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Funciones E Instrumentos De Inteligencia Al Servicio De Los Intereses De Seguridad De Estados Unidos

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Funciones E Instrumentos De Inteligencia Al Servicio De Los Intereses De Seguridad De Estados Unidos C UADERNOS DE I NVEST I G A C I Ó N Funciones e instrumentos de inteligencia al servicio de los intereses de seguridad de Estados Unidos Programas de vigilancia masiva de la National Security Agency, ¿Razón de Estado? Enrique Utrilla Quintanar Director: Soledad Segoviano Monterrubio CI 23/2016 ISSN: 2530-3570 Universidad Complutense de Madrid Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociología Índice 1. Introducción. ................................................................................................................ 6 1.1. Delimitación del tema y objetivos. ................................................................................... 6 1.2. Metodología y fuentes. ................................................................................................... 8 1.3. Hipótesis. ..................................................................................................................... 10 1.4. Marco teórico y aproximación conceptual. ....................................................................... 11 2. La construcción de la maquinaria de inteligencia norteamericana. ...................................... 18 2.1. La National Security Act. Erigiendo la estructura de inteligencia. [1947] ............................ 18 2.2. De la Armed Forces Security Agency a la National Security Agency. [1949-1952] ............... 20 3. La National Security Agency: Etapas en la configuración del centinela global. ....................... 21 3.1. La NSA en la Guerra Fría. [1952-1991] .......................................................................... 21 3.1.1. El antecedente de la vigilancia: El Counter Intelligence Program. [1956-1971] ............ 21 3.1.2. La National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Comienzo de las rivalidades entre Agencias Ejecutivas de vigilancia. [1961] ....................................................... 23 3.1.3. Creación del Central Security Service. El complemento funcional de la NSA. ................ 24 3.1.4. El Church Committee: Las revelaciones de los programas MINARET y......................... 24 3.1.5. La Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). El mecanismo supervisor de inteligencia. [1978] ......................................................................................... 26 3.1.6. La era del criptosecretismo: La NSA e IBM. El algoritmo Data Encryption Standard. [1970-1979] ...................... 27 3.1.7. La Orden Ejecutiva 12333. Las 16 Agencias Ejecutivas de inteligencia. [1981] ............ 29 3.1.8. La Goldwater-Nichols Act. La reorganización del Department of Defense. [1986] ........ 30 3.2. La NSA en la post-Guerra Fría. [1991-2001] ................................................................... 32 3.2.1. El dividendo de la paz en la etapa Clinton y la puesta en marcha de la Revolution in Military Affairs. El impacto en la vigilancia del siglo XXI. [1993-2001] ..................... 32 3.3. La NSA en el siglo XXI. Del 11-S a las revelaciones de Edward Snowden. [2001- 2013] ...... 34 3.3.1. Administración George W. Bush. [2001-2009] ......................................................... 34 3.3.2. Administración Barack Obama. [2009-Actualidad] ..................................................... 44 4. El desafío de las filtraciones en la comunidad de inteligencia norteamericana........................ 50 4.1. Filtradores y filtraciones anteriores a WikiLeaks. .............................................................. 50 4.2. WikiLeaks. La ventana a las revelaciones masivas. ............................................................. 56 4.3. Filtraciones más relevantes de WikiLeaks. ....................................................................... 57 4.4. Edward Snowden. ¿Héroe o traidor? ............................................................................... 59 5. Programas de espionaje masivo de la NSA revelados por Edward Snowden. ........................... 61 5.1. Tratado UKUSA. Construyendo la estructura de espionaje. El club de “Los Cinco Ojos”. .... 61 5.2. Clasificación de los objetivos de espionaje. El impulso de la cooperación y la ausencia de amistades en el entorno global. ................................................................................... 63 5.3. Programa PRISM. .......................................................................................................... 64 5.4. Programa BOUNDLESS INFORMANT. ......................................................................... 66 5.5. Programa SHELLTRUMPET.......................................................................................... 68 5.6. Programa X-KEYSCORE. .............................................................................................. 68 3 5.7. Programa PROJECT BULLRUN. .................................................................................... 70 5.8. Programas Upstream Collection. ..................................................................................... 71 5.8.1. Programa STORMBREW. ........................................................................................ 71 5.8.2. Programa OAKSTAR. .............................................................................................. 72 5.8.3. Programa BLARNEY. .............................................................................................. 74 5.8.4. Programa FAIRVIEW. ............................................................................................. 75 5.9. La Estrecha colaboración con el Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) británico. ...................................................................................................................... 77 5.9.1. Programa OPTIC NERVE. ....................................................................................... 77 5.9.2. Programa THIEVING MAGPIE. ............................................................................... 78 5.9.3. Programa TEMPORA. ............................................................................................. 79 6. Análisis de impacto de las revelaciones de Edward Snowden. ............................................... 81 6.1. Ámbito interno de Estados Unidos. ................................................................................. 81 6.2. Panorama internacional. ................................................................................................. 82 6.2.1. Naciones Unidas frente a los programas de la NSA. La acción diplomática de Brasil y Alemania.............................................................. 82 6.2.2. El Parlamento Europeo: Comisión de Libertades Civiles, Justicia y Asuntos de Interior. [21/02/14] ........................................................................ 84 6.2.3. Reacciones por países: ............................................................................................. 84 6.3. Reacciones de otros observadores: Human Rights Watch y American Civil Liberties Union. 89 7. Conclusiones. ................................................................................................................ 92 8. BIBLIOGRAFÍA ............................................................................................................ 95 9. ANEXO APÉNDICES ..................................................................................................... 104 9.1. APÉNDICE A: .............................................................................................................. 105 9.2. APÉNDICE B: .............................................................................................................. 111 9.3. APÉNDICE C: .............................................................................................................. 115 9.4. APÉNDICE D: .............................................................................................................. 124 9.5. APÉNDICE E: .............................................................................................................. 129 9.6. APÉNDICE F: .............................................................................................................. 134 9.7. APÉNDICE G: .............................................................................................................. 139 9.8. CRONOLOGÍA DE ACONTECIMIENTOS ................................................................... 143 4 RESUMEN La comunidad de inteligencia norteamericana ha experimentado profundas mutaciones con objeto de adaptarse a las diferentes dinámicas y desafíos internacionales. No obstante, han sido dos los acontecimientos que han supuesto un punto de inflexión en su adaptación a la coyuntura global. Por un lado, la confrontación bipolar y el cuestionamiento de liderazgo estadounidense por parte de la URSS durante la Guerra Fría. Por el otro, los ataques terroristas del 11 de septiembre de 2001. Frente al primer escenario, la Administración Truman respondió con la aprobación de la National Security Act de 1947, sobre la que se fue conformando la comunidad de inteligencia norteamericana, readaptada otras tantas veces con motivo de las diferentes crisis internacionales y con el objetivo prioritario de garantizar la seguridad nacional en un entorno internacional adverso. En cuanto al segundo escenario, ya en el siglo XXI, la Administración George W. Bush reaccionó a través de una Ley que ayudara al Gobierno a tener controlada cualquier posible amenaza: la USA PATRIOT ACT. Un contexto de Global War on Terror donde la seguridad dependiente de las actividades de inteligencia quedaba subordinada a la razón
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