WILL THERE EVER BE a CYBER WAR? Evija Šulte

5. SECURITY STUDIES WILL THERE EVER BE A CYBER WAR? Evija Šulte

ABSTRACT DOI: 10.26410/SF_2/17/12 During the NATO Warsaw Summit cyberspace was recognized as a domain of operations reaffirming the necessity and requirement for the regulation of cyberspace as a potential operational environment for network-centric operations. It is linked with the fact that cyber-attacks of diverse types are continuously increasing in numbers, thus causing a significant threat to the uninterrupted functioning of governmental and public communication and information systems, data centres, financial and banking systems, national and international networks and infrastructure. This raises the question of whether it is a new domain of warfare. The paper analyses terms “cyber warfare” and “cyber war” in the contemporary context of cyber security and the forms and effects of cyber war. EVIJA ŠULTE, Latvia evija.sulte@ baltdefcol.org KEY WORDS Baltic Defence College Cyber security, offensive cyber capabilities, cyber warfare. Tartu, Estonia

Introduction In July 2016, during the NATO Warsaw system depend on digital technology, rely- Summit, the Alliance ‘recognised cyber- ing on network infrastructure that provides space as a domain of operations in which the advantage of interconnectivity, near NATO must defend itself as effectively real-time communication and exchange as it does in the air, on land, and at sea’ of information and data worldwide. How- (CCDCOE, 2016). This decision therefore ever, despite numerous benefits of modern reaffirms the necessity and requirement for technology, the cyberspace has also ena- regulations of cyberspace as a potential bled a new platform for the opponents to operational environment for the network- exploit and a surface to launch an attack centric operations. With the accelerating from. Cyber-attacks of diverse types are speed of modern technological develop- continuously increasing in numbers, thus ment along with the high demand for the causing a significant threat to the uninter- connectivity of various digital systems, pro- rupted functioning of governmental and tection of networks and security of cyber- public communication and information space have become a vulnerable and chal- systems, data centres, financial and bank- lenging realm for every nation. Furthermore, ing systems, national and international net- all domains of national and international works and infrastructure. This consequently 5.1. SECURITY STUDIES

raises the question whether the world is cur- Defining the cyber warfare rently entering a new era of warfare, where the means to wage war and cause disrup- and the cyber war The recognition of cyberspace as a do- tion and destruction are purely digital. Are main of operations encompasses the cur- all the offensive cyber activities conducted rent problem that there is no consensus by single hackers, hacktivists or state- and united understanding reached about sponsored individuals/groups heading to- the definitions and terms related to the cy- wards a potential large-scale confrontation ber domain that would explain the potential between states? Offensive cyber capabili- cyber operations. In particular, cyber war- ties developed by many states today build fare and cyber war are terms that are inter- a powerful and efficient weapon for the po- changeably used by nations and interna- tential use against an opponent in case of tional actors without unanimously accepted a conflict to achieve political, military and/ definitions, and therefore are controversial or economic goals. in their meanings. States and international The connection of systems and networks organizations have put in a great deal of ef- to the Internet exposes them to public ac- fort in defining these terms, and on account cess and thus, through the Internet, to of this, a wide range of definitions exist in penetration, intrusion, attacks targeted at the cyber realm. For instance, Russia and the systems themselves, the information the United States have agreed on a defi- they contain, and the processes they con- nition that cyber warfare is to be regarded trol and facilitate. There are scholars who as ‘cyber-attacks that are authorized by contend that cyber-attacks cannot consti- state actors against cyber infrastructure tute an act of war as they lack criteria of in conjunction with government campaign’ an armed attack that should be instrumen- (Godwin III et al., 2014, p. 43). Furthermore, tal, political, and violent per se (Rid, 2013). RAND, the research and analysis organiza- Nevertheless, this paper will claim that the tion Corporation suggests that the ‘cyber cyber war will take place in the near future warfare involves the actions by a nation- as a new form of warfare in the technologi- state or international organization to at- cally developed world. Cyber war could be tack and attempt to damage another na- commenced because of its cost-effective- tion’s computers or information networks ness, a less lethal and destructive form, the through, for example, computer viruses or potential to deter or prevent enemy’s ability denial-of-service attacks’ (RAND, 2016). to the conventional use of military force, or Whereas the International Committee of as an option for creating the supplementary the Red Cross defines the cyber warfare effect for any conventional military opera- as any adverse action against an opponent tion in the initial phase of an armed conflict. intended ‘to discover, alter, destroy, dis- To support this argumentation, the first part rupt or transfer data stored in a computer, of the paper will define the terms “cyber manipulated by a computer or transmitted warfare” and “cyber war” in the contem- through a computer’ (International Commit- porary context of cyber security, whereas tee of the Red Cross, 2010). These various the second part will focus on the forms and definitions lead to the conclusion that the effects of cyber war. cyber warfare is any offensive cyber activity within the cyberspace that has a political background involving another state or its

132 WILL THERE EVER BE A CYBER WAR? political actor to target the critical networks of conflict between states. In this context, and infrastructure of the opponent country. cyber war is referred to combined political As a result, these targeted cyber-attacks and military actions using the cyberspace would significantly disrupt or damage the as the platform to launch the attacks from target country’s ability to use the critical against another state in order to achieve information and communication systems. strategic political goals. This paper sup- Cyber-attacks as part of cyber warfare ports the reasoning that cyber war will be would therefore be referred to the instru- related to a form of war between states, ments of national power of one state to in- and will be used in conjunction with other fluence another state by conveying political military actions and campaigns. Cyber war messages to the targeted state or causing could therefore be considered as a form of social, financial or other economic damage power wielded with specific weapons and without the use of physical force or employ- capabilities to be used to gain power, influ- ment of military force. ence the international system and execute To distinguish the nature and scale of of- military operations. fensive cyber activities, the distinction be- Furthermore, it has to be emphasized tween cyber warfare and cyber war has to that the protection of networks, systems be made. A wide variety of available defini- and data is essential to the safety and tions describes the aspects that would be security of national, public and private ac- related to an interstate conflict and would tors, and that offensive actions through the constitute the offensive cyber actions as cyber domain against any of these actors cyber war. For instance, Belgium (2012) can threaten their continuity, stability and and Austria (2013) offer coherent and com- prosperity. Well-prepared and coordinated prehensive definitions associating cyber offensive cyber operations can seriously war with the rapid and large-scale acts of disrupt disparate electronic systems, and aggression executed by one state against infect and damage network infrastructure. another one by using cyber means and Moreover, they can cause physical dam- conducting activities in support of con- age and limit access to the critical services ventional military operations to achieve thus paralyzing interconnected processes national goals. Furthermore, the following and functions of a state. In this context, definition is provided by Russia and the states should have a novel approach to de- United States describing cyber war as ‘an fining the current and future threats, risks escalated state of cyber conflict between and vulnerabilities, and carry out a realistic or among states in which cyber-attacks and comprehensive assessment of the po- are carried out by state actors against tential outcome of any cyber related dan- cyber infrastructure as part of a military ger. For this purpose, as underlined by the campaign’ (Godwin III et al., 2014, p. 32). United Nations Institute for Disarmament In line with these definitions, it has to be Research (2013), there are many countries underlined that a cyber war encompasses (i.e. the United States, France, India, China, the means to launch digital attacks, applies Russia) that have included the development the use of force against opponent’s critical of offensive cyber capabilities in their cyber infrastructure, networks, and information security strategies. The offensive cyber ca- and communication systems, as well as pability will be referred to as ‘a capability to conducts military operations in support of initiate a cyber-attack that may be used as overall political aims to resolve the matter a cyber deterrent’ (Godwin III et al., 2014,

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p. 49). However, most countries do not state the acme of skill’ (Sun Tzu in Griffith, 2011). publicly the support of offensive cyber ca- Following this logic, a cyber war would of- pabilities, practicing instead the term of ac- fer a potential aggressor an option of influ- tive cyber defence. For example, CCDCOE encing its opponent without direct attacks (2017) defines active cyber defence as an against its force. Instead, it would allow the anticipatory action aimed at disclosing any engagement by other, non-conventional attempts of cyber-attacks or the actual means thus affecting its critical capabilities breaches, or to identify any cyber offensive and not its conventional forces. As Farwell at the earliest stage by executing pre-emp- and Rohozinski (2012) note, there is no tive, preventive or retaliatory cyber actions need to defeat the opponent in order to at- against the origin of the cyber-attack. In tain certain national goals, moreover cyber this context, it is important to highlight that weapons would provide non-lethal means active cyber defence involves the proac- to disable the adversary’s operational po- tive measures while defensive cyber capa- tential. Cyber weapons like digital codes bilities, as defined in Russia-U.S. Bilateral and malicious software are developed on Cybersecurity (2014), foresee only the within the virtual domain. From this aspect, reactive or passive measures in relation to cyber weapons do not possess the kinetic protection or repellence against cyber acts qualities and can therefore be considered being used as cyber deterrents. as non-lethal per se. As Rid (2013) points Moreover, it has to be taken into con- out, it is to be highlighted that the digital sideration that the growth and expansion computer codes by their nature are not of technological potential will continue to able to cause harm to any biological entity increase in the future, thus providing the for the reason being developed within the capabilities to shape the future battlefield digital environment, and from the technical in the cyber domain. Taking these factors perspective possessing the capability to into account, cyber wars will not only be affect only digital systems. In addition, Rid part of any interstate conflict in the future, (2013) remarks that any system affected they will also exist as separately planned by hostile actions has to be changed to and executed acts of war against the op- a weapon system first in order to enable the ponent states. power and energy for further destruction of any kind, be it material or human life. All the Cyber war as a less lethal conventional attacks and armed conflicts and destructive form of war use traditional means and ways to achieve In today’s globalized and technologically the strategic and military end-states by ex- developed world where every action is re- ploiting other operational domains. Waging corded, any form of violence, unnecessary a digital war through the cyberspace would suffering and collateral damage is strongly enable the possibility to cause damage to condemned by the whole society. From this the opponent without kinetic means be- perspective, a cyber war launched from any ing applied, thus causing less damage or of the digital platforms would be chosen as destruction. Lewis (2015) argues that the a less destructive form of war causing less majority of cyber-strikes would not result in casualties than any other armed engage- a devastating outcome as after convention- ment. ‘For to win one hundred victories in al military attacks, they would rather deny one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. access to networks and degrade systems, To subdue the enemy without fighting is thus throwing the opponent into a turmoil.

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Seen from this perspective, a cyber weap- than it takes to reconstruct and rebuild the on in terms of a digital malicious code or infrastructure after any conventional use of a computer virus cannot be aimed directly weapons such as air strikes and bombard- at a human being as a conventional weap- ments. This aspect is supported by Farwell on system. The loss of human life as a con- and Rohozinski (2011), who claim that cy- sequence of the use of cyber weapons can ber-strike has in this regard the advantage therefore only be a secondary effect cre- of reaching the ends with fewer casualties ated by the damage of the system that has among the civilian population in compari- been attacked. son with air strikes. Moreover, as McGraw Furthermore, cyber weapons can be (2013) argues, it does not require large developed with the aim to target specific national and state resources to develop systems or infrastructure thus not intended as effective cyber weapon as Stuxnet. Ow- to cause additional, unnecessary collateral ing to the fact that the development of this damage to achieve the political, strategic sort of effective cyber war payload is less or military objectives. In parallel with the complicated and takes less effort than to precision ammunition, cyber weapons may develop conventional military capabilities, be used for sophisticated targeting, aiming cyber war is for this reason cost-effective at definite components of a digital system. and thus also unavoidable (McGraw, 2013). As in the case of Stuxnet, which was cre- In addition, evaluating the ethical side of ated in the form of a malicious computer vi- cyber war, Arquilla (2013) notes that be- rus aiming to affect Iran’s nuclear program cause of the fact that digital units like bits and caused the physical damage to nucle- and bytes would disrupt rather than destroy ar centrifuges, it is reasonable to deduce the targeted system, a cyber war would be that this type of cyber weapon is designed considered less problematic from the ethi- for specific cyber war actions. Professor cal perspective. Moreover, given the cir- George Lucas notes that Stuxnet ‘shows cumstances when a physical engagement that cyber war can be an effective alterna- does not follow, cyber war would cause tive to conventional war’ (Lucas, 2011, p.18). practically no physical damage or loss More importantly, cyber weapons and ap- of life. With that in mind, digital weapons plied techniques could be conceived to could replace conventional combat weap- launch surgically precise cyber-attacks ons, save extensive amounts of national thus being efficient and reaching propor- resources and require comparatively less tionate effects on targets (Radziwill, 2015). combat personnel to apply these weapons Cyber weapons may therefore be used for into actions, and by all this still achieving the incapacitation of vital systems without the political goals with less cost in resourc- physical destruction, by damaging or tem- es and human lives. porarily disabling electronic systems con- trolling, for example, water plants, power Cyber war as a preventive grids, transportation systems etc. Another war important factor to highlight with regard to With the development of operational con- the less destructive effects of cyber weap- cepts that are enabled by the sophisticated ons is the fact that the damage caused by technologies, cyber war as a future form cyber-attacks can be reversible, meaning of war would be launched as a preventive that digital systems can be restored and war to stop the enemy state from starting brought back online easier and quicker the war, either of a hybrid or conventional

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character. This type of cyber war would most of the financial, media, communication be used as a separate deterrent act, and systems are interlinked already, and there it would not be linked to the conventional is a tendency within the military domain to military operation. Lebow (2007) describes achieve maximum interoperability between deterrence as the influential process that various information technology systems allows for impeding any unwanted activity as well. The militaries around the world by assuring the involved actor that the ben- put in a considerable effort to interlink the efits gained could not be worth the expens- systems not only internally within separate es. Following this logic, the cyber war in a military services and components but also form of preventive war would have the ef- between the components and the higher fect of deterrence that would either prevent commands. They use different digital and enemy from engaging in war with a threat- computerized systems like command and ened state or it would compel the oppo- control information systems, weapon plat- nent to act according to the attacker’s will forms and sensors that are linked together and request. Researchers on cyber deter- or interconnected with each other, as well rence theories like Jensen (2012) highlight as connected to the external networks via that cyber deterrence is to be regarded to the Internet. Furthermore, the interoper- all the parties, be it individuals, groups or ability between various military systems is states, and it comprises the whole range of becoming more and more critical to enable offensive cyber activities that could poten- faster communication, the exchange of tially create kinetic effects, thus achieving mission essential data and provide better the desired end-state of respective party. situational awareness and control over on- When assessing the causes of such pre- going operations. In addition to this, Rich- ventive wars and evaluating the justification ard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake (2011) of those, Lucas argues that the efforts to argue that besides the fact that ever in- defuse a crisis prior a military offensive is creasing number of critical systems are put launched would therefore justify the pre- online, also human-made flaws in software ventive war if other attempts of conflict and hardware development and the public resolution have failed. Moreover, he adds Internet vulnerability should be considered that the preventive cyber war would be ‘fo- as the potential drivers for the opponents cusing solely on threatening’ (Lucas, 2011, to exploit the opportunities of accessing p.18), and would be aimed at strategic mili- essential and critical information and data. tary objectives, thus being directed against In consequence, the interconnectivity and the critical and essential enemy military interlinkage of military networks, digital command and control infrastructure. With weapon platforms and communication and the accelerated sophistication of informa- information systems can become large tion and communication technologies, it high value targets of external influence and would be possible to achieve a wide range attacks when being online. Based on this, of effects on the adversary by the applica- the preventive cyber war would therefore tion of various cyber-attack methods and be effective to deny the enemy the use of techniques. These could vary from the dis- most critical infrastructure for its own mili- ruption of critical services, denial of access tary purposes, thus delaying or preventing to the essential infrastructure to the physi- the enemy to launch an attack with the con- cal destruction of networks and interlinked ventional means. systems or capabilities. On a national level

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Cyber war as a part of con- As James A. Lewis (2015) points out the possible target to be chosen before the ac- ventional war tual conventional use of military force would The future armed conflicts and conven- be the so-called ‘war-supporting infra- tional use of military force between state ac- structure’. Thus referring to the most critical tors would include cyber war as part of the infrastructure, networks and systems that generally recognized warfighting function provide electricity and power, transporta- to gain the effects of initiative, surprise and tion services, access to different financial momentum while confusing the targeted and media systems, information and com- state of the character and nature of the cy- munication systems and official websites of ber-attack. Italian air power strategist Gen- targeted state’s government (Lewis, 2015). eral Giulio Douhet notes that ‘Victory smiles He also adds that these objects would be upon those who anticipate the changes in valuable and interesting targets for cyber- the character of war, not upon those who strikes as part of military campaigns. The wait to adapt themselves after the changes initial cyber war activities would allow the occur’ (Douhet, 1921, p.30). In this context, external control over the critical networks, it is of the highest importance for any nation systems and infrastructure thus denying to comprehend the challenges associated their use by the targeted state. One of the with the development of cyber domain and aims for the initial cyber war to take place the contemporary (CCDCOE, 2016) and fu- would be to incapacitate the targeted state ture threats it may pose. Many countries are in terms of taking over the control of its sur- developing their capabilities incrementally veillance and control systems thus “blind- to conduct an offensive cyber action, and ing” it for a specific period of time. In case many more will ultimately procure and im- these systems have been disabled to the prove these capabilities as active defence extent required for the conventional attack means. According to Lewis (2015), cyber- to be launched, the attacking state would strikes are part of the current military doc- enjoy the advantage of not being seen by trine of potential adversaries with the aim land, air or navy surveillance systems, and to design the early stages of conflict and would require the targeted state to use its delay NATO’s capability to react. Offensive conventional military forces to acquire the cyber actions in advance of any conven- necessary operational information. Clarke tional use of military force would enable and Knake (2011) argue that modern so- the potential enemy to gain advantage and cieties and governments are excessively surprise while the target state would not be relying on different computer systems able to react and respond immediately to that enable their functioning. The current the imminent conventional threat. Arquilla dependency on cyberspace expose each (2013) describes the cyber war as an ex- and every nation along with their military ceptionally powerful and covert instrument forces to the vulnerabilities coming from to be utilized at the early stage of the war. and through the public access to the Inter- Moreover, a war initiated by cyber-surprise net. With different systems and networks could contribute to the victory, at the same being interconnected within the military time reducing the number of casualties, realm and beyond it, the opponent might and causing less harm to the adversary, as be able to exploit this opportunity in order well as own forces (Arquilla, 2013). to take out all vital and essential systems of the target state, and even get access to the

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restricted networks through the gateways weapons constitutes a threat that might be interconnecting the different systems. Far- directed against opponent country to wage well and Rohozinski (2012) emphasize that cyber war in order to influence the targeted effective use of cyber weapons may disrupt state’s decisions or actions. In this context, the opponent’s military forces to be used cyber war creates the possibility to engage efficiently by reducing the speed of mo- the targeted state with less resources than bilization, assemblage and deployments a conventional military action would require, thus ruining the momentum of attack. They therefore cyber war as a form of war is high- underline that disabling adversary’s criti- ly possible, if not inevitable. Reconsidering cal networks and services could be a wiser the possibilities and the goals of countries approach than physical destruction of the to launch a cyber war, and reassessing adversary. Moreover, future cyber weapons the current trends of recent and ongoing will be targeted at enemy’s capability to armed conflicts, the future cyber war could operate within the operational area, limit its be associated with either a preventive type command and control, and therefore hin- of action or as a part of a conventional dering the enemy decision makers from ac- war. The former type of cyber war would complishing the mission and furthermore, be aimed at stopping the enemy state from from reaching operational or strategic starting the war, therefore having either co- goals (Farwell and Rohozinski, 2012). This ercive or deterrent effect. Whereas the lat- being said, the cyber war will be the initial ter form of war would be waged in order to crucial phase for any conventional warf- achieve the moment of surprise and at the ighting scenario providing the advantage same time degrading enemy state’s capa- and freedom of action to the party having bilities to accordingly react and respond to the offensive incentive to strike first. Fur- the conventional military engagement. The thermore, the cyber war as a covert part of cyber war in either form would carry the po- future military offensive actions will enable tential of disabling targeted state’s critical the initiative, momentum and surprise thus infrastructure, command and control infor- confusing and incapacitating the targeted mation systems, governmental and military state, and will therefore, without doubt, be networks. This would constrain its ability a part of every military operation or cam- to coordinate actions and efforts, organize paign in the future. forces and operate within the battlespace be it only within the cyberspace or in other Conclusion operational domains. In comparison with In conclusion, it has to be reemphasized the conventional armed conflicts and the that the latest decision of NATO to recognize use of military force, and being embodied the cyber domain as a potential operational within the cyber domain, cyber weapons domain reassures the crucial role of cyber and cyber war carry no lethal energy per realm in the contemporary global security se. From this perspective, cyber war would arena. With the sophistication of technol- be considered as a less lethal and less de- ogy and increased development of cyber structive war, causing less human casual- capabilities, both defensive but especially ties and collateral damage than any form offensive ones, the cyber domain becomes of conventional use of arms and weapons. a potential future battlefield for countries to Taking all the aspects into consideration, achieve their political, strategic, military or it has to be noted that the reasons and economic goals. The proliferation of cyber causes of wars will be mainly the same,

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