurgency changes in operations of the force. In- going organizational changes will result campaigns during the past decade-and- stead, the armed forces have been asked in tens of billions in potential savings a-half laid bare the discrepancy between to do more with less and continue to that can be reinvested elsewhere within

6 inFOCUS | Winter 2019 MACKENZIE EAGLEN: the defense budget has yet to be proven. explicitly what sacrifices the force could counterterrorism – synonymous with • An obsessive hunt for technologi- make, and signal to allies and partners the Joint Chiefs’ “four-plus-one” list) has cal silver bullets could be our military’s where they could be most helpful, in or- persisted into this administration. Given ruin, not its salvation – if it comes at the der to allow the Department of Defense to the finite supply of American defense expense of medium-term needs. concentrate on its most critical missions. capacity, not all of these threats can re- To endure as a global power, the Rosy assumptions need to go. As- ceive the same amount of attention – nor United States must never be in the posi- sumptions about international affairs should they. Force deployments must be Stop Repeating Past Mistakes tion – as it is now in danger of finding that underpinned the last administra- rationalized to prevent the use of capa- itself – of committing its last reserves of tion’s force planning – that Europe bilities intended for high-end wars or military power to any single theater. In- would remain peaceful, that the United deterrence being worn down in the long stead, force planners need to expand the States was dangerously overcommitted grind of ongoing anti-terror operations. size of the armed forces using the capa- across the Middle East, and that a “re- Stealth aircraft should not be perform- bilities on hand. American forces must balance” to East Asia could be accom- ing fire support missions against the commit to permanent forward presence plished without a substantial increase in Taliban that could be handled by robust where they can effectively deter threats forces – have all proven incorrect. army artillery, for example. before they rise to the level of hostilities. The new strategy also has to combat The Pentagon is bigger than a De- To facilitate these goals, the strat- unrealistic assumptions about the De- partment of War. Fighting and winning egy should focus not only on the need partment of Defense – such as the belief the nation’s wars is a core mission of to decisively defeat our enemies, but also that reforms and efficiencies will generate America’s military. Preventing them is to support the steady-state operations significant savings that can be reinvested equally important. Daily, the U.S. mili- American forces undertake each day to deter our adversaries and reassure our allies in priority theaters abroad. An obsessive hunt for technological silver bullets ❚❚ Define Objectives, Set Strategy could be our military’s ruin, not its salvation... The National Defense Strategy must prioritize missions – and by extension – clearly delineate what it can stop do- ing. In the last decade, the U.S. military outsourced airlifting of troops to Iraq elsewhere in the defense budget, and that tary is active in maintaining a regular to Russian companies, NASA hitched the Pentagon will certainly become more presence around the globe, cooperating rides into space also from Russia, Ma- innovative when money is tight. with allies, and checking potential ag- rines embarked on allied ships for mis- Global force management is not a gression. These “peacetime” presence and sions patrolling the African coast, cargo substitute for strategy. Because cam- steady-state activities are the most effec- shipments to Afghanistan were delayed paigns can now occur across geographic tive – and certainly the cheapest – use of due to inadequate lift during hurricane boundaries and within multiple domains military power. The Pentagon must more relief efforts, a private contractor evacu- of warfare at the same time, the default accurately size the military to not only ated U.S. and local troops after the ISIS strategy-in-motion has become global fight and win multiple contingencies at affiliate ambush in Niger, and the Air force management. Despite the flexibil- once, but also to conduct the multitude of Force has outsourced “red air” adversary ity it generates, this is not a substitute for routine missions, deployments, and for- training aircraft to contractors. This strategy. The world is not one global com- ward presence that advance and protect is just a sample of tasks that are being batant command, nor does any one lead- American interests overseas. curtailed as the military struggles with er, commander, or service have the ability It’s getting harder to differentiate be- fewer resources and finds it cannot actu- to manage complex contingencies as if it tween war and peace. The dangers of as- ally do “more with less.” were. The forthcoming strategy must re- suming Europe is a net producer of secu- Not all of these capabilities need to store classic force planning and develop- rity became apparent the moment Russia be restored – in some instances, it may be ment to Pentagon processes. annexed Ukrainian sovereign territory. In more efficient to continue to outsource Claiming all operations are equally a single stroke, the Pentagon’s last strategy ancillary assignments that don’t neces- important is not strategy, it is the absence was rendered moot. The rise of ISIS fur- sarily require military forces to pros- of one. Former Defense Secretary Ash ther showcased the perils of American ecute. Instead of papering over these re- Carter’s list of “five challenges” (China, withdrawal from the Middle East. Cou- alities, the new strategy should spell out Russia, Iran, North Korea, and persistent pled with increasing Chinese and North

How We Fight | inFOCUS 7 The Pentagon in Washington, D.C., headquarters of the U.S. military. (Photo: Ivan Cholakov)

Korean bellicosity, these theaters are obvi- existential one. The NDS must recognize a clear distinction between the forces, ously vital considerations for U.S. military that countering terrorism will be a gen- capabilities and posture required to planning, even if active hostilities involv- erational struggle that can be managed prevent a war against a near-peer state ing American troops are not underway in more gradually and cheaply than efforts versus those needed to win one should all of them simultaneously. to counter immediate and monumental it break out. threats, such as North Korean ICBMs. While deterring further Russian and ❚❚Tailored Responses, Even Organize for three theaters, not two Chinese aggression requires advanced During Peacetime wars. The degradation of the two-war aerospace capabilities, the principal pres- Each of the five challenges to Amer- standard since the end of the Cold War ence missions would fall on maritime ican security is unique and requires has left the nation with a one-plus-some- forces in the Pacific and land forces in tailored responses, even in peacetime. thing strategy that is neither well under- Europe. In the Middle East, the situation Ballistic missile defenses have immense stood nor universally accepted by poli- is quite different; there is no favorable use against North Korea, but little util- cymakers or service leaders. Planners status quo to defend. Securing our re- ity against ISIS. As each of our competi- tors focus on a particular suite of niche capabilities – from Chinese maritime American forces undertake each day to deter our capabilities to Russian land power and electronic warfare – America is in the adversaries and reassure our allies in priority unenviable position of needing to re- theaters abroad. spond to all of them. To manage the ex- pense of this endeavor, efficiencies must be found to deter and mitigate certain threats within an acceptable margin of should size forces to maintain robust gional interest requires not just presence, risk in order to concentrate additional conventional and strategic deterrents in but an active effort to reverse the rising resources on more pressing ones. Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, and tide of adversaries: Iran, ISIS, al-Qaeda The clearest example is terrorism, equip a force-for-decision in the event and its associates, and now Russia. If which is a relative threat and not an deterrence fails. The NDS must make we hope to remain safe and prosperous,

8 inFOCUS | Winter 2019 MACKENZIE EAGLEN: America can neither swing among these of a given capability can introduce risks the latter challenge, but new investments theaters, nor retreat to the continental and decrease the efficiency of U.S. forces. will need to be tied to clear strategic United States. Forces can and should be One obvious example is the degradation goals in order to address the former. We tailored to the needs of each. of Army short-range air defense (SHO- cannot repeat the mistakes of the early These forces must be of a size and RAD) and an overreliance on increas- 2000s when billions were squandered quality to be operationally decisive and ingly scant Air Force interceptors to on cancelled research and development a balanced “capacity of capabilities” maintain air superiority. Competition programs that fielded little to nothing Stop Repeating Past Mistakes because they were not tied to the threats America faced. Investments must balance the needs ... “peacetime” presence and steady-state activities of today, the medium term, and wars of the 2030s. To alleviate strain on the are the most effective – and certainly the cheapest – current force, it will need to grow. This use of military power. expansion of capacity should be under- taken immediately and with currently available equipment and technology rather than forestalled in pursuit of to- across air, land, sea, space, and cyber do- among the services – for missions and morrow’s super weapons. Over-invest- mains is necessary to provide the widest for resources, for example – is the key ing in near-term readiness and specu- possible set of options to campaign plan- to innovation. Beyond the advantage lative capabilities not only introduces a ners (and the president). of having redundant tactical and op- large amount of acquisition risk, it also erational tools at hand in the event one creates a dangerous situation in which ❚❚Develop New Capabilities to fails or proves to be easily countered, adversaries know we are weak today and Over-Match competition fosters a richer and more will be strong tomorrow. Facing this sce- Presence missions and train-and- diverse discussion of the nature of war nario, they would see that it’s better to advise efforts are crucial to support our and serves as a check on the American strike now than later. allies, but firepower is ultimately what propensity to rely too heavily on techno- In this way, more investment in our deters our foes. The new defense strategy logical solutions to military problems. military could worsen American se- should concisely outline the core compe- tencies required of each service by region and threat, and over varying time hori- ...competition fosters a richer and more diverse zons and levels of risk. It should concen- discussion of the nature of war and serves as a check trate development of new capabilities to restore as much technological overmatch on the American propensity to rely too heavily on as is possible. Planners should also seek technological solutions... opportunities to generate efficiencies when possible. For example, introduc- ing a series of Armored Cavalry Regi- ments permanently stationed in Eastern The Budget Control Act must no curity unless it is properly managed to Europe comprised of combined arms longer be the scapegoat. By attributing alleviate any potential gap in American units would not only provide a power- most or all of the current force’s prob- readiness to deter and, if necessary, de- ful U.S. presence to counter Russia, but lems to sequestration and ignoring their feat our foes. Policymakers must avoid also would allow regional partners to historical context, policymakers wrong- a “barbell” investment strategy that de- better develop their domestic capabilities ly assume that solutions are simple (e.g., emphasizes the medium-term needs of through increased opportunities for bi- higher defense toplines alone will solve the 2020s. lateral training and exercises. the military’s woes). The next National It is time for strategy to make a The American military needs more Defense Strategy will need to account comeback in American defense thinking. inter-service competition, not less. In for two compounding problems. First, some respects, the individual services the international situation is deteriorat- MACKENZIE EAGLEN is a resident have become too dependent on one an- ing. Second, our fiscal ability to support fellow at the American Enterprise In- other. Having the entire military rely on all instruments of national power is de- stitute specializing in defense strategy, an individual service as the sole provider clining. Higher spending can alleviate defense budgets, and military readiness.

How We Fight | inFOCUS 9 Israel: America’s Ally by the Numbers by JONATHAN HONIGMAN

hile the United States has long while refusing to adequately contribute the trillions spent all together on mili- been willing and able to sup- to their defense, Israel has long sacrificed tary operations within those countries. port its allies, with a massive to ensure it can protect itself. Its military Further, with Israel’s aid from the United Wdebt and prosperous friends spending was 9 percent of GDP between States between 1946 and 1966 represent- refusing to sufficiently fund their de- 1957 and 1966, 21 percent between 1968 ing one-fourth of Turkey’s, one-third of fense, the costs have become unreason- and 1972, and 26 percent between 1974 Pakistan’s, and less than either Egypt or able. For many American partners, sev- and 1981. Throughout the 1970s, its de- Iran, substantial American support did eral generations without experiencing fense commitment was four times the not arrive until the late 1960s when Is- armed conflict has set a low standard as rate NATO countries and five times that rael had proven itself to be the region’s to what should be expected of them in of Warsaw Pact countries. Though able to focal anti-Soviet actor. both their own security and that of the relax its spending since then, Israel’s 5.5 broader Western world. Israel has been a percent defense allocation is today still ❚❚Military Capabilities Matter bright spot in America’s pursuit of like- the highest in the Western world. While Beyond the reasonable expectation minded nations who pay their fair share over one-fifth of all U.S. service person- that an ally properly finance its defense, and play a constructive military role in nel were stationed abroad between 1950 America needs battle-tested partners. safeguarding mutual interests. and 2014, and Israel was heavily out- While initially refusing to sell Israel numbered in all four of its major wars, its meaningful weapons, as Egypt, Syria, and ❚❚Discarded Priorities compulsory military service has ensured Iraq gravitated toward the Soviet Union, Currently responsible for over one- that no American soldier would ever be America became its primary supplier and third of the world’s military expendi- called upon to fight on its behalf. accounted for 94 percent of its imported tures, Americans have grown restless Though a large beneficiary of arms between 1967 and 1988. The Soviets with the financial outlays expected American aid, Israel is not at all alone. accounted for 86 percent of Egypt’s im- of them in maintaining global order. Beginning with the Marshall Plan, ported arms between 1955 and 1976, 93 Though representing 35 percent of NA- which provided over $103 billion to Eu- percent of Syria’s between 1955 and 1988, TO’s population, and under half its GDP, rope between 1948 and 1952, the United and 77 percent of Iraq’s between 1958 and the U.S. accounts for 70 percent of its States has used aid as a strategic means 1988. By 1982, Israel had as many tanks defense spending. This has amounted to to retain alliances. The United States has and jets as West Germany – a country roughly 3.5 percent of GDP in America given more than $109 billion to Afghan- then with fifteen-times its population and while other NATO members have collec- istan and over $70 billion to Pakistan, thirty-times its GDP. tively spent below 2 percent since 2000. This is to say nothing of the non-NATO European states that are granted de-facto Israel has been a bright spot in America’s pursuit protection given their location, or that several NATO allies still profit greatly of like-minded nations who pay their fair share and from their arms industries (which for play a constructive military role in safeguarding instance, together exported more equip- ment than the United States between mutual interests. 2007 and 2011). America is also treaty- bound to defend Japan – which is the world’s third-largest economy yet spends while Arab countries combined received Between 1966 and 1982, Israel only 1 percent of its GDP on security. 50 percent more aid than Israel between played an essential – if not the prin- Unlike so many other allies who 1946 and 2013. These figures do not -in cipal – role in the Cold War’s battle- have thrived under American patronage clude (and indeed pale in comparison to) fronts and its many victories were of

10 inFOCUS | Winter 2019 JONATHAN HONIGMAN: great strategic importance for America and the West. As several vital Ameri- can weapon systems first saw real com- bat with Israel (including the HAWK surface-to-air missile [SAM], both the F-15 and F-16 fighter jets, and AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control Sys- tem Aircraft]), it was able to provide Israel: America’s Ally by the Numbers valuable lessons – particularly during American peacetime. As the Soviet Union could not com- pete with the West’s civilian technology or economic aid, military exports to un- derdeveloped allies were its fundamen- tal avenue for projecting influence, and that process was greatly hindered by Israel’s repeated success with Western weapons. Meanwhile, American arms exports grew eight-fold between 1968 and 1974, accounted for half of global Captain Munir Redfa, an Iraqi fighter pilot, who worked with Mossad in 1966 to fly his sales between 1966 and 1976, and were Soviet-designed MiG-21 to Israel and defect. twice that of the Soviets in 1973. Israel’s aerial dominance with F-15s (those sold have gone to Soviet allies elsewhere. For was the most widely produced super- to Israel represent less than 5 percent of example, as the Vietnam War continued sonic fighter jet ever and was exported the total produced but account for over to rage between 1968 and 1972, Soviet all over the world – including as the half of the jet’s flawless 104:0 air-to-air military aid to Syria and Egypt was 60 most cutting-edge fighter facing Ameri- kill ratio) and F-16s in the late 1970s and percent larger than that given to North can pilots in Vietnam. In 1966, after an early 1980s played an important mar- Vietnam. Between 1955 and 1978, Arab elaborate Mossad operation seeking him keting role that helped make aircraft 39 states accounted for half of the Develop- out and securing safety for his family, an percent of all U.S. foreign military sales ing World’s 44,000 military personnel Iraqi pilot defected to Israel in what be- during the 1980s. trained in the Soviet Union, and by 1978, came the first MiG-21 in Western hands. Between 1964 and 1967, America’s over 57 percent of all Soviet military ad- Israel subsequently loaned it (along with cumulative military allotment was 26 visors in the Developing World were sta- two MiG-17s obtained from Syria) to the percent larger than that of the Soviet tioned in Arab countries. The Soviets of- United States in 1968. Union – and the disparity was over twice ten delivered state-of-the-art weaponry The SA-2 SAM famously shot down as large between NATO and the Warsaw to their Arab allies before even arming American U2 spy planes over the Soviet Pact. As American spending was greater Eastern Europe - including SA-3 SAMs Union in 1960 and over Cuba during the than Soviet, the continual rearming of to Egypt in 1970, and T-72 tanks, MiG- 1962 crisis, and also brought down 205 Syria and Egypt following their vari- 25 jets, and SA-5 SAMs to Syria in the American aircraft during the Vietnam ous defeats was that much more costly. early 1980s. War – including that of Senator John Mc- Over one-third of all Soviet military aid Cain. Israel’s troops seized nine SA-2s in to the Developing World between 1956 ❚❚Technology Transferred the 1967 War – along with a complete set and 1978 went to Syria and Egypt (68 Along with undermining Soviet- of blueprints and operating instructions percent went to Arab countries). Not built arms in battle, Israel captured ful- which they later lent to the United States. only did Syria, Egypt, and Iraq each re- ly-intact weapons and introduced them In December 1969, Israeli commandos ceive more during those pivotal years to Western analysts. It seized over three even managed to acquire a complete than any other non-aligned state, their hundred tanks from Syria and Egypt, in- P-12 radar station (typically used in con- aid even exceeded that given to fellow cluding the T-62 in 1973 when it was the junction with the SA-2 SAM), and later Communist states such as Cuba, North mainstay of the Soviet army and com- sent it as well to America. Surely the op- Korea, and North Vietnam. prised 75 percent of the tanks in East portunity to study both the actual SA-2 These expenditures represented Germany facing NATO forces (several SAM and its P-12 radar played a major money, arms, and training that could were transferred to NATO). The MiG-21 role in reducing North Vietnam’s SA-2

How We Fight | inFOCUS 11 hit-per-launch ratio from 1:15 in 1965 to surprise attack on its holiest day of Yom were) or by SAMs, this meant that Is- 1:50 in 1972. Israel also captured several Kippur, Israel ejected the Syrians from raeli pilots shot down approximately 350 advanced SA-6 SAMs in the 1973 War the Golan Heights within five days, be- Arab planes while Arab pilots shot down and passed them along. gan a successful counterattack against roughly five Israeli planes. Egypt within 10 days (which included The SA-6 SAM first saw combat in ❚❚Battles Won the largest tank battle since World War 1973 and accounted for the majority In the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel was II), and won the war within three weeks of Israel’s 50 lost jets in the first three outspent by 55 percent and outnumbered with its troops 63 miles from Cairo and days of the war. The following years left 15:1 in population, 2:1 in troops, and 3:1 25 miles from Damascus. In what be- Western states reasonably fearing that in tanks and combat aircraft. In under came the first missile-to-missile naval their planes would not be able to gain 130 hours, it destroyed over four hun- battles in history, Israel’s sailors (while superiority against an integrated Soviet dred Arab aircraft (while losing less than facing missiles with twice their range) SAM network. In the initial phase of fifty), meted out a 25:1 casualty ratio, and introduced electronic countermeasures the Lebanon War in June 1982, Israel’s obtained $2 billion worth of Soviet-built to naval combat, prevented all of the air force destroyed all 19 Syrian SA-6 weapons. Of particular importance con- fifty-two Soviet-built Styx missiles fired SAMs in the Bekaa Valley while simul- sidering its small geographic size was that at their ships from making contact, and taneously shooting down 64 Syrian jets without any losses in the largest air bat- tle the Middle East has ever seen. With Along with undermining Soviet-built arms in battle, the SA-6 stationed throughout Eastern Europe and exported to more than 20 Israel captured fully-intact weapons and introduced countries outside the Warsaw Pact, this them to Western analysts. defeat challenged a system deployed to protect Soviet allies and clients around the world. On July 1, 1982, the Soviets felt obliged to take the rare step of pub- after seizing control of the Golan Heights destroyed or commandeered some 48 licly denying that their weapons sup- and Sinai Peninsula, Israeli soldiers were Arab vessels without any losses. plied to the Arabs were inferior to Israeli closer to Damascus and Cairo than either To assist their Arab clients, the and American arms. Israel then shared Syrian or Egyptian troops were to Tel Soviets conducted the largest airlift in with the United States its lessons from Aviv or Jerusalem. their history, and the Americans soon battling Soviet-built equipment in the Throughout its many battles be- followed and resupplied Israel. Having Lebanon War. tween the 1967 and 1973 wars, Israel a destination nearly four times farther killed over 12,000 enemy fighters – 17 away, and flying 40 percent fewer mis- ❚❚America’s Path Forward times the number of Israeli causalities. sions, the Americans delivered 50 per- Israel is a global military power that In one audacious mission in September cent more cargo than the Russians. This today has the 15th largest defense bud- 1969, Israeli forces crossed the canal showcased America’s far superior ability get, exports the eighth-largest amount and (masquerading as Egyptian forces to quickly transfer heavy supplies over of military hardware and the second in captured tanks) handily destroyed long distances. Perhaps it was not co- largest number of cyber-security prod- military installations for some 10 hours incidental that Egypt’s first major pur- ucts, and alone accounted for a major- and over a 50 mile stretch – the news chase of American military equipment ity of drone exports between 1985 and of which gave then 51-year-old Egyptian in 1976 was six transport planes. 2015. As the U.S. continues to grapple President Gamal Abdel Nasser a heart With a material loss double that of with rising competitors and complacent attack. Its air force shot down roughly their 1967 defeat, Arab forces lost twice friends, Israel’s combat effectiveness 160 planes while it lost around a dozen as many tanks and four times as many and defense investment can continue to – including the July 30, 1970 air battle in aircraft as Israel. All but a handful of Is- serve as a positive blueprint for other al- which Israeli pilots took on Soviet pilots rael’s 105 lost planes were destroyed by lies. America would be wise to maintain in Egyptian-marked jets and downed SAMs rather than Arab jets and even the vital support that it has given Israel five without losing any of their own. then, Israel’s loss-per-sortie ratio actu- so that many more strategic benefits can In the 1973 War, Israel was out- ally declined compared to the 1967 War. be gained. numbered roughly 2:1 in troops, com- As only about one-tenth of the Arabs’ bat aircraft, tanks, and naval vessels. 395 lost aircraft were destroyed either on JONATHAN HONIGMAN is After suffering a severe blow from the the ground (as the vast majority in 1967 an educator in Washington, DC.

12 inFOCUS | Winter 2019 Enabling China’s Weapons Hacking by STEPHEN D. BRYEN

or years, the Pentagon has been What is true of the F-22 is true of documents were uncovered in Libya. pretending to be securing its com- many other weapons systems and pro- The New York Times story explained puter networks from Russian and grams. America spends tens of billions that there was extreme resistance to in- FChinese hacking. But while wast- of dollars on Research & Development vestigating the Los Alamos leak, mostly ing huge resources on an impossible (R&D), testing and re-testing super- in an American government effort to futile task, it has sponsored the devel- secret technology. But China is privy protect U.S.-China economic relations. opment of weapons systems that them- to much, if not all of the developments selves are wide open to hackers. The net taking place in U.S. defense laboratories ❚❚Markets over Cybersecurity result is that cyber insecurity has esca- and defense contractors. It even stole Behind the internal struggle was the lated exponentially. You don’t have to from Los Alamos. fact that American companies saw huge look far for examples: As early as 1999, The New York potential markets in China and allega- If you were somewhere near the Times revealed China had stolen the de- tions of espionage and data theft could South China Sea, on the islands and reefs sign of the W-88 nuclear warhead from well derail the chance to enter and devel- China has seized illegally, you might be the Los Alamos National Laboratory. op business there. Even today, now that most if not all of America’s top compa- nies are not only selling but manufactur- China is privy to much, if not all the developments ing in China, America gives lip service to the danger of Chinese hacking, but taking place in U.S. defense laboratories and does not retaliate when it happens, even defense contractors. if the result is the compromise of U.S. military equipment and the corollary of endangering the lives of our men and women in uniform. buzzed by one of China’s stealthy J-20 The W-88 is a miniaturized design that Indeed, one of the key reasons we do fighter bombers. How can China, a coun- allows for mounting multiple nuclear not have a serious missile defense capa- try that has always needed a lot of help warheads (called multiple independent- bility is that we do not want to antago- to build warplanes, field an airplane that ly targeted reentry vehicles, or MIRV) nize China. It was only the emergence of uncannily resembles the F-22, America’s on long-range missiles. Senior officials the North Korean threat on one hand, overall best stealth fighter-bomber? Be- from the Energy Department, who man- and the Iranian one on the other, that cause, while the Europeans, Israel, and age U.S. nuclear weapons development, has prompted more, though still hardly most of all Russia, have supplied aircraft found that not only was Los Alamos adequate, American investment in mis- designs to China, the United States is the compromised by Chinese espionage, sile defense programs such as PAC-3, single biggest supplier. other development centers were as well. SM-3 and Thaad (terminal high-altitude No. The United States does not sell American security on small nuclear area defense). F-22 blueprints to China; but China has warhead design was so poor that the And there are other reasons the Unit- them. They were obtained mostly by hack- same W-88 design appears to have got ed States has trouble dealing with Chinese ing the Pentagon’s defense contractors and into the hands of the Khan-Pakistan espionage, whether cyber or human. their suppliers. How did they know where nuclear technology smuggling network Before the late 1980’s, the Pentagon to look? They hacked Defense Department – whether from the Chinese or others. relied on specially designed electronics computers to get the lists of all the suppli- A possible copy was found on a Dutch comprised of parts made in the United ers, subcontractors, and equipment manu- businessman’s computer linked to the States and shielded to limit electronic facturers. From there, it was easy. Khan network, and possibly similar emanations that could be intercepted.

How We Fight | inFOCUS 13 The idea was that Russia could in- as much as the Raytheon Lexitron, the United States or from other advanced tercept information from computers and Tempest desktop. producers such as Japan, South Korea equipment that had embedded comput- Many of these IBM PCs were con- and Taiwan. American export control ers using radio intercept technology. The nected through networks to larger main- laws have been systematically liberalized program was called Tempest and it was frame computers. Some of them, like the to enable the China market to grow and required anywhere classified informa- IBM-360/370 in the Pentagon network, flourish. America’s allies and friends tion was being used. had already been obtained illegally by the sell manufacturing technology freely Aside from shielding from the Rus- Russians (ES EVM or ЕС ЭВМ, Единая to China, set up factories in China and sians, Tempest had practical application, система электронных вычислительных manufacture for global markets, often for example protecting the electronics машин, Yedinaya Sistema Electronnykh under well-known brand names. of aircraft from civilian hazards, such Vytchislitel’nykh Mashin, meaning “Uni- For example, Foxconn (Hon Hai as powerful radio transmitting towers. fied System of Electronic Computers). Precision, a Taiwan-owned electronics company) is the world’s largest elec- tronics contractor company. It builds One of the problems facing the Defense Department products for Acer, Apple, Amazon, Blackberry, Google, Hewlett Packard, is the use of embedded computers, which ... often Microsoft, Motorola, Sony and Toshiba. are produced in Chinese factories and typically run It employs over 800,000 people, with the old versions of Microsoft Windows software. largest number in China where it sup- ports 12 factory locations (many of them with multiple factories at each location) in nine different cities. The bottom line In 1984, a German Tornado fighter air- ❚❚Made by America – in China is, if it says Apple, or Dell, or HP on the craft crashed when it flew too close to The original IBM PC was made box, more than Intel is inside. the VOA transmitter near Munich, Ger- up of parts sourced both in the United China has been known to compro- many. During a B-52 nuclear long-range States and abroad, and as PC technology mise the products it sells. A good ex- bomber and missile interface unit test, evolved quickly so did manufacturing ample are memory sticks that are widely an un-commanded missile launch signal outsourcing. Integrated circuit assem- used for storing data. A new generation was given. Among the contributing fac- bly migrated to Asia followed by floppy of memory sticks can store up to 1 tera- tors was crosstalk in the systems’ wiring drives and hard disks, and soon every- byte of data. A single stick can hold 75 and EMP (radio wave) interference. And thing except the Intel microprocessor million pages of data or text, or about now that we use GPS for navigation and was produced abroad, increasingly in 18,750,000 documents, assuming four warfighting, the Russians and Chinese China. Today somewhere between 70 pages per document. The market natu- can jam our systems, as the Russians re- cently did in Norway. By the early 1990’s, the Pentagon decided it did not need to have Tempest ... 70 to 80 percent of the Pentagon’s COTS computers (although it kept Tempest building enclosures for a few highly computers are Chinese in whole or in part. classified meeting rooms, referred to in Pentagon lingo as “tanks”). But out- side of the tanks, the Pentagon turned to “commercial off the shelf” (COTS) and 80 percent of all commercial elec- rally enough, is robust, with approxi- technology for tens of thousands of tronics are made in China meaning that mately 16 million sticks sold each year. computers, deciding it was more cost ef- 70 to 80 percent of the Pentagon’s COTS Unfortunately, there is no easy way fective. As the name implies, the prod- computers are Chinese in whole or in to secure commercial memory sticks, uct are the same ones you can buy in part. The same applies to computer net- and even so-called “secure flash” memo- stores. The earliest popular COTS com- work equipment and communications ry sticks may have vulnerabilities. puter in the Pentagon was the first PC hardware, even sensors of all types. The Pentagon has an official poli- made by IBM (now Lenovo, a Chinese Most of China’s electronics tech- cy banning commercial USB memory company) in 1981. Assembled in Boca nology manufacturing know-how and sticks as serious security risks, but it is Raton, Florida, it cost about one-fourth production equipment comes from the poorly enforced and the Pentagon has

14 inFOCUS | Winter 2019 STEPHEN BRYEN: Enabling China’s Weapons Hacking

The logicboard of a server supplied by Elemental Technologies that allegidly includes an unauthorized Chinese chip. (Illustration: Scott Gelber For Bloomberg Businessweek) granted so many exceptions as to make ❚❚Embedded Computers network could work its way into crucial the ban meaningless. One of the problems facing the De- systems on a submarine,” he said. China has also bugged equipment fense Department is the use of embedded Even tactical systems are clearly at sold commercially, including web cam- computers, which, like their desktop and risk today because of commercial soft- eras, microphones, and routers. Yet server counterparts, often are produced ware and vulnerable data links. DOD is using Chinese cameras at sensi- in Chinese factories and typically run old Consider drones. Drones are in- tive military bases where they are part of versions of Microsoft Windows software. creasingly used to carry out vital surveil- perimeter security systems. Other gov- America’s Virginia-class attack sub- lance, follow and kill terrorists, and for ernment agencies, among them the State marines – our most modern, nuclear many other security tasks. Drones use Department, have installed Chinese powered attack submarines – use Win- COTS software and hardware including cameras in embassies, including in Ka- dows XP for vital functions. XP, which Windows XP and other Windows operat- bul, Afghanistan. Despite understand- has always been a security nightmare, ing systems that are equally problematic. ing the massive vulnerability of Chinese cameras (and American cameras that are put together from Chinese parts), the The United States has to invest in a completely new United States still has no government policy against using Chinese cameras type of computing environment that does not use for security. commercial software... Recently, China was discovered to have “sneaked spy chips into Super Mi- cro servers used by Amazon, Apple, the U.S. government, and about 30 other is no longer supported by Microsoft al- In December 2011 a U.S. “stealth” organizations,” according to Bloomberg though the Pentagon recently financed drone known as the RQ-170 Sentinel, news. The servers were supplied by El- additional Microsoft support at least for was captured as it operated overhead emental Technologies, and according to the next couple of years. That’s because near the city of Kashmar in northeast- Bloomberg, “Elemental’s servers could it has no way to easily switch out these ern Iran. The Iranians were able to con- be found in Department of Defense data computers in major weapons systems. trol the drone and guide it to a landing centers, the CIA’s drone operations, and In 2014, then-head of Naval Sea on their territory. According to Iran, the onboard networks of Navy warships.” Systems Command Vice Admiral Wil- this was accomplished by a special cy- The “chips allowed the attackers to create liam Hilarides verified that key systems ber team that was able both to jam the a stealth doorway into any network that included processor chips running Win- incoming signal from a satellite and re- included the altered machines. Multiple dows XP, and worried about hacking – place it with its own commands. people familiar with the matter say inves- as submarine machinery control systems Also in 2011 a computer virus infect- tigators found that the chips had been in- are analyzed in unclassified computers ed the cockpits of America’s Predator and serted at factories run by manufacturing onshore at warfare centers. “That means Reaper drones that carry Hellfire missiles. subcontractors in China.” a virus that gets onto the unclassified Something similar happened in

How We Fight | inFOCUS 15 ❚❚A Short-Term Fix A partial short-term fix is for all data on U.S. computer networks to be encrypted with strong encryption. This does not prevent certain kinds of attacks on our networks including denial of ser- vice and border gateway protocol attacks that recently redirected Google’s Cloud network. (Ironically, Google has refused to sell its cloud services to the Pentagon for “moral” reasons. Does that mean the Pentagon isn’t obliged to help Google out if it is attacked by a foreign adver- sary? That would seem to be fair play!) But it makes it hard for a competitor or adversary nation, e.g., China or Russia, to read our mail. But to keep command and control military networks viable, and key parts of the critical infrastruc- ture operational (such as power plants American soldiers update anti-virus software for the Air Force to assist in the preven- tion of cyberspace hackers at Barksdale Air Force Base. (Photo: U.S. Air Force) and communications), the short-term fix is not good enough. Israel. In 2013 an Israeli Shoval (Her- countries such as Finland and Sweden, on) drone was hijacked on a mission buy COTS including embedded com- ❚❚A Long-Term Fix over the Mediterranean Sea between puters, there is no centralized security The United States has to invest in a Tel Aviv and Netanya. The hijacking review of COTS products. Vulnerabili- completely new type of computing envi- was done either by Hezbollah or Iran, ties, when they are found, are (some- ronment that does not use commercial with the betting being on Iran. Israel times) patched if they can be and if the software, is triple encrypted – meaning grounded the fleet until better security affected agency doesn’t get a waiver to the network, the nodes on the network, could be implemented. delay implementing a change. Waivers and the individual sites are separately en- There is a good chance that the Is- are given for such reasons as the system crypted. This way cracking into sensitive networks is nearly impossible and denial of service and border protocol attacks can Google has refused to sell its cloud services to the better be prevented or contained. We are already vulnerable, and our Pentagon for “moral” reasons. Does that mean the security and economic interests are be- Pentagon isn’t obliged to help Google out if it is ing eroded daily. So, either we move to a new solution and completely overhaul attacked by a foreign adversary? our computer networks and their em- bedded counterparts, or we will become a second-rate power intimidated by Rus- raeli drones, like the American ones, use being in use and that shutting it down sia and China, or even worse. commercial operating systems software would disable a vital requirement such Until there is internal change, the to manage drone missions. Presumably as an aircraft, a missile or a submarine Pentagon is not a responsible steward of the Iranians had little trouble figuring on a mission. American national security. this out. It is time to consider dumping COTS products, with those containing STEPHEN D. BRYEN, Ph.D., is presi- ❚❚Patching and Fixing Chinese parts first on the scrapping list. dent of SDB Partners, former Under- While DOD and its counterparts in It is reckless for the U.S. government and secretary of Defense for Trade Secu- NATO and Israel, as well as in the Asia military to use these products since they rity Policy and head of the Defense Pacific region (South Korea, Japan, Tai- are exposed to systematic hacking. Technology Security Agency at DOD. wan, Singapore, Australia) and neutral

16 inFOCUS | Winter 2019 Strategic Challanges: Near East Gateways to Europe by SETH CROPSEY

olicy analysts and planners draw Eastern Mediterranean, Red Sea, Arabian skeptical about Western modernity. But a line between Europe and the Gulf, and Black Sea. unlike its Sunni Wahhabi and Salafi ri- Middle East. Security dynam- The Greek city-states remained free vals, whose adherents want a return to Pics, strategic planning, political mostly because of the “wooden walls” of seventh-century barbarism, the Iranian arrangements – they neatly fall into re- Athenian triremes. Alexander toppled regime does not reject modernity whole- gional boxes. the Achaemenid Empire despite its con- sale. Rather, it believes that modernity The reality is more complex. The trol of the Levantine Basin, by conquer- should be Islamic in character imbued Middle East, and its adjacent bodies of ing what is modern Lebanon, Israel, and with the revealed truths of Moham- water – the Levantine Basin, Red Sea, Egypt. This denied Persians access to the med’s Quran. Politically, culturally, and and Arabian Gulf – is at the southern sea. Ottoman power waxed as the Em- spiritually, the regime’s leaders believe end of the fault-line between Europe pire extended its reach over the Levan- that Persia is best equipped to lead the and Asia. From the Zagros mountains tine Basin and Black Sea, and waned as Islamic world into the modern age, and extends a cone that covers the Central it lost both. It is no coincidence that the that under Persian leadership, Islam can Asian steppe and Russian tundra to the Battles of Salamis, Actium, Lepanto, and lead the world. East and the borderlands of Eastern Eu- rope to the West. In terms of mineral and energy deposits, particularly oil and The spirit of Iran’s theocratic oligarchy is uranium, most of the world’s energy and mineral abundance lies here. Hal- expansionist. The regime is deeply skeptical about ford Mackinder was prescient when he Western modernity. termed this the “Eurasian Heartland.” Not only is the Middle East the southernmost tip of the Eurasian heart- land – it is also the most convenient the Nile occurred within a 400-mile di- This objective requires, first, control transit link between Europe and Asia. ameter circle. over the Islamic world. With one ex- Despite predictions of land transport Politically, geographically, strategi- ception, the entirety of the Middle East superseding maritime shipping as the cally – in all three categories, the Middle is part of the Dar al-Islam. The control major mode of international move- East, Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, of the Middle East is Iran’s first goal. ment, roughly nine-tenths of commer- Red Sea, and Arabian Gulf should be The Islamic Republic has already con- cial goods today are still shipped by sea. viewed as part of one continuous theater. solidated the region’s Shia communities Nearly 50 ships per day pass through the The actions in one part of this broader into a loose alliance, creating a corridor Suez Canal, the natural chokepoint for theater modify the balance of power in that runs from Tehran to Tripoli and trans-Eurasian maritime movement. all the others. Beirut. Iran’s support for terror, both Any power or coalition of powers globally and regionally, is not defensive that seeks to control Eurasia must con- ❚❚Iranian Interests notwithstanding that nearly 90 percent trol the heartland. But the heartland is The connection between the East- of the Islamic world is Sunni. This num- geographically bound by frozen seas to ern Mediterranean and Black Sea on the ber is irrelevant. Nearly half the Islamic the north, and land borders or maritime one hand and Middle East on the other, world lives in five countries – Indonesia, chokepoints to the south, east, and west. illustrates the extent of Iran and Russia’s Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Ni- European, and Eurasian history is a series regional ambitions. geria – outside of the Middle East. All of struggles over control of the Heartland The spirit of Iran’s theocratic oligar- five of these countries’ Islamic popula- and its adjacent seas – specifically, the chy is expansionist. The regime is deeply tions are largely Sunni. Therefore, the

How We Fight | inFOCUS 17 Small Iranian vessels in the Persian Gulf harassing the U.S. Navy. (Video Screenshot: U.S. Navy)

politically-relevant sectarian balance of invading a legal U.S. partner, or mount heavy toll on a Saudi/GCC strike mission. power is closer to five-to-one, not ten- a major amphibious operation in the Iran, in sum, has little to fear of- to-one. Arabian Gulf. The Saudi Navy is entire- fensively from Saudi Arabia. Finally, Second, none of the three Islamic ly unequipped for the latter operation, few countries are blessed with such de- countries that could oppose Iran’s drive while Saudi land forces would likely en- fensible geography as Iran. The Zagros for regional domination can do so now. counter similar difficulties fighting -Ira mountains protect nearly all of Iran’s Turkey shows little stomach for oppos- nian-backed Iraqi paramilitaries as they major population centers, allowing ing Iranian expansion, and shares criti- have in Yemen. An air offensive would Iran’s ground forces and Navy to con- cal interests with Iran, particularly over face similar issues. Saudi F-15’s and centrate on defending Khuzestan and its Kurdish autonomy. Egypt, more stable than it was in 2013, still cannot be ex- pected to meaningfully project power. Is Saudi Arabia the actual object of Ira- The Islamic Republic has already consolidated the nian ambition? region’s Shia communities into a loose alliance, Saudi Arabia’s population is less creating a corridor that runs from Tehran to Tripoli... than half of Iran’s. Its political system rests upon a fragile alliance between the House of Saud and the conservative religious authorities, who both ensure Eurofighter Typhoons would outclass oil-production facilities. Even the Unit- the people’s docility through religious Iran’s MiG-29’s and Chengdu F-7’s, not ed States would find it difficult to invade control and welfare benefits. Saudi Ara- to mention Iran’s ancient F-14’s, F-4’s, and subjugate Iran. Either severe para- bia’s defense spending dwarfs Iran’s. But and F-5’s. noia, or a genuine expansionist impulse, the Saudi military, despite its advanced But Iran has a full suite of Russian- underlies Iran’s regional aggression. technology and Western support, has built air-defense systems that it would The logical next steps of Iran’s strate- proven unable to win the low-level operate alongside its fighters. In a func- gy are maritime. By consolidating control proxy conflicts that characterize its con- tionally uncontested environment, the over the Arabian Gulf, contesting control flict with Iran. A massive Saudi conven- Saudi Air Force has lost one F-15 and of the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Aden, tional offensive against Iran is difficult one Eurofighter Typhoon in Yemen. At and controlling, or abetting the friendly to imagine and would face significant a minimum, despite their technological control of the Levantine Basin, Iran can obstacles. Either Saudi forces would disadvantage, one can expect Iranian bracket Saudi Arabia on all sides. More- need to strike through Iraq, practically fighters and air defense forces to take a over, it can also directly confront its

18 inFOCUS | Winter 2019 SETH CROPSEY: However, this percentage could increase to its previous level, and potentially ex- ceed it if the EU’s member states become less willing to do business with Saudi Arabia. Without American forces able to Strategic Challanges: Near East Gateways to Europe take control of the Strait of Hormuz in a crisis, Iran could target certain states by reducing energy exports. A 3 percent or 5 percent cut in EU crude imports Presence in, or friendly control of, the Eastern would not go unnoticed. Iran could Mediterranean would allow Iran to pressure Israel similarly target India, its third-largest oil consumer, to ward off a partnership directly, harassing its vulnerable coastline... between New Delhi and Washington. Thus, although the Arabian Gulf has become less important to Iran, it retains significant strategic value.

❚❚Russo-Iranian Partnership Iran’s interests most clearly overlap with Russia’s in the Levantine Basin. Russian expansionism, even more so than its Iranian counterpart, is fueled by paranoia and distrust of the West. Rus- sia’s reaction to NATO is the clearest in- dicator. As an insular power, American interest opposes any power or coalition of powers from gaining control of the Eurasian heartland. This helps explain American intervention in both world wars, and its persistent security pres- ence in Europe after 1945 where the Eu- ropean continent, shattered by six years of conflict, was defenseless in the face of actual regional rival, Israel. The Israeli Iran’s two areas of strategic inter- Soviet military power, despite Russia’s Defense Forces is the only Middle Eastern est, then, are the Eastern Mediterranean 20-million-plus war deaths. military force genuinely superior to Iran. and Strait of Hormuz. Presence in, or A stable balance of power between Israeli intelligence has shown itself capa- friendly control of, the Eastern Medi- Russia and the United States is easy to ble of jeopardizing Iranian nuclear devel- terranean would allow Iran to pressure envision. Russia would need to respect opments, and the Israeli Air Force, with Israel directly, harassing its vulnerable the sovereignty of its Eastern European or without American help, could feasibly coastline, potential offshore natural gas neighbors: namely, the Baltic states, Po- strike nearly all major Iranian nuclear rigs, and submarine deterrent with na- land, Ukraine, and the states of the Bal- facilities, along with military bases in val combatants, long-range missiles and kan peninsula and bordering the Black the country’s west. And on the ground, other irregular assets. Sea. In return, these states would respect only the IDF’s special forces pose a legiti- Iran’s objectives in the Strait of Russian interests, restrained from any mate threat to the IRGC’s Quds force. Of Hormuz are less direct. Sanctions on revanchist ambitions. Russia’s inabil- course, Israel cannot be said to hold hege- Iran throughout the 2000s and increases ity to even attempt such a compromise monic aspirations – it could not control in American oil productivity have pre- speaks to either a deep paranoia or a Gaza or South Lebanon, and barely holds vented Iran from reclaiming its previ- fundamentally expansionist outlook. the West Bank. But its robust military ca- ous share of the EU’s oil import market These need not be mutually exclusive. pabilities, combined with an undeniable – in 2000, Iran provided 5 percent of Russia’s objective, therefore, is reas- will to fight, make Israel Iran’s most dan- the European Union’s crude oil, where- serting its security dominance up to at gerous adversary. as today it provides around 3 percent. least central Germany. NATO stands in

How We Fight | inFOCUS 19 the way of this goal. Moreover, Russia Eastern Mediterranean, it can pressure against Iran, best expressed through his can no longer rely on massed tank di- NATO’s vulnerable southern European less restrictive rules of engagement in visions to smash their way into Central flank. How would Italy react to Russian the Arabian Gulf, should be commend- Europe, followed by millions of occupy- warships patrolling off the Sicilian coast ed. But the underlying strategic factors ing troops. Rather, Russia must “crack” days before a critical vote on invoking remain the same. NATO by stressing the natural fault- Article 5 over defending Montenegro? Iranian ships persistently harassed lines and divergences of interest within Would Spain support a NATO response American assets in the Arabian Gulf throughout the Obama administration, most visibly capturing an American pa- Russian expansionism, even more so than its trol craft in early 2016. The previous -ad ministration chose to focus on the crisis’ Iranian counterpart, is fueled by paranoia and “resolution,” hailing it as a benefit of the distrust of the West. post-JCPOA U.S.-Iranian relationship. Meanwhile, images of American sailors, with sacks over their heads, were circu- lated by Iranian social media outlets. such a large international coalition. This to Russian aggression in the Baltics if it Although this incident was the most strategy includes sustaining a frozen detected Russian submarines near Bar- prominent case of Iranian harassment, Ukraine conflict and supporting nation- celona? How would French warships there are others. Iranian fast-boats – small, alist, pro-Slavic groups in whatever Eu- patrolling to find migrant transports cheap, lightweight boats armed with ma- ropean country it can. respond to a Russian operational squad- chine guns and rudimentary missiles and But its growing presence in the East- ron just east of Corsica and Sardinia? rockets – consistently harassed American ern Mediterranean is more important. Despite friction between Russia and surface combatants throughout 2016 and Since its initial intervention in Syria in Iran, ultimately, each is the other’s most 2017. Seven Iranian fast-boats harassed the 2015, Russia has established a signifi- logical partner. Russia seeks to keep U.S. USS Firebolt, a naval patrol ship, in Sep- cant aviation and naval presence on the and allied interests in the Middle East un- tember 2016, making repeated passes at the Eastern Mediterranean coastline. Rus- der constant pressure to prevent a threat to ship and provoking several warning shots. sia is repairing the Tartus naval facility its Mediterranean operations. Iran wants Iranian drones flew dangerously near U.S. to allow it to host major warships. The a great power guarantor that can give it fighter jets, and Iranian sailors even shined Khmeimim Air Base can support nearly any aircraft in the Russian Air Force, including the Tu-22M Backfire Bomber, If Russia can establish control of the Eastern the mainstay of the Soviet Union’s mari- time strike force. Russia has defended its Mediterranean, it can pressure NATO’s vulnerable installations with an overlapping air de- southern European flank. fense system, providing the S-300 mis- sile platform to Syria’s armed forces. By projecting its power throughout the Eastern Mediterranean, Russia can freedom of action in the Middle East and laser-pointers at U.S. helicopter pilots. Ac- challenge NATO at one of its weakest prevent an American counterattack from cording to the U.S. Navy, 30 unsafe or un- points. Permanent American presence in the Mediterranean. Israel cannot provide professional incidents occurred between the Eastern Mediterranean amounts to a the guarantees that Iran offers Russia. American and Iranian ships in 2016. Such command ship and a handful of guided- Absent a substantial diplomatic realign- harassment continued – until August missile destroyers optimized for anti- ment involving Israel, the Gulf States, and 2017, when it abruptly ceased. For nearly a ballistic missile missions and based at Egypt, Russia cannot find a regional part- year, Iranian ships have been significantly the inland sea’s western end. The Italian, ner as reliably activist as Iran. less aggressive towards American forces in Spanish, and French navies lack the num- the Arabian Gulf. bers to keep up with a large-scale Russian ❚❚Rules of Engagement This change in Iranian behavior is sortie from the Black Sea, while Greece This points to the most visible area most likely a consequence of the Trump would likely be more preoccupied with of confrontation between Iran and the administration’s resolve, expressed Turkish actions than with Russia. United States – the Arabian Gulf. Presi- through the president’s willingness If Russia can establish control of the dent Trump’s more aggressive stance to expand the U.S. military’s Rules of

20 inFOCUS | Winter 2019 SETH CROPSEY: Strategic Challanges: Near East Gateways to Europe

Fighter jets at a Russian military facility in Syria. (Photo: Syria.mil.ru)

Engagement (ROE). Under the Obama the full backing of the executive to en- ❚❚Certain U.S. Interests, administration, American ROE were gage hostile forces if necessary. Uncertain Response extremely restrictive, with a variety of But this does not change the under- Just as the Iranian and Russian re- vital tactical and operational decisions lying strategic situation. As noted, the gimes are clear expressions of those na- requiring centralized approval from U.S. Sixth Fleet, responsible for protect- tions’ political cultures, so is the Ameri- Washington. By contrast, the current ing American interests in the Mediterra- can regime a reflection of the American administration has been more willing to nean Sea, only has five permanent ships people. Slow to act, but decisive in its authorize commanders’ use of force. assigned to it – four guided-missile de- anger and convinced of its justice, the The new approach was set with the stroyers and one command ship. Russia, United States has been an international January 2017 U.S. Special Operation raid by contrast, could sortie seven surface force for good in no small part because against a terrorist target in southern Ye- combatants and seven submarines from of its citizens’ moral character. But in men. Although unsuccessful in its intel- ligence-gathering mission, and despite the casualties U.S. forces incurred, the President Trump’s more aggressive stance mission demonstrated a willingness to use force that had been lacking during against Iran, best expressed through his less the last two years of Obama’s presidency. restrictive rules of engagement in the Arabian Gulf, President Trump reinforced this percep- tion with the April 2017 Shayrat missile should be commended. strike, authorizing a 58-cruise missile barrage against Syrian targets. In Febru- ary 2018, American forces in Tanf, Syria its bases in the Black Sea, supported by an age of growing partisanship and po- directly engaged Russian private security Khmeimim-based aviation and Syria litical strife, the possibility exists that forces fighting alongside the Syrian gov- air defenses. Iran’s ability to turn up the the American people may lose sight of ernment and its paramilitary partners – heat in the Arabian Gulf, it seems, belies their strategic interests and the defens- unthinkable during the Obama era. a more troubling situation in the East- es needed to protect those interests. Because of this increased resolve, ern Mediterranean. Control of one is Iran has been less willing to test Ameri- meaningless without control of the other, SETH CROPSEY is the Direc- can limits since late 2017. No longer particularly when the Eastern Mediterra- tor of The Center for American restrained by a passive president, U.S. nean, not the Arabian Gulf, is the greater Seapower at the Hudson Institute. commanders on the ground now have strategic prize.

How We Fight | inFOCUS 21 It Started with the “Peace Dividend” An inFOCUS interview with Representative DON BACON (R-NE) Congressman Don Bacon (R) serves the 2nd District of Nebraska, sitting on the House Armed Services, Homeland Security, and Agriculture committees. Prior to his election to the House in 2016, he spent nearly 30 years in the U.S. Air Force, retiring as a Brigadier General. During his career in the Air Force, Congressman Bacon specialized in electronic warfare, intelligence, reconnaissance, and public affairs. He served 16 assignments including four deployments overseas, three of which were in the Middle East, including one assignment to Iraq in 2007 to 2008 during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. inFOCUS Editor Shoshana Bryen met with him in early December.

inFOCUS: You have warned over the lowest readiness level since 1977. now. We can’t buy ourselves out of this time about readiness, and the Half the Navy aircraft couldn’t fly. Of 58 overnight, we also have a budget issue, problems that lapses in readi- combat brigades in the army, only three and the deficit. I think we’re at the right ness cause, including the recent were ready to deploy to Korea or wher- spot for slowly getting healthy. KC-130 accident that killed ever they were assigned; 55 were not. Our five Marines. What would you fighter pilots are getting about 40 percent iF: Secretary Mattis said this say is the current state of read- of the flight time that they should have week that the White House iness in the U.S. military; where been getting. Nothing like we were get- was going to resist any effort do we need more inputs, and ting in the 1990s. to cut the defense budget in what do we need to do first?

Rep. Bacon: We have both a readiness We can’t buy ourselves out of this overnight, we problem and a modernization problem. also have a budget issue, and the deficit. I think If we back up, it started with the “peace dividend” that we “received” in 1989-90, we’re at the right spot for slowly getting healthy. after the fall of the Soviet Union, when we thought we could reduce defense spend- ing. Then, after Desert Storm [1991], we If you put all that together, we had a the next cycle. Do you think were so dominant that we thought we tremendous readiness problem. We also that will carry, or do you could cut more. We were second to none. had over a 20-year hole in moderniza- think there’s enough pres- Nobody was close – that was the mind- tion. That’s what we’ve got to get out of, sure from Congress to start set. Then, after 9/11, Congress plussed- these two things. The military had cut 18 reducing again? up spending, but it went toward counter percent since 2010. Last year we plussed terrorism operations and training, not to it up by 10 percent, so we bought back Rep. Bacon: My position is we can’t cut countering a near-peer competitor. Then 60 percent of the reductions from the se- it. We have to stick with what we have in 2010, we went into sequester as a bud- quester, and now we’re trying to hold it plus inflation; that’s what will get us get cutting tool. even with inflation. You can’t just get out healthy on readiness and, over time, on The military said “If we do seques- of the readiness hole or modernization modernization, which will take longer. ter, we want to cut weapons systems or hole overnight. Readiness is going to I think it would be a mistake. I know bases.” Congress said no. So, we forced take another couple of years at this rate Chairman [Mac] Thornberry wants to the military to cut operations and train- to be healthy. Modernization is going to stay with the plan, budget plus inflation. ing, which hurts readiness. Two years take perhaps 10 years. To do otherwise will hurt readiness, or ago, when I came into Congress, we had That’s what we’re dealing with right hurt modernization.

22 inFOCUS | Winter 2019 INTERVIEW: The problem is, I can’t promise what the Democrat side will do on this. I think the new Chairman of the HASC [House

Armed Services Committee] wants to re- Rep. Don Bacon duce the top line. I think that’s a mistake. Our job is to do our best to not let that happen. Thankfully we have the Senate. iF: You mentioned Mr. Thorn- berry, who is an advocate of Space Command. How do you feel about space command, and where does it fit in your think- ing about modernization?

Rep. Bacon: I support a Space Com- mand-like model. To do a full separate service for space would be difficult, be- cause there are only 20,000 space opera- tors. The Marines are the next smallest service and they’re 90 times bigger. It doesn’t make sense to make a totally se- prate sixth service. We need to do some- thing different for three reasons. • First, Space is now a war fighting domain, so we need to be organized to win in that theater. We have to dominate that domain for ourselves and our allies to win a war, just like we have to do with air, sea, and ground, cyber and electronic Rep. Don Bacon. magnetic spectrum. • Second, we have duplicate acquisi- combatant command with its own fund- South China Sea and other areas of the tion lines that we need to consolidate. We ing line and it has a lot of its own culture. world. They could be more helpful with shouldn’t have four different space offices We need to go that way with space com- North Korea as well. China has a vote, – we need to stop that. mand as well. do they want to have a more cooperative • Third, and this goes back to the relationship and a partnership? We have point about a war-fighting domain, we iF: I want to talk about China to engage, but we have to be alert to what need a space war-fighting culture. I You’ve said that under some is China doing. China can’t just say the come from the Air Force, I love it, but it circumstances, we can have a South China Sea is theirs. Philippines, is still primarily a fighter pilot culture, productive relationship with Vietnam, Indonesia, Taiwan – our allies and we have to do something in the Air China. What needs to happen – have a voice in their part of the world Force to grow a space war-fighting cul- to get there? How do we deal and China can’t see them as vassal states. ture, just like the fighter pilot. We have with China and the South Chi- China has a bit of that culture that to get to where the Navy’ is where avia- na Sea? Under what conditions they see neighboring countries as being, tors, surface operators, and submariners can our relationship with or should be vassal states, but no, they’re have equal shot to be the CNO [Chief of China improve? our allies. We want to protect that. We Naval Operations]. You don’t see that on have to see how China responds. If they the Air Force side; they have to evolve to Rep. Bacon: We do not want to be en- try to be good partners in the world, of where the Navy is. emies with China. That would be bad course, they’re going to be worried about What I would recommend is some- for China and America, and the rest of their own priorities, and I understand thing like SOCOM [Special Opera- the world. But China gets a vote in this, that, but we’d like to see them embrace tions Command]. SOCOM is a separate in how they respond to things like the more of our values of human liberty, the

How We Fight | inFOCUS 23 various freedoms that we protect espe- bases that we will need in a time of cri- and the Baltics shows commitment to cially freedom of religion. We see people sis – which will probably be with Rus- them, which improves deterrence. of faith being persecuted, Muslims and sia. So we have to have a smarter policy. Christians, right now. I hope China We should not be reliant on Russian gas iF: Now we have a new situation moderates to where we have a coopera- in Europe for U.S. bases. in Ukraine between the Black tive partnership, whether it’s in trade Another example, we know the Rus- Sea and the Azov Sea. They’re or in how we work in the international sians are in our energy grid. I don’t know not in NATO. They’re not an ally arena. We have to see them do it in trade, about the Chinese at this point, but the and they’re not a treaty part- too. They have barriers, they’re stealing Russians are. So we have to be working ner. What are our choices in the intellectual property, they have preda- to build a resilience in our energy grid. face of Russian aggression? tory economic policies of buying our businesses, taking the technology, and acquiring it. They’re not fair business partners right now, and we can’t let that continue without a reaction from us. China has a bit of that culture that they see neighboring countries as being, or should be vassal states, but no, iF: Then comes the question of they’re our allies. We want to protect that. cyber spying and cyber war- fare. The Pentagon still buys computers and other systems from China and with Chinese iF: What do you mean “in the en- Rep. Bacon: Russia actually made a ter- parts. Why do we do that? ergy grid”? rible mistake in Ukraine. Ukraine had been a fifty-fifty country where they Rep. Bacon: They should not be. I think Rep. Bacon: They want to have the ability wanted to be in between alignment with we’re moving away from it. We’re very to turn off certain sectors of our energy Russia and the United States. Moscow concerned that there could be backdoor in a time of crisis, which would cause attacking Crimea and taking it and the software that will enable them into our rolling blackouts. I can only say that now Donetsk region – the Russian-populated systems. You can’t buy an F-35 [fighter because the administration released that areas – Ukraine now is, I think, very plane] and have Chinese-made comput- at an unclassified level but we’ve known it strongly wedded to the West and the er chips in there. That’s a recipe for di- for a while. That goes for Russia, not Chi- United States. You can guarantee that saster. So, we have to make sure that we na, but if the Russians are doing that the Ukraine will be very much more aligned have integrity in our computer systems Chinese could possibly try to do the same with us from here on out. Russian policy and software on our military systems. thing. We should be buying smartly when is doing the opposite of what they want- There is a focus on making sure that it comes to our weapons systems. ed. If you ask me, it’s a mistake. we’re buying, and I know this first hand. I think for Ukraine, we’re going to If we know things are from China we iF: The next question was actu- have to work with them to figure out encourage folks in the National Security ally about Russia and wheth- what can we do with weapons and train- arena to buy from certain companies be- er Russian behavior in Europe ing to help them out. The previous ad- cause we know that they check. might necessitate larger bases, ministration was sending them MRE’s more bases, more soldiers. [Meals Ready-to-Eat]. I thought we iF: Could you imagine a “Buy should be sending them anti-tank mis- American” policy? Rep. Bacon: If budget wasn’t a concern, I siles and I supported the anti-tank mis- would say yes, we need to have more pres- siles that this administration sent. I also Rep. Bacon: Yes, or “Buy Allied.” I ence in Europe. I would support what think we should be working in other think particularly when it comes to Poland’s asking for, which is a NATO areas. It would be a mistake right now software, computers, to do that from ground armored unit in their country. to talk about NATO because they’re in Russia or China makes no sense. I’ll It would be smart because I think it is a a state of war with Russia, but we could give you a related example. Our bases in deterrent. They’re on the front lines with surely help make them more proficient. Europe are using Russian energy right a revisionist Russia right now. I do think Russia had a treaty with Ukraine in now, natural gas. It’s a mistake because we need to expand the presence because which they pledged to honor their bor- they can just turn off their gas and the we need to ensure that we have a strong ders if Kiev gave up its nuclear weapons. bases are vulnerable. Precisely those deterrent. Having a presence in Poland Moscow has walked all over that treaty.

24 inFOCUS | Winter 2019 INTERVIEW: Rep. Don Bacon

U.S. Army soldiers with the Joint Multinational Training Group conduct live fire exercises with their Ukrainian counterparts. (Photo: Army Staff Sgt. Elizabeth Tarr) It’s unacceptable. I think that that is But we have to realize they’ve not their presence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, our green light to do much more with done anything tangible on their nuclear Yemen, you name it. It’s a very scary Ukraine to support them. program. So we need to keep the sanc- place. Not immediately, but in 10 years tions on and not back off. I could see that being the world’s big- iF: I’d like to raise Iran and gest flashpoint. North Korea. We’ve tried to iF: And Iran? make inroads with North Ko- iF: They’ve been having demon- rea, maybe in some ways we Rep. Bacon: Iran is what scares me most. strations for a year now all have. What should we do? We haven’t had a nuclear weapon drop across Iran. Do you think they in anger since 1945. If there is one in the can change their government? Rep. Bacon: The president and the secre- next 10 or 15 years, the most likely sce- I’m NOT suggesting we over- tary of state did the right thing in meet- nario is with Iran. If they build nuclear throw it. ing with Kim Jong Un. But in the end, we weapons and add to their missile capa- haven’t seen tangible results, just a lot of bility, Israel will not stand on the side- Rep. Bacon: I don’t know. Obviously, talk. So, we should maintain sanctions lines. Not with an Iran that’s pledged to we would love to see that regime gone; on the regime until things change. On annihilate it. the Iranian people deserve better. When the other hand, the dialogue has lowered We have to do everything in our you look at polling from Iran, they are the temperature. That’s good, because a power right now to stop Iran from ac- the people in the region most favorably year ago it was something else. I talked quiring nuclear weapons. I supported inclined toward the West, but they have to General [Mark] Milley [Chairman of pulling out of the JCPOA [Joint Com- the worst government – a theocracy the Joint Chiefs of Staff], and it was scary prehensive Plan of Action, the “Iran based on Shite extremism. It would be to hear how close we were and really deal”]. It was a mistake. The Obama an answered prayer if their government what a war with North Korea would en- administration gave $100-150 billion was overthrown. But you’re right, it has tail. They have biological weapons, nerve to the world’s largest exporter of terror to come from the Iranians. agents, and on an unclassified level, an and strengthened it based on a promise estimated 60 nuclear weapons. It would with a sunset clause that allowed it to iF: Do we support the Iranian be ugly – an estimated million people, become a recognized nuclear state in a people? How do we let them primarily civilians, killed in a war. So decade. It was a mistake. We have not know we’re on their side? I’m glad the temperature has gone down. seen Iran back off at all, their terrorism,

How We Fight | inFOCUS 25 Rep. Bacon: We do support them. I’m not too sure what the best policy is. We overthrew Saddam in Iraq and then we pulled the rug out from under the Shia down south. So we have to be careful about over-promising. We surely stand by them with moral support, infor- mation. I think we keep the economic clamps on Tehran so that we cut down on their trade. I just co-sponsored a bill today that will punish banks that do business with Iran, even in Europe. So we have to choke them and weaken them. But I know that often hurts the people, but in the end our goal, our hope is that the people do get rid of that government.

iF: Back to the United States. You’re on the Homeland Secu- (Photo: Jennifer Vinciguerra) rity Committee. What would you say keeps you up at night? not people who wish harm on America; against people and trying to shut down we’re talking about a small minority. But free speech. They use the same tech- Rep. Bacon: The worst terrorist attack they can do real damage. There are some niques that they decry. They’re a violent obviously was imported here from Af- who are radicalized through the Inter- group, but I wouldn’t call them a terrorist ghanistan by al-Qaeda, which is why net, or maybe it’s an outlier mosque. group yet. I just think they’re repugnant. it’s important that we not let the Taliban We have an outside threat and an This may be an aside, but I think win in Afghanistan. We have to main- inside threat. We know terrorists are in politics we need to be more respect- tain a presence there, a minimal pres- trying to come here from the Middle ful with each other. We can agreeably ence, to ensure that the Taliban doesn’t East every day. Every day, they’re some- disagree, but what I hear right now is take over. There is some terror that where in the pipeline. We have to talk the other side of the aisle [Democrats] will typically call us fascist, Nazi, and it’s wrong. Actually, it’s not really an When you look at polling from Iran, they are the aside, because the Antifa movement people in the region most favorably inclined toward plays into that. Both sides of our gov- ernment, Republicans and Democrats, the West, but they have the worst government – a have to raise the bar – I’m talking more theocracy based on Shite extremism. about the Democrats, but Republicans have to do the same thing. We have to be more respectful.

can come from the outside – we have about the ideology that does that and try iF: As an Air Force veteran, can evidence of some Sudanese extremists to figure out how do we undermine the you address providing the care trying to come through our southern process of radicalization. our veterans need when we’re border, through Brazil. We’re working talking about budget cuts? that. But day-to-day, the bigger threat is iF: What about groups like An- How do we make sure that they homegrown extremism. People become tifa? That’s not terrorism as we get what they need, including radicalized. Second generation people normally define it. long-term care? who are radicalized in ways their par- ents were not. Rep. Bacon: What concerns me is that Rep. Bacon: We have to say up front, It’s a minority, a small minority. We they say they’re anti-Nazi, but they use VA has had an increase in funding the have always to clarify that, 99 percent are fascist techniques – threatening violence last two years and it is one area that’s

26 inFOCUS | Winter 2019 INTERVIEW: had bipartisan support on the Hill. And country as a whole is having. Cost. Costs have been rising every year, to the point the doctors and nurses are committed are going up. I don’t support a govern- where some ports can’t function. They’re individuals. ment takeover of healthcare, and we have actually having to raise the ports up.

However, the bureaucracy is out to acknowledge that Obamacare has not Water levels are rising. Does that Rep. Don Bacon of date. It shouldn’t take months and worked; it doubled premiums, it’s raised mean it’s caused by human activ- months to pay a private doctor who sees cost. I voted for AHCA [the American ity? There is probably a combination a veteran under the Choice Act [rather Health Care Act], to lower premiums, of inputs into this, but the point is the changes are having an impact. I just see it most readily when I talk to the Navy. ...our VA is suffering from a medical problem that They have to face the real-life challenge of keeping ports functioning when water our country as a whole is having. Cost. levels rise every year. More broadly, we’re seeing the Arctic Ocean becoming more and more pass- than the vet going to a VA hospital]. It’s but we’ve got to find ways to reform and able; fewer months filled in by ice. We’re not right. We’re going to have to restore lower cost. What we’re seeing with the seeing some change now. I don’t believe a functioning bureaucracy in the VA VA is a symptom. we know how much of that is man-made that knows how to pay bills on time, that We can’t just fix the VA. We have a and how much of it is normal cycles, but does electronically transferable records. medical problem in our country and we there are changes and it’s impacting the When I talk to our local VA, they’re snail- have to fix it. military as well. mailing records and reports to Florida, I take a pragmatic view: our goal and they have to wait for the papers to be iF: Last question. You’re a mem- is to ensure that our air and water are mailed back. They’re technologically in ber of the Bipartisan House cleaner than what we received when we the 1950’s and 60’s. Climate Solution Caucus. Can started. That our kids are given a cleaner I support choice for veterans, rather you talk about that? planet. That’s my goal. than making them go to VA facilities that are sometime far away or inconvenient. Rep. Bacon: I actually look at this in iF: Congressman Bacon, on be- Choice will help them, but I’m pretty terms of our military operations. I was half of the members of The sure you have to pay the doctors on time. just down in Virginia Beach, at the ports Jewish Policy Center and the But the fact also is that our VA is suf- where they were building aircraft carri- readers of inFOCUS Quarterly, fering from a medical problem that our ers and subs. For decades, the water levels Thank you.

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How We Fight | inFOCUS 27 Space Force: It’s Time to Act by Maj. Gen. THOMAS TAVERNEY, USAF (ret.)

“We are going to have the Air Force and The reality is, as with other domains, ❚❚Arguments For and Against we are going to have the Space Force.” space has already been militarized be- Some non-space experts view cre- –President Donald Trump, June 2018. cause we have used space to support our ation of a Space Force through the lens land, sea, and air forces. What we are do- of creation of the Air Force over 70 years pace capabilities are a critical ing in space is really no different. When ago: that is, we have no need for a space part of everything we do in the we put a communications satellite in orbit force until we deliver offensive effects Defense Department. We could and gave our soldiers, sailors, Marines, from space. The problem with this view Snot effectively conduct military airmen, and Coast Guardsmen radios, is that it looks at the value and utility operations without space. Additionally, space was militarized. When we got the of the space medium through the lens the commercial and civil world depends GPS constellation on orbit and gave a sol- of the air medium. All four mediums on capabilities from space; from naviga- dier a GPS receiver, space was militarized. in which we operate (air, sea, land, and tion and timing to communications. So, the question is, did these actions space) have their own utility, strengths, Today we do not have the focus, cause space to become weaponized? And weaknesses, and challenges. Viewing force structure, force posture, operat- if it is weaponized, will it cause a war? the value of any of them through the ing practices, or warfighting strategy to We have proven over many years that perspective of any of the others does not counter the current or emerging threats the best way to avoid military conflict do a service to the medium regarding its to our national interests in space. We do is to have a strong military with power- advantages and challenges. not have an organization with the au- ful capabilities. It is called “deterrence.” We wouldn’t want to assess the Air thority, responsibility, budget, or even This makes staring a war not a good de- Force’s value against its ability to oc- direction to assess solutions to these is- cision for our adversaries and therefore cupy ground or separate combatants sues with the necessary singular focus. keeps the peace. As President Ronald from non-combatants. As a nation, the Reagan said, “Peace through strength.” Defense Department has done very well ❚❚Weaponizing Space? While some may wish weaponizing when our services have looked at the Some of the rhetoric, often from space never occurred, the fact is that our ad- medium in which they operate in a fo- non-space professionals, has been about versaries get a vote, and have already voted cused fashion and with world-class ex- space becoming a dangerous place in to weaponize space. Russia and China both perts and leaders in that medium. Space which to operate, not just for us, but for have demonstrated offensive space capabili- is unique and brings capabilities none of the commercial and civil markets across ties, along with the stated and demonstrat- the other domains can contribute. Thus, the entire world. The crux of some of ed intent to use those capabilities. Addi- the use of space systems should be ad- these arguments is that a Space Force would militarize (use space for military purposes) and weaponize (put weapons in) space, thereby making space less safe The reality is, as with other domains, space has and could result in wars in space. The first time we armed a soldier already been militarized because we have used or built a tank, did we militarize land? space to support our land, sea, and air forces. When we built and floated our first naval vessel, did we militarize the sea? When we built our first military aircraft, did we militarize air? I guess the answer is yes. We have always opted to provide the lead- tionally, they are both building hypersonic dressed by space professionals steeped in ership of the country with the ability to weapons systems to put our nation and our the missions accomplished through, to, defend ourselves in all domains, and to people at risk. Our adversaries now pose a and from space. use those domains to the maximum ad- clear and present threat to our national se- Another issue is that a different vantage of our country, our international curity. If anything, the case for a strong de- military service would complicate in- diplomacy, our allies, and our troops. fensive posture in space has strengthened. teraction and communication within

28 inFOCUS | Winter 2019 Maj. Gen other threats. We are not in this game to only protect our satellites, but also

to protect those men and women that . THOMAS TAVERNEY, USAF need our space capabilities to success- fully carry out their military and civil- ian missions. 2. Russia and China are develop- ing anti-space capabilities. We need to ensure freedom of action in space (for peaceful purposes) for the United States, our allies, and the world so space commerce can continue unthreatened and unabated. (ret.

3. Additionally, Russia and China ) :

are developing hypersonic glide mis- Time to Act Space Force: It’s sile threats to the United States, our infrastructure, our people, and that of our allies and friends. We must defend ourselves against these threats. We need Vice President Mike Pence, speaking at the Pentagon on the Space Force, called for an assistant secretary of defense for space. (Photo: U.S. Department of Defense.) space-based systems to locate and track and counter these threats before they hit the Air Force between space and air ele- at the types of systems Russia and China the United States or our allies. ments. The truth is that the majority of have been pursuing, we have been sur- 4. We have been somewhat sur- support from space is to the Army, Navy, prised by the speed at which they have prised at the progress Russia and China Marines, and Special Operations; all are developed sophisticated space and hy- have made in these areas. We certainly bigger users than the Air Force. We al- personic threats. They are rapidly im- knew they were pursuing hypersonic ready ensure space is fully integrated plementing new technologies and their technology, but the speed at which they into the operations of the other services technology-based demonstrations chal- have done it has apparently been a sur- as well as the Air Force. Space is a do- lenge the assured availability of our prise. We need to make it somebody’s main that transcends regions, and can space capabilities and threaten people job to not be surprised. provide global reach. and facilities on the ground. 5. Russia and China are advancing Peers, near-peers, regional powers, space technology faster than we cur- ❚❚Why Now? and even non-state actors can now hold rently are. They seem to be turning over The United States has been the clear all or some of our space assets at risk and technology in three to four years, while dominant player in space for more than deny the United States freedom of pas- we are turning technology in seven to 12 25 years. Space has remained a safe and sage through and operations in space. years. While we remain the preeminent protected place, with amazing growth They also have developed technologies nation in space, and the leader in space of a commercial space industry world- that threaten American assets on the technologies, it is clear it will not take wide. Today, space is an international ground. Hypersonic systems threaten many of their advancement cycles before domain with more than 60 nations us- our troops and U.S. facilities and equip- we begin falling behind. ing it in a peaceful, unthreatened fash- ment as well as our civilian population. ion. Unfortunately, the guarantee of op- ❚❚Why Pursue a Space Force? erating freely in space no longer exists. ❚❚Drivers for Acquisition Establishing a Space Force is not Congressman Jim Cooper (D-TN) 1. We need to ensure the safety of- only about providing effects from space, said, “Some have argued that the U.S. current systems we fly in space – to sup- it is about focus. taking a more belligerent approach to port military operations, limit collateral If your raison d’être is space, you space could encourage a new arms race. and infrastructure damage, and support wake up in the morning and go to bed at But this notion is uninformed. Space for international disaster relief. We need night thinking of space and only space. is already a war-fighting domain. Pre- to ensure they can continue to support You develope people with a career of ex- tending our satellites are safe right now their missions, even while those systems perience in space, but also with a strong is foolish.” potentially could come under attack set of warfighter experiences. Space While we have not been surprised from kinetic, electromagnetic, cyber, or professionals need to understand the

How We Fight | inFOCUS 29 criticality of their systems to the warf- options may save money in the long run, the 1960s into a bureaucratic web that ighter and gain experience in how they every option would have a near-term bogged down the acquisition process. are used. Implementing a Director of cost; the question is how much is that How do we put in place safeguards Space Forces in the area of responsibility near-term cost? against a similar devolution in the fu- is important, but we clearly need to build Creation of a completely separate ture, without affecting efficiency, speed, closer ties with all of the services and go service equivalent to the Air Force, and effectiveness, and while including forward with them to understand fully Army, or Navy would create the great- intelligent, focused oversight? Commer- how space is being used, and be able to est cost and bureaucratic disruption. A cial space and early space developments determine how it could be used. This will Corps or Guard may be less disruptive provide a clue by co-locating smart en- lead to better systems and support. Suc- and costly, but still would come with gineers with authority and responsibil- cess in the terrestrial battlespace requires a price tag. We should not create a big ity onto the developers’ site. significant cross-domain employment of bureaucracy and the kind of footprint Probably the key recommendation land, maritime, air and space in mutually that would generate a new constellation from Vice President Mike Pence’s speech supporting and supported relationships. of civilian leaders, under-secretaries, in August was a call to establish an As- When the United States does this, assistant secretaries, deputy assistant sistant Secretary of Defense for Space instead of reacting to the problem of secretaries, their attendant staffs, and to drive and organize this transition – the day (and with the Air Force having all the accompanying bureaucracy. We someone steeped in space and all of the three major missions there is always a need to consider the value added of rep- elements of launch, on-orbit operations, problem, or two, of the day) you are able licating things like basic training, ser- command-and-control, and acquisition. to think about the “what ifs.” What if vice academies, recruiting, and so on, This person also needs to have a predi- our adversaries develop hypersonic and and what may be more cost-effective lection for out-of-the-box thinking and multi-burn weapons? What if our adver- functions for the Defense Department change; be committed to doing this with saries develop more robust antisatellite to cross-utilize versus the value of a to- a very small staff; committed to total ac- weapons? What do we do if a determined tally independent service. cessibility; and have the necessary au- adversary takes out one of our satellites? The advantage of being able to take thority and accountability. What if our adversaries begin turning a fresh look is you can take advantage Most importantly, this startup technology faster than we do? When you of modern information systems to do leader needs to commit to the first six are busy solving an F-35 production is- business in a more efficient and effec- months, then get off the stage and let the sue there simply is not time for this type tive fashion and with fewer people. The process pick a qualified secretary unbur- of thinking. proper alignment of authority and ac- dened by the inevitable broken glass of countability will be critical. The Space setting up a new organization. The skills ❚❚Creating the Right Force Force does not have to be an onerously to start a new organization and the skills We simply cannot lose sight of the expensive organization. By exploiting to be a secretary differ substantially. ultimate goal, capturing superiority in instantaneous digital communications, With a lean organization of similarly space so we can guarantee that our space we can design a much leaner organiza- qualified people, this office must lead capabilities are always available, that we tion with fewer levels of organization, this transition, with some likely reluc- advance technology as fast or faster than shorter lines of communication, and tant partners. our adversaries, and that we assure the more rapid, cleaner decision-making. free and unfettered use of space by all. We can create mission managers, com- ❚❚Conclusion The best argument against forming bining operations and acquisitions with- The commander-in-chief has spo- a Space Force is the cost; that it is bet- in the same organization. In effect, we ken, and the time to debate is over. It ter to spend our Defense Department can disaggregate the organization and is time to determine the best and most dollars on equipment, systems, and ensure that senior leadership gets and cost-effective organizational alignment training. This is certainly a valid argu- sees everything of use to it. No longer to get the job done, present recommen- ment. However, using the only number will decisions get staffed and manipu- dations to the White House and Con- that currently exists (provided by Air lated by a cast of thousands. gress, and let them do their jobs. Force Secretary Heather Wilson), the However, we need to be vigilant: cost would be on the order of one half of as Gen. Bernard Schriever observed, Maj. Gen. THOMAS TAVERNEY, one percent of the Defense Department the procedures that the Western De- USAF (ret.) is a former vice commander budget. And, indeed there may even be velopment Division created to expedite of Air Force Space Command. A version of ways to lower this estimated cost with a acquisition and deployment of the first this article appeared in The Space Review. more efficient organization. While some ICBMs and spacecraft devolved during

30 inFOCUS | Winter 2019 Afghanistan: How Much Longer, To What End? by JAMES DURSO

(Editor’s Note: American forces have NATO command in its various guises training, improvised explosive device spent 17 years, costly in lives and money, has had 16 commanders, Americans (IED) attacks, or number of people dis- fighting in Afghanistan. The following commanding exclusively since 2007. placed by the fighting, we’ve got you cov- article, intended to stimulate strategic re- President Donald Trump isn’t ered. Adding to the confusion, compet- examination of our involvement, focuses comfortable with the extended mission ing assessments by the Department of on accountability for achieving objectives in Afghanistan. He wants to win, but Defense, the Special Inspector General and posits an unusual “exit strategy.”) probably doesn’t see a way out, primar- for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR), ily because most of his advisors don’t and the Lead Inspector General for eneral Electric Co. fired its chief know any means other than “money and Overseas Contingency Operations dis- executive officer, John Flannery, time.” So, in August, he authorized an agree on the meaning of trends. after 12 months because “the additional 4,000 troops for training and How can the president measure the Gboard had grown frustrated counter-terrorism missions. leaders’ success or failure? By looking with the slow pace of change.” Ameri- American taxpayers were indulgent at the amount of territory the Afghan can taxpayers know exactly how the GE for the first decade of the Afghanistan central government controls or influ- board felt whenever they see another project, but President Barack Obama ences, currently under 60 percent of the headline about Afghanistan. gave notice the tide had turned when country? Or looking at the level of opi- In September 2018, the United States he suggested America pursue “nation um production? According to the latest had been in Afghanistan for 17 years building here at home.” President Trump report by the U.N. Office on Drugs and and there was no end in sight. The CIA, the spearhead of U.S. forces, reached Af- ghanistan’s Panjshir Valley on Sept. 26, After almost two inconclusive decades there’s no 2001 just more than two weeks after al- Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks in New York City shame in allowing domestic political considerations and Washington, D.C. Military special to drive Afghanistan policy. operations forces arrived shortly after, and the combined CIA-military team connected with the Northern Alliance to rout the Taliban and liberate Kabul by pithily seconded that when he asked, Crime “opium production in Afghani- mid-November. “What the f**k are we doing there?” stan increased by 87 percent to a record Maybe we should have quit while we Maybe it’s time Trump gave his top level of 9,000 metric tons in 2017 com- were ahead: the tab so far is $840 billion three officials in country, the ambassa- pared with 2016 levels.” for military operations, $126 billion for dor, the commander of NATO’s Opera- Up to now, the senior leaders, dip- reconstruction, probably another $1 tril- tion Resolute Support, and the USAIS lomats, generals, and reconstruction lion for veterans’ health care and more Mission Director 12 months to show officials worked as if they had no dead- than 2,200 American killed and 20,000 demonstrable progress. But how will he line, which in the trade is known as wounded. The annual cost is $50 billion, determine success? “conditions-based.” Instead, the leaders more than the defense budget of the The war has spawned a flood of should be given a deadline and promise United Kingdom. measurements that tell us more and of no micromanaging by Washington. On Sept. 2, 2018, Gen. Scott Miller more about how we’re “not winning” in There’s a lot going on beneath the sur- assumed command of the NATO forces the words of Defense Secretary James face of those metrics because they really in Afghanistan. Since January 2002, the Mattis. If you want to measure days of measure the provision of public safety

How We Fight | inFOCUS 31 in Afghanistan’s ungoverned spaces, so government control of the countryside Ghani’s opponents in the Coalition for the leaders should have a free hand to do and increasing illegal opium produc- the Salvation of Afghanistan may hand what they must to succeed. tion. In questioning the purposes of the Trump an opportunity to break out. Twelve months will keep the NATO continued U.S. military presence in Af- The Coalition, an assembly of the forces in place through the next Afghan ghanistan, President Trump was chan- minority Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazara, presidential election on April 20, 2019. neling many Americans. with Pashtun leadership, will be a serious And speaking of presidential elections, In parallel with the 4,000 troop in- challenge to Ghani in next April’s vote, and it may try to invalidate the October 2018 parliamentary election and call a U.S. diplomats have started direct talks with the traditional Loya Jirga to unseat Ghani. If the Coalition uses the extra-legal Loya Taliban while reiterating that the end to the conflict Jirga to oust Ghani, Trump would have will only come through an intra-Afghan settlement. the justification he needs to go to the American people with a decision to quit and cut America’s considerable losses, es- pecially if he is bolstered by a pessimistic the 2020 vote in the U.S. is on Nov. 3, crease authorized by President Trump, National Intelligence Estimate. 2020, so a 12-month performance period the administration slashed assistance to So now comes Erik Prince, the for the three leaders will give the Repub- Pakistan, the state sponsor of the Tali- man everyone loves to hate, with a plan lican candidates one year to campaign ban. This won’t change Pakistan’s behav- to privatize and streamline the tasks without having to promise progress in ior in Afghanistan, but at least America now being performed by about 14,000 Afghanistan if there is none to be had. won’t continue to insult itself by funding American and 8,000 NATO troops and After almost two inconclusive decades its enemy. over 26,000 contractors. Prince earned there’s no shame in allowing domestic U.S. diplomats have started direct his notoriety in Iraq when his security political considerations to drive Afghan- talks with the Taliban while reiterat- company, Blackwater Worldwide, was istan policy. In fact, it’s about time. ing that the end to the conflict will only involved in a shooting incident at Bagh- And facile assurances, like from come through an intra-Afghan settle- dad’s Nisour Square that left 17 inno - Afghanistan’s Chief Executive Abdul- ment. At the same time, Uzbekistan’s cent bystanders dead and caused Black- lah Abdullah that it “won’t be a 50-year diplomats hosted talks with Taliban rep- water’s expulsion from the country. engagement,” indicate some of that resentatives as part of Tashkent’s initia- Prince, in his defense, claims he never country’s leaders don’t understand most tive to include Afghanistan in Central lost a client which, if you were protected Americans think it’s unlikely the United Asia, and to give the Taliban an inter- by his teams, is probably the most sig- States will prevail, whether the strategy locuter other than Pakistan. nificant criterion. is dressed up as “time-based” or “condi- Trump’s pro-intervention advi- Prince proposes to replace the tions-based.” They need the motivation sors probably want to block him from NATO forces and their support contrac- the ticking clock provides, and the un- deciding to withdraw and upsetting tors with 6,000 contractors, all special derstanding that this may be the end of their claim on America’s attention.

❚❚Plan Illuminates Current Prince proposes to replace the NATO forces and Short-comings their support contractors with 6,000 contractors... In August 2018, U.S. Defense Secre- tary James Mattis kiboshed Erik Prince’s plan to privatize the war in Afghanistan. Prince called the fighting “an expensive next spring’s Afghan presidential elec- operations veterans, and 2,000 U.S. spe- disaster for America.” But we may not tion. Twice-postponed parliamentary cial operations troops, who will provide have seen the last of the Prince plan, elections were held successfully in late QA for the contractors and unilateral which is forthrightly titled “An Exit October. Retaining U.S. forces through direct-action capability. The mentor- Strategy for Afghanistan.” the Afghan presidential balloting would contractors will stay with their assigned Despite the cost in dollars and give the new NATO commander time Afghan National Army battalions for a lives, there hasn’t been much progress, to make progress (known as “calendar minimum of three years. Two-thousand as noted above in figures on central creep”). But Afghan President Ashraf contractors will operate aircraft for

32 inFOCUS | Winter 2019 JAMES DURSO: Afghanistan: How Much Longer, To What End?

Soldiers from A Company, 101st Division Special Troop Battalion air assault into a village inside Jowlzak valley, Parwan province, Afghanistan. (Photo: U.S. Army) medical evacuation and close air support experience with the military and intelli- Prince’s force will be non-American). and will staff two Western-style combat gence agencies, but no candidate may sat- News media report the death of every surgical hospitals that would also treat isfy all the bureaucracies so the president deployed military member, even if he wounded Afghan soldiers. The contrac- (and Congress) will have to back it up by or she dies in a vehicle accident on base, tors and U.S. forces would be subject to giving the viceroy hire-and-fire authority but dead contractors go unnoticed. Two the Uniform Code of Military Justice and control of the budgets. hundred and fifty-seven American con- and Afghan law, and contractor medical Another noted feature was con- tractors died in Iraq from 2003 to 2011 care would be provided by Defense Base tracting the effort under Title 50 of the but received far less attention than fa- Act insurance, which is current practice United States Code which is the author- talities among soldiers they supported. for contingency contracts. ity for the security services, such as the The opportunity to mine Afghani- The plan includes a governance sup- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), but stan’s trove of rare earth elements was port unit that will provide logistics to also for most military operations. This highlighted in Prince’s plan, which im- the force and, very importantly, prevent may expedite the contract award pro- mediately drew accusations of plun- payment to Afghanistan’s “ghost sol- cess, but particular attention will be der. There is wealth to be had: Russian, diers” and the skimming of soldiers’ pay required for “contract administration,” British, and American geologists have by their commanders, perennial corrup- that is, ensuring the vendor completes found that Afghanistan has enormous tion problems in Afghanistan’s military. the terms and conditions of the contract. untapped mineral resources, possibly The most remarked upon feature of As the military, the diplomats, and the valued at $3 trillion. the plan was Prince’s suggestion that the reconstruction officials have been -un The minerals are there, but there’s effort be led by a “viceroy” who would able to define “success” in Afghanistan, no way to mine them, so they’re effec- answer directly to the president and com- the contracting officer and the vendor tively worthless. And there’s no way mand all military, diplomatic, and in- may be left to their own devices. to get them out because the country is telligence assets in Afghanistan. This is And using contractors has one big violent and corrupt, which scares away known as “unity of command,” and has benefit for a government: their deaths investors. Outsourcing may be the last never existed in America’s long project are pretty much off the radar, especially chance to recover Afghanistan’s mineral in Afghanistan. That person would need if they aren’t American (and a share of wealth for its people. It will also chip

How We Fight | inFOCUS 33 away at China’s control of a significant share of the world’s rare earths. Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s govern- ment has some concerns the United States must address: • Is the plan legal under interna- tional law? • Will using foreign contractors encourage local warlords to circumvent the newly-formed democratic institu- tions in the country? • Who will be accountable for the success or failure of outsourcing a mili- tary campaign? • How will the government of Af- ghanistan provide oversight of military operations on its territory? • Will outsourcing be seen as a for- profit corporation taking control of the conflict and selling war as a product, Defense Secretary James Mattis conducts an all call with the men and women of Ba- dooming prospects for peace and recon- gram Airfield, Afghanistan. (Photo: U.S. Air Force) ciliation in the country? The regional powers, China and Detractors of a new approach may also consider Afghan concerns. Russia, and the active neighbors such as say the sacrifice of our GIs will be dis- Prince’s plan gives the United States Pakistan and Uzbekistan, may stop their honored by resorting to “mercenaries,” an opportunity to try a new strategy in support of the peace process if they in- but the sunk cost of the dollars, dead, Afghanistan instead of spending an- terpret outsourcing as indicative of wan- and wounded shouldn’t stop us from ex- other year while yet another new NATO ing U.S. interest. amining alternatives after 17 years fight- commander gets acquainted with his Criticism of Prince’s plan runs up ing a war we are “not winning” accord- job. It may prompt Washington to con- against the ticking clock that is close to ing to Sec. Mattis. sider three options: Prince’s original chiming “20 years” so Trump may soon Prince has suggested a “test drive” plan, an Afghan Ring Road reconstruc- run out of patience and present Kabul of his proposal which would see con- tion plan suggested by Gary Anderson, (and U.S. officials) with a “take it or tractor deployments to Nangarhar and which could strengthen the country’s general infrastructure and commercial integration with Central Asian neigh- There’s no U.S. political constituency for continued bors, or the “decent interval” option, providing mentoring and training to loitering in Afghanistan and Trump won’t lose any the Afghan army so, if worse comes to votes in 2020 if he says he gave it his best shot... worst, the United States will be several years removed from a Taliban takeover.

JAMES DURSO is Managing Director of leave it” proposal. There’s no U.S. politi- Helmand provinces. Nangarhar is an Corsair LLC and was a professional staff cal constituency for continued loitering egress route to and from safe havens in member for the Commission on Wartime in Afghanistan and Trump won’t lose Pakistani, and Helmand is the Taliban’s Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. any votes in 2020 if he says he gave it his financial center of gravity where one- This article is an edited combination of best shot but getting out now is right for third of the arable land is used for poppy his “General Electric’s version of account- America. Secretary Mattis is concerned cultivation. That would provide Wash- ability should be used in Afghanistan” and that outsourcing may make NATO allies ington some interesting lessons learned “Is Erik Prince Pointing the Way Out of in our Afghan coalition jump ship, but whatever the outcome but, given resis- Afghanistan?” which appeared in the Oct. how many American lives and dollars tance inside the U.S. government, it will 4, 2018 and Sept. 28, 2018 editions of The should we pay for Latvia’s 37 troops? require an impartial evaluator who will Hill and Real Clear Defense, respectively.

34 inFOCUS | Winter 2019 Threats and Strategic Foresight by LANI KASS

ll strategic planning is based on a Indians only to struggle to deploy a bri- resounding success – perceived as such set of assumptions. Surprise oc- gade 80 miles off the coast of Florida – by friend and foe alike – will be magni- curs when core assumptions are against Spain in Cuba. Likewise, Britain fied in the interconnected global village Aproven wrong. and France post-1815 let their conven- and feed the narrative of America as “the History is replete with examples of tional power fade – while their hubris giant with feet of clay.” militaries that failed due to their inabil- blossomed – resulting in a blood bath in We must balance current exigen- ity to transform organizations and cul- the Crimean War and near-existential cies with future requirements. Any ture, adopt new operational concepts, disasters in the two World Wars that fol- single-focus approach bears a huge op- or leverage breakthrough technologies. lowed. In the wake of their spectacular portunity cost. The rest of the world has But militaries do not fail by themselves. victory in June 1967, the Israel Defense not taken a time out while we tended to Failure occurs in the context of an over- Forces (IDF) rested on its laurels, ceased Iraq and Afghanistan. To the contrary, all national debacle caused by systemic innovating, and focused on policing the it exploited our focus on the lower end problems that fall into three distinct but newly acquired territories and fighting of the conflict spectrum to the point of related categories: terrorism, secure in the soon-to-be- leapfrogging areas where the United • Failure to Anticipate the nature of proven fallacy that past successes and States effectively took its dominance for and trends within the strategic environ- strategic depth would deter any future granted. Consequently, future conflicts ment; the character and resilience of the opponent; one’s own will and resolve; the impact of technology – be it new or old but used in new ways; and, perhaps ...aggressors tend to assume risks that seem irrational most importantly, failure to anticipate – and, thus, improbable – to the intended victim. the second- and third-order conse- quences of both action and inaction. • Failure to Learn from experience – both our own and others’. Selective read- conventional threat. Six short years lat- will be more costly, violent, and difficult ing of history – especially when coupled er, in October 1973, Israel was fighting to control. The potential for strategic with faulty analysis – is particularly for its very survival, having fallen victim surprise is high, and our military’s re- pernicious here, as is mistaking “lessons to strategic surprise masterfully orches- sidual capacity is at a historic low. Con- recorded” with lessons absorbed and ac- trated by the seemingly defeated foe. cepts and institutional structures, valid tually learned. The implications are clear: First, ag- for a specific time and place, should not • Failure to Adapt behaviors, con- gressors tend to assume risks that seem be allowed to become dogma. That too is cepts and institutional constructs to the irrational – and, thus, improbable – to a prescription for failure. ever changing domestic and interna- the intended victim. This leads to stra- A compelling description of what tional dynamics; evolving adversarial tegic dislocation – and, potentially, cata- failure might look like is as important operational, tactical, technological, and/ strophic failure. Second, reputation and as a crisp articulation of the desired or doctrinal innovations. Failure to vali- credibility born of past successes might end-state. The latter describes how we date pivotal assumptions and adjust ac- not suffice as a deterrent. Third, reneg- WANT the situation to be after the mis- cordingly falls in this category as well. ing on commitments undermines cred- sion is accomplished. The former lays History is replete with examples of ibility, potentially causing long-term out the UNDESIRABLE alternative – disasters born of lack of strategic fore- damage to global stature and influence. the consequences of a mission left un- sight: The American Army after the Civil Specifically, for a great power like the done. Yet, imagining failure is simply War – arguably the most experienced on United States, there is no such thing as not in our DNA. Indeed, it isn’t in ANY the planet – spent 30 years fighting the “minor setback.” Anything less than a nation’s DNA. Consider the following

How We Fight | inFOCUS 35 truism: the only certain thing about war deterrence and conceive new ways to • Proliferation of weapons of mass de- is that one side will lose. Yet, since time deal with asymmetric actors who might struction and empowering technologies; immemorial, nations and armed groups have been deemed “undeterrable” in the • Increasing lethality and risk of have gone to war with nothing but a pic- Cold War construct. intrusion by terrorist and criminal or- ture of victory imprinted in their minds Strategic risk can also mount ganizations; – secure in the belief that God and jus- through the accumulation of shortfalls • Systemic instability in key regions (political, economic, social, ideological); • Unprecedented velocity of techno- logical change and military adaptation; What prevents ... course correction are systemic • Availability of advanced weapons deficiencies, wishful thinking, as well as the inherent in a burgeoning global marketplace; • Exponential growth in volume, human ability to adjust to a “new normal” – the exchange, and access to information; shifting baseline of what is deemed acceptable. • Greatly reduced ability to retain high-level national security secrets; • Extremely rapid decay rates for any domain advantage; tice were on their side. Saying that “fail- in recapitalization and modernization, • Surging globalization, intercon- ure is not an option” is, thus, nothing stale strategic concepts, failure to re- nectivity and competition for scarce re- but an exhortation. In truth, failure is vitalize organizational ethos, and un- sources; and an ever-present – though obviously ad- willingness to let go of outdated struc- • Dislocating climate, environmen- verse—possibility. tures, bureaucratic arrangements, sector tal, and demographic trends. Debacles-in-the-making develop boundaries, and hierarchical relation- These global dynamics are closely over time, usually with plenty of oppor- ships. America’s global posture and fu- intertwined with the changing character tunities to notice and correct the down- ture success depend upon the ability of of 21st century warfare. Having experi- ward spiral. What prevents that course our people and organizations to adopt enced – or vicariously learned – the cost correction are systemic deficiencies, new, relevant concepts, constructs and of challenging the United States head- wishful thinking, as well as the inherent technologies, suitable to the dynamics of on, would-be adversaries are developing human ability to adjust to a “new nor- the strategic environment. asymmetric approaches to attack vital mal” – the shifting baseline of what is The United States is at an historic levers of U.S. power. Their strategies deemed acceptable. inflection point demanding an equally seek to circumvent our core advantages, At its core, the inability to conceive comprehensive revolution. The future while undermining international sup- anything but a resounding success is a strategic environment will be shaped port and domestic resolve. failure of the imagination. It is also a by the interaction of globalization, eco- Our military’s unprecedented le- natural defense mechanism. Humans nomic disparities and competition for thality and effectiveness deter opponents tend to repress or explain away the ever- resources; diffusion of technology and from massing on the battlefield, driving present potential for failure. Bad experi- information networks whose very nature them to adopt distributed and dispersed ences are particularly tempting to forget. allows unprecedented ability to harm operations. They find maneuver space Yet imagining what failure might look and, potentially, paralyze advanced na- and sanctuary in dense urban areas, un- like is a necessary step in laying out the tions; and systemic upheavals impacting governed hinterlands and loosely regu- foundation for success. state and non-state actors and, thereby, lated information and social networks. For a nation whose security is pred- international institutions and the world Meanwhile, ascendant powers are icated on an enduring strategy of dis- order. The following are salient features posturing to contest U.S. superiority, suasion and deterrence, the most fun- of this increasingly complex, dynamic, translating lessons from recent conflicts damental risk is failure of deterrence. lethal, and uncertain environment: into new concepts, capabilities and doc- Deterrence is a function of capability, • Rising peer competitors with vora- trines tailored to counter U.S. strengths will, and credibility and, thus, exists in cious appetites for resources and influence; and exploit vulnerabilities. Specifically: the eye of the beholder. Its success – or • Predatory and unpredictable re- • Anti-access/Area-denial weapons failure – is measured only in the breech. gional actors; and operational concepts designed to We also need to evolve new deterrence • Violent extremism and ethnic limit our freedom of action and power concepts. In particular, it behooves us strife – a global, generational, ideologi- projection capability; to rethink concepts such as extended cal struggle; • “Generation 4-plus” aircraft that

36 inFOCUS | Winter 2019 LANI KASS: LANI KASS: challenge America’s existing inventory the chain of cascading effects. payload to strike any target, anywhere, and, potentially, air superiority; Even if we continue successfully to anytime, in and through any domain. • Increasingly lethal, integrated air dissuade and deter major competitors, Joint and Combined Force Command-

defense systems (IADS) that could ne- their advanced equipment is proliferat- ers must retain the ability to safeguard Threats and Strategic Foresight gate weapons and tactics used to sup- ing worldwide. We are bound to con- the homeland, assure allies, dissuade op- press or destroy these systems; front these systems wherever America ponents, and inflict strategic dislocation • Proliferation of surface-to-surface engages to promote and defend its in- and paralysis on adversaries. missiles with growing range, precision, mobility, and maneuverability—capa- ble of delivering both conventional and non-conventional payloads; ...the U.S. should expect to be asymmetrically • Proliferation of unmanned aerial challenged in ALL domains... systems (UAS) capable of conducting low observable, persistent, intrusive missions in both lethal and non-lethal modes; • Resurgence of offensive counter- terests. We must also be vigilant for ad- America’s strategic partnerships space capabilities; versary breakthroughs in fields such as are more important than ever. We must • Increasing ability of even mar- cybernetics, nanotechnology, biotech- strengthen and broaden coalitions, at- ginal actors to observe the disposition nology, electromagnetic spectrum phys- tending to interoperability between al- of U.S. assets through widely-available, ics, robotics, advanced propulsion, etc. lies and partners. Building these rela- inexpensive commercial means; and We cannot assume that the next military tionships is both an engine of progress • Attacks through cyberspace are revolution will originate in the West. and prosperity, as well as a potent in- creating tactical, operational and stra- Therefore, we must anticipate innovative strument of America’s diplomacy in an tegic effects at low cost and with relative combinations of traditional and new increasingly interconnected world. impunity. concepts, doctrines, weapons systems, We must formulate innovative Consequently, the United States and and disruptive technologies. concepts to anticipate, adapt to, and its allies face an unprecedentedly varied overcome symmetric and asymmetric array of threats, ranging from existential ❚❚At a Strategic Crossroads challenges. We must also accelerate the to potentially crippling perils. As a consequence of these global dy- deployment of evolutionary and disrup- namics, we are at a strategic crossroads. tive technologies, as we address the ur- ❚❚Existential Threats From this point forward, the United gent need to recapitalize and modernize. Existential threats are risks to States should expect to be asymmetrically Our shared touchstone of the noble America’s way of life as a Western, dem- challenged in ALL domains. Perhaps for virtues enshrined in the Constitution ocratic society with a functioning econ- the first time in history, the ability to in- and a single, unifying purpose “to pro- omy, governance, public services and flict damage and cause strategic disloca- vide for the common defense” must re- infrastructure. While most existential tion is no longer directly proportional to main unchanged. We will have neither threats occur suddenly, an overwhelm- capital investment, superior motivation the buffer of time nor the barrier of ing migration of alien culture beyond and training, or technological prowess. oceans in future conflicts. The character, our ability to absorb and socialize to Asymmetry is the order of the day. And, tempo and velocity of modern warfare our way of life could cause an existential all too often, America finds itself on the already severely test our ability to adapt. threat over time. wrong side of the cost-imposition curve. Therefore, redefining the interagency Such existential threats to our way Our non-negotiable commitment and the private-public relationship is an of life must be distinguished from crip- is to provide forces proficient across the urgent national security requirement – pling threats which severely affect either full range of military operations to pro- not a luxury we can defer. Rising to this a segment of society, a geographic re- tect the United States, its interests, val- challenge is not a choice: It is our shared gion, or an isolated portion of the coun- ues and allies; deter conflict and prevent responsibility and a national imperative. try’s infrastructure. A crippling threat is surprise; and, should deterrence fail, recoverable, although the recovery could prevail against any adversary. We must LANI KASS, Ph.D., is Senior Vice be long and painful. A synchronized se- enhance our own asymmetric advantage President and Corporate Strategic Ad- ries of crippling threats could become by delivering global surveillance, global visor for CACI International Inc. and existential, if we fail to regain decision command and control, and the requisite served as Senior Policy Advisor to the superiority, respond properly and break speed, range, precision, persistence, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

How We Fight | inFOCUS 37 Prospect for Artificial Intelli- gence in Taiwan’s Defense by YISUO TZENG

rtificial Intelligence (AI) is by and regardless of the big talk, none of this daunting, if not insurmountable, chal- no means new, but after decades is going to happen automatically. How lenge in the way of machine learning. of lukewarm development, it well AI works in military operations Beyond the problems of quality data Ahas re-emerged and has been a ultimately depends on how hard the de- collection and accumulation, there exist buzzword around the globe since 2016, fense planners and industries “walk the algorithmic biases and AI ethical issues. particularly in defense circles. The walk.” And there is no such thing as low- It comes as no surprise that algorithms American organization The Center for hanging fruit in AI development. One are biased if AI has to pass the 1950 “Tur- Strategic and Budgetary Assessments may find primitive AI in daily life, for ex- ing Test” [Ed. developed by Alan Turing (CSBA) in its 2018 report on human-ma- ample with iOS Siri (Speech Interpreta- to test a machine’s ability to exhibit in- chine teaming for future ground forces tion and Recognition Interface) as a case telligent behavior equivalent to or indis- portrays future military command and of natural language processing (NLP) in tinguishable from human thinking]. Hu- control working across multiple do- point. But it took years to make machine man beings are by no means value-free. mains with multiple partners while con- learning advance to an acceptable level. An often-cited example is AI-powered decision-making for an autonomous ve- hicle that encounters the classic textbook ethical dilemma: should an autonomous ...AI is not almighty but rather assisted intelligence vehicle be taught to shy away from a most of the time... group of children if it means hitting an individual adult? This involves not just the number of casualties but also the pri- ority of children as opposed to adults. sidering multiple options. AI will have ❚❚Problems on the Way Similar difficulties are likely to -oc to be embedded in the design to tackle There are more problems than meet cur when AI is applied to autonomous complex decision-making in order to the eye in creating AI that works. While weapons’ target selection. Despite the process and recommend options faster it is true that what takes years for a hu- rhetoric regarding omnificent, AI-pow- and better than human cognition. man to accomplish is likely to be done ered, hyper-powerful automated/autono- In the meantime, heated debates in hours with the help of AI, it is no easy mous weaponry that can do what prior over the weaponization of AI-enabled task to come up with the cross-domain, efforts could only dream of, a check on autonomous technologies came to the knowledge-backed algorithms and to the current state of AI embedded in de- fore at such United Nations fora as the Conventions on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), as well as the UN In- ...an open environment contains daunting challenges stitute for Disarmament Research (UNI- DIR). News regarding AI-enabled weap- for unmanned platforms equipped with AI. ons research and development often hits the headlines, from F-35 fighters with AI-assisted ICT platforms, to AI-pow- grab big data that together make possi- fense development says otherwise. Ac- ered unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in ble the big data analytics, edge compu- cording to a 2018 Center for Strategic swarming attacks, to AI-generated cy- tation, and deep learning a preliminary and International Studies (CSIS) report berattacks and information warfare. stage of AI. Today, the absence of suf- on AI and national security, “….it is dif- But that by no means indicates a ficient data needed in the construction ficult to immediately identify where AI is mature AI applicable to defense systems, of the quality analytics constitutes a being applied. The narrative of ‘waiting

38 inFOCUS | Winter 2019 YISUO TZENG: YISUO TZENG: Prospect of AI in Taiwan’s Defense

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense showcases its Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) UAV at Aeronautical Systems Research Division (ASRD), a branch of the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST). (Photo: J. Michael Cole) for AI’ is more prevalent in national se- remote-control station, thereby support- may exercise multiple wartime missions curity, particularly within the DoD and ing the controllers who make the call. in countering China’s assembly of an the intelligence community.” amphibious landing fleet, compromising AI is not almighty, but rather as- ❚❚Taiwan Needs AI the enemy’s strategic and tactical targets, sisted intelligence most of the time, with With the basics of the state of AI in reducing wartime loading for the fighter the rise of augmented intelligence as the defense in mind, we turn to Taiwan. In jets, and finally, acting as decoys to con- upshot. Autonomous intelligence waits the face of growing military threats from sume the enemy’s air-defense missiles. to be developed for future applications. China, a nuclear-free Taiwan with a de- Moreover, under an enemy attack upon With that limitation, AI application on creasing youth population has no options Taiwan’s military air bases and runways, autonomous weapons or unmanned ve- but to embrace asymmetric warfare. The the island’s average roads are just fine for hicles turns out to be neither autonomous UAV rises to the top of the development a UAV takeoff, making UAVs easy to de- nor really unmanned. Unlike machine list for Taiwan’s Ministry of National De- ploy and hard to find. learning placed in closed or semi-closed fense (MND). Paying close attention to The UAV is also a good payload environments, an open environment American, Chinese, and European mili- platform for Taiwan’s current weaponry. contains daunting challenges for un- tary technology developments, Taiwan’s With air-to-surface AGM Hellfire and manned platforms equipped with AI. In MND considers the UAV and autono- other such precision weapon systems defense, AI mainly reaches the level of mous technologies a good fit for Taiwan’s as anti-ship cruise missiles as well as a automated systems, human-in-the-loop defense strategy: holding a fortified de- submunition dispenser, UAVs may initi- weapons rather than autonomous intelli- fensive posture with multi-layered deter- ate counterattacks on the enemy’s battle gence, human-out-of-the-loop weapons. rence, particularly tailored to Taiwan’s ships, harbors, airports, and missile A salient case in point is the UAV, which downsized force and tight procurement batteries in an attempt to deter or delay remains human-in-the-loop automation budget allocations. enemy operations and complicate the en- with a satellite transmitting control sig- Considering China’s offensive op- emy’s military scenarios. In addition to nals from a remote-control station to the tions, large-sized UAVs with high endur- counterattacks, UAVs could be handy in UAV as well as the UAV’s’ sensor data to a ance performance and payload capacity the defense of Taiwan’s offshore islands.

How We Fight | inFOCUS 39 At present, Taiwan’s MND has placed with regard to development. Taiwan has underwater vehicles (UUVs) for the pur- stand-off weapon systems, including air embarked on an inter-agency approach pose of harbor siege and sea mining. defense and anti-ship missiles, on vari- to bring together the Minister without Taiwan’s executive branch is not ous offshore islands. The UAV fleet could Portfolio in charge of economic devel- alone in pushing the advancement of be a good option with aforementioned opment, the Ministry of Science and AI-powered UAVs. Taiwan’s Legislative warfighting capabilities in mind. Technology (MoST), and the Ministry Yuan (parliament) passed “Unmanned During both peacetime and wartime, of Economic Affairs (MoEA), to work Platform Technology Innovation Ex- automated or autonomous platforms ei- together in AI R&D, applications, and periment” regulations at the end of No- ther on the ground (unmanned ground vehicles, UGV) or in the air (UAV) are only good news for Taiwan’s armed ...mini-UAV could even initiate swarm attacks if AI is forces facing low fertility in the general population and a tough market for volun- applied to empower the algorithms driving the attacks. tary force recruitment. Taiwan’s logistics troops would benefit most from the use of UGVs to carry ammunition and other industrial ecosystem buildup. Today, AI vember to bring forward a “regulatory heavy cargo. A data-linked UAV with an does not just create news headlines, but sandbox” for encouraging the R&D and endurance of up to 20 hours of air patrol it also takes the lead on a large propor- testing ground buildup for UAVs, UGVs, could lift much of the load for Taiwan’s tion of the research projects sponsored USVs and UUVs. Taiwan’s legislators airborne early warning aircraft fleet. by MoST. Many, if not all, enterprise claimed such a regulatory act is the first project managers seeking MoEA fund- in the world to cover experimental in- ❚❚Taiwan’s AI Development ing also find AI a necessary element in novation on unmanned vehicles in the Taiwan’s MND has no intention of their project proposals. air, on the ground, and in/under the being savvy on automation while over- Taiwan’s MND is keen to seize op- sea. Moreover, the regulations specifi- looking the opportunity to take advan- portunities to find applicable AI-related cally call for AI-boosted algorithmic un- tage of Taiwan’s industrial edge on smart projects likely to advance the perfor- manned platforms. technology development. Taiwan’s in- mance of its weaponry and decision- Last but not least, one should take digenous AI-assisted logistics, quality making systems. According to the sug- note of the National Chung-Shan Insti- control apparatus, artillery target acqui- gestions proposed by a newly published tute of Science and Technology’s move sition, and computation might be well 2018 Annual Defense Technology Trend in this regard. NCSIST is the primary on their way to improving performance Analysis Report (of which this author is research and development institution of and efficiency while compensating the the co-editor and a chapter contributor) Taiwan’s MND Armaments Bureau, and shortage of troop forces in combat and of the Institute for National Defense and is most representative of the prospects logistics units. Security Research (INDSR), a defense for AI in Taiwan’s defense given its abun- Taiwan’s big data analytics and think tank fully sponsored by Taiwan’s dant financial and human resources. cloud computing has been pacing side- MND, UAVs and UGVs ought to be focal NCSIST’s transition into a com- by-side with the deployment of smart points for Taiwan’s asymmetric warfare- petitive research institute has showcased city buildup and smart manufacturing oriented weaponry procurement. some great accomplishments involving embedded with the Internet of Things UAVs could be of use in reconnais- AI-powered weapon systems that are like- (IoT). Looking back on high-tech indus- sance and air-to-surface assaults. In ad- ly to become enablers for Taiwan defense trial development in Taiwan, the govern- dition, mini-UAVs could even initiate transformation to an asymmetric war- ment and private sectors are, for most swarm attacks if AI is applied to empow- fighting orientation. That said, however, it part, followers and late-comers. Chasing er the algorithms driving the attacks. remains to be seen how the institute man- civilian technology transfer and carving Other AI-powered weaponry proposed ages the momentum of its developments benefits from the pie of Original Equip- by the INDSR includes cybersecurity in- in AI-related cyber warfare apparatus ment Manufacturers or Original Design trusion detection, cyber threat identifica- as well as in AI-powered UAVs. Human- Manufacturers (OEM or ODM) seems to tion, disinformation/hate speech/infor- machine teaming mode is likely to present be the biggest game in town for Taiwan’s mation warfare – all of which are under the first milestone for that matter. positioning in the global value chain. development by technology institutions AI is a bit of a different story ow- in Taiwan. Moreover, the INDSR also YISUO TZENG, Ph.D., is the act- ing in large part to Taiwan’s determina- proposed the deployment of unmanned ing director of the Institute for Na- tion to move beyond its comfort zone surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned tional Defense and Security Research.

40 inFOCUS | Winter 2019 “There is No New Thing Under the Sun” review by SHOSHANA BRYEN

his is a book about past wars. No, The German high command it’s a book about present wars. planned in painstaking detail for unre- No, actually, it’s a book about stricted submarine warfare against the Tfuture wars. Or it’s a book about British toward the end of World War I. your imagination. Berlin knew how much of what the Brit- Every War Must End by the late Fred ish imported and on how many ships. Charles Iklé is a book for considering Planners knew what the British con- war – this one, that one, and the one we sidered essential items and when those haven’t had yet. Iklé, who passed away in would run out. But from the detailed 2011, served as undersecretary of defense dive into measurements, the Germans for policy in the Reagan administration. made a strange leap into political/pa- For him, the essential lesson is that it is triotic/emotional imponderables. They much easier to start a war than success- assumed that the British people would fully to conclude one. Having achievable force the government to fold in five aims – both military and political – and months – before the Americans had an stopping when they have been met is opportunity to bring their resources ful- Every War Must End key to success. The alternative is to slog ly to bear. The British didn’t. The Ameri- along with grinding casualties until the cans did. The Germans lost. By Fred Charles Iklé conflict peters out ignominiously when Similarly, when the Japanese were public opinion no longer supports the planning the attack on Pearl Harbor, effort. The French, he pointed out, were they made meticulous counts of hard- Columbia University Press the military victors in Algeria – as were ware, fuel and personnel. But their un- 2005 the Americans in Vietnam – but in both derstanding of how the war would end cases, the Western power withdrew was hazy. Iklé notes that, in a memoran- without a political victory, and public dum, the service chiefs wrote: disillusionment hampered the govern- ment at home and abroad for years after. It is very difficult to predict the ter- Think of Afghanistan, except we mination of a war, and it would be haven’t withdrawn yet. well-nigh impossible to expect the Iklé’s examples are primarily World surrender of the United States… At War I, World War II, and Korea, with a any rate we should be able to estab- bit of the Russo-Finnish and Vietnam lish an invincible position…Mean- wars thrown in. The elapsed decades while, we may hope that we will be make it easier to dissect them and their able to influence the trend of affairs lessons with less emotion. But your head and bring the war to an end. will have trouble not making the leap to current wars – and that’s OK. The Navy Chief of Staff told the Emperor: Lesson 1: Meticulously detailed re- ports are not a substitute for unsubstan- Even if our Empire should win a tiated assumptions or failing to articu- decisive naval victory, we will not late political and military objectives and thereby be able to bring the war to how to achieve them. a conclusion…Our Empire does not

How We Fight | inFOCUS 41 war. For the present era, it is critically important to understand how ap- peasement can succeed or fail, with- out being swayed by false lessons from the 1930s.

It is hard to understand the differ- ence between “pacifying through con- cessions” and “appeasement.” Is there a point at which the party reaping the concessions decides, “This is enough. I don’t really need any more, so I’ll stop threatening the neighbors.” Or does that party think, “Well, I’ve gotten this much without too much trouble. I think I’ll go for more.” Considering Israeli con- cessions to the Palestinian Arabs since the 1993 Oslo Accords doesn’t help, nor does the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan USS West Virginia in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack. (Photo: U.S. Navy) of Action (the Iran deal), or watching China build militarized islands in the have the means to take the offensive, South China Sea, or watching Russia re- overcome the enemy and make them Fighting sharpens feelings of hostil- claim Crimea. give up their will to fight. ity. It creates fears that an opponent Churchill said, “Appeasement is might again resort to violence, and one feeding the crocodile in hopes that Lesson 2: Failure to articulate an thus adds to the skepticism about a it will eat him last,” not that the croco- achievable objective may lead to side compromise peace…More is expected dile will not eat him at all. Churchill discussions, including when and how of a settlement because both the gov- wins this point. to start the fighting, but rarely leads to ernment and the people will feel that Lesson 4: It isn’t always the political steps to de-escalate the crisis. Lesson the outcome of the war ought to jus- forces looking for terms against military 2A: And once the war begins, the fight- tify the sacrifices (already) incurred. officers looking for war. More than once, ing is often subject to forces other than an evaluation of the most advantageous way to stop it, either for the side that Failure to articulate an achievable objective may lead to is winning to consolidate its gains, or side discussions, including when and how to start the for the side that is losing to minimize the damage. Lesson 2B: War aims may fighting, but rarely leads to steps to de-escalate the crisis. change radically during the fighting. Even after understanding that the Japanese military a) could not assume/as- sure victory or b) even envision the end of Lesson 3: “Appeasement,” and Iklé points out, it is the military that has the war, the Japanese leadership, includ- “Ending Wars before they Start” are not a better understanding of the costs that ing the Emperor, chose not to press the the same thing, but Iklé thinks they’re will be imposed by starting or continu- point. Instead, they engaged in discus- close. He tries to resurrect the reputation ing a war. Finnish military chief – and sions of when to strike Pearl Harbor, not of “appeasement,” but in one of the few later Finnish president – Carl Gustav whether. The Germans had the same con- miscues in the book, he fails. Emil Mannerheim opted out of Fin- versation about the timing, not the value, land’s alliance with Germany to make a of unrestricted submarine warfare. Prior to the late 1930s, “appease- separate peace with Russia in 1944: Once war starts, Iklé notes, the pub- ment” did not mean feeding the ap- lic has a say in ending it – and the public’s petite and power of an aggressor, but I wish especially to emphasize that view may not coincide with that of either pacifying through concessions a con- Germany will live on, even if fate the military or civilian leadership. flict that threatened to erupt into a should deny you victory in your

42 inFOCUS | Winter 2019 BOOK REVIEW: fighting. Nobody can give such an the country). But the civilian and some of the same logic that applied to assurance regarding Finland. If this military leaders in deciding how to Germany entering a war that it could not nation of barely 4 million be defeated end the war cannot have a frank de- conceive of winning applies to Palestin- militarily, there can be no doubt that bate on how to abolish each other. ian decision making.) Iraq, ISIS, Iran,

it will be driven into exile or extermi- and Afghanistan will begin to populate Every War Must End nated. I cannot expose my people to Is it possible for Mahmoud Abbas to the pages along with the Finns, Rus- such a risk. abandon the war he has been stoking for sians, Germans, and Algerians. You will more than a quarter century? Iklé wrote compare Charles DeGaulle to Lyndon If you’re starting to think about Is- of Mussolini: Johnson to Barak Obama in Iraq and Af- rael here, hold on. In the chapter “The ghanistan. You might find yourself ask- Search for an Exit,” Iklé considers how Mussolini (did not argue) that he ing what we’re still doing in Afghanistan countries finally see the end coming and would remain on “the world scene” 17 years, more than 2,700 Americans make the necessary changes to policy. or that the military situation was dead, more than 360,000 Afghans killed Think about Palestinians instead. better than his chief of staff told directly and indirectly, and about a tril- him. But under the stress of mount- lion dollars later. What is the military To make peace may require that the ing catastrophe he could not muster objective, and how has President Trump nation get rid of its leader. But the the determination to choose a policy improved on the Obama recipe? leader, in seeking advice from his that would have corresponded to the That would be a useful thing. ministers on how to end the war, military situation. So painful had The book is also a reminder that as cannot ask for a frank debate on his the facts become that he could no long ago as perhaps 400-180 BCE, Eccle- own political demise. Or, to make longer face them. siastes – attributed to King Solomon – peace may require the abandonment was writing, “The thing that hath been, of war aims for which men are still Abbas, again. it is that which shall be; and that which being asked to die. If the leaders who Finally, then, is Lesson 5: This slim is done is that which shall be done: and wish to argue for such a peace deni- volume will take you places you may not there is no new thing under the sun.” grate these war aims, they would be have planned to go. You will read about (“Ain chadash tachat hashamayim.”) asserting that the men at the front the Korean War and think about Kim are dying in vain. To make peace Jong Un or read about Nazi Germany SHOSHANA BRYEN is Senior Di- may require disbanding the existing and think about Palestinians. (No, NOT rector of The Jewish Policy Center army (or conversely, letting it rule because they are the same, but because and Editor of inFOCUS Quarterly.

Chairman: Richard Fox Board of Fellows: The Jewish Richard Baehr, William J. Bennett, Honorary Chairman: Mona Charen, Midge Decter, Policy Center Sheldon B. Kamins David Frum, David Horowitz, Rabbi Daniel Lapin, Michael A. Board Vice Chairmen: Ledeen, Michael Medved, David Marshall J. Breger Novak, Daniel Pipes, John Michael David Epstein Podhoretz, Norman Podhoretz, Dennis Prager, Ilya Shapiro, Tevi General Counsel: Jeffrey P. Altman Troy, Ruth Wisse

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❚❚A Final Thought ...

The❚❚A Final ThoughtAmerican ... Interest If Lord Palmerston was right about friends and inter- relationship between Israel and the Arab States is based not ests,tk it is American interests for which President Trump on friendship but on a realistic appraisal of the risks posed and Congress are responsible. Those interests include: by Iran. It nevertheless is in Israel’s interest as well as ours. tk Preventing Iranian expansion into and weaponiza- Rejecting simplistic tropes about Sunnis and Shiites tion of other countries. Iran’s nuclear program is not sepa- and building a realistic understanding of the cross-cur- rate from the mullah’s hegemonic intentions, it underpins rents among its present adversaries. The closeness of Tur- them. Whatever hopes America has for the region, they key and Hamas to Iran and Qatar is counterintuitive for cannot succeed if the Islamic Republic does. Americans who believe the Sunni-Shiite divide is the only Ensuring freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and one that matters. It is not. Persian Iran and Aryan Turkey Persian Gulf. Iran’s war in Yemen aims for a military posi- have fought Arabs for centuries. Today, Turkey sides with tion from which it could close the narrow Bab el Mandeb the Muslim Brotherhood against Sunni Saudi Arabia and Straits. Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt – America’s Sunni Egypt. Shiite Iran’s funds Sunni Hamas, and Iran’s allies – would lose their Red Sea exit to the Indian Ocean. Sunni ally and Muslim Brotherhood supporter Qatar has And the American base in Djibouti – our only one in Africa made major investments in Turkey to boost its economy. – would have Iranians at the door. It is in the American interest to follow Lord Palmer- Preventing Iran’s creation of the overland Shiite Cres- ston through a particularly messy part of the world. cent. Iran seeks a permanent presence in Syria along the land route to the Mediterranean Sea – traversing Iraq, Syria – Shoshana Bryen and Lebanon, and putting a “lid” on Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Editor, inFOCUS and Israel in the north. Having the Arab states accept Israel as a legitimate, permanent presence in the Middle East. The burgeoning