Quarter 2019 th Issue 95, 4 95, Issue
2019 Essay Winners Competition 2019 Why Normandy Still Matters Still Normandy Why Strategic Foresight Strategic Maximizing
JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE NINETY-FIVE, 4TH QUARTER 2019 Joint Force Quarterly Founded in 1993 • Vol. 95, 4th Quarter 2019 http://ndupress.ndu.edu
GEN Mark A. Milley, USA, Publisher VADM Frederick J. Roegge, USN, President, NDU
Editor in Chief Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.
Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D.
Production Editor John J. Church, D.M.A.
Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich
Copyeditor Andrea L. Connell
Associate Editor/Book Review Editor Jack Godwin, Ph.D.
Associate Editor Patricia Strait, Ph.D.
Intern Noah W. Garber
Art Director Marco Marchegiani, U.S. Government Publishing Office
Advisory Committee Ambassador Erica Barks-Ruggles/College of International Security Affairs; RDML Shoshana S. Chatfield, USN/U.S. Naval War College; Col David J. Eskelund, USMC/Marine Corps War College; Col Thomas Gordon, USMC, USMC/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; MG Lewis G. Irwin, USAR/Joint Forces Staff College; MG John S. Kem, USA/U.S. Army War College; LTG Michael D. Lundy, USA/U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; LtGen Daniel J. O’Donohue, USMC/The Joint Staff; Brig Gen Evan L. Pettus, USAF/Air Command and Staff College; RDML Cedric E. Pringle, USN/National War College; Brig Gen Kyle W. Robinson, USAF/Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy; Brig Gen Jeremy T. Sloane, USAF/Air War College; Lt Gen Glen D. VanHerck, USAF/Joint Staff; Thomas Wingfield, J.D./College of Information and Cyberspace
Editorial Board Richard K. Betts/Columbia University; Eliot A. Cohen/The Johns Hopkins University; COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.)/National War College; Richard L. DiNardo/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Aaron L. Friedberg/Princeton University; Bryon Greenwald/ Joint Forces Staff College; Douglas N. Hime/Naval War College; Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.)/The Joint Staff; Kathleen Mahoney-Norris/Air Command and Staff College; Bert B. Tussing/U.S. Army War College
Cover 2 images (top to bottom): Air Force pararescueman assigned to 83rd Expeditionary Rescue Squadron communicates with Army Task Force Brawler CH-47F Chinook during training exercise in Afghanistan, March 14, 2018 (U.S. Air Force/Gregory Brook); U.S. Marines with 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit hike to cold-weather training site inland, Iceland, October 19, 2018, during Trident Juncture 18 (U.S. Marine Corps/Menelik Collins); Soldiers assigned to 2nd Battalion, 32nd Field Artillery, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division fire M777 howitzer on Qayyarah West Airfield, Iraq, August 10, 2019 (U.S. Army Reserve/DeAndre Pierce) About the Cover In This Issue Aviation boatswain’s mate (equipment) Airman Heaven Forum Alexander secures lube line to 2 Executive Summary port cylinder of catapult four on flight deck of Navy’s only forward- 4 Strategic Army: Developing deployed aircraft carrier, USS Ronald Trust in the Shifting Reagan, Yokosuka, Japan, August 14, Strategic Landscape 2016 (U.S. Navy/Nathan Burke) By Emily Bienvenue and Zachary Rogers 14 Maximizing the Power of Strategic Foresight By Amy Zalman
22 Strengthening Mission Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Assurance Against Emerging Features Defense University Press for the Chairman of the Threats: Critical Gaps and 86 Development Beyond Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the Chairman’s flagship joint military and security studies journal designed to Opportunities for Progress the Joint Qualification inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and By Paul N. Stockton System: An Overview other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat with John P. Paczkowski By Dina Eliezer, Theresa K. terrorism; homeland security; and developments in Mitchell, and Allison Abbe training and joint professional military education to Essay Competitions transform America’s military and security apparatus 92 3D Printing for Joint to meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting 32 Winners of the 2019 freedom today. All published articles have been vetted Agile Operations through a peer-review process and cleared by the Essay Competitions By Jaren K. Price, Miranda C. Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review. 34 Pakistan’s Low Yield in the La Bash, and Bart Land NDU Press is the National Defense University’s cross-component, professional military and academic Field: Diligent Deterrence publishing house. or De-Escalation Debacle 100 The Chain Home Early Warning Radar System: A Case Study The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations By Daniel Hooey expressed or implied within are those of the in Defense Innovation contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views By Justin Roger Lynch of the Department of Defense or any other agency of 46 The Second Island Cloud: A the Federal Government. Deeper and Broader Concept Copyright Notice for American Presence Recall This is the official U.S. Department of Defense edition in the Pacific Islands of Joint Force Quarterly. Any copyrighted portions 104 Wolfe, Montcalm, and the of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted By Andrew Rhodes without permission of the copyright proprietors. JFQ Principles of Joint Operations in should be acknowledged whenever material is quoted 54 America First ≠ America Alone: the Quebec Campaign of 1759 from or based on its content. Morocco as Exemplar for U.S. By Joseph Finnan, Lee P. Gray, Submissions and Communications John H. Perry, and Brian Lust JFQ welcomes submission of scholarly, independent Counterterrorism Strategy research from members of the Armed Forces, By James B. Cogbill security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from the United Book Reviews States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration JPME Today to ScholarOne, available at https://mc04. 112 The Lessons of Tragedy manuscriptcentral.com/ndupress, or write to: 58 Why Normandy Still Matters: Reviewed by Joseph J. Collins Editor, Joint Force Quarterly Seventy-Five Years On, NDU Press 113 Sailing True North 300 Fifth Avenue (Building 62, Suite 212) Operation Overlord Inspires, Fort Lesley J. McNair Instructs, and Invites Us to Reviewed by Peter H. Daly Washington, DC 20319 Be Better Joint Warfighters 114 Subordinating Intelligence Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 By Bryon Greenwald Email: [email protected] Reviewed by J. Paul Pope JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu/jfq 4th Quarter, October 2019 Commentary Joint Doctrine ISSN 1070-0692 70 Attacking Fielded Forces: 116 Unmasking the Spectrum An Airman’s Perspective with Artificial Intelligence from Kosovo By Matthew J. Florenzen, Kurt By Phil Haun M. Shulkitas, and Kyle P. Bair 78 Countering Threat Networks 123 Joint Doctrine Update to Deter, Compete, and Win: Competition Below Armed Conflict with Revisionist Powers By Vayl S. Oxford During Berlin Crisis of 1961, group of U.S. Naval Reservists talk to U.S. Army Soldiers who man Checkpoint Charlie, only American checkpoint along Berlin Wall (U.S. Navy Museum)
Executive Summary
his year has been one of important victories on the Eastern Front, would And the anniversaries where we can anniversaries and one of change. ultimately end that violent period in honor our fallen and celebrate those Just this past weekend, the world Western Europe. But that effort would who survived continue to reverberate. T th marked the 100 year since the Armi- eventually turn into the Cold War, a Lest we forget. But what can we say stice for World War I, the “war to end long struggle between U.S.-led Western we have learned from this seemingly all wars,” was placed in effect. On that powers and Soviet bloc countries. The endless cycle of struggle that results in date, at the 11th hour of the 11th day of 30th anniversary of the end of that con- war? One answer has been to improve the 11th month, the bloodiest war up flict was marked this year, as the Berlin how our troops fight together as part to that time ended. Or so the world Wall ceased to function as a political and of a joint force. To do so, its leaders had hoped. Just 25 years later, Allied physical barrier between the German need to understand the past, both good forces would assault the beaches and Democratic Republic (GDR) and and bad, and find ways to make our skies above Normandy, France, in an West Germany on November 9, 1989, joint bonds strong enough to meet the unprecedented invasion to roll back the although official destruction of the wall challenges ahead, even those that may Nazi empire, which, along with Russian did not begin until June 13, 1990. surprise us.
2 Forum / Executive Summary JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 I would offer that our world is in of Defense Strategic Research Paper military, and Jaren K. Price, Miranda C. constant motion, and as a result change category provides an interesting look at La Bash, and Bart Land describe how it is what we must always seek to adjust Pakistan’s military stance and reliance on could improve joint operations. Justin and improve our situations. If you have nuclear weapons. Speaking to the strategic Roger Lynch delivers a valuable case a setback, a delay, or a loss, you do as issues of the security environment in the study in military innovation by explaining the unofficial slogan of the U.S. Marine Pacific, the winning CJCS Strategic Essay how British scientists created the Chain Corps suggests—you improvise, adapt, Competition (Strategic Research Paper Home early warning radar system, the and overcome. I would add that we need category) by Andrew Rhodes develops world’s first integrated air defense system. to be constantly learning both from what a new view of how U.S. power should One of the constant challenges in we see and from what others experienced. be used to counterbalance China. And my job is finding useful history articles As former Secretary James Mattis asked James B. Cogbill, winner of the CJCS for our Recall section that provide valu- our professional military education (PME) Strategic Essay Competition (Strategy able insights into joint operations. But institutions to do, developing our critical Article category) competition, suggests somehow, we get a really great piece for thinking skills and testing our intellectual the experiences of Morocco in countering you every issue. You may have initially limits in new and engaging ways are no terrorism offers the United States a po- scratched your head trying to see how last longer options for a select few. To that end tentially superior approach to this threat. issue’s Civil War article (JFQ 94 [3rd for the joint force, Joint Force Quarterly In our JPME Today section, Bryon Quarter], “Flanking the Crater,” by John continues to offer discussions about past Greenwald, one of our leading professors K. DiEugenio and Aubry J. Eaton) fit that conflicts and current issues and to frame and an award-winning historian who was requirement, but after reading it, I hope future concepts and issues in ways that instrumental in adding an overseas expe- you saw its value for modern joint war- hopefully help each of us better use our rience to the Joint Advanced Warfighting riors. This time we go even further back minds. With that as a goal, we offer a School in Norfolk, discusses the value of in history as Joseph Finnan, Lee Gray, wide range of ideas to help you keep your a student-led, student-focused battlefield John Perry, and Brian Lust help us un- intellectual edge. Hopefully, you will read history experience within that program derstand joint principles through the lens them and send us your best ideas on how and how similar offerings have a positive of the Quebec Campaign of 1759. Along to keep improving the joint force. impact on our PME programs. with three informative book reviews and In the Forum section we have three In Commentary we present two our Joint Doctrine Update, in our Joint valuable perspectives on strategic issues. unique views on modern war, both past Doctrine section Matthew Florenzen, In reviewing the largest element of one and future. As the 20th anniversary of the Kurt Shulkitas, and Kyle Bair help us work of our important international partners, North Atlantic Treaty Organization war out the range of likely impacts of artificial Emily Bienvenue and Zachary Rogers over Kosovo is marked, Phil Haun, one intelligence on joint warfighting. discuss some available opportunities for of the U.S. Air Force veterans of that While change is a challenge for the the Australian army to meet the complex conflict and now a historian and Naval joint force, NDU Press and your JFQ and increasingly challenging threat envi- War College dean, offers his thoughts team is not immune. After serving as one ronment there. Helping us in the world on what he experienced then as a fighter of our associate editors for the past several of teaching future strategic leaders, Amy pilot and later, after becoming a historian. issues, we wish Patricia Strait all the best Zalman offers advice on how we can get Confronting conflict below the tradi- in her well-earned retirement after many the most from strategic foresight. As tional levels of armed combat is the focus years in U.S. Government service. We threats seem to be multiplying as the 30th of an important set of ideas from Vayl also want you to know that NDU Press anniversary of the Cold War ends, Paul Oxford, as he offers his take on dealing has moved its operations to the second Stockton offers his view on how we can with 21st-century threat networks. floor of Marshall Hall here at Fort Lesley seek to identify issues and potential paths We are fortunate to bring you three J. McNair, back to where we were more to successfully continuing our military distinctively refreshing articles in Features than a decade ago. Moving a team of missions in this difficult world. that span from internal improvement eight along with 10 tons of books and This year’s Secretary of Defense and suggestions for fostering better jointness equipment caused a bit of delay to our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and joint operations to separate pieces on production process, but we hope you will (CJCS) Essay Competitions featured a two of the five concerns of our National come visit us in our new home. In the record number of entrants from across Security Strategy. Dina Eliezer, Theresa meantime, we look forward to publishing the PME community. I want to thank K. Mitchell, and Allison Abbe discuss the very best ideas from, for, and about all the judges and entrants for their par- how the military might develop its offi- the joint force for many years to come. JFQ ticipation and for once again accepting cers using more than what is required by the challenge of determining the best the current Joint Qualification System. William T. Eliason expressions of ideas from those who Additive manufacturing—also known as Editor in Chief are our future security leaders. Daniel 3D printing—has started to revolutionize Hooey’s winning essay in the Secretary a growing number of areas, including the
JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Eliason 3 Marine keeps watch during Talisman Sabre exercise, Shoalwater Bay Training Area, July 16, 2019 (Australian Defence Force/Jake Sims)
well understood, the impact of complex Strategic Army interwoven technological and social trends on the nature of conflict and the threat posed to the rules-based global Developing Trust in the order are less so. The intentions of this article are twofold. First, it aims to improve un- Shifting Strategic Landscape derstanding of the nature of change in the operating environment. Emerging By Emily Bienvenue and Zachary Rogers from technological change is a strategic war against trust—trust in the open rules-based system and the sociopolitical hile the nature of war remains and scope of technological change, systems of its key players. Authoritarian a battle of political wills, the age of information warfare (IW) states such as China and Russia, for W discontinuous change in is well upon us.2 While the impact of whom a level of revision of the existing the strategic landscape is constantly technological change on operational order is a key strategic interest, are changing the way in which warfare is and strategic maneuverability in the contending to rewrite, disrupt, or block conducted.1 Expedited by the speed physical battlespace is comparatively the preferred narratives of the Western liberal democracies such as Australia’s by sowing seeds of distrust within and without of their hyper-connected Emily Bienvenue is a Senior Analyst in the Joint Operations and Analysis Division at the Defence Science and Technology Group Edinburgh. Zachary Rogers is a Research Lead in the Jeff Bleich Centre societies. Four interlocking features of for the U.S. Alliance in Digital Technology, Security, and Governance at Flinders University. the emergent operating environment
4 Forum / Developing Trust in the Shifting Strategic Landscape JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 drive this change: the shift from ver- Shifting Contours of the Today, major shifts in the strategic tical to horizontal networks of power, Strategic Landscape landscape suggest that the narrative of expansion of the cognitive battlespace, In 2004, the Australian army released liberal internationalism and the associated constant and unrestricted warfare, a future operating concept. Written by global governance model is under great and the erosion of trust in traditional Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, strain. In place since 1945, the rules- centralized institutions. In the digital “Complex Warfighting” described a based global order has been underwritten era, state and nonstate actors alike ex- “changing landscape in which [global- by the primacy of U.S. material power ploit and manipulate information for ization] has created and empowered a and principles of democracy, transparency, commercial and strategic effect. Power diverse range of enemies of the west; and openness as reflected and reinforced flows among a diversity of actors con- and U.S. dominance . . . has caused by national and global institutions. These nected through horizontal networks, in those adversaries to seek asymmetric pillars of the postwar order do not exist in which the state’s—and other traditional arenas and unconventional means isolation. Superior military and economic institutions’—roles and capacities to to confront the west.” Kilcullen’s resources manifest as strategic power only channel that power are disrupted.3 The analysis of the operating environment when translated through the institutions lines between the civilian and military and the evolving character of warfare able to convert the resource into the pre- domains and the conditions of peace centered around four longstanding ferred strategic outcome. The capacity for and war are indistinguishable. The trends: complexity, lethality, diversity, the translation of resources into preferred contemporary canter of warfare, con- and diffusion of warfare. For Kilcul- strategic outcomes has been dependent sidered as both violent and nonviolent len, however, ongoing changes in the on not only the maintenance of material contending with others for political gain, operating environment and the nature superiority but also the sustainment of is now a constant between and across of warfare resided “in the unpredict- the enabling narrative.13 whole societies.4 Chaos and disorder able, ambiguous, and highly complex Through a combination of relative in the information domain undermine manner in which the trends interact, decline in material superiority and ac- functionality in the Western liberal insti- not in each trend itself.”10 Subsequent cumulating challenges to the narrative, tutional tradition and degrade the basis doctrine sketched the contours of such the capacity for translation has been of authority, legitimacy, and trust in the complexity, describing an operating eroding for the United States for some rules-based order.5 environment “that is more than the time, marked by many scholars of the Second, this article asserts that trust, physical environment.”11 However, international order as far back as 1973 characterized by its relational nature, is the ongoing preoccupation with the and beyond.14 This decline has continued the connective tissue that provides legit- modernization of technology as a means and accelerated in recent times, as major imacy and authority to the promise and to maintain relative advantage in the signs of fragility in the order marked by functionality of openness and rule-mak- physical battlespace neglects the deeply financial crises, breakdown of interna- ing. It enables the acceptance of a level complex social changes Kilcullen was tional consensus and cooperation, and of vulnerability associated with open referring to. security crises have proliferated since systems.6 This relational trust offers us an Drawing on lessons from Iraq and 2001. In addition, the digital age has advantage over adversaries that cooperate Afghanistan, in 2006 Robert Scales ushered in new threats that have not only on a more transactional and calculative purported that victory in the wars of the created a new terrain of competitive in- basis, and is thus an underrecognized future would be decided by human and teractions but have also distorted existing strategic resource. Without trust and the cultural factors. According to Scales, orientations regarding competition and normative principles and institutions that Iraq and Afghanistan indicated that it conflict. A major development has been provide a plausible narrative for the rules- would be not technological superiority the capacity of opponents of the existing based global order, those who support but rather the capacity to capture the order to cause disruption and dysfunction and benefit from an open system risk perceptions and minds of populations in its supporting narrative while pursuing strategic defeat below the threshold of that would determine victory on the material gains in other ways.15 conventional conflict.7 To default to the battlefield.12 The idea that war is not sim- Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. employment of the offensive strategies ply an engineering problem is not new. Presidential elections marks the manifes- of our adversaries, what Joseph Nye has Scales goes beyond this understanding tation and convergence of these trends. termed “sharp power,”8 is to risk forfeit- of warfare, claiming that human and Fragility in the global order has given way ing one of our most valuable strategic cultural factors are decisive factors in to upheaval. As major reorientation of the resources.9 In addition, it is to play into battle. Indeed, close combat capabilities global order is under way, states are being the strategic strengths of adversary actors would remain a key function of an army forced to adapt to the rapidly changing for whom the incumbent international that would have to contend with violent environment while seeking to preserve order and its underpinnings of relational conflict; however, these capabilities would features of the order aligned with their trust between allied partners are the pri- be insufficient to achieve strategic effect strategic interests. For Australia, its inter- mary competitive threat. in the future war for minds. ests remain tied to the material superiority
JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Bienvenue and Rogers 5 Iraqi security forces conduct wreath-laying ceremony at Tomb of Unknown Soldier as part of Third International Conference to Counter Daesh Propaganda and Ideology, in Baghdad, Iraq, December 13, 2017 (U.S. Army/Von Marie Donato) of allied military and economic resources tissue of allied strategic power. The the other hand: compromise those values to coupled with an institutional narrative of erosion of trust must not be met with wrestle in the mud with rivals, and hazard openness to cross-border trade and in- a retreat from trust; rather, it brings to erosion of the hard-won principles that vestment, the preservation of stability and the fore the centrality of relational trust have for so long separated the United States security, and an emphasis on consensual as a strategic resource of allied systems and other liberal democracies from their and rules-based international governance. and the paucity of trust in adversary sys- authoritarian adversaries.18 While global shifts in material power tems.17 Relational trust cultivation is the are forces outside of Australia’s control, counter to adversary transactional-based This challenge is evident across a the sustainment and propagation of its relationships, which represent a vector number of theaters of below-the-thresh- preferred institutional narrative can be of long-term strategic advantage that old conflict around the world. Gregory significantly influenced by whole-of-gov- requires greater acknowledgment. Poling reports on China extending its ernment actions. Nathan Freier and Jonathan Dagle influence in the South China Sea not This process is dependent on trust. of the U.S. Army War College have through its often cited military modern- It is trust that allows both individuals identified the challenge presented by an ization but through its “weaponized” and states to commit to institutions in an era of hyper-competition to the values of counter-narrative of victimization at the environment of imperfect information openness and liberalism: hands of European and Asian powers.19 and underpins the narratives that sustain Digital platforms provide new opportu- them over time. Disinformation and un- Russia and China create the worst possible nities for China to transmit this narrative certainty in the age of cognitive warfare Faustian choices for U.S. public- and not only to its domestic population but present a direct threat to these processes private-sector leaders. On the one hand: also to the region and beyond. China’s and capacities to maintain and renew the choose to stick to the core values that define narrative depicts the United States and its institutions and norms that underwrite the United States—a rules-based interna- allies as a destabilizing force in the region the rules-based global order.16 Adversarial tional order, truth and candor, free speech, and serves to propagate the belief that the attempts to precipitate the erosion of free markets, free enterprise, etc.—and see U.S.-led security architecture, long syn- trust are an attack on the connective those values exploited at U.S. expense. On onymous with a rules-based global order,
6 Forum / Developing Trust in the Shifting Strategic Landscape JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 is merely a euphemism for its hegemony, the role of the state and its ability to propaganda and amplify its voice to con- not a guarantee of security and stability exercise power is unclear.24 Individuals, struct a narrative of religious superiority for the region. social groups, organizations, and state and moral higher order to support calls A more unilateralist foreign policy actors as distinct and indistinct entities for jihad.32 under Trump and a reduction of U.S. and in side-by-side relationships are hard power in the region play to China’s involved in the transmission of ideas Expansion of the counternarrative. This metanarrative pro- and the exploitation and manipulation Cognitive Battlespace vides a façade for the People’s Liberation of information as a means to gain Corresponding with the expansion of Army’s incremental territorial gains in strategic advantage. As a number of digital horizontal networks, the cogni- the South China Sea. By targeting the authors attest, IW waged through these tive battlespace has expanded dramat- morality of U.S. strategy, it challenges horizontal networks upsets the balance ically while eluding formal characteri- the normative basis for the “rules-based of power as its means do not favor the zation within military and intelligence global order” without which the United traditional remit of vertically hierar- communities. The shifts in the strategic States and other members of the re- chical conventional militaries.25 In the landscape suggest its time has come and gional system of alliances, most notably information domain, advantage is hard a cogent definition and lexicon are now Australia, cannot exercise their material to achieve and maintain as “a narrative overdue. IW is an enduring feature of power. As noted by U.S. Air Force can now deploy in a rapid-fire series warfare. Early 1990s conceptualizations Intelligence and Information Operations of mutually reinforcing stories that are of IW viewed it as a component of the Officer Jon Herrmann, “When a nar- hard for people to disregard and reach overall military battlespace and as a con- rative, as a key example of information a global audience in seconds at minimal vergence of separate lines of effort that power, falters, other forms of power also costs.”26 Furthermore, the rapid deploy- included all elements of intelligence, falter.”20 As a number of scholars, officials, ment of narratives can create chaos and surveillance, and reconnaissance, elec- and commentators have also noted, a fur- undermine the rules-based global order tronic warfare, psychological operations, ther refined and targeted version of this and those that stand in support of it.27 and cyber operations. However, a unity strategy is likely to migrate further south China has conducted a concerted in- of effort under a unified theory of IW to the South Pacific and the strategically formation campaign through statements did not materialize, and the elements of pivotal countries to Australia’s north.21 of senior officials and state-owned media IW continued to develop and evolve as outlets to develop a narrative of victim- more or less distinct operational efforts From Vertical to Horizontal ization and rightful historical ownership supplementary to kinetic effects.33 Con- Networks of Power of land features in the South China Sea.28 cepts of “cognitive warfare” were intro- The future of governance in the imme- This narrative is intended to foster per- duced but remained indistinct from the diate region and elsewhere is uncertain. ceptions that China’s extension of power broader IW discussion within military It cannot be predicted, and efforts into the South China Sea is a defensive and intelligence communities.34 A brief to reconstitute it must be cognizant measure, and therefore the behaviors overview of the cognitive battlespace of complexity, as the nature of these of those contesting China’s actions are and cognitive warfare is offered below. changes is inherently discontinuous and offensive. At the same time, little infor- Broadly speaking, cognition describes nonlinear.22 This disruption is driven mation has been released to the public the mental process by which informa- by four interlocking characteristics of from U.S. intelligence agencies regarding tion is transformed into knowledge and the age of digital information networks, China’s activities, further facilitating knowledge into understanding.35 As early detailed below. The ubiquity of infor- China’s own narrative.29 Operatives of discussions of IW pointed out, human mation in the digital era has caused a the Russian Internet Research Agency, a understanding of the battlespace is the diffusion of power among a diversity Kremlin-associated group run by oligarch essence of situational awareness and the of actors in the international system. Yevgeny Prigozhin, exploited existing basis of strategic decisionmaking and ac- However, as indicated in Kilcullen’s partisanship and disenfranchisement in tion.36 Contests for information assurance 2004 Complex Warfighting operating the U.S. political system.30 Their use of and security involving attempts to deny, concept, while the increased diversity fake profiles on social media platforms, degrade, and destroy adversary informa- of actors is not a new trend, it is how including but not limited to Twitter and tion have always occurred in a “cognitive these actors wield power through flat- Facebook, to spread suspicions against battlespace.” These efforts now include tened power structures that represents key political figures, namely within the but are not exhausted by all the elements a marked change.23 In the unfolding Democratic Party, was a highly effective, of IW mentioned, and thus involve both strategic context, power no longer yet unseen offensive against American human and cyber systems and dissolve the strictly flows through vertical hierar- democracy.31 Before Russia, militant civil-military divide. The point of depar- chical institutions upon which sits the extremist group al Shabaab, and later the ture is in the exploding use of computers state, but rather flows horizontally so-called Islamic State, used a wide range as persuasive technologies—the set of through complex networks in which of social media platforms to transmit its practices termed captology by Stanford
JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Bienvenue and Rogers 7 U.S. troopers, assigned to A Battery, Field Artillery Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, raise assembled radio antenna to enable field communications during Operation Chosin at 7th Army Joint Multinational Training Command’s Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, January 28, 2015 (U.S. Army/Gertrud Zach)
University’s B.J. Fogg in 1997.37 It is by environment. By connecting all domains, information operations traversing this way of the uniquely persistent, proximal, it blurs distinctions between war and peace terrain are poised to target the political, and continuous forms of contending and operational levels. The unification cultural, and moral centers of gravity of availed by digital technologies, accessing of lines of effort and effects under preex- society, leveraging all elements of the the minds of others anonymously and isting IW constructs has been forced on connectivity, reach, and persistence of the from extended range, that IW efforts operators by a combination of the shifting medium. have merged into an expanded cognitive strategic circumstances and by the efforts No better example to date exists domain. These contests taken as a whole and activities of not only adversaries but than the Russian manipulation of various amount to “cognitive warfare,” the sum also private-sector captology practices with social media platforms in the 2016 U.S. of which is greater than its individual no malignant intent, effectively creating election, acknowledged on July 3, 2018, parts, and where the unintended side a new terrain. The transformative impact by the U.S. Select Senate Committee on effects of intended persuasive activities are of the weaponization of the cognitive Intelligence (SSCI) report, which con- unpredictable and emergent. Effects in the domain extends well beyond existing firmed the U.S. Intelligence Community cognitive battlespace have the capacity to conceptualizations of the problem space. Assessment produced in January 2017.38 alter the context of situational awareness, In turn, the erosion and delegitimization Having foreseen “the broad impact of thus rendering it incomplete. Incomplete of the liberal internationalist narrative technology on the battlespace,” Russia situational awareness can reflect an orien- change the context in which the United has effectively leveraged the shift to tation toward information that obscures States and its allies may seek to exercise horizontal information networks and the its meaning. Capabilities deployed under kinetic power. This terrain and its infor- expansion of gray-zone warfare.39 a false orientation cannot achieve the mational content connect the traditional While very much in its formative desired strategic effect. Worse still, the physical domains of warfare to human stages, U.S.-based military and intel- capacity to recognize and adapt to the systems, and there is no firewall dividing ligence communities have begun to shifting circumstances can be thwarted. civil and military domains and no sentinel develop a lexicon for cognitive war that Cognitive warfare is an enduring fea- currently protecting the domestic pop- contains analogies with elements of ture of the existing and future operating ulation. Sophisticated and coordinated traditional kinetic warfare.40 From these
8 Forum / Developing Trust in the Shifting Strategic Landscape JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 early conceptualizations, the concept of military and nonmilitary mechanisms global financial crisis is now exacerbated information effects is being refined. The aimed directly at the strategic level, by the advent of peer-to-peer digital advent of hyper-connectivity has added bypassing operational level campaigns, platforms, including but not limited the carefully tailored narrative to the which extend beyond the limits of the to social media, through which ideas arsenal of information effects.41 The nar- physical battlespace.43 Iran’s constant, about the failure of Western demo- rative, injected into the information cycle unrestricted, and unbounded warfare cratic institutions and decentralized at the critical time, can be described as strategy leverages Hizballah to cause self-governance models are transmitted. a form of “cognitive fire.” Cognitive societal and political chaos for its Soon, distributed ledger technology, fires are now precision-guided, and adversaries.44 This strategy, bypassing commonly known as “blockchain,” the kill chain is transversal. Cognitive the strengths and authority of tradi- will add new and novel variances to the fires emit a “narrative signature” in the tional militaries, is not the preserve of human-computer interface as institu- electromagnetic spectrum, analogous to militaries but is open to all. As Clint tions such as banks, governments, and an aircraft wing in the radio spectrum Watts suggests, the concern now should corporations seek a secure foothold out or a combustion engine in infrared.42 be how everyone, state and nonstate, of what is widely recognized as a rogue To an extent, they can be identified might seek to employ similar strategies cyber domain.49 These and other tech- and tracked. However, when a weap- and the consequences of mass chaos in nology-driven changes represent radical onized narrative leaps inevitably from a world in which the capacity to distin- and untested interventions in analogue cyberspace into analogue physical space, guish truth from fiction is in precipi- systems of trust. its signature gets disseminated and, in tous decline.45 According to the 2018 Edelman many cases seen recently, its effects both This strategy is intentionally designed Trust Barometer, the trust that was dis- intended and unintended can be expo- to play to the weaknesses of Western located from vertical liberal democratic nentially magnified. This exponential liberal democracies by attacking their institutions to digital platforms is now payoff in effects is what defines cognitive soft underbelly.46 Military and legal re- also in decline as the findings of the fires as a strategic weapon of unprece- sponses to adversaries’ efforts that blur Robert Mueller investigation are made dented power. The Russian information the line between militaries and civilian public and people come to realize that operations identified in the SSCI report populations and acts of war debilitate the person they correspond with via these benefited precisely from this payoff. The liberal democratic norms and principles networks may not be a “peer” but rather strategic ramifications, therefore, are not of international law. Effective responses a bot.50 How trust in a post-truth world limited in the same way as adversaries’ must be oriented to reflect this blurring will be reconstituted in horizontal net- employment of high-tech weaponry or and reconstitution of the relevant bat- works and the role of the state within are the cyber warfare targeting of command tlespace.47 The integrated incorporation yet to be determined.51 At the same time, and control of deployed armed forces. of informational effects with physical the 2018 Edelman barometer shows that The strategic implications extend to the effects, in both offensive and defensive trust of a different type—transactional vulnerable cognitive fabric of the open contexts, can orient the armed forces in nature—has increased in authoritarian society from which the armed forces of toward the “cognitive main effort” they systems, most notably China, which now liberal democracies draw the entirety of will require while defending the peace holds the number-one trust rank. Here their resources. as well as to fight and win in the future the broader implications of proliferating operating environment. A cognitive disinformation activities are clear. Not Constant, Unrestricted, main effort requires whole-of-govern- only battles for trust, but contests of trust, and Unbounded Warfare ment coordination and support, and will to reorient its meaning between different As the cognitive battlespace expands, require significant organizational ad- political-economic systems—democratic the strategic threshold, once deter- justment within the Australian Defence and authoritarian—characterize this mined as a discernible point on a linear Organisation.48 strategic contest. Leading scholars from continuum by traditional markers of the intelligence, military, and academic conflict escalation, now transverses a Erosion of Trust in Western communities are recognizing this fun- multidimensional nonlinear matrix of Liberal Democratic Institutions damental shift: “The most prominent competition and conflict. In the cogni- The dislocation of states from their operations of the last year—Russian at- tive battlespace, lines demarcating civil traditional hierarchies and the failure tempts to undermine the 2016 American and military spaces and conditions of of governance are both caused by and Presidential election through the hacking peace and war are being blurred and enforce the erosion of ideas, norms, and of the Democratic National Committee, reconstituted. Adversary lines of effort trust upon which the Westphalian state the release of emails, and the use of fake are increasingly aimed below a thresh- and rules-based order are predicated. Facebook and Twitter accounts—were old at which conventional combat capa- The loss of trust in centralized Western designed to undermine trust in institu- bilities would be engaged. Both Russia liberal democratic institutions and their tions through manipulation, distortion, and China have employed integrated ability to govern after the 2007–2008 and disruption.”52
JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Bienvenue and Rogers 9 to adversary advantage. It provides the heuristic needed to underpin the neces- sary unified narrative to coordinate joint and whole-of-government activities—for example, international engagement, information operations, IW, and psy- chological operations—in the cognitive battlespace and the means to deny the adversary strategic space gained through “information fratricide,” a consequence of discordant strategic messaging. Coherence can only be achieved as a product of strategic engagement that augments and aligns existing disparate lines of effort conducted under the aus- pices of a cognitive main effort. Without the coherence of narrative provided by trust, the cognitive main effort succumbs to an analogue of blue-on-blue conflict, to use kinetic terms. IBM’s Watson for Cyber Security uses cognitive capabilities to improve cyber security investigations For an army, this requires a reorien- (IBM/John Mottern) tation of its international engagement strategy as an ad hoc line of effort in Developing Trust to at both local and global levels in the support of kinetic operations. The de- Navigate Uncertainty in the face of contending narratives that erode velopment of relational trust requires Cognitive Battlespace the incumbent social-political settle- strategic engagement—enduring in The future of global governance and the ment upon which civil peace—domestic nature and coordinated for a unified Western liberal democratic model is yet and international—is predicated. Rela- strategic message as the U.S. Echelons to be determined and may be in a state tional trust, therefore—the voluntary Above Brigade (EAB) concept concurs. of contested reconstitution indefinitely. acceptance of a level of vulnerability in U.S. Army efforts in this regard are The interplay of social and technological the presence of pervasive uncertainty— well advanced. U.S. Army Training and trends, from which the threat to the is a strategic resource that represents Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-8, strategic narrative and global gover- the connective tissue of Australian and published December 6, 2018, details how nance model emerges, is characteris- allied power, and it requires acknowl- the Service’s EAB concept can better tically nonlinear and therefore cannot edgment and cultivation as a type of support operations across the “compe- be predicted, and plays out below a “immunity boost” for sociopolitical sta- tition continuum,” with particular focus threshold in which the attention and bility and sustainability, not retreat and on persistent competition below the resources required to respond are likely abandonment.53 threshold of armed conflict, with irregu- not forthcoming from highly distracted Trust cultivation and prioritization lar and unconventional combatants and societies and government institutions. are active strategies to reestablish the capabilities, and emphasizes the pervasive This is fundamentally because the inter- conditions in which preferred supporting cognitive element,54 as described above. play is occurring within complex and narratives can be forwarded. Without It envisions persistent and continuous multifaceted human and nonhuman the trust component, the narrative and EAB formations and commanders as systems about which we as observers associated order become one of reactive never ceding the initiative, being antici- have inherently imperfect knowledge. self-interest and short-term transaction- patory rather than reactive, and remaining The threat is by its nature an orientation alism, which provides benefits to the skeptical of their own understanding challenge, driven by the complexity in highest bidder and the most materially throughout a campaign or operation due the speed and scope of change. This endowed. Power and influence become to the inherent complexity of the con- means that the more immediate stra- a numbers game, one that would offer temporary battlefield.55 Acknowledging tegic problem for the Australian army particular benefits to authoritarian adver- the significant civil-military cooperation is not in meeting a peer adversary on saries. Building trust avoids succumbing required to achieve these ambitious goals, the conventional battlefield, which is a to an attempt to directly counter the Assad Raza and Jerritt Lynn argue that low-probability, high-impact operational strategic aims of the adversary, which EAB formations must be complemented and tactical scenario, but the uncer- further erodes the fabric of open societies by a unified civil affairs regiment under tainty of governance, stability, and peace and works to alter the rules of the game the joint command of the communities
10 Forum / Developing Trust in the Shifting Strategic Landscape JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 of interest they represent within the deepened and sustained civil-military and in the human and technical environ- armed forces, which can nonetheless military-to-military interactions, from ment, and the expression of these ele- carry forward the government’s strategic the bottom up and side by side across ments through the prism of increasingly intent. According to Raza and Lynn, levels of society. Furthermore, the army’s diverse and unpredictable threats to the the envisioned U.S. Joint Civil-Military efforts to build trust as a counter to ad- regional and global rules-based order. Operations Center would serve as an versaries should also be directed internally These threats have emerged from the within Australia, as there is no firewall technology-driven shift from vertical operational- to strategic-level organization dividing the narrative the army needs to to horizontal digital information flows to maintain continuous coordination project overseas and the narrative it needs and the associated degree of hyper-con- with interagency partners, [which] would to project domestically. Leveraging trust nectivity. This results in an expanded facilitate cooperation with interagency as a strategic resource requires sustained battlefield, with an increasing emphasis partners in areas of common interest, pro- commitment and focus. It should be on cognitive vulnerabilities that do not mote a common civil operational picture, treated as part of the Australian army’s discern between military and civilian and enable sharing of critical information core business rather than as “accessories domains or conditions of peace and war. and resources to support population-centric that serve military requirements,”59 or the This gives rise to a high-tempo threat operations, [providing] commanders a remit of the special forces. environment of constant, unrestricted, unique capability to help resolve popula- Here the opportunity exists for the and unbounded warfare. Together, tion-centric problems that could negatively army to lead the strategic response to these shifts in the strategic landscape impact military and civilian efforts.56 develop trust between Australia and key amount to what is essentially a cognitive domestic, regional, and global partners. contest, one that goes beyond existing The concept is closely aligned with In its ability to build trust from the bot- risk modeling and challenges the army the “cognitive main effort” we describe tom up and side by side, the Australian to account for broader types of threats. above and expressed in our recommenda- army uniquely contributes to joint and This challenge reveals the critical role tion for the role of strategic engagement whole-of-government international played by trust in the constitution and within the Australian army.57 engagement efforts.60 This would offer understanding of the nature and charac- To achieve this outcome and meet particular benefits to the special forces, ter of threats and the required response. strategic guidance would require a sig- whose own unique efforts would be Trust can provide the “cognitive shield” nificant change in the role of the army, greatly facilitated by a more favorable in the changing operating environment. which would need to be articulated in operating environment. Existing strategic The threat environment is forcing a the Australian army’s operating con- engagement efforts do not extend far reorientation on the army that is highly cepts. Close combat capabilities will enough and are not structured to fulfill disruptive but also presents new oppor- remain a cornerstone of the remit of the aim of establishing enduring relational tunities. The necessary reorientation Australian Land Forces. Modernization trust-based relationships across the region challenges the army to seriously consider programs should be maintained to and abroad. Periodic ship visits, joint its future roles and the structure and sustain a combat capability. At the same exercises, capacity-building, and cultural makeup of the key capabilities required time, the army could expand upon ele- exchanges are important but insufficient to deliver the desired strategic engage- ments of its traditional remit to support to respond to the persistent challenges of ment effects, integrated with close whole-of-government efforts to address the shifting operating environment. The combat capabilities, in order to realize a the growing strategic vacuum that exists augmentation of the Australian army’s strategic army. JFQ below the threshold of conventional civil-military information center capability, armed conflict. This would involve potentially leveraging expanded reservist a paradigm shift from the traditional forces trained with a specific skill set, Notes notion of top-down military-to-military could provide the scale-appropriate niche 1 and civil-military cooperation to allow capability for the army, whether acting in- Daniel Maurer, The Clash of the Trini- ties: A New Theoretical Analysis of the General for new forms of bottom-up and side- dependently or in an alliance contingency. Nature of War (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. by-side cooperation, which leverage a Enabled by its strategic agility and innova- Army War College Press, 2017), available at coherent strategic narrative to introduce a tion, the army’s impact will be to leverage
JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Bienvenue and Rogers 11 4 Nathan Freier and Jonathan Dagle, (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001). ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy,’” ABC News, No- “The Weaponization of Everything,” Defense 15 Nathan Freier et al., “Game On or Game vember 18, 2018, available at
12 Forum / Developing Trust in the Shifting Strategic Landscape JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 available at JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Bienvenue and Rogers 13 Array of blue light-emitting diodes and time-gated specialized camera is used to collect whole body image data from test mannequin (Courtesy Howard J. Walls/ Aerosol Control Group Lead, RTI International) precisely and outcomes predicted; in Maximizing the Power the national security environment, variables are dynamic and complex, and outcomes are the product of emergent interactions among people, institutions, of Strategic Foresight and systems. The exact path of these interactions is inherently nonlinear and By Amy Zalman difficult to predict. The national security strategist is thus also in need of specialized thinking n order to develop plans and recom- skills to help him or her mentally model mend actions in support of strategic uncertainty and grasp the nonlinear and I goals, national security profession- complex pathways of change. These als need the ability to anticipate the thinking skills do not come naturally impacts of change in their external to the modern American military environment. The planner’s task is education system, which valorizes an Dr. Amy Zalman is CEO of Prescient, a complicated by the fact that from Enlightenment-inspired scientific ap- Washington, DC–based foresight consultancy. the vantage of the present, there are proach and has historically focused on She is also an Adjunct Professor in the Culture, Communications, and Technology Program at many possible impacts of change. In teaching critical thinking skills. Such Georgetown University. a laboratory, variables can be titrated skills are valuable when a problem is well 14 Forum / Maximizing the Power of Strategic Foresight JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 defined and it is possible to identify its What Is Strategic Foresight? Yet enthusiastic support, while component parts, evaluate evidence, and Strategic foresight is an interdisciplinary necessary, is not sufficient to create a generate solutions. However, they are not domain that draws on cybernetics and future-minded national security work- sufficiently robust to address situations systems thinking, management sciences, force. It is possible to use strategic that are as ambiguous, loosely bounded, sociology, data science, cognitive psy- foresight well or badly. In the national and complex as the possible futures of chology, and creative thinking, among security community today, there is room national security. others. Anticipatory thinking to support for improvement. Strategic foresight In contexts of uncertainty, another set decisionmaking is its essence. The indi- activities are often brought into class- of skills—those contained in the strategic vidual who invests time in learning how rooms and conference rooms in ways foresight toolkit—is required. Arguably, to think like a futurist emerges with an that are superficial. A quick exercise in this requirement is especially vital today: appreciation for the cognitive barriers scenario-building, for example, may give technological advancements and their faced by the human brain when it participants the satisfaction that they have unevenly distributed but powerful effects, attempts to envision the future and will engaged in strategic foresight. But when climate change, and social change are be well-practiced in holistic, synthetic, conducted superficially, such activities unfolding at a challenging pace in our in- analytic, and creative ways of thinking. typically become exercises in reinforcing terconnected global system. Black swans, Organizations that adopt foresight rather than challenging preexisting ideas cascading problems, and uncertainty practices to help them identify trends about what the future will be like. To be stemming from interconnections abound. at an early stage and adapt or innovate clear, superficiality is never intentional. The stakes are high for anticipating and to leverage those trends are in stronger Instead, urgent pressure to produce activ- planning effectively for the potential im- competitive positions than those that ities leads course or activity facilitators to pacts of change. do not. This value is demonstrable: A using frameworks and ideas that are the By way of example, imagine you recently completed longitudinal study easiest to access instead of those that are are a strategist in the 1970s seeking to of large European firms demonstrated the most appropriate. Popular ideas and understand the implications of the newly that those incorporating foresight into activities circulate through the national created Internet. Its early architects did their strategic planning realized signif- security educational community uncriti- not view Internet protocols as a potential icant gains in both profit and market cally, so that rough usage in one place is locus of national security threat because capitalization over the long term.2 replicated in another, and it is difficult to they assumed that small communities of Management science has revealed that get new thinking in the door. mutually trustworthy academics would systematically scanning the peripheral As the history of national security be the most likely users of the future environment for weak signals of change community engagement with foresight Internet. Critical thinking would not can help people and institutions prepare demonstrates, thinking creatively about assist you in generating scenarios of the for otherwise unexpected events.3 the future is a cultural challenge. Large possible futures of the Internet, let alone Foresight is not an unknown quantity bureaucracies, such as the Department of conceiving of it as the foundational infra- in the U.S. national security space, yet it Defense, are often resistant to change and structure of future human institutions. has waxed and waned as a discipline of to reckoning with the fact that conditions In open-ended situations such as the interest. Following sustained enthusiasm for success in the future may be differ- future of a new technology or institution, from the end of World War II through ent from those of today. Institutional systems thinking and frameworks to the early 1990s, interest languished as proclivities can shape and constrain the help structure imaginative and expansive the dramatic events of the moment—the imagination that is required to develop exploration of the implications of change fallout from the demise of the Soviet insights into the future of a profoundly are required. Strategic foresight supplies Union, the 9/11 attacks, the 2008 finan- complex, changing, and uncertain world. these frameworks. cial crisis—took center stage. Recently, To take one example, futurism is fre- This article makes a two-pronged strategic foresight has reappeared on quently presented in mainstream culture argument. First, strategic foresight, a dis- the radar. The growing number of con- as primarily associated with technological cipline I describe in more detail, provides ference sessions, professional education innovation. This is a narrow use of the the vitally needed mindsets and frame- opportunities, and pursuits such as sci- strategic foresight skillset; technology is works required to plan in uncertainty.1 ence fiction writing contests designed to only one of the drivers of complex social Strategic foresight should be taught trigger creative thinking about the future events such as war. When they assume, and used more widely in the national attest to this rise in interest. This is all rather than interrogate, a high-tech security space. Second, where foresight good news, and, hopefully, leaders in all future, military participants in strategic is being taught and used (it has recently relevant institutions will continue to grow foresight foreclose the opportunity to had an upswing in interest), there are their support for fostering successors who identify signals of change and devel- opportunities to improve its application are skilled at thinking both systematically opment across the spectrum of human and better serve planning staffs and and creatively about how to envision an activity. This has in the past led to insti- decisionmakers. uncertain future. tutional blindness to signals of change in JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Zalman 15 Paratrooper assigned to Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, provides security outside subway tunnel at Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia, March 21, 2018 (U.S. Army) societies that might produce low-tech, of strategic foresight. To use the foresight foresight offers compelling frameworks asymmetric approaches to armed conflict. toolkit more comprehensively and effec- for asking these sorts of questions, and One of the key tenets of foresight is that tively, planners will also think deeply and the frameworks themselves are not it is imperative to explore not only the creatively about the possible, a much wider fancy or difficult to understand. This is most likely future but also a range of and more complex world of potential all the more reason why advancing the possible futures. It is in this arena where than that of simply the probable. This understanding of strategic foresight as a potential black swans lurk. is not easy; it takes intellectual rigor and discipline and a strategy support tool is The popular premise that future self-knowledge to explore trends that not only a good idea but also a clear and wars will take place in megacities (with may violate one’s institutional worldview. simple route to creating opportunities more than 10 million inhabitants) offers How could a war unfold in a nonurban for asking difficult questions about the another example of how a selective use area, especially in a world that is primarily potential future at a time when such of the tools of strategic foresight can urban? What assumptions are held today questions are critical. narrow strategic vision precisely where about what a city is and looks like? Will Strategic foresight functions best it would be useful to expand it. The other emergent realities—for example, as a normal, integrated element of an war-in-megacities scenario is grounded about the way people communicate and organization’s planning cycle. This cycle in trend information related to the urban work or about how climate change and will typically include horizon scanning growth. By some accounts, there will be weather evolve—change the ways that (also called environmental scanning) for at least 50 such cities by 2050.4 So it is cities develop in the future? early indicators of change, the integration reasonable to project that at some point, Venturing answers, however explor- of early signals into existing forecasts, warfighters will probably engage in a meg- atory, to questions that probe beyond impact assessments, and a decisionmaking acity. However, strategists who halt their the boundaries of current expectations process that uses insights of foresight to exploration of the future with scenarios could help reduce strategic surprise in the inform action. based on the extrapolations of current future and prompt innovative thinking Historically notable examples demon- trends alone are underutilizing the tools in advance of the unexpected. Strategic strate the power of this activity. The most 16 Forum / Maximizing the Power of Strategic Foresight JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 famous example is likely that of Royal to China, a country perceived to be bestselling book, Future Shock. These Dutch Shell—a common tool in the strong at long-term planning because ideas trickled into the executive offices foresight kit because of its pioneering it has a long history and a centrally of both government leaders and major use of scenarios. The oil industry his- controlled government.) This is clearly corporations. Long-range planning and torically forecast its future needs on the a discussion that deserves its own time the basic tenets of foresight were accom- presumption of steadily growing demand and place; what can be stated here is that panied by a spirit of openness and an and opportunities to locate supply. In military futurists have played a critical exploratory readiness to consider the po- the 1970s, Royal Dutch Shell recognized role in creating some of the foundational tential that more than one future might that geopolitical developments (such techniques and ideas of foresight, which emerge. At the same time, voices of warn- as the newly formed Organization of offer an alternative history of successful ing also called on political and military Petroleum Exporting Countries) could and thoughtful exploration of potential leaders to adapt U.S. planning processes lead to a serious disruption in oil supply, futures. It also helps to press into relief to a world that was becoming more com- transforming what was heretofore a some of the cultural tendencies that plex and interconnected. Projects such buyer’s market into a seller’s market. As a might have helped planners in the past as the Department of Defense Office of result of its readiness to take this scenario but that might be hindrances today. Net Assessment, which was established in seriously, the company was prepared for 1973 to assess the impact of converging the 1973 oil embargo and recovered with Historical Snapshot macro-trends, were attuned to the need greater speed than its industry peers.5 A quick survey of the history of strate- to assess complex environments. In the United States, the coordinated gic foresight as a coherent management Some of the most forceful notes of effort to prepare for potential disruptions planning discipline often begins with warning can be found in a 1987 volume related to the Y2K “bug” offers a power- the example of the U.S. Air Force. After titled Creating Strategic Vision: Long- ful example of the role strategic foresight World War II, under the direction of Range Planning for National Security.7 can play in raising awareness and address- Secretary Harold “Hap” Arnold, the This compilation of essays outlining ing potential crises. In 1998, the World Service took the first steps to connect the various techniques of strategic fore- Future Society (formerly a nonprofit U.S. military planning with long-term sight was offered as an antidote to the organization for futurists) began working scientific and technological develop- “pragmatic, fragmented, short-term” with the White House, United Nations ments. In order to organize resources tendencies that were presumed to char- coordination groups, and others to antic- and investments, Arnold commissioned acterize the American way of leadership.8 ipate and address potential Y2K issues in a major study titled Toward New Hori- Much of this critique from a generation the United States. Most of their efforts zons that projected future technology ago about the short-term nature of U.S. were in “real-time networking and swift needs for the Air Force. The planning strategy has become dogma today. When decisionmaking,” but the group also momentum was maintained by standing I introduced the work to a cohort of flag raised awareness in a 1998 conference up the Research and Development officers in an advanced training course on the consequences that could unfold Corporation, known today as RAND, recently, they readily warmed to the thesis without further attention.6 Failures of which became the military’s go-to think that the United States is inherently poor foresight are similarly dramatic, as the tank for long-term questions and also at long-term thinking and needs to do a many well-known anecdotes of corpora- the home of some of the country’s most better job. tions and retailers that failed to recognize prominent futurists during the Cold Also, in the late 1980s, the U.S. Army the potential impacts of technological and War. War College introduced a new course ti- cultural trends, such as online shopping This story of foresight’s foundations tled Futures: Creating Strategic Visions.9 or streaming video, attest. in the United States encapsulates the The goal of the course was to provide In the spirit of supporting this capac- spirit of the American brand of foresight: promising future leaders with the creative ity, the remainder of this article offers a a triumphal and empowered energy, a thinking skills required to envision and brief account of the role that foresight has focus on technology as the key critical communicate alternative futures in an ex- played in military planning, followed by driver of future events, and a positivist ecutive setting. Alternative futures, in this recommendations for advancing its im- outlook of the future as knowable and context, refers to a practice of indicating plementation in military education today. manageable. In the ensuing decades, that more than one future is possible and The history of foresight in the U.S. this foundational vision of the postwar that one’s own present-day decisions help national security environment is offered American future infused planning ac- to shape the future. The course was no- here to rebut the pervasive idea among tivities and also a particularly American table for stressing creativity as a teachable national security professionals that the mindset about how to think about “the skill and for proposing that the future United States cannot be good at long- future” in the abstract. may unfold in many possible ways. term strategy or planning. (This idea is In the 1970s, the ideas of previously And there the enthusiasm stops. often justified by reference to the United obscure futurists gained popularity, most There is little documentary evidence in States as a young country, as compared notably as a result of Alvin Toffler’s the 1990s of the creative, open-ended JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Zalman 17 energy that suffused futures work in the Five Recommendations surprise that “low-tech” cultures could 1980s. Indeed, the signs point in the to Maximize the Benefits use new media in sophisticated ways. opposite direction. The 2004 Strategic of Foresight An even more sophisticated step in Leadership Primer published by the Embrace Analytic Holism. The U.S. this arena will be for strategic foresight Department of Command, Leadership, military typically privileges technological projects to start acknowledging the fun- and Management of the Army War innovations as the key driver of the fu- damental transformations in the global College, while retaining the language ture, which reflects a deeply embedded economic, political, and social systems of strategic vision and the future, pres- tendency in American culture and history. being wrought by the ongoing evolution ents the concept quite differently than This is problematic in several directions, of digital technologies. As many com- it had in the 1980s.10 Drawing grimly all of which distort the ability to accu- mentators have noted, all of humanity is on President George W. Bush’s 2004 rately assess the evidence about potential in the first stages of a new era grounded remarks that the Nation’s “terrorist contexts of future conflict. in digital infrastructure.12 When techno- enemies have a vision,” the document First, technological change does logical innovations on this scale become calls for a countervailing one: an over- not take place in a vacuum, but at the ubiquitous and accepted, they actually arching summation of what “ought to intersection of other human institutions become less notable in themselves as be,” subject to the ends-ways-means and drivers of change. While there is a features of our world. Take, for example, logic of strategy creation and capable of need for pure technological forecasting in electricity. Although not everyone has being summarized in a pithy image or weapons development and other related electricity, its ubiquity is a critical expla- phrase—vision, in other words, as a tag- areas, this work will not generate sce- nandum of human behavior. The world line. Little could be further from the late narios of potential future conflict. It will is on the way to a digital ubiquity (even 1980s promotion of strategic vision as an only produce scenarios of future weapons though not everyone will have access empowering, adaptive capacity to think systems and other related technologies. to digital tools), and it is at the point of creatively and imagine alternative futures. Analytic holism is a concise directive ubiquity that nontechnological drivers A decade later, as the mood of crisis reminding participants in futures work to of change become vitally important to that permeated the “hot” years of the keep a wide range of drivers of change in explore in order to posit potential future war on terror waned, foresight activities mind. A traditional place to start is with environments. once again emerged into national security the drivers encapsulated in the acronym Rather than highlighting technolog- and Federal Government consciousness. STEEP—society, technology, environ- ical drivers of change and treating other Today, we can find a Federal Foresight ment, economics, politics. There are drivers as “soft” or less real, strategic community of interest sharing activities others, of course: cultures, demographics, foresight project leaders should frame across the government in the shape of media, and legal systems, to take a few explorations of the future holistically formal educational opportunities, such obvious examples. and with a strong eye to ways in which as the Army War College futures semi- Change in a complex, open system, people, collectively and individually, drive nar titled What Kind of Army Does the such as the international system, will emergent and unexpected system behav- Nation Need in 2035 and Beyond; the occur at the intersection of develop- ior. This nuanced approach can improve commitment to develop an entire course ments in these areas. War and conflict, as the accuracy of insights into potential on foresight at the Army Command and quintessentially social events, are always futures and potential surprises, even in General Staff College; and hands-on shaped by developments in these areas, high-tech battle space environments. long-term planning experiments such even when technology on the battlefield Adopt a Shared Lexicon Across the as the Air University’s Blue Horizons is of the essence. If planners do not look Government. Foresight terminology can program.11 Beyond formal education, at their surrounding environment as be confusing. Not only does it present there are forums such as the periodic holistically as they possibly can, they risk a number of terms of art that are also conferences and online community of not seeing or recognizing signals that present in our everyday language (such as the Mad Scientists, sponsored by the are eminently available for analysis and foresight, uncertainty, and prediction), but Army Training and Doctrine Command, thus losing the opportunity to consider there also are differences among futurists and various think tank conferences and how to avoid being surprised by them. and other disciplines in the ways they events. This upsurge of interest, coupled One sobering example from this century use these same words. While I might use with forays in different areas of the mili- should be the social media sophistication the word predict in a loose and general tary into more wargaming, red-teaming, of the planners of the al Qaeda attacks in sense to indicate my effort to explain my and activities structured according to 2001. If the national security community subjectively developed insights into how design theory, suggest that this is a fa- had been better prepared to see how, in the future might unfold (“Here’s how I vorable moment to advocate on behalf the 1980s and 1990s, satellite television predict the long-term impacts of negoti- of not simply quantity, but also higher and the advent of the Internet affected ations over the Arctic on both trade and quality. Here are five recommendations social interactions around the world, it culture,” for example), many practitioners for its achievement. could have reduced the unwarranted in the strategic foresight community use 18 Forum / Maximizing the Power of Strategic Foresight JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Demographers project that more than 70 percent of world’s population will live in cities, many of them coastal, by 2050, and that potential for instability and strife caused by humanitarian or other disasters in megacities makes it necessary to look at them as potential future battlegrounds, Lagos, Nigeria, June 23, 2011 (Wikipedia) the concept of prediction to refer to the on the Internet for anyone’s reference.13 achieving success.14 Heifetz and Laurie narrow capacity to identify exactly what However, as a glance at the Singapore suggest that rather than offering solutions will happen, to a degree that is typically lexicon shows, such dictionaries are in such situations, leaders should galva- available only under strictly controlled reflections of the context and priorities nize adaptation to these new conditions experimental conditions. To add to this of their governments. A U.S. lexicon by safely exposing employees to the chal- difficulty, many terms are somewhat sim- may share terminology as it is used by lenges facing them and supporting the ilar in everyday usage (“forecasting the futurists around the world, but it will be a development of new behavioral models. weather” and “predicting the weather” more authoritative resource for American To this end, Heifetz and Laurie point to the same general idea for most professionals if it is composed with the encouraged leaders to learn not only to purposes). Similar lexical and conceptual United States in mind. Such a project view their organizations from the “field confusion abounds in the national secu- will engender other benefits as well; it of play,” where they are a part of the rity community and between different will create a clear point of reference for day-to-day work of their team, but also projects. developing institutional knowledge across to “get on the balcony.” From the rafters, A clear and relatively simple route to Services and agencies and, simplest of all, high above the game itself, leaders can see orienting defense practitioners around the introduction of conceptual clarity into not only competitors and the dynamics foresight work will be by developing the disparate activities by different actors. of doing business side by side with their an authoritative lexicon and educating “Get on the Balcony.” The title of this colleagues but also the larger dynamics people across the government to use it as recommendation borrows from the ad- of the system—how different parts of the a reference. Other dictionaries of terms vice offered in the 1990s by management organization work together, and how have been created—most notably by the strategists Ronald Heifetz and Donald they interact and intersect with the world government of Singapore, whose civil Laurie to corporations facing emerging beyond. Observations made from the bal- service does use the lexicon—and these business conditions requiring novel forms cony can provide powerful insights into and many other resources are available of behavior and new ways of defining and the dynamics of the wider system and JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Zalman 19 From left, August Cole, co-author of Ghost Fleet, Chuck Gannon, author of Trial by Fire, and Max Brooks, author of World War Z, talk with select group of burgeoning science fiction writers from across Department of Defense, February 4, 2019 (DOD/Kyle Olson) introduce opportunities to find “leverage to the sports teams that serve as models other actors, whether these are militaries, points . . . to intervene” in the system, for adaptive leadership in Heifetz and corporations, global nonprofits, or any of as the esteemed systems thinker Donella Laurie’s work, institutions whose work the other institutional actors who make Meadows characterized the opportu- is national defense tend to the see the up the world. nity.15 Strategic foresight education and world in terms of opposing teams. This Incorporate Complexity Thinking activities offer an appropriate venue for is reasonable; it is their job. The field of into Foresight Activities. Foresight and this exploratory way of seeing the world. play is the space from which members the study of complex systems arose from First, holistic vision and systems thinking of the institution seek to see threats and similar and even intertwined conceptual are intrinsic to foresight; only by seeking potential adversaries. movements in the 20th century, and signals of potential change throughout When the world and national situa- both futurists and complexity scientists the system, and beyond one’s typical do- tions are in flux, however, this view will draw inspiration from some of the same main, will one find the potential surprises not provide a sufficiently comprehensive people—for example, Jay Forrester and and opportunities that offer competitive view of the evolving system—in this case, Donella Meadows (and others), whose advantage. the global geopolitical, economic, and research used computer modeling in the This recommendation is especially social systems. Leaders who can “get on 1970s to explore the intricate relation- salient for leaders in the U.S. national the balcony” to view the larger context ships between such large-scale systems security community seeking to grapple of change will see the system from an as human societies and the planet’s with how to influence future events in the unusual vantage point that highlights ecological systems. The interdisciplinary emerging and not yet fully understood flows, connections, and feedback loops science that emerged in the late 1970s geopolitical circumstances of the 21st not only beyond but also between parts recognized that some systems cannot century and beyond. In a rough analogy of the U.S. defense establishment and be reduced to their component parts 20 Forum / Maximizing the Power of Strategic Foresight JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 but rather are the result of small, simple is a habit of mind, a way of seeing the Firm Performance: A Longitudinal Analysis,” Technological Forecasting and Social Change actions whose interactions can produce world in such a way that we question our 129 (2018), 105–116, available at JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Zalman 21 Interim Armored Vehicle “Stryker” and AH-64 Apache helicopters with Battle Group Poland move to secure area during lethality demonstration at Bemowo Piskie Training Area, Poland, June 15, 2018, as part of Saber Strike 18 (U.S. Army/Hubert D. Delany) Strengthening Mission Assurance Against Emerging Threats Critical Gaps and Opportunities for Progress By Paul N. Stockton with John P. Paczkowski .S. combatant commanders electric power and other infrastructure degrade the deployment, operation, (CCDRs) face an intensifying support, typically provided by U.S. and—ultimately—the lethality of U.S. U and deeply asymmetric chal- civilian-owned utilities (or host-na- combat forces. lenge to carrying out their operational tion assets for installations abroad). Since publication of the DOD plans (OPLANs). To help execute Disrupting or destroying that infra- Mission Assurance Strategy in 2012, these plans, Department of Defense structure offers adversaries an indirect the Department has taken far-reaching (DOD) facilities and functions require but potentially devastating means to measures to strengthen mission assurance (MA).1 In particular, DOD has expanded its traditional emphasis on defense critical Dr. Paul N. Stockton is Managing Director of Sonecon, LLC. From 2009 to 2013, Dr. Stockton served as infrastructure protection and is adopting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs. Colonel John P. a more holistic and integrated approach Paczkowski, USMCR (Ret.), is Senior Managing Director at Witt O’Brien’s. 22 Forum / Strengthening Mission Assurance Against Emerging Threats JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 to support OPLAN execution by regional saries may strike the infrastructure that risk of cyber attacks on the electric and functional combatant commands DOD relies on to carry out its mission power grid, transportation systems, (CCMDs). DOD is also improving the essential functions (MEFs) and under- and other civilian-owned infrastructure resilience of critical nodes for defense mine the lethality of the joint force.3 that defense operations depend on. functions and advancing new partnership Mission Assurance Strategy provides This section also examines the risk initiatives with private-sector infrastruc- the foundation to meet these challenges. that adversaries will combine cyber ture owners and operators. The strategy highlights how adversaries attacks with targeted kinetic strikes and However, potential adversaries are can seek “asymmetric means to cripple information operations to cripple the refining increasingly sophisticated cyber our force projection warfighting, and restoration of electric power and other weapons to disrupt and destroy industrial sustainment capabilities by targeting defense-critical services. control systems and other key enablers of critical defense and supporting civilian Cyber Attacks on the Grid and Other the electric grid, water systems, ports, and capabilities and assets.” The strategy also Supporting Infrastructure. Former U.S. other support functions. Private-sector offers overarching guidance to strengthen Director of National Intelligence Dan infrastructure owners and operators are mission assurance—that is, by building “a Coats warned that “today, the digital also increasingly concerned that adver- comprehensive and integrative framework infrastructure that serves this country is saries will combine cyber attacks with to assess and address risks” to MEFs and literally under attack.”6 Russia and other information warfare and kinetic strikes using that framework to help “prioritize nations are conducting sustained, increas- against key system nodes. Moreover, investments to ensure MEF performance ingly sophisticated campaigns to implant for installations abroad that rely on host in a constrained fiscal environment.”4 advanced persistent threats on both nation–supplied energy, or on infrastruc- The issuance of DOD Directive civilian and government systems, includ- ture owned and operated by Russian 3020.40, Mission Assurance, in ing DOD. These campaigns can enable and Chinese companies, a simple flip November 2016 marked a major step adversaries to maintain a covert presence of the switch could jeopardize mission forward in implementing that vision. The on infrastructure networks, secrete mal- execution. directive remedies a key gap in the 2012 ware designed to disrupt grid operations, DOD should counter these inten- strategy by integrating cybersecurity is- and conduct other malicious activities to sifying threats by intensifying the MA sues into mission assurance. The directive prepare for possible attacks on critical sys- focus on supporting OPLAN execution. also strengthens DOD-wide governance tem components.7 To frame such efforts Exercises that assess how disruptions and coordination mechanisms for mis- more bluntly, adversaries are preparing in U.S. infrastructure might affect the sion assurance. Especially valuable, the the battlefield to create massive blackouts flow of forces, logistical support, and document directs DOD components and other interruptions of critical services other components of such plans can help to prioritize MA efforts to help fulfill whenever they deem the moment right. identify opportunities to strengthen MA critical DOD strategic missions, including Adversaries recognize the founda- and help DOD move beyond outdated CCDR execution of OPLANs.5 tional importance of grid-provided power debates over investing in “tooth versus DOD components are also acceler- for mission assurance and will target U.S. tail.” The Department should also bring ating their efforts to strengthen mission electric companies accordingly. Cyber cybersecurity into the heart of mission assurance. The military departments, attacks on the grid in Ukraine in 2015 assurance and intensify the DOD focus on Joint Staff, CCMDs, and other compo- and 2016 demonstrated key threat vec- managing the risks posed by wide-area, nents are refining their own plans and risk tors that might be employed against U.S. long-duration power outages. However, mitigation strategies for MA. Moreover, utilities. In these cyber-induced black- MA initiatives should also account for the they are increasing collaboration across outs, attackers crossed a key threshold: danger that adversaries will strike energy the Department to develop holistic they moved cyberwarfare against electric systems with both cyber and physical at- approaches to support CCMD OPLAN systems from theory to (limited, but still tacks. Moreover, adversaries could attack execution. However, threats to mission unprecedented) practice. In 2015, at- multiple sectors simultaneously and inten- assurance are becoming more severe and tackers hijacked the grid’s own operating sify the cascading failures between them. increasingly diverse. Understanding these systems to disconnect critical substations, threats and the asymmetric strategies that creating brief but wide-area outages. Mission Assurance: Basic leverage them is essential for assessing po- Attackers were also able to “brick”8 Goals and Ongoing Progress tential gaps in MA plans and capabilities operating system components and com- The 2018 National Defense Strategy and for developing initiatives to address munications devices.9 emphasizes that “the homeland is these shortfalls. The 2016 event displayed even more no longer a sanctuary.” It also notes sophisticated capabilities. After mapping that “during conflict, attacks against Emerging Threats to the grid’s operating systems, attackers our critical defense, government, and Mission Assurance used the system’s own incident command economic infrastructure must be antic- The most rapidly intensifying challenges system (ICS) protocols to open circuit ipated.”2 Especially significant, adver- to mission assurance stem from the breakers, creating blackouts.10 The JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Stockton with Paczkowski 23 malware was unusually difficult to detect outages by disabling the protection sys- power systems). Installation personnel and included a wiper module that could tems in place to safeguard the integrity typically live in and commute from com- brick grid control system components of the grid; corrupting or denying state munities surrounding their bases. Water on a large scale.11 Attackers also had the estimation and situational awareness and wastewater systems, regional hospi- ability to deny or corrupt situational capabilities; and wiping, overloading, or tals, and other supporting infrastructure awareness data, making the grid ex- holding “ransom” critical components that these personnel depend on will fail in tremely prone to cascading failures.12 or systems.17 In the future, adversaries long-duration outages. These disruptive Potential adversaries are conducting that employ artificial intelligence to assist effects will also cripple port operations “test drives” of additional ways to attack their attacks will increase the potential for and contractor-provided logistical systems the grid and other critical infrastructure damage and make defense against such essential to deploying and sustaining that defense installations depend on. strikes increasingly difficult.18 U.S. combat forces abroad. DOD MA The Dragonfly campaign, which is still Implications for Mission Assurance initiatives should account for these risks ongoing today, enables adversaries to use Initiatives. The severity of cyber threats and develop holistic strategies to support utility vendors and other trusted third to the power grid and electricity-de- OPLAN execution. parties to conduct attacks on targeted pendent infrastructure has far-reaching Combined Cyber-Physical Threats systems.13 Triton malware (in use since at implications for MA policies and pro- and Additional Risks to Critical least September 2017) enables adversaries grams. Indeed, given the dependence of Infrastructure. Physical attacks on the to corrupt the safety systems that monitor DOD force projection on civilian-op- grid add another threat vector for mission and protect the performance of key sys- erated ports, transportation assets, and assurance. If adversaries can physically de- tem components, creating new pathways other infrastructure, accelerating the stroy large power transformers at critical for adversaries to sabotage and intention- restoration of grid-provided power will substations in multiple states, they may ally mis-operate critical infrastructure.14 be of prime importance for mission be able to create exceptionally wide-area, Most recently, the Department of assurance. This dependence on private in- long-duration outages, given the many Homeland Security (DHS) reported that frastructure is not new. The U.S. military weeks that will typically be required Russian cyber campaigns have granted has long relied on civilian transportation to transport and install replacement them access to utility human-machine and communications systems for opera- transformers. Such blackouts could have interfaces and information on accessing tional logistics. However, adversaries are catastrophic effects on national security ICS systems.15 Adversaries can use these increasingly threatening this infrastruc- and public health and safety. interfaces—and potentially ICS systems— ture as a means to disrupt and degrade Electrical industry leaders have been to shut down or mis-operate portions of U.S. warfighting capabilities. Building increasingly concerned about the disrup- the grid. resilience against these threats will require tive potential of kinetic attacks on grid These demonstrated adversary ca- new and deeper levels of collaboration infrastructure since the physical attacks pabilities fail to represent the true scale with grid owners and operators. on the Metcalf substation in April 2013. and severity of the threat confronting the One especially valuable focus of col- Fortunately, an adversary would face U.S. grid and the MEFs that depend on laboration has been to improve the ability greater risks when launching physical the flow of grid-provided power. Russia, of defense installations to execute MEFs rather than cyber attacks. Blowing up China, North Korea, and other potential with emergency power. A growing num- transformers and killing workers who adversaries have powerful incentives to ber of defense installations are becoming are transporting replacement equipment hold their most destructive cyber weap- capable of operating as “power islands,” might rapidly escalate conflict with the ons in reserve; doing so helps hobble separated from the surrounding grid and United States into larger scale kinetic U.S. efforts at building protections able to serve critical loads with emergency warfare. In contrast to the typically less against such weapons. generators, on-site fuel, and electricity visible (and more difficult to detect) Recent studies by the Department of distribution systems. These improve- malware that cyber adversaries would Energy (DOE), other governmental de- ments are vital and must be sustained. hide on utility networks, arming and partments, and cyber experts in academia Emergency power capabilities, prepositioning covert teams to conduct and the private sector highlight a range of however, will be at increasing risk if physical attacks would also increase the potential cyber threats that these adver- adversaries create wide-area, long-dura- risk that the United States would discover saries might use to cause outages far more tion power outages. In blackouts lasting the attackers before they struck. Yet the severe than in Ukraine. Most concerning more than a week, emergency power potential rewards of physical attacks are is the potential for adversaries to compro- generators will start breaking down, and immense, especially if the adversary be- mise operator workstations or use native fuel resupply could become increasingly lieves that they will create power outages ICS communication protocols to inten- difficult to sustain. Moreover, many de- that last far longer than those induced by tionally mis-operate grid components.16 fense installations rely on grid-dependent cyber weapons alone. Adversaries could also significantly infrastructure outside their perimeters Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) magnify the effect of cyber-induced (and beyond the reach of their emergency could also pose increasingly complex 24 Forum / Strengthening Mission Assurance Against Emerging Threats JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 First Security Forces Assistance Brigade Soldier uses Drone Defender with electromagnetic pulse to disable, capture, and control target drone, Camp Buehring, Kuwait, March 6, 2018 (U.S. Army/Brent Thacker) kinetic threats. Improvements in drone adversaries can use physical attacks to measures, even though the disruption of technology and low-cost options increase destroy transformers and other critical power supplies in an EMP attack could the potential for adversaries to use UAVs electric infrastructure, and/or (poten- significantly degrade the ability of defense to attack U.S. infrastructure, especially tially) deploy active shooters against installations to execute their MEFs. if they are equipped with improvised utility employees once the attack is under Adversaries may also seek to incite electromagnetic interference devices or way, the difficulty of defending the grid public panic through social media and other advanced payloads.19 Even relatively will be significantly greater than against other information warfare operations to simple UAVs can defeat traditional physi- cyber weapons alone.21 advance their broader political objectives. cal protections that focus on deterring or Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks GridEx employs a threat scenario that stopping armed personnel. Long-range present another potentially catastrophic includes combined cyber-kinetic attacks drones could also present particular chal- attack vector. The electric industry and on power companies in multiple U.S. lenges for facilities overseas around which its Federal partners are already strength- regions, as well as adversary information the United States does not control the ening preparedness against EMP attacks. warfare campaigns on social media to airspace. For decades, DOD has taken measures disrupt restoration operations, inflame Even more concerning, however, is to ensure the survivability of key com- public fears, and create challenges for the threat that adversaries may launch munications systems and other defense public messaging that are far more dif- combined cyber-kinetic attacks. The assets against EMP threats. DOE and ficult to counter than in any past U.S. premier exercise system for the North DHS have launched initiatives to help power outages. These disinformation American power grid, the GridEx series, grid owners and operators protect their operations could complicate efforts is built around such combined threats own systems against EMP effects.22 Until to provide defense support to civil au- because they could create multiweek recently, however, DOD has provided thorities. They could also magnify the power outages over multiple areas of little support to electric utilities on hard- difficulty of ensuring that civilian em- the United States.20 In particular, if ening technologies and other protective ployees for ports and other infrastructure JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Stockton with Paczkowski 25 During loss of commercial power to Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, Airmen from 39th Logistics Readiness Squadron receive fuel from bladder off C-5M Super Galaxy, July 22, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Caleb Pierce) essential to MA continue to perform their increasingly dominant source of fuel for also ensuring the resilience of the natural functions. generating grid-provided electricity for gas pipelines that provide fuel for these Cross-Sector Interdependencies: A defense installations. generators. However, the potential for New Frontier for Mission Assurance. As natural gas has become an in- mutually reinforcing failures is not unique U.S. critical infrastructure sectors are creasingly important fuel for electric to the oil and natural gas subsector, becoming increasingly interdependent. generation, natural gas pipelines have also and failures in other sectors could also These cross-sector dependencies are come to rely on electricity to function. threaten mission assurance. Equivalent creating new risks of infrastructure failure Key components of gas pipeline systems, challenges will exist for managing the and significant opportunities for adversar- including the compressors and industrial risks posed by interdependencies between ies to magnify the effects of their attacks control systems that keep gas flowing to the grid and water systems, communica- on the power grid and other systems power generators and other users, are tions systems, and other tightly coupled essential for MA. Accounting for this shift more reliant on electric power. Adversary- infrastructure sectors. Public-private in the architecture of U.S. infrastructure induced outages could interrupt the flow partnerships (P3s) focused on the electric will be essential for supporting OPLAN of electricity to these components and (in industry and other sectors are necessary execution by U.S. defense installations. a classic case of spiraling effects) magnify but not sufficient; to strengthen mis- The most immediate cross-sector those outages by disrupting gas deliveries sion assurance, DOD will also need to risks to mission assurance lie in the to power generators essential for power conduct multisector risk analyses and interdependencies between natural gas restoration. mitigation initiatives. transmission systems and the electric grid. MA initiatives will need to account for Mission Assurance Abroad. For A growing number of proposed DOD the risks created by these and other in- many CCDRs, especially in regional microgrids will rely on natural gas to fuel frastructure interdependencies. It would commands, executing OPLANs will their generators. Moreover, in California, be dangerously shortsighted to assume require support from bases outside of the New England, and many other regions that gas-fired generators for DOD mi- continental United States (OCONUS). of the United States, gas provides an crogrids provide resilient power, without Major U.S. bases in Europe, the Far East, 26 Forum / Strengthening Mission Assurance Against Emerging Threats JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 and other areas depend on the same in- to mitigate the risks of cyber attacks on on OPLAN execution offers a range frastructure services as installations in the host-nation infrastructure. DOD should of potential benefits. By disaggregat- United States. In particular, these bases also explore partnership opportunities ing OPLANs and identifying specific depend on host-nation power grids to to help strengthen the resilience of allied dependencies on installations, support function (though they also typically have power grids. functions, and the infrastructure that emergency power capabilities). Utilizing Infrastructure interdependencies cre- they rely on, DOD will be able to pri- grid-provided power in OCONUS in- ate additional challenges to U.S. mission oritize and target resilience initiatives in stallations can significantly reduce energy assurance abroad. For U.S. installations in ways that produce the greatest value for costs. A comprehensive assessment of Europe, the dependence of local power deterrence and warfighting. Bolstering OCONUS base power options found generation on Russian-supplied natural the resilience of Defense Critical Assets that “in every case, it was found that gas provides a special threat. The Nord and other key components of well-es- bases connected properly to host nation Stream-2 gas pipeline project will increase tablished Defense Critical Infrastructure power grids . . . would reduce the cost of the leverage of Russia’s Gazprom, which Protection (DCIP) programs will remain energy for those bases, reduce fuel usage currently supplies around one-third of vital. However, additional measures will (and the associated logistic challenges), European Union gas. In 2009, Russia cut be necessary against adversaries who seek and increase base endurance. This was off gas supplies to Ukraine, with down- asymmetric means to degrade U.S. warf- true even in cases where the host nation stream consequences for the European ighting capabilities. power grid had very low reliability.” Union. Amos J. Hochstein, U.S. Special The Defense Department should Accordingly, the study “strongly recom- Envoy and Coordinator for International move beyond outdated “tooth versus mended that every U.S. military base Affairs, emphasizes that “our commit- tail” debates over how to invest scarce consider using host nation power.”23 ment to energy security in Europe is resources and adopt a risk management Dependence on host-nation in- directly linked to our concern for national approach to bolster end-to-end im- frastructure services, however, carries security.”26 That commitment must ex- provements in joint force lethality. In the significant risks. The July 2016 cutoff tend to strengthening mission assurance past, DOD invested relatively little in of power to a U.S. Air Force air base in for U.S. installations reliant on Gazprom- ensuring the survivability of supporting Incirlik, Turkey, exemplifies these risks. fueled electricity generation. infrastructure. That low priority made Incirlik Air Base is essential for conduct- Finally, China and other potential sense at the time; DOD could conduct ing U.S. military operations against the adversaries are buying up (and helping to warfighting abroad operations without so-called Islamic State (IS), using manned operate) infrastructure around the globe, concerns that adversaries would disrupt and unmanned aircraft. The Turkish including in nations where U.S. defense U.S. installations and the privately government cut off commercial electric installations support OPLAN execution. owned infrastructure systems that they power to Incirlik for nearly a week in Chinese companies are rapidly increasing depended on. In recent years, however, 2016, following a failed coup attempt by their investments in and ownership of military bases in the United States have members of the Turkish armed forces. A foreign power and gas networks, buying taken on increasingly important roles in recent study of the event found that while assets in the United Kingdom, Spain, conducting UAV operations and other the air base made use of standby genera- Australia, and Latin America.27 These warfighting and sustainment activities tors, the Air Force was forced to reduce ownership and operation trends create an to execute CCMD OPLANs. As DOD the number of sorties flown. Had the additional threat vector to manage and dependence on U.S.-based installations power outage continued, the Air Force reinforce the need to bring OCONUS has grown, adversaries have ramped up would have had to stop flying altogether.24 installations into the core of future mis- their ability to disrupt the flow of power The bottom line: host nations can jeop- sion assurance initiatives. and other critical infrastructure services ardize mission assurance and OPLAN that those bases rely on. Intelligent, execution with a flip of the switch. Recommendations adaptive adversaries will seek to defeat the The foreign-owned infrastructure on DOD is taking major steps to combat all United States without facing the point of which OCONUS installations depend the threats examined above. The analysis its spear. Treating infrastructure resilience is also vulnerable to the same cyber and that follows offers recommendations on as a core warfighting requirement, and kinetic threats that confront U.S. infra- how DOD can ramp up that progress ensuring that adversaries cannot break the structure. In Japan, for example, cyber and expand the partnerships necessary to shaft of that spear, constitute an essential threats from China, North Korea, and strengthen mission assurance. paradigm shift for mission assurance. other potential adversaries are inten- Shifting the Paradigm: Mission DOD should also intensify the focus sifying at least as rapidly as against the Assurance as a Component of of MA on supporting the execution of United States. However, Japan has been Warfighting. DOD Directive 3020.40 CCMD OPLANs. Combatant com- slower to buttress its cyber resilience.25 established an important policy shift by manders must continue to ramp up their Strengthening emergency power capabil- directing components to prioritize the focus on the resilience of upstream assets ities on U.S. installations will be essential CCMD execution of OPLANs. Focusing and infrastructure, even if those assets JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Stockton with Paczkowski 27 are owned by others and lie outside their even if cyber attacks disrupt the flow of the appropriate mechanisms to receive area of responsibility. Exercises can help grid-provided power to defense installa- data and malware threat signatures that support that transformation. Using severe tions, ports, and the water systems and these partners gather from operational but realistic scenarios to reflect the dis- other infrastructure essential to their technology logs (and vice versa), as well ruption of energy systems, transportation operations. DOD Instructions 8500.01, as assessments of potential risks to DOD- companies, and other infrastructure that Cybersecurity, and 8510.01, IT Risk supporting infrastructure systems. near-peer adversaries can inflict, CCMDs Management Framework, provide the Industry and DOD have begun to and their partner components can assess policy foundations for these efforts. consider enhancing such operational co- potential effects on OPLAN execution. DOD Directive 3020.40 also empha- operation and coordination. During the They can use these assessments to de- sizes the need to integrate cyber issues GridEx IV exercise in November 2017, velop cost-effective options to address into MA decisionmaking. However, the utility leaders expressed interest in explor- any MA shortfalls they identify. DOD catch-up process must accelerate ing how the National Guard (operating Such reprioritization measures should to account for the growing severity and in state Active-duty or full-time National be reflected in DOD budgeting systems. breadth of cyber challenges. Guard–duty [Title 32] status) might DOD leaders should examine a range Expanding Partnerships with support state and local law enforcement of options to help build a culture of Critical Infrastructure Owners and and contractor security services to protect risk management that puts MA issues Operators. Substantial policy support key substations and other grid assets from front and center in component and already exists for expanding P3s for kinetic attack, including infrastructure Department-wide investment and plan- both microgrids and accelerated power that directly serves critical defense instal- ning decisions, including: restoration for military bases. Both the lations. Exercise participants and senior 2012 MA strategy and DOD Directive DOD leaders also discussed whether and systematic efforts to remedy •• 3020.40 emphasize the importance of how the National Guard might support OPLAN-related MA shortfalls via the partnering with the owners and operators utilities for post–cyber attack power res- issue paper process of U.S. critical infrastructure, including toration. DOD and its industry partners use of the Joint Requirements •• the electric grid, to help ensure that the could further examine these cyber and Oversight Council system to Department can perform its MEFs. physical security support options. strengthen MA These policies have enabled the The private sector can also help DOD modifications of the OPLAN •• development of a growing number of identify the specific critical assets and development and review process P3s for installation microgrids as well as facilities that the Department depends to highlight (and develop options “outside the fence-line” initiatives to cre- on. The Federal Power Act provides the to mitigate) risks that adversaries ate redundant power feeds from the grid ideal point to move this effort forward. will cripple OPLAN execution by and other measures to strengthen the The act requires the Secretary of Energy, striking essential installations and resilience of grid-provided power. DOD in consultation with other Federal agen- infrastructure. and its industry partners should continue cies and grid owners and operators, to In addition, DOD must develop to improve the ability of key defense identify and designate “critical defense MA strategies that better incorporate installations to function as power islands facilities” in the 48 contiguous states cross-cutting risks to MEFs, assets, and segmented from the grid, with hardened and the District of Columbia that are systems that span the domains of multiple on-site power generation, transmission, “(1) critical to the defense of the United Services and agencies. In the past, MA and distribution systems. DOD should States; and (2) vulnerable to a disruption risk assessments too often focused on also expand microgrid projects so that of electric energy provided to such facility Service- or agency-specific concerns. Such they can sustain service to water systems by an external provider.”28 Congress’s narrow assessments cannot be simply and other mission-critical loads in sur- definition of defense critical electric infra- aggregated to form a composite view of rounding communities. Moreover, DOD structure also helps guide implementation risks to OPLAN execution. A more joint and its industry partners should examine of that requirement. Such assets include (and more CCMD-led) approach will be how these initiatives can be scaled up on “any electric infrastructure located in crucial to counter asymmetric threats. a nationwide basis to help meet the inten- any of the 48 contiguous States or the Finally, DOD must bring cybersecu- sifying cyber threat. District of Columbia that serves a facility rity into the heart of mission assurance. In addition to extending P3s for designated by the Secretary [of Energy]” The Department has made significant pre-event, steady-state collaboration and as a critical defense facility, “but is not progress in moving beyond its traditional investments in grid resilience, DOD and owned or operated by the owner or oper- focus on “guns, guards, and gates” under industry need better plans and capabilities ator of such facility.”29 DCIP and is accounting for a broader to coordinate operations in major events. DOD is already working with indus- range of threats to mission assurance. A joint capacity for industry-government try and DOE to identify defense critical DOD is also ramping up efforts to information-sharing will be a critical electric infrastructure and the installations ensure that OPLANs can be executed enabler. DOD should ensure that it has this infrastructure serves. DOD also has 28 Forum / Strengthening Mission Assurance Against Emerging Threats JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 South Carolina Army National Guardsmen from 228th Signal Brigade out of Spartanburg, South Carolina, set up Joint Incident Site Command Center package to support Horry County Emergency Operations Center with back-up communications system, September 15, 2018 (U.S. Army National Guard/ Brian Calhoun) a well-established, continuously updated Many of these sectors are rapidly im- management efforts, including priori- list of critical military bases and other proving their cyber defenses and adopting tization initiatives.32 As noted by Tom DOD assets to support this identification industry standards to ensure sector-wide Fanning, chief executive officer of gas and process.30 However, deterrence and compliance. However, ports and other electric utility Southern Company, the power projection will also depend on sus- infrastructure critical to MA have tradi- center could also help enable DOD and taining electric service to a diverse array tionally focused on physical security rather the Federal Bureau of Investigation to of ports, transportation systems, and than cyber resilience. DOD can partner play a uniquely critical role in protecting other civilian-owned infrastructure. with port owners and operators to help U.S. critical infrastructure: “hold[ing] the DOD will therefore need indus- them meet their cyber challenges. In addi- bad guys accountable.”33 try-government partnerships outside the tion to sharing appropriate information on Supply Chains as a Special Area electricity subsector. MA initiatives must potential threats, the Department can help of Focus. Supply chain risks offer a account for cross-sector infrastructure these owners develop and adopt standard- particularly important opportunity for interdependencies, as adversaries can ized policies for assessing, containing, and collaboration between DOD and indus- also disrupt other infrastructure sectors mitigating cyber risks.31 try. Adversaries could disrupt the grid that defense installations depend on. DHS recently announced creation of by corrupting widely used infrastructure Specifically, DOD needs to make greater its National Risk Management Center components then exploiting those progress in addressing the risks of cascad- (NRMC), which can play a centralizing common vulnerabilities to cause massive ing failures across other civilian-owned role for coordination between DOD and breakdowns.34 This threat applies to all infrastructure sectors, including water both industry and government partners critical infrastructure sectors. Software, utilities, natural gas pipelines essential for in all sectors. The NRMC will be a locus firmware, hardware, or network services power generation, and transportation for industry-government collaboration are all vulnerable to supply chain com- systems that MEFs may depend on. on sector-specific and multisector risk promise, potentially enabling adversaries JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Stockton with Paczkowski 29 to inject destructive malware and/or basis. Thus far, mission assurance has uments/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strate- gy-Summary.pdf>. gain access to sensitive components and focused primarily on installations and 3 DOD definesmission essential functions as data in utility systems. Foreign owner- supporting infrastructure in the United “Select functions directly related to accomplish- ship of technology companies poses an States. However, many OPLANs also ing the Department’s mission. Failure to per- increasing threat due to potential ties to depend on support from U.S. bases lo- form or sustain these functions . . . would signifi- adversarial governments, especially for cated in partner nations. China and other cantly affect the Department of Defense’s ability to provide vital services or exercise authority, infrastructure in countries abroad that potential adversaries are rapidly expanding direction, and control.” See DOD Directive 35 house U.S. bases. their ownership of (or provision of key 3020.26, DOD Continuity Policy (Washington, DOD is already working to com- operational control systems for) critical DC: DOD, February 14, 2018), available at bat this threat. Ellen Lord, Defense infrastructure worldwide, creating a grow- 30 Forum / Strengthening Mission Assurance Against Emerging Threats JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Grid Operations, Dragos, Inc., June 13, 2017, 8, Studies, July 2017), 24, available at JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Stockton with Paczkowski 31 NDU Press Congratulates the Winners of the 2019 Essay Competitions DU Press hosted the final round of judging on May 16–17, 2019, during Strategic Research Paper which 23 faculty judges from 13 participating professional military edu- N cation (PME) institutions selected the best entries in each category. First First Place Place winners in each of the three categories are published in the following pages. Mr. Andrew Rhodes U.S. Naval War College Secretary of Defense National Third Place “The Second Island Cloud: A Deeper Security Essay Competition Major Anthony Surman, USAF and Broader Concept for American Air Command and Staff College Presence in the Pacific Islands” “Eluding the Electromagnetic Chokepoint: ‘For-Space’ Intelligence to Second Place Enable Spectrum Maneuver” Commander Lloyd Edwards, USN National War College Chairman of the Joint “Balancing Competition with The 13th annual competition was Chiefs of Staff Strategic Cooperation: A Strategy to Prepare for intended to stimulate new approaches to Essay Competition the Chinese Dream” coordinated civilian and military action from a broad spectrum of civilian and Third Place military students. Essays address U.S. Major Alvin Q. Chan, Singapore Army Government structure, policies, capabil- Marine Command and Staff College ities, resources, and/or practices and to “China’s ‘Three Warfares’: Insights into provide creative, feasible ideas on how Cyberspace Competition and Potential best to orchestrate the core competen- This annual competition, in its 38th U.S. Policy Options” cies of our national security institution. year in 2019, challenges students at the Nation’s joint PME institutions to write Strategy Article First Place research papers or articles about signifi- Mr. Daniel Hooey cant aspects of national security strategy First Place Air Command and Staff College to stimulate strategic thinking, promote Colonel James B. Cogbill, USA “Pakistan’s Low Yield in the Field: well-written research, and contribute U.S. Army War College Diligent Deterrence or De-Escalation to a broader security debate among “America First ≠ America Alone: Debacle” professionals. Morocco as Exemplar for U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy” Second Place Lieutenant Colonel Matt Gaetke, Second Place USAF Colonel Christopher A. Ingels, USA The Dwight D. Eisenhower School for U.S. Army War College National Security and Resource Strategy “Stabilizing Diplomacy in a Changing “Mobilization in the 21st Century: Asking World Environment” a Better Question 32 Essay Competitions / Introduction JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Third Place Forum Features Lieutenant Colonel Paul Golden, Jr., James Hasik J. Patrick Work USA “Beyond the Third Offset: Matching “Fighting the Islamic State By, With, U.S. Army War College Plans for Innovation to a Theory of and Through: How Mattered as Much “Artificial Intelligence Revolution: Victory, ”JFQ 91 (4th Quarter 2018) as What,” JFQ 89 (2nd Quarter 2018) Thoughts for Implementing an Effective Acquisition Strategy” JPME Today Recall Milan Vego Kenneth T. “Max” Klima, Peter Joint Force Quarterly “The Bureaucratization of the U.S. Mazzella, and Patrick B. McLaughlin Maerz Awards Military Decisionmaking Process,” JFQ “Scipio Africanus and the Second Punic In its 4th year, the JFQ Maerz Awards, 88 (1st Quarter 2018) War: Joint Lessons for Center of Gravity chosen by the staff of NDU Press, rec- Analysis,” JFQ 88 (1st Quarter 2018) ognize the most influential articles from Commentary the previous year’s four issues. Five Mike Jernigan and Jason Cooper outstanding articles were chosen for the “Cooking Shows, Corollas, and Maerz Awards, named in honor of Mr. Innovation on a Budget,” JFQ 90 (3rd George C. Maerz, former writer-editor Quarter 2018) of NDU Press. Distinguished Judges Twenty-three senior faculty members from the 13 participating PME institutions took time out of their busy schedules to serve as judges. Their personal dedication and professional excellence ensured a strong and credible competition. Front row, left to right: Dr. Michelle Getchell, U.S. Naval War College; Colonel Donald Holloway, USAF, National War College; Dr. Amy Baxter, Air University eSchool; Dr. Donald W. Chisholm, U.S. Naval War College; Dr. Richard L. DiNardo, Marine Corps Staff College; General Joseph J. Dunford, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Dr. Charles Chadbourne, U.S. Naval War College; Dr. Elizabeth D. Woodward, Air War College; Dr. Benjamin “Frank” Cooling, Eisenhower School; Dr. C.J. Horn, College of Information and Cyberspace; Dr. Jeffrey D. Smotherman, NDU Press; Dr. Bonnie Calabria, College of International Security Affairs. Back row, left to right: Dr. John Terino, Air Command and Staff College; Dr. Paul Springer, Air Command and Staff College; Dr. Jeff Turner, Joint Forces Staff College, Dr. Naunihal Singh, U.S. Naval War College; Dr. James D. Kiras, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies; Dr. William T. Eliason, NDU Press; Dr. Peter Eltsov, College of International Security Affairs; Dr. Brian McNeil, Air War College; Dr. Ryan Wadle, Air University eSchool; Dr. James Chen, College of Information and Cyberspace; Dr. Jack Godwin, NDU Press; Dr. Jaimie Orr, National War College. Not shown: Dr. Kristin Mulready-Stone, U.S. Naval War College; Dr. Larry D. Miller, U.S. Army War College; Dr. Daniel Marston, U.S. Marine Corps School for Advanced Warfighting. Photo by James Lewis, NDU. JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 2019 Winners 33 First test flight of Agni-V on April 19, 2012, from Integrated Test Range, Wheeler Island, Orissa (Courtesy Ministry of Defence, Government of India) subject of rich debate among Western and South Asian scholars.1 While the nuclear exploits of both countries trace back to the 1960s, this article focuses on developments observed since declared nuclearization in 1998—most notably Pakistan’s ongoing pursuit of low-yield nuclear weapons (LYNWs).2 The nuclear beginnings of both coun- tries occurred clandestinely, outside the recognized “nuclear norms” of the five established nuclear-armed states.3 These nuclear programs, born of failed non- proliferation efforts and viewed with ire by the international community, drew diplomatic pressure to sign nuclear treaties to conform with global efforts of inventory reductions, nuclear test bans, and disarmament. Having refused these overtures, both India and Paki- stan continued to develop their nuclear programs, albeit toward seemingly different ends. India largely modeled its doctrine and behaviors after the estab- lished nuclear states, while Pakistan avoided the constraints of nuclear no first use and sought to proactively lever- age the regional deterrence paradigm to its full advantage. This article examines how Pakistan’s pursuit of LYNWs has affected Indian and Pakistani conceptions of deterrence and escalation management and tests two independent hypotheses. The first hypothesis (H-1) asserts India will seek Pakistan’s Low Yield to maintain a credible second-strike nuclear posture and believes it can deter Pakistan’s LYNWs with conventional in the Field forces and the threat of assured retalia- tion. The second hypothesis (H-2) asserts that Pakistan views LYNWs as a mecha- Diligent Deterrence or nism to lower the nuclear threshold as an instrument of brinkmanship. De-escalation Debacle This article employs a comprehensive approach to evaluate the two hypotheses using a body of Western and South Asian By Daniel Hooey scholarly works that specifically pertain to the Indo-Pakistan nuclear paradigm. The article begins by outlining the respective aving engaged in three wars nuclear doctrines and postures of both and numerous border crises, Pakistan and India and subsequently ex- H Pakistan and India remain at a plores Pakistan’s introduction of LYNWs Daniel Hooey wrote this essay while a student high state of potential conflict in the and their impact on South Asian deter- at the Air Command and Staff College. It won the 2019 Secretary of Defense National Security future; however, the prospects of esca- rence. Following this is an evaluation Essay Competition. lation toward a nuclear exchange are a and testing of the two hypotheses, along 34 Essay Competitions / Pakistan’s Low Yield in the Field JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 with an assessment of the potential for a been little observable change to its salient key cities are within striking distance of nuclear conflict in South Asia. The article doctrinal features. the border also heightens Pakistani per- culminates with sections exploring impli- Pakistan operates under a true nuclear ceptions of strategic vulnerability, making cations and opportunities for the United dyad with India, which allows Islamabad the prospects of first use more appealing States and the international community. to focus its entire nuclear contingent as it offers more flexibility. Enduring against a single adversary. The associated concerns over the survivability of its sec- Pakistan’s Nuclear regional dynamics pose unique challenges ond-strike capabilities and, more recently, Doctrine and Posture given the geographical contiguity of the India’s advancements in missile technol- Pakistan’s move toward LYNWs is two countries. The associated lack of ogy to include hypersonic variations of its believed to be predicated on obser- geographic depth inherently alters the Brahmos II continue to make nuclear first vations of the U.S. employment of nuclear dynamics between these states use the most viable option.16 The “use these systems in Europe during the and complicates nuclear employment and it or lose it” dilemma faced by countries Cold War.4 The U.S. rationale for the doctrinal considerations.11 While Pakistan that typically adopt first-use postures will employment of LYNWs was to delib- claims a policy of minimum deterrence, similarly challenge Pakistan as LYNWs erately lower the nuclear threshold to this is more likely out of necessity than will be subject to these issues.17 deter the possibility of Soviet aggression choice. As opposed to India, which de- There are several factors that shape from adjacent Warsaw Pact nations.5 liberately chooses to limit the size of its Pakistan’s doctrine regarding counter- Pakistan confronts similar challenges as nuclear arsenal, Pakistan is forced to do value targeting. The relatively small size it faces a conventionally superior Indian so given the budgetary and fissile material of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal makes it adversary. Conventional military asym- production constraints that have limited important to maximize punishment on metry and an inability to compete with its nuclear ambitions.12 New Delhi, which is likely why Islamabad India economically render Pakistan inca- Massive retaliation is a key facet of (perhaps mistakenly) terms it a policy of pable of addressing the widening mili- Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, although its maximum retaliation. Neither India nor tary gap despite attempts to modernize limited arsenal probably lends itself more Pakistan possess a sufficient arsenal to and expand its military capabilities.6 As toward assured retaliation by Western achieve the Cold War measure of mutu- such, it is unsurprising that Pakistan standards. South Asian scholars believe ally assured destruction, but both possess would turn to its nuclear arsenal, much this is driven by two factors: the need to the ability to destroy large swathes of like the United States did in Europe, deter a potential Indian preemptive strike each other’s territory. However, India’s for solutions to its lack of conventional against its nuclear arsenal, and to offset strategic depth, combined with the lack parity. its conventional inferiority.13 Pakistan’s of reach of Pakistan’s weapons (although Pakistan views its nuclear arsenal as progression toward a nuclear triad and this is improving), would render efforts the ultimate guarantor of its sovereignty concerns over India’s burgeoning bal- to preemptively attack Indian strategic as- and national survival against India, and its listic missile defenses are testaments to sets ineffective, thus giving Pakistan little nuclear doctrine seeks to deter not only Islamabad’s doubts in the credibility of hope of achieving a successful decapi- India’s nuclear use but also the prospects its second-strike capabilities and will serve tation while simultaneously subjecting of conventional aggression.7 Though as a justification for a larger and more di- it to assured retaliation from India. Pakistan has not officially declared a nu- verse arsenal.14 Experts believe Pakistan is Indian population and industrial centers clear doctrine, instead invoking principles rapidly expanding its arsenal, which could are within striking distance of Pakistani of selective ambiguity, Islamabad’s poli- eventually put it on pace to surpass the nuclear weapons, making them lucrative cies and actions since 1998 have revealed United Kingdom and France in terms of targets that are easy to engage.18 its core tenets.8 South Asian scholars its inventory; however, Pakistan may ex- The most substantive examination of such as Gurmeet Kanwal posit that haust its sources of uranium ore by 2020, South Asian nuclear postures is derived “ambiguity has been used as an offset for putting it at an upper limit of around 250 from the analysis of U.S. scholar Vipin conventional inferiority with the belief strategic weapons.15 Narang. He asserts that Pakistan started that control over escalation is possible.”9 Pakistan’s selection of nuclear first use with a more stable catalytic posture that Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine encompasses was an obvious choice given its lack of relied on the intervention of a third-party four primary principles: Indo-centric conventional parity with India, which has patron (initially the United States).19 minimum nuclear deterrence, massive re- required Islamabad to threaten the use However, the rather tumultuous nature taliation (although its limited arsenal may of its full nuclear complement to buttress of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship over the not lend itself to such), nuclear first use, its nuclear credibility. It is important to years—one that has been fraught with and strategies that emphasize counter- note that this inherently makes Pakistan mutual distrust and perceptions of U.S. value nuclear targeting.10 While Pakistan’s more prone to consider the use of nuclear strategic abandonment—led to an even- nuclear posture has shifted in response weapons as a warfighting capability, which tual shift toward a more dangerous and to regional threat perceptions, there has in part explains Islamabad’s pursuit of unstable asymmetric escalation posture.20 LYNWs. The fact that many of Pakistan’s The exact state of Pakistan’s nuclear JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Hooey 35 readiness is unknown, but Islamabad According to Vipin Narang, the overrid- will be directed against primarily coun- claims it maintains a low state of readiness ing intent of India’s doctrine is to “deter tervalue (civilian) targets.36 This is further with its warheads stored at dispersed the use and threat of use of nuclear weap- evidenced by India’s proclivity to use locations in a disassembled state.21 While ons by maintaining an adequate retaliatory these weapons toward achieving political Pakistan’s strategic systems are not be- capability should deterrence fail.”29 Many ends rather than military objectives on lieved to be stored in a ready state, this scholars believe this posture implies that the battlefield.37 As such, Tellis concludes, may not apply to its developing LYNWs. India will absorb the first nuclear blow “India is almost certain to settle for The air-, sea-, and ground-launched and will invoke its doctrine of assured countervalue targeting and, by implica- cruise missile variations of Pakistan’s retaliation to authorize a strategic nuclear tion, seek to service a nuclear strategy low-yield systems are believed to be response.30 It is this point that draws con- centered on some kind of mutual assured produced and stored in a fully assembled tention among contemporary critics of no vulnerability.”38 state.22 Pakistan claims it has no plans to first use, who assert this weakens India’s Narang offers useful insights into proactively disperse its low-yield systems, deterrence credibility. However, Tellis India’s nuclear posture noting three which is unsurprising as doing so would notes that this concept is “remarkably per- specific pillars of its nuclear policy: no invite preemptive or preventative strikes vasive in Indian strategic thought,” which first use, assured massive retaliation, and by India. However, it does make it clear may explain why this policy has endured under “no condition will the weapons be that these systems are stored in a manner despite prolonged disputation.31 India’s conventionalized.”39 Under these pre- that allows them to be deployed quickly doctrine also calls for minimum credible tenses, Narang’s model categorizes New during a crisis, alluding to a period of deterrence seeking to achieve deterrent Delhi’s nuclear posture as one of assured hours, not days.23 effects with a limited arsenal.32 There retaliation. While India lacks the strategic are indications, though, that India, like reach to target the entirety of Chinese or India’s Nuclear Doctrine Pakistan, considers the size of the arsenal Pakistani territory, it retains the ability to and Posture to be a fluid concept that must be respon- inflict substantial damage against either U.S. scholar and recognized authority sive to the actions of its adversaries.33 As state, which substantiates its deterrence on Indian nuclear doctrine Ashley Tellis Pakistan and China expand and diversify credibility, and its technological advance- posits that “any discussion of India’s their arsenals, it is reasonable to assume ments are quickly narrowing this gap.40 nuclear doctrine and force posture is India will also do so in kind to maintain its Despite some indications of internal by definition fraught with uncertainty” deterrence credibility. debate, there are no signs that India has and something that could take decades Assured retaliation is a significant, officially altered any facets of its existing to sort out.24 Tellis notes that doc- although also highly contested, aspect of nuclear posture or doctrine in response to trine progresses at the unpredictable India’s nuclear doctrine. India does not Pakistan’s threats of LYNWs. pace of technological advancement, consider nuclear weapons as warfighting and this, along with other conditions options, but as instruments of punish- Low-Yield Nuclear that prompt rapid change, may be ment to inflict maximum damage against Weapons Deterrence the case with Pakistan’s introduction an adversary should deterrence fail.34 LYNWs, in nearly every facet of of LYNWs.25 India released its Draft Tellis further qualifies this concept as employment, tend to complicate tra- Report of the National Security Advisory “delayed, but assured, retaliation.” Since ditional concepts of deterrence and Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine on India is postured for punitive operations, necessitate considerations of limited August 17, 1999, which represented it must therefore consider that the ability nuclear war. U.S. nuclear scholars such the most comprehensive document on to retaliate is more important than the as Jeffrey Larsen and Kerry Kartchner Indian nuclear doctrine that New Delhi timing of the response.35 While there is have assessed and evaluated the many has ever produced.26 Many experts claim no specified timeline for a nuclear re- challenges associated with the possibility there has been little change to the core sponse, it must be assumed that India will of limited nuclear war—a prospect so tenets of the doctrine since the draft be required to calculate its reaction, ready dangerous that the United States and was released, but Tellis cautions the the required delivery vehicles and war- the former Soviet Union bilaterally draft was written to serve as recommen- heads, and execute the nuclear command, agreed to abandon these practices dations that do not necessarily reflect control, and communication (NC3) in Europe.41 As Lawrence Freedman established policy.27 From its inception, authorization process. While there are in- famously wrote, “It takes two to keep the policy was not only provocative for dications that India has enacted measures a war limited,” a lesson that no doubt Pakistan and China but also highly con- to reduce nuclear response times, there applies to the South Asian dynamic, tested internally.28 is a reasonable expectation for delay due perhaps in more striking ways. At face A largely unchanged version of the to New Delhi’s highly centralized NC3 value, the animosity between the two doctrine released in 2003 included key structure. Given that India’s doctrine countries is not so different from other concepts of no first use, minimum cred- restricts nuclear use to punishment, Tellis adversarial relationships in the interna- ible deterrence, and assured retaliation. and others assess that nuclear weapons tional system, but what makes this rela- 36 Essay Competitions / Pakistan’s Low Yield in the Field JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Military truck carrying intermediate-range ballistic missile of Pakistani army, November 27, 2008 (Courtesy SyedNaqvi90) tionship different is that all major crises has adopted its doctrine of full-spectrum endeavors tend to alter the deterrence since nuclearization have required a deterrence, which seeks to lower the paradigm between the affected states as degree of international mediation assis- nuclear threshold to provide Islamabad observed during the similar introduction tance.42 The fact that these countries do the flexibility to contend with even con- of LYNWs in Europe during the Cold not effectively engage on a state-to-state ventional threats from India.44 Indian War. As Dave Smith surmised, “Pakistan’s level—even during periods of enormous scholar Inderjit Panjrath notes four decision to embrace tactical nuclear bilateral tension—creates an obvious central themes that are apparent in official weaponry will ultimately require it to deal deterrence issue, decreasing the prob- Pakistani statements regarding full-spec- with the doctrinal implications, increased ability of effective communication of trum deterrence. First, LYNWs were a security and command and control nuclear signaling or de-escalation mea- response to India’s Cold Start doctrine requirements, and the potentially desta- sures during the progression of a crisis.43 that seeks to rapidly conduct numerous bilizing implications of deploying such These challenges are exacerbated by a limited military penetrations to secure weapons.”46 heightened potential for confirmation Pakistani territory while remaining under Pakistan’s development of a low- bias during a crisis given the inability of the nuclear threshold. Second, Pakistan yield triad to increase the credibility of both sides to objectively detect, process, acknowledges that any battlefield use its second-strike capability will further and validate the intentions of the other. would have strategic consequences. disrupt the deterrence paradigm and A lowered nuclear threshold and the Third, full-spectrum deterrence is not a could hasten reciprocal Indian efforts to decentralized nuclear authority struc- warfighting strategy, but rather a strategy acquire comparable capabilities to defeat ture inherent to LYNWs will inevitably to deter limited conventional war below Pakistan’s systems. These developments reduce decision space for senior leaders Pakistan’s existing threshold for nuclear were probably a component of India’s on both sides, which could make this a use. Fourth, Pakistan will maintain cen- ongoing pursuit of a viable ballistic recipe for disaster. tralized command and control of LYNWs missile defense system, which threatens Driven by its development and on- in the same manner as its strategic arse- the credibility of Pakistan’s strategic going integration of LYNWs, Pakistan nal.45 While superficially reassuring, these delivery vehicles. Such developments will JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Hooey 37 inevitably invoke further South Asian India’s Reaction to Full- Nuclear optimists tend to downplay arms races; however, India’s economic Spectrum Deterrence the threat of full-spectrum deterrence, and already significant qualitative and The various works of South Asian and instead highlighting the benefits of quantitative military advantages will Western scholars suggest India may be adhering to India’s existing doctrine. increasingly widen the gap and stimulate struggling to cope with the prospects They argue that India capitalizes on the further Pakistani strategic paranoia. This of full-spectrum deterrence. Indian benefits of its recognition as a responsible dichotomy is unsustainable for Islamabad, discord over full-spectrum deterrence actor within the international commu- whose failing economy will continue is confined to two primary spheres of nity by ignoring Pakistan’s provocative to stunt its military development and thought: nuclear pessimists who advo- actions. These efforts, in no small part, nuclear ambitions. Unlike India, whose cate for an alteration of India’s current helped secure India’s conditional entry conditional Nuclear Suppliers Group doctrine to address the prospects of into the Nuclear Suppliers Group and status grants New Delhi the ability to full-spectrum deterrence, and nuclear may outweigh the risks of electing not purchase nuclear materials, Pakistan’s in- optimists who believe full-spectrum to respond.58 Extensive studies have also ability to secure additional fissile material deterrence can be mitigated through revealed the ineffectiveness of LYNWs from external sources will significantly existing means without the need to alter against advancing armor columns, which hamper its future efforts. or adapt existing doctrine. Each side is what many Indian military experts as- Another change to the deterrence presents a relatively strong case to sub- sess to be the primary target of Pakistan’s paradigm stems from the potential for stantiate its respective claims, but there LYNWs.59 It would take hundreds of dispersal and the NC3 structure for are also areas of convergence between these systems to destroy a single armored LYNWs. There are indications that the two camps. division, which would quickly exhaust Pakistan actively employs denial and de- Nuclear pessimists contest that Pakistan’s LYNW inventory and inevita- ception measures and routinely shuffles India’s doctrinal concepts of no first bly incite an Indian reprisal in the form its strategic nuclear assets among a dozen use and assured retaliation make New of a full-scale nuclear retaliation with its or more secret bunkers in addition to Delhi vulnerable to acts of Pakistani strategic assets.60 several other phony locations.47 There provocation, essentially rendering India In addition, LYNWs would place are also suspicions of various decoy strategically paralyzed.53 While India’s high demands on Pakistan’s existing plu- sites in an elaborate tunnel network to current doctrine of assured retaliation tonium stocks, as these systems require optimize the prospects of survivability.48 reserves the right to use nuclear weapons a significant amount of fissile material An intermingling of conventional and if any weapons of mass destruction are to produce and would be capable of nuclear-tipped delivery systems, coupled used on any Indian forces anywhere, achieving only marginal effects on the with elaborate denial and deception pessimists believe this may be insufficient battlefield.61 These are considerations mechanisms, could inadvertently pro- to deal with full-spectrum deterrence.54 that prompt some optimists to label these voke an Indian preventative strike if Pessimists have also called for the Indian systems “showcase weapons” rather than these systems were dispersed during a military to develop a reciprocal low-yield viable warfighting systems.62 Optimists crisis regardless of the type of munition capability to allow for a proportional re- also posit that, regardless of the promises used.49 The other issue concerns the sponse should Pakistan detonate LYNWs of full-spectrum deterrence, there is still NC3 of LYNWs, as Inderjit Panjrath during a future crisis or conflict.55 There room under the nuclear umbrella for observed that “pre-delegation to field has also been significant emphasis on conventional military action. The “surgi- commanders was an integral part of cred- developing a robust ballistic missile de- cal strikes” conducted by Indian special ible deterrence through TNWs [tactical fense capability that is seemingly based forces in September 2016 in response nuclear weapons].”50 U.S. scholars echo on Israel’s Iron Dome model. New Delhi to the Uri terrorist attacks are cited as these concerns as they identify Pakistan has acquired several of the components evidence, as full-spectrum deterrence had as one of the few nuclear states that has of the system, such as the Green Pine been implemented by this time.63 adopted such a structure.51 Delegative radar and associated interceptor missile Both sides agree on several core NC3 postures provide advantages as they systems, from Tel Aviv.56 While the issues, including actively exploring ways diversify launch authority, which negates broader Indian political community con- to mitigate Pakistan’s ability to export the prospects of a decapitation strike and siders its nuclear arsenal purely strategic, terrorism under the umbrella of nuclear allows for rapid assembly, deployment, there are indications that New Delhi blackmail.64 Both camps also seem to and delivery of nuclear weapons during may be trending toward a higher state of agree that the political space for Indian crisis situations while providing few phys- readiness. Vipin Narang notes India may restraint in the face of continued ter- ical barriers to their release.52 However, be pursuing avenues such as “canisteriza- rorist attacks emanating from Pakistani these postures also tend to introduce tion,” which is a method of hermetically soil is rapidly diminishing—a point that increased potential for miscalculation, sealing and storing a fully mated warhead Western scholars are also concerned nuclear accidents, or inadvertent and/or to reduce preparation timelines during about.65 Hardliners within India’s cur- unauthorized use. future crises.57 rent Narendra Modi government have 38 Essay Competitions / Pakistan’s Low Yield in the Field JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Admiral Phil Davidson, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, hosts India’s Minister of Defense, Nirmala Sitharaman, on barge tour of historic Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, December 6, 2018 (U.S. Navy/Robin W. Peak) popularized the prospects of assuming a under its policy of full-spectrum deter- intends to do so. The preponderance of firmer stance regarding Pakistan that may rence as a mechanism to lower the Western and South Asian scholars agree progressively drive the political establish- nuclear threshold as an instrument of that LYNWs do not pose a significant ment toward more provocative responses brinkmanship. threat to advancing armor forces and to preserve political capital in the future.66 H-1 attempts to explain how India do not significantly improve deterrence Another area of convergence involves ad- would cope with the introduction of credibility based on empirical evidence dressing issues with Pakistan in a manner LYNWs as New Delhi must contend from the U.S. experience in Europe that preserves India’s positive image in with two nuclear-armed adversaries in and assessed conditions in South Asia.68 the international community.67 both Pakistan and China. Despite recent Indian and Western scholars surmise that, debate over some facets of India’s doc- like the U.S. employment of LYNWs in Low-Yield Rationale: Pakistan trine, no significant changes have been Europe, these systems are not meant for Coping with Asymmetry or made to its core tenets since its drafting battlefield use and are more of a “show- Strategic Brinkmanship? in 1999 regardless of Pakistan’s intent to case weapon” with limited range and This section evaluates the two hypoth- field LYNWs. Most experts seem satisfied yield.69 Indian and Western scholars also eses pertaining to the insertion of with the guarantees of India’s existing agree that the tremendous fissile material LYNWs into the South Asian nuclear doctrine of assured retaliation, which commitments for these weapons make context. The first hypothesis asserts calls for a strategic response to the use them unlikely to be widely fielded and, if that India will seek to maintain a cred- of weapons of mass destruction against proactively dispersed, would be easy tar- ible second-strike nuclear posture and Indian forces operating anywhere. While gets of Indian preemptive strikes.70 Indian believes it can deter LYNWs with con- there are scholars who advocate for India scholars such as Inderjit Panjrath also be- ventional forces and threat of assured to develop a reciprocal low-yield capa- lieve there is still room for conventional retaliation. The second hypothesis bility, there is no evidence that India has actions under the nuclear umbrella, citing asserts that Pakistan views LYNWs developed a low-yield equivalent or even the surgical strikes conducted after Uri.71 JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Hooey 39 In addition, there is evidence that India however, significant challenges associated While the aspects of lowering the nuclear is continuing to improve its second-strike with H-2. threshold are not in question, the subse- credibility through the acquisition of The difficulty with proving or quent prospects of nuclear brinkmanship nuclear submarines and development of disproving H-2 relates to the second have not been definitively proved. There advanced delivery vehicles.72 portion of the hypothesis, which deals is little evidence to suggest Pakistan is While a large body of evidence sup- with nuclear brinkmanship. While the deliberately engaging in nuclear brink- ports H-1, there is also contradictory introduction of LYNWs carries numer- manship; however, there is nothing evidence that counters this claim. Both ous inherent risks and the potential for saying that it has not or will not do so in Western and South Asian scholars assess brinkmanship, there is no evidence to the future. that Indian tolerance for continued suggest that Pakistan has leveraged them, attacks by Pakistani terrorists is dimin- or even intends to leverage them, for Assessing the Potential for the ishing and, with it, prospects of strategic deliberate escalatory actions. Pakistan cer- Great Nuclear Misadventure restraint. While India has elected to curb tainly realizes that provoking an Indian While it is easy to dismiss the enduring its present response to LYNWs, this sen- strategic nuclear response would invoke problems between India and Pakistan timent may not prevail in the long term, destruction of the Pakistani state, but as merely a regional issue that can be particularly given growing concerns of this realization may not stop Islamabad worked out bilaterally, the effects of nuclear blackmail. Hardliners in the exist- from manipulating the conditions during even a limited nuclear conflict carry ing Modi government have popularized an escalation in hopes of obtaining con- grave consequences that extend far a hard stance, a trend that is expected to cessions from India. While LYNWs may beyond the region. U.S. scholars offer a continue as future politicians campaign not be deliberately intended to create the grim and sobering view of what LYNWs for office, which may lead to gradual conditions for brinkmanship, there may could mean in the South Asian context. changes to India’s nuclear posture. There be opportunities for such exploitation to The United States previously reached is a body of nuclear pessimists that is occur as a crisis evolves. Indian scholars similar conclusions about LYNWs in calling for changes to the existing nuclear openly accuse Pakistan of shielding Europe as initial wargames and exercises doctrine, most notably its policies of no terrorism with nuclear blackmail, and, in the 1950s revealed that “in only 9 first use and assured retaliation; however, while perhaps not entirely untrue, there days of simulated nuclear combat, West these calls do not appear to reflect the is little more than Indian accusations to Germany was judged to have suffered sentiments of civilian government per- substantiate this claim. The preponder- three times the civilian casualties of sonnel who would be the only officials ance of evidence suggests that Pakistan, [World War II].”75 Historic assessments empowered to alter the doctrine.73 While concerned over the reduced credibility have shown the consequences of even this has not yet prompted any observable of its deterrence against a conventionally the most limited nuclear exchange are doctrinal changes, additional crises or superior adversary, has simply leveraged far reaching and produce a strategic provocative actions by Pakistan could its most powerful instrument of war to effect regardless of yield. LYNWs intro- give these arguments more traction to address perceived conventional gaps. duce additional factors that must be incite future modifications. While it does so in a conceivably dan- carefully considered, such as increased H-2 seeks to explain Pakistan’s ratio- gerous manner, this is not evidence of potential for miscalculation, nuclear nale and endstate for the development brinkmanship. accidents, unauthorized use, and of nuclear weapons. There is strong evi- In sum, research validates H-1, as the impacts to the intervention calculus, dence to support the first portion of H-2, bulk of the evidence suggests that India which will be explored further below. which asserts full-spectrum deterrence has not deviated from its existing strate- One of the more difficult challenges seeks to lower the nuclear threshold, as gies in response to LYNWs. There could of LYNWs is their inherently destabi- Pakistani officials claimed this was exactly be a variety of drivers for this, but there lizing nature, exacerbated by Pakistan’s what these systems were intended to do. seems to be a prevailing sentiment that propensity toward nuclear ambiguity that Western and South Asian scholars largely India has much more to lose with regard in turn creates an environment rife with agree that Pakistan is following the model to international credibility by responding miscalculation potential. While Pakistan set forth by the U.S. employment of in a manner that would be perceived as and India have successfully maneuvered LYNWs during the Cold War as a means irrational. There are no indications that their way through various crises and in- of deliberately lowering the nuclear deterrence considerations concerning ternational incidents over the years using threshold. There is also evidence that China have substantively affected India’s a bilaterally understood framework of es- indicates these weapons may be intended calculus regarding LYNWs, and New calation management, the introduction of not for battlefield use, but rather as Delhi seems comfortable with its existing LYNWs may have a significant impact on standoff weapons like those deployed by deterrence posture, aided by natural the calculations of both countries. Given the United States in Europe. There is no defensive terrain advantages along its that Pakistan’s ground-based LYNWs are evidence that refutes the use of LYNWs northern border.74 Per the available evi- considered dual-use systems with con- to lower the nuclear threshold. There are, dence, the results of H-2 are inconclusive. ventional and nuclear-tipped munitions, 40 Essay Competitions / Pakistan’s Low Yield in the Field JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 even a benign deployment of high-ex- of strong safety controls and centralized Former Pakistani strategic plans division plosive–equipped systems could cause a authorization mechanisms during crises commander Lieutenant General (Ret.) significant overreaction by India, which makes the weapons not only less safe Kahlid Kidwai claimed LYNWs were may misperceive such systems as an esca- (accidental use) but also vulnerable intended to “pour cold water on Cold lation to a nuclear level.76 Pakistan could to unauthorized use.83 Pakistan has a Start.”91 What is most striking about also elect to intentionally deploy conven- demonstrated vulnerability to insider at- the Indian and Pakistani war plans is the tional low-yield systems (real or decoy) tacks as evidenced by the assassination of strong emphasis on speed of execution. to attempt to coerce India to stand down the Punjab governor by members of his While on the surface this represents pru- during a period of heightened tensions, own security detail, various unsuccessful dent military planning by both militaries leveraging these systems as a dangerous assassination attempts against President to optimize force agility, these endeavors instrument of battlefield signaling. Pervez Musharraf, and numerous attacks also critically limit decision space and Another key facet of miscalculation against Pakistani military installations.84 de-escalation potential. The tempo of involves target selection. As mentioned, While there are stringent personnel evalu- conflict that these strategies hope to Indian scholars have wrestled internally ation controls in place to actively monitor achieve increases the potential for a rapid with the doctrinal prospects of assured members of Pakistan’s nuclear commu- escalation sequence, while decreasing retaliation, which do not adequately nity, it is unknown to what degree these space for bilateral de-escalation measures address the threat of LYNWs.77 As such, measures are applied to crews operating to occur. Timely international interven- questions arise as to what response op- the various components of Pakistan’s tion becomes more complicated under tions India would contemplate in the LYNW arsenal. The delegative nature these expedited escalation timelines. event Pakistan actually employed such of the NC3 authority for LYNWs places There is also the potential that a mili- systems during a crisis.78 Will it matter if high decision capital on relatively junior tary crisis under these conditions could Pakistan uses LYNWs against advancing military officers in the field, which could unravel so quickly that an international Indian forces on its own soil? Does coun- create the conditions for a “rogue major” intervention may not occur in time to tervalue (civilian) versus counterforce to take actions into his own hands with- prevent a nuclear first-use scenario.92 (military) targeting make a difference in out authorization.85 Even under prudent Should this scenario play out, the pros- the Indian calculus? Given that India does operational control, a junior officer may pects of convincing India to exercise not possess an LYNW equivalent, does quickly face a “use it or lose it” scenario restraint and withhold a strategic nuclear proportionality matter enough to prevent during an Indian counteroffensive as the response against Pakistan become exceed- them from using a strategic weapon in limited range of these systems requires ingly slim. These issues, if left unchecked, response? The fact that New Delhi itself them to be positioned close to the bor- may spell out the very nuclear disaster does not have clear answers to these dif- der, outside the hardened defenses of the that many Western scholars adamantly ficult questions should theoretically give rear garrisons.86 fear, and with it a host of implications Pakistan pause to carefully evaluate how The final factor is the potential effects that will be explored further in the next it employs such assets; however, this does of LYNWs on the international inter- section. not appear to be the case.79 vention calculus. Both countries have The second factor involves the po- adopted conventional military strategies Implications for International tential for accidental or unauthorized that attempt to inflict (in India’s case) Intervention use. U.S. scholars like Eric Schlosser or deflect (in Pakistan’s case) as much The complex nature of the dynamics conclude that sustaining a high level of conventional punishment as possible between India and Pakistan as nucle- nuclear alert creates the conditions for prior to international intervention.87 ar-armed opponents poses unique risks an “always/never” dilemma.80 Under India’s Cold Start doctrine, more recently on the world stage and foments dis- these conditions, nuclear weapons are labeled Proactive Strategy, seeks to rap- tinctive challenges for the international expected to always work when called idly conduct numerous limited military community. International intervention upon and never fail. Western scholars penetrations to secure Pakistani territory is a calculated component by both India have expressed serious doubt regarding while remaining under the nuclear and Pakistan during these crises as a the safety measures of low-yield delivery threshold.88 Many South Asian scholars mechanism to draw in patron support.93 vehicles as such systems are expected to assert this strategy was a major driver of This is exemplified by U.S. scholar be made field-expedient for rapid use on Islamabad’s push toward LYNWs, even Mooed Yusuf’s observation that “the order—these circumstances favor the “al- though the strategy was never officially predictability of U.S. crisis interventions ways” to the detriment of the “never.”81 adopted by India.89 In response, Pakistan also created a moral hazard problem There is also a question as to whether has since developed a strategy called New and an incentive for Pakistan and India Pakistan’s LYNWs have been subjected Concepts of Warfighting, which seeks to to manipulate the risk of war to attract to the same level of safety scrutiny as “modernize, restructure and re-position Washington’s attention and support.”94 its strategic systems, namely weapons its armed forces” to blunt Indian ad- These conditions demand a more that are one-point safe.82 The absence vances in conjunction with its LYNWs.90 multilateral approach with an emphasis JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Hooey 41 on mediation to manage tensions and early nuclear exchange.101 Observed ironic, as China is just as concerned as control incidents of potential escalation. deployment preparations of conventional the United States about the potential for Yusuf offers an insightful approach to variants of these low-yield systems alone a nuclear war in South Asia and would this problem, which involves the use of could prompt India to escalate during a actively seek to avoid such an outcome to third-party brokering techniques. All crisis. The public fear that such a scenario preserve its regional economic stakes.108 three military crises between India and would invoke may also severely limit Beijing has invested heavily in Pakistan to Pakistan since declared nuclearization New Delhi’s decision space and timing. include assistance with its civilian nuclear were dependent on some form of third- The lack of an obvious solution to such power plants, infrastructure improvement party intervention to facilitate de-es- problems increases the need for proactive projects, construction of Gwadar Port, calation.95 The paragraphs that follow intervention from the international com- and most notably its $55 billion invest- evaluate Yusuf’s model, explore the munity, most notably from the United ment in the China-Pakistan Economic individual roles of the United States and States and China. Corridor that will link Chinese imports/ China, and examine the prospects of a The United States has played a exports to the Arabian Sea.109 China also quadrilateral approach to future crises. predominant role in the de-escalation played a crucial role in the progression Yusuf relates brokered bargaining to process during previous crises in South of Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions as Beijing a three-actor model that explains state Asia. It has been able to accomplish this provided delivery vehicles and assisted behaviors during various crises.96 The through a careful process of leveraging in enhancing Islamabad’s indigenous model is comprised of two parallel and in- existing transactional partnerships with missile and fissile material production tertwined interactions. The first involves Pakistan while simultaneously appealing capabilities.110 Of course, there is also the the antagonists aiming actions and signals to India’s desire to be perceived as a obvious common ground of seeking to at one another in hopes of deterring an growing international power by urging curb India’s expanding regional influence outcome or compelling them to respond New Delhi to exercise restraint.102 While and economic growth, making Pakistan in line with crisis objectives. The second this approach has worked well in the an ideal partner and a strategic hedge involves luring the third party to act in past, Washington’s growing discord with against New Delhi. The aforementioned certain ways while the intermediary at- Islamabad, namely over its alleged sup- dynamics, coupled with already deep tempts to find space to mediate to defuse port to terrorism in Afghanistan, coupled historical ties, will make China a more the crisis.97 These interactions ultimately with dwindling international aid may feasible third-party broker with Pakistan lead to “an interplay of the perceptions, reduce U.S. clout during future interven- during future crises. expectations, incentives, and strategies tion efforts.103 The evolving geopolitical landscape among the three parties that affects the Growing U.S. ties with India since and the progressive realignment of overall behavior and stability, and in turn, 2005 and Pakistan’s fears of strategic traditional patron relationships in the the outcome of a crisis.”98 This results encirclement via perceptions of U.S. en- region may mandate a different strategy in a competition of sorts between the couragement of an India-friendly Afghan and suggest that a quadrilateral approach antagonists to obtain third-party support government in Kabul have only further may be a more appropriate response to rather than a fear of a rebuke or third- diminished the U.S. ability to influence future South Asian crises. China’s strong party action against them.99 Islamabad.104 Inderjit Panjrath also al- influence with Pakistan and its desire to Yusuf’s model did not specifically ludes to the possibility that the bilateral prevent a potential escalation that risks address Pakistan’s pursuit of LYNWs and relationship could turn adversarial when nuclear war make Beijing a viable broker instead focused on de-escalation short of he posits that “Pakistan’s attitude toward for Islamabad. Conversely, growing U.S. a descent into nuclear war. While this will the U.S. and its allies in Afghanistan may relations with India may be leveraged ef- certainly be the most prudent approach turn hostile, further exacerbating the fectively to represent a viable third-party to prevent the use of such weapons short already fragile situation and adding yet broker for India. In this light, a four- of all-out mobilization, care must also be another dimension to the ongoing con- party de-escalation process could prove given to quick de-escalation. Pakistan’s flict in the region.”105 Collectively, these to be a feasible method of international development of a low-yield triad, and its conditions are not promising and suggest intervention in the future. Splitting up intent to leverage LYNWs as a means to the United States will have less influence the responsibilities of crisis monitoring, lower the nuclear threshold, also raise over Pakistan during future crises.106 in extremis bilateral intelligence-sharing the potential for escalation to occur In stark contrast to the progressively channels could potentially be preestab- sooner in the conflict.100 Traditional declining U.S. relationship with Pakistan, lished between the United States and second-strike options require proactive China enjoys relatively close ties to China to address the rapid de-escalation deployment early in a crisis for surviv- Pakistan—a relationship that is only requirements that will be inherent to the ability, and Pakistan’s development of growing stronger. Pakistan considers introduction of LYNWs. While not an nuclear-capable subsurface LYNWs Beijing an “all-weather friend” and a ideal situation, as there are trust barriers for its fleet of Agosta-class submarines reliable strategic partner both econom- between Beijing and Washington, the could stimulate the conditions for an ically and militarily.107 This sentiment is sharing of sanitized information in a 42 Essay Competitions / Pakistan’s Low Yield in the Field JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Indian army’s BrahMos Mobile Autonomous Launchers, February 7, 2014 (Courtesy Anirvan Shukla) timely manner is certainly better than broader international community, not Under these premises, two opportu- the alternative of idly watching a rapid the United States specifically, due to the nities are presented for consideration: and uncontrolled escalation unfold. fact that U.S. credibility with Pakistan steering Pakistan toward a safer employ- Preemptive formation of intervention has waned as Washington has placed ment of LYNWs through international delegation parties by the United States its burgeoning relationship with New collaboration on training, education, and China with rough outlines of pre- Delhi on full display.113 Perceptions of and lessons learned, and establishing a pared material to aid in the mediation preferential treatment by the United viable international mediation forum for process may also be effective. This could States toward India render it a biased India and Pakistan to address enduring be a more comprehensive version of the broker in the Pakistani view. As such, bilateral issues such as the Kashmir “notional playbook” the United States other players on the international stage issue, water-sharing agreements, and utilized during the Mumbai crisis, which should be encouraged to take more cross-border violence. had been developed during the previous proactive roles in the process to defuse The window to dissuade Pakistan two India-Pakistan crises since declared tensions in South Asia. These include away from the prospect of LYNWs has nuclearization.111 obvious players such as China, who already closed. A U.S. or international shares a strong patron relationship with rebuke now would be deemed hypocriti- Opportunities Pakistan, as well as other regional actors cal and dismissed by the Pakistanis, given Despite a negative trajectory toward such as Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Washington’s recent reconsideration the revival of LYNWs within the Nepal, who also have much to lose in of LYNWs. However, symposiums and nuclear domain, there are avenues the the event of a nuclear escalation. Russia other discussions with Islamabad about international community could explore is another possibility, as Moscow shares the intricacies of the LYNW experience to address South Asian issues.112 The historic defense ties with India and a in Europe may help Islamabad shape its opportunities should come from the growing relationship with Pakistan.114 decisions regarding LYNW architecture JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Hooey 43 in a constructive and informed manner. military and diplomatic dialogue when Notes This is already occurring to some extent the stakes are at their highest. through multitrack talks, but these efforts 1 Gurmeet Kanwal, Sharpening the Arsenal: should be expanded.115 This may address Conclusion India’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrence Policy some of the issues of Pakistan walking The enormous challenges in South Asia (New York: HarperCollins, 2017), 86–89. 2 away with the wrong endstates and les- represent wicked problems on the inter- Mark Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nuclear Dangers (New York: Routledge Taylor sons learned about LYNWs in Europe national stage with no easy or clear solu- and Francis Group, 2014), 16–17. based upon a limited consumption of tion in sight. These challenges are com- 3 Ibid., 159–164. Western nuclear scholarship.116 These dis- plicated by waning U.S. influence with 4 Inderjit Panjrath, Pakistan’s Tactical Nu- cussions should occur in a coalition-based Pakistan and the increasingly complex clear Weapons: Giving the Devil More Than His setting and include not only the nucle- regional dynamics that will demand Due (New Delhi: Vij Books, 2018), 19; Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: ar-armed nations, but also countries in multinational mediation approaches that Regional Powers and International Conflict Europe that house elements of the North include other powers such as China and (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), Atlantic Treaty Organization’s nuclear perhaps Russia. The introduction of 81; Bhumitra Chakma, Pakistan’s Nuclear contingent, as these countries offer LYNWs to an already extremely tense Weapons (New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2009), 52. unique perspectives, particularly regard- environment will undoubtedly create 5 117 Tom Nichols, Douglas Stuart, and Jeffrey ing the downsides of such systems. great consternation among the various McCausland, eds., Tactical Nuclear Weapons The United States and the larger in- global powers and regional actors, and NATO (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic ternational community have been reticent but the nuclear restraint that binds Studies Institute, 2012), viii–ix. to officially acknowledge standing terri- together the nuclear-armed powers of 6 Panjrath, Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons, 5, 18. torial issues between India and Pakistan the world has continued to hold despite 7 118 Chakma, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons, 48. as anything more than bilateral in na- crises, accidents, and miscalculations. 8 Ibid., 40. ture—ironically, this is probably the most The great South Asian nuclear rivalry 9 Kanwal, Sharpening the Arsenal, 16. consistent U.S. policy position in South between Pakistan and India has pro- 10 Chakma, Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Asia. It is exceedingly clear, though, that duced several close calls. Both states, Weapons, 47. 11 bilateral mediation efforts have failed, however, have navigated these crises Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nu- clear Dangers, 51; Chakma, Pakistan’s Nuclear and the numerous deep-seated issues without resorting to nuclear war, albeit Weapons, 79. 119 between the two countries will require in- with outside mediation assistance. 12 Chakma, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons, 46. ternational mediation for any meaningful Despite numerous provocations, India 13 Ibid., 51. progress to occur. If South Asia rep- has exercised strategic restraint, and 14 Panjrath, Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear resents the most likely environment for a Pakistan, whether purposefully or Weapons, 34; Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nuclear Dangers, 92; Sadia Tasleem and Tony nuclear war, then it stands to reason that accidentally, has avoided pushing the Dalton, “Nuclear Emulation: Pakistan’s Nucle- the most effective way to prevent such an envelope too far. These factors would ar Trajectory,” The Washington Quarterly 41, outcome is to address the core friction lead nuclear optimists to conclude that no. 4 (Winter 2019), 138. points that would incite a nuclear con- both countries have developed enough 15 Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s frontation. Establishing an international of a sense of one another to sufficiently Nuclear Dangers, 22–24, 71–73; V.N. Veda, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons (New Delhi: KW forum for Pakistan and India to address weather a storm of escalation. Publishers, 2012), 25. their concerns accomplishes two things: In the absence of quantitative or 16 Kanwal, Sharpening the Arsenal, 50. it grants international legitimacy to these qualitative conventional parity, which in 17 Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nucle- issues, and it provides a venue to vent all likelihood will never come irrespective ar Dangers, 85. 18 during periods of heightened tensions. of Islamabad’s monetary commitments, Chakma, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons, 56. 19 Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern This could potentially provide a valuable military acquisitions, or modernization Era, 55. de-escalation during a crisis, giving both efforts, it is unsurprising that Pakistan 20 Ibid., 56. sides the ability to pause and voice issues turned to its nuclear arsenal to safeguard 21 Chakma, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons, 60. in the international courts rather than its sovereignty. While there is certainly 22 Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern depending on international intervention cause for concern regarding the prospect Era, 86–87; Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nuclear Dangers, 26; Panjrath, Pakistan’s to bring them back from the precipice. of nuclear war in South Asia, particularly Tactical Nuclear Weapons, 44–45. Previous crises since declared nuclear- with the introduction of LYNWs, the sit- 23 Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nucle- ization (the Kargil crisis in 1999, the uation is not without hope. Encouraging ar Dangers, 90. 2001–2002 Operation Parakram crisis, further Pakistani and Indian compliance 24 Ashley J. Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear and the Mumbai terror attacks in 2008) with nuclear norms, creating constructive Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), demonstrated that established routes of opportunities to address major friction 251. bilateral de-escalation through hotlines points, and forming a supportive inter- 25 Ibid. are only effective to a point, and that national community will go a long way 26 Ibid., 252–253. both sides have habitually abandoned toward defusing future tensions. JFQ 27 Ibid., 253. 44 Essay Competitions / Pakistan’s Low Yield in the Field JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 28 Ibid., 254. 23; Kanwal, Sharpening the Arsenal, 123–132. Dangers, 85, 89. 29 Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern 57 Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern 87 Sood, “Pakistan’s Response to Cold Start Era, 100. Era, 103–104. Doctrine,” 2. 30 Ibid. 58 Kanwal, Sharpening the Arsenal, 10, 32. 88 Larsen and Kartchner, On Limited Nu- 31 Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture, 59 Panjrath, Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear clear War in the 21st Century, 107; Tasleem and 302. Weapons, 47–48. Dalton, “Nuclear Emulation,” 140–141; Sood, 32 Ibid., 374–378. 60 Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nu- “Pakistan’s Response to Cold Start Doctrine,” 33 Chakma, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons, 49. clear Dangers, 34; Panjrath, Pakistan’s Tactical 1–3. 34 Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture, Nuclear Weapons, 47–48. 89 Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nucle- 312–313. 61 Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nu- ar Dangers, 80. 35 Ibid., 321. clear Dangers, 34; Panjrath, Pakistan’s Tactical 90 Panjrath, Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear 36 Ibid., 342–344. Nuclear Weapons, 46. Weapons, 5, 18. 37 Ibid., 342. 62 Panjrath, Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear 91 Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nu- 38 Ibid., 347. Weapons, 49. clear Dangers, 81; Panjrath, Pakistan’s Tactical 39 Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern 63 Ibid., 61. Nuclear Weapons, 21. Era, 95. 64 Kanwal, Sharpening the Arsenal, 13; 92 Yusuf, Brokering Peace in Nuclear Envi- 40 Ibid., 94–95. Sechser and Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and ronments, 178–179. 41 Jeffrey Larsen and Kerry Kartchner, On Coercive Diplomacy, 36, 150. 93 Ibid., 23. Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century (Palo 65 Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nucle- 94 Ibid., 158. Alto: Stanford University Press, 2014), 107; ar Dangers, 49. 95 Ibid. David O. Smith, The U.S. Experience with 66 Panjrath, Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear 96 Ibid., 28. Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Lessons for South Asia Weapons, 61. 97 Ibid., 40–41. (Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, March 67 Kanwal, Sharpening the Arsenal, 32. 98 Ibid., 40. 4, 2013), 4. 68 Smith, The U.S. Experience with Tactical 99 Ibid., 42. 42 Moeed Yusuf, Brokering Peace in Nuclear Nuclear Weapons, 8–10. 100 Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nu- Environments (Palo Alto: Stanford University 69 Panjrath, Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear clear Dangers, 26; Sood, “Pakistan’s Response Press, 2018), 158. Weapons, 46–49; Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Paki- to Cold Start Doctrine,” 6. 43 Ibid., 171; Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Paki- stan’s Nuclear Dangers, 34. 101 Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nu- stan’s Nuclear Dangers, 65. 70 Panjrath, Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear clear Dangers, 26; Narang, Nuclear Strategy in 44 Larsen and Kartchner, On Limited Weapons, 46–49; Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, 108–109. Nuclear War in the 21st Century, 107; Tasleem the Modern Era, 86–87; Chakma, Pakistan’s 102 Panjrath, Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear and Dalton, “Nuclear Emulation,” 140–141; Nuclear Weapons, 78. Weapons, 71; Kanwal, Sharpening the Arsenal, Meenakshi Sood, “Pakistan’s Response to Cold 71 Panjrath, Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear 32. Start Doctrine,” Centre for Land Warfare Stud- Weapons, 61. 103 Veda, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons, 50. ies 94 (March 2017), 1–3. 72 Kanwal, Sharpening the Arsenal, 7, 50; 104 Panjrath, Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear 45 Panjrath, Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons, 72. Weapons, 44. Dangers, 75. 105 Ibid. 46 Smith, The U.S. Experience with Tactical 73 Kanwal, Sharpening the Arsenal, 13, 17, 106 Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nu- Nuclear Weapons, 4. 25. clear Dangers, 66. 47 Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nu- 74 Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern 107 Veda, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons, 2. clear Dangers, 119, 124–125; Narang, Nuclear Era, 111. 108 Panjrath, Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, 86–87. 75 Smith, The U.S. Experience with Tactical Weapons, 71. 48 Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Nuclear Weapons, 10. 109 Ibid., 71–74. Era, 86–87. 76 Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nucle- 110 Veda, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons, 2, 35; 49 Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The ar Dangers, 26, 84–85. Chakma, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons, 28. Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring De- 77 Kanwal, Sharpening the Arsenal, 17. 111 Yusuf, Brokering Peace in Nuclear Envi- bate (New York: Norton, 2013), 2. 78 Sannia Abdullah, “Nuclear Ethics? Why ronments, 140. 50 Panjrath, Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Pakistan Has Not Used Nuclear Weapons . . . 112 Amy F. Woolf, Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, 5. Yet,” The Washington Quarterly 41, no. 4 (Win- Weapons, RL32572 (Washington, DC: Con- 51 Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, ter 2019), 159. gressional Research Service, 2017), 1–2. Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (New 79 Tasleem and Dalton, “Nuclear Emula- 113 Panjrath, Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 121. tion,” 150. Weapons, 72. 52 Larsen and Kartchner, On Limited 80 Eric Schlosser, Command and Control 114 Ibid., 75. Nuclear War in the 21st Century, 108; Sechser (New York: Penguin, 2013), 174. 115 Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nu- and Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive 81 Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern clear Dangers, 66. Diplomacy, 149. Era, 85. 116 Tasleem and Dalton, “Nuclear Emula- 53 Kanwal, Sharpening the Arsenal, 17–25. 82 Smith, The U.S. Experience with Tactical tion,” 143. 54 Panjrath, Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Nuclear Weapons, 40. 117 Smith, The U.S. Experience with Tactical Weapons, 37; Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s 83 Ibid., 44. Nuclear Weapons, 9–10. Nuclear Dangers, 86; Kanwal, Sharpening the 84 Veda, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons, 49, 118 Abdullah, “Nuclear Ethics?” 158. Arsenal, 31. 60, 70; Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s 119 Yusuf, Brokering Peace in Nuclear Envi- 55 Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nucle- Nuclear Dangers, 126, 132. ronments, 24. ar Dangers, 77. 85 Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nucle- 56 V. Sahay, Tactical Nuclear Weapons ar Dangers, 89. Deterrence Stability Between India and Pakistan 86 Chakma, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons, (New Delhi: Gaurav Book Centre, 2018), 12– 79; Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nuclear JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Hooey 45 Annual air combat tactics, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief exercise Cope North increases readiness and interoperability of U.S. Air Force, Japan Air Self-Defense Force, and Royal Australian Air Force (U.S. Air Force/ Matthew Bruch) The Second Island Cloud A Deeper and Broader Concept for American Presence in the Pacific Islands By Andrew Rhodes n the early 20th century, the vision- challenges to the U.S. position in Ellis mastered its geography, he saw ary Marine officer Earl “Pete” Asia, and it is time for Washington not a “chain,” but a “cloud.” He wrote I Ellis compiled remarkable studies to develop a coherent strategy, one in 1921 that the “Marshall, Caroline, of islands in the Western Pacific and that will last another 100 years, for and Pelew Islands form a ‘cloud’ of considered the practical means for the the islands of the Western Pacific. islands stretching east and west.” His seizure or defense of advanced bases. It has become common to consider apt description of these archipelagoes A century after Ellis’s work, China the second island chain as a defining serves well for a broader conception presents new strategic and operational feature of Pacific geography, but when of the islands in, and adjacent to, traditional definitions of the second island chain. A new U.S. strategy Andrew Rhodes wrote this essay while a student at the U.S. Naval War College. It won the Strategic should abandon the narrow lens of Research Paper category of the 2019 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition. the “chain” and emphasize a broader 46 Essay Competitions / The Second Island Cloud JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 second island cloud that highlights in eastern Indonesia. The second island as vice chairman of the Central Military the U.S. regional role and invests in chain lies to the east; the first island Commission in the 1990s. One leading a resilient, distributed, and enduring chain, which is also imprecise, generally Chinese scholar on seapower references presence in the Pacific. comprises a line from southern Japan control over the Pacific islands as key The United States has often been through the Ryukyus and Taiwan, ter- to U.S.-led efforts to “contain China,” of two minds about its role in Asia, and minating in the Philippines or Borneo. invokes the operational imperative to recent heated debate on the future of The island chains took on strategic “break through” the island chains, and U.S. security commitments in the region importance for the United States when also highlights the power of small islands is no exception. This pendulum has it annexed the Philippines and Guam to confer broad “jurisdictional sea area.”8 swung before, from the heavy presence after the Spanish-American War. The Andrew Erickson and Joel Wuthnow lasting from World War II through fortification of these outposts was a catalog these discussions of the island Vietnam to a partial retrenchment under central feature of negotiations in the chains concept in Chinese sources and lay Richard Nixon’s Guam Doctrine, and 1920s that vainly sought to prevent mil- out three ways that Chinese authors have back toward statements of a greater itary competition and conflict between thought about island chains: as barriers, strategic emphasis on the region under the United States and Japan. Michael springboards, and benchmarks.9 These the Obama administration’s “Rebalance Green notes that as much as many plan- three concepts provide a useful frame- to Asia.”1 Despite some inconsistent ners of the interwar period regretted the work for not only understanding Chinese messaging on military alliances and trade decision not to establish robust fortifica- perspectives but also analyzing U.S. relationships, the Trump administration tions of strategic points such as Guam, interests in the region. A durable U.S. has indicated a major focus on Asia in the the restrictions of the Washington Naval regional strategy should reject what have 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) Treaties incentivized key innovations in become Chinese concepts of the islands and its strategy for a “Free and Open fleet mobility, such as underway replen- and redefine the geography as a cloud, Indo-Pacific.”2 Regardless of whether the ishment, to mitigate against the threat then consider the various roles of the sec- United States pursues broad engagement to fixed fueling points.4 ond island cloud as a barrier, springboard, with the region, focuses on military con- The notorious geopolitician Karl and benchmark. tainment of China, or decides to allow a Haushofer was one of the first to describe These three perspectives are already larger Chinese sphere of influence in the the island chain concept, calling them inherent in some of the debates on U.S. Western Pacific, the second island cloud “offshore island arcs.”5 Haushofer served relationships and force posture in the represents critical geography for what as German military attaché in Tokyo Western Pacific. The argument for “ar- Vice President Mike Pence has called an before he established his Institute for chipelagic defense” typifies the barrier “ironclad commitment” to the region.3 Geopolitics at the University of Munich concept, seeking new ways to defend To demonstrate this commitment and and gained influence in the 1930s with the island chains in the face of daunting respond to operational imperatives, there Nazi leaders such as Adolf Hitler and Chinese capabilities.10 The second island is a compelling need to get serious about Rudolf Hess. Leading architects of the chain has served as a springboard for the second island cloud—we need to post–World War II Pacific security archi- the U.S. military for decades, launching identify the challenges to a sustained or tecture, including Douglas MacArthur strategic bomber strikes at the end of enhanced U.S. presence and to pursue and Dean Acheson, also invoked the World War II and in Vietnam, and sus- near-term opportunities that advance island chains. Chinese strategists have taining the Continuous Bomber Presence U.S. national interests. A strategy for the focused contemporary attention on the Mission from Guam’s Andersen Air second island cloud should deepen the island chains, and it is Chinese adapta- Force Base since 2004.11 Homeporting unique U.S. relationship with these is- tions and descriptions of the island chains submarines at Guam and redeployment lands and reframe the strategic discussion that have reintroduced the concept to of Okinawa-based Marines to the island with a broader definition that includes American strategists.6 Throughout the have enhanced the springboard aspect valuable islands excluded from the second remarkable modernization of China’s of one link in the second island chain.12 island chain. military since the 1990s, its leaders have Finally, the second island chain has been emphasized the military challenge of an important benchmark of China’s Origins and Interpretations U.S. and allied deployments in the island growing maritime power, both for those The second island chain has no offi- chains and the strategic importance of seeking to balance against Chinese ex- cial standing among geographers or the waters they enclose.7 A central figure pansionism and those advocating a more international organizations but has in the promulgation of the island chains conciliatory approach to China. Lyle served as shorthand for the line of in Chinese geostrategy and military plan- Goldstein, for example, argues that a islands extending from the Japanese ning was Admiral Liu Huaqing, often reduction of U.S. forces on Guam would mainland, through the Nanpõ Shotõ, referred to as the “Father of the People’s foster trust and greater cooperation with the Marianas, and the western Caroline Liberation Army Navy,” who served as China.13 Goldstein also employed the Islands, before terminating somewhere its commander in the 1980s and then benchmark concept to note Chinese JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Rhodes 47 focus on the Philippine Sea—between the subtly different statuses in U.S. law, and access to military facilities in the islands. two island chains—as nascent evidence of each has a non-voting representative in All three nations face development chal- an “evolving new multipolarity.”14 Congress. Both Guam and the CNMI lenges relating to their remote locations are unincorporated territories where the and undiversified economies and have Island Geography Constitution applies only partially. Both seen heavy outward migration, with The second island cloud lies to the territories have a non-voting member of nearly a quarter of FAS citizens living east of the first island chain, across the House of Representatives, but there in the United States.17 Palau has much the Philippine Sea. This cloud spans a are subtle differences in the application higher per capita gross domestic product complicated patchwork of sovereignty of Federal law in each territory. Guam is and has been more successful at investing arrangements, political contexts, and the largest, most populous, and most de- U.S. assistance than its neighbors. The economic challenges. The concept of veloped island in the Marianas and hosts economic outlook is more discouraging a second island cloud should build on a substantial U.S. military presence, while for the FMS and RMI as a 2024 deadline three basic types of islands in the tra- the CNMI—including the smaller and looms for both nations to transition away ditional chain definition: Japanese and less populous islands of Saipan, Tinian, from direct U.S. support in favor of dis- Indonesian territory at the northern and and Rota—hosts only small-scale U.S. bursements from a trust fund established southern ends, a core of U.S. territory military training. The CNMI has strug- in 2003.18 The trust fund sought to place in the Marianas, and the island groups gled economically in the last decade and the FMS and RMI on a more stable long- adjacent to the core consisting of the has started to rely for jobs and growth term financial footing; however, enduring Republic of Palau and portions of the on Chinese investment in casino tourism, structural challenges, weak performance, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). an alarming development for those who and corruption suggest poor prospects The second island cloud should also advocate for the CNMI’s importance to for a successful transition to trust fund include the islands in the Carolines U.S. regional military strategy.16 income.19 that make up the rest of the FSM, the Palau and the western end of FSM Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), are links in the traditional chain, but Barrier and Springboard: and islands on the southern rim of the these islands are part of a broader geog- The Military Potential of Caroline Basin belonging to Indonesia raphy and have a uniquely complicated the Second Island Cloud and Papua New Guinea. relationship with the United States. The The second island cloud can play a The fully sovereign foreign territory shared history and similar political status vital role in concepts in the 2018 NDS at the northern and southern anchors of Palau, the FSM, and the RMI make it Global Operating Model, filling oper- of the second island cloud is markedly imperative to consider all three of these ational space for the “contact layer” different in terms of U.S. security archi- island nations together and highlight a and enabling maneuver for the “blunt tecture. The Nanpõ Shotõ are covered key dimension of why the more expansive layer.”20 While Ellis and the “War Plan under existing U.S.-Japan treaties, and second island cloud is more coherent Orange” generation sought protected U.S. forces enjoy access to military facil- and accurate than the chain. The United anchorages for the fleet, since 1942 ities, such as the airfield at Iwo Jima.15 States administered these islands as the the military value of these islands has Indonesia, which governs the islands Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands fol- resided primarily in airfields, even as along the southern rim of the Caroline lowing World War II and then devolved growing Chinese capabilities for long- Basin, remains a nascent security partner sovereignty to the three independent range strike make them increasingly for the United States, and U.S. forces governments under Compacts of Free vulnerable.21 have enjoyed only limited access to the Association (CFA).The CFAs with the Active defenses, like missile inter- economically challenged parts of eastern FSM and the RMI entered into force ceptors, and passive defenses, such as Indonesia. Papua New Guinea, whose in the 1980s and were revised in 2003, hardening, play a central role in miti- islands mark the southeastern rim of the while the CFA with Palau entered into gating long-range fires, but the chief Caroline Basin, is an even more nascent force in 1994, and a long-pending revi- defensive contribution that the second partner for the United States, although sion entered into force in late 2018. island cloud can offer is dispersal.22 the joint U.S.-Australia initiative at These three sovereign nations, known Dispersal bases are in short supply in Manus Island, announced by Pence in collectively as the Freely Associated States the Pacific, but the second island cloud 2018, is an important development for (FAS), receive various forms of financial includes several of the “secondary and an area not included in the second island assistance and public services from the tertiary operating locations” called for by chain. U.S. Government, and FAS citizens may Elbridge Colby, the principal architect Discussions of Pacific strategy regu- live and work in the United States, in- of the 2018 NDS.23 The importance of larly reference the U.S. territories in the cluding serving in the military. The U.S. Palau and Yap, from which aircraft can Marianas, but these islands are poorly un- Government takes full responsibility for range the Philippine Sea, is evident, but derstood. Guam and the Commonwealth the defense of FAS territory and enjoys the eastern Carolines also have utility. of the Marianas Islands (CNMI) have exclusive rights to establish and control The FSM’s Chuuk, for example, is several 48 Essay Competitions / The Second Island Cloud JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 U.S. Air Force and Japan Air Self-Defense Force conduct Cope North annually at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, to increase combat readiness and interoperability, concentrating on coordination and evaluation of air tactics, techniques, and procedures, February 21, 2011 (U.S. Air Force/Angelita M. Lawrence) hundred kilometers closer to Taipei of it hearkening back to World War II an important benchmark demonstrating than Darwin, Australia. Operational and the anchorages surveyed by the likes to rivals, allies, and partners alike that discussions do not typically include the of Ellis.26 Expeditionary “forward arming the United States intends to sustain RMI, but the Marshalls and Aleutians are and refueling points” at tertiary airports its role as a Pacific power. The United equidistant from potential combat zones; offer the potential of much more dy- States should integrate the second Kwajalein and Attu are each roughly namic airpower, particularly with aircraft island cloud into what Jakub Grygiel 2,900 miles from Okinawa. capable of operating from austere facili- and Wess Mitchell call “tighter frontline The second island cloud’s military ties.27 The ability to rearm combatants, webs” of security relationships.30 The potential could grow with the introduc- and potentially even submarines from means to strengthen these ties in the tion of new capabilities and operational support ships in sheltered anchorages, second island cloud are primarily non- concepts. U.S. withdrawal from the rather than pierside at established bases, military and suggest a greater focus on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces offers a new take on an old concept to diplomatic, political, and development Treaty could lead to the deployment of regenerate naval combat power despite aspects of U.S. relationships with these mobile intermediate-range missiles in the the Western Pacific threat environment.28 islands. Traditional security cooperation second island cloud that could range key All these concepts are directly compatible with Indonesia and Japan helps ensure regional targets and complicate adversary with the second island cloud concept and the northern anchor remains secure targeting.24 Secondary airfields in the would benefit from peacetime infrastruc- and U.S. access grows along the south- second island cloud could also prove ture investment throughout the islands.29 ern edge of the second island cloud, valuable to supporting operations by although there is room to improve syn- future “arsenal planes” with large load- Demonstrating Regional chronization with other instruments of outs of standoff weapons, an old concept Staying Power Through national power.31 that gained new energy through a 2016 the Second Island Cloud Washington should also reinforce Strategic Capabilities Office program.25 Sustaining and growing the U.S. its commitment to its territories in the A growing body of operational literature presence in the second island cloud Marianas where foreign and domestic on new concepts for combat logistics in is important for the springboard or policy overlap. Both Guam and the the Pacific has developed recently, some barrier purposes; it would also provide CNMI would benefit from enhanced JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Rhodes 49 Two U.S. Air Force B-1B Lancers assigned to 9th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron, deployed from Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, fly 10-hour mission from Guam through South China Sea, operating with USS Sterett, June 8, 2017 (U.S. Air Force/Richard P. Ebensberger) commitments at the Federal level to impossibility in the current political but supporting the long-term stability of support sustainable economic growth climate, statehood for a unified Guam these U.S.-aligned nations offers a high and address labor shortfalls while creating and the CNMI could imitate Hawaii’s potential return for the United States. alternatives to potentially problematic economic success and provide an un- These nations already rely on assistance Chinese investment.32 The Department mistakable symbol of long-term U.S. from multilateral financial institutions of Interior–led Interagency Group on commitment to regional presence. such as the Asian Development Bank Insular Areas was established in 2010 Senior-level visits are an important (ADB), and their economic situation to make recommendations on Federal currency in diplomacy, particularly with leaves them vulnerable to bilateral eco- programs in Guam, American Samoa, partners like the FAS that get less atten- nomic inducements from rivals probing the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the CNMI.33 tion. In 2018, senior Defense officials, for weakness in the U.S. regional posi- The group could play a role in coor- including the Under Secretary of the tion. ADB assistance to the FAS is small dinating long-term U.S. policy for the Navy and the Assistant Secretary of by the standards of most international second island cloud, but would be more Defense for Asian and Pacific Security development programs but is significant effective with more frequent meetings Affairs, visited underappreciated parts in small economies like those of the and the inclusion of additional agencies of the second island cloud.34 High-level FAS. ADB assistance in 2017 was $8.3 at the assistant secretary level. Enhancing officials from Washington should sustain million to the FSM, $10.5 million to the influence of Guam and the CNMI a regular calendar of bilateral and mul- the RMI, and less than $1 million to in Congress, potentially through greater tilateral meetings to discuss diplomatic, Palau.36 In the larger context of regional staff support on their representatives’ defense, and development initiatives in relationships, it is important to note that assigned committees, would also build venues like the Pacific Islands Forum.35 Palau and the RMI are among the few capacity for shaping legislation that Investing in the economic develop- nations that maintain diplomatic relations supports these islands. Although a near ment of the FAS entails serious challenges with Taiwan, making them a target for 50 Essay Competitions / The Second Island Cloud JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense interceptor missile launches from Meck Island to intercept ballistic missile target during Missile Defense Agency integrated flight test, Republic of the Marshall Islands, October 25, 2012 (U.S. Navy) Chinese coercive diplomatic efforts.37 programs, but the strategic imperatives Pacific Islands Forum.40 The United Deliberate erosion of FAS support for suggest the United States should accept States should seek additional opportuni- the United States by a challenger with the risk of some inefficiency in an ex- ties, such as that recently announced for deep pockets could introduce substantial panded aid program while continuing Manus Island, to partner with Australia friction should the United States seek to address structural economic reform in new defense, diplomacy, and devel- expanded presence or new facilities. and corruption. The U.S. Agency for opment efforts across Oceania. India’s A new focus on economic develop- International Development (USAID) growing engagement in the region also ment that complements the RMI and plays only a minor role in the second offers the possibility of coordinating on FSM trust funds but endures beyond island cloud, as all assistance is managed second island cloud investment within the them could increase investment in in- through the CFA, but it has been active emerging Quadrilateral Security Dialogue frastructure and such key industries as in disaster preparedness in the FSM.39 with Japan, Australia, and India.41 tourism and fisheries to build a stronger Washington should make greater use of economic foundation. Revenue from fish- USAID, which has expertise and mech- Counterarguments ing licenses has been a critical source of anisms for providing the needed support There are strategic, financial, political, foreign exchange for the FAS with their while managing the tradeoffs between and operational arguments against a large exclusive economic zones but small efficiency and foreign policy objectives, in deeper U.S. commitment to the region. economic bases. The ADB notes that in the FAS. At the strategic level, some might 2017, revenue from fishing licenses was Finally, just as Japan is the linchpin of argue that an enhanced U.S. focus and the primary factor returning the economy the northern part of the region, Australia posture in the area will contribute to a of the FSM to growth after a period of plays a critical role throughout the South security dilemma and further incentivize contraction.38 Monitoring and oversight Pacific, both as a staunch U.S. ally and China’s military buildup and aggressive are essential to effective development as a leading voice in venues such as the behavior. Replacing or augmenting JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Rhodes 51 the RMI and FSM trust funds with the international stage with new security January 2018); “Fact Sheet: Advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region,” Department additional financial support, as with any relationships and overseas bases and is of State, November 18, 2018, available at 44 development program, risks open-ended even contemplating military alliances. 52 Essay Competitions / The Second Island Cloud JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 18 Compacts of Free Association: Actions ers-aid-northern-mariana-islands>. Development Bank and the Marshall Islands: Needed to Prepare for the Transition of Micro- 27 Joseph Trevithick, “Glimpse of the Fact Sheet,” April 2018, available at JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Rhodes 53 Marine with Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force– Crisis Response–Africa 19.2, Marine Forces Europe and Africa, evaluates Moroccan soldiers during culminating event at Tifnit, Morocco, July 25, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Margaret Gale) America First ≠ America Alone Morocco as Exemplar for U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy By James B. Cogbill n October 4, 2018, Secretary of importance of diplomacy and the role (USAFRICOM) to label Morocco State Mike Pompeo announced of international partnerships in com- “Africa’s premier security exporter.”3 O the release of President Donald bating the terrorist threats we face.”1 This article evaluates Morocco as a Trump’s new National Strategy for The first page of the NSCT includes model for the NSCT objectives regard- Counterterrorism (NSCT), stating that the statement “America First does not ing partner-nation CT/CVE activities, “the President’s strategy emphasizes the mean America alone,” indicating the while also noting where Morocco’s essential role of key international part- efforts could be improved. ners.2 Morocco is such a partner. In the Colonel James B. Cogbill, USA, wrote this essay years since 9/11, Morocco has built an Background while attending the U.S. Army War College. It effective program for counterterrorism Morocco is a parliamentary consti- won the Strategy Article category of the 2019 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic (CT) and countering violent extremism tutional monarchy in which King Essay Competition. (CVE), leading U.S. Africa Command Mohammed VI retains ultimate 54 Essay Competitions / America First ≠ America Alone JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 power and authority. Following the key partners.”7 With the assistance of training on intelligence analysis, facial 2011 Arab Spring protests, the king the U.S. Embassy in Rabat, Morocco is recognition, and management.15 introduced a new constitution that well on its way to accomplishing all of As a measure of effectiveness, ac- increased the powers of parliament and these goals. cording to BCIJ data, Moroccan security permitted direct elections for regional In order to professionalize its military, services have interdicted 183 terror cells councils. Despite this liberalization, the Morocco has invested several hundred since 2002, prevented 361 terrorist acts, king still retains near-exclusive power million dollars for modernization, pur- and arrested more than 3,129 terrorists.16 over the military and religious and chasing U.S. F-16 fighter jets, M1A1 The success of Morocco’s CT/CVE foreign affairs. The population is 99 tanks, and helicopters.8 As stated, programs is further indicated by the fact percent Sunni Muslim, and the king Morocco participates in the coalition that the country has experienced only derives religious legitimacy through his to defeat IS and committed its F-16s two terrorist attacks since 2012—the constitutionally enshrined title as Com- to combat operations in Syria and for fewest in North Africa by far.17 While im- mander of the Faithful and by tracing anti-Houthi strikes in Yemen.9 Morocco pressive, human rights organizations have his lineage to the Prophet Muham- operates a field hospital in Jordan that has accused Moroccan security services of mad. During Mohammed VI’s reign, served more than 1.5 million Syrian refu- mass arrests, beatings, and even torture.18 the economy has experienced steady gees, and it also provided a field hospital To avoid creating more terrorists and growth but still suffers from significant in response to the 2014 Ebola outbreak achieving tactical success at the expense youth unemployment, especially in in West Africa.10 Additionally, Morocco of long-term strategic failure, Moroccans urban areas.4 participates in peacekeeping missions, must redouble efforts to purge security Located in northwest Africa, with more than 1,500 peacekeepers services of such abuses. Morocco represents a key gateway deployed to the Central African Republic For judicial reform, the U.S. State to Europe, the Middle East, and and Democratic Republic of the Congo.11 Department’s Bureau of International Africa. This also makes it a key hub Morocco’s military conducts partner- Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs for migration—mostly from Africa to ship-building and professionalization works with Moroccan partners to increase Europe—which is a security concern activities with sub-Saharan militaries and the professionalism and independence for the European Union. Despite this trains more than 1,000 foreign officers of the judiciary, combat radicalization in concern, Morocco enjoys excellent rela- and noncommissioned officers annually prisons, and facilitate reintegration for re- tions with the international community. in its military academies and technical habilitated detainees.19 Specifically, since The U.S. diplomatic relationship with schools.12 Such activities are the reason 2010, the bureau has worked through Morocco dates back to 1777, represent- USAFRICOM has called Morocco Morocco’s prison administration, training ing the longest unbroken relationship Africa’s premier security exporter. Moroccan prison wardens to modernize in U.S. history.5 Separately, Morocco In order to professionalize law en- prison management, keep terrorists seg- is a “major non–North Atlantic Treaty forcement, in 2013 Morocco established regated from the general population, and Organization ally” and a co-chair of the the Bureau Central d’Investigation build more modern and secure facilities.20 Global Counterterrorism Forum, and it Judiciaire (BCIJ, or Central Bureau of Counterterrorism is not accomplished has been a key military partner through Judicial Investigations) as its elite crime through security efforts alone. In addi- its participation in the coalition to defeat fighting organization. Labeled the tion to security force professionalization, the so-called Islamic State (IS) and by “Moroccan FBI” by the media, the BCIJ Morocco has implemented an impressive hosting multinational exercises including is the primary law enforcement agency CVE program through policies that USAFRICOM’s largest such exercise, responsible for CT.13 It operates under ameliorate poverty, improve education, African Lion.6 the supervision of the public prosecutor and promote a moderate and peaceful of the court of appeals and reports to version of Islam. These programs mirror Morocco as a Model for the General Directorate for Territorial the NSCT’s LOE to “counter terrorist NSCT Objectives Surveillance, whose agents have the rank radicalization and recruitment.” The NSCT is divided into six lines of of judicial police officers and can conduct Addressing poverty is particularly effort (LOEs). Morocco’s example as a investigations, question suspects, and important as recent studies indicate model CT partner is recognizable in the make arrests. They also conduct elec- the primary reason Moroccans join LOEs “strengthen the counterterrorism tronic tracking and eavesdropping upon terrorist networks is because of eco- abilities of international partners” and receipt of written approval from the court nomic—not ideological—factors.21 The “counter terrorist radicalization and of appeals. The Moroccan government average monthly salary for an IS fighter is recruitment.” Under the “strengthen has pledged not to use such authorities $1,400, while Moroccans typically earn abilities” LOE, the NSCT states that the to deprive citizens of their individual less than $200 a month (if employed at United States will help “professionalize rights.14 Regarding intelligence collection, all).22 Hence in 2005, King Mohammed the military, law enforcement, judicial, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation VI launched the National Human intelligence, and security services . . . of provides Moroccan government officials Development Initiative (NHDI), a JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Cogbill 55 Alpha 3rd Marine Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team from Yorkstown, Virginia, weapons training with Royal Moroccan armed forces during exercise African Lion, April 22, 2019, at Tifnit, Morocco (U.S. Army Reserve/Tynisha L. Daniel) program that has invested more than $6 percent of first graders graduate from broadcast more extremist Wahhabist billion in its first 10 years of existence high school), and national literacy rates principles.31 Representing a notable in- and was lauded by United Nations of 55 percent are among the lowest novation, in 2015, Morocco’s Ministry Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon as a in the region.27 In addition, low daily of Islamic Affairs created an imam model for Africa.23 attendance rates and teacher absentee- training academy in Rabat that trains NHDI has served at least 7 million ism leave young people vulnerable to not only Morocco’s 50,000 imams but people, with more than 34,000 projects radicalization.28 In response, the U.S. also hundreds of imams from elsewhere targeting youth and women and pro- Agency for International Development in Africa, Europe, and Asia in moderate viding affordable housing and loans.24 works with civil society organizations to Islam.32 Additionally, the king created the Despite its popularity, NHDI has been enhance reading instruction. In addition, Mohammedan League of Ulema to pro- criticized for lacking transparency and en- the agency facilitated a Millennium mote research in moderate Islam, ensure couraging patronage due to centralization Challenge Corporation compact (grant) conformity in Moroccan school curricula, of decisionmaking over funds disburse- for $450 million to increase access to and conduct youth outreach.33 Morocco ment. As such, some have called for higher quality secondary education.29 also regulates fatwas (religious rulings) greater transparency and involvement of Drawing on his religious legitimacy by requiring their issuance through a regional councils in program execution.25 as Commander of the Faithful, King single religious authority—the Higher Regarding education, a recent Mohammed VI has worked to promote Scholastic Council.34 Lastly, Morocco study indicates the majority of the moderate and peaceful interpretations of monitors all mosques within the country 1,600 Moroccans who joined IS and Islam.30 Specifically, Morocco established to deter preaching of radical sermons.35 affiliated groups did not have more satellite television channels that promote While government oversight appears to than a primary school education.26 the official government version of Islam, constrain freedom of religion, clearly Primary and secondary school dropout including the Sufi and Maliki traditions, some effort to intervene against militant rates remain high in Morocco (only 18 to counter Persian Gulf stations that Islam seems justified to address catalysts 56 Essay Competitions / America First ≠ America Alone JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 for radicalization. However, such reforms Overview,” 2. roccos-role-in-supporti_b_7434738.html>. 9 Ibid. 24 “Talking Points of Ambassador Nass- must necessarily be undertaken by an 10 Meeting with Colonel Andrew Hamann, er Bourita at the Open Briefing of the UN actor seen to have religious legitimacy U.S. Defense Attaché, U.S. Embassy Morocco, Counter-Terrorism Committee,” New York, and not by an external power such as the Rabat, Morocco, March 13, 2019. September 30, 2014, available at JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Cogbill 57 Troops watch activity on Omaha Beach as their LCVP landing craft approaches shore on D-Day, June 6, 1944 (U.S. Army Signal Corps/U.S. National Archives) Why Normandy Still Matters Seventy-Five Years On, Operation Overlord Inspires, Instructs, and Invites Us to Be Better Joint Warfighters By Bryon Greenwald he 50-mile stretch of French nomic prosperity those values permit. coastline running from midway There, on June 6, 1944, Allied forces T up the Cotentin Peninsula east conducted an enormous amphibious to the Orne River is hallowed ground invasion across five beaches—Utah, Dr. Bryon Greenwald is a Professor of History in the Joint Advanced Warfighting School at the for all who cherish democracy and the Omaha, Gold, Juno, and Sword—that National Defense University. rule of law and the freedom and eco- caught the Germans by surprise and 58 JPME Today / Why Normandy Still Matters JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 initiated the end of Nazi reign over reexamining after spending nearly a gen- but it also meant capturing a heavily Europe. The invasion not only enabled eration in counterinsurgency operations. defended port and fighting through the American, British, Canadian, French, Finally, as Russia and China continue to majority of German forces, including and other forces to join the Russians in act aggressively on the world stage, this Panzer divisions, in the west. Some senior defeating Germany, but it also allowed anniversary may turn out to be one of the German leaders, however, suspected that them to advance far enough east to last to occur during the relatively peaceful the attack might come elsewhere. The prevent Soviet suzerainty over most of interregnum in Great Power competition failed Anglo-Canadian attempt to attack Western Europe after the war. In its the world has enjoyed since the end of the heavily defended port at Dieppe in success, Operation Overlord ushered the Cold War. Thus, 75 years after air- August 1942 proved just how difficult in an open, democratically based eco- borne troops leapt into the dark French that approach would be in the future and nomic system that has since expanded night and thousands of aircraft and hun- hinted at an over-the-beach invasion. beyond its meager beginnings and dreds of warships protected dog-faced Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel, improved the lives of hundreds of mil- soldiers as they spilled from plywood in charge of all western defenses from lions of Europeans. landing craft on to fire-swept beaches, the the Bay of Biscay to Denmark, initially This article celebrates the success and efforts of our forefathers to plan and con- leaned toward Calais, but considered a sacrifice of Operation Overlord on its duct Operation Overlord should inspire Normandy invasion likely. He focused his 75th anniversary, acknowledges both the us, instruct us, and invite us, as a joint attention on what the Allies would call achievements and mistakes made in plan- force, to improve our ability to plan and Omaha Beach because its long concave ning and execution, and asks readers to execute all-domain operations. waterfront resembled Salerno, which the compare the abilities of the current joint Allies had assaulted in September 1943. force with those of World War II. Geared An Inspiration for All Even Adolf Hitler had a premonition of to those who are familiar with, but not The invasion of Normandy inspires us an attack in Normandy, but hedged his expert in, the critical components of the by its sheer audacity, its enormous size bet by predicting the Allies would invade operation, this article reviews key aspects and scale, and, of course, the personal in both places.3 Fortunately, in doing so of the invasion and offers insight into the courage of those involved. To describe he unwittingly supported the Allied de- difficulty of orchestrating such a compli- the invasion as audacious, however, ception plan designed to make the attack cated joint and multinational endeavor understates the precarious, one-shot, on Calais appear as the operational main at a time when radio communications roll-of-the-dice nature of the event. At effort. were in their analog infancy. The article the tactical level, the Allies prepared Finally, the assault was strategically also provides teaching points for emerg- for the attack almost within eyesight of audacious. Other amphibious assaults ing military strategists and planners and German forces. At their closest points, during the war were no less daring, critiques the operation. Finally, the article Britain and the European coast are a difficult, or deadly, but they were es- asks the reader to question whether to- mere 20 miles apart. Many of the 120 sentially “away games” for both sides, day’s joint force could achieve something German radar sets clustered from Calais fought by the Allies against second-tier similar, not in size or scale, but sophis- to Guernsey could easily spot ships and or lesser forces that were unprepared, tication, even with the benefit of global aircraft moving in the English Channel.2 undersupplied, isolated, or retreating. digital command and control suites. Portsmouth and Southampton, two With Operation Torch in North Africa, As anniversaries go, the 75th anniver- of the main ports from which British the Allies conducted an error-filled assault sary of Operation Overlord holds special forces would sail, are only 100 miles on Vichy French forces in a secondary significance. As with all the major battles from Normandy. In today’s strategic theater and later defeated Rommel’s be- of World War II, it will certainly be one of environment, that would be the same leaguered army in Tunisia.4 In Operation the last major anniversaries where any of as launching an invasion from an inter- Husky, the successful yet flawed amphibi- the participants are still living.1 As such, mediate staging base like Taiwan toward ous landing on Sicily, the Allies learned their sacrifice in that mighty endeavor mainland China or from Kaliningrad to the difficulty of transitioning from ship should not go unnoticed. And although Sweden. to shore and air to ground against a it occurred almost a lifetime ago, the At the operational level, the Germans wounded but deadly enemy.5 Even in the Allied effort to plan and execute the expected the attack, but could not pin- Pacific, as ferocious as the fighting from invasion still provides an extraordinary point exactly where or when it might Tarawa to Okinawa was, the Americans opportunity to examine the difficulty occur. Many suspected the Allies would isolated the Japanese, cut their air and of planning and conducting integrated, attack across to the Pas-de-Calais, con- naval support, and pounded them relent- all-domain, and joint and combined tinue through the German industrial lessly with naval gunfire, artillery, and forced-entry operations against a lethal base in the Ruhr, and on to Berlin. This aviation.6 Victory in those battles was enemy whose antiaccess/area-denial avenue offered the most direct route and bloody, but never in doubt. Moreover, preparations were immense—some- gave Allied aircraft the greatest amount while all those amphibious assaults thing that today’s joint force is just now of loiter time over the invasion area, carried tactical and operational risks, JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Greenwald 59 their outcome was not in question, and stalemate and possibly a negotiated peace that marked the boundaries of the inva- beyond North Africa, even their failure as well. Overlord really was a one-shot sion area. Ahead of these forces, two U.S. could not derail Allied strategy. effort. and one British airborne division, 23,400 The invasion of Normandy, however, Despite a shortage of British man- troops in all, dropped at night to secure was fought on German ground, although power and barely enough transport to key points behind Utah Beach and seal their lease on French territory was only conduct the invasion, the size and scale of the eastern flank along the Orne River 4 years old. And while Hitler’s boasts the operation was breathtaking. Today’s from counterattack. Moving these men of Festung Europa (Fortress Europe) strategists and operational planners can were almost 1,400 transports and over and the impenetrable Atlantic Wall were only begin to fathom the magnitude 760 gliders (416 with U.S. forces and at largely just that, once he placed Rommel of the combined force and complex- least 250 with British). Blasting the far in charge in early 1944, the defenses ity involved in marshalling, moving, shore and sweeping the skies over this improved dramatically. With characteristic and synchronizing its effects in a world force were nearly 4,500 bombers and energy, Rommel revitalized languid units where analog communication was dif- 4,000 fighters. By sunset at 10:06 p.m. and layered the coast with hundreds of ficult and digital technology nonexistent. local time, the Allies had placed over pillboxes and tank traps, thousands of Crammed into England at over 2,000 155,000 men, 1,550 tanks, and 12,500 obstacles, and millions of mines, many camps and airfields were over 1.5 million vehicles ashore.11 deviously placed to be underwater at high American and 600,000 British service- Beyond its size and scope, what tide.7 And unlike in other amphibious men organized into 20 U.S. and 16 one soldier in the German 716th Static assaults, the Germans could reinforce the British, Canadian, and Polish divisions Infantry Division described as a “gigantic assault area with Panzer and other units as well as scores of other ground, sea, city at sea,” the force contained several from as near as the Pas-de-Calais and as and air forces. Another 37 U.S. divisions specialty vehicles that spoke to the value far away as the Eastern Front. were to follow, either through England of innovation and organized industrial Beyond all of these tactical and op- or directly from America.9 The initial strength.12 Operating with the inva- erational factors, Normandy posed the invasion launched five divisions destined sion force were Duplex Drive tanks that likelihood of strategic and political failure. for four nearly contiguous beaches run- could swim ashore albeit under the right If Rommel had succeeded in throwing ning east to west—Sword, Juno, Gold, conditions; Crocodiles, tanks turned into the Allies back into the Channel, the and Omaha—and one outlier on the tracked flamethrowers; Crabs, flail tanks chance of a follow-on Allied attack within Contentin Peninsula closer to the port of fitted with heavy chains on a rotating a year or two was extremely remote. Cherbourg near Utah Beach. Three other cylinder that cleared minefields; Bobbins, While General George Patton’s Third divisions followed in trail. tanks that rolled out a reinforced canvas Army was sitting in England in reserve, Transporting these forces across the road to drive on as they moved forward; it would take time to reconstitute losses Channel from 171 British ports at night Armored Ramp Carriers (ARKs), tanks in landing craft. Besides, not only was under radio silence were nearly 7,000 that carried deployable ramps instead of Prime Minister Winston Churchill already vessels operated by almost 200,000 turrets; and Ducks (DUKWs), 6-wheeled antsy and given to visions of a repeat of sailors, coastguardsmen, and merchant- amphibious vehicles for moving men, Gallipoli, the Somme, and Passchendaele, men in Operation Neptune, a supporting 105-mm howitzers, and supplies ashore.13 with Allied blood filling the Channel, but operation to Overlord that focused on Finally, chugging along just behind the the British were also running out of men the crossing and beach landings. This force were a flotilla of tugs hauling three and had started cannibalizing divisions armada included 138 destroyers, cruisers, miracles of modern industry—two artifi- for infantry replacements even before the and battleships. These warships provided cial floating harbors and a pipeline under invasion started.8 There was simply no this fleet’s seapower, but the landpower the ocean (PLUTO). more ink in the British well to spill on a needed to retake Europe arrived on 46 Given the difficulty expected in second attempt. Operation Overlord was different types of landing craft, approxi- seizing a heavily defended deep-water their only opportunity. mately 4,200 in all, including the critically port intact, the Allies, largely through Exacerbating an initial defeat in short landing ship tank or “long slow British initiative, decided to bring two France, any Allied pause to regroup target” capable of carrying half an armor enormous ports with them. While logisti- would have allowed Hitler to expand his battalion and depositing it on the beach cians intended to protect all five invasion V-weapons campaign, which was already via its massive bow doors.10 This enor- beaches with “gooseberries” or artificial ravaging London. The combination of mous and diverse force rendezvoused breakwaters, two beaches—Omaha the two might have caused Churchill’s about 13 miles south of the Isle of Wight, and Gold—would serve as sites for the government to fall and resulted in a ne- in Area Z, or as it was called “Piccadilly Allies two artificial floating harbors, gotiated peace. Finally, an Allied defeat in Circus,” and led by 300-odd minesweep- codenamed Mulberries. Consisting of Normandy would have freed the major- ers, chopped across the Channel in 5 and several unique elements, including float- ity of German units to turn back to the then 10 lanes averaging about 800 yards ing steel pier heads and roadways and east, where they might battle Russia to a wide in search of the midget submarines massive hollow concrete breakwaters 60 JPME Today / Why Normandy Still Matters JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Following three Allied airborne divisional drops, five U.S., British, and Canadian divisions assaulted the Normandy beaches (Courtesy West Point Department of History) for the inner harbor, these structures tons of fuel, mostly in 5-gallon jerricans, June that provided the right combination consumed about 661,000 U.S. tons on one-way highways to supply points in of a late rising moon and early morning of concrete and 100,000 U.S. tons of the First and Third U.S. Army areas.15 rising tide to create the opportunity for a steel and took 45,000 men 8 months to Notwithstanding the countless acts successful assault. Seventeen hours later, construct. Although a tremendous storm of bravery noted over the last generation as wind and rain lashed the windows of (June 19–22) destroyed the American of conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, the his temporary headquarters at Southwick Mulberry at Omaha, the British port at personal courage demonstrated during House near Portsmouth, Eisenhower re- Gold Beach survived and proved useful Operation Overlord by men at all levels ceived a forecast update indicating a mild throughout the Normandy campaign.14 still inspires and serves as an example to break in the weather for June 5 and 6. Lastly, if 19th-century armies marched us all. From Supreme Allied Commander After polling his commanders, he calmly on their stomachs, modern armies mo- General Dwight D. Eisenhower through assessed the situation, wondering aloud, tored forward on petroleum. To keep component commanders and senior “How long can you hang this operation their highly motorized and mechanized leaders, to the engineers, Seabees, med- on the end of a limb?” He committed to armies moving, the Allies developed and ics, and infantrymen that first landed in launch the assault with a final go/no-go laid hundreds of miles of steel PLUTO. Normandy, their actions and level of per- weather update at 4:15 a.m. on June 5. Unfortunately, while engineering sonal responsibility represent our better At that meeting, after receiving confirma- marvels, these pipelines suffered from ac- selves even in the darkest of times. tion that the weather break would hold, cidents with ships’ anchors and breakage Consider Eisenhower’s example of he announced without any pomp, “Okay, that limited their timely transport of fuel. humble strategic leadership. At 4:30 we’ll go.” He then returned to his private This shortfall led to an early adaptation of a.m. on June 4, he postponed the inva- trailer where he handwrote a note taking existing transport capacity, the Red Ball sion for 24 hours due to extremely bad complete and personal responsibility for Express, as supply officers commandeered weather, knowing that there were only the invasion if it failed and stuffed it in 7,000 2.5-ton trucks to transport 4,000 4 days—the 5th, 6th, 19th, and 20th—in his wallet. Finally, he visited Greenham JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Greenwald 61 While fixing German attention on Dover, England, Allied forces consolidated and sailed toward Normandy. Hours earlier, paratroopers and glider forces took off to seize key objectives on the Orne River and Cotentin Peninsula (Courtesy West Point Department of History) Common airfield to meet paratroopers example is Brigadier General Theodore like Colonels Charles Canham (116th from the 101st Airborne Division, staying Roosevelt, Jr., the Assistant Commander RCT) and George Taylor (16th RCT) to watch the last of their aircraft take off, of the 4th Infantry Division, who landed similarly led from the front and exhorted saluting with tears in his eyes and know- 2,000 yards off course with the first men to advance.19 ing that by dawn many of those he met wave at Utah Beach and calmly decided The Rangers scaled the 100-foot would be dead.16 that “we’ll start the war from here.”18 cliffs of Pointe du Hoc while dodging Then there was the calmness and Brigadier General Norman “Dutch” German grenades and rifle fire, and clarity of men under fire, men like Rear Cota, Assistant Division Commander of lieutenants, sergeants, and privates led Admiral John Leslie “Jimmy” Hall, Jr. the 29th Infantry Division, on landing in platoons, squads, and confused groups Known in modern joint parlance as the the second wave at Omaha Beach, found of men forward—always forward. Finally, Commander, Amphibious Task Force, the men leaderless and not moving. any of the thousands of frightened men Hall directed the assault on Omaha Walking westward under fire, he admon- who, scrambling to exit their Higgins Beach from the USS Ancon. In the midst ished troops to “get off the beaches,” boats, “tumbled out just like corn cobs of the assault, he cautioned a very anx- encouraged the “Rangers to lead the off a conveyor belt” and were hit by fire ious Major General Clarence Huebner, way,” and then, after machine gun fire from German machine gun nests cover- Commander of the 1st Infantry Division, had stalled an attack, personally led a ing “Bloody Omaha.”20 One only has to be patient and let the stalemated situ- charge through a gap in the wire and up to read the names on the 29th Infantry ation on Omaha develop further, thereby the bluff east of Vierville-sur-Mer that Division and Engineer Special Brigade preventing Huebner or First Army enabled men from the 116th Regimental monuments or walk up the slopes behind Commander General Omar Bradley from Combat Team (RCT) to outflank Omaha Beach about 500 yards to a great issuing what would have been a disastrous German defensive positions at the D-1 granite obelisk engraved with the names order to evacuate the beach.17 Another (Vierville) draw. Regimental commanders of the 627 men from the 1st Infantry 62 JPME Today / Why Normandy Still Matters JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Division who died that day, including 3 very great; and while we might not lose American and British forces needed to names etched in gold signifying that they everywhere, we might, possibly, not win win the Battle of the Atlantic before they won the Medal of Honor, to realize that anywhere.”21 Thus, despite planning for a could ever reasonably consider beginning uncommon valor was a common occur- war with Japan since 1907, the national the necessary logistical buildup to sup- rence on June 6, 1944. security apparatus recognized the greater port an invasion of the continent. Finally, threat and adjusted its overarching policy the Allies had to win control of the air to Instruction for Today accordingly. That the Nation would allow any invasion force a modicum of Despite the passage of time, Opera- remain committed to this policy after the freedom of maneuver. tion Overlord continues to offer valu- Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor speaks to In 1942, Army Chief of Staff General able lessons across a range of critical the quality of analysis and the strength of George C. Marshall and his Chief of topics. Chief among these lessons is the its conclusion. War Plans, Brigadier General Dwight D. importance of getting the overarching This tectonic shift in policy quickly Eisenhower, pressed for a direct attack war policy correct through coher- led the United States and Britain to ex- on the Germans as soon as possible, and ent and clear-eyed national security pand senior military staff talks on global certainly not later than 1943. Thus, prior policy planning. To paraphrase Carl strategy and resulted in a series of Allied to the decision to invade Normandy, von Clausewitz, senior leaders should decisions over the next few years that the most instructive decision from both avoid turning the purpose of war into framed the overall strategic direction a geopolitical and strategic perspective something alien to its nature—a mistake for the rest of the war. As they applied was Roosevelt’s July 1942 decision to many contend the United States made to Normandy, these decisions were to invade North Africa, which he made in Iraq. Other lessons include the need avoid negotiated settlements and seek against the wishes of his military advisers. to align strategic goals with higher the complete defeat of the Axis nations; Hailed by some today as an example of policy ends, the criticality of determin- defeat “Germany First”; invade North the value and need for civilian control of ing and sequencing of essential tasks, Africa in 1942 instead of attempting the military, the decision makes complete and the value of developing an opera- a cross-channel attack; resource the sense in hindsight. Roosevelt wanted tional approach to achieve strategic Combined Bomber Offensive to attack American troops in combat against the and operational objectives and then German forces, resources, and cities; and Germans in 1942, but neither the British planning in reverse from the point of invade Northwest Europe in 1944.22 nor the American militaries were ready success to ensure forces and actions are All these decisions demonstrate to con- to conduct a contested amphibious land- arranged, sequenced, and supported temporary officials, as Clausewitz notes, ing against the Germans on the coast of appropriately in time and space. the importance of understanding the France.26 The British, who had already Lessons on Policy Planning and political purpose of war and the need to lost several battles to the Germans and Strategic Alignment. Against the work hard to get the policy and strategy who at that point would have to provide backdrop of the Vietnam War and the aligned as correctly as possible. For as the majority of forces, were accord- wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Operation the Germans learned, no amount of op- ingly reluctant. And as the clumsiness Overlord stands as an example of what erational or tactical virtuosity can rescue of American operations in North Africa coherent policy, grand and theater strat- a military force from bankrupt strategic indicated, U.S. troops and their leaders egy, all-domain operational design, and direction.23 were simply not ready to take on German organizational acumen can achieve. At Lessons on Determining and forces in an amphibious assault.27 Even the level of Allied policy, in late summer Sequencing Essential Tasks. Before Marshall later intimated that the idea of 1940, with Germany having conquered tackling any of its strategic objectives, landing 25 divisions in Europe in 1942 most of Western Europe and now however, the United States had to com- might have been “suicidal.”28 Moreover, bombing and preparing to invade Great plete a series of essential tasks. It needed as much as General Eisenhower lamented Britain, U.S. Army and Navy leadership to raise, organize, train, and equip the about “wasting resources all over the shrugged off decades of planning for a military forces of all four Services (Army, world,” the fact remained that shipping potential war with Japan and came to Army Air Forces, Marines, and Navy) and amphibious craft, two important re- the conclusion that the survival of Great to a level where they could fight and sources for globally integrated operations, Britain and its Empire was in the best sustain a series of global campaigns for were in short supply—so much so that interest of the United States. As the now years.24 Before contemplating an attack in 1944, Eisenhower, as Supreme Allied historic memorandum sent by Chief of on Europe, the Americans needed to Commander, requested a 1-month delay Naval Operations Admiral Harold Stark sustain the British, who were rebuilding in launching Operation Overlord in order to President Franklin D. Roosevelt in their own military after Dunkirk and to obtain more “long slow targets.”29 November 1940 stated, “If Britain wins suffering a 60 percent decrease in food- Eventually, the Americans and British decisively against Germany, we could stuffs and fuel due to the success of the overcame their collective difficulties win everywhere; but . . . if she loses German U-boat campaign against com- in North Africa and began to prepare the problem confronting us would be mercial shipping in the Atlantic.25 Thus, for an invasion of Europe. In February JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Greenwald 63 1943, they formed an integrated plan- between the Orne and Vire rivers. In late over the Seine and the Loire rivers, essen- ning headquarters under the Chief of 1943 and early 1944, Eisenhower and tially carving out a section of France and Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander his ground commander, British General isolating it from German units to the east (COSSAC), British Army Lieutenant Bernard L. Montgomery, assessed the and south of the rivers. Fifth, they used General Frederick Morgan, and selected plan and found the force too weak. They air interdiction to destroy railheads and Normandy as the site of the invasion. drove further refinement and expanded it marshalling yards across France to force In May 1943, as American and British from three to five divisions, increased the Panzer units on to roads, where they soldiers defeated the Germans near Tunis airborne forces from less than one divi- would consume precious fuel and could and captured 275,000 soldiers, their sion to three, and added Utah Beach as be hit by air or subject to sabotage by the leaders met in Washington, DC, at the an objective in order to facilitate captur- French Resistance. In all these air attacks, Trident Conference and set the date for ing the vital port of Cherbourg.32 the British and American air forces were Operation Overlord as May 1944. In the Appropriately, the staff identified the careful to spread out their attacks, striking meantime, they would attack through key component of the German defense twice as many targets outside the Seine/ Sicily and on to Italy with the goal of in the west as the Panzer divisions and Loire area as in it, to mask their intent knocking Italy out of the war and forc- corps. Known in today’s doctrine as the to land in Normandy. Sixth, to create ing the Germans to send reinforcements operational center of gravity, the Panzers a tactical deception and assist inbound to stop the Allies. This decision meant were the only force with enough mobil- airborne forces, planners in Operation the Allies, in a supporting effort to the ity and power to threaten the Allied Titanic dropped special operations forces overall campaign in Europe, would landings; they were the glue that held with amplifiers and recorded combat fight a determined German enemy up the German defense together. The foot- noise, thousands of rifle and machine gun the mountainous Italian boot on some- mobile infantry had neither the speed simulators, and 200 dummy half-sized thing of a shoestring as the British and nor the punch to stop the Allies, and the paratrooper “dolls” or, as the Germans Americans withdrew units and diverted Luftwaffe could not provide significant called them, Explosivpuppen, in key areas supplies to begin the buildup for the in- air support because it was defending the throughout Normandy to confuse the vasion of France.30 skies over Germany from the Combined Germans and draw off anti-paratrooper Lessons on Operational Design and Bomber Offensive. To protect the land- reaction forces.37 Arranging and Sequencing Forces in ing sites from armored counterattack, Finally, planners dropped the 6th Space and Time. Although not without the planners used a combination of British Airborne Division to the east of issues, the quality of the operational information, intelligence, joint fires, and the Orne River and Caen Canal to blow design and joint/combined planning for maneuver to fix Panzer units near Calais up bridges over the Dives River, destroy Operation Overlord offers today’s lead- and impede the movement of other an artillery battery capable of hitting ers and planners an excellent example of Panzer units into the assault area.33 Sword Beach, and capture the bridges integrated all-domain operations.31 As for First, they reinforced the Fortitude at Bénouville and Ranville, which they operational art and design, Allied plan- South deception plan by deploying live did with an amazing glider assault.38 On ners developed an operational approach units to mix with fake ones in eastern the west end of the assault area, the 82nd that envisioned the arrangement of real England and Scotland and broadcast Airborne Division secured the key road and fake forces in England such that the scripted radio traffic to support the junction at Sainte-Mére-Èglise and two Germans viewed the area near Calais as cover plan and augment the action of bridges over the Merderet River, while the main objective and reinforced it ac- those units.34 Second, planners assigned the 101st Airborne Division captured cordingly with the bulk of their Panzer electronic warfare assets, ships, and critical elevated causeways and provided units. If successful, this action would give bombers to execute tactical deception the 4th Infantry Division with a way the Allies a better chance to get ashore plans (Operations Taxable and Glimmer) across the flooded lowlands and off of as a coherent fighting force; to defeat a on the night of June 5–6 to trick German Utah Beach. smaller, less powerful German reaction radar operators, shore lookouts, and In the end, the combined effect force; and to win the race to build up intelligence personnel into believing the of these actions did indeed delay and more combat power than the Germans Allies were attacking north and east of impede the movement of Panzer and could bring to bear in the assault area. Le Havre.35 Third, using Ultra decrypts, other units. Even after the Normandy Then beginning with the strategic guid- overhead imagery, agent reports, and landing, Ultra decrypts confirmed that ance to “enter the continent of Europe radio intercepts they identified the gen- Hitler remained convinced the main and . . . undertake operations aimed at eral locations of several Panzer units and attack was still to come in the area of the heart of Germany and the destruc- targeted them for bombing, both before Calais and would not release the Panzer tion of her Armed Forces,” the COSSAC and after the assault.36 units there until early August. Closer staff developed a concept of operations Fourth, as part of the Transportation in, the destruction of the bridges over that integrated the multifaceted decep- Plan, the Allies used bombers as part of the Dives River and the defense at the tion story with a three-division assault their operational fires to drop the bridges bridge at Ranville forced the 21st Panzer 64 JPME Today / Why Normandy Still Matters JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Panoramic view of Omaha beachhead after it was secured, mid-June 1944 (U.S. Coast Guard/U.S. National Archives) Division to endure countless air attacks told, the Das Reich division took 17 days Division after a tough fight had failed to while driving around Caen to attack to move the 350 miles from Montaubon take either Port-en-Bessin-Huppain or British and Canadian units from the to Normandy, a journey that should have Bayeux or link up with the Americans south instead of more directly from the taken just 3 days.40 at Omaha. At Juno, the 3rd Canadian east. Operation Titanic succeeded in Not Everything Will Go According Division advanced farther than any other dispersing elements of the first-rate 352nd to Plan, Failures to Anticipate and unit, but failed to secure the high ground Infantry Division and delayed Task Force Prepare Will Occur, and Mistakes Will near the Carpiquet airfield west of Caen. Meyer (915th Infantry Regiment) from Happen. Despite its ability to deceive, And finally, at Sword Beach, the British counterattacking forces struggling ashore delay, and disrupt the Germans, the 3rd Division failed to take Caen. at Omaha Beach.39 Finally, the interdic- Allied assault was not a complete suc- At the tactical level, the tail end of the tion of bridges and railheads forced cess. As darkness fell on Normandy, the storm that initially delayed the invasion the 2nd SS Panzer Division, Das Reich, Allies had achieved none of their D-Day and caused the Germans to believe that located near Montaubon in Brittany, to objectives other than getting ashore. At nothing would happen on June 6 made travel north toward Normandy intermit- Utah, the 4th Infantry Division had yet bombing by sight difficult and sailing in tently by rail and road. At great risk, the to link up with the 82nd or 101st airborne small craft treacherous. But beyond the French Resistance blew up fuel dumps, divisions. At Omaha, the beachhead was weather, errors in judgment cost lives sabotaged rolling rail stock, destroyed rail barely a mile deep and the beach itself and wasted tactical efforts, particularly lines, and organized small ambushes. All was a disaster. At Gold, the 50th British on hard-fought Omaha Beach. B-24 JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Greenwald 65 of the immediate beach area. With thick, impenetrable Norman hedgerows and sunken ox-cart tracks bordering thousands of small farm fields, the area was superb defensive terrain that armor could not breach, traditional artillery could not hit, and infantrymen could not enter without coming under withering machine gun and mortar fire.43 The terrain provided such a series of natural obstacles that a two- or three-man team could defeat a platoon, a platoon might defeat a company, and a company could slay a battalion. The Allies had over 1 million photographs of the Normandy area and hundreds of intel- ligence reports, including one from April 1944 by Bradley’s First Army that warned that fighting there “be given considerable study.” As Bradley later stated, “I couldn’t imagine the bocage until I saw it.” It was “the damnedest country I’ve ever seen.”44 Equipment and armored vehicles, some damaged, stretch across sands in Normandy where Allies seized beachhead, June 6, 1944 (Courtesy AP Photo) One battalion commander was more suc- cinct, noting later that “we were rehearsed Liberator pilots forced to bomb using one of the Army’s experts in amphibious endlessly to attack the beaches, but not radar and flying perpendicular to Omaha warfare, Major General Charles Corlett, one day was given to the terrain behind feared hitting the approaching landing from the Pacific. Despite a wealth of the beaches.”45 This failure to recognize craft. As a result, the lead pilots held their advice, Bradley and Eisenhower displayed and react to the potential difficulties posed fire for an additional 5 to 20 seconds no interest in learning from Corlett, view- by the bocage country cost the U.S. Army and 450 bombers ended up dropping ing efforts in the Pacific as “bush league.” dearly as divisions were bled white fight- their 13,000 bombs harmlessly on crops Corlett warned Bradley that he did not ing south to the St. Lô-Périers Road, the and livestock miles behind the German have enough naval gunfire to support the jumping off point for the “breakout” on defenders. At sea, 6,000 meters (more landings properly or enough ammunition July 25. than 3 miles) off Omaha, Army lieuten- for the upcoming land battles, both of On D-Day, U.S. forces suffered ap- ants and Navy and Coast Guard ensigns which were ultimately proven correct. proximately 12,000 casualties, including discussed the sea state with its 4-foot Moreover, despite Montgomery’s en- 8,230 Americans. From D-Day until July chop. Some considered it too dangerous couragement, Bradley dismissed the value 31, Bradley’s First Army took 100,000 to launch their Duplex Drive swimming of flail and other types of tanks offered by casualties, including 9,939 in the 29th tanks and artillery-carrying DUKWs the British—only to wish later that he had Infantry Division and 7,876 in the 4th that far out. Others debated and made them at Omaha.42 Infantry Division, both of which fought the fateful decision to launch anyway. In At the operational level, intelligence through the bocage. Eighty-five percent one case, 27 of 32 Duplex Drive tanks failures influenced events on D-Day and of the casualties were infantrymen.46 and most of the artillery foundered and beyond. First, Allied intelligence com- Finally, perhaps the greatest fail- sunk. A number of Soldiers drowned and pletely missed or “lost” the location of ure in planning and leadership was the Americans lost a great deal of the the 352nd Infantry Division, a first-rate Montgomery’s inability to take Caen, firepower they needed to suppress the 35 unit initially thought to be near St. Lô, his D-Day objective for the 3rd British German pillboxes, 8 huge bunkers, and but which the Germans moved forward Infantry Division at Sword Beach. 85 machine gun nests guarding Omaha in May. On D-Day, it stretched from Montgomery and his army, corps, and Beach.41 the Vire River to Arromanches, with at division commanders failed to plan Exacerbating these tactical errors were least two infantry battalions and a light backward from their objective. They organizational decisions made by First artillery battalion bolstering the defense did not factor in likely confusion on the U.S. Army Commander General Bradley of elements of the second-rate static beach, consider the likely exhaustion and that limited the amount of naval gunfire 716th Infantry Division at Omaha Beach. culmination of their initial and follow-on support or specialized armored vehicles Second, the Americans utterly misunder- forces, anticipate German counterattacks available to the troops on Omaha. In the stood the nature of the bocage country by elements of the 21st Panzer Division, spring, Army Chief Marshall sent Bradley that filled the Normandy region south and provide for additional forces to 66 JPME Today / Why Normandy Still Matters JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 pass through and take Caen. While the succeeded in part because of America’s forefathers did at Bataan, Kasserine Pass, Germans certainly had a role to play with overwhelming ability to build and deploy or Anzio) and recover? Or are we too their staunch defense at the Hillman a vast array of ships, landing craft, air- fragile—too unprepared intellectually, too strongpoint and along Périers Ridge, craft, tanks, and artillery; in part because thin in necessary force structure, or too it is clear that the 3rd British Infantry of the individual and collective courage technologically dependent—to win the Division faced too many tasks and suf- of the Allied servicemembers who fought battles, campaigns, and wars we portend fered too many diversions that frittered it on the ground, on the sea, and in the with Great Power competition? away its combat power.47 In essence, air; and in part because the operational Finally, do we have the requisite Montgomery, Lieutenant General Miles design and combined planning for the mental and command flexibility, or- Dempsey, Lieutenant General John invasion synchronized all aspects of ganizational diversity, and depth to Crocker, and Major General T.G. Rennie Allied capability sufficiently enough to recover from an adversary’s first bloody ignored the timing and tempo of opera- provide the slimmest of margins when it surprise moves and fight back to tactical, tions, did not mitigate known risks, and mattered most. operational, and strategic positions of failed to arrange their forces such that dominance? Do we have, as the Capstone they would have the staying power neces- An Invitation to Improve Concept for Joint Operations 2030 sary to seize their admittedly ambitious More than answers, Operation Overlord asks, the “strength, agility, endurance, objective in the face of likely opposi- invites us to ask questions of ourselves resilience, flexibility, and awareness” to tion.48 Despite relentless Allied air and and our ability to operate jointly. Spe- recover and adapt? Today, are we in a résistant attacks, the Germans managed cifically, could we do it again? Not in joint “Boxer’s stance” ready to react, to reinforce the area with Panzer forces. size, but in effect? Could the United punch, and counterpunch, just as the In some of the largest tank battles of the States or NATO repeat an operation as men in Normandy did 75 years ago? Will war, Montgomery and Dempsey would complex as Overlord? Are our generals we be a “globally integrated, partnered spend the next 45 days attempting to and admirals, colonels and captains, joint force that is designed and able to envelop Caen and capture the key opera- and perhaps most important, the iron out-think, out-maneuver, and out-fight tional terrain on Hill 112 that opened the majors and commanders who sweat out any adversary under conditions of disrup- path to Paris and beyond.49 Meanwhile, the critical details, educated and savvy tive change”?51 Or will we be like the the Americans, due to their own failures enough to conceptualize, organize, French in 1940, who had none of those to anticipate and prepare for fighting in and synchronize an integrated joint/ qualities and subsequently lost so over- the bocage, would slog forward, grind- combined operation of Overlord-like whelmingly that their first battle became ing through divisions and wearing down complexity against a peer competitor? their last? Germans forces until their own breakout Beyond our ability to conceive, plan, in Operation Cobra on July 25. and synchronize such a complex event, In 1946, General Eisenhower and The study of Operation Overlord the legacy of Operation Overlord invites Chief of Naval Operations Admiral teaches today’s commanders and planners us to consider if we are ready in unit Chester Nimitz established the Armed that designing an all-domain operational manpower, equipment, and training Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia, approach that keeps the enemy off bal- readiness to execute combined operations to capture and teach the joint lessons of ance and synchronizes the integrated of similar sophistication against Russia, World War II—lessons that the Army joint and combined actions of thousands China, or Iran as described in recent dis- and Navy (as well as the Air Force and of aircraft and ships and hundreds of cussions of globally integrated operations. Marines) learned the hard way in the thousands of men under the watchful Is the Navy seaworthy? Can the Air Force Pacific, North Africa, and Normandy, eyes of the enemy is excruciatingly hard get more than 60 percent of its aircraft and sadly have relearned in numerous to do, let alone do well. It requires an airborne at any one time? Are the Army campaigns since then. Eisenhower later uncommon level of operational under- and Marine Corps robust enough to field commented that “separate ground, sea standing and joint knowledge. Overlord full-up brigades and divisions without and air warfare is gone forever. If ever also warns us to expect that our adversar- cutting late deploying units to the bone? again we should be involved in war, we ies may be both lucky and good, and as Are we practiced enough in our Service- will fight it in all elements, with all ser- well-equipped and trained as we are. It based skills that we can even attempt to vices, as one single concentrated effort.”52 cautions those conditioned by decades of integrate jointly? In the current era of Great Power com- all-domain dominance against less than For the joint force, this calls into petition that demands coherent policy first-tier opponents to expect that even question whether we can integrate seam- and strategy and excellence in all-domain the best plans will go awry and, unlike the lessly above Service level, on the fly, integrated operations, we can ill-afford to Americans in the bocage, we should plan at night, under radio silence, without relearn the hard lessons that Eisenhower and train for that eventuality as well. GPS, just as the forces did in approach- and Allied forces learned so expensively In the end, success in Operation ing Normandy. Are we resilient enough during Operation Overlord 75 years ago. Overlord was “a close run thing.”50 It to take a punch on the chin (like our We must not only continue to teach the JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Greenwald 67 joint lessons of World War II and other Murray and Millett, A War to be Won, 420; (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2019), avail- Craig L. Symonds, Neptune: Allied Invasion able at 68 JPME Today / Why Normandy Still Matters JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 28 Minutes, 81st Meeting of the Joint Chiefs twin bridges at Bénouville and Ranville is Ste- up the infantry. The 9th Armored Brigade was of Staff, May 14, 1943, cited in Maurice Mat- phen E. Ambrose, Pegasus Bridge: June 6, 1944 held in reserve, but when landed was directed loff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988). by Lieutenant General George Allen Crocker, 1943–1944, U.S. Army Center of Military His- 39 Brown, Bodyguard of Lies, 665–666. the corps commander, to support the airborne tory Pub 1-4 (Washington, DC: Government 40 The Das Reich Division was particularly forces in the vicinity of Pegasus Bridge. See Printing Office, 1959), 131. ruthless in dealing with French citizens and D’Este, Decision in Normandy, 120–150. 29 Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for partisans. For more on the Das Reich Division 48 Ever since the failure to seize Caen on Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942 (Washington, and the French Resistance, see Beevor, D-Day, D-Day, Montgomery, some of his subordinates, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 165–167; and Max Hastings, Das Reich: The and some military historians have argued that 1980), 156, available at JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Greenwald 69 Aviation ordnanceman applies final wiring to GBU-24 laser-guided bomb attached to F-14 “Tomcat” fighter aircraft on board USS Theodore Roosevelt during Allied Force, Adriatic Sea, May 4, 1999 (U.S. Navy/Dennis Taylor) Attacking Fielded Forces An Airman’s Perspective from Kosovo By Phil Haun he Dayton Peace Accords in 1996 failed at Rambouillet, France, in Feb- Airmen and intelligence officers from settled the Bosnian civil war but ruary 1999, however, and frustrated the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, Navy, left unresolved the ethnic conflict U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Orga- and Air Force, alongside those from T 1 in Kosovo, the semi-autonomous region nization (NATO) leaders ultimately other NATO nations. The air tasking in southern Serbia. By 1998, clashes authorized three nights of restricted included strikes against leadership, between Serbian police and ethnic airstrikes to bring the Serbs back to economic, and infrastructure targets in Kosovar Albanians produced a humani- the negotiating table. Serbia responded Serbia and military forces in Kosovo. tarian crisis only temporarily resolved instead by launching an ethnic cleans- Ultimately, the strikes against fielded by a U.S.-brokered peace agreement ing campaign that displaced hundreds forces failed to convince Serbian presi- that quickly unraveled over the winter. of thousands of Kosovar Albanians. As dent Slobodan Milosevic to withdraw Reinvigorated efforts at a peace deal a result, the air-only campaign, Opera- his forces. Rather, his desire to remain tion Allied Force (OAF), extended for in power and the threat posed by a 78 days. A truly joint and multina- continuation of airstrikes, which held Dr. Phil Haun is the Dean of Academics at the U.S. tional coalition effort, OAF involved hostage Serbia’s stagnated economy, Naval War College. hundreds of aircraft and thousands of along with diplomatic pressure by 70 Commentary / Attacking Fielded Forces JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 the Russians, compelled Milosevic to troops appropriating civilian vehicles, that have and will continue to challenge concede Kosovo.2 which were off limits to airstrikes due air forces in prosecuting attacks. The Controversy over the effectiveness of to NATO rules of engagement (ROEs), lack of friendly ground forces to provide NATO air attacks against Serbian fielded and driving them from village to village target identification and to prevent the forces was fueled in the final days of the to conduct ethnic cleansing. As the war Serbs from dispersing their forces would war when U.S. military leaders claimed progressed, I further observed the prolif- later lead to innovations by embedding that half of the 300 Serbian tanks de- eration of decoys designed to absorb the joint tactical air controllers alongside ployed to Kosovo had been destroyed.3 attention and bombs of NATO airmen. indigenous friendly ground forces in General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Right after the war, with the BDA Afghanistan and Libya. Challenges with Commander Europe, soon scaled back controversy mounting, the U.S. untimely intelligence, surveillance, and the battle damage assessment (BDA) to Munitions Effectiveness Assessment reconnaissance (ISR) to conduct strikes 110 tanks as NATO officials observed Team was dispatched to Spangdahlem on mobile targets would further spur in- Serbian forces withdrawing with their Air Base, Germany, in preparation for its vestment in the near real-time intelligence armor in tow.4 In response, Clark ordered deployment to Kosovo. There I provided provided by Predator and other remotely a reassessment that, when released in the team with a detailed description of piloted aircraft. Similarly, onboard sensors September 1999, further reduced the the tanks, armored personnel carriers on tactical aircraft proved inadequate for count to 93 tanks hit, of which 26 were (APCs), and artillery pieces I had at- inflight target identification, which led to catastrophic losses and 67 were severely tacked. Later, in September 1999, I was the development and widespread deploy- damaged.5 summoned to Brussels to be among a ment of advanced targeting pods to most Yet the revision came too late. At the handful of NATO pilots to stand along- U.S. tactical aircraft. The lack of adequate time, and to this day, it remains widely side General Clark when he released doctrine and training for conducting believed that the actual number killed an updated BDA based on the team’s direct strikes without coordination was closer to the 13 tanks declared by the findings.8 with friendly ground forces also limited commander of the Serbian forces shortly Eleven years later, while conducting airpower’s effectiveness against fielded after the withdrawal.6 The final narrative research, I had the opportunity to travel forces, a shortcoming that unfortunately from Kosovo depicted NATO airmen as to Kosovo where, aided by a Kosovar has yet to be adequately resolved. incapable of identifying enemy ground Albanian driver and translator, I visited Instead of simply critiquing air- forces as the Serbs hid and camouflaged six of my strike sites.9 The number of sites power’s shortcomings in attacking their military vehicles, tricking pilots into was limited due to time constraints and fielded forces, this article draws on the attacking decoys and then making spuri- safety concerns. Given these restrictions, author’s experience in Kosovo to extract ous claims.7 Lost in this controversy was several targets were selected near major 11 generalizable lessons as to the chal- an understanding that the effectiveness roads and where target areas could be lenges and requirements that remain for of air operations against fielded forces identified utilizing imagery available from executing and assessing effective airstrikes should be measured not by the number Google Earth. At all target locations, against fielded forces. To do so, two of of tanks destroyed, but rather by the local Kosovar Albanians were found who my airstrikes—one successful and one degree to which airpower denied ground claimed to either have witnessed or have unsuccessful—are analyzed. These are forces the ability to execute their pre- knowledge of the strikes. In eyewitness first described based on the notes and ferred strategy and achieve their desired accounts, individuals recounted their mission reports I made immediately military and political objectives. memories of the target, attack, and battle after the attacks in April and May 1999. In May 2010, a decade after the damage. These accounts were then com- Each strike is then reexamined from the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia during pared to my submitted mission reports. ground perspective on the basis of inter- the Kosovo War, I had the opportunity to Overall, on airstrikes where I could visu- views conducted in Kosovo in May 2010. travel to Kosovo to investigate the accu- ally identify targets, what was reported As with the majority of the A-10 strikes racy of my mission reports. From March from the air was corroborated by wit- during the war, both of the air attacks 31 to June 7, 1999, I flew 28 combat nesses on the ground. Unfortunately, this examined were conducted against Serbian missions in Kosovo where I conducted was not the case for the one strike where military vehicles from medium altitude, 73 airstrikes as an A-10 airborne forward I had inferred target identification from during daylight, and under visual flight air controller (AFAC). I experienced first- other visual cues. conditions. hand the challenge of locating Serbian This article does not dispute the The evidence is admittedly anecdotal armor, particularly as the conflict ex- general claim of the ineffectiveness of and biased. Due to unexploded ordnance tended and as the Serbs adapted to U.S. NATO airstrikes against Serbian fielded concerns, it proved impossible to examine tactics. Flying above 10,000 feet above forces in Kosovo.10 A variety of factors strike sites away from major roads in the ground level to avoid Serbian antiaircraft made the systematic execution of such areas where the Serbs had deployed many artillery and infrared-guided shoulder- attacks problematic. Poor weather and of their decoys. In addition, the A-10 launched missiles, I observed Serbian rugged terrain are environmental factors was designed, and its pilots specifically JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Haun 71 trained, for attacking ground forces. If a small convoy with one large and When asked about the attack, Shkelza any combat aviator should have been able two small armored vehicles approach- stated he had witnessed the strike from to identify valid ground targets, it was an ing a T-intersection in a little village. a field 3 kilometers to the southeast. A-10 pilot. At the time, I was a highly ex- Extending to the north, I selected an He pointed up and to the north and re- perienced weapons instructor with 2,000 infrared-guided air-to-surface Maverick counted how an A-10 had shot a missile hours flying the A-10 in close air support missile and rolled in and locked up at the self-propelled artillery piece just and AFAC missions. Even so, experience what I identified in the cockpit video as the vehicle was pulling out to follow goes only so far, and there were clear to be a self-propelled artillery piece, a the APCs. The large vehicle had been limits as to what could be observed from Russian 2S1 Gvozdika. Upon receiving hit as it passed the back of the building, the air. Furthermore, target coordinates indication of a valid lock, I launched the and secondary explosions had caused the were imprecise as the A-10 did not yet missile, then pulled up and rolled over damage to the walls of the houses we had have global positioning systems (GPS), to observe the weapon’s impact. Once just observed. and pilots relied instead on plotting tar- the rocket motor burned out, I lost Ruzhdi added that 16 Serbs, includ- gets in the cockpit from a stack of dated sight of the missile and waited. Finally, ing an infantry platoon catching a ride 1:50,000-scale maps designed for the the 2S1 burst into flames just before it on top of the 2S1, had been instantly Army. Moreover, the electro-optic (TV) reached the T-intersection. Sparks flew, killed in the strike. A further 55 Serbs had and infrared LITENING targeting pods and black smoke billowed, indicating a been either killed or wounded from the I would later employ in Afghanistan were secondary explosion. My wingman then secondary explosion.12 The two brothers not yet available. Instead, A-10 pilots attacked one of the APCs, and before showed us the upper room, which had relied on visual searches, augmented by departing, I observed and strafed several since been renovated, where they main- commercially available 20-power, image- tanks just north of the village. Debrief tained soldiers had been eating at the stabilized binoculars. video review of the Maverick seeker time of the attack. In addition, Ruzhdi While these two airstrikes may not confirmed the target likely to be self- claimed that over the ridge a few kilo- be representative of the overall experi- propelled artillery. meters to the north, the A-10s had also ence of NATO airmen in Kosovo, when May 18, 2010: From the Ground. My destroyed a tank, an armored vehicle, and combined the strikes do provide a useful driver and interpreter, Zeka, drove west three heavy trucks. point of departure to consider the key at- out of Pristina while I acted as naviga- When asked what happened to the tributes of effective air operations against tor with a handheld GPS, an old flying damaged vehicles, Ruzhdi stated that the fielded forces. map, and an aerial photo I had previously self-propelled artillery piece had burned printed from Google Earth. We located to the ground, leaving nothing to re- A Successful Mission: the village and the T-intersection where move. The other vehicles had either been The Convoy I had plotted the strike. We parked in towed away by the Serbs or by KFOR, April 8, 1999: From the Air. My first front of a nearby house, and two men in the NATO-led Kosovo Force, after the AFAC mission over Kosovo was on their mid-thirties approached us as we war. Before I left, Ruzhdi thanked me March 30, but due to cloud cover, got out of the car. Zeka explained why we and related that after the strike that day, a condition typical of the Balkans in were there, and Ruzhdi and his brother the Serbian forces had departed and early spring, I could not conduct any Shkelza introduced themselves and the villagers were able to return to their airstrikes until April 8. I was the flight motioned that we follow. As we walked, homes. lead for a two-ship of A-10s assigned for the men identified themselves as former Assessment of the Convoy. The April AFAC duty. In the first of two assigned Kosovo Liberation Army fighters who 8 airstrike was the only time in the war vulnerability periods, I controlled had been forced from their homes dur- when I attacked a moving vehicle. The strikes on several military trucks parked ing the war, along with 8,100 Kosovar Serbian forces adjusted to having NATO in a compound in southwest Kosovo. Albanians who had taken to the nearby aircraft overhead by operating at night During aerial refueling between vulner- forests while 2,000 Serbian troops had or under cloud cover or by driving civil- ability periods, I received a report from encamped in their village.11 ian vehicles. It was also the only time I the Joint Surveillance Target Attack We walked down a narrow lane where received real-time target description and Radar System of a 50-vehicle convoy shrapnel had left pockmarks in the walls coordinates from a Predator. In this case, moving 8 miles west of Pristina. Upon of several houses. We entered a large yard the eyewitness account from the ground returning to western Kosovo, I identi- with a farmhouse and a raised building matched what I had observed from the fied the convoy as a column of refugees. with three parking spots underneath. air, except for the additional information The radar system then relayed that a Ruzhdi described how Serbian forces had of the battle damage sustained from the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle had quartered in the yard, using an upper secondary explosions. The only reason- spotted two APCs and a tank moving room in the building for meals and stor- able explanation for such a large blast east near my position. Rolling the jet ing their two APCs and a tracked artillery would have been the detonation of artil- over, I visually identified beneath me piece beneath. lery rounds the 2S1 stores internally. 72 Commentary / Attacking Fielded Forces JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Sailors review manual tracking procedures of target using plot board in Combat Direction Center at sea aboard USS Theodore Roosevelt in support of Allied Force, Adriatic Sea, June 3, 1999 (U.S. Navy/William L. Vandermate) This attack highlights several lessons abandoning their tanks and APCs, and antiaircraft activity, I thought, “There on the employment of airpower against by picking up their AK-47s and driving goes the bravest pilot I’ve ever seen.” fielded forces. First is a general reminder in confiscated Kosovar automobiles. The Its relatively low cost and ability to that when tactics prove successful, the Serbian army was never forced to choose operate without aircrew in the cockpit enemy will quickly adapt. Rarely in between concentrating against enemy allowed the Predator to assume much Kosovo did the same tactics work for ground forces and dispersing to avoid air greater risk.15 Unfortunately, due to the more than a few days. The enemy will attacks.13 high demand for Predator video, higher address exposed vulnerabilities and adopt Third, persistent ISR is critical for authority tasking, such as monitoring countermeasures as quickly as possible. targeting fielded forces, and the Predator refugees, frequently superseded the tar- Interaction with the enemy is dynamic, set the standard for ISR in Kosovo.14 Its geting of fielded forces. The Predator was and tactics and doctrine must be flexible image-stabilized, magnified video camera valuable but rarely available, and at the to evolve quickly in the battlespace where provided an unmatched capability to time it had not been fully integrated into Darwin rules. locate and identify Serbian forces, and tactical air operations.16 Second, when faced with the threat its feed to the Combined Air Operations Fourth, as to BDA, after the war the of credible airstrikes, ground forces Center at Vicenza, Italy, sped up the tank count became the most important disperse and hide. While such a response target approval process. The Predator metric for measuring airpower effective- increases their survivability, such tactics flew lower, slower, and loitered longer ness against the Serbian fielded forces. may leave ground forces vulnerable to over targets than any manned aircraft. As This measure, however, proved prob- ground attack. In the case of Kosovo, a result, it could visually identify targets lematic. Theoretically, a highly effective however, Serbian forces did not face the where other ISR sensors could not. air campaign against armor should have credible threat of NATO ground troops. On one occasion, when I witnessed a caused the Serbs to hide their tanks, As a result, the Serbian army could Predator flying well below me, straight which is in fact what occurred. The continue conducting ethnic cleansing by and level through a heavy volley of enemy’s expectation of lethal airstrikes JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Haun 73 Two U.S. Air Force A-10A Warthogs, from 52nd Fighter Wing, 81st Fighter Squadron, Spangdhalem Air Base, Germany, in flight during NATO Operation Allied Force combat mission, April 22, 1999 (U.S. Air Force/Greg L. Davis) should deter them from risking their it did not stop Serbian ethnic cleansing and secondary explosions.18 Without forces whenever it is not absolutely operations, nor did the threat to fielded the onboard sensors or confirmation necessary. It is therefore impossible to forces convince Serbia to withdraw from a ground-based joint tactical air determine by the number of vehicles from Kosovo.17 Without the threat of controller capable of conducting precise destroyed whether airstrikes were effec- a ground invasion, Serbs were free to post-strike BDA, a mission report was at tive. A low tank kill rate might indicate conduct operations without risking their best an informed guess.19 After the war, that the ground forces were deterred tanks, APCs, or artillery. The attrition the absence of destroyed heavy weaponry from using their armor, while a high rate of enemy armor, just like the body at strike locations was taken as evidence tank kill rate might indicate that ground counts from Vietnam, is an inadequate that pilot claims were exaggerated. As forces were more highly resolved to measure of combat effectiveness. It is far evidenced by the attack on the convoy, achieve their objective and undeterred by more informative to ascertain whether some damaged APCs, tanks, and trucks airstrikes. military and political objectives are being had been removed. It should not come To be clear, this article is not claim- achieved. as a surprise that the Serbs removed dam- ing that NATO airstrikes were effective Fifth, an additional challenge to aged equipment from the battlefield, against Serbian fielded forces in Kosovo conducting BDA is in validating strikes. I as this is common army practice. There but that the tank count was not an ad- reported most of my strikes as hits rather was ample opportunity to remove the equate measure. Airpower was ultimately than kills, as I was reluctant to call a strike equipment attacked early in the war. ineffective against fielded forces because a kill unless I had observed a direct hit From an assessment of all the strikes I 74 Commentary / Attacking Fielded Forces JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 conducted throughout the war, only the along the border. I radioed a descrip- hit. They ran into the woods and watched vehicles and artillery attacked in the final tion of the building, the berms, and as the barn burned with everything days were abandoned by the Serbs.20 the accompanying muddy tracks before inside destroyed. Fortunately, the house Unfortunately, KFOR did not conduct departing for the tanker. While aerial had been spared. As she spoke, Sherife adequate BDA forensics on the destroyed refueling, I received permission from reappeared with Habib, who insisted on and abandoned vehicles hauled away. It the CAOC to attack the building. I then greeting me. Though unable to speak, is critical in future conflicts that BDA coordinated for strike aircraft. Habib sat next to me and held my hand teams are prepared to gather data during Returning to the area, two Turkish as his wife continued the story. the conflict from intelligence reports and F-16s checked in. I talked them onto my The family held no grudge against then accompany ground forces into the position and when they called visual, I the destruction of their property as combat zone to conduct the appropriate rolled in and marked the barn with two NATO had been fighting the Serbs for forensics as soon as possible. 500-pound bombs, one of which was a Kosovo’s freedom. Instead, every year This last lesson regarding BDA may direct hit. Climbing off target, my wing- the family celebrates May 12 as the day now have been at least partially resolved man called “break” and as I jinked, I NATO bombed their farm. For many by the development of more sophisticated could see the distinctive tiny red muzzle years, the U.S. Army commanding officer sensors on tactical aircraft. In Afghanistan flashes of small-arms fire and the white- from nearby Camp Bondsteel visited the in 2004, I flew A-10s modified to carry gray airbursts from antiaircraft activity as house on the anniversary of the strike the LITENING II targeting pod, which it popped off below my jet. The F-16s out of respect for the family. She pulled included enhanced electro-optics and in- followed my attack, dropping their ord- out a certificate presented on one such frared imaging. The optics on this sensor nance, after which I noted the barn on occasion. When asked about the yellow- were so refined that, even from medium fire with an accompanying pale yellowish- ish-green smoke, she just shrugged. altitude, I could often distinguish an indi- green smoke. Assessment of the Barn. For over a vidual walking along a trail as being either May 17, 2010. Eleven years later, the decade, I believed the barn to be a suc- a woman or a man just by their gait. “barn” was the last stop on the first day cessful attack. I was surprised to find that Continued improvements in sensors will visiting strike sites. As the car turned into instead of destroying Serbian armor, I allow for more opportunities to validate the driveway of an older two-story farm- had caused collateral damage and endan- BDA by strike aircraft. house, I noticed the house was attached gered the lives of two civilians. From this to a long single-story building with a new unfortunate strike, five additional lessons The Unsuccessful red roof. A man greeted us, introducing can be distilled. Mission: The Barn himself as Sherife, the son of the owner Sixth, there is no substitute for direct May 12, 1999. On May 11, a Predator of the farm, Habib. Sherife explained that target identification. In this case, I had had spotted 20 Serbian military vehicles during the war, Serbian forces had been relied on indirect visual indications. The as they were being moved into a large deployed in their village. When asked fact that the Serbs had been observed L-shaped building. A two-ship of A-10s about the airstrike on May 12, 1999, he hiding their vehicles in similar build- from my squadron had subsequently confirmed the earthen berms to have ings had motivated the search, request, strafed the building and reported been military and the tracks were made and approval for the strike. In addition, secondary explosions accompanied by by Serbian tanks kept in the barn. The intelligence had indicated Serbian armor an unidentified pale yellowish-green local Serbian troops, however, had left in the village, which is why I searched smoke. That evening I discussed the the farm the day prior to the attack. in that particular location. The earthen specifics of the attack with the pilots Sherife appeared happy to talk with berms further indicated military vehicles and made a mental note to look for us and invited us into the farmhouse were being used at the location, and similar buildings where there might to meet his mother. Habib was also in the muddy tracks leading to the barn also be armor. During the next day’s the house but we were told he was on indicated the Serbs were utilizing the intelligence briefing, I noted the villages his deathbed. Sherife’s mother insisted barn to hide their armor. None of these where Serbian tanks had recently been on making coffee while explaining how indications was wrong. As this strike reported. she had sent Sherife out of Kosovo the demonstrates, however, there is no While searching a small village in week before the strike, after he had been substitute for real-time, direct target southeast Kosovo, I identified a 200-foot- severely beaten by local Serbian troops. identification. The greater the reliance on long metal building, which I judged to She and Habib had remained behind to indirect measures for target identification, be a barn, near the village of Viti. Mud care for the farm and, once the Serbs had the more chance a strike goes wrong. tracks made by heavy equipment led from removed their tanks, the two had moved Seventh, realize that there are no a group of freshly dug, large earthen their tractor and car, along with 60 head fixed targets. Aircrew and intelligence berms to the barn. The empty berms of sheep into their barn for safekeeping. officers have long distinguished between resembled the revetments the Serbian She and Habib were in the house at- fixed and mobile targets. This is a mis- tanks used in prepared defensive positions tached to the barn when the first bomb take; although structures may not move JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Haun 75 pods.23 Furthermore, cloud cover through mid-April prevented medium altitude operations. The inability to vali- date targets without visual identification, coupled with concerns over collateral damage, precluded dropping bombs through clouds. Often ignored in general discussions on airpower effectiveness is the impact weather can have, a point largely overlooked in the recent air campaigns in the desert climates of Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria. Weather had, however, significantly restricted airpower operations over Germany, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and Bosnia, as it did in Kosovo, and should be taken into account as a primary consideration for employing airpower in future conflicts. Eleventh is the issue of decoys. The Serbs, like many armies, deployed decoys th Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Wesley Clark meets with members of 510 Fighter as part of their tactics. The use of decoys Squadron and 555th Fighter Squadron deployed to Aviano Air Base, Italy, on May 9, 1999, in support of did not make the Serbian army excep- Operation Allied Force (U.S. Air Force) tional, nor were NATO airmen necessarily in the three spatial dimensions, their Ninth, it was the threat from Serbian naive for striking them. At medium function can change rapidly in the fourth air defenses, not ROEs, that restricted altitude, it is difficult to discern a decoy dimension of time. The timeliness of operations to above 10,000 feet above from a valid target. The method often intelligence for structures is as important ground level. Combat effectiveness employed was not to be overly concerned as it is for fielded forces. In this case, the depended on the ability to attack enemy about differentiating between the two, building transformed overnight from a forces, which required the time to be able but to strike any targets located. If the tar- Serbian armor vehicle storage facility to to locate and validate targets. The threat get disappeared when struck, it was likely a sheep barn. Those who continue to of Serbian air defenses, however, com- a decoy. The point is that when targets are distinguish between fixed versus mobile pelled operations to medium altitude. rare and weapons plentiful, it is preferable targets ignore the fact that targets can When operating at lower altitudes, I had to waste some bombs on decoys rather maneuver within both time and space.21 to maneuver constantly to avoid ground than allow valid targets to escape. At the Eighth, the validity of intelligence fire, which in turn prevented time spent end of the war, the fact that destroyed de- is based on its timeliness, origin, and searching for targets. As the war pro- coys were found or that derelict hulks in form. Intelligence reports older than 6 gressed, I circled higher and higher, well the open had been struck multiple times hours were unlikely to result in a suc- above the ROE hard deck, which allowed proved neither the brilliance of Serbian cessful airstrike. Intelligence was most more heads-down time to search for new tactics nor the naiveté of NATO airmen. effective when delivered quickly and in a targets and less time spent worried about It instead revealed the shortcomings of medium closest to how it was intended Serbian air defenses. The ROE reflected some analysts who reached broad conclu- to be employed. For daylight operations, the desire by senior air commanders to sions over the ineffectiveness of airpower this meant timely photos with sufficient limit exposure. In Kosovo, it was not based on the anecdotal evidence of these detail of the surrounding area for the ROE restrictions but the enemy threat individually ineffective airstrikes. pilot to be able to locate the target that limited combat effectiveness. This is not to say that decoys do not from the air. If a photograph was taken Tenth, air operations are dramati- provide challenges for air operations. the previous day, the vehicle may have cally affected by lighting and weather Given the increased reliance on a limited long since been moved or the function conditions more so than typically ac- number of relatively costly precision- of a building may have changed. While knowledged. Nighttime operations were guided weapons, along with lessons intelligence might be useful for building far less effective than daytime operations from the recent air campaign against the situational awareness, information with- as sensors were not capable of target so-called Islamic State, where weapons out accompanying recent photographs identification at night, a limitation the availability became an issue, the impact would not directly lead to a strike, and it F-16 AFACs encountered with their of decoys on the efficient utilization of still remained up to Airmen to locate and LANTIRN (low-altitude navigation and ordnance may be a concern in future identify valid targets.22 targeting infrared for night) targeting operations. 76 Commentary / Attacking Fielded Forces JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 The Kosovo War was a unique con- Serbian artillery positions. RAND, 2001), 97. 2 Phil Haun, Coercion, Survival, and 16 I also found this to be the case in combat flict fought two decades ago. It would War: Why Weak States Resist the United States operations in Afghanistan in 2004. Efforts to be easy to ignore its lessons as specific to (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2015), coordinate tactics between A-10s and Predators that war or nullified by new technologies 114–133; and Daniel Lake, “The Limits of Co- in theater were continuously disrupted by high- and doctrines or contradicted by lessons ercive Airpower: NATO’s ‘Victory’ in Kosovo er headquarters tasking. As a result, combined from other conflicts. That would be a Revisited,” International Security 34, no. 1 tactics, such as the Predator providing laser (Summer 2009), 83–112. designation for a laser-guided bomb dropped mistake. Airmen have now largely solved 3 Steven Myers, “Damage to Serb Military from an A-10, could not be exercised. This was the problem of how to place a weapon Less than Expected,” New York Times, June 28, particularly important since the first time such on a target, but challenges remain of first 1999. a combined tactic would have been employed being able to locate and identify targets 4 William Arkin, “Operation Allied Force: would have been for a high-value target. as valid and then being able to determine ‘The Most Precise Application of Air Power 17 Haun, Coercion, Survival, and War, in History,’” in War Over Kosovo: Politics and 125–131. the effect of strikes on the targets that Strategy in a Global Age, ed. Andrew Bacevich 18 This only occurred three times: the strike are attacked. This article has identified and Eliot Cohen (New York: Columbia Univer- just described, on an April 16 attack against a enduring challenges of attacking fielded sity Press, 2001), 25. T-72, and on a June 7 attack on a T-54. forces that will likely be present in the 5 James Diehl and Charles Sloan, “Battle 19 The problem with the Maverick was that next conflict and are therefore worthy of Damage Assessment: The Ground Truth,” video was severed once the missile departed Joint Force Quarterly 37 (2nd Quarter 2005), the aircraft. The problem with targeting pods is consideration now. 59–64. that the video is taken at aircraft altitude. There In combat, the enemy will continue 6 Rebecca Grant, “True Blue: Behind the are some weapons, such as the GBU-15, that to adapt, and the joint force must be Kosovo Numbers Game,” Air Force Magazine transmit weapons video to the cockpit up until prepared for this eventuality with the (August 2000), 74–78. weapons impact. organizations and doctrine to respond 7 Richard Norton-Taylor, “How the Serb 20 I was able to validate battle damage for Army Escaped NATO,” The Guardian, March strikes on June 7 from photographs taken by quickly to the inevitable changes required 8, 2000. NATO helicopters. to succeed. Target identification will 8 General Wesley K. Clark and Brigadier 21 A more infamous example was the attack continue to be the major challenge for General John Corley, press conference on the on the Al Firdos bunker outside Baghdad on attacking fielded forces, which requires Kosovo Strike Assessment, North Atlantic February 13, 1991, which at night served as an continual investment in real-time ISR Treaty Organization (NATO) Headquarters, air raid shelter. September 20, 1999, available at JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Haun 77 Marine with 3rd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, scales wall during counter- IED training at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California, July 25, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Colton Brownlee) Countering Threat Networks to Deter, Compete, and Win Competition Below Armed Conflict with Revisionist Powers By Vayl S. Oxford he current geopolitical envi- Soviet Union, and since its collapse, and conventional forces.1 The 2018 ronment is the most complex, the United States has battled an assort- National Defense Strategy directs the T dynamic, and dangerous the ment of rogue regimes and violent Department of Defense (DOD) to United States has ever faced. During extremist organizations (VEOs). While focus on “long-term, strategic com- the Cold War, the Nation squared rogue regimes and VEOs remain a petition” with these two “revisionist off against a superpower rival in the threat to U.S. and allies’ security, the powers,” whose regional and global United States must also contend with ambitions are at odds with those of the the threat posed by not one but two United States and its allies, while also Vayl S. Oxford is Director of the Defense Threat major state competitors, China and continuing to keep rogue regimes and Reduction Agency. Russia, each fielding significant nuclear VEOs at bay.2 78 Commentary / Countering Threat Networks to Deter, Compete, and Win JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 As a Department, we are well versed networks toolkit to reveal and stymie continuum as part of a broader, ongoing in deterring state adversaries from ini- revisionist power activities across the campaign to undermine U.S.-led alliances tiating major armed conflicts against conflict continuum is an important com- and regional security arrangements, erode ourselves or our allies by maintaining ponent of broader efforts to compete U.S. global power and leadership, and nuclear and conventional forces capable with Beijing and Moscow below the level challenge the rules-based international of imposing severe costs against overt, of armed conflict. order. These efforts include several direct military aggression by any state This article describes the competition components. actor. However, the scope of the threat continuum and illustrates some of the Covert, Deniable Hybrid Operations. posed by revisionist powers extends well actions of Russia and China within this Russia used military forces operating beyond these types of hostilities. While space, identifies tools and approaches without clearly identifiable national mili- the United States must continue to seek first developed to counter nonstate threat tary markings as part of its illegal seizure cooperation with Russia and China in networks that can be adapted to counter and annexation of Crimea, deploying areas where our interests align, we must revisionist powers and their global threat these forces across Ukraine’s borders also recognize those areas where Moscow networks across the competition contin- while denying its direct military involve- and Beijing seek to challenge U.S. mili- uum, and discusses the potential benefits ment.6 These “little green men” provide tary primacy and undermine the Nation and possible risks of the United States Russia a covert means to seize key targets and its allies. In such cases, the United pursuing these courses of action. or stir up internal dissent as a pretext for States must be prepared to counter a military intervention.7 Similarly, China broad range of malign activities carried Competition Continuum has deployed a supposed “fishing fleet” out below the threshold of state-on-state U.S. security is underpinned by a of ships in the Western Pacific that oper- armed conflict. These global threat net- robust, flexible nuclear deterrent and ates as a shadow maritime militia.8 These works can include leveraging rogue states, powerful conventional forces. These vessels often loiter near disputed areas, VEOs, and witting and unwitting actors capabilities deter potential adversaries harassing the maritime craft of other na- in the private sector. To counter the ef- from launching direct attacks against tions as part of China’s broader effort to forts of revisionist powers to exploit the the United States due to the certain and force other parties to drop their claims to competition continuum between war and severe costs Washington can impose in reefs, islands, and waters. In both cases, peace, we must recalibrate existing tools response. these forces allow Moscow and Beijing and approaches—including those initially Nuclear deterrence and conventional to pursue key national objectives while developed after 9/11 to counter VEOs— forces, however, cannot forestall all simultaneously denying responsibility. in order to regain the initiative in the forms of aggression. Moreover, the cur- Even if improbable, these denials can present era of Great Power competition. rent threat environment is described as complicate efforts to attribute their in- The Defense Threat Reduction a world of long-term competition that volvement and organize a response. Agency (DTRA), which I have the is exacted through a combination of Use of WMD for Assassination on honor to lead, is the DOD combat sup- cooperation, competition below armed Foreign Soil. With the attempted assas- port agency responsible for enabling conflict, and armed conflict.4 While state sination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury, the Defense Department, the U.S. adversaries seek to avoid direct armed United Kingdom, in March 2018,9 Government, and our international conflict with the United States, revision- Russia demonstrated its willingness to use partners to counter and deter transre- ist powers have shrewdly calculated the advanced chemical weapons on the soil gional and multidomain weapons of mass thresholds below which they can operate of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization destruction (WMD) and improvised to further their own interests—often at (NATO) member.10 In conducting the threat networks.3 In this capacity, DTRA the expense of the United States or its attack, Moscow violated the Chemical plays a key role in ongoing U.S. efforts allies—without triggering an automatic Weapons Convention, showed contempt to illuminate and dismantle VEO threat U.S. military response. General Joseph for international norms, and demon- networks. As DOD refocuses on the Votel, former commander of U.S. Central strated that it is prepared to employ a long-term challenge posed by revisionist Command, described this “gray zone” sophisticated WMD with little consid- powers, I believe it is critically important between peace and armed conflict as a eration of collateral damage. Moreover, to consider applying the best practices space “characterized by intense political, in its efforts to hinder an international and lessons learned from combating economic, informational, and military investigation by the Organization for nonstate networks to similarly uncover competition more fervent in nature than the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and counter the covert and deniable normal steady-state diplomacy, yet short Moscow was joined by Beijing, which machinations of state actors and their of conventional war.”5 Russia and China often shares Russia’s general opposition global networks. These revisionist powers view the United States as the principal to greater international transparency or employ their own networks and exploit obstacle to realization of their regional accountability.11 the networks of other state and nonstate and global ambitions. Both revisionist Supporting Nonstate Proxies. Russia entities. Applying our countering threat powers operate across the competition has embraced the use of nonmilitary JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Oxford 79 actors, such as private security companies, have blocked efforts at the United back against, Russia and China across the to advance its interests. These merce- Nations (UN) to publicly report these competition continuum. naries (often former Russian military violations,15 reducing the effectiveness of personnel) remain involved in the ongo- UN sanctions against Pyongyang.16 Countering Threat Networks ing Ukrainian conflict and participated Challenging, Breaching, and The U.S. military developed its current in an ill-fated February 2018 attempt Infiltrating Sovereign Boundaries concept of threat networks in the years to attack a combined Kurdish and U.S. (Land, Sea, and Air). Despite frequently after 9/11 due to a recognition that force engaged in anti–Islamic State (IS) emphasizing the importance of sover- many of the insurgents and terrorists operations in Syria.12 Similar to little eignty to deflect criticism of internal encountered by U.S. and coalition green men, private military companies activities, Russia and China have increas- forces were not confined by borders or can operate below the threshold of state- ingly challenged sovereign boundaries rigid state or bureaucratic structures.18 on-state armed conflict while the Kremlin in the land, sea, and air domains. As These threat networks usually sought publicly denies involvement. noted, Russian little green men infiltrated to remain hidden from view, eschewing Enabling/Failing to Prevent Ukrainian territory, leading several NATO uniforms or other identifying character- Proliferation of Weapons and Sanctions members and partners that border Russia istics in order to blend in with civilian Enforcement. Russia and China have to step up efforts to secure their borders populations. Many had links or ties a decidedly mixed record regarding and monitor Russian military activity near with communities across state borders the proliferation of weapons or dual- their territories. Moscow and Beijing have that allowed them to recruit additional use items (goods or technologies that also engaged in the provocative behavior members and draw financial support can have civilian or military applica- of sending military aircraft and ships from multiple sources. In many cases, tions), including items associated with on patrols or excursions that are viola- they also cultivated transnational supply WMD or improvised threats. The State tions or near violations of U.S., allied, or chains, including legitimate businesses Department, for example, has reported partner airspace or waters. U.S., British, unaware of the intended end use of that China continues “to supply missile and Japanese aircraft, for example, have their products. programs of proliferation concern” and scrambled to intercept Russian bombers In response, the U.S. Armed Forces that Russia remains engaged in dual-use that have entered national airspace or air developed a methodology and strategy activities that raise questions regarding its defense identification zones; the Japanese for countering these nonstate threat compliance with the Biological Weapons government reported conducting nearly networks that combined aspects of mili- Convention.13 In addition, terrorists and 1,000 of these intercepts against Chinese tary engagement, security cooperation, insurgents building improvised explo- or Russian aircraft in the past year.17 In ad- and deterrence to apply steady pressure sive devices (IEDs) in Syria, Iraq, and dition, in the last 2 years, Japan, Vietnam, while disrupting their direct and indirect Afghanistan regularly procure items and the Philippines have charged China sources of support.19 from both countries, including fertilizer with violating their territorial waters, Threat Network Illumination. To purchased from Russian suppliers and using ships to engage in provocative, dan- target threat networks, the totality of the electronic components purchased from gerous behavior that has resulted in the network must be understood—includ- Chinese suppliers.14 collision and sinking of vessels (as well as ing the relationships that allow them to More broadly, Russia’s and China’s many near misses). operate. Numerous tools and skill sets enforcement of sanctions against bad It is clear from these examples that are levied against the network, coupled actors—including states illegally pursu- Beijing and Moscow are engaged in with specialized U.S. human capital and ing WMD and their delivery systems a broad range of activities below the partner nation governments and agencies. (or seeking to sell them)—is often threshold of state-on-state armed conflict When effectively collected and assessed, lax. This is sometimes due to a lack of to challenge the United States and its this information sheds light on a threat capacity to enforce sanctions; in other allies in a manner that they believe will network’s internal and external relation- cases, it reflects a deliberate decision to not result in a U.S. military response. In ships and reveals key nodes (such as their deprioritize enforcement or allow these order to meet this challenge, the United leadership and critical enablers). As David activities to continue. The United States, States can draw on the lessons learned Richard Doran notes, “Understanding for example, has provided Beijing with from countering nonstate threat net- how adversaries use threat networks photographic evidence of North Korean works in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around globally to compete with us below the ships illegally loading petroleum from the world. For all their important differ- threshold of traditional armed conflict is a vessels (registered to third nations) just ences, state and nonstate actors seeking critical first step to identifying opportuni- off China’s coastline, well within an area to do harm to the United States and its ties” to mitigate their effects. This detailed where Chinese naval or coast guard craft allies employ similar means, and several picture of a threat network informs actions should challenge and halt these types of of the tools honed during 18 years of to exploit, disrupt, or degrade the network transfers. Russia has also allowed similar battling terrorists and insurgents have and ultimately scatter or collapse the larger practices, and both Beijing and Moscow utility in shedding light on, and pushing interconnected structure.20 80 Commentary / Countering Threat Networks to Deter, Compete, and Win JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Ukrainian soldiers decontaminate vehicles as part of simulated chemical exposure event during field training exercise portion of Rapid Trident 2019, September 24, 2019, near Yavoriv, Ukraine (U.S. Army National Guard/Amanda H. Johnson) Teaming to Defeat Networks. In many by the United States and allied and part- Developing a Toolkit to cases, however, the illuminated threat net- ner governments, to include financial, Illuminate Threat Networks work reveals a complex entity with links customs, law enforcement, and military Beginning in 2003, U.S. forces began and nodes across multiple jurisdictions task force activities that starve VEOs of encountering IEDs on the roads and and borders. To disrupt and defeat such resources, prevent them from adding highways of Iraq and soon thereafter networks, we must build teams across recruits, uncover their weapons caches and in Afghanistan. These low-cost devices DOD, its U.S. Government partners, hideouts, and allow for the apprehension were soon inflicting injuries, causing and with foreign counterparts to bring and prosecution or elimination of their fatalities, and slowing operations by together the expertise, capabilities, and leadership. In many cases, DOD is in a U.S. forces deployed across both coun- authorities necessary to isolate and take supporting role to an interagency or in- tries.23 The U.S. Army responded to action against key network nodes. As ternational partner that has the placement this threat by forming a task force, the Admiral Kurt Tidd, former commander and authority to take the actions that Joint IED Defeat Organization, which of U.S. Southern Command, noted in maintain or achieve U.S. objectives.22 evolved over time to become a core March 2018, in order to combat nonstate DTRA and its U.S. Government and mission of DTRA. threat networks that can include “drug international partners have worked hard Early U.S. Government efforts to traffickers, human smugglers, terrorist to illuminate the activities of nonstate counter IEDs struggled to assess large supporters, arms dealers and money laun- threat networks and assemble combined volumes of information collected from derers,” it is vital for the U.S. Government teams to counter the multifaceted chal- multiple sources on insurgents, the to “integrat[e] our expertise and tools lenge posed by this type of adversary. This types of attacks carried out, and the with those of committed [foreign] part- experience, described in two case studies variations of explosive devices employed. ners to remain more adaptive and capable below, provides tools and templates that In addition to the challenge of sifting than adversaries who exploit or target our can prove valuable to countering malign through mountains of data, different citizens.”21 Dismantling a network may activities short of armed conflict by major stakeholders faced serious technical chal- require, for example, combined operations powers that employ similar methods. lenges when they attempted to share this JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Oxford 81 Marine dresses in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense gear for sensitive site exploitation training during exercise Eager Lion 2019 in Jordan, August 27, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Rhita Daniel) information with each other. In response, against a threat network’s key nodes. In organization or fall into the hands of U.S. Government teams developed the IED and improvised threat space, an enterprising smuggler. In addition, cutting-edge analytical tools to integrate DTRA’s flexible, evolving toolkit has pro- IS’s success in developing its own hundreds of data sets from previously vided timely and actionable assessments chemical weapons prompted fears it disparate platforms and partners. DTRA to effectively target key nodes associated might attempt to remove these weapons continues to work hand-in-glove with with VEO improvised threats in Iraq, from Syria to conduct attacks on U.S. its U.S. Government partners to en- Afghanistan, and Syria. allies or partners in the Middle East or able information-sharing and continue further abroad. integration of new data sets to further Building Regional Partnerships Based on these threats, the United improve the fidelity of analyses of VEO The devastation and chaos of the Syrian States, together with key allies such as strategies, tactics, and day-to-day op- civil war pose an ongoing threat to the United Kingdom, partnered with erations. These teams also pioneered regional security and stability, including Jordan and Lebanon to better protect processes bringing together regional and several U.S. partners and allies. In addi- their borders and prevent bad actors from functional subject matter experts directly tion to representing an acute humani- smuggling chemical weapons, precur- with programmers in order to tailor tarian crisis, this flow of people raises sor materials, or other WMD-related existing tools to meet unique require- a host of security concerns for nearby items into their countries. Meeting this ments. This nimble approach to metadata states, one of which is preventing objective required a comprehensive, analytics helps DOD keep pace with VEO fighters and weapons—including around-the-clock monitoring of borders threat networks that constantly adapt in chemical weapons or precursors—from that run along rough terrain, often in response to U.S., allied, and partner ac- leaving Syria. At various stages of the remote areas far from existing infra- tions against them. country’s civil conflict, the security of structure. Operationally, smugglers and All the tools described above improve Syrian government stocks of chemical IS fighters needed to be distinguished U.S. commanders’ situational awareness weapons was in doubt, raising the possi- from civilian refugees, while weapons, and ability to execute decisive actions bility they could be seized by a terrorist dual-use items, and other improvised 82 Commentary / Countering Threat Networks to Deter, Compete, and Win JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 threat materials needed to be detected to detect and interdict WMD and Uncovering the connections with and identified. The scope of the challenge related materials at their borders. This proxies can also provide U.S. decision- required developing innovative, purpose- WMD-focused assistance has broader makers with options to counter this type built “hardware and software” solutions second-order effects, improving these of activity. The Chinese or Russian gov- for each partner state that brought partner nations’ overall border security ernment entities involved with nonstate together best practices from multiple ac- and aiding their capabilities to apprehend proxies can be identified by a demarche tors, from local border guards to British VEO members and sympathizers and and/or targeted by sanctions. If the military trainers and U.S. information to identify and intercept conventional United States chooses to go public with technology engineers. weapons. Critically, these combined U.S., information on the extent of Russian or In Jordan, DTRA played a central allied, and partner teams provided the dy- Chinese state involvement, this could role in orchestrating and developing the namic collaboration required to counter have a chilling effect on the proxy’s Jordan Border Security Program, which threat networks in and around Syria as future ability to conduct its operations; to date has provided a layered defense well as trafficking networks in the South once the association is public, China across more than 400 kilometers of China Sea and nearby waters. As the or Russia may cease its support to the border.24 The program, which will soon National Defense Strategy emphasizes, now-exposed proxy, thus degrading its fully transition to the Jordanian govern- this bolsters U.S. partnerships in parts of malign activity. In other cases, this threat ment, has taken a holistic approach to the world where revisionist powers are illumination can uncover how these countering the threat of potential WMD eager to exert malign influence through states employ parastate actors for the proliferation through enhanced border regional partnerships at the expense of purposes of espionage or even kinetic ac- detection and response capabilities. U.S. objectives. tion abroad and in turn allow the United Physical barriers are provided where States and its allies response options such appropriate, while improved situational Application to Great as demarches or other types of disruptive awareness is supplied by a network of Power Competition actions against Beijing or Moscow. watch towers equipped with sensors, State and nonstate actors differ in many In addition, projects to secure land radars, and other surveillance technology. critical ways, including the scale and and maritime boundaries against illicit Information streams are connected to scope of resources available to pursue WMD smuggling networks provide U.S. battalion-, brigade-, and national-level their objectives. The methods utilized partners and allies with critical capabilities operations centers, where they can be to counter nonstate threat networks, to identify and interdict proliferation of combined with other data or assess- however, can provide a way ahead WMD-related materials, dual-use items, ments that allow Jordanian authorities for uncovering the covert networks and delivery systems tied to Russia or to quickly determine which resources employed by state actors across the China. Disrupting these networks can to deploy to mitigate a threat. In cir- competition continuum, including help prevent proliferation of these ma- cumstances where border personnel Chinese and/or Russian use of deniable terials to nonstate actors seeking WMD suspect the presence of a possible WMD assets, proxies, and covertly funded, capabilities. or chemical, biological, radiological, or supported, or enabled nonstate actors. These efforts to prevent proliferation nuclear material, the program has also China and Russia work to keep their of WMD and related materials across equipped and trained specialized mobile covert, hybrid activities cloaked or, at land borders also build broader partner units to quickly respond and conduct an the very least, screened by misinforma- nation border security capabilities that initial assessment of the potential WMD tion; if revealed, they assess their net- can be applied to U.S. and allied efforts threat. Tying all this technical equip- works will become fragile or ineffective to stymie certain Chinese and Russian ac- ment and know-how together is a set of or otherwise become a liability. tivities below the level of armed conflict. robust training programs for Jordanian The toolkit developed to illuminate Moscow has breached land boundaries border, law enforcement, military, techni- nonstate threat networks thus represents to move forces, seize strategic territory, cal, and disaster response personnel, as a potentially powerful means to push undermine institutions, and conduct well as an equipment repair facility to back against China and Russia across the covert attacks (including with WMD), ensure Jordanian officials can sustain the competition continuum. For example, while China repeatedly interferes with system’s operations. Similarly, DTRA has further exposing the web of Chinese and maritime boundaries in its efforts to bully partnered with Southeast Asian nations Russian complicity with North Korea’s its neighbors into accepting its control to improve the security of their maritime sanctions evasion (by identifying specific over the Western Pacific. DTRA’s efforts domains against WMD trafficking by ships involved, their links back to Chinese to help Jordan better detect and interdict nonstate actors, as well as trafficking by or Russian firms, and the exact location WMD and related materials at its borders rogue regimes such as North Korea and of illicit transfers) provides U.S. decision- and to help the Southeast Asian nations Iran. makers with expanded options to increase detect and interdict WMD trafficking in These projects have significantly en- pressure on them to fully enforce UN their maritime domains are also relevant hanced the capacity of key U.S. partners sanctions. to countering revisionist power efforts to JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Oxford 83 Bahrain Defense Force servicemember showcases protective chemical and biological protective suit to exercise participants of United Arab Emirates Union Defense Force, at Al Wathba, UAE training facility, as part of exercise Leading Edge, January 28, 2013 (U.S. Marine Corps/Leon M. Branchaud) infiltrate and interfere with the sovereign When engaging with nonstate threat Russia and China will require deepened space of U.S. allies and partners. networks in the past, the United States cooperation with current and new U.S. The United States has a range of op- could act without the risk of initiating a partners or allies. tions to counter Russia and China across strategic conflict that posed an existen- the competition continuum, including tial threat to the country. In the future, Conclusion tools and approaches honed during the United States will need to carefully Russia and China use a wide range of the battle against VEOs. Now that the consider whether to target a key node unconventional methods to achieve United States recognizes the challenge of a state network—such as a foreign their objectives of undermining inter- posed by Moscow and Beijing within this military intelligence official funneling national order and fracturing U.S.-led space, it is important that we adapt to weapons to a nonstate proxy—if under- regional security architectures. Thanks meet the strategic environment in which taking such an action could prompt a to robust U.S. nuclear and conventional we now operate. retaliatory attack on U.S. forces. More- capabilities, these state actors remain over, in addition to the immediate costs deeply wary of the risks of direct armed Potential Risks incurred, this response by a revisionist conflict with the United States and its In doing so, however, it is also critical power could potentially escalate to a allies and partners. This has pushed to proceed carefully, deliberately, and, state-on-state armed conflict. their competition with the United wherever possible, in tandem with allies Another risk is that many revisionist States below the threshold of state-on- and partners. State and nonstate threat power malign activities involve (some- state armed conflict that is neither a networks share a number of features times witting, sometimes unwitting) stable peace nor a hot war. and operating procedures, but the risks third-party actors. The potential conse- The United States has demonstrated in countering state networks are signifi- quences of alienating third parties must the capability to operate across the cantly higher and must be factored into also be taken into account, particularly conflict continuum, though we must the calculus of U.S. decisionmakers. as long-term success in countering take steps to adapt our operations to this 84 Commentary / Countering Threat Networks to Deter, Compete, and Win JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 7 new strategic environment and increase Robert R. Leonhard, Stephen P. Phil- Europe/Radio Liberty, September 14, 2018, lips, and Johns Hopkins University Applied available at JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Oxford 85 Pararescueman with 82nd Expeditionary Rescue Squadron, deployed in support of Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa, participates in static line jump from 75th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron C-130J Hercules near Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, May 11, 2019 (U.S. Air Force/Chris Hibben) Development Beyond the Joint Qualification System An Overview By Dina Eliezer, Theresa K. Mitchell, and Allison Abbe n 1986, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols requirements were cation and supporting criteria for each Goldwater-Nichols Department of based on concerns that the Department level.1 In response to this congressional I Defense Reorganization Act, leading of Defense (DOD) had paid insufficient requirement, DOD evaluated the state to substantial reforms in joint officer attention to joint officer management of Joint Officer Management (JOM) personnel policy and management. and on a perception that there were and the Joint Specialty Officer designa- disincentives to serving in joint assign- tion process and implemented the Joint ments. Twenty years after Goldwater- Qualification System (JQS) to support Dr. Dina Eliezer is a Research Staff Member at Nichols, continued congressional inter- a more strategic human resource the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). Theresa est in joint officer development resulted approach to JOM.2 Mitchell, JD, is a Research Staff Member at IDA. Dr. Allison Abbe is a Professor of Organizational in the 2007 requirement for DOD to The JQS is a system of progressive Studies at the U.S. Army War College. establish different levels of joint qualifi- career development steps intended to 86 Features / Development Beyond the Joint Qualification System JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 prepare officers for unified action at the to the JOM policy have limited what indicated that the learning curve required operational and strategic levels. Under are considered joint experiences. For in their position was 7 months or longer.7 the current JQS, officers become creden- instance, experiences in which the officer This amounted to almost one-third of a tialed as Joint Qualified Officers through is not responsible for implementation of 22- to 24-month assignment period. Part a combination of education and experi- joint policy or program—for example, as of the skill deficit may be due to a lack ence, and this designation is required for a student or in a fellowship or in assign- of education, as about three quarters of promotion to general officer/flag officer. ments affiliated with a degree-granting Joint Staff officers had not yet attended The experience requirement can be met institution or research program—are not joint professional military education either through standard joint duty as- eligible for consideration. Phase II courses. Furthermore, given signments (S-JDA) after service in a Joint that nearly half of the headquarters billets Duty Assignment List (JDAL) position or Joint Leader Competencies were at the O-4 level and below, officers through joint experience points obtained By focusing solely on the strategic may have lacked a sufficient career history from experience in non-JDAL joint duty level, the JQS omits a host of joint of joint duty assignments, deployments, assignments and experiences that demon- experiences that may nonetheless be and exercises to prepare them for the strate an officer’s mastery of knowledge, important for building joint competen- position. skills, and abilities in joint matters cies. Despite changes to JOM policy To better prepare personnel for (experience-based joint duty assignments, and a narrowing of the joint matters these roles, the Services and Joint Staff or E-JDA). For both S-JDA and E-JDA, definition since 2007, successful leader- should consider developmental assign- the preponderance of duties must involve ship in joint environments continues ments more systematically and promote joint matters as defined by statute. to require a broad set of competencies. joint development at an earlier career The JQS recognizes that significant In a study on developing Army officers stage. Formal joint professional military experience in joint matters is gained for the joint environment, the officers education specifies learning outcomes, through operations supported by joint interviewed cited the importance of instructional methods, and content, task forces and other organizations, such joint knowledge, including awareness and aligns assessments to those learning as the interagency community and inter- of the function, capabilities, and cul- outcomes. Informal experiential learning, national and nongovernmental partners, tures of other governments, agencies, by definition, does not lend itself to the as well as through joint exercises and joint or Services.5 They also emphasized same degree of structure; nonetheless, training events or courses. At the time of the importance of critical thinking and experiential learning through assignments its implementation, the definition of joint expertise in their functional specialties. can be part of a developmental career matters was fairly general and focused on However, above all else, officers empha- progression that sets the conditions for the joint aspects of military operations: sized the importance of interpersonal systematically building joint competencies “matters related to unified action by mul- skills, explaining that in joint environ- over time. tiple military forces in operations across ments it is essential to develop relation- domains such as land, sea, or air, in space, ships, listen to diverse viewpoints, and Challenging Experiences or in information environment.”3 As a motivate disparate groups to collaborate Build Competency result, the JQS was originally intended toward a common goal. Another study Joint development is best completed to include a broad range of experiences, of senior executive service members, through a progressive model or build- including joint training, education, Reserve component and general and ing-block approach whereby leaders participation in exercises, and self-devel- flag officers, and noncommissioned offi- are exposed to a wide range of increas- opment learning opportunities, as well as cers arrived at similar conclusions about ingly complex and challenging learning non-JDAL joint assignments. the skills needed in joint environments. experiences. These opportunities to Subsequent changes to the definition Interviewees emphasized the impor- progressively develop the joint compe- of joint matters and associated policy tance of general people and leadership tencies described above are not limited since 2007 have limited credit for E-JDA skills, understanding of other organiza- to just the strategic level or to formal and S-JDA to strategic roles and select tions, knowledge of joint operations educational settings, as predicated in education and assignment opportunities. and doctrine, and expertise in their own the current JQS. Rather, research sug- Changes to the definition in 2016 shifted fields.6 gests that a broad range of experiences the focus to the strategic mission level: Despite an adequate understanding of builds competency, particularly in areas “the development or achievement of the skills needed in joint environments, of knowledge that lack clear guidelines strategic objectives through synchroniza- officers are not always sufficiently pre- or specific sets of rules.8 Knowledge tion, coordination, and organization of pared for assignments at joint commands. that is acquired through experience and integrated forces in operations conducted In one study of Joint Staff officers and that cannot be articulated through a across domains, such as land, sea, or air, their senior leaders serving in assignments formalized set of rules is referred to as in space, or in the information environ- at the nine combatant command head- tacit knowledge. In this context, tacit ment.”4 Additionally, other changes quarters, more than half of respondents knowledge includes understanding JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Eliezer, Mitchell, and Abbe 87 Patrolman with 22nd Security Forces, McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas, receives some motivational words from Phoenix Raven instructor during intensive 3-week, 12-hour-a-day Phoenix Raven Qualification Course at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey (U.S. Air Force/Vernon Young, Jr.) how to work with and lead others of development because they push individu- to challenging experiences, compared to different backgrounds, shape the envi- als to think beyond parochial Service more experienced leaders. Experienced ronment, and contribute and combine perspectives, expend greater effort, cope leaders may have well-established belief Service-specific resources in the joint with uncertainty, reflect on their out- systems and patterns of behavior that are environment. This learning through comes, and develop new behaviors.11 A less amenable to change when compared application or experience-based tacit wealth of empirical research supports the to their younger counterparts. Less- knowledge is especially important for positive relationship between challenging experienced leaders simply have more to problem-solving and has been linked to work environments and development. learn and may be more willing to adapt favorable performance among military In fact, supervisors rate junior manag- and change.14 and business leaders.9 Tacit knowledge ers as more competent when they are may be particularly important for joint positioned in challenging assignments.12 Implications for Joint assignments, given the scope of respon- Leaders indicate that they developed the Leader Development sibilities and the competencies required. most in positions that were different from As reflected in the research above, Foundationally, experiences must be their typical assignments.13 to develop joint competency in the sufficiently challenging, complex, and While it is important to provide military, it is necessary to place Ser- broad to have a significant impact on challenging and diverse developmental vicemembers in challenging joint envi- leadership development. Developmentally experiences, individuals also vary in ronments early in their careers. Joint enhancing experiences often involve high their abilities to draw the appropriate environments require leaders to manage levels of responsibility while perform- lessons from these challenging experi- a complex set of individual and group ing novel tasks, implementing change, ences and then generalize those lessons relationships, all while executing a tech- working across functional domains, and to subsequent experiences. Leaders early nically challenging and novel mission. working with diverse groups.10 These in their careers are more apt to develop Not all joint experiences may be suf- challenging experiences promote joint and modify their behaviors in response ficient to develop joint competency. To 88 Features / Development Beyond the Joint Qualification System JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 contribute significantly to development, one mission level rather than encouraging skills that can be applied to both Service- experiences must be novel, complex, a progression of experiences that develops specific and joint domains. and difficult, without creating over- leaders over time. Strategically focused whelming cognitive demands.15 This joint experiences are certainly critical, but The Air Force Joint points to a progression of multiple, experiences at the tactical and operational Talent Tracking and increasingly challenging joint experi- levels are important components of a Management Initiative ences over one’s career. developmental progression toward joint Airmen bring unique Service perspec- To assess whether the types of ex- and strategic leadership. The extent to tives and capabilities to the complex periences recognized in the JQS meet which an experience is broadening and challenges of joint warfighting. Yet these criteria, we reviewed a subset of challenging likely plays more of a role in the Air Force is underrepresented in E-JDA self-nominations, limiting the determining joint development than the the senior joint positions most influ- review to Air Force submissions that specific mission level. ential for national security strategy were disapproved in calendar year 2017. By focusing solely on the strategic and warfighting, as well as Joint Staff E-JDA submissions are reviewed by JQS level, the JQS omits a host of joint positions that are seen as preparatory Experience Review Panels three times per experiences that are important for the positions for senior levels of joint year. Panels determine whether each sub- Services to encourage, track, and assess command. Various factors may explain mission meets the joint matters criteria, for their own joint leader development this underrepresentation, but one does not meet the criteria, or should be efforts. Additionally, current Service important reason may be that the Air rewritten. The panels then make a recom- career milestones may not incentivize Force often develops its top talent for mendation to the Vice Director of the joint experiences at early career stages. positions within the Service rather Joint Staff. This limited scope may be necessary from than for joint leadership.16 Moreover, When considering whether to award a DOD perspective; providing too many as revealed in the review of the 2016 joint credit for an experience, the JQS officers with joint qualification through Air Force E-JDA submissions, Airmen Experience Review Panels assess both E-JDA may deplete the supply of officers are gaining valuable joint experiences the “how” (the nature of the work com- available for JDAL positions. However, that are not recognized under the JQS, pleted) and the “who” (with whom the from a Service perspective, the limited which can serve as a disincentive to officer worked). Guidance to the panels scope of the JQS provides no benefit and seeking joint experiences that would requires that joint experiences must be could serve as a disincentive for person- help develop joint leaders. strategic in nature and meet the other nel to seek a variety of challenging joint Recognizing the need for greater elements of the joint matters definition— experiences. Because officers early in their emphasis on joint development within for example, involving interaction with careers likely have the most to gain from the Air Force, the Chief of Staff of the Air personnel from another Service, with the challenge of a joint experience, it is Force, General David L. Goldfein, estab- other U.S. departments or agencies, with advisable to encourage joint experiences lished “Strengthening Joint Leaders and foreign military or agencies, or with non- through alternative mechanisms outside Teams” as an Air Force key focus area to governmental entities. Although the who the JQS. The Services often retain their advance the Air Force’s Future Operating component of this requirement is quite best talent for Service leadership positions Concept, Strategic Master Plan, and Air broad, the strategic focus limits the scope at the expense of exposing members to Force priorities. In response, the Air of experiences eligible for joint credit. a greater breadth of joint experiences at Force initiated 26 supporting projects to The review of Air Force E-JDA sub- different levels. improve joint development. One of these mission denials confirmed the limitations Broader approaches to assess, track, projects is the Joint Talent Tracking and of the system described herein. Although and manage joint capabilities are needed Management (JTTM) initiative to assess, the E-JDA submission form requests within the Services to develop a fully track, and manage joint experience within information on what members did and joint-competent force. Service-specific the Air Force. with whom they did it, the decisions approaches to recognize a wide range of The JTTM initiative recognizes the recommended by the panels do not ap- joint experiences throughout the career need to value and track both traditional pear to reflect consideration of the who, cycle should emphasize the value of joint and nontraditional joint experiences but instead rely almost exclusively on the matters, encourage Servicemembers to across different career fields. The current what. Most of the disapproved submis- pursue joint opportunities, and support joint matters definition in the JQS is too sions reported experiences involving more informed personnel management. narrowly focused on strategic roles and supervisors and peers from other Services, It is important for the Services and DOD has been limited to joint officer develop- foreign militaries, and U.S. agencies or to recognize and convey the value of joint ment, whereas the Air Force aims to track non-DOD entities, but they did not experiences for career development. Joint and encourage a broad range of joint receive joint credit due to the tactical or experiences are broadening experiences; experiences for all Airmen (officers, en- operational level of the work. Thus, the they provide opportunities to develop listed, and civilians). Accordingly, the Air JQS recognizes joint experiences at only general leadership and problem-solving JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Eliezer, Mitchell, and Abbe 89 Explosive ordnance disposal technicians assigned to 466th Air Expeditionary Squadron walk toward blast pit after detonating four 500-pound bombs during demolition day, March 16, 2014 (U.S. Air Force/Vernon Young, Jr.) Force broadened the definition of what is Field Managers and other Airmen when experiences at the tactical level, while considered joint. developing the definition and indicators. about half of self-nominated question- Specifically, JTTM uses a broad Air Career Field Managers tested a precoding naires were at the operational level. Given Force–specific definition of joint experi- questionnaire to assess officer and en- that the majority of these experiences ences: “an assignment or experience that listed assignments on the joint experience lacked a strategic focus, they would not develops or demonstrates mastery of indicators (duration, exposure to non–Air be eligible for E-JDA credit, yet they knowledge, skills, and abilities in joint, Force personnel or organizations, or- clearly demonstrated exposure to a broad interagency, intergovernmental, or multi- ganizational level, mission level, joint range of joint experiences in a variety of national (JIIM) topics or activities.” JIIM functions, and joint role). Additionally, domains. experiences include not only billets and both officer and enlisted Airmen com- In a related initiative, the Air Force operational assignments, but also educa- pleted self-nomination questionnaires is working to refine joint knowledge tion, exercises, and other experiences. describing their joint assignments, standards as part of its Institutional The definition aligns with joint policy, deployments, and education along the Competencies. Many of these joint adapting the definition of E-JDA in the indicator dimensions. The study initially competencies align with the knowledge, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff involved career fields that were known to skills, and abilities described by officers Instruction on JOM, but expands the have joint experiences, such as air liaison, and other senior leaders in the research range of experiences and extends beyond explosive ordnance disposal, medical highlighted above, particularly those per- officers to enlisted Airmen and civilians. corps, judge advocate general corps, taining to joint knowledge. Recognizing Additionally, the JTTM development logistics, and weather, but later extended the interdependency between joint team defined a set of indicators to use in to a broader range of fields (for example, competency and leadership competency identifying, validating, and potentially foreign area officers, cyber, intelligence, in general, the joint competencies were valuing these experiences. The indicators, force support, mobility pilots, fighter developed to align with the Air Force’s drawn from previous studies regarding pilots, and airfield operations). broader competency framework. This joint experience, are as follows: type of Responses to the precoding and self- allows for a greater integration of joint experience, duration of the experience, nomination questionnaire indicated a skills throughout career development. exposure to non–Air Force personnel or diverse range of joint experiences, roles, Currently, the Air Force is working to organizations, organizational level, mis- and functions available to Airmen. Most implement its Institutional Competencies sion level, joint functions, and joint role.17 respondents indicated that exposure to (including joint competencies), JTTM, To ensure that Airmen had a voice JIIM personnel or organizations occurred and other joint development initiatives. in the initiative, the JTTM develop- on a daily or weekly basis. The majority Next steps for JTTM include developing ment team gathered input from Career of precoded questionnaires identified the processes and information technology 90 Features / Development Beyond the Joint Qualification System JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 8 to support the collection and storage of officers working at the strategic level Morgan W. McCall, Jr., “Developing Executives Through Work Experiences,” in JIIM experience information for use in will be insufficient to build the joint- Human Resource Planning: Solutions to Key career development. In combination with ready force needed to meet our nation’s Business Issues, ed. David M. Schweiger and the other joint development initiatives, warfighting demands. It is time to move Klaus Papenfuss (Wiesbaden: Gabler Verlag, the Air Force’s JTTM system will directly beyond a strategic and officer-centric 1992), 219–229; and Cynthia D. McCauley, promote joint career development by joint development focus and ensure that Leader Development: A Review of Research (Greensboro, NC: Center for Creative Leader- conveying the value the Air Force places joint development encompasses the total ship, 2008). on joint experiences, encouraging more force. Joint officers cannot succeed with- 9 Jennifer Hedlund et al., “Identifying and Airmen to pursue joint opportunities, out civilian and enlisted leaders who are Assessing Tacit Knowledge: Understanding and supporting more informed personnel similarly developed for joint roles. The the Practical Intelligence of Military Leaders,” management. Broadening the tracking of Air Force has taken steps to enhance joint The Leadership Quarterly 14, no. 2 (2003), 117–140; and Robert J. Sternberg and Richard joint experiences beyond officers and to a development that can serve as a model K. Wagner, “Tacit Knowledge: An Unspoken wider spectrum of experiences, including for the other Services in developing their Key to Managerial Success,” Creativity and In- tactical and operational joint exposure, own career development processes to novation Management 1, no. 1 (1992), 5–13. will enable the Air Force to develop better prepare leaders for the demands 10 Cynthia D. McCauley, Patricia J. Ohlott, a deeper pool of joint competent and of joint operations. These efforts should and Marian N. Ruderman, Job Challenge Profile, Facilitator’s Guide: Learning from Work credible Airmen across all ranks. The Air proceed in close coordination with the Experience (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass/Pfeiffer, Force’s enhancement of its tracking and Joint Staff, consistent with JOM and 1999); Cynthia D. McCauley et al., “Assessing management of joint experiences for all education policies, to ensure that career the Developmental Components of Manage- Airmen acknowledges the crucial role of development meets both Service and rial Jobs,” Journal of Applied Psychology 79, no. enlisted and civilian Airmen and the fact joint requirements. JFQ 4 (1994), 544; and Patricia J. Ohlott, “Job Assignments,” in The Center for Creative Lead- that officers serve as only one element of ership Handbook of Leadership Development, ed. the Air Force team in a joint fight. Cynthia D. McCauley and Ellen Van Velsor Notes (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004), 151–182. Conclusions 11 D. Scott DeRue and Ned Wellman, “De- 1 Joint experiences provide the kinds of H.R. 5122, Pub. L. 109-364, John veloping Leaders via Experience: The Role of Warner National Defense Authorization Act of Developmental Challenge, Learning Orienta- complex “stretch” assignments that Fiscal Year 2007. tion, and Feedback Availability,” Journal of contribute to leadership development. 2 Government Accountability Office Applied Psychology 94, no. 4 (2009), 859. A variety of joint experiences at all (GAO), Joint Officer Development Has Im- 12 Lisa Dragoni et al., “Understanding mission levels (for example, tactical, proved, but a Strategic Approach Is Needed, Managerial Development: Integrating Devel- operational, and strategic) can place GAO-03-238 (Washington, DC: GAO, 2002); opmental Assignments, Learning Orientation, Independent Study of Joint Officer Manage- and Access to Developmental Opportunities Servicemembers in complex situations, ment and Joint Professional Military Educa- in Predicting Managerial Competencies,” The expose them to diverse perspectives, tion (Washington, DC: Booz Allen Hamilton, Academy of Management Journal 52, no. 4 and require them to engage in new 2003); and Harry J. Thie et al., Framing a (August 2009), 731–743. behaviors and ways of thinking that Strategic Approach for Joint Officer Manage- 13 Morgan W. McCall, Jr., and George P. develop stronger leaders. As such, joint ment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005); Hollenbeck, Developing Global Executives: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruc- Lessons of International Experience (Cambridge: experiences should be considered as tion 1330.05A, Joint Officer Management Harvard Business School Press, 2002). valuable for their potential to develop Program Procedures (Washington, DC: The 14 Giles Hirst et al., “Learning to Lead: not only joint competencies but also Joint Staff, December 15, 2005). The Development and Testing of a Model of broader leadership and problem-solving 3 “Department of Defense Joint Officer Leadership Learning,” The Leadership Quarterly skills that will transfer to both joint Management Joint Qualification System Imple- 15, no. 3 (2004), 311–327. mentation Plan,” March 30, 2007, A-4. 15 DeRue and Wellman, “Developing Lead- and senior Service leadership. The Ser- 4 Title 10, U.S. Code, § 668, National ers via Experience,” 859. vices should plan for these experiential Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017. 16 Caitlin Lee et al., Rare Birds: Under- assignments more deliberately, develop- 5 M. Wade Markel et al., Developing U.S. standing and Addressing Air Force Under- ing the bench for future joint leadership Army Officers’ Capabilities for Joint, Inter- representation in Senior Joint Positions in the earlier in members’ careers. agency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Post–Goldwater-Nichols Era (Santa Monica, CA: Environments (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, RAND, 2017). Today’s adversaries are increas- 2011). 17 John F. Schank et al., Who Is Joint? ingly challenging the United States by 6 Raymond E. Conley et al., Enhancing the Reevaluating the Joint Duty Assignment List employing lethal and nonlethal effects Performance of Senior Department of Defense (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996); Sheila Na- across multiple domains and regions. As Civilian Executives, Reserve Component Gen- taraj Kirby et al., Who Is “Joint”? New Evidence military operations grow in sophistica- eral/Flag Officers, and Senior Noncommissioned from the 2005 Joint Officer Management Census Officers in Joint Matters (Santa Monica, CA: Survey (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006); and tion and complexity, the value of joint RAND, 2008). Margaret C. Harrell et al., A Strategic Approach leaders who have progressed through 7 The Joint Staff Officer Project, Final to Joint Officer Management: Analysis and developmentally challenging joint experi- Report (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, April Modeling Results (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, ences will increase. The JQS focus on 2008). 2009). JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Eliezer, Mitchell, and Abbe 91 Titanium parts printed from powder and laser provide researchers with high-strength, heat-resistant examples of future of additive manufacturing (U.S. Army/David McNally) n the near future, this scenario could become reality. Additive manufac- 3D Printing for Joint I turing (AM), also known as 3D printing, could enable future agile operating concepts. AM has the ability Agile Operations to significantly shorten the Depart- ment of Defense (DOD) logistics chain, By Jaren K. Price, Miranda C. La Bash, and Bart Land especially where repair parts are con- cerned, by producing the parts as they are needed. This would enable rapid, flexible response to unanticipated faults The Navy seabase off the coast of Africa is like a floating hive, with personnel moving or battle damage with reduced stockpile about aboard multiple ships and both aircraft and landing craft launching to deliver the requirements, increasing the agility second wave of the assault force to their objectives. Teams of mechanics examine several of the operational force. However, to Army and Marine Corps vehicles recovered from the beach via landing craft air cushion. One team triages damage in preparation for repairs required for expedited return of the vehicles to the field. Another team assesses the more significant damage done to a joint Colonel Jaren K. Price, USA, is the Deputy light tactical vehicle (JLTV) that struck a mine. The mechanics submit requests for repair Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command parts. Some parts are immediately retrieved from stores located on the seabase, while man- Joint Intelligence Operations Center. Lieutenant Commander Miranda C. La Bash, ufacturing specialists load blueprints from a database for those parts not already on hand. USN, serves in the Intelligence Directorate Soon, three-dimensional (3D) printers hum. Meanwhile, the specialist engineering team at U.S. Special Operations Pacific Command. develops a repair solution for the JLTV, and an engineer drafts the 3D design. The new Major Bart Land, USAF, is the North East Asia Logistic Planner in the Directorate of Logistics, plans are also transferred to print production. The parts are delivered to the mechanics Engineering, and Security Cooperation at U.S. who then complete the repairs. Within hours, the vehicles are ready for return to their units. Indo-Pacific Command. 92 Features / 3D Printing for Joint Agile Operations JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 fully and efficiently capitalize on the U.S. forces to be able to maneuver from solve niche problems.4 Other potential potential of AM, DOD must develop strategic distances and integrate capabili- benefits of AM for manufacturing include common data solutions and standard- ties across time and space to overmatch networked smart factories, improved ized safety, certification, and requisi- the enemy. Implementing these con- quality control, rapid innovation, indi- tion processes for AM, leveraging data cepts requires “precision logistics that vidualization with voxel-by-voxel5 digital science to prioritize development efforts provides a reliable, agile, and responsive modifications, and on-demand produc- by cost savings and implementation sustainment capability.”3 The enemy is tion, reducing inventories.6 Incorporating impact. An integrated effort by the expected to specifically target U.S. sus- AM into the manufacturing process can joint enterprise is required to overcome tainment capabilities both at home and also reduce part count, assembly time, Service independence and technology at deployed locations by conventional, and weight “while creating complex in- implementation challenges to make unconventional, and cyber means. Thus, ternal and external geometries that could joint agile sustainment a reality. sustainment forces must often be dis- not be made any other way.”7 The December 2017 National persed to multiple locations, be resilient At a distance from both repair Security Strategy identifies Russia and to attack, and have enough redundancy facilities and spare parts storage, units China as revisionist powers that are ac- to maintain baseline capability in spite of employing agile operating concepts tively competing with the United States attacks on some locations. They also call could manufacture their own replace- across all domains.1 They have developed for sustaining, maintaining, and repairing ments or leverage a nearby forward base, weapons to asymmetrically exploit U.S. units and equipment as far forward as significantly reducing stocked inventory, weaknesses and create standoff through possible. transport requirements, and time to get antiaccess/area-denial and area-denial The common theme among all the needed parts to repair facilities. To main- strategies. Outside the realm of nation- operating concepts is the ability to deliver tain operations in denied areas, avoid state competition, the United States sustainment support as far forward as detection, reduce equipment downtime, continues to carry out humanitarian and possible, reduce the requirement for large and maximize repair opportunities while antiterrorism operations in austere envi- logistic bases, and protect the joint force under way or in the field, units with AM ronments. These developments mandate through minimizing its size and opera- capabilities could create parts on demand. that the United States devise the means tional footprint. While equipment and Currently, each Service has its own to operate in contested environments spare parts make up only a small fraction system of mobile warehouses that contain and in places where access to bases and of sustainment requirements compared replacement parts for specific weapons infrastructure does not readily support with fuel and ammunition, AM at for- systems such as fighter aircraft. Mobile operations.2 A key aspect of future opera- ward locations would help realize these warehouses enable our current expedi- tions is how to effectively sustain the joint concepts by reducing required spares tionary capabilities but require significant force. inventory, shrinking lift requirements, enhancement in order to support agile Based on this vision for the future, creating more flexible prepositioned operating concepts. These mobile the Services have laid out concepts stocks, and providing redundancy. warehouses rely on extensive amounts and started to develop capabilities and The term AM appropriately describes of demand data to forecast with modest procedures for agile operations in an a process that involves adding and accuracy what should be maintained in array of denied environments. The new bonding consecutive layers of material, stock. Demand data can be best described operating concepts envision sustained whereas traditional (subtractive) manu- as the frequency with which certain items ground, naval, and tactical air operations facturing involves shaping and milling are required. Collected over years, this being conducted without access to ports, and usually secondary materials specifi- data forms a picture of the replacement airports, or staging bases for extended cally engineered for the creation of one parts required over time for each system periods and operating from austere air- design (such as a mold). The removal of on record. fields with only the minimum logistics material during traditional manufacturing Demand data, however, cannot pre- support. These tactics require logisticians results in a much larger percentage of dict all critical failures, leaving weapons to develop new ways to meet the needs waste of the base material than AM does. systems susceptible to mission degrada- of the force, providing timely sustain- AM generates the capability to rapidly tion for prolonged periods of time. New ment without the use of large land-based manufacture spare parts in the local vicin- systems have no demand data, making logistics facilities. These concepts ity, eliminating supply chain distances and predictive schedules for replacement include the Navy and Marine Corps’ often prolonged acquisition processes. parts difficult. Legacy weapons systems Seabasing Concept, a variety of Air Force It has fixed per unit costs, enabling the have failures that were never anticipated, Disbursed/Agile Basing Options, and the efficient production of small quantities of meaning no replacement parts were ever Army’s Multidomain Operations. custom parts. Besides the ability to recre- produced. They may also have compo- Whether operating from floating ate previously out-of-production parts, nents that are no longer manufactured. seabases, dispersed airfields, or remote AM facilitates unit-level innovations such AM has the potential to reduce risk as- operating bases, these concepts call for as the production of custom tools to sociated with unanticipated demand by JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Price, La Bash, and Land 93 Army researcher Dr. Brandon McWilliams holds sample part created from powder at U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command’s Army Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, February 25, 2019 (U.S. Army/David McNally) enabling production at the point of need. could instead concentrate on the delivery ready to respond to crises, but there are In addition, AM enables leaner mobile of operational forces and equipment to only a few ships maintained worldwide warehouses because the risk generated and from agile bases. due to the immense investment required by out-of-stock parts is reduced or elimi- Transportation assets, such as cargo to operate each. These stocks consist of a nated through on-site manufacturing. aircraft and ships, would also benefit from large variety of items that enable crucial The technology does not yet allow an onboard or isolated location AM capa- weapons systems and combat personnel for the elimination of these mobile ware- bility to support organic repair capabilities. including, but not limited to, materiel- houses, but it will allow stocks focused Units could make their own critical parts handling equipment, construction on low-density, high-demand parts, par- on-site, allowing distribution missions to equipment, generators, radios, refueling ticularly complex parts or parts requiring continue on schedule. This would be es- equipment, medical equipment, and am- materials or precision not easily produced pecially useful when transportation assets munition. AM could be utilized to allow under current AM capabilities. More ef- do not include mobile warehouse capabili- more robust maintenance and repair fective and condensed mobile warehouses ties or are themselves long distances from actions on board for both the ship and and global stocks will lighten the burden logistics support. The increased availability stock, averting frequent returns to port on transportation assets and the distribu- of transportation assets created by this to restock. Returning to port takes days tion system. On a large scale, this would capability would allow resources to be to weeks and often includes significant result in reduced personnel and materiel- committed to other operational needs. homeport maintenance periods, reducing handling equipment at distribution It would also enable more frequent trips platform availability for crisis action and hubs, en route locations, and agile bases. to isolated agile bases without increased increasing risk to potential operations. Some of these personnel could instead investment in transportation assets. AM would provide a means to mitigate be trained to become AM specialists. Adding an AM capability to preposi- this risk. With fewer aircraft, ships, trucks, and rail tioned stocks would directly support agile Another advantage of utilizing AM cars required to move items through the basing concepts. The Army, Marines, and is the avoidance of sunk costs due to supply chain, these transportation assets Air Force depend on these ships to be obsolescence or end of service life. As 94 Features / 3D Printing for Joint Agile Operations JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 military equipment is modernized over shipping container. It contains four 3D joint committee composed of Service, time, prepositioned stock must be up- printers, currently limited to polymer Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and dated, incurring periodic reinvestment printing.12 One is deployed to Bagram America Makes leads published a DOD costs. Some of this replacement stock Airfield in Afghanistan, and another is AM Roadmap containing high-level is also discarded due to expiring shelf operating out of Camp Arifjan, Kuwait.13 goals for continued development and life despite having never been used. AM This enables solutions to problems discov- implementation of AM objectives. The helps reduce these costs by enabling pro- ered on the battlefield, but current policy committee assessed significant coordina- duction of equipment when it is actually strictly confines AM to only emergency tion across the Services but suggested needed. When AM technology matures, repairs. Furthermore, to produce a repair that more formal sharing mechanisms the increased equipment produced at part, Soldiers are required to simultane- and progress assessments were required, the time of need may allow for the con- ously requisition the item through the including the assignment of a lead inte- version from a few large prepositioned supply system.14 grator to coordinate DOD AM Roadmap stock vessels to a larger number of small The Defense Department has already revisions.21 Despite coordination, it is but equally capable ships. This will be made significant investments in AM unclear if an OSD lead was ever named, possible because AM will be able to technology, and America Makes—the and each of the Services has developed or produce complex pieces of equipment National Additive Manufacturing is developing its own AM roadmap and custom made for the mission. These ships Innovation Institute—was established independent capabilities. could more effectively provide coverage in 2012 as a public-private partnership In order to enable AM for mainte- for global operations, creating a much between the Federal Government, private nance and logistics, the whole of AM more responsive prepositioned stock. industry, and universities. It is managed implementation across DOD must be Improving the prepositioned stock fleet by the Air Force Research Laboratory matured. The independently produced in this way is critical to making agile oper- (AFRL).15 As a significant marker of AM implementation plans for the Army, ating concepts a reality. progress in the partnership, in June Navy, and Air Force take separate ap- Units across DOD are already be- 2018, America Makes and the American proaches to developing AM across the ginning to innovate utilizing AM to National Standards Institute published force. Only with unity of effort can DOD develop new tools and to streamline version 2.0 of the AM Standardization efficiently overcome nine key implemen- maintenance and supply procedures. Roadmap, highlighting the gaps in and tation challenges: The Marine Corps Iwakuni Engine Ship steps to standardize the lifecycle of an material standards and availability Kit, created by a technician in the unit AM part.16 This work will go a long way •• part selection using a 3D printer, allows for the move- to boost industry development of AM •• skill set development ment of aircraft engines requiring repair that can eventually be used by DOD. •• configuration control without draining oil and hydraulics.8 Meanwhile, disparate organizations •• reproducibility Marine Corps Systems Command and within the Services are pursuing database •• cyber security Marine Corps Installations and Logistics design and parts validation for AM. The •• part validation and qualification have created a transportable 3D print Navy has designated OPNAV N4 as lead •• process validation and qualification lab prototype, X-FAB (Expeditionary Navy synchronizer for AM.17 RDECOM •• ability to reverse-engineer Fabrication Lab), for use with deployed and U.S. Army Materiel Command are •• components.22 maintenance forces. The Chief of Naval creating a product data management Operations’ Rapid Innovation Cell has system to retain and share design data.18 And these challenges must be over- permanently installed one printer on the RDECOM, the Office of Naval Research, come in order to achieve AM capabilities USS Essex9 and has plans to install 3D and AFRL all have laboratories that con- that can support agile operating concepts. printers on two additional ships.10 Naval duct AM research activities.19 For shorter term limited employment Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) has The U.S. Government Accountability of AM for repair parts, most critical is also approved the first metal part cre- Office recommended in October 2015 the ability to develop, share, and retain ated by AM for a 1-year trial on the USS that DOD designate an Office of the Technical Data Packages (TDPs), which Harry S. Truman.11 Secretary of Defense (OSD) lead for the make parts printable, and the ability to To support forward-deployed Soldiers, development and implementation of a reproducibly print to adequate precision U.S. Army Research, Development, and systematic approach to Department-wide and quality in the design-specified materi- Engineering Command (RDECOM) activities and resources that facilitate als. To enable AM for part production has partnered with the Rapid Equipping the adoption of AM technology across more generally, a prerequisite for reliable, Force to help manage, staff, and support DOD. The primary driver is an ability competitive sourcing of spare parts is its own 3D printing Expeditionary Labs to track actual or potential performance a mature industry of AM manufactur- (Ex Labs), which can be deployed world- and combat capability improvements, ers using comparable printers, with a wide. The Army Ex Lab is a fabrication cost savings, and lessons learned.20 Over defined set of material standards and file laboratory, self-contained in a 20-foot a year later, on November 30, 2016, a formats.23 JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Price, La Bash, and Land 95 The engineering and post-processing required to maximize the effectiveness and Third is shifting the requisition intensity required for most parts means minimize the overall size of all stock. process to incorporate AM, leveraging that printing qualified parts will be dif- In order to most effectively develop a centrally managed database of quali- ficult to achieve in austere environments. AM to support agile logistics, several fied parts to print where they are needed A part must be qualified, or certified, things must occur. First, a secure unified instead of requisitioning parts through to meet certain design specifications digital network across DOD, contain- normal supply channels. Robust multi- (temperature, pressure, forces, and mo- ing certified TDPs themselves as well as function printing would then be viable at tion over certain amount of time), in metadata regarding the printer, supplier in-theater depots. Although the Services order to be installed in a DOD system. data, and certifying engineering activity, would largely print different parts, there is For a 3D part to be qualified, it must be is required. DLA Logistics Operations likely to be some overlap in parts and sig- printed from a qualified printer: an AM Research and Development is developing nificant overlap in qualified printers and printer that has been itself certified as such a database in coordination with the materials, making unified and compatible able to reproduce the part to the same Services. It is also developing a repeatable systems by design as well as federated test- specifications with each use. Competitive supplier qualification process and has de- ing absolute must-haves for efficiency. bidding is also required among potential veloped a limited Additive Part Candidate Fourth, safety standards must be manufacturers, translating into a require- Identification Tool to help identify which published and implemented. This includes ment to certify multiple models of printer parts to prioritize for production using safety considerations for closed spaces, (in use at different companies or built by AM.25 For the development of new such as shipboard environments or conex different manufacturers) that would need systems, contract language to handle boxes. The AM work environment must to be qualified for each part. intellectual property issues and enable both contain materials and allow adequate Materials must also be certified by a future access to precise technical data will ventilation in order to prevent hazards defined standard, increasing the develop- be key to successfully harness AM capa- to personnel, such as toxic gases released mental work required by DOD to leverage bilities in the long term. during fusion of metal powders.28 The use a still immature field to this task. In alloy Second, DOD must develop stan- of personal protective gear and adequate production, there are currently only a dardized processes across the Services. detection of and ventilation for a possible few metals with an American Society NAVSEA, the Naval Warfare Centers, gas leak from within a metal printer’s inert for Testing Materials standard defined and DLA are building standardized gas atmosphere are required. This capacity for AM. And for metal AM techniques, processes and guidelines for AM and must be integrated within safety proce- significant facility and operational require- developing TDPs for parts that can no dures and hazardous waste programs. ments exist to accurately and consistently longer be acquired through normal sup- Depending on part complexity, mate- create parts, including controlled tempera- ply channels. The Naval Warfare Centers, rial, and the AM capabilities forward, ture, humidity, movement, and reliable Systems Centers, and Naval Research some parts offer greater differential electrical power, containment of powders Laboratory are studying how best to advantage to stock rather than print. An to prevent accidental transport and con- qualify and certify 3D printed parts. Naval important fifth step in implementation is tamination of alloys on hand, specialized Surface Warfare Center Port Hueneme prioritizing which parts should be devel- equipment to clean the machine, and is also looking at applications on ships, oped for AM. Paired to part prioritization material that must be disposed of—the specifically on the logistics, data librar- is developing the level of printer capabili- creation of soot-laden waste water in the ies, contracting mechanisms, and issues ties that would be most useful forward. machine itself.24 To date, these constraints regarding data rights.26 Process validation Costs and capabilities vary widely for 3D have restricted field printing to polymers. remains rather intensive, with three differ- printers, pricing anywhere from $2,000 The variety of raw materials required ent printers at three different locations test for a home plastics printer to $50,000 to manufacture repair parts is another printing a single TDP in order for DLA to for a basic metal printer to over a mil- limitation that will need to be considered. then put out a bid for the contract manu- lion dollars for a larger, more accurate Systems design engineers will need to find facture of that part. One Warfare Center multi-material printer. Differentiating ways to reduce the diversity of materials in materials engineer, however, has sug- both parts and printers across a range of order to permit leaner AM material stocks. gested that eliminating the requirement attributes, including size, material, and For example, it may be advantageous to to qualify every individual part is required resolution requirements, is critical to use more expensive materials for some to realize AM’s true potential.27 Because it establishing which parts can realistically parts that do not actually require them is not cost effective to validate in this way be fabricated locally and which would be in order to use a single material across every part that a unit might want to print better produced in more specialized facili- several components, simply to reduce AM or design, there should be a streamlined ties, whether land-based, in-theater, or raw material variety required in stock. To process for those parts meeting a lower back with the manufacturer. Some parts, implement AM in support of mobile ware- threshold of system criticality. Whatever critical but difficult to precisely print, houses, the right balance between stocking the standard, there must be a single stan- would need to be retained in stock. For replacement parts and raw materials is also dard implemented across DOD. mission-critical parts that can be precisely 96 Features / 3D Printing for Joint Agile Operations JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Marines with 7th Engineer Support Battalion and Sailors with Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 5 attach hose onto 3D concrete printer during 3D Concrete Printing exercise at Camp Pendleton, California, December 9, 2018 (U.S. Marine Corps/Betzabeth Y. Galvan) 3D printed—such as engine compo- Adaptive modeling and visualization development, database creation and nents—whether steam plant or aviation, of which policy adaptations, joint col- maintenance, contracting methods, safety weapons systems, and safety systems, a laboration opportunities, and technical standards, and AM policy can and must long lead of material, printer, and part solutions are most useful for increasing be accomplished jointly. qualification is required to ensure the capabilities forward, while reducing cost parts meet specifications. would advise the most beneficial focuses AM implementation across the Sixth, DOD must broadly assess over time across the DOD enterprise. Department of Defense is in its early which spare parts across the inventory Finally, it is critical that the most stages. Current experimentation with would offer economic and operational cost-effective methods and processes be AM across the Services demonstrates advantage if shifted to AM. This would determined. The cost calculations for an applications for agile operations, emer- enable the prioritization of over 5 million AM implementation must include the gency situations, and innovative uses. line items across the Defense Department total cost of facilities, training or con- However, there are significant program for further investigation, with unity of tracting of operators, unified databases development hurdles ahead to reach effort and potential federation across with mechanisms to allow for intellectual AM’s potential. The DOD must identify Service channels.29 Applying data sci- property rights of the designs, ongoing cross-Service solutions that will generate entists to this effort will help systems fabrication materials costs, software and a distinct operational advantage when engineers prioritize their efforts. Criteria machine service contracts, and program factors such as repair time and cost are for AM at point of need should include management over time.30 As AM is considered. Some of the most immediate high or intermittent demand, long lag developed, the cost savings that can be challenges include developing databases to receipt at supply depot, criticality of realized across DOD if the Services ap- of parts that can be printed locally; readiness impact without component, propriately leverage economies of scale establishing DOD-wide methods and printing capability to produce a quali- and avoid duplicative efforts cannot requirements for safety, parts, and printer fied part if required, and accessibility of be overemphasized. While relatively certification; and determining which parts design specifications in a TDP repository. segregated today across Services, TDP are best printed locally and which should JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Price, La Bash, and Land 97 Prototype parts are 3D-printed in new Advanced and Additive Manufacturing Center of Excellence to troubleshoot machines at Joint Manufacturing and Technology Center, Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, May 15, 2019 (U.S. Army/Debralee Best) Multi-Domain Operations, 2028 (Washington, Technology Offers Major Benefits for Army be stocked or supplied through more DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, Maintenance,” Army Magazine, November traditional supply channels. AM is a key 2018), iii, available at 98 Features / 3D Printing for Joint Agile Operations JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 (ANSI), “America Makes and ANSI Publish Ver- sion 2.0 of Standardization Roadmap for Addi- tive Manufacturing,” ANSI.org, June 28, 2018, available at JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Price, La Bash, and Land 99 Women’s Auxiliary Air Force radar operator Denise Miley plotting aircraft on cathode ray tube of RF7 receiver in Receiver Room at Bawdsey Chain Home radar station (Courtesy Royal Air Force, Imperial War Museum, Goodchild) The Chain Home Early Warning Radar System A Case Study in Defense Innovation By Justin Roger Lynch The Germans were aimed to facilitate an amphibious landing across the Channel, to invade this country, and so to finish the war. . . . Mine was the purely defensive role of trying to stop the possibility of an invasion, and thus give this country a breathing spell. . . . I had to do that by denying them control of the air. —Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding 100 Features / The Chain Home Early Warning Radar System JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 he United Kingdom began the and the Royal Navy to prevent powerful flight path of a bomber to see if aircraft Battle of Britain in an unenviable continental armies from invading. The would deflect radio waves.8 He reported position. After the fall of France combination of the two formed a barrier that while death rays were unlikely to T 3 and evacuation of Dunkirk, Britons that had remained intact for centuries. succeed, radio waves could detect air- were justifiably concerned about Ger- British fleets protected England from at- craft.9 By June, he demonstrated bistatic many’s next move and the potential tack by the Spanish Armada in 1588, by continuous wave (CW) radar, which for an attack on England. Fortunately, Napoleon at Trafalgar in 1805, and by separates transmitters and receivers in when the Luftwaffe attack came, the German land forces during World War I. order to generate interference when British government had already created Airpower threatened to allow rivals to by- an object flies between the two. While the world’s first integrated air defense pass the Channel and the fleet, negating an advance, bistatic CW radar was too system. Britain’s traditional defense. Adversaries limited for practical use. In September, The Chain Home early warning possessing powerful air forces would be Watson-Watt’s team demonstrated the radar system played an important role able to directly target the British popula- pulse radar detection the Chain Home in Great Britain’s defense during the tion, industry, and infrastructure. In system would eventually use.10 One of Battle of Britain. The system’s ability to some ways, this returned the British to the government officials who received warn the Royal Air Force (RAF) about a vulnerability they had not experienced Watson-Watt’s report reacted by pro- incoming Luftwaffe attacks helped since medieval times. claiming, “Once again Britain is an restore a measure of Britain’s isolation At the same time, Nazi Germany’s island.”11 from continental states, contributing to increasingly aggressive rhetoric and The government approved construc- the resistance to and eventual defeat of powerful air force convinced Britons tion of a coastal radar system while Nazi Germany. Much of the story of the they needed to develop a defense against research was still ongoing. It authorized Chain Home system is already known. their most likely threat.4 The Luftwaffe the system in September 1935, the same Today, however, its creation serves as a had demonstrated its potential dur- month Watson-Watt tested pulse radar case study in military innovation; it shows ing the Spanish Civil War by bombing detection. In December, it approved the importance of allowing strategy to Guernica.5 A war between Germany and the expenditure of £60,000 to build inform the acquisition process, adapt- Britain promised to see similar actions. 5 stations.12 Each transmitting station ing rapidly during war, and having the By the late 1930s, the Germans planned consisted of a pair of 100-meter-tall steel right team to manage development and an invasion of England that relied heavily towers with 2 dipole arrays hanging on implementation. on using the Luftwaffe to strip British wires between them. The receiving sta- defenses and to destroy the population’s tions were east-west and north-south Context morale via terror bombing.6 As a result, running dipole antennas mounted on British scientists created the Chain the British began to develop a system to approximately 245-foot-tall wooden Home system during a time when the defend themselves against aircraft in the towers.13 relative strength of the offense and same manner the Channel and Royal After proving the concept, the British defense was shifting. During World War Navy had defended against ground and government began construction of a I, trench warfare challenged the logistics naval forces.7 complete system. Coastal radar systems of the day, hindering the exploitation went into continuous service in the of tactical victories and therefore pre- The Creation of Chain Home spring of 1938. By September 1939, the venting armies from achieving decisive The British government began to dedi- government had installed 20 stations results for the majority of the war.1 cate significant resources to the devel- along the majority of Britain’s east coast, During the interwar period, some theo- opment of radar in January 1935. The establishing the Chain Home system.14 rists believed the creation of powerful government asked Robert Watson-Watt, For approximately £10 million, Britain bomber aircraft would allow air forces a scientist at the National Physical Lab- created a system that detected aircraft out to bypass enemy armies and geographi- oratory, about the feasibility of creating to 120 miles, providing roughly 20 min- cal boundaries, shifting the balance back a radio death ray. In February, his team utes warning, from technology that did toward the offense.2 conducted the Daventry experiment. not exist at the beginning of the acquisi- Airpower’s growing offensive ca- They mounted a short-wave British tion process.15 pabilities changed Britain’s strategic Broadcasting Company transmitter Early versions of the Chain Home outlook. During previous conflicts, the and a receiver onto commercial vans, system had two major problems. The first British relied on the English Channel then transmitted radio waves along the was its inability to detect low-flying air- craft. The original system detected aircraft between 25,000 and 1,000 feet above ground level, creating the potential for Justin Roger Lynch served as an Active-duty Army officer before transferring to the Army National Guard. As a civilian, he has served in multiple roles in the national security enterprise, including roles German aircraft to evade detection. To focused on emerging technology. resolve this issue, the RAF added Chain JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Lynch 101 Home Low, a series of shorter portable adversaries, the RAF and British political than one that seeks perfection from the towers that could detect aircraft flying leaders decided they needed to defend start. The Chain Home team developed at 500 feet.16 The second problem was the Home Islands from the type of air the program incrementally, develop- the skill needed to interpret radar signals. attacks they experienced in 1917 and ing and implementing flawed systems Early displays used oscilloscopes that re- 1918.22 Their determination led to an as long as they were an improvement quired complex calculations to determine investment in Fighter Command, which, to the current system and there was a target locations.17 The creation of the with support from its political allies, de- reasonable probability the flaws could Plan Position Indicator, which showed cided that it needed advance notice of air be fixed. Watson-Watt tested his theory the target’s position on a map displayed forces coming from the continent to pre- using existing technology designed for on a cathode ray tube, resolved the issue vent adversaries from gaining control of different purposes.26 Six months later, he by reducing the number of calculations the air—thus the need for Chain Home.23 had developed a prototype and received needed and making the display more Chain Home’s development also the funding needed to create a working instinctive.18 testifies to the importance of rapid system.27 The first system’s inability to The Chain Home system quickly innovation in war. The system was a detect low-flying aircraft or function became an important part of Great direct response to the advent of effec- without significant mathematical ex- Britain’s defense. With the system in tive bomber aircraft, strategic bombing pertise by the user also did not halt its place, the British received a warning. concepts, and Adolf Hitler’s aggressive production. Instead, the government German aircraft staged for their attacks rhetoric. The system subsequently tran- accepted that it would need to continue by gathering in France in full view of the sitioned from a theoretical concept in iterating the system’s design. The will- Chain Home system.19 Combined with January 1935 to an operational coastal ingness to accept an imperfect design in information from Ultra and the Observer defense system in September 1939.24 order to generate progress allowed the Corps, Chain Home gave the RAF time Walter Kaiser claims, “It is probable that government to continue advancing the to intercept the Luftwaffe before it could never before or since has such a major project and create the Chain Home sys- bomb RAF bases or civilian popula- technical advance been so widely and suc- tem before the Battle of Britain. tions, allowing the British to save their cessfully deployed in such a short time.”25 A third lesson from the development resources for an eventual counterattack.20 If the British government had been of Chain Home and its integration with While they were far from completely safe, slower to act in recognizing its problem Fighter Command is the importance of they could use their isolation to protect set, initiating research, or implementing having the right team in place to foster their strategic base from the German construction, the system might not have the growth of specific innovations. It can army and, as necessary, use their island as been ready before the Battle of Britain. be tempting for innovative thinkers to a staging area for forces to fight on the Even if Chain Home had not existed, believe their idea’s or program’s merits continent, as they had in World War I and the Luftwaffe might not have been able should stand on their own. This is, some- the Napoleonic Wars. to destroy either Britain’s will or capac- what unfortunately, not true. Great ideas ity to fight. It is likely, however, that and programs rarely survive the uphill Lessons for Military Innovation without a warning of incoming German climb against bureaucratic inertia based One of the most important lessons from aircraft, more RAF fighters would have solely on their merits. Programs also need the development of Chain Home is the been destroyed on their runways, and leaders that can shepherd them through need for strategy to inform operational the Luftwaffe would have dropped more the existing system. The expertise to do needs and therefore the acquisition bombs on British cities. so, and the bureaucratic, diplomatic, and process. The interwar period was a It is also unlikely that Chain Home emotional intelligence it requires, is just time both of dramatically changing would have been ready if the RAF had as important to program implementa- military technology and miniscule not used an iterative development pro- tion as tactical and technical expertise. defense budgets. The RAF was pri- cess. Developers using iterative processes In this case, Chain Home had a military marily focused on creating a strategic make incremental changes to their champion, entrepreneur, and technical bomber force. Many of its leaders were product rather than try to create a perfect expert.28 convinced that bombers would always solution from the start. Each iteration is Hugh Dowding served as the military be able to make it through air defense an opportunity to learn rather than a ver- champion. He advocated for radar within systems and that strategic bombing dict on the system’s potential. This allows the military bureaucracy, ensured that could independently win wars. As a for less-than-perfect advancements that military personnel partnered with engi- result, other parts of the air force, such are still improvements and for regular neers to make sure they both understood as Fighter Command, were usually real-world tests throughout the develop- operational needs and how the system neglected during budgetary decisions.21 ment process rather than waiting until the could perform, and helped develop the Rather than dedicating their limited end to test the whole system. tactics the RAF could use to capitalize resources toward the latest new technol- An iterative development process on Chain Home’s capabilities, particu- ogy or trying to match their potential can create useful systems more quickly larly for night airborne interceptions. 102 Features / The Chain Home Early Warning Radar System JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Watson-Watt was the group’s entrepre- process and focus on shipping the prod- ship of History of Technology and of General History,” 35. neur. He negotiated with government uct instead of fighting a bureaucracy. 10 Merrill I. Skolnik, “Fifty Years of Radar,” organizations and industry groups, sug- Proceedings of the IEEE 73, no. 2 (1985), 182. gested the line of stations that eventually Lessons about effective development 11 James, “A History of Radar,” 344. became Chain Home, and helped acquire and acquisition are incredibly relevant 12 Otto Kreisher, “Radar from World War II the funding streams to turn the group’s for the joint force. The 2018 National Until Today,” Naval Forces 3 (2007), 71–72. 13 Ibid. ideas into reality. Sir Henry Tizard was Defense Strategy notes that “our com- 14 Skolnik, “Fifty Years of Radar,” 38. the technical expert. His committee petitive military advantage has been 15 Kaiser, “A Case Study in the Relation- helped anticipate the system’s potential eroding” in an environment defined by ship of History of Technology and of General capabilities and issues, including the rapid technological changes and other History,” 37. 16 limitations of air interception, how to factors.29 The ability to identify actual and Ibid., 38. 17 Kreisher, “Radar from World War II communicate air warnings, informa- potential strategic threats, define capabil- Until Today,” 70–71. tion quality control, and how to guide ity deficits, and create solutions will be an 18 Kaiser, “A Case Study in the Relation- aircraft to their targets. Without all three important part of retaining an advantage. ship of History of Technology and of General performing their roles, it would have Today’s defense development and History,” 39. been far more difficult to identify radar’s acquisition systems can learn from the 19 Kreisher, “Radar from World War II Until Today,” 71. potential, acquire the funding needed to history of the development of the Chain 20 Joseph F. McCloskey, “British Opera- develop it, and integrate it into Fighter Home early warning radar system. While tional Research in World War II,” Operations Command. the above lessons are helpful, perhaps Research 35, no. 3 (1987), 454. Team composition may differ based the most important lesson is the focus 21 Hart, Clash of Arms, 37–38. on the technology being developed and and willingness to take risks shown by 22 Williamson Murray, Military Adapta- tion in War: With Fear of Change (Cambridge: the system being worked through, but Dowding, Watson-Watt, Tizard, and Cambridge University Press, 2011), 156–158. every team needs technical, military, and their teams. Radar systems did not exist 23 Colin Gray, “Dowding and the British bureaucratic expertise. Without a techni- in 1935 when the government agreed to Strategy of Air Defense 1936–1940,” in Success- cal expert, teams struggle to understand fund one. They based their path ahead ful Strategies Triumphing in War and Peace the nuances of development, purchasing, on the sense of urgency created by their from Antiquity to the Present, ed. Williamson Murray and Richard Sinnreich (Cambridge: creating requirements, and maintaining strategic environment, a prototype, and Cambridge University Press, 2014), 241. new capabilities. This can result in unre- the belief they could iterate their way to a 24 Skolnik, “Fifty Years of Radar,” 38. alistic expectations, new technology that successful system. Without a similar atti- 25 Kaiser, “A Case Study in the Relation- does not actually perform the task it was tude, any group of innovators is less likely ship of History of Technology and of General designed for, and long-term maintenance to succeed. JFQ History,” 41. 26 James, “A History of Radar,” 344. problems. 27 Skolnik, “Fifty Years of Radar,” 182. Military experts serve several roles. 28 Alan Beyerchen, “From Radio to Radar: They help ensure technology will be ef- Notes Interwar Military Adaptation to Technologi- fective by identifying operational needs, cal Change in Germany, the United Kingdom, 1 potential friction points during real-world John Keegan, The First World War (New and the United States,” in Military Innovation York: Vintage Books, 2000), 174–182. in the Interwar Period, ed. Williamson Murray use, and how a particular capability will 2 Giulio Douhet, “The Command of the and Allan R. Millett (Cambridge: Cambridge fit in with the rest of the military. Military Air,” in Roots of Strategy: Book 4, ed. Curtis University Press, 1998), 282–283. experts connect their team to the op- Brown (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 29 Summary of the 2018 National Defense erational force, easing implementation. 1987), 283. Strategy of the United States of America: Sharp- 3 They also help add legitimacy so that the Alfred Gollin, “England Is No Longer an ening the American Military’s Competitive Edge Island: The Phantom Airship Scare of 1909,” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, acquisition system will take the program Albion 13, no. 1 (1981), 43. 2018), 3. seriously. 4 R.J. James, “A History of Radar,” IEE Bureaucratic experts are necessary Review 35, no. 9 (1989), 344. because development and acquisition 5 Russell A. Hart, Clash of Arms: How the take place in a vast, confusing space Allies Won in Normandy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 50. filled with red tape. However, they are 6 William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the also filled with opportunities for those Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New who understand the system to make a York: Simon & Schuster, 1960), 760. meaningful difference. A team member 7 Walter Kaiser, “A Case Study in the who understands the Federal Acquisition Relationship of History of Technology and of General History: British Radar Technology and Regulation, Other Transaction Neville Chamberlain’s Appeasement Policy,” Authorities, and a host of other regula- Icon 2 (1996), 32. tions, processes, and personalities allows 8 James, “A History of Radar,” 344. a team to move through the acquisition 9 Kaiser, “A Case Study in the Relation- JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Lynch 103 Death of General Wolfe, by Benjamin West, 1770, oil on canvas, National Gallery of Canada (Courtesy of The Yorck Project) Wolfe, Montcalm, and the Principles of Joint Operations in the Quebec Campaign of 1759 By Joseph Finnan, Lee P. Gray, John H. Perry, and Brian Lust critical campaign analysis of the reflected the principles of joint opera- joint operations, the thought processes French and Indian War’s 1759 tions better than its French enemy did. and underlying concepts similar to our A Quebec campaign demonstrates While the British lacked a doctrinal current doctrinal principles unmistak- that Britain achieved victory because it publication that listed principles of ably shaped their military thought. British General James Wolfe achieved decisive victory at Quebec because he creatively integrated many of these prin- Dr. Joseph Finnan is an Intelligence Officer in the Defense Technology and Long-Range Analysis Office ciples in his operational plan, thereby at the Defense Intelligence Agency. Major Lee P. Gray, USA, is a Political-Military Officer at Headquarters, U.S. Africa Command. Lieutenant Commander John H. Perry, USN, is on the Joint Staff J5. Lieutenant magnifying their effect. Committing to a Colonel Brian Lust, USA, is a Joint Transportation Planner at U.S. Transportation Command. clear strategic objective while practicing 104 Recall / The Principles of Joint Operations in the Quebec Campaign JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 effective unity of command between the force of French regulars led by the till the enemy should come near us; but army and navy allowed Wolfe to practice Comte de Bougainville arrived after the to little purpose.” As a commander, he economy of force with the troops he had climactic effort, but quickly withdrew. rigorously trained his troops in musket available. He retained the operational Both Wolfe and Montcalm suffered fire: “firing balls at objects teaches the offensive, exploiting masterful amphibi- mortal wounds in the engagement, and soldier to level incomparably, makes the ous maneuver and achieving dramatic the remaining French garrison inside recruits steady, and removes the foolish surprise in order to deploy overwhelming Quebec surrendered on September 17, apprehension that seizes young soldiers.” mass at the decisive point of the cam- 1759, resulting in a decisive British Similarly, he honed his appreciation for paign. Conversely, his opponent, General campaign victory.1 the principles of maneuver and surprise Marquis de Montcalm, displayed isolated during the abortive British amphibious adherence to some of these principles, Wolfe and the Traditional effort against Rochefort on the French but his failure to integrate them into an “Principles of War” coast in 1757. Wolfe deduced important overall approach limited their impact and Wolfe’s experience suggests that joint lessons for amphibious actions: “lose led to defeat. officers should take it upon themselves no time in getting troops on shore. . . . to analyze historical case studies and not generals should settle their plan of opera- Quebec Campaign of 1759 leave such examination solely to formal tions, so that no time may be lost in idle After achieving naval superiority in military instruction. Joint officers need debate. . . . pushing on smartly is the North America and conquering the to tie the lessons of abstract principles road to success.”3 French Atlantic fortress of Louisbourg to historical examples, as well as connect in 1758, British war plans targeted them to their own personal experiences, Successful Integration of Quebec City, the capital of New France, in order to internalize and apply these Joint Operating Principles as the primary objective for 1759. Con- principles in complex and unanticipated During the Quebec campaign, Wolfe sequently, Wolfe led his British expedi- future environments. integrated a majority of what we today tion of 9,000 men up the St. Lawrence While today’s designation of 12 call the principles of joint operations, River, landing initially on Ile d’Orléans, “principles of joint operations” is anach- using each as a force multiplier for the downriver from Quebec, on June 26, ronistic for the 18th century, Wolfe largely next, leading to ultimate victory on the 1759. Wolfe sought to draw his oppo- taught himself the military arts and Plains of Abraham. nent, Montcalm, out from his defensive acquired a familiarity with the traditional Objective. The British had a clear positions where he could conduct a principles of war. He read military theory and concrete strategic objective: the decisive engagement. Montcalm refused and history widely, including writers capture of the French Canadian capital to oblige. Wolfe ordered an artillery from antiquity such as Thucydides, Julius of Quebec. This clarity and consistency barrage of Quebec in early July, staged Caesar, and Xenophon, as well as more allowed Wolfe to organize his operational a frontal assault at Montmorency on recent military thinkers like Gustavus use of joint principles toward a consistent July 31, and conducted an operation Adolphus, Charles XII of Sweden, and strategic goal. Maintaining this clear in August of widespread destruction Vauban. Wolfe lamented Britain’s lack and consistent objective served as a throughout the French-Canadian of formal military education and argued prerequisite to leveraging the other joint countryside. With winter quickly that “our military education is by far the principles during the campaign. approaching, Wolfe faced the loss of worst in Europe. We are the most egre- Unity of Command. Though Britain his supporting naval squadron. He gious blunderers in war.” Wolfe strongly had no doctrinal concept of jointness, opted for a bold offensive move to draw favored critical analysis of past campaigns the clarity of the objective encouraged Montcalm out of his tactical defense. “to exercise the faculty of judging,” mak- excellent British interservice cooperation He therefore staged a daring nighttime ing the practical case that “the more a at Quebec. Wolfe needed this given his amphibious operation on September soldier thinks of the false steps of those reliance on the navy for access to French 13, where 4,000 British regulars sailed that are gone before, the more likely he is Canada and for overall campaign ma- downriver to a cove called the Anse au to avoid them.”2 neuver. British Admiral Charles Saunders Foulon, climbed the bluff there, and Wolfe also fortified his appreciation reported that “during this tedious moved onto the Plains of Abraham for these principles through firsthand mil- campaign, there has continued a perfect west of the city. Montcalm, unprepared itary experience, an option also available good understanding between the army for the British move, decided to attack to today’s joint officers. Wolfe identified and navy.” George Townshend, one of the British line with a combination of his preoccupation with the principle of Wolfe’s brigadiers, acknowledged that roughly 4,500 French regulars, Cana- mass after his experience at the battle of “we are indebted for our success to the dian militia, and Native allies. Con- Dettingen, in Germany in 1743, where constant assistance and support received centrated musket fire from the British as a junior officer he fruitlessly went on from [the admirals].”4 regulars broke the French advance and “begging and ordering the men not to Economy of Force. During the cam- cost France the battle. An additional fire at too great a distance, but to keep it paign Wolfe wrote, the “Marquis de JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Finnan et al. 105 Figure 1. Siege of Quebec during June 8 1 1759 egend R. Montmorency British Forces French Forces Artillery Militia and Natives Troop Movements Artillery Unsuccessful assault Troop Movements on Beauport R. Saint-Charles Hills Roads arthworks Buildings Beauport French Camp N Plaines of Abraham o Cap Rou ille t ge North Channel inv ga ou B Isle D Orleans Fire Ships British Quebec Camp South Channel Anse Du Foulon R. St. Lawrence Army Landing (Courtesy Hoodinski) Montcalm is at the head of a great num- Offensive. Wolfe did seize the embodied the modern instruction to ber of bad soldiers, and I am at the head initiative, although his initial attack at joint officers that “commanders adopt of a small number of good ones.”5 Wolfe Montmorency utterly failed and cost 440 the defensive only as a temporary expedi- sought to besiege his enemy, despite casualties.7 Wolfe nevertheless retained ent.”9 After the decisive engagement being heavily outnumbered throughout focus on his objective and remained on on the Plains of Abraham, British forces the province. He relied on the fact that the offensive at the operational level switched back to the operational offensive his British regulars were well drilled and when he launched his amphibious as- for the remainder of the campaign. well disciplined and that most British sault on September 13. After reaching Maneuver. By exploiting unity battalions at Quebec had trained exten- the promontory of Quebec, however, of command and economy of force, sively the year before in joint army-navy Wolfe switched to the tactical defensive, Wolfe could pursue the offensive with amphibious tactics.6 This greatly reduced waiting patiently for Montcalm to at- remarkable skill by employing maneuver the significance of simple numerical tack and giving tactical initiative to the and making use of military geography. inferiority, especially because Wolfe’s re- French.8 While this move violated the Relying on the navy’s direct observations tention of the initiative would allow him broad principle of the offensive, it did of the tidal pattern of the St. Lawrence to concentrate his limited forces against further Wolfe’s campaign goal of draw- River, Wolfe selected the one night in the primary effort. ing Montcalm into open battle and September 1759 when the tides would 106 Recall / The Principles of Joint Operations in the Quebec Campaign JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 deliver his men—who embarked at 0200 the anticipated main assault at Beauport. the decisive engagement on the Plains on the morning of September 13—to the Ultimately, Montcalm did not reach the of Abraham. Once the smoke cleared, target Anse au Foulon at 0400, shortly Plains of Abraham until 3 hours after the British forces could see the French force before dawn. Given tidal conditions, an initial British landing.14 in full retreat.20 amphibious operation the night before Mass. The shock among French Current doctrinal instructions to would land his men a full hour before leaders led Montcalm to react relatively joint officers caution that “the principles dawn; one the following night would fail quickly without waiting for reinforce- do not apply equally in all joint opera- to deliver them ashore until after dawn. ments, which allowed the mass effects of tions.”21 When Wolfe applied lessons Additionally, Wolfe took advantage of the British regulars’ firepower to become learned from historical cases and his own moonlight to enable his assault to navi- the decisive principle in the French defeat experiences throughout the campaign, gate successfully but without detection. on the Plains of Abraham. Tactically, he reinforced the concept of operational The southeasterly direction of the moon- British officers usually sought to control command as an art, requiring command- light effectively lit up the northern shore their men’s fire for coordinated effect, ers to interpret the relative weight of for his ships to identify their landing area, whereas the French generally approved of joint operating principles and their use in but failed to silhouette his assault force French troops firing on their own, favor- appropriate combinations. In this case, until it reached the objective—thereby ing efforts to follow this fire with a quick knowing when and how to violate specific denying the French sentries effective sur- bayonet charge.15 The French forces principles actually allowed Wolfe to ac- veillance until nearly the last moment.10 roughly equaled the number of British complish his overall campaign goals. Then British troops climbed a 175-foot forces in the battle, despite Montcalm’s Security. Wolfe intentionally violated bluff where they overpowered the small decision to strike before Bougainville’s the principle of security at the climactic number of French defenders.11 This nearly 2,000 reinforcements arrived. point of the battle by stationing his masterful use of maneuver further dem- While French regulars had the discipline troops in a static line on the Plains of onstrated that a commander must tailor to advance deliberately and hold ranks, Abraham without entrenching and with abstract operational principles to concrete the Canadian militiamen sprinkled no viable escape route. This had the physical and temporal conditions. throughout the French units broke into calculated effect of showing enough Surprise. The well-executed British a run. Various French forces opened fire apparent vulnerability to provoke maneuver produced total surprise among far outside musket range, at about 125 Montcalm finally into what Wolfe had the French. In 1757, Montcalm had to 150 yards, to minimal effect. French sought all summer: an open-field, identified Beauport, east of Quebec, as regulars reloaded standing in line while pitched battle.22 By sacrificing the prin- “the only place where the enemy can, the militia reloaded in their traditional ciple of security, Wolfe was able to set and must, make their landing.”12 This method—under cover or lying on the up conditions to exploit the principle of key assumption blinded Montcalm to ground. The effect left the French line mass to decisive effect. Wolfe’s actual operational plan even completely uneven and incapable of mass- Simplicity. Wolfe also jettisoned the after its initiation. Montcalm’s failure to ing fire effects.16 As the French advanced, principle of simplicity, relying instead on anticipate Wolfe’s point of attack reduced the center of the line pulled ahead and a highly risky, highly coordinated, and Montcalm to developing a battle plan on the left fell behind, creating three distinct tightly timed joint service operation. Part the spot with poor situational awareness clusters of French units as they ap- of this decision rested on his supreme and poor communications with his dis- proached the British lines.17 Once French confidence in his military and naval force persed forces. troops started to fire their muskets, the capabilities. The remainder reflected British deception efforts also achieved French battalions effectively split into Wolfe’s view “that in war something must great success. The day before Wolfe’s small groups of regulars or militia, given be allowed to chance and fortune, seeing assault on the Anse au Foulon, Admiral their different methods of reloading.18 that it is in its nature hazardous, and an Saunders’s sailors placed buoys into the British forces held fire as the French option of difficulties.”23 Additionally, the river near Beauport as if to mark obstacles advanced; British units on the flanks sheer complexity of the operation helped in the St. Lawrence River for an amphibi- opened fire at a range of 60 yards, but to guarantee that the French would not ous assault to avoid, as well as to conduct units in the center opened fire simul- anticipate it and that Wolfe could exploit a heavy bombardment there. Three hours taneously at 40 yards with devastating the principle of total surprise. before Wolfe’s landing upriver, Saunders’s effect.19 A British officer reported that Perseverance. Wolfe did not focus men rowed back and forth in the St. British forces “with great calmness, as at all on the three newer principles Lawrence near Beauport to imply an im- remarkable a close and heavy discharge, (perseverance, legitimacy, and restraint) minent landing.13 Montcalm so strongly as I ever saw . . . and, indeed well might beyond the traditional principles of war. assumed a Beauport assault that he even the French Officers say, that they never Abandoning perseverance, he wisely took interpreted the British ships traveling opposed such a shock as they received a major gamble to bring the campaign upriver (with Wolfe’s actual amphibious from the center of our line, for that they to a conclusion in September because assault force) as itself a diversion from believed every ball took place” during waiting would have deprived Wolfe of his JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Finnan et al. 107 greatest military advantage, British naval tale to joint officers about the risks of Simplicity. As with the principle of mobility. Waiting also would have risked applying these principles in isolation. By perseverance, Montcalm exercised the the primary British objective—to capture the time of Wolfe’s Quebec campaign, principle of simplicity, but in a man- Quebec City during 1759.24 Montcalm had to function on the oper- ner similarly divorced from the other Legitimacy. Wolfe also did not ational defensive with limited personnel principles. Originally, Montcalm settled concern himself with the principle of le- and material resources, since France on a straightforward preparation of his gitimacy. As a regular army officer fighting had reoriented its strategic priorities in defenses while waiting for likely British in a declared war, Wolfe made no special the wider war toward Europe and away assaults on his positions. Once British effort to demonstrate legitimacy to the from Canada.29 This reality elicited a forces arrived at the Plains of Abraham, French or French Canadians. Wolfe, who general defeatism in Montcalm by early Montcalm ordered a straightforward respected well-trained regular troops, 1759 when he predicted that “Canada frontal assault on the British lines, dic- disdained even his own American colonial will fall to the English, maybe this tated mostly by the topography of the troops, calling them “the dirtiest most campaign, or the next.”30 Acting on the Plains of Abraham.33 In this case, though, contemptible cowardly dogs that you can operational defensive put Montcalm at a the simplicity of Montcalm’s attack de- conceive.”25 None of this contempt for the significant disadvantage, ceding the ini- rived more from immediacy than from principle of legitimacy had any apparent tiative to Wolfe’s forces. This restricted wisdom, and even then it illuminated a effect on Wolfe’s campaign progress. Montcalm to a reactive approach and lack of interoperability between French Restraint. Additionally, during the led to a haphazard application of the regular and Canadian militia units. combat phase of the operation, Wolfe principles of joint operations through- Legitimacy. Montcalm, like Wolfe, grossly violated the principle of restraint out the campaign, which in turn led to did not show great concern for the prin- in a failed attempt to provoke Montcalm general operational incoherence and, ciple of legitimacy and, similar to Wolfe, into open battle. After the British failure ultimately, French defeat. suffered no apparent drawbacks for it. at Montmorency in July, Wolfe ordered Objective. Montcalm demonstrated The French court’s order early in 1759 his forces “to destroy the Harvest, strategic clarity regarding his campaign elevating Montcalm to the position of Houses, & Cattle” of the French objective, viewing his primary task as commander in chief of all French forces Canadian countryside, whereupon British the conventional military defense of in Canada did head off any potential in- troops laid waste to 1,400 civilian farms.26 Quebec City, which held the key to fighting between Montcalm and French By contrast, Wolfe’s successor French control of Canada. This held Canada’s political leadership over strate- Townshend realized that after the end true throughout the campaign despite gic direction.34 Montcalm, though, had of combat operations, he did not have Montcalm’s strategic disagreement with little sympathy for his French Canadian enough forces to control a hostile French the French Canadian governor General comrades. When some French Canadian Canadian civilian population. When the Marquis de Vaudreuil, who believed civilians in the summer of 1759 sug- remaining French garrison in Quebec that even if the British captured the city, gested surrendering the capital in order surrendered, he ordered that “all acts of they could not hold it if French and al- to terminate Wolfe’s campaign of de- violence, pillage, & cruelty are strictly lied Native forces retained the ability struction in the countryside, Montcalm forbid [sic]. The garrison are to have to conduct guerrilla-style harassment threatened them with abandonment to the Honours of War.”27 Britain com- throughout the province.31 Since both “the savages” as a form of counterter- mitted to returning French regulars to the French and British commanders ror.35 Nevertheless, Montcalm still France under flag of truce, while allowing identified control of the capital as the managed to exercise effective operational Canadian militiamen who surrendered campaign’s key objective, this parallel authority among his French regulars and their arms and pledged fidelity to Britain focus intensified the importance for each his Canadian militia units during the to return home.28 In this way, the British of effectively integrating the remaining campaign. maintained a successful occupation of operational principles. Unity of Command. Montcalm did Quebec City, demonstrating that while Perseverance. Montcalm did exercise exercise unity of command in Canada restraint had minimal relevance during perseverance but generally by default better than his French contemporaries in combat operations, it had a decisive rather than calculation. During the Europe. The court at Versailles, which importance as part of postcombat stabili- campaign, Montcalm had the luxury of consistently made binding “suggestions” zation efforts. time and demonstrated perseverance by to its field commanders, could not mi- refusing to allow the British to draw him cromanage military actions in Canada Montcalm’s Ineffective Use from his strong defensive positions from due to physical distance.36 Montcalm of Joint Operating Principles late June through early September.32 This therefore exercised direct control over Montcalm’s failure to integrate the negatively affected the overall campaign, French regulars and Canadian militia. He principles of joint operations during however, since it occurred only because did not exercise it, however, over France’s the Quebec campaign, in contrast to Montcalm surrendered the more decisive Native allies, who numbered over 1,000 Wolfe’s efforts, serves as a cautionary principle of the offensive. warriors in the Quebec campaign. The 108 Recall / The Principles of Joint Operations in the Quebec Campaign JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 “View of Louisbourg when the city was besieged by British forces in 1758,” Captain Charles Ince, drawn on the spot, engraved by P. Canot, November 11, 1762 (Courtesy Yale Center for British Art, Paul Mellon Collection) Native allies traditionally fought in east of Quebec with French regulars, posture than as an integrated opera- parallel, rather than integrated, efforts which allowed him to repel Wolfe’s at- tional approach to achieve an objective. with the French, and they performed ef- tacks in July, but relied on less capable Montcalm also fought among a friendly fectively against the British at the Plains militia units west of Quebec given the population, which restricted any tempta- of Abraham—British troops had estab- French expectation that the British tion to violate restraint. But he abandoned lished themselves in a field surrounded would not land there.39 Montcalm’s this prudence once British troops ap- by trees and brush, and this provided heavy fortification of the Beauport area, peared outside Quebec, allowing Wolfe Native skirmishers with an ideal operating Wolfe’s preferred amphibious target, did to provoke him rapidly into a disadvanta- environment.37 in fact deter Wolfe from landing there.40 geous military engagement.42 Montcalm’s But on the day of the battle, French The French commander, though, failure to show restraint in waiting for unity of command broke down. demonstrated a fatal overconfidence reinforcements on the Plains of Abraham Montcalm and both of his acting briga- that the 60-yard cliff from the river to contributed heavily to his defeat. diers suffered mortal wounds, meaning the promontory of Quebec afforded a Economy of Force. Because that the Quebec garrison after the battle natural defense west of the city where Montcalm remained on the operational had no senior French commanders. “100 men posted there could stop a defensive, he dispersed his forces over Meanwhile, the remaining French forces whole army [and] give us the time to a wide geographic area, thereby violat- outside the city, now under Governor- wait for daylight [and] march there from ing the principle of economy of force. General Marquis de Vaudreuil’s nominal [Beauport].” French overconfidence Since the British could decide the loca- command, decided after a council of the also led them to neglect the establish- tion of the primary engagement, this remaining officers to abandon the city to ment of a signals or mounted courier guaranteed that the French force would the British siege.38 system to allow the small garrison to call expend a high proportion of its combat Security. Montcalm practiced se- for help quickly.41 power on secondary efforts. Wolfe’s curity commendably throughout the Restraint. As with the principle of assault, therefore, caught French forces campaign except for one disastrous perseverance, Montcalm’s exercise of widely dispersed—Montcalm to the oversight. He heavily fortified the area restraint derived more from his defensive east at Beauport, Bougainville to the JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Finnan et al. 109 “Brigadier General James Wolfe at the siege of Louisbourg, 1758,” by Charles R. Tuttle (Illustrated History of the Dominion, 1877) west at Cap Rouge—and as a result, Offensive. Montcalm spent the with the best French regular units avail- Bougainville and 2,000 of France’s best entire campaign on the operational able to his command before launching his troops did not arrive on the battlefield defensive and never achieved the initia- attack on the British line. The disjointed until after the British had defeated tive throughout the campaign. When French attack displayed a critical French Montcalm’s main force.43 Montcalm suddenly decided to switch failure to concentrate mass among French Maneuver. Montcalm lost control of without preparation to the tactical of- combat power, leading to decisive defeat. the St. Lawrence River east of Quebec fensive on the Plains of Abraham, he did City at the start of the campaign.44 This, this solely as a reaction to Wolfe’s initia- Conclusion plus his need to defend a broad territory, tive. This combination, which proved Wolfe’s experience at Quebec implies severely limited his ability to maneuver his catastrophic, demonstrates that applying that while formal doctrinal instruction forces. Ultimately, Montcalm’s need to a joint operating principle in a technical in the principles of joint operations is move his forces by land in the operational way without integrating it into an overall useful, it will not by itself yield supe- area meant that first his own and then operational context can actually do more rior integration of these principles in Bougainville’s forces each arrived too late harm than good. practice. A truly inspired application to the battle to repel British forces.45 Mass. Montcalm’s offensive action of joint operating principles requires a Surprise. Montcalm failed most di- also suffered from a fatal weakening of commander to rely on a broad under- sastrously on the interrelated principles of French mass both before and during the standing of historical case studies, per- surprise, offensive, and mass. At the Plains battle. Because most battalions of French sonal experience, creativity, and specific of Abraham, Montcalm suffered total regulars had suffered attrition over the campaign conditions to exploit these surprise regarding the location and tim- course of previous North American principles to maximum effect. Con- ing of the British assault, which arguably campaigns with few replacements from versely, Montcalm’s experience suggests led to his rash and unsuccessful response. Europe, Montcalm compensated by that enacting these principles simply as Conversely, Montcalm’s behavior achieved integrating Canadian militia into French part of a rote checklist might individu- no surprise while playing perfectly into regular units, thus reducing unit integ- ally yield modest results but will fail to Wolfe’s operational plan, meaning the rity across many of his regular forces.46 maximize a military force’s capabilities British did not have to adjust their ap- Montcalm compounded this weakness by and will leave the force at the mercy proach at all due to French actions. failing to wait for Bougainville to arrive of an adversary commander who inte- 110 Recall / The Principles of Joint Operations in the Quebec Campaign JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 grates these principles into a coherent Ideal Moon: An Unappreciated Aspect of Wolfe’s Generalship at Quebec, 1759,” The overall operational plan. Notably, Wolfe William and Mary Quarterly 59, no. 4 (Octo- favored historical authors who were not ber 2002), 965, 967, 969, 973–974. only military theorists but also military 11 Anderson, Crucible of War, 353–354. practitioners. 12 D. Peter MacLeod, Northern Armaged- Today’s military practitioners can don: The Battle of the Plains of Abraham and the Making of the American Revolution (New York: benefit from Wolfe’s example of an abid- Knopf, 2016), 70. ing focus on the overall objective of the 13 Borneman, The French and Indian War, French capital, his mastery of surprise 219; see also Anderson, Crucible of War, 355. through understanding of the terrain, 14 Anderson, Crucible of War, 355–356. and his unique massing of overwhelming 15 Reid, Quebec 1759, 74. 16 Anderson, Crucible of War, 360–361. effects. While the character of war may From NDU Press 17 MacLeod, Northern Armageddon, 191. be rapidly evolving, the nature of war 18 Ibid., 195. Women on the Frontlines maintains many immutable principles. 19 Anderson, Crucible of War, 360–361. Studying historical cases demonstrates 20 Reid, Quebec 1759, 75. of Peace and Security that the principles of joint operations 21 JP 3-0, A-1. Foreword by Hillary Rodham 22 Anderson, Crucible of War, 355. apply universally in time and place, a Clinton and Leon Panetta 23 Liddell Hart, Great Captains Unveiled, NDU Press, 2015 • 218 pp. lesson James Wolfe implicitly knew and 250. mastered in 1759. Future joint force 24 Frank W. Brecher, Losing a Continent: This book reflects President officers will face the challenge to fuse France’s North American Policy, 1753–1763 Barack Obama’s commitment to doctrinal understanding, historical ex- (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998), 149. advancing women’s participation 25 Ibid., 255. in preventing conflict and keeping emplars, and personal creativity to apply 26 MacLeod, Northern Armageddon, 40; see peace. It is inspired by the joint operating principles in the future also Anderson, Crucible of War, 344. countless women and girls on the operating environment. JFQ 27 MacLeod, Northern Armageddon, 267. 28 Anderson, Crucible of War, 364–365. frontlines who make a difference 29 Francis Parkman, France and England in every day in their communities and societies by creating Notes North America, vol. 2, part 7: Montcalm and Wolfe (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, opportunities and building peace. 1942), 183. When women are involved 1 Walter R. Borneman, The French and In- 30 MacLeod, Northern Armageddon, dian War: Deciding the Fate of North America in peace negotiations, they raise 189–190. (New York: HarperCollins, 2006), 204, 207, important issues that might be 31 Anderson, Crucible of War, 346. 211–213, 217–223; William M. Fowler, Jr., otherwise overlooked. When 32 Fowler, Empires at War, 198, 206–207. Empires at War: The French and Indian War women are educated and enabled 33 Anderson, Crucible of War, 359. and the Struggle for North America, 1754–1763 to participate in every aspect of 34 Borneman, The French and Indian War, (New York: Walker and Company, 2005), 184, 190. their societies—from growing 191–194, 199–200, 204–213. 35 Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune: the economy to strengthening 2 B.H. Liddell Hart, Great Captains Crowns, Colonies, and Tribes in the Seven Years the security sector—communities Unveiled (London: Greenhill Books, 1989), War in America (New York: Norton, 1988), are more stable and less prone to 242–246. 421. conflict. 3 Ibid., 212–213, 245, 247–250. 36 Lee Kennett, The French Armies in the 4 Simon Foster, Hit the Beach! Amphibi- The goal of this book is to Seven Years’ War: A Study in Military Orga- ous Warfare from the Plains of Abraham to bring together these diverse nization and Administration (Durham: Duke San Carlos Water (London: Arms and Armour voices. As leaders in every region University Press, 1967), 19–21. Press, 1995), 20. of the world recognize, no 37 MacLeod, Northern Armageddon, 5 Fowler, Empires at War, 198. country can reach its full potential 66–68, 172–173. 6 Stephen Brumwell, “General Wolfe’s Men 38 Anderson, Crucible of War, 363–364. without the participation of all its in Quebec,” History Today 59, no. 9 (Septem- 39 Ibid., 348. citizens. ber 2009), 48–51. 40 MacLeod, Northern Armageddon, 28. 7 Stuart Reid, Quebec 1759: The Battle That Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/ 41 Reid, Quebec 1759, 61; see also MacLeod, Won Canada (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, Books/WomenontheFrontlinesof Northern Armageddon, 158. 2003), 42. 42 Fowler, Empires at War, 198, 206–207. PeaceandSecurity.aspx 8 Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven 43 Borneman, The French and Indian War, Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British 220–221. North America, 1754–1766 (New York: Knopf, 44 Brecher, Losing a Continent, 135–136. 2000), 357. 45 Ibid., 220–221. 9 Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Opera- 46 Reid, Quebec 1759, 17. tions (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, Janu- ary 17, 2017, incorporating change 1, October 22, 2018), A-3. 10 Donald W. Olsen et al., “Perfect Tide, JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Finnan et al. 111 understand world politics, one must be made repeat appearances. The Thirty alert to the potential for tragedy. Sadly, Years’ War, the Napoleonic Wars, and the United States today has lost its tragic World War I all had increasingly tragic sensibility at a time when it must work outcomes. The authors worry that today with purpose and vigor to shore up a the potential for great power conflict ap- faltering world order. In the process of pears to be growing as the proclivity of proving this thesis, the two authors have Western powers to take collective action published a book that is relatively com- is fading. The last time that happened prehensive, well-written, and original in was in the late 1930s, where the high its approach. casualties of World War I, isolationism, The authors begin with Aristotle, who the prominence of idealistic thinking, noted that a tragic sensibility is about and poor economic conditions induced understanding “not the thing that has paralysis among the Allies in the face of happened but a kind of thing that might the Axis threat. happen” (p. 3). The citizens of volatile The post–World War II period was Greek city-states had a much better sense grounded in the lessons of the tragedy of of what could happen at the extremes that greatest of all conflicts. The United of state relations, but Americans, the States and its Allies created a comprehen- authors argue, are “serial amnesiacs.” sive world order that included security After 75 years of peace among the major organizations, trade rules, monetary powers, Americans “are losing their sense policy management, a developmental of tragedy” (p. 5). The authors assert assistance bank, and the United Nations that Americans “must re-discover their system. Still, the bipolar competition The Lessons of Tragedy: inner sense of tragedy before they have to between the United States and the Soviet Statecraft and World Order experience it themselves” (p.6, emphasis Union accommodated limited wars By Hal Brands and Charles Edel in the original). Who better to teach and proxy conflicts. Wars of national Yale University Press, 2019 Americans about tragedy than the ancient liberation, often aided and abetted by 200 pp. $25.00 Greeks, who invented the art form more the Soviet Union or China, were fre- ISBN: 978-0300238242 than 20 centuries past? quent, but great power war was avoided. The ancient Greeks warned against Prosperity returned to the developed Reviewed by Joseph J. Collins both hubris and complacency. Blending world, and economic progress spread in fact, fiction, and recreation, their plays the developing world. The potential for often shocked the audience into contem- tragedy faded in the American mind. he field of international relations plating a contemporary world in relation Brands and Edel argue that after 75 is awash with books on world to tragedies of the past. The authors years of great power peace, the United order, “the system of norms, T offer as a prime example Aeschylus’s States has lost the tragic sensibility that rules, and power relationships that dissection in The Persians of how Xerxes “impelled it to do great things—and in regulates international affairs” (p. 42). abused his superior capabilities and doing so, it is undermining the exertions While military concerns often focus underestimated his determined Greek that have long held tragedy at bay” (p. on technical or operational issues, opponents. Persian hubris ruled, and 91). The end of the Cold War, the desire senior officers and strategists need to “dangers abound when leaders reach for a peace dividend, idealistic “end of understand the evolving world order to beyond their grasp” (p. 14). Greeks and history” thinking, and a real reduction understand the strategic context that Persians paid heavily for Xerxes’ folly. in defense spending all took place before underpins their work. The high prices paid by Americans and the costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Hal Brands, the Henry Kissinger the indigenous people in the invasion of After nearly a decade of fighting the Professor of Global Affairs at The Iraq and the war in Vietnam were pre- unanticipated war on terror, the United Johns Hopkins School of Advanced figured by the price paid by Greeks and States endured a serious financial crisis. International Studies, and Charles Edel, Persians. Unfortunately, the Greek ability At the same time, China and Russia had a senior fellow in the United States to learn from tragedy was not perfect; become more powerful and aggressive Studies Centre at the University of their refined tragic sensibility did not pre- internationally. In 2008, the Russians Sydney, Australia, have sought the wis- vent them from initiating the disastrous invaded Georgia. A half-decade later, they dom of the past to help us understand Peloponnesian War 50 years later. seized the Crimea and invaded Ukraine. the future world order. Their thesis is As the eras unfolded, progress and In 2017, Chinese Premier Xi Jinping told that tragedy has been a recurring but not development had their day, but tragedy, the Party Congress that China could now inevitable part of international affairs. To riding in the trains of large-scale wars, “take center stage in the world” (p. 131) 112 Book Reviews JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 and potentially establish a Sinocentric The curious reader may want to cast world order. a wider net on the issue of world order. The United States, according to the Three new books that would be useful authors, faces a “darkening horizon” are Kori Schake, America vs. the West: and increasingly “contested primacy” (p. Can the Liberal World Order Be Preserved 123). The onset of the Trump Presidency (Penguin Specials, 2018); Robert has complicated the U.S. response, weak- Kagan, The Jungle Grows Back: America ening the strong U.S. alliance focus, and and Our Imperiled World (Knopf, detracting from its propensity to exercise 2018); and Michael Mazarr and Ashley international leadership. The potential Rhoades, Testing the Value of the Postwar for great power conflict today is higher International Order (RAND, 2018). than it has been since the Cold War. Were But if you have a chance to read only that not enough to worry about, Iran and one book on world order, you would North Korea provide additional sources do well to read and meditate on Lessons of regional instability. The authors com- of Tragedy. Aristotle would salute your pare the contemporary period to the late prudence. JFQ 1930s and assert that today’s defenders of world order “seem demoralized, divided, and unreliable” (p. 140). Colonel Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.), Ph.D., taught for 25 years at the U.S. Military Academy at West In the final chapter of the book, Point, the National War College, and Georgetown Brands and Edel summarize their argu- University. From 2001 to 2004, he served as ment and leave the reader with what the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations. He holds a doctorate in amounts to a set of conceptual recom- political science from Columbia University and is mendations. They remind us that tragedy a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Sailing True North: Ten Admirals in international politics is normal and that and the Voyage of Character today tragedy is “again stalking global By James Stavridis affairs” (p. 149). At the same time, they Penguin Press, 2019 reject both complacency and fatalism. 336 pp. $28.00 All is not lost. To repair the world order, ISBN 978-0525559931 they recommend collective action and Reviewed by Peter H. Daly communal sacrifice. This will require consistent U.S. leadership, which they believe has been lacking for many years. haracter is being widely discussed The authors recommend “timely and on the national stage today, and it enduring action” (p. 158) to solve both is the main subject of Sailing True immediate and unending long-term C North: Ten Admirals and the Voyage of problems. Finally, they recommend a Character. This new title spans the arc sense of restraint and proportion, avoid- of time from Themistocles to current- ing both complacency and hubris, which day admirals. For each of his subjects, just happens to be a central message of the author distills their stories and key Greek tragedies. attributes. I have known Jim Stavri- The Lessons of Tragedy is an excellent dis for more than 30 years and most book, but the analysis is focused on great recently worked closely with him in my power politics. The centrality of survival role as CEO and Publisher at the U.S. and security supports that approach, but Naval Institute when he was Chair of the fraying of the international order has the Board. a number of important aspects beyond The short histories and examples that interstate security politics. The issues of he provides in Sailing True North do not international political economy, trade, just focus on successes; the book does a globalization, and regional/global orga- good job of giving balanced treatment nizations are a big part of the world order to both successes and failures. The flaws story, as are Chinese and Russian futures, are covered, and from these flaws and critical metrics in appreciating the poten- failures, we learn the most. It is a heavy tial for tragedy. lift to see so many historic subjects in one JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Book Reviews 113 title and relate these to the present-day identified in George Washington. A mal- world, all while providing relatable exam- aise has set in—one that manifests itself ples within the author’s own substantial in a trend of the best and brightest being experience. Sailing True North makes the discouraged from engaging in national lift and does it well. service. In reading the work, I was reminded While its emphasis is on naval lead- of the writings of Douglas Southall ers, Stavridis’s book provides character Freeman, best known for his biogra- and leadership insights that transcend phies of George Washington (Simon things naval and are relevant to the joint & Schuster, 1995) and Robert E. Lee warfighting community and joint pro- (Scribners, 1991). Freeman gave a series fessional military education. Indeed, it of lectures at the Army War College and has lessons that extend well beyond the the Naval War College that I recommend purely military realm. This gives Sailing to anyone who wants to understand True North a Freeman-esque quality and leadership under stress and under truly utility, and I recommend it to anyone consequential circumstances. After look- who wants to understand the essential ing at the leadership traits common questions of character and leadership to these men and others he studied, under stress. Jim Stavridis boils down the Freeman summed up their leadership traits, the common threads. For each, the qualities in three tenets, which in today’s author provides examples from his own diverse world of military service would experience. At the top of his list of 10 translate as follows: “Know Your Stuff,” key conclusions are creativity followed by “Do the Right Thing,” and “Look After resilience. The book makes readers think Your People.” and challenges us to ask who our heroes Subordinating Intelligence: Leadership and character are always are and what qualities they embody. The DOD/CIA Post–Cold important, but perhaps even more so Stavridis encourages us to self-examine as War Relationship now. There is a real thirst for national we make our voyage through life with all By David P. Oakley leadership—on both sides of the aisle— the tests of leadership and character that University Press of Kentucky, 2019 that citizens can feel proud of. This book one will experience. 264 pp. $37.70 proves that leadership is not limited to The author is supremely well read, ISBN: 978-0813176703 heroic seagoing assignments, even in the and, as such, he provides an invaluable Reviewed by J. Paul Pope Navy. Stavridis highlights three examples distillation of a vast span of history for in particular: Alfred Thayer Mahan, the easy assimilation. I found the style and writer whose books about seapower, the structure of the book easy to follow ong experiences in Iraq, Afghani- history, and geopolitics continue to influ- and enjoyable to read. Translating this stan, and other conflicts have ence our ideas about foreign policy and history and these traits into specific, resulted in an increased emphasis national defense; Hyman Rickover, the modern examples makes the book both L on civil-military relationships and visionary whose work on nuclear propul- an invaluable primer for new students of the interagency community in U.S. sion transformed the Navy forever; and leadership and a stepping off point for doctrine. Predeployment training now Grace Hopper, the gifted mathematician those who want to delve deeper into spe- includes exercises requiring coordina- and computer scientist who led the Navy cific historical subjects. tion with Embassies, Ambassadors, into the computer age. These leaders This book answers the question: What and U.S. and international agencies. demonstrated the kind of character— does Jim Stavridis think is most impor- Harnessing, aligning, and integrating especially the dedication to national tant? When the author is this well read, the collective expertise and capabilities service—that Stavridis obviously admires. this well known, and himself served at the found in these organizations is essential Another context that makes this book most consequential levels of command, for mission accomplishment. This inte- timely is the dramatically changed media that is a question worth answering. This gration cannot be assumed in mission environment. Deliberate disinformation makes it a recommended read—a must planning; it requires closer coordina- and the polarization of debate and dis- read. JFQ tion than previously understood, course make it more difficult for citizens mutual understanding, and intentional- to distinguish factual information from ity at all levels. false. The media environment is weapon- Vice Admiral Peter H. Daly, USN (Ret.), is the Chief Executive Officer of the U.S. Naval Institute. The practical record shows we have ized, and a casualty of this is a loss of faith too often failed to achieve even basic in our leaders and our institutions. We mission alignment or deconfliction. But crave the “essential sanity” that Freeman 114 Book Reviews JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 beyond an exhortation to expand our col- implicit demands that CIA be subordi- Oakley records instances of interagency lective understanding of jointness, how nated to a support role for DOD (despite conflict, or “storming,” which in turn does this actually work? Why is it so hard? its immense intelligence resources). An led to “norming,” which led to jointly Who is responsible for making it happen? interesting quality of the book is that it is “performing” the mission. His cases Who works for whom? Subordinating a Soldier—who understands the potential show that this process occurred much Intelligence: The DOD/CIA Post–Cold value of CIA capabilities when employing faster on the second and third attempts. War Relationship represents an important U.S. combat power—who articulates the They also highlight that the importance contribution to the body of literature potential costs of sacrificing its strategic of personal relationships—often forged on joint operations in this interagency collection and analytic responsibilities by shared danger—speak to the necessity context. to DOD’s “infinite demands on a finite for liaison officers, and offer examples of Other intelligence and non-intelli- resource.” Oakley not only illustrates what can happen when mutual respect for gence organizations are important to this “support-to-supported” tension for the ethos of other organizational players military operations, but the Central particular missions but also highlights in the shared operational space results Intelligence Agency is a particular case. instances where one side or the other in deep trust. The historical examples In some recent instances, CIA was the fails to understand that their missions seem to indicate that this process can be only U.S. organization already operating are actually different. He quotes a CIA accelerated, but not replaced, by reorga- in a region where the Department of officer describing the DOD’s expectation nization or imposed process. Defense (DOD) was assigned a combat of tactical support in its “sprint” to leave Interagency alignment is a prerequi- mission, as was the case in Afghanistan Iraq, while the Department of State and site for success. Oakley’s book is a model after 9/11. In noncombat zones, chiefs CIA were tasked to focus their efforts for more that needs to be written—on of station are tasked by the CIA director on a “marathon” to support a stable DOD and State, the Federal Bureau of and the Director of National Intelligence Iraq. In his excellent concluding chapter, Investigation and CIA, U.S. Aid and with coordinating all intelligence opera- Oakley quotes Senator David Boren DOD, and so forth. I highly recommend tions in-country. CIA analysts guard their (D-OK) musing about the appropri- his book. JFQ independence stubbornly, and command- ate role for CIA in 2013 by asking, “In ers from William Westmoreland to David the long term, what’s more important, Petraeus have found themselves frustrated Afghanistan or China?” J. Paul Pope is Professor of Practice at the LBJ School for Public Affairs and Senior Fellow in the by the effect their analysis had on the ci- While bringing this baked-in dilemma Intelligence Studies Project at the University of vilian leadership’s framing of “their war.” into stark relief, Oakley correctly resists Texas at Austin. Professional development often does too the urge to prescribe bold legislative or little to prepare rising officers to work executive remedies to resolve it. Yes, with CIA in the field or at senior staff the CIA exists to collect strategic intel- levels, with the recent exception of special ligence, to provide strategic analysis for operations forces. the President and his key advisors, and Subordinating Intelligence is a well- to conduct covert action when lawfully written analysis of the evolution of the ordered to do so. On the other hand, relationship between DOD and CIA in the CIA can bring unique capabilities to the post–Cold War era. One valuable the fight and can contribute to the “rich contribution from this history is the iden- contextual understanding” (as General tification of the barriers to cooperation, Stanley McChrystal described it) required which pop up time after time in the vari- for success on complex battlefields. It ous instances Oakley describes. A second would be folly either to subordinate CIA contribution is the isolation of the factors to supporting warfighters or to preclude that made a difference where integration its assistance when Americans are shed- was achieved. As implied in the title, how- ding blood. The chapters between the ever, Oakley’s book addresses another introduction and the conclusion offer important and specific question. CIA examples and practical principles for was created to be an independent agency building effective teamwork and avoiding outside any Cabinet-level department and these draconian choices, while taking ad- a strategic intelligence organization to vantage of all available capabilities. serve the needs of the President and the Both military and intelligence profes- National Security Council. sionals would be well served to read this Oakley sees a threat to this mission excellent book to find examples of what based on the creeping militarization of can go wrong, but also what can go right. U.S. foreign policy, including explicit and Consistent with organizational theory, JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Book Reviews 115 Marine Corps cryptologic analyst assigned to 1st Radio Battalion, I Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group, monitors electromagnetic spectrum during training in support of Command Post Exercise at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, December 12, 2018 (U.S. Marine Corps/Brendan Mullin) Unmasking the Spectrum with Artificial Intelligence By Matthew J. Florenzen, Kurt M. Shulkitas, and Kyle P. Bair magine you are a combatant com- command center you can precisely munications are at best intermittent and mander (CCDR) equipped with the observe your forces on the battlefield, at worst nonexistent, your modern air- I latest capabilities today’s military has and your surveillance equipment allows craft and naval assets cannot integrate to offer. Your troops are armed with unmitigated access to their actions and operations, and your combat arms are fifth-generation aircraft, precision- communications in real time. However, relegated to utilizing line-of-sight com- strike capabilities, advanced naval when you take this state-of-the-art force munications to control the battle. The forces, and fully networked combat into combat against a near-peer com- Clausewitzian “fog of war” settles on arms and land forces. From your petitor, nothing seems to work. Com- the joint operation, inducing confusion, ambiguity, and missed opportunities to advance the mission. At the tactical and operational levels of war, the ability to Lieutenant Colonel Matthew J. Florenzen, USAF, is in the Central Security Service at the National pass real-time decisions is gone, and the Security Agency. Lieutenant Commander Kurt M. Shulkitas, USN, is the Military Advisor for Cyber and Information Operations at the Department of State. Major Kyle P. Bair, USA, is an Analyst in the Joint latency of information delays command War Gaming and Experimentation Division at the Joint Staff J7. decisions for 24 to 72 hours. The 116 Joint Doctrine / Unmasking the Spectrum with Artificial Intelligence JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 combined arms firepower of your joint Figure 1. The Electromagnetic Spectrum force—the cornerstone of U.S. military doctrine—is combat-ineffective. isible Radio Spectrum Spectrum In this scenario, one potential issue complicating your operations might be E F F F F F F U F S F E F IR U -Ray amma Cosmic an enemy exploiting your force’s reliance Ray Ray on the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). What do you see when you envision the EMS? It could be nothing that comes F U F S F to mind, or maybe you picture the static joint doctrine description shown in 100 300 1,000 3,000 6,000 figure 1. This article examines the ben- MHz MHz Hz Hz Hz efits and risks associated with integrating Below 6 z artificial intelligence (AI) and machine Non-Federal Controlled Spectrum Shared Spectrum learning (ML) technologies into the com- Federal Controlled Spectrum Selected Bands at Issue mand and control (C2) systems guiding The top bar shows how the electromagnetic spectrum is divided into various regions and indicates that joint electromagnetic spectrum operations portion referred to as the radio spectrum. The lower bar illustrates the division of Federal, non-Federal, and (JEMSO). To scope this discussion, this shared bands for a critical part of the radio spectrum. article examines how AI and ML solutions egend can improve a CCDR’s ability to visual- EHF: extremely high frequency LF: low frequency UHF: ultrahigh frequency ize, comprehend, and make informed ELF: extremely low frequency MF: medium frequency UV: ultraviolet GHz: gigahertz MHz: megahertz VHF: very high frequency decisions regarding the electromagnetic HF: high frequency SHF: super-high frequency VLF: very low frequency operating environment (EMOE).1 IR: infrared Figure 2 portrays how the U.S. Army perceives the EMOE. In today’s for AI- and ML-enabled EMS visualiza- developing and resourcing an electro- information age, speed in the battlespace tion systems and provides a sample of magnetic capability to deter and defeat is predicated on information and the what is currently available. Finally, it ad- threats are imperative to U.S. national joint force’s overall understanding of dresses the potential impacts of data types interests. how the EMOE functions in joint opera- regarding AI and ML integration that Ensuring constant and reliable tions. Understanding and visualizing must be considered in order to minimize access requires significant EMS connec- the EMOE are crucial as military and risk. With this understanding of where tions to facilitate modern command, civilian network interconnectedness and we are currently, the capability of AI/ML control, and communication linkages reliance on reliable access to the EMS to improve our EMS visualization and across military systems. The joint force increases. In turn, this interconnected- understanding, and clear appreciation for attempts to achieve a credible means to ness and reliance help clarify the root the role of data inputs to these systems, maneuver within the EMS through joint problem: spectrum operations in today’s we gain a better appreciation of AI- and electromagnetic spectrum management information age and against a near-peer ML-enabled EMS visualization systems operations, which enable “EMS- competitor pose significant regional and and how they might improve the decision dependent capabilities and systems to global challenges that will ultimately cycle within the EMOE. perform their functions in the intended complicate a CCDR’s ability to visual- environment without causing or suffer- ize and understand the EMOE with Impetus ing unacceptable interference.”2 While the required fidelity to make timely and Most of our modern military (and civil- technical solutions are in development appropriate JEMSO decisions. With this ian) capabilities, warfighting systems, to meet this critical need, joint force problem identified, this article examines and businesses depend on open, trusted, spectrum management is largely ac- the following question: can AI and ML and constant use of the EMS. Policies complished manually through Excel improve a CCDR’s understanding of and procedures must lay the foundation spreadsheets and frequency listings. The a contested EMS, and what potential for planning and mission preparation manual processes used to manage the data quantity and quality pitfalls must be in a complex electromagnetic environ- increasingly congested EMOE depicted understood? ment. The National Security Strategy, in figure 3 are the antithesis of simplicity Three lines of effort are used to dis- National Intelligence Strategy, and joint and should concern the warfighter. sect this complex question. First, the doctrine generally agree that near-peer To better manage this process, the article builds a common understanding competitors to Western ideals recognize joint force is developing JEMSO doctrine of why AI and ML are being considered the significant advantages provided by to guide the growing dependence on to improve CCDR EMS visualization. effective EMS operations. These impor- reliable EMS access. According to Joint Second, it examines the potential roles tant documents clearly indicate that Doctrine Note 3-16, Joint Electromagnetic JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Florenzen, Shulkitas, and Bair 117 dynamic EMOE is vital for a CCDR to ef- Figure 2. isualization of Cyberspace and the Electromagnetic fectively shape and dominate the EMS and Spectrum in an perational Environment improve the capacity to identify, confront, AIR circumvent, communicate, synchronize, U.S. ilitary Commercial Satellite United States Satellite Europe and operate effectively. S CF ilitary The process employed to mitigate D D D D Satellite ateway UAS ateway EMS fratricide is the joint restricted EW R N frequency list (JRFL), a “time and NEC geographically oriented listing of . . . func- AND tions, nets, and frequencies.”6 However, EW Radio the JRFL is still a list and does not readily improve a CCDR’s ability to recognize Cellular PTT Radio EMS fratricide or visualize how the interference is affecting the battlefield. Cellular BDE The current process to manage spectrum fratricide and interference is to file a report BN with the Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR) program, which “iden- tifies, reports, analyzes, and mitigates or Undersea Cable CC D Switching Station resolves incidents of EMI [electromagnetic interference].”7 Spectrum managers use C RPS DI the manual JSIR process to “report and diagnose the cause or source of all EMI (intentional/unintentional).”8 The JSIR SEA process quickly loses utility and effective- egend BDE: brigade PTT: push to talk ness when facing a near-peer competitor BN: battalion RHN: regional hub node attempting to affect the EMS in his favor CCMD: combatant command UAS: unmanned aerial system or in a congested EMOE with constant DIV: division International boundary DOD: Department of Defense EMI. In a contested or congested EMOE, Network node EW: electronic warfare friendly EMS fratricide and intentional Non-attributed network HSMCF: home station mission command facility interference by an enemy force are nearly NEC: network enterprise center Satellite transport indistinguishable. our e: U.S. Army Field Manual 3-12, y ers a e and le troni Warfare erations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, April 2017), 1-3. With the 2019 JEMSO doctrine release, joint force commanders should Spectrum Operations, “[JEMSO] are operations are vital to victory and may expect improved integration of EMS military actions undertaken by two or offset the military advantages enjoyed operations. This doctrine reorganizes more Services operating in concert to by the United States and its allies. The CCDR staffing functions and processes exploit, attack, protect, and manage the EMOE also provides an avenue for an ad- to recognize, report, and react to EMS EMOE. These actions include all joint versary to influence the U.S. homeland in interference sources; however, it does not force transmissions and receptions of elec- ways not possible during earlier conflicts. singularly boost capacity or dramatically tromagnetic (EM) energy.”3 The EMS is Near-peer competitors are incorporating improve subject matter expertise running critical to the military’s ability to execute progressive and innovative technologies JEMSO cells. Humans have a limited operations and plays a similarly vital role in that pose significant challenges to C2 and ability to process the continually expand- civilian infrastructures. The United States the infrastructures used in it. ing amounts of EMS-related information and its highly interconnected society are The Defense Spectrum Organization in the EMOE. Additionally, humans particularly exposed to a variety of EMS- (DSO) is the Department of Defense manually processing the signal data lack related attacks, ranging from degraded (DOD) Center of Excellence for spectrum the information quality required to visu- communications and disrupted banking management. DSO provides data-focused alize and understand the modern EMOE and financial transactions to interrupted analytic expertise for military command- in battle-relevant time frames. The future electricity distribution. This dependency ers, partners, and allies to enable spectrum of EMOE management hinges on system extends to U.S. military forces. In fact, the management.5 The analyses bolster the automation being able to inherently next armed conflict may be won or lost CCDR’s ability to visualize and effectively sense, display, and eventually modify based on the fight for EMS superiority.4 employ operational capabilities within a friendly EMS-dependent systems opera- Adversaries are cognizant that ef- complex electromagnetic environment. tions to adapt to interference. Automated fective EM measures during combat Comprehensively understanding the sensing and decisionmaking solutions 118 Joint Doctrine / Unmasking the Spectrum with Artificial Intelligence JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 must be employed to understand and Figure 3. The Electromagnetic Spectrum visualize a complex EMOE and enable decisionmaking within the EMS that isible maximizes combat capability. Radio Spectrum Spectrum amma Cosmic Current Initiatives E F F F F F F U F S F E F IR U -Ray Ray Ray While the concepts and doctrine associ- ated with JEMSO provide the joint force with necessary processes and a foundation for improving a CCDR’s radio frequency infrared ultraviolet geomagnetic extremely very spectrum very ability to see, understand, and make and sub ELF low low low sense of the EMOE, the underlying sources frequency frequency microwaves visible x-rays frequency technology is crucial to operationalizing the EMS as a warfighting capability. Even with the best trained personnel, Earth and CRT mobile cell/ microwave medical radioactive processes, and plans, the future operat- subways AC power monitors AM/FM TV PCS and satellite sunlight x-rays sources ing environment will be so complex Gigahertz (GHz) 10-9 Terahertz (THz) 10-12 Pentahertz (PHz) 10-15 Exahertz (EHz) 10-18 ettahertz ( Hz) 10-21 ottahertz ( Hz) 10-24 that our ability to sense and orient the egend force to the EMS actions of a near-peer AC: alternating current FM: frequency modulation SHF: super high frequency competitor will be virtually impossible. AM: amplitude modulation HF: high frequency TV: television Numerous studies have determined that CRT: cathode ray tube IR: infrared UHF: ultrahigh frequency the character of war will continue to be EHF: extremely high frequency LF: low frequency UV: ultraviolet ELF: extremely low frequency MF: medium frequency VHF: very high frequency increasingly reliant on the force’s ability EMF: electromagnetic field PCS: personal communication system VLF: very low frequency to sense and make sense of information. Workshops and war games repeatedly a recognized sub-discipline of AI, ML released its 2018 AI strategy. The strat- find that the ability to collect, process, seeks to make sense of massive troves egy, clearly informed by the other major and disseminate accurate battlefield of data using computers that can react national security strategies, broadly directs intelligence to the right decisionmak- without running explicit rules-based the Department to accelerate the adop- ers provides a key decisive edge.9 To programming functions. Essentially, the tion of AI while acknowledging that the address this critical shortfall, DOD rec- computers are deriving key relationships technology will almost certainly change ognizes that the joint force must rapidly by learning from the data rather than how DOD conducts business in poten- evolve in both its battlespace awareness being told what is important.12 There are tially profound and unexpected ways.14 and EMS agility to adequately compete a variety of other ML techniques with a As DOD finally shines a spotlight in the next conflict. Legacy systems and broad range of utility and effectiveness, on these disruptive and transformative engineering designs carried the force but a deeper discussion of the full breadth technologies and acknowledges the to where it is today, but the future and depth of AI and ML is beyond the need for coherent national AI strategies, promises known and unknown complex scope of this article. research and development focused on challenges that will test our ability to As the world continues to blur the utilizing AI and ML to improve how the decisively act and react to changes in boundary between possible and impos- United States leverages the EMS is in- the competitive environment. sible with AI, DOD recognizes it must creasingly important. One such project is Before a discussion regarding active be at the forefront of the potentially the Defense Advanced Research Projects projects seeking to address the challenges disruptive technology. In June 2018, Agency (DARPA)–sponsored Radio faced in the EMS can commence, it is former Secretary of Defense James Mattis Frequency Machine Learning System important to briefly discuss AI and ML. reorganized responsibility for DOD’s AI (RFMLS). RFMLS’s goal is to “develop AI is an umbrella term used to describe initiatives from the Under Secretary of the foundations for applying modern a family of technologies and techniques Defense for Research and Engineering, data-driven machine learning to the RF seeking to allow machines to respond to Michael Griffin, to DOD’s Chief [radio frequency] spectrum as well as to external stimulation as humans might, Information Officer, Dana Deasy, under develop practical applications in emerging with “contemplation, judgment, and in- a new organization, the Joint Artificial spectrum problems.”15 The effort sought tention.”10 Others take this idea one step Intelligence Center (JAIC). The JAIC to achieve four specific objectives. First, further by broadly defining the qualities assumed coordination responsibilities for the system or system of systems should such systems and techniques must have. any AI-related project over $15 million, have the ability to learn features in order John Allen and Darrell West assert that while the Services or sponsoring agencies to directly use sensor data. Second, the AI systems should have “intentional- maintain responsibilities for any project system should be able to determine what ity, intelligence, and adaptability.”11 As under $15 million.13 Additionally, DOD EMS data are most important while JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Florenzen, Shulkitas, and Bair 119 Marines from 2nd Radio Battalion, II Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group, and a Norwegian army electronic warfare operator employ Wolfhound Handheld Threat Warning System during Integrated Training Exercise 5-19 at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California, July 30, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Cedar Barnes) simultaneously being able to recognize and integrate warfighting functions. The The Future Need new signals of interest. Third, the system complexity of the environment requires Incorporating AI into the EMOE visu- should be able to adaptively reconfigure that today’s CCDR can understand, alization and understanding process will sensors automatically to achieve optimum visualize, and act within the EMS to fully support the growing speed of JEMSO; performance under given prevailing employ the broad capabilities of their however, AI, ML, and deep learning conditions. Finally, the system should fighting forces. models depend on reliable and trusted have the capability to learn to synthesize This is where the utility of AI- and data to ensure learning is not corrupted. and transmit entirely new engineer- ML-enabled EMS visualization systems The dependence on data in both quality ing strong-motion ESM waveforms.16 can truly impact the total force operations and quantity poses the greatest risk to Another DARPA initiative is the Adaptive by recognizing and reacting to a fluid integration of AI and ML technologies Radar Countermeasures (ARC) program. EMOE. By integrating systems that can into the JEMSO processes. In June This program seeks to leverage ML and communicate among themselves without 2015, the U.S. Army Research Labora- advanced signal processing to dynami- operator intervention and can incorpo- tory conducted a workshop to visualize cally characterize a potential radar threat, rate the necessary bits of information that the tactical ground battlefield in 2050 even one never observed; synthesize a otherwise would be background noise to and reported that “the roles of informa- countermeasure (for example, conduct the human operator, improvements can tion technologies will co-evolve (that jamming); and then evaluate the counter- be made in the ability to sense EMS ac- is, will influence and be influenced measure’s battlefield effectiveness.17 tors and emissions. By applying a variety by) future concepts and technologies Thanks to programs like RFMLS and of models, AI- and ML-assisted systems for key warfighting functions, includ- ARC, the pace of EMS operations and can begin to categorize individual emis- ing seeing (sensing), understanding, our reliance on them will only increase. sions and their impacts to friendly force communicating . . . capabilities that Near-peer competitors will attempt to EMS operations. With that said, the are involved in obtaining, collecting, exploit joint force EMS dependency, ability of AI and ML systems to access, organizing, fusing, storing, and distrib- seeking to isolate systems specifically process, and report on the EMS poses uting relevant information as well as the designed to use the EMS to optimize some operational challenges. capabilities associated with C2 functions 120 Joint Doctrine / Unmasking the Spectrum with Artificial Intelligence JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 and processes including reasoning, systems, we can connect these apertures, connect, apply context, infer meaning, inference, planning, decisionmaking.”18 or more accurately the data they are and ultimately make analytical and op- Up to this point this article has dis- sensing becomes connected, to a central erational judgments based on all available cussed the current limitations in sensing nervous system capable of moving and data.”20 Since data in its rawest form and understanding the EMOE and the storing the information meeting multiple builds the individual pixels of informa- role of AI and ML technologies and how EMS purposes simultaneously. This idea tion to be used by AI/ML systems to they can change the tools available to is commonly referred to as the “big data” learn, the sources and quality must be accomplish these tasks. In order to real- concept.19 In the simplest terms and for controlled to reduce risk and prevent un- ize the potential advantages offered by the scope of this article, two types of data wanted manipulation. Failure to ensure introducing AI and ML capabilities into concepts are examined, “big” data and the quality of data sets can change the our JEMSO C2 systems, there must be “deep” data. Arguments can be made on processing and dissemination of the intel- clarification of the basic requirements for the advantages and disadvantages of these ligence being produced. Conversely, deep sensing, visualizing, and informing deci- data sets. In truth, battlefield command- data sets are used to describe the detailed sions regarding the EMS. ers will require both. quality of an individual data point against First, sensing is the process of collect- Let us begin by clarifying in simple a singular purpose or target over time ing, routing, and storing information that terms the differences between big and to build behavioral relationships and to will form the building blocks for further deep data sets. The working definition of add depth of understanding.21 Through analysis and processing. Using EMS data for our discussion is bits of informa- deep or analyzed data, EMS visualiza- sensors to facilitate this is not a new con- tion that can be combined to depict a tion takes on context and meaning. By cept. Nearly every fielded system in the pattern of information that can be used combining both deep and big data sets military today has an aperture designed to visualize the EMS. In this simple into our ML and deep learning models, to facilitate its own limited EMS sensing definition, an individual data point is not EMS visualization systems can rapidly requirements. So how does application of much value to improving AI and ML sense the EMOE and focus intelligence of AI and ML change the role of these technologies or recreating near real-time analysis efforts against it to enable mean- apertures to enable enhanced and cen- EMS visualization. To do this, automated ingful understanding. In other words, tralized EMS sensing? More specifically, systems will require multiple data sets or if big data provides the what, then deep what level of EMS sensing is required groupings of these individual data points data provides the so what. With both the to facilitate a CCDR’s decisionmaking that, when combined, begin to tell a what and the so what bits of information, regarding JEMSO? The answer is not in story about the nature of the EMOE. intelligence processes can be streamlined, the apertures; instead, it lies in how one Common approaches for collecting these resulting in actionable EMS visualization connects and moves the information to data sets are where the terms big and deep and understanding informing the CCDR a central processing system enabled by enter the discussion. For the purpose of decision processes. Therefore, while the AI and ML. This information or data is this article, big data is used to reference idea of big data does offer a capability working through the AI and ML models the collection of massive quantities of to rapidly sense the EMOE, it must be to provide the learning context for these data sets from across a wide set of sen- measured and weighed against deep data systems, which builds understandable vi- sors. The advantage of big data in this sets to reduce the risks of data corruption sualization, improves them over time, and definition is in its ability to scrape a vast and to provide the intelligence necessary ultimately allows a CCDR to understand quantity of data points from the EMOE to understand the EMOE. where, how, and to what effect all EMS for any snapshot in time. It does this by Next is communicating this informa- actions are having on the EMOE. integrating and pulling shallow data sets tion in a way that enables a commander Imagine the EMOE as an ecosystem. from multiple sensors for a defined time and staff to quickly understand it, enabling Within it, the AI and ML would repre- slice and providing these individual data them to make informed decisions on sent a central nervous system, connecting points to the AI ecosystem. The AI/ML JEMSO. Today, our forces employ many the individual sensor neurons and pro- system can rapidly compare these snap- variations of EMS modeling capabilities to cessing inputs from them to understand shots, using them to recognize patterns help them build graphical understanding the environment. In this same ecosystem, occurring in the environment. and visualization of the EMS—everything the data from these sensors could be While the idea of having thousands of from 3D modeling to waterfall spectrum represented by the blood that fuels the EMS sensors each providing inputs from charts and maps with specific emitter decisionmaking and learning models their individual apertures’ perspective graphics and details. However, all of these for the AI and ML systems. Today, each into a visualization system may initially visualization tools are costly in time and individual aperture is isolated, reporting sound like an easy answer, the issue is labor and do not have the capacity to only to its own internal and limited sys- more complex. Moreover, commanders work with the vast amount of data avail- tem for a designed function related to the make decisions not on data but rather able through an AI-enabled EMS sensing same individual system. By integrating on intelligence, and “it is the job of the solution. To reduce the processing time AI and ML processes into our JEMSO Intelligence Community to analyze, required and accurately relay the EMOE JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Florenzen, Shulkitas, and Bair 121 Marine with electronic warfare liaison element, Marine Rotational Force–Europe 19.2, Marine Forces Europe and Africa, prepares for tactical extract during exercise Valhalla in Setermoen, Norway, June 17, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Larisa Chavez) at the speed of battle, these modeling air, or space operations centers, a CCDR data sets—data sets that can be applied tools must leverage or become a func- can look up to the big screens and quickly to the AI and ML systems to increase tion of the same AI learning systems used see and understand where forces are system learning of the EMOE in detail. to collect and process the EMS data/ and what actions are being performed. Armed with these systems and your information. To simplify, the same AI However, there is not visualization of network of data providers, you can and ML technology that is integrating what the EMS looks like around them or rapidly detect, report, and produce the EMS abilities to sense, visualize, and what is being done within it to ensure they visualization tools that allow you to understand can simultaneously direct are connected to the rest of the force. In a understand the changes in your EMOE refined intelligence analysis and graphical limited engagement, we can get away with as they are reported, enabling you to modeling programs. Not only can it do this lack of understanding and visualiza- make effective and timely decisions to this, but it also should do this to provide tion, but against a near-peer competitor protect and ensure your force access to CCDRs a visual depiction of what is being we will quickly see our forces isolated from the EMS. Given this system, the CCDR detected in the EMS, relationships and the rest of the military systems supporting sees and understands the EMOE, behaviors tied to the detections, and how them if we fail to visualize and understand quickly recognizing and mitigating their forces are responding. Admittedly, the EMOE. near-peer competitors’ attempts to this may present some risk by prematurely affect friendly force spectrum assurance. acting on information before detailed Conclusion Having gained an increased understand- intelligence analysis is accomplished. To Let us again imagine you are a CCDR ing of the EMOE, the CCDR can miti- mitigate this risk, human expertise is re- equipped with the very best capabili- gate EMS impacts and maximize the quired in the processes. ties today’s military can offer. But now joint force’s warfighting potential. The human expertise residing in the add into your tool kit a C2 system that By integrating AI and ML systems JEMSO planning and execution cells will incorporates emerging JEMSO doctrine into the JEMSO C2 doctrine and pro- serve to coordinate these actions, but the and is enabled by AI and ML technolo- cesses, a CCDR is better equipped to design of the visualization must be simpli- gies. These technologies rapidly connect visualize and understand his EMOE at fied to allow for immediate and detailed the thousands of apertures across the the speed of battle in the information understanding. To put this in context, battlefield and report back to command age. The need for improved processes to today within most of the land, maritime, systems, providing both big and deep sense and make sense of the EMS and 122 Joint Doctrine / Unmasking the Spectrum with Artificial Intelligence JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 how it is intertwined within our military and national networks has been identi- fied as critically important by all levels Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision of our strategic guidance, yet DOD has (to be signed within 6 months) no solutions currently fielded to address JP 1-0, Personnel Support the issues. By incorporating smart and JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence automated systems that apply a variety of learning models, we can improve the JP 3-05, Special Operations EMS visualization processes and better JP 3-26, Combating Terrorism understand the nature of the informa- JP 3-40, Countering WMD tion fueling these systems. The Defense Department can reduce the risks associ- JP 5-0, Joint Planning ated with capacity saturation by balancing JP 6-0, Joint Communications System between deep and big data solutions that enable us to understand and visualize the EMOE. The safety and combat effective- JPs Revised (signed within last 6 months) ness of the joint fighting force demand JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, vol. 1 AI solutions that preserve the capacity JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support to sense and make sense of an incred- JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support ibly complex electromagnetic operating environment. Now is the time to lift the JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations electromagnetic fog of war. JFQ JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance JP 3-30, Joint Air Operations Notes JP 3-31, Joint Land Operations JP 4-09, Distribution Operations 1 The electromagnetic operating environment (EMOE) is defned as “the background [elec- JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support tromagnetic] radiation and the friendly, neutral, and adversarial electromagnetic [activity] within the [electromagnetic area of influence] associ- ated with a given operational area.” See Chair- shop Report, ARL-SR-0327 (Adelphi, MD: U.S. 2018), available at JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Florenzen, Shulkitas, and Bair 123 call for entries for the 2020 Secretary of Defense and 2020 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competitions Are you a professional military education (PME) student? Imagine your winning essay published in a future issue of Joint Force Quarterly, catching the eye of the Secretary and Chairman as well as contributing to the debate on an important national security issue. These rewards, along with a monetary prize, await the winners. Who’s Eligible? Students, including international students, at U.S. PME colleges, schools, and other programs, and Service research fellows. What’s Required? Research and write an original, unclassified essay on some aspect of U.S. national, defense, or military strategy. The essay may be written in conjunction with a course writing requirement. Important: Please note that entries must be selected by and submitted through your college. When? Anytime during the 2019–2020 academic year. Students are encouraged to begin early and avoid the spring rush. Final judging and selection of winners take place May 2020, at NDU Press, Fort McNair, Washington, DC. For further information, see your college’s essay coordinator or go to: http://ndupress.ndu.edu/About/Essay-Competitions/ New from NDU Press A Persistent Fire: The Strategic Ethical Impact of World War I on the Global Profession of Arms Edited by Timothy S. Mallard and Nathan H. White 2019 • 412 pp. Since “the war to end all wars” witnessed the rise of global war among competing nation- states conducted in often tenuous alliances with nascent professional militaries—characteristics that continue to mark contemporary warfare a century later—then studying that conflict’s impact seems a relevant method to decide ways in which the profession of arms will develop in the next 25 to 50 years. Indeed, like a smoldering, persistent fire that threatens to re-erupt into a fresh conflagration, World War I continues to deeply shape and guide the profession of arms today. Download the EPUB, MOBI, or PDF version for free. Scan the QR Code above or go to: http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/ Books/A-Persistent-Fire JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE NINETY-FIVE, 4TH QUARTER 2019 Flickr Pinterest Facebook Twitter You can also find us on: can also find You Visit us online at: https://ndupress.ndu.edu Visit articles, occasional papers, books, and other publications. site is a great place to find information on new and upcomingsite is a great place to find information With 20,000 unique visitors each month, the NDU Press WebWith 20,000 unique visitors each month, JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY National Defense University, Washington, DC National Defense University, Washington, The Armed Forces Officer“This new edition of The Armed Forces articulates the ethical and moral underpin- nings at the core of our profession. The special trust in us by the Nation and confidence placed we protect is built upon this foundation. I commend members of our officer corps to embrace the principles of this important book and practice them daily in the performance of your du- I expect you to imbue these values in the next generation of leaders.” ties. More importantly, Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1159223/the-armed-forces-officer/ From NDU Press From NDU Officer The Armed Forces 2017 • 212 pp. Dunford, Jr.: From the Foreword by General Joseph F. C. Marshall, then serving George “In 1950, the great Soldier-Statesman Secretary as the of Officer page for a new book titled The ArmedDefense, signed a cover Forces . That original Marshall, who later explained that was written by none other than S.L.A. version of this book Secretary Marshall had ‘inspired the undertakingpersonal conviction that American due to his military officers, of whatever service, should share common ground morally.’ ethically and it addressed an of the Cold War, emergence at the dawn of the nuclear age and the Written officer a strategy of nuclear deterrence, corps tasked with developing facing unprecedented deployments, and adapting to the creation of the Department- of Defense and other new orga nizations necessary to manage the threats of a new global order. Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff University Press by National Defense Have you checked out NDU Press online lately? Have you checked