DOCSLIB.ORG

Morality As Social Software

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Morality As Social Software City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 9-2018 Morality as Social Software Jongjin Kim The Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2786 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] MORALITY AS SOCIAL SOFTWARE by JONGJIN KIM A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York 2018 © 2018 JONGJIN KIM All Rights Reserved ii Morality as Social Software by Jongjin Kim This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in philosophy in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Date Jesse Prinz Chair of Examining Committee Date Nickolas Pappas Executive Officer Supervisory Committee: Rohit Parikh Melvin Fitting Jesse Prinz THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK iii Abstract Morality as Social Software by Jongjin Kim Advisor: Rohit Parikh The dissertation research is a project to understand morality better through the concept of ‘Social Software.’ The dissertation is, consequently, to argue that the morality in a human society functions as a form of social software in the society. The three aspects of morality as social software are discussed in detail: the evolutionary, anti-entropic, and epistemic game-theoretic aspect. We humans ‘usually’ think that, for example, (a) killing other humans without any necessary reason is morally wrong, and (b) helping other humans in need is morally right. We want to know, in this dissertation research project, why we think in such ways. Myriads of answers to this question have already been offered. We will pursue an answer that has more explanatory power and enlightening lucidity. The term, ‘Social Software’ was coined by Rohit Parikh to connote, broadly, social “procedures that structure social reality” (van Eijck and Parikh 2009, p. 2). The term can be understood, “more or less equivalently,” (Parikh 2002-1, note 2) as ‘social procedure,’ ‘social algorithm,’ or ‘social game.’ (1) The first aspect of ‘morality as social software,’ to be discussed is the evolutionary: human morality has emerged and developed further through the process of evolution; (2) the second aspect iv is the anti-entropic: human morality is human resistance against the universal law of entropy that tends to annihilate everything from order to disorder; (3) the third aspect is the epistemic game- theoretic: human morality is understood better by epistemic game theory, which is a combination of ‘classical game theory’ and relatively new ‘epistemic logic.’ As more specific case studies for the epistemic game-theoretic aspect, the concepts of backward induction and “the less we know, the more rational and moral,” are discussed. Finally, a thorough discussion on the naturalistic fallacy instills more philosophical rigor into the dissertation. v Dedication To my mother and in memory of my father who let me learn what is morally right and what is morally wrong, so that how I ought to live with other beings. vi Acknowledgements It is my delightful duty to acknowledge the help that I have received in the writing of this dissertation. I appreciate the four elements (earth, water, fire, and air) and the six kinds of quarks (up, down, charm, strange, top, and bottom) that have allowed me to write this dissertation. I appreciate that the food grown on earth came to me with water and air to make the fire within me. I would like to thank my dissertation supervisory committee comprised of Professors Rohit Parikh, Melvin Fitting, and Jesse Prinz. I am deeply grateful to my dissertation adviser Rohit Parikh for his judicious advice and firm encouragement (though sometimes “tough but fair”). Literally and in any counterfactual way, without Professor Parikh as a scholar, teacher, mentor, and friend of mine, this dissertation would not have been shaped into the present form. Though, as a science-trained philosophy disciple, I do not endorse any supernatural entity and concept, I have sometimes wondered that Professor Parikh and I might have had another teacher-student relationship in another trans-world. Especially, for the last few years, due to a strange University Rule between Colleges, he has not received the advising credit from advising me; still we have met his office, apartment, and cafés, once, twice, or three times a week whenever any issue has arisen. (Rohit ‘bhai,’1 I will remember this as long as my personal identity and memory persist.) To Professor Melvin Fitting, I am deeply indebted for his teaching, encouragement, and trust. Since I first took Professor Fitting’s First-Order Modal Logic course, his lucidly written logic textbooks2 and articulately spoken logic classes have been the major sources of my ‘humble’ 1 “(Indian) Added to proper names to form an affectionate form of address to an older person,” Oxford Living Dictionaries (English), https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/bhai. 2 Such as, among others, Melvin Fitting (1990/1996 2nd ed.), First-order Logic and Automated Theorem Proving; Melvin Fitting and Richard L. Mendelsohn (1998), First-order Modal Logic. vii understanding of logic; since he became my first dissertation adviser and then, before he retired (I had not expected that fast retirement), his encouragement to me to pursue what I really wanted to research has come to fruition in this dissertation as an interface between ethics and logic; and since he has joined the prospectus (proposal) committee, and then later the supervisory committee, (I was fortunate to have him in those committees even after his ‘half’- retirement) his trust in my work has made me expedite the completion of this dissertation. (Mel, I will show you what I promised in the defense.) To Professor Jesse Prinz, I owe a great deal of the content and the form of this dissertation. I should confess that, while reading Professor Prinz’s works on moral philosophy, I have woken up to shatter my dogmas and to construct my view on morality (if I may, as Kant admitted that Hume interrupted Kant’s “dogmatic slumber”). I thank Professor Prinz for his professional services as the chair of both my prospectus exam and dissertation defense, especially when the unexpected happened in the prospectus exam. I appreciate Professor Prinz’s policies, “Students first!,” and further, “Crying students first!.” (Thanks, Jesse, my teacher.) I would like to thank Professors Richard Mendelsohn and Samir Chopra, who were the members of my prospectus committee, for their helpful suggestions and critical comments. I hope Professor Mendelsohn is now savoring his time after retirement; I will remember the long discussion with Professor Chopra at the first-floor cafeteria of the Graduate Center, and I believe we will have more time to share together. I am grateful to the committee of the comprehensive exam in ethics: Professors Stefan Bernard Baumrin, Douglas Lackey, and Steven Ross. As examiners, their standards were really high and hard to pass; while striving to meet their standards, I was able to come up with many of the ethical ideas discussed in this dissertation. viii I am also grateful to the former and the current chairpersons (Executive Officers) of the philosophy program of the Graduate Center, CUNY, for their inexhaustible support: Professors John Greenwood, Iakovos Vasiliou, and Nickolas Pappas. During the countless times that my Ph. D. education was in danger of being derailed, especially, Professor Greenwood’s considerate and encouraging involvement resolved the (administrative and financial) issues. (Thanks, John, I will remember you and Singapore.) In addition to those professors, I owe lots of ideas discussed here to the conversations in classrooms, cafés, and pubs with fellow students and colleagues. They are: Kathleen R., Todd, Cosim, Tudor, Len Mitchell, Hidenori, Hirohiko, Naoko, Yoko, Ren-June, Junhua, Yunqui (QiQi), Can Başkent, Ҫagil, Yoonhee, Sung Oo; and my friends whom I met at the University at Buffalo (SUNY): Konishi, Ping, S. Choi. My language is often “shaky,” both written and spoken, and both in my mother tongue and English. To my editor, Jen, for her thorough and creative edit, I am deeply grateful. Or, more than that: It has been an “ontological turn” that her editing work has made me feel free to write whatever I want to write. Instead of resorting to circumlocution, let me be direct: Without money, this work would not have been possible. The following universities’ students and chairpersons have provided me with financial support (as well as academic) by hiring me as an adjunct instructor: Professors Mark Halfon of Nassau Community College, Enrique Chávez-Arvizo of John Jay College of Criminal Justice, Julie Maybee of Lehman College, Arlig Andrew of Brooklyn College, Howard Ruttenberg, George White, and Timothy Kirk of York College, and Tiger Roholt of Montclair State University. I appreciate the shining eyes of those students. ix However, “adjuncting” in New York City would not be enough to make ends meet, and so my “budget deficit” has had to be filled by the financial support of numerous friends, in addition to brothers, sisters, and their families. I would like to express and “engrave” my deep gratitude to them: Kyu-Tae Jeong, Kyu-Dong, Jae-Myeong Kim, Sang-Gyun, Hee-Baek, Chang-Ryung, Ho- Seok, and brothers and sisters. So, not rhetorically, but literally, they all have some shares of my life and what I will achieve. Finally, all the help appreciated here is my fortune; still, all errors and mistakes remaining in this dissertation are my sole responsibility.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Effective Altruism's Underspecification Problem
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by PhilPapers Effective Altruism’s Underspecification Problem Travis Timmerman 1. Introduction Whether any given act is supererogatory, obligatory, merely permissible, or impermissible depends upon the alternative acts available to the agent. But what exactly are the relevant alternative acts available to an agent? It turns out that this is a surprisingly difficult question to answer, yet it’s one on which any complete normative ethical theory must take a stance. It’s also one on which any effective altruist must take a stance. This may be unwelcome news for effective altruists since, as I will demonstrate, each of the dominant views in the literature generates verdicts that are (i) implausible in their own right and (ii) seemingly at odds with typical effective altruist commitments. Considering a particular case will help make this issue less abstract: The Gig Brandi has been invited by her friend, Chad, to attend his musical gig. Brandi can easily decide to attend the gig, and then decide at the gig to be supportive of Chad, which would be the best outcome. Unfortunately, Chad is a mediocre musician. Consequently, Brandi would not in fact decide to be supportive of Chad if she decided to attend his gig due to being irritated with Chad’s performance—even though she could decide at the gig to be supportive. Since Chad would be deeply hurt, this would be the worst outcome. Brandi could alternatively decide not to attend Chad’s gig, which would be better than the worst outcome, yet worse than the best outcome.1 To be sure, Brandi can decide to attend the gig, and once, there she can decide to be supportive of Chad.
    [Show full text]
  • The Profoundest Problem of Ethics: About the Possibility of a Profound Solution
    Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Master's Theses Graduate School April 2019 The rP ofoundest Problem of Ethics: About the Possibility of a Profound Solution Pol Pardini Gispert [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Pardini Gispert, Pol, "The rP ofoundest Problem of Ethics: About the Possibility of a Profound Solution" (2019). LSU Master's Theses. 4915. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses/4915 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE PROFOUNDEST PROBLEM OF ETHICS: ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A PROFOUND SOLUTION A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in The Department of Philosophy & Religious Studies by Pol Pardini Gispert B.A., Universitat de Girona, 2001 May 2019 For my mother and father, For as many books as I read, your actions are still my moral compass. ii Table of Contents Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... iv Preface ............................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • 1 from Viktor Frankl's Logotherapy to the Four Defining Characteristics of Self-Transcendence (ST) Paul T. P. Wong Introductio
    1 From Viktor Frankl’s Logotherapy to the Four Defining Characteristics of Self-Transcendence (ST) Paul T. P. Wong Introduction The present paper continues my earlier presentation on self-transcendence (ST) as a pathway to meaning, virtue, and happiness (Wong, 2016), in which I introduced Viktor Frankl’s (1985) two-factor theory of ST. Here, the same topic of ST is expanded by first providing the basic assumptions of logotherapy, then arguing the need for objective standards for meaning, and finally elaborating the defining characteristics of ST. To begin, here is a common-sense observation—no one can remain at the same spot for life for a variety of reasons, such as developmental and environmental changes, but most importantly because people dream of a better life and want to move to a preferred destination where they can find happiness and fulfillment. As a psychologist, I am interested in finding out (a) which destination people choose and (b) how they plan to get there successfully. In a free society that offers many opportunities for individuals, there are almost endless options regarding both (a) and (b). The reality is that not all purposes in life are equal. Some life goals are misguided, such as wanting to get rich by any means, including unethical and illegal ones, because ultimately, such choices could be self-defeating—these end values might not only fail to fill their hearts with happiness, but might also ruin their relationships and careers. The question, then, is: What kind of choices will have the greatest likelihood of resulting in a good life that not only benefits the individual but also society? My research has led me to hypothesize that the path of ST is most likely to result in such a good life.
    [Show full text]
  • Virtue Ethics in This Paper, I Am Going to Discuss the Common Objection To
    Virtue Ethics In this paper, I am going to discuss the common objection to virtue ethics that William Frankena and other moral theorists have posed: virtue ethics cannot tell us how we ought to act (i.e. that it is not a normative theory). In doing this I will discuss how Rosalind Hursthouse successfully defends virtue ethics against this charge and makes it more appealing than both deontological ethics and utilitarian ethics. I will then argue that Hursthouse’s defense shows that deontology ethics better serves as a heuristic for virtue ethics, than its own ethical theory. I will finish the paper by arguing Hursthouse’s defense of normative virtue ethics reveals a counterintuitive conclusion, but one that I am willing to accept in favor of the moral framework. In William Frankena’s “A Critique of Virtue-Based Ethics” Frankena brings up the common criticism that a virtue ethics theory cannot tell us how to act, but instead gives us a way to cultivate and teach ourselves and others the existing moral principles we should hold. He does believe virtues have a valuable role to play in “moral education and development,” but ultimately believes they do not serve the purpose of providing us with a direction when we are faced with a moral dilemma (Frankena p. 353). He writes, “the function of the virtues in an ethics of duty is not to tell us what to do but to ensure that we will do it willingly in whatever situations we may face” (Frankena p. 353). He argues that because we have to appeal to existing principles defined by different ethical theories such as trait egoism, trait utilitarianism, trait deontological theory, ect, virtue ethics is just an extension of these theories (Frankena p.
    [Show full text]
  • Justifying Reasons, Motivating Reasons, and Agent Relativism in Ethics
    p. 1 Justifying Reasons, Motivating Reasons, and Agent Relativism in Ethics JOHN J. TILLEY INDIANA UNIVERSITY–PURDUE UNIVERSITY INDIANAPOLIS [email protected] From: Philosophical Studies 118(3) (2004): 373–99. Please cite the published version. ABSTRACT. According to agent relativism, each person’s moral requirements are relative to her desires or interests. That is, whether a person morally ought to φ depends on what interests or desires she has. Some philosophers charge that the main argument for agent relativism trades on an ambiguity—specifically, an ambiguity in “reason,” “reason for action,” or a kindred term. This charge has been common, and widely thought to damage the case for agent relativism, since its appearance, in 1958, in a now classic paper by William Frankena. In what follows I examine the charge in detail, showing that insofar as it aims to discredit the argument for agent relativism, it fails in its purpose. Agent relativism is the view that each person’s moral requirements are relative to her desires or interests. Unless an action is suitably related to those desires or interests she has no moral requirement to perform that action.1 My concern is with the principal argument for this view, specifically with a frequent objection to it. According to that objection, the argument for agent relativism trades on an ambiguity in “reason,” “reason for action,” or a similar term. This objection has been prevalent since its appearance, in 1958, in a now classic paper by William Frankena.2 Strangely, although one or two authors 1 This, at least, is one of the views that go under the name “agent relativism.” I have used that name for a very different view in some of my other papers, e.g., in “Cultural Relativism,” Human Rights Quarterly 22(2) (2000): 501–47, at 506.
    [Show full text]
  • The Political Obligation of a Citizen
    Case Western Reserve Law Review Volume 52 Issue 3 Article 3 2002 Ethics in the Shadow of the Law: The Political Obligation of a Citizen Robert P. Lawry Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Robert P. Lawry, Ethics in the Shadow of the Law: The Political Obligation of a Citizen, 52 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 655 (2002) Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol52/iss3/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. ARTICLE ETHICS IN THE SHADOW OF THE LAW: THE POLITICAL OBLIGATION OF A CITIZEN Robert P. Lawr9 INTRODUCTION This article is a series of meditations on texts. The focus is on the moral quandry a citizen faces when confronted with what he or she perceives to be an unjust or immoral law or policy, emanating from the State in which that citizen has membership. As such, it is a con- tribution to the rich literature of political obligation. It joins the long debate in jurisprudence and political and legal theory over the citi- zen's "obligation to obey the law," or "fidelity to law."1 It joins that debate obliquely, however, not by trying to argue philosophically for one particular theory of political obligation, but by reflecting on inter- esting and historically important texts in that literature.
    [Show full text]
  • Virtue Ethics
    Business Ethics Queens College Russell Marcus http://philosophy.thatmarcusfamily.org Reading Guide #7: Virtue Ethics This reading guide is provided to assist you in your reading. I encourage you to read the material through, first, then go back to answer the questions. You are not expected to submit written answers. You are expected to have responses ready for class discussion. Only the boldfaced questions will appear on exams. Page numbers refer to Louis Pojman, Moral Philosophy, 3rd ed., Hackett. Aristotle, “Virtue Ethics,” pp 249-259. 1. What makes some end better than another end? What will the best good be like? 2. Why is happiness the highest good? 3. How does the good of something depend on its function? 4. What is man’s particular function? What is human good? 5. “For one swallow does not make a spring...” (252) Explain. Be specific about the use that Aristotle makes of this statement. 6. What are the two kinds of virtues? Describe them. 7. How do we acquire virtue? What does this mean about how we should live our lives? 8. How must an action be done, in order for it to be done virtuously? 9. Is virtue a feeling? Explain. 10. In what way is virtue a mean state? What lie at the extremes from this mean? 11. How are bravery and temperance virtues? Between which extremes do they lie? 12. How are generosity and magnanimity virtues? Between which extremes do they lie? 13. How are mildness, truthfulness, wit, and friendliness virtues? Between which extremes do they lie? 14. How are some vices more opposed to the mean than others? Provide examples.
    [Show full text]
  • Lon Fuller and Substantive Natural Law Anthony D'amato Northwestern University School of Law, [email protected]
    Northwestern University School of Law Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons Faculty Working Papers 1981 Lon Fuller and Substantive Natural Law Anthony D'Amato Northwestern University School of Law, [email protected] Repository Citation D'Amato, Anthony, "Lon Fuller and Substantive Natural Law" (1981). Faculty Working Papers. Paper 131. http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/facultyworkingpapers/131 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. Lon Fuller and Substantive Natural Law, by Anthony D'Amato,* 26 Am. J. Juris 202-218 (1981) Abstract: I will contend that Fuller's secular or "procedural" natural law, as described by Moffat, does not cover the theoretical position that could be occupied by a substantive natural lawyer, that such a theoretical position is viable today, and that there are some key elements in Fuller's theory that actually conflict with substantive natural law and might therefore be criticized from that perspective. Tags: Jurisprudence, Natural Law, Fuller (Lon), Hart, Dworkin, Cicero, Bentham, Austin, Aquinas [pg202]** Since Lon Fuller was the efficient, sufficient, and necessary cause of my entering the field of jurisprudence, it is with some trepidation that I venture here to criticize his work. However, I take a little comfort from the fact that he always welcomed criticism, even from, and sometimes particularly from, the converted. I will contend that Fuller's secular or "procedural" natural law, as described by Professor Moffat, does not cover the theoretical position that could be occupied by a substantive natural lawyer, that such a theoretical position is viable today, and that there are some key elements in Fuller's theory that actually conflict with substantive natural law and might therefore be criticized from that perspective.
    [Show full text]
  • The Prospective Pareto Principle and Equity of Access to Health Care
    The Prospective Pareto Principle and Equity of Access to Health Care ALLAN GIBBARD University of Michigan ( f "Tk r ORALITY IS MADE FOR MAN, NOT MAN FOR | \ / | morality.”11 interpret this aphorism as suggesting that JL V J L questions of morality can most fundamentally be ad­ dressed by considering human benefits and human harms—those ben­ efits and harms to which our acceptance of various alternative moral principles would tend to lead. This formula is vague, but I shall be concerned in this paper with one attempt to state clearly at least a part of what is involved. I shall be examining issues of social justice in access to health care. Does justice, I shall ask, require that everyone be assured access to every kind of health care that can be expected to benefit him? If not, does it at least demand that everyone have equal access to health care, without regard to income or place of residence? Or does justice rather demand no more, and no less, than that everyone be assured a “decent minimum” of access to health care—and if that is so, what comprises that “decent minimum”? 1 The allusion is to M ark 2:27. This aphorism has been a theme in the moral philosophy of William Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice- Hall, 1963), p. 37. Milbank Memorial Fund Q uarterly I Health and Society, Vol. 60, No. 3, 1982 © 1982 Milbank Memorial Fund and Massachusetts Institute of Technology 0160/1997/82/6003/0399-30 $01.00/0 399 400 Allan Gibbard These questions of social justice are at basis questions about our responsibilities to each other.
    [Show full text]
  • AN ESSAY on DIVINE COMMAND ETHICS a Dissertation by JEREMY
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Texas A&M Repository AN ESSAY ON DIVINE COMMAND ETHICS A Dissertation by JEREMY ALAN EVANS Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY August 2007 Major Subject: Philosophy AN ESSAY ON DIVINE COMMAND ETHICS A Dissertation by JEREMY ALAN EVANS Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Approved by: Chair of Committee, Hugh J. McCann Committee Members, Scott Austin James Aune C.E. Harris Head of Department, Robin Smith August 2007 Major Subject: Philosophy iii ABSTRACT An Essay on Divine Command Ethics. (August 2007) Jeremy Alan Evans, B.A., Texas A&M University; M.Div., Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Hugh J. McCann Twentieth-century analytic philosophy ushered in a renewed interest in an ethical theory known as the Divine Command Theory of ethics (DC). Consequent to the work of G.E. Moore, philosophers have been involved in metaethics, or how we may ground ethical terms such as “good” and “right”. The traditional DC response is to argue that God is the source of good, and best serves that role in that He is an “ideal observer” of all states of affairs. The question is how is God’s will relevant to determining the moral status of actions? At this point one may distinguish between what God wills and what God in fact commands.
    [Show full text]
  • Monism and Pluralism About Value
    Chapter 8 Monism and Pluralism about Value Chris Heathwood At the start of Plato’s Philebus, Socrates sums up the two views that he and Protarchus will be discussing: Philebus says that the good for all animate beings consists in enjoyment, pleasure, delight, and whatever can be classed as consonant therewith, whereas our contention is that the good is not that, but . thought, intelligence, memory, and things akin to these, right opinion and true reasoning. (Plato 1958, 11b) Philebus holds, in a word, that “pleasure is the good,” Socrates that “knowledge is the good.”1 On each of these views, there is just one kind of good. Each is thus a form of monism about the good. A more ecumenical approach would allow that both pleasure and knowledge are good—and perhaps other things as well, such as love, beauty, and virtue. Tis is pluralism about the good. Tis chapter explores some of the important facets of the contemporary debate between monism and pluralism in axiology. We will begin by explaining what value monism and pluralism are (section 8.1), and will then consider some important argu- ments bearing on the question (section 8.2). Whether monism or pluralism is true may have implications for other areas of moral philosophy. For example, if pluralism is true, it may be more difcult to hold a reductionist metaethic about axiological properties. Tis is because goodness would then be “multiply realizable,” which stands in the way of identifying it with any par- ticular nonevaluative property. Susan Wolf (1992) argues that one kind of pluralism makes possible an attractive, moderate relativist metaethic that doesn’t devolve into a troublingly expressivist or subjectivist one.
    [Show full text]
  • What Is Deontology?, Part One: Orthodox Views Gerald F. Gaus
    What is Deontology?, Part One: Orthodox Viewsa Gerald F. Gaus 1. Introduction Current moral philosophy is often seen as essentially a debate between the two great traditions of consequentialism and deontology. Although there has been considerable work clarifying consequentialism, deontology is more often attacked or defended than analyzed. Just how we are to understand the very idea of a deontological ethic? We shall see that competing conceptions of deontology have been advanced in recent ethical thinking, leading to differences in classifying ethical theories. If we do not focus on implausible versions, the idea of a deontological ethic is far more attractive than most philosophers have thought. Indeed, I shall argue that in an important sense, only a deontological ethic can be plausible. 2. Deontology as the Non-teleological Most commentators follow William Frankena in characterizing deontology as the class of non- teleological theories. “Deontological theories deny what teleological theories affirm.”1 It is widely agreed that a theory is teleological if it justifies the right, moral duty, or obligation, on the a Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 35 (2001): 27-42. grounds that it promotes what is good. This, though, is vague. If we are to understand this characterization of deontology, we need to be clearer about the idea of teleology. Because philosophers disagree about precisely what teleology affirms, we confront different accounts of deontology. One interpretation of this orthodox formulation is suggested by Jeffrey Reiman: Teleological
    [Show full text]