SECTION 6.1 DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY OPTIONS FOR AN INVASION OF IRAQ Contents Introduction and key findings ........................................................................................ 174 MOD Defence Planning Assumptions .................................................................... 176 The possibility of military invasion emerges ................................................................. 178 The impact of 9/11 .................................................................................................. 178 President Bush’s “axis of evil” speech and the UK response ................................. 182 JIC Assessment, 27 February 2002: ‘Iraq: Saddam under the Spotlight’ ........ 183 The MOD perspective ...................................................................................... 184 Cabinet, 7 March 2002 ................................................................................... 187 The Cabinet Office ‘Iraq: Options Paper’ ........................................................ 188 Mr Hoon’s advice, 22 March 2002 ................................................................... 191 Mr Blair’s meeting at Chequers, 2 April 2002 ......................................................... 195 Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush at Crawford, April 2002 ............................ 198 Initial consideration of UK military options .................................................................... 201 MOD contingency planning in April and May 2002 ................................................ 201 Mr Webb’s advice, 12 April 2002 ..................................................................... 202 Establishment of the “Pigott Group” ................................................................. 205 MOD advice to Mr Hoon, May 2002 ................................................................ 207 Meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld, 5 June 2002 ..................................................... 215 SPG paper, 13 June 2002 ...................................................................................... 217 Ministerial consideration of UK policy – July 2002 ....................................................... 221 Formal military planning begins ............................................................................. 221 JIC Assessment, 4 July 2002: ‘Iraq: Regime Cohesion’ .................................. 225 Mr Hoon’s proposal for a collective Ministerial discussion ..................................... 226 The MOD’s assessment of US military plans ......................................................... 229 Mr Blair’s meeting, 23 July 2002 ............................................................................ 234 Cabinet Office paper, ‘Iraq: Conditions for Military Action’ .............................. 234 MOD advice for Mr Hoon ................................................................................ 237 Definition of UK force “Packages” ............................................................................... 244 MOD advice, 26 July 2002 ..................................................................................... 244 171 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry Developments during August 2002 ........................................................................ 249 JIC Assessment, 21 August 2002: ‘Saddam’s Diplomatic and Military Options’ ............................................................................................................ 255 The impact of Operation FRESCO .................................................................. 257 PJHQ advice, 30 August 2002 ......................................................................... 259 Preparations for Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush, Camp David ................. 261 SPG paper, 4 September 2002 ........................................................................ 262 MOD advice, 6 September 2002 ..................................................................... 264 The outcome of the meeting at Camp David .......................................................... 268 JIC Assessment, 9 September 2002 ..................................................................... 270 Decisions to offer ground forces to the US for planning purposes ............................... 271 MOD planning for a UK land contribution, September 2002 .................................. 271 Cabinet, 23 September 2002 ........................................................................... 280 Chiefs of Staff meeting, 25 September 2002 .................................................. 281 SPG paper, 30 September 2002 ...................................................................... 283 The MOD request to offer ground forces .............................................................. 286 Mr Hoon’s minute, 15 October 2002 ................................................................ 294 No.10’s questions ........................................................................................... 297 The FCO perspective ....................................................................................... 299 Mr Blair’s meeting, 17 October 2002 ...................................................................... 300 Mr Blair’s decision to offer Package 3 to the US, 31 October 2003 ....................... 302 Cabinet, 24 October 2002 ................................................................................ 303 MOD concerns about the US perspective ....................................................... 304 JIC Assessment, 30 October 2002: ‘Turkey: Attitude to an Iraq Campaign’ .... 309 Mr Blair’s meeting, 31 October 2002 ............................................................... 310 Why did the UK Government decide to offer ground forces? ...................................... 311 Why did the UK offer a divisional headquarters and an armoured brigade? ......... 312 What was the UK’s desire to influence the US seeking to achieve, and was it a determining factor in the decision? ..................................................................... 314 What factors influenced the timing of the decision? ............................................... 318 Were the post‑conflict implications for the UK, of a significant role on the ground in an invasion of Iraq, properly addressed? ............................................... 319 Did the need to maintain the Army’s morale influence the decision? ..................... 320 Were the other risks of offering ground forces fully identified and considered? ..... 323 UK pursuit of the northern option.................................................................................. 324 Discussions with the US about Turkey’s position ................................................... 324 172 6.1 | Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq Military planning for the northern option ................................................................. 327 SPG paper, 6 November 2002 ........................................................................ 327 US request for support from allies .................................................................. 330 PJHQ’s proposal to explore options in the South ........................................... 331 MOD advice for No.10, 19 November 2002 ..................................................... 334 Uncertainties about the northern option ........................................................... 336 JIC Assessment, 6 December 2002: ‘Iraq: Military Options’ .................................. 343 Agreement to visible preparations for military action starting in January ............... 346 Agreement to a role for the Royal Marines in the initial stages of an invasion ....... 352 Mr Hoon’s statement, 18 December 2002 ............................................................. 356 Continued pursuit of the northern option ................................................................ 357 SPG paper, 13 December 2002 ....................................................................... 358 Proposals to increase ground combat forces and options for the South ................ 359 MOD advice to No.10, 19 and 20 December 2002 .......................................... 362 MOD advice to Mr Hoon, 20 December 2002 .................................................. 365 Mr Hoon’s statement, 7 January 2003 .................................................................. 369 The end of the northern option ............................................................................... 370 Mr Hoon’s visit to Turkey, January 2003 ................................................................ 372 Should the UK have addressed an alternative to the northern option earlier and more seriously? ............................................................................................................ 376 173 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry Introduction and key findings 1. This Section addresses the UK planning for a military invasion of Iraq and the decisions: • on 31 October 2002 to offer ground forces to the US for planning purposes for operations in northern Iraq; and • in December to deploy an amphibious force, including 3 Commando Brigade. 2. This Section does not address: • The decision in mid‑January 2003 to deploy a divisional headquarters and three combat brigades for potential operations in southern Iraq and the commitment of those forces to a combat role in the initial stages of the invasion of Iraq. That is addressed in Section 6.2. That Section