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An Ethical Analysis of Ectogenesis And AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS OF ECTOGENESIS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON THE ABORTION DEBATE Arianna Sica Student number: 6455603 Supervisor: Sven Nyholm Second reader: Martin Blaakman Utrecht Universiteit Faculty of Humanities MA Applied Ethics June 2020 Abstract Ectogenesis, the technology which allows a foetus to develop independently from its mother’s body, will likely become a reality within the next few decades. This paper explores the potential and significant implications of this technology on the abortion debate. It first examines William Simkulet’s argument, according to which ectogenesis will end the abortion debate by presenting a unique opportunity for a moral compromise between those who oppose and those who favour abortion. It will be argued that Simkulet’s reasoning is unsound and non-feminist, premised upon a misinterpretation of the concept and purpose of abortion. Furthermore, this paper raises the question of whether there are plausible reasons which justify killing abortions in the context of ectogenesis. Eric Mathison and Jeremy Davis, and Bruce Blackshaw and Daniel Rodger have advanced several arguments against the right to the death of an ectogenetic foetus. This paper responds to their analyses, concluding that their arguments are unsuccessful and that there is a right to the death of a foetus which is not sentient, even when ectogenesis will be available. Key words: ectogenesis, abortion, foetus, moral compromise, rights, parenthood, moral status. 1 Table of Contents Introduction 3 Section One: What is ectogenesis? 6 Section Two: Can ectogenesis be a moral compromise? 8 2.1 – The ectogenetic compromise 8 2.2 – A feminist objection 13 Section Three: Do the parents have the right to the death of the foetus? 19 3.1 – The concept of right and the role of the father Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito.1 3.2 – Abortion rights and the right to the death of the foetus Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito.3 3.2.1 – The right not to become a biological parent Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito.6 3.2.2 – The right to property Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito.8 Section Four: The moral status of the ectogenetic foetus 32 4.1 The concept of moral status 32 4.2 – Criteria for moral status 34 4.2.1 – Human Exceptionalism 34 4.2.2 – Personhood 35 4.2.3 – Life 36 4.2.4 – Sentience 37 4.3 – The right to the death of the non-sentient foetus 41 4.3.1 – The right not to become a biological parent 41 4.3.2 – The right to property 42 Conclusion 45 References 47 2 Introduction Imagine living in “Ectoworld” (Brassington, 2009), a place where ectogenesis, the process of transferring the foetus from a mother’s womb to an artificial womb and carrying it to term, is standard practice. It is a world where the extreme prematurity of a foetus has stopped to be one of the leading causes of neonatal mortality. It is a world where “mother” is a superfluous term. If you think that this is just a thought experiment, recent developments in medical technology have actually led to the potential realisation of Ectoworld in the foreseeable future. The possibility for foetuses to develop artificially, independently from their gestational mother’s body, has raised significant worries in the bioethical discussion, and an analysis of the ethical consequences ectogenesis might bring to society, foetuses, and women is required. Some theorists have argued that the use of ectogenesis would conclude the debate about abortion (Singer and Wells, 1984; Simkulet, 2019). By making it possible to remove the foetus from the gestating woman without killing it, this technology allows reconciliation between the alleged foetal rights with women’s rights. Therefore, it presents a unique opportunity for a moral compromise between those who oppose and those who support abortion. However, others have claimed that the abortion debate could not be ended. According to such views, conceiving abortion as the termination of a pregnancy disregards the actual reasons behind undertaking such a practice; namely, the desire not to become a mother (Rowland, 1992; Langford, 2008). In this regard, some philosophers sustain that abortion rights are grounded not only on the right to terminate the pregnancy but also on the right to the death of the foetus (Räsänen, 2017). As a result, even if ectogenesis was available, they argue that it would be morally permissible for the parents to kill the foetus. My essay has two aims. The first is to evaluate the sacrifices of the two parties involved in the abortion dilemma – namely, anti-abortionists and pro-choice advocates – and to establish whether a moral compromise would be possible. I argue that the views which present ectogenesis as a moral compromise do not consider the moral relevance of a woman’s desire not to become a mother in the abortion debate. I claim that such arguments are non-feminist and unsound, and that a moral compromise is not possible. The second is to discuss whether the parents have a right to the death of the foetus, despite the opportunity of the foetus’ survival via ectogenesis. I aim to reject the objections against the possibility of this right raised by authors such as Eric Mathison and Jeremy Davis (2017), and Bruce Blackshaw and Daniel Rodger (2019). I claim that, in light of a sentience criterion for the moral status of the foetus, 3 the biological parents have a right to kill it within the end of the second trimester of development. Within Section One, I will feature an exposition of the definition and purposes of ectogenesis. In Section Two, I will present William Simkulet’s argument (2019), which presents ectogenesis as a valid alternative to abortion. Simkulet asserts that any argument for abortion relying on the right to self-defence and bodily autonomy can be satisfied by terminating the pregnancy, without the otherwise necessary implication of the foetus’ death. I will reject his view by claiming that such an “ectogenetic compromise” is a reductionist representation of abortion as a woman’s wish not to be pregnant. Instead, by adopting a feminist standpoint methodology, I will argue that the aim of abortion and the reason why women choose to abort primarily consist of preventing motherhood. My claim will be sustained by empirical research about women’s attitudes towards abortion and ectogenesis. I will conclude that ectogenesis cannot be considered a moral compromise1. Within Section Three, I will introduce the argument which assesses whether the mother has a right to the death of an ectogenetic foetus. Firstly, I will present some views which believe that killing abortions would not be morally permissible once ectogenesis is available, given that abortion rights are grounded on principles of self-defence and bodily autonomy. I will respond to such claims by advancing two arguments supported by Joona Räsänen (2017) which defend a right to the death of the foetus; namely, the arguments based on biological parents’ rights and property rights. I will then consider and try to reject some objections raised by Mathison and Davis (2017) and Blackshaw and Rodger (2019) against Räsänen’s arguments. My reasoning will assume the same premises on which such objections are based. This methodology allows me to counterargue more substantially and to present a more convincing conclusion. Furthermore, I will suggest that the discussion about the right to the death of the ectogenetic foetus cannot be complete without addressing the issue of its moral status – a topic which has not been adequately discussed by either Räsänen, or Mathison and Davis, and Blackshaw and Rodger. 1 Section One and Section Two refer to issues which I have already addressed in one of my previous papers (Sica, 2020). I want to make clear that I have decided to re-use some of the paragraphs from my past paper since they are essential for the purpose of my current argument. In the text, I add a reference at the end of the paragraphs which has been entirely or partly repeated. Anyway, in this paper, I have further developed my reasoning: I have added several arguments and raised some objections to challenge and make my claim stronger and more convincing. This process helped me to develop a consistent, personal line of thoughts through different perspectives. 4 Finally, in Section Four, I will consider the debate about the moral status of the foetus. I will try to assess a criterion to establish moral status by evaluating four among the most known theories: human exceptionalism, personhood, life, and sentience. I will indicate a sentience- related argument as the least problematic account for moral status. As a result of this discussion, I will argue that Mathison and Davis (2017) Blackshaw and Rodger’s (2019) objections against the right to the death of the foetus are profoundly weakened. I will claim that it is possible to kill the ectogenetic foetus before it becomes sentient. 5 Section One What is ectogenesis? In this section, I am firstly going to describe what is meant by ectogenesis. I will then briefly outline the potential implications of such a technology on issues related to pregnancy, to finally focus on the concerns related to the ethical debate of abortion (Sica, 2020). Ectogenesis consists in the process of creating an environment that will simulate that of a pregnant woman’s womb, including a flux of oxygen, filled with specific nutrients needed to recreate the environment present in the uterus, and a form of waste disposal (Gelfand & Shook, 2006; Lee, 2016; Partridge et al., 2017; Romanis, 2018; Shultz, 2010). The use of such an artificial womb would support the development of a foetus outside the gestational mother’s body, during the period which it would naturally exist in her uterus.
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