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Mirziyoyev's Reforms Reach the National CAUCASUS, CENTRAL AND SOUTH ASIA Mirziyoyev’s Reforms Reach the National Security Service (SNB) OE Watch Commentary: A lot of attention has been on reforms carried out by Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev since he came to power in late 2016 following the death of Islam Karimov. Excerpts from the accompanying articles report on Mirziyoyev’s recent decision to remove Rustam Inoyatov as the head of the National Security Service (SNB) and they note a couple of things that can help gauge the impact of this change. The article from Fergana News, an independent Russian-language news website with reporters based in Central Asia, reports on how immediately following Inoyatov’s removal, he was “appointed to be a member of the Senate of the Oliy Majlis (upper house of parliament)” by President Mirziyoyev and that with this position he “received the right of immunity.” The article also notes why Inoyatov likely received immunity as he had been “one of the most influential figures in the Uzbek establishment under President Islam Karimov” and that he had probably been involved in the transition of power following Karimov’s death. There was speculation following Karimov’s death that Mirziyoyev became president with Inoyatov’s approval. Lastly, the article reports how Mirziyoyev is looking to reform the SNB by removing “departments which are not engaged in their assigned tasks.” The article from Uzmetronom, a Russian-language independent website with sources in Shavkat Mirziyoyev. Uzbekistan, reports that in addition to Inoyatov’s dismissal, “two of his deputies and 11 head Source: Kremlin Press Service, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AShavkat_Mirziyoyev.png, CC BY-SA 4.0. of regional directorates of the SNB were removed from their posts.” The article also points out that in Uzbekistan there are predictions that the new head of the SNB, Ikhtiyor Abdullayev, will “finally clean out the ‘agency’ of supporters or associates of the previous leadership” by “removing those who compromised themselves with bribery or were simply indebted with the former agency head.” Overall, Mirziyoyev’s removal of Inoyatov and a dozen other senior leaders of the SNB marks one of his most significant reforms to date. Perhaps just as important, Mirziyoyev did not mention which SNB departments will be removed or if the tasks assigned to them will be transferred to another ministry While that information may not come out for some time, if at all, it could have just as significant of an impact as Inoyatov’s removal. End OE Watch Commentary (Stein) “According to Article 6 ‘On the Senate of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan,’ Inoyatov received the right of immunity.” Source: “Бывшему главе СНБ Узбекистана обеспечили неприкосновенность (The former Source: “Смещение совпало с head of the SNB of Uzbekistan has been provided immunity),” Fergana News, 1 February землетрясением (The removal coincided 2018. http://www.fergananews.com/news/28166 with an earthquake),” Uzmetronom, 31 January 2018. http://www.uzmetronom. The former head of the National Security Service (SNB) of Uzbekistan, Rustam Inoyatov, has com/2018/01/31/smeshhenie_sovpalo_s_ been appointed to be a member of the Senate of the Oliy Majlis (upper house of parliament) zemletrjaseniem.html by the decree of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev on 31 January…Earlier that day, Inoyatov was removed from the post of head of the SNB…according to Article 6 “On the Senate of the Oliy On January 31 the President of Uzbekistan Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan,” Inoyatov received the right of immunity. introduced the new head of the National Security Service (SNB), Ikhtiyor Abdullayev… …(Inoyatov) was considered one of the most influential figures in the Uzbek establishment Shortly before (Inoyatov’s dismissal), two under President Islam Karimov…Until recently, Inoyatov’s position had been thought to be of his deputies and 11 head of regional unshakable…the peaceful transfer of power from the latter (Karimov) to Mirziyoyev was directorates of the SNB were removed from regarded by many observers to be a result of internal agreements… their posts. After coming into power in the fall of 2016, Mirziyoyev practically changed all the ministers According to experts, Abdullayev’s task is to of the government power structures…the head of the Interior Ministry has been changed twice finally clean out the “agency” of supporters and as a result, in September 2017, Pulat Bobojonov was appointed Interior Minister, and or associates of the previous leadership…he Abdusalom Azizov was appointed Defense Minister…the SNB’s main tasks are intelligence and performed this kind of work in the Prosecutor counterintelligence activities…However, as Shavkat Mirziyoyev admitted in December 2017, General’s Office, removing those who the authority of this department were needlessly expanded…At a National Security Council compromised themselves with bribery or were meeting, Mirziyoyev said that the SNB will be relieved of departments which are not engaged simply indebted with the former agency head… in their assigned tasks… OE Watch | March 2018 49.
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