Notes on Italian Philosophy, Peer-Reviews and “La Corruttela”*
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Notes on Italian philosophy, peer-reviews and “la corruttela”* Annalisa Coliva University of Modena and Reggio Emilia and Cogito Research Centre in Philosophy In his “A minor philosophy. The state of the art of philosophical scholarship in Italy” Roberto Farneti examines the production of contemporary Italian philosophers and discerns three main attitudes towards philosophy: denial, the “evil-queen syndrome,” and compliance. On Farneti’s view, philosophers in a state of denial appear to be oblivious to the fact that Italian philosophy doesn’t have much of a recognition in international forums. In contrast, the “evil-queen syndrome”, according to Farneti, consists in assembling “surveys of past philosophies, focusing on traditions of which one considers oneself the privileged inheritor” (p. xx). Finally, compliance refers to the increasing number of scholars who publish for the most part in Anglo-American peer-refereed journals. However, Farneti, who commends publication in international peer-reviewed journals, is critical also of philosophers falling in this last category, because they are found guilty of, ultimately, “a subservient intellectual attitude” (p xx). Farneti contends that Italian philosophers ought to supply new and original ideas to the international philosophical scene through contributions to peer- refereed journals and should do so by drawing on a rather unspecified repository of ideas and wisdom that Italians possess, or can have access to, thanks to their educational system “that nourishes classical studies” (p. xx). In what follows, after some brief remarks on the rhetorical structure of his piece, I will take issue with a lot of what Farneti says, in hope to make out a much more nuanced account of Italian philosophy’s state of the art than his and to put forward some proposals about how to improve things, in Italy and elsewhere. * I would like to thank Elisabetta Lalumera, Sebastiano Moruzzi, Marco Panza and Eva Picardi for their comments on previous versions of this paper. 1 1. The rhetoric Despite the interest of Farneti’s paper, I think a reader may find the rhetorical makeup of his article slightly unusual for a contribution to a scholarly journal at least for the following reasons. First, because of the rhetorical device of picking out sentences from books and papers to make their authors appear silly. This is a well-known rhetorical tool in other communicative contexts. But quotations in scholarly contexts usually display taking one’s adversaries seriously, thereby showing some kind of engagement with their ideas. By contrast, scholarly irrelevance is testified by ignoring what one deems only alleged contributions to a given field. More heated accusations are, as a rule, reserved for reviews and critical notices. But Farneti’s paper doesn’t clearly belong to these latter genres. Reference to a recently published book,1 in fact, seems more to be a pretext for launching a complex attack on present-day Italian philosophy than an occasion to provide the reader with an in- depth study of that volume. Secondly, a reader may find it weird that so much prominence be given, the impressive bibliography notwithstanding, either to the opinions of newspapers’ columnists or to the interviews or articles of Italian philosophers published on national newspapers. For the scholarly status of a discipline isn’t usually fathomed by this kind of evidence. Furthermore, even the deepest of philosophers would presumably oversimplify his ideas to make them suitable to a large audience, had he to address it. But, perhaps, Farneti finds reproachable the typically Italian vanity of pursuing visibility on the media, which, alas, makes no exception in the case of many academic philosophers. I personally would share such a criticism, but, then, I would make it a point to discuss only a philosopher’s academic work and do so in a scholarly traditional way. So I wonder whether Farneti’s paper would, in effect, have been more effective if it had been written differently. This worry notwithstanding, I will now turn to a discussion of some of his main 1 Benso, S. and Schroeder, B. (eds.) 2007 Contemporary Italian Philosophy: Crossing the Borders of Ethics, Politics, and Religion, New York, SUNY press. claims. 2. Who needs an Italian philosophy? Let me indulge in a little biographical sketch. I am an analytic philosopher for the best part educated in the UK and the US. No wonder that, once back in my home country, I have kept the conversation going with those who have been either my teachers there, or those whom I have happened to meet along the way while abroad; but, I should hasten to add, also with those Italians whose ideas seemed to me to deserve scrutiny, given my philosophical interests. Whether this makes me—or anyone else with a similar background and philosophical interests—intellectually “subservient” is something that it will be for others to decide. However, it is not clear to me that Italy qua Italy could or for that matter ought to be able to produce an entirely original—that Farneti seems to consider synonymous with “national”—view on topics which concern human nature, such as personal identity and the possibility and features of self-knowledge, or, just to stay close to my fields of interest, our knowledge of an external world. It seems to me enough of a contribution to Italian reputation worldwide that Italian philosophers could “make claims over the status of their philosophical propositions that nobody within the scholarly community could casually ignore” (p. xx), no matter how much of an Italian pedigree these claims may have. I am flattered to see that Farneti ranks me among such contributors together with others he mentions and others he nonchalantly ignores. But, I should insist, the idea of an Italian philosophy is, for the best part a myth, often put at the service of a nationalistic ideology which there is every reason to reject.2 Nor do I think that the watered-down heir to that view—namely that there should be 2 This myth started with Gianbattista Vico’s De antiquissima Italorum sapientia (1710-1713). It was then developed along different lines by Vincenzo Cuoco in his Platone in Italia (1806) and greatly exploited during Fascism. For a discussion of this idea, see Albarani, G. 2008 Il mito del primato italiano nella storiografia risorgimentale, Milano, Unicopli. 3 something like a recognizably Italian school in whatever area of philosophy that might be—is, as such, commendable. Indeed the idea of a “national” philosophy or school is a very ethnocentric and therefore parochial one which sits badly with Farneti’s injunction that Italian scholars should regain visibility in international forums. It seems to me that the only way in which that can happen is if philosophers based in Italy worked on themes that engage with the interests of the international philosophical community. 3. Are international forums oblivious to the Italian philosophers Farneti attacks? Given my intellectual upbringing, it is weird for me to embark in a defense of those whom Farneti more strongly attacks. But, definitely, it is hard to deny that for instance Gianni Vattimo and his “weak thought” have had and still have international resonance. Surely, he hasn’t been admitted in the club of professional analytic philosophers, nor has another internationally renowned Italian— Umberto Eco. But he is widely read and discussed abroad—in the large sense of the term, including continental Europe and the US, even if not in the Departments of analytic philosophy in America and the UK (and so of course is Eco, but Farneti doesn’t talk of him in his paper, so I won’t either). Somewhat similar considerations, I take it, would hold at least for Giorgio Agamben, and Antonio Negri3 and perhaps others criticized by Farneti. Elsewhere,4 I have already briefly expressed some sketchy considerations as to why mainstream analytic philosophy does not take these Italian voices into account. So I won’t take up this issue here. Rather, what I would like to consider in the following is, first of all, the connection Farneti makes between such an alleged oblivion and the fact that many renowned Italian philosophers don’t send 3 A volume of The library of living philosophers in honor of Negri is scheduled to appear shortly http://www.opencourtbooks.com/forthcoming_body_n.htm 4 See my Preface to the Italian edition of P. Boghossian 2006 Fear of Knowledge, Oxford, Oxford University Press; Italian transl. Paura di conoscere. Saggio contro il relativismo e il costruttivismo, Roma, Carocci, 2006. their papers to international, peer-reviewed journals. Secondly, I will discuss whether the practice of peer-reviewing makes an important difference to the quality of a paper and, moreover, ensures that only the best papers be published. Thirdly, I will consider one—perhaps the only philosophical— strand in Farneti’s paper where he considers what may be taken the philosophical rationale for the refusal to oblige to the practice of sending one’s papers to peer-reviewed journals. Finally, I will point out what kind of value that practice can have for the Italian academic community at large. What will emerge is, I hope, a much more nuanced account than Farneti’s and some recommendations to the philosophical community, both national and international, and to the Italian Government. 4. Peer-reviews and international recognition Let us therefore ask whether for instance Gianni Vattimo5 would be an internationally better-known philosopher if he (had) sent his papers to The Journal of Philosophy or, for that matter, to the European Journal of Philosophy, whose mission is to be a forum of discussion for European philosophy irrespective of whether it is analytically or more continentally oriented. A moment reflection suffices to return an agnostic answer.