A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 1

A Policy Map to Avoid the Sino-American Thucydidean Trap

It’s Flashpoint in the South China Sea

David E. Berghel

Californian State University, Maritime Academy

A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 2

Abstract

Tensions in the South China Sea are the latest indication that Thucydide’s Trap is dangerously close to occurring between the United States and China. China is on the verge of becoming the dominant economy in the world, has greater human capital capabilities than

Europe and the United States combined, and possesses an insecure geostrategic position which is prompting an age old threat of a rising power necessitating war with an establish hegemon. Three different regions were analyzed to identify the key areas of risk for the Sino-American relationship. They were the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and the East Sea. There is a high probability that a miscalculation between China and the United States, India, Japan, or members of the ASEAN could spark a minor skirmish between America and China that could escalate into a total war leading to the devastation of both states. The extent of this research looked at historical case examples of the Thucydidean Trap dating back to the Peloponnesian Wars. It also studied the political geography and economy of Sino-American relations, as well as reviewing current international relations between the two states and the prevailing international system. The variables of nuclear power, international institutions, economic interdependence, non-state actors, and the geopolitics of the ASEAN community were controlled for and are indicated as key areas of opportunity in policy recommendations. Energy security, renewable energies, and food security were outside the scope of this research but have been identified as critical areas needing further analysis. The findings of this paper are that the Thucydidean Trap can be avoided by utilizing three key cooperation models in the researched regions. This conclusion is vital for

Sino-American peace and global stability as a world order dominated by America’s post-Cold

War power transitions into a more historically common multipolar international system.

A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 3

Introduction

A rising Chinese power will likely feel compelled early in the 21st century to assert its emerging position as a regional power in order to assure its calculated geopolitical strategy at the cross-roads of East Asia, Southeast Asia, the western Pacific, and South Asia. Given the overwhelming superiority of the American allied forces in nearly every category of warfare on the global stage it is necessary to understand how China will attempt to realize this outcome in defiance of a dominant status quo. This thesis builds upon the works of international relations scholars, foreign policy experts, military strategists from the major stakeholders, high level national security imperatives as stated by each countries’ domestic institutions, and Associated

Press accounts of events as they have transpired in recent years. This thesis endeavors to provide a component level analysis of the dynamic geopolitical conditions and relationships that exist within this region. It will further provide recommendations for American policy makers on strategies with desirable outcomes to American geopolitical necessities, with an emphasis on exigent risks. In order to accomplish this task a framework is necessary to build a cohesive strategy that takes into account: widely accepted parameters of contemporary international relations, the effect the Prisoner’s Dilemma has on international law and policy (Ohlin, 2010), trends of global income inequality and the consequences of globalization measurable in many democracies related to this issue space (Inglehart & Norris, 2016), and a recognition that the polarity of the world is on the cusp of changing (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2008; see also Jacques,

2012; Kaplan, 2014; Khanna, 2008; Mahbubani, 2008; Shambaugh, 2013; Zakaria, 2008). Shifts in Westphalian sovereignty towards interdependence and institutionalist theory in the past thirty years have served as an uncertain bulwark against conflict escalation in the South China Sea. It is yet to be understood what long term effects this hastened destabilization of the unipolar model A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 4

will have in this region. Anti-globalist and populist trends are might be fluctuations amid longer

trajectories of stability, or a precursor to a drawdown from post WWII institutions sponsored

primarily by the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO). Whichever is

demonstrated to be accurate over time will likely determine both the speed with which China can

achieve its maritime and foreign policy strategies, and what position China will seek to establish

for itself in a new paradigm of multipolarism. This dynamic development in East Asia begs the

question- will China’s rise as a global power, and specifically their outlined maritime strategy

within the first and second island chain, spring a Thucydides Trap with the United States (or

American mutual defense pact allies) that escalate minor skirmishes and sphere of influence

proxy conflicts into a total war? This question was first posited by Graham Allison in 2012 and

has yet to be discussed robustly enough through analyzing the geopolitical, socioeconomic,

historical, and armed forces lenses.

Literature Review

The Athenian historian Thucydides wrote in the History of the Peloponnesian War (5th c

B.C.E.) that a rising Athens triggered an inevitable war with the existing regional hegemon

(Sparta) on the Greek peninsula. Thucydides argued that both Athens and Sparta followed their inherent political realties and natural self-interested strategies to a foregone conclusion- war over the existential survival of a state’s identity (Thucydides, Lateiner, & Crawley, 2006). His perspective was unique among his peers as he was a self-described Athenian elite living in exile amongst their allies whose observations led to a written catalogue and analysis of important events that was intended to be passed down through the ages. Thucydides could thus be interpreted as the father of political realism and this concept has been generally accepted for millennia. For in his influential histories the first observations of intractable state behavior A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 5

implacably bent towards conflict over identity, power, and threat to power. In the modern era this

power has been expressed through might at sea (Mahan & Reese, 1995).

A rising China confronting the established world order dominated by America is creating

a scenario nearly identical in framework to that described by Thucydides so a question must be

asked- is the Thucydidean Trap inevitable in this case as well? Graham Allison, in his two recent

op-eds, has taken this basic understanding of great power conflict and evaluated the probability the Thuycdidean Trap may be avoidable as it pertains to the Sino-American relations (Allison,

2012; Allison, 2015). Since Allison’s research question is both novel and recent, there has been scant debate directly on his observations and likely will not be until his book is published this year. The literature available at this time instead focuses on evaluating the geostrategic positions of China and America and their relative strengths and weaknesses. Thus it only indirectly converses with Allison and his question. Researchers have evaluated China’s historical and cultural imperatives against the current facts on the ground and confirmed that China either wishes to become a regional hegemon, or feels it must become one (Christensen, 2015;

Goldstein, 2015; Kaplan, 2010; Kaplan, 2014; Mahbubani, 2008; Roy, 2013; Zakaria, 2008).

Beijing’s primary method of communicating its intentions are through occasional PLA-N white

papers, strategic Five-Year Plan documents, and politburo statements pertaining to significant

events that are as carefully bellicose on national security issues as they are abrupt on

socioeconomics (Holmes & Yoshihara, 2011, Qi, Erickson, & Goldstein, 2006).

American, Chinese, and Indian Ocean Rim scholars have come to the conclusion that

China will inevitably find itself at a cross-roads with the United States over the established world

order and China’s place within it. China’s economic growth and broadening global power is well

established (Berteau et al, 2012; Kaplan, 2010; Roy, 2013), as is the diminishment of the A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 6

American one from its previous position as a unilateral power (Jacques, 2012; Khanna, 2008;

Zakaria, 2008). Chinese military capabilities and development has been exhaustively covered by

American military strategists and are evidenced in U.S. Department of Defense reports to

Congress (Department of Defense, 2004; 2010; The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy:

Achieving U.S. National Security Objectives in a Changing Environment, 2015). Retired

Admirals like McDevitt and Blair (Paulson Institute, 2015) have also discussed everything from

the geopolitical implications of Chinese posturing and it's “slicing the salami” approach to the

South China Sea to the intricacies of how its naval architecture and weapons development

programs impact American security (Dutton & Martinson, 2015; Erickson, 2016). Historical

implications that explain Beijing’s bellicose prosecution in protecting its own SLOC’s and

preventing foreign land invasions from being able to penetrate its coastal defenses have been

extensively covered (Christensen, 2015; Goldstein, 2015; Kaplan, 2014; Mahbubani, 2008; Roy,

2013).

While there is general consensus that a minor conflict between the U.S. and China is inevitable amongst military experts, significant disagreement on how this relationship between a rising China and a diminishing United States hegemony will play out after this conflict exists

(Christensen, 2015; Goldstein, 2015; Jacques, 2012). These problems are further exacerbated by a global geopolitical dilemma and issue linkages in the Indian Ocean Rim as exemplified in both

China’s cultural and economic expansion in the region and American dominance being strained

by conflicts in the Middle East and fragile states in Africa (Agnihotri, 2015; Kaplan, 2010;

Singh, 2015; Shambaugh, 2013). An analysis of the existing topical research provides a valid

argument that Allison’s position coincides with the independent assertions of scholars in

numerous disciplines who widely support through parallel research that the Thucydidean Trap A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 7

can be avoided, even if the label itself was never mentioned (Bluestone & Mirasola, 2016;

Brooks & Wohlforth, 2008; Campbell & Andrews, 2013; Goldstein, 2015).

Thucydides and his Trap

Understanding humankind’s traditional reactions to institutional challenges stemming from threats, and fear of said threats, helps observers predict more accurate outcomes to rapid structural upheaval to the polarity of a region (Allison, 2015). This model appears to borne out time and time again in the ages before Europe took to the oceans in the 15th century (Bentley &

Ziegler, 2011a), but how has it fared in evaluating conflicts in the years since? Allison’s work provides sixteen case studies since the 16th century, and not once until the 20th century did a rising power escape total war with the established unilateral power (Allison, 2015). This deviation from history and Thucydides’ Trap is the Monroe Doctrine. A rising United States avoided war with Great Britain, despite a fairly robust and documentable bellicosity, as the

United Kingdom ceded all influence in America’s proclaimed sphere of influence. This anomaly did not occur again until after World War II as massive fluctuations in polarity and ideologies occurred around the world (Allison, 2015). A deconstruction and comparison between these four case studies and the Sino-American relationship will be necessary to understand what course the facts on the ground in the South China Sea, East Sea, and Indian Ocean Rim might follow.

China’s Perspective

Beijing’s practice of disseminating their intentions through occasional high level white papers by leaders of the PLA-N, politburo statements pertaining to significant events that are as carefully confrontational on national security issues as they are abrupt on socioeconomics, and

Five-Year Plans of strategic domestic and international goals present challenges for observers endeavoring to anticipate Chinese responses to stimuli. This challenge is further exacerbated by A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 8

the tumultuous nature of American election cycles and its disjointed rhetoric that can have

international ramifications. It is made more intertwined due to globalized markets fueled by

transnational shipping and containerization. Both China and America must calculate increasingly

important international institutions, maritime piracy and other Tier III threats, Africa’s

development, India’s geopolitics, and a multitude of other factors into their respective national

security frameworks.

To understand Beijing’s perspective on the innate challenges of its international position

takes a combination of understanding Mahan and his popularization within Han Chinese culture,

China’s own influential military strategists like Xi Qi and Wu Shengli, interpreting speeches by

Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping, and carefully studying the deployment of China’s vast

resources of labor and capital. It is relatively straightforward and demonstrative that China

desperately needs advanced electronics and machinery, oil, medical equipment, ores, slag, ash,

plastics, and copper. This coincides with Beijing’s policy of non-interference in the domestic

affairs of other states and explains both their 21st Century Maritime Road (called the String of

Pearls by many contrary to Beijing’s dislike of the term) and their investments or partnerships

stretching from Uzbekistan to Argentina.

Chinese Security. Avoiding conflict over the Senkakus (also called the Diaoyu Islands

by China), the Paracels, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef, Johnson South Reef, Southwest Cay,

Woody Island, Itu Aba, Gaven Reef, and Taiwan itself will be critical as they are the focal points

for China’s national defense strategy in the first island chain as illustrated in Figure 1. China’s

anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)1 efforts in the Philippine Sea and the rest of the second island

1 Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) is modern warfare terminology for an actor’s ability to bar access to a specific theatre or region. In regards to the maritime domain it more specifically refers to the capability to prevent commercial or military vessels from navigating the area of operation. A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 9

chain depicted in Figure 1 are of a lessor concern for the United States and its allies, as China

does not yet have the capability to expel outside forces

from his region. Much of China’s blue water naval

development and their focus on submarines and advanced

missile frigates emphasizes that Beijing is well aware of

this weakness, and is redoubling its efforts to develop the

capability to protect its sea lanes of communication

st nd Figure 1: 1 & 2 Island Chain (Chang, 2001) (SLOC) projecting outwards into the Philippine Sea, the

Sea of Japan, the Celebes and Sulu Seas, and deep into the complex of international waterways along Indonesia’s vast expanse of islands projecting eastward into the Pacific. The subject of capabilities and development has been exhaustively covered by American military strategists.

Retired Admirals like McDevitt and Blair have discussed everything from the geopolitical implications of Chinese posturing and it's salami tactics2 approach to the South China Sea to the intricacies of its naval architecture and weapons development programs (RADM Michael

McDevitt, US Navy (Ret.), 2015). Researchers and scholars like Robert Kaplan (2010, 2011,

2014) and Thomas Christensen (2015) have exhaustively covered the historical implications that explain Beijing’s bellicose prosecution in protecting its own SLOC’s and preventing foreign land invasions from being able to penetrate its coastal defenses.

The current geostrategic dilemma posed by China’s metaphorical collision with the 1st and 2nd island chains (Figure 1) and their accusations of a Western containment policy designed to prevent Chinese military projection from beyond these points is forcing increased maritime

2 Salami Tactics (Slicing the Salami, piecemeal strategy, etc.) is a term attributed to communist and Nazi regimes who used small, incremental advances of policy that eventually provided their desired dominant position. The practice has been effective in masking the true intentions of the regimes until the process is nearly complete and has a divide and conquering effect on cooperative international responses. A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 10

friction between the denizens of the South China Sea, Japan, and China. These maritime conflicts are becoming the lens with which potential conflicts between China and the United

States are being focused (Bluestone & Mirasola, 2016; Campbell & Andrews, 2013; and

Goldstein, 2015). The dilemma they form is aptly labeled a Thucydidean Trap by Allison for the purposes of examining the situation and the logical conclusions given the sciences of geography, political science, and history. While there is general consensus amongst scholars, strategists, analysts, military commanders, and foreign services experts on the above areas of developing international flashpoints there is significant disagreement on how this relationship between a rising China and a diminishing United States hegemony will play out. Many argue that China’s dominance is assured and that the best course of action is to facilitate a transition beneficial for international human rights protections, free trade, and the security interests of Europe and North

America. (Christensen, 2015; Goldstein, 2015; Jacques, 2012, and Kaplan, 2014).

Is China a Hegemon? Others argue that China is a realpolitik practitioner seeking regional and then global hegemony and that its dreams of empire are only tempered by geography and time, both of which they fully intend to overcome in coming decades. Western proponents of imminent and unavoidable confrontation are further divided by those that feel the conflict should be prompted now while the West is in an advantageous position, and others who believe a shift in Western priorities could effectively contain even the double digit military and international investment growth Beijing sponsors now (Erickson, 2016). The latter side of the debate has demonstrated an incorrect understanding of China’s history and culture, but is in no way prohibited from being correct despite this. China is not an aggressor because it wishes to achieve a dominant global position from which to carve out advantages in global politics, and thus a policy of containment could be effective in curbing political ambitions (Kaplan, 2014). A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 11

China is aggressive because the international community has squandered over 200 years’ worth of opportunities to facilitate shifting its people into modernity and Beijing feels its national security can only be assured through regional assertions of power and authority (Goldstein,

2015). Furthermore, China recognizes the power of infrastructure development. It intends to lift the developing world out of poverty using its economic efficiency and leadership rather than moral guidance or the promotion of social contracts. America and its allies follow a more exploitative transaction based model in which the International Monetary Fund is often at cross- purposes with raising the Global South out of poverty quickly through infrastructure investment as it focuses on social and political institutions. In the absence of a rapid development plan from the dominant international institutions many states, and occasionally entire economic or ethnic regions, are turning to China to fulfill this need anywhere Beijing’s interests align with a developing partner (Jacques, 2012, 2015).

China may well find both the Thucydidean Trap and, if it were then to survive the ensuing conflict wholly intact, the time tested practice of empire to be a logical conclusion of its power projection and national security interests. However, as Robert Kaplan and other have said,

China is indeed at a precipice. Chinese culture had a nearly unbroken lineage of regional dominance since 1,500 B.C.E. That is until the Ming, and then Qing dynasties fell victim to

European colonialism and empire. Since Sun Yat-sen and the Wuchang Uprising in 1911-12,

China has experienced turmoil, famine, subjugation, and containment from the major powers of the world (Kaplan, 2014). Chinese sensitivity toward foreign powers projecting influence into its historical domain is thus very reasonable. China is providing ample evidence, through its actions and more importantly key inactions, that it may still break the shackles of history and refuse to A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 12

spring the Trap and reject the practice of empire which has left deep scars on the Chinese psyche and created a society that refuses to be victimized ever again (Roy, 2013).

An Active Defense. Sino-American foreign relations objectives and domestic narratives are critical to recognizing the dangers surrounding the current South China Sea disputes, and how other case examples might provide insight on events to come. Beijing states that its primary policy goals are: maintaining 7-8% economic growth, protecting its sea lanes of communication

(SLOC)3, and assuring Chinese mainland defense from all foreign powers (Berteau et al, 2012).

China continues to assure its economic growth by strengthening its capabilities in the latter two.

Realization of these national strategies take the form of rapid blue water naval investment policy

(called a far seas navy in China) outlined by Xu Qi in the 2004 China Military Science paper

(translated by Erickson & Goldstein, 2016) and a stratagem of “active defense” outlined in The

Study of Campaigns written by Zhanyi Xue in 2000 for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

This is not a new concept in Chinese military strategy. It is a continuation of Mao’s position on defending China’s sovereign terrestrial territory against more powerful invading forces (Holmes

& Yoshihara, 2011).

America’s Perspective

The global reach of an empire can be awe inspiring. It can reach the farthest corners of known territory and overwhelm the spheres of influence developed by lesser powers. While

America has arguably never existed as a traditional colonial empire, its power at the end of the

20th century was truly transcendent and personifies one of Saul Cohen’s five stages of modern geopolitics. Beginning in the late 19th century Friedrich Ratzel and Halford Mackinder described conditions that necessitated imperial hegemony. A race for that power followed in the Old World

3 SLOCs are maritime transportation routes connecting ports used for commerce and national security. A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 13

powers. The rise of Germany and then America marked the next two stages. The duration of

Cold War spheres of influence and commercial blocs marked the next. The last of the five has illustrated the rise of a post-Cold War America gaining global hegemony for a brief period between 1991 and 2007 (Cohen, 2015). The path of American unipolarity the world experienced after the close of the Cold War was as all-encompassing as it was brief. Despite the continuance of American military prowess that dwarfs that of its competitors in scope and funding American is no longer the global superpower capable of wielding unilateral force internationally in prolonged campaigns on multiple fronts (Mahbubani, 2008). Yet in that brief period between the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of multipolarism following the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the economic collapse beginning in 2007 America solidified many of the global trends that had been building in a post-globalization digital age. American cultural diffusion through technology after the dramatic conclusion of WWII reached what is likely to be its zenith, spreading capitalism and American emphases on human rights, private property, and freedom of speech. America has become a beacon of morality and hope to many in a world walking a razors edge of nuclear deterrence and second strike capabilities.

During this period America’s reach was not exclusive to developing the economy and security of a liberal world order. It also purported to strengthen suffrage and global morality along American ideologies. As Vice Admiral Matoglio (ret.) once remarked about the American position in global security, “no issue is an island” (Martoglio, 2016). Since the end of WWII the counterpoint to Soviet interests and ideologies has emanated from America and its allies. The global peace has been maintained through the investments, leadership, and threat of violence systematically maintained by the United States that numbers among its successes the existence of

Israel (albeit a shatterbelt may have formed as a result) and an unprecedented era of peace on the A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 14

European continent (Martoglio, 2016). America has kept its Sea Lanes of Communication

(SLOC), the same ones that carry the vast majority of global trade, free from interruptions by state actors. It also led to the emergence of two of the last major powers to seek imperial conquest to become respected members of the international community and the third (Japan) and fourth (Germany) largest economies in the world according to the International Monetary Fund

(“World Economic and Financial Surveys,” 2016). The United States additionally stands as a bulwark against additional Russian aggression in the Ukraine and Georgia, even if those two conflicts and the current Syrian dilemma have accelerated the finality of America’s entrance into a multipolar world. Whether from a position of a global hegemon, the singular superpower, or the strongest state on earth in a multipolar world the United States serves this function as a moral safeguard against state actors practicing neorealist (it is moral for all states to do only what is in their self-interest, even if the actions are in and of themselves immoral) policies within the international system.

Criticisms of American hypocrisy in international relations and accusations of a different kind of imperialism stemming from America’s political economy and realpolitik military- industrial complex certainly possess merit. President Eisenhower first warned America (in his

Farewell Address to the Nation) in 1961 (Perret, 1999) of the dangers posed by a rise of a security state so intertwined with ensuring the safety of the world that it could forget the idealism and peace that prompted its creation, not power and influence over the domestic affairs of other states. It is nontrivial to reconcile American idealism and the inarguable benefits its existence and dominance in the past 77 years have provided the world with the baser elements that exist in

American foreign policy. Whether it is the Iran-Contra Affair or the American relationships with

Saudi Arabia, Israel, South Africa, Pakistan, Nigeria, and China these policies have harmed A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 15

others with the intended purpose of strengthening American security. The value these operations and policies have contributed to American security is arguable, but their existence is part of

America’s complicated history with power. America is a disparate nation from all others on earth and whether a multipolar world is upon it or not, Americans are unlikely to forget that the world order, global peace, nuclear deterrence, international arms control, international emergency aid, and universal suffrage are products of their sacrifices.

The Springs in the Trap

The relationship between rising China and the maritime hegemony of the United States need not necessarily play out as have nearly all major historical examples of a rising power triggering total war with the established regional hegemon have (Allison, 2012). Reductions to the probability of total war in this region are possible given careful diplomacy and strategic policy decisions pertaining to the South China Sea and East Sea if China’s ascendance as a regional hegemon in a multipolar world can be guided (Christensen, 2015). Or by strengthening

American partnerships with The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)4 or endeavoring to change the Sino-American relationship to more pragmatic and cooperative one

(Goldstein, 2015). Yet another possibility is the strategic use of India’s emergence in South Asia as a counterbalance to China’s 21st Century Maritime Road in the Indian Ocean (Kaplan, 2011).

In the last five years, numerous setbacks and obstacles to these policy recommendations have taken shape in the form of a further destabilizing shatterbelt in the Middle East. A wave of anti-globalism has placed over 1.7 billion people under the governance of populists or ultra- nationalists in India, the Philippines, the United States, Russia, and arguably now the United

4 The ASEAN is an IGO consisting of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Bhurma), the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste are considered observer states. It exists to provide collective bargaining power and greater institutional cohesion in a region dominated by China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 16

Kingdom. This wave of populism may very well prompt another two members of the United

Nations Security Council (The United Kingdom and the United States) to retract from the global

status quo. This could leave France as the sole ecumenical agent of institutionalist norms and the

democratic peace with permanent veto power in the United Nations. The recent populist election

of the 45th American President Donald Trump and of Great Britain’s 2016 referendum to leave

the EU (colloquially called BREXIT) are indicative that even if a return towards globalization

and democratic institutions occurs, structural realist security5 policies in foreign relations are

likely to signal an application of neorealism6 to a host of domestic and foreign issue areas well

beyond security for as long as these political conditions remain parochial. Simply put, if the

generational gap continues to worsen as a result of the increased life expectancy and modern

health care, if wage inequality continues to rise to unprecedented levels in liberal democracies,

then it is likely the world is entering a period of increased unpredictability containing greater

barriers to foreign relations (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). Should this be the case China will likely

accelerate its decade’s old strategies of gaining recognized sovereignty over the resources (and

much of the land) in the South China Sea as illustrated by their 9-Dash Line policy.

Beijing can only be aided in this endeavor by its mobilization of a sophisticated new green water

navy, it’s testing of long term blue water power projection, and transitioning its agrarian

population into modern industry. These conditions, as will be discussed, may very well prohibit

alleviating foreign policy and structural stressors that allowed the four exceptions to the

Thucydidean Trap to maintain the peace.

5 Structural realism, also known as neorealism6, is a political ideology based on the writings of the American political scientist Kenneth Waltz. The concept holds that international relations occurs in a vacuum of anarchy. Within that anarchy states must do whatever is in their own best interests, irrespective of the interests of other actors. That power is the best facilitator of security.

A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 17

A Hundred Years of Shame. In order to grasp the exigence of China’s maritime

expansion and current foreign policy strategy, an understanding of the last three hundred years of

China’s history is pertinent. This is no easy measure as China is a vast country whose cultures

span most of human history. China is culturally dense as a result of a nearly unbroken lineage dating back to the Shang dynasty (to the point of appearing incomprehensible to the many of the world’s Westphalian denizens). This lineage of cultural development has endured historical

invasions from nearly every cardinal direction and, in modern times, observed the sovereignty of

the ruling regime usurped or overthrown at least a dozen times since the Opium Wars began in

1840 (Bentley & Ziegler, 2011b). Yet the core of Han identity amongst the Chinese has remained unbroken for nearly two thousand years. This is all the more remarkable given that

China is nearly encircled by states that have historically invaded its territory, are allied to those

that have, or are currently engaged in maritime territorial disputes with China. To compare

China’s experiences during this time an American citizen would do well to envision a Soviet aircraft carrier escorted by several ballistic submarines cruising 45 miles off the coast of the

Chesapeake Bay in 1966. Or Chinese Naval patrols from Baton Rouge, MS to Owensboro, KY

on the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers today. Neither would be acceptable and the clamor for war

would be as deafening as that observed by William McKinley’s administration following the

misconstrued explosion aboard the USS Maine (ACR-1) in 1898.

China has a single party system called the Politburo that encompasses so many different

systems and peoples it can hardly be labeled as simply as it is – communist (Goldstein, 2015).

Coupled with a longstanding American policy of containment around communist state actors, a

sympathetic observer might understand more clearly why China would view its recent efforts in

the South China Sea as a response to a threat to its national security. These concerns alone would A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 18

provide ample reasoning for China to pursue an aggressive stance in its maritime force projection, but their maritime strategy is not limited to protecting itself from an invasion or to

counter the advancement of foreign forces near its border due to a cultural imperative never to be

victimized again (Roy, 2013). The waters around China, from the Indonesian archipelago to the

contested Korean peninsula, traffic over 30% of the world’s trade and over 60% of the imported

crude oil imported by South Korea and Japan (Kaplan, 2014). China views the trade navigating

through the Straits of Malacca as a pivotal component of its national security, and is

understandably driven to secure unfettered and unassailable maritime shipping access to its southern ports. Thus one of China’s primary national security concerns can be said to be dependent on preventing another state actor’s A2AD capabilities in the South China Sea, a policy that runs contrary to current American Naval Surface Warfare doctrines.

Geopolitics and Maritime Territory. China is approaching its foreign policy position with a measured and long term methodology, often called the “cabbage strategy”7, that seems

nigh impossible for the United States to wholly disrupt without triggering a serious escalation of

a wide array of threats for both states. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is discernibly aware of China’s objectives and the manifestation of such a tenuous regional balance of power is best observed in analyzing the Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Filipino disputes in the

South China Sea. To be sure, nearly every nation in South East Asia has a dispute with China over the 9-Dash Line (Figure 2), whether it is over an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or territory under UNCLOS III, but the conflicts with Vietnam and the Philippines will likely have the greatest risk of sparking a major regional conflict that could embroil the United States.

7 The Cabbage Strategy is a concept of layered encirclement of maritime targets of interests, such as islands and oilrigs, and is attributed to PLA General Zhaozhong in Jeff Himmelman’s NYT article titled “A Game of Shark and Minnow”. A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 19

Indeed many fear that China will soon “kill a chicken to scare the monkeys”, a Chinese proverb

insinuating that China will make an example of one of these regional opponents to both disengage the notion that America is a viable ally against China in the South China Sea, but also to further their escalating approach to regional dominance by absorbing additional claim strengthening positions within the 9-Dash Line

(French, 2014). It is as yet unclear what the recent regime changes in the United States and Great Britain, which mark a departure from traditional foreign policy Figure 2: China’s 9-Dash Line. Shapefiles pulled from CSIS.org norms, will have on Beijing’s timetable and calculations in regards to the South China Sea.

The Philippines, a Complicated Country

The Sino-Filipino dispute appears to be the most straightforward and arguably has the greatest possibility, however unlikely, of being resolved through political pressure on Beijing.

China’s refusal to acknowledge the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s (PCA) judgement in

Philippines v. China (case no. 2013-19) creates a significant setback in international legality and diplomatic capital for China as it seeks to become a regional hegemon. The PCA’s 2016 ruling strikes down both of China’s existing claims in regards to the South China Sea as part of its territory. The PCA Tribunal found that China’s 9-Dash Line historic rights claim was invalid as there was no evidence of sovereignty or dominion in regard to the South China Sea since China’s navigators and fishermen first explored the region. The court further found that none of the features of the man-made islands in the Spratly’s entitle China to an Exclusive Economic Zone A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 20

under UNCLOS III (Arbitration between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s

Republic of China, 2016). Both of these determinations create international precedent that would

negate any legal claims by China in the South China Sea. As China seeks to legitimize its

standing as a hemispherical leader and an alternative to the United States and the European

Union for emerging players in the Indian Ocean Rim and East Asian regions, rulings such as this one will create barriers Beijing will need to overcome as it creates IGO’s and institutions on a whole host of issue areas designed to create a powerful economic and environmental security bloc under Chinese leadership.

In the likely event that the territorial disputes between China and the Philippines remain unresolved, despite the harm done to Beijing’s international authority, an analysis of the risks this relationship poses becomes necessary as they are a probable source of a miscalculation in the

South China Sea. The Philippines has a mutual defense treaty with the United States, a crucial arms deal with Japan (Tatsumi, 2016), and has very strong claims to many of the uninhabitable

Spratly Islands within their EEZ due to a long tradition of fishing those waters that was reinforced by the PCA’s decision in Philippines v. China (Arbitration between the Republic of

the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China, 2016). They are also the most likely to

pursue international support for their position as their military only recently began to rebuild

from a period of decay. Furthermore, any bolstering of Filipino claims are limited to publicity

stunts such as manning the Sierra Madre with a small team of Marines near the Second Thomas

Shoal (known as Ayungin in the Philippines), which is a beached World War II era tank landing

ship that was installed on the South China Sea Island reef in 1999 (Mogato, 2015). The Second

Thomas Shoal is about halfway between Pag-Asu (Thitu) and Puerto Princesca, placing it around

100 nautical miles from the western Philippines province of Palawan and well within their A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 21

legitimate and internationally recognized EEZ (Etzler, 2014). The Marines, by virtue of living

aboard the ship, are attempting to block Chinese efforts in the region to assert territorial authority

within the Philippine EEZ and provide the Filipino government with a manned “island” in the

Second Thomas Shoal (called Ren'ai Jiao in China) to attempt to prevent further island

occupation in the shoal, and the greater Spratly Island region (called Nanshu in China) (Etzler,

2014). While the Philippine efforts involving the Sierra Madre pale in comparison to China’s

ability to build entire islands that can serve as fixed aircraft carriers and their encirclement of

nearly every other ASEAN claimant’s position in the Spratly and Paracel Islands, it illustrates

the power vacuum in which these disputes are occurring.

The Chinese seem to have anticipated several potential miscalculations that could trigger

the American-Filipino mutual defense treaty (signed in 1951) by utilizing a strategy of

overpowering the Philippine forces with Chinese Coast Guard assets supported by naval

warships. Using warships as tertiary support provides China a plausible case for a defensive war

should the Philippines retaliate with its military against non-combatant Coast Guard vessels

(French, 2014). The Philippines responded in 2015 with a $22 billion military modernization

program aimed at modernizing their forces by 2028 (Parameswaran, 2015). If continued by the new Filipino regime this will bolster their Coast Guard and help to contain Chinese expansion in the region. This regime has provided ample evidence that it is currently seeking stronger ties with China and may well roll back this initiative. Given that the Philippines has been cautious enough to refrain from retaliating militarily to Chinese violations of international law in the

Spratly Islands under UNCLOS III, to which both nations are signatories, it seems their existing flash points in the South China Sea might be a hopeful case for avoiding a miscalculation for other state actors operating in the region. Beijing likely anticipated and accounted for the Obama A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 22

Administrations recalcitrance to obligate forces overseas to risk a confrontation with the

Philippines in order to signal to the other claimants in the South China Sea that the United States might not be the stalwart ally it proclaims to be. This strategy was likely modified in the face of

the Trump White House’s reinforced campaign rhetoric on the South China Sea and threats of

tariffs on Chinese exports.

Vietnam is not a “Little Dragon”

In the case of Vietnam’s EEZ there is an even greater immediate risk of war with China

than over the Senkakus and the Spratly Islands. China has already engaged in numerous

skirmishes with the Vietnamese in the South China Sea specifically the Trường Sa and Hoàng Sa archipelagos, commonly known as the Spratly and Paracel Islands (Nam-Suk, 2016). As recently

as 2014 a skirmish involving a Chinese oilrig named Haiyang Shiyou 981, which China installed

within Vietnam’s EEZ, triggered massive protests within Vietnam after Vietnamese forces failed

to repel the oilrig (Taylor, 2014). Chinese president Xi Jinping’s comments afterwards support a

rising opinion in the international community that China had prepared for and was fully

committed to a conflict using the armada sent to accompany the oilrig in the event that Vietnam

responded militarily. China’s steadfast position over Beijing’s 9-Dash Line has strained already

exacerbated relations between China and Vietnam despite their significant economic ties. In

response, many senior Vietnamese military officials have said that despite China’s

overwhelmingly superior maritime capabilities they will likely react to a seizure of additional islands with war (French, 2014). Vietnam, like the Philippines, is strengthening its military capabilities in response to China’s escalation. In 2013, the Vietnamese sent military personnel to

Russia to train and take command of two Russian made submarines and received offers from both India and Russia to train their burgeoning submariner forces (Andersson, 2013). It will be A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 23

some time before Vietnam can create a maritime defense strategy based upon undeveloped

Chinese anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability. In the short term, two Kilo-class submarines may serve as enough of a deterrent to keep China’s Liaoning at bay.

The Sino-Vietnamese and the Sino-Filipino maritime disputes emphasize the importance

of the previous American admiration’s “Pivot to Asia”, although it is arguable how effective the implementation of this strategy has been due to the numerous distractions the Obama administration faced in Southwest Asia and Africa (Campbell & Andrews, 2013). This shift in

focus to an area of the world with vastly more prominence in American security objectives may

be overly protracted, but it reaffirms a standing policy that amounts to a containment of military assertions of force in the region by local state actors (Shambaugh, 2013). China is within a decade of eclipsing the American economy and within two decades of realizing a powerful green water navy which could dominate their maritime environment (Shambaugh, 2013). To confront these developments, America and its ASEAN partners have committed to hemming Beijing’s advances by excluding them from regional trade agreements, sharing intelligence and military technologies, and contributing to the rising relative power of the opposing forces in the South

China Sea. Vietnam is procuring submarines with the support of Russia and India. The Philippines are spending billions on their Coast Guard and green water navy. And to the east-

Japan, under Shinzo Abe, has shifted domestic rhetoric from a pacifist stance to building up its armed maritime Figure 3: The Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute in the East Sea. Shapefiles pulled from MarineRegions.org A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 24

forces. When viewed through the lens of national security, and specifically maritime security,

China’s motivations in the South China Sea become resoundingly comprehensible. Beijing’s

tactical escalation in the South China Sea has netted several island air-and-sea force projection

installations, on-going oil extraction in the EEZ’s of sovereign nations despite opposition both

regionally and internationally, vibrant fishing grounds that are mere miles away from the

territorial waters (TTW) of American allies, and an as yet tacit acquiescence from the international community.

Why the South China Sea, and not the East Sea

If Beijing’s short term interests in the next decade progress linearly and without

miscalculations in the South China Sea, it seems logical that they will advance their position in the East Sea with Japan over the Senkakus. The Senkakus, known in China as the Diaoyu

Islands, have been in dispute since 1971. A holdover from World War II, in 1971 the United

States turned over sovereignty of the chain of uninhabitable islands in the East Sea to Japan.

Since then the islands have been largely nationalized by Japan and are the primary territory

dispute between Japan and China (French, 2014). Tokyo seems as reluctant to engage China

directly over its actions in the South China Sea as the United States, despite the threat it poses to international law and regional stability. Japan’s position on the Senkakus is unambiguous, by contrast. Any actions taken in the Senkakus by Beijing akin to its salami tactics in the South

China Sea would assuredly lead to war between Japan and China. While the Chinese green water navy would be incredibly unlikely to prevail against Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (154 modern vessels and crews that have been well trained in joint operations with South Korea and

the United States) over the Senkakus, this may not always be the case (Shimodaira, 2014).

Indeed, it seems Beijing has held back in the Senkakus when compared to its actions in the A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 25

Spratly and Paracel Islands, which is likely indicative of Chinese awareness that Japan remains an unassailable maritime force. Despite Japan being an intractable adversary, a more prominent reason for China’s hesitation and a near term focus on the South China Sea would be the 53,000

American military personnel stationed in Japan at 85 facilities, and the Seventh Fleet housed in

Honshu (Chanlett-Avery & Rinehart, 2016). Japan’s Coast Guard is also playing a prominent role in the Senkakus in reaction to China’s development of its own Coast Guard to advance their territorial disputes without using military agents. In response Japan and the United States have established the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) to jointly respond to Chinese escalations in the Senkakus while avoiding a major war (Shimodaira, 2014). Combined with ever strengthening security ties between the United States and Japan, the disregard by both the United

States and Japan of China’s air defense identification zones (ADIZ)8 in the East Sea (Chanlett-

Avery & Rinehart, 2016), and Abe’s recent assertions of collective self-defense; it seems that only a miscalculation by China would pose a probable threat to igniting a conflict over the

Senkakus . If China can secure most of its purported 9-Dash Line in the South China Sea, it seems unlikely that the asymmetry of their position juxtaposed with Japan’s would slow down their advancement indefinitely as the Senkakus make exceptional linkages in maritime security transiting from China to the Pacific ocean, and effectively break through their eastern containment.

China’s PLA-N

Beijing’s Military Development. Continual growth in Beijing’s military sectors has

been recorded since 1991 which has most notably created three major capabilities: anti-ship

8 Air Defense Identification Zones were first designed by the United States in the 1950’s. A defensive depth system used to detect, identify, and intercept hostile air assets entering a sovereign state’s air space. Most ADIZ’s extend far beyond territorial air space to facilitate earlier detection. A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 26

ballistic missiles (ASBM)9 that are now sophisticated enough to be dubbed “carrier killers”,

intercontinental range ballistic missiles (ICBM)10 serving as China’s nuclear payload delivery

system in the DF-31/A (the DF-41 was reportedly tested in early 2016), and a robust Chinese

navy that includes ballistic missile submarines (SSBN)11 and aircraft carrier strike groups

(“Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China”, 2010). ADIZ

and other A2AD technologies have been designed to limit American access to the commons off

their coastlines (“Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of

China”, 2010). This strategy will be a baseline from which the PLA-Navy (PLA-N) will project

outwards as China establishes its maritime dominance in the western Pacific and secures

positions within the first island chain, and ensures their ability to operate in the second island

chain (“China’s maritime strategy and the future of Asia”, 2015). In dire circumstances this

strategy will allow China to yield ground inwards from the second island chain in the face of

multiple naval powers encroaching on their position.

Mao’s Active Defense. Chinese forces can thus utilize their inherent geostrategic

advantages provided by mainland ground and air power support and extensive green water

maritime development to fight an asymmetric defensive battle until a major counterattack is

prescient (Holmes & Yoshihara, 2011). A yield/counterattack strategy is further illustrated by

China’s mainland offensive missile capabilities and island construction in the South China Sea

which will function as fixed carrier positions whose nonexistent mobility serves China’s

9 ASBM’s are outfitted with maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs) for fine course adjustments designed to destroy targets moving at sea. These MaRVs can use a variety of targeting methods such as optics, radar, millimeter wave technology, etc. Can be launched from a variety of platforms. 10 ICBM’s are guided ballistic missiles designed to provide delivery systems across vast distances using multiple phases (boost, midcourse, and reentry/terminal). Typically utilized to deliver nuclear payloads as part of a nuclear deterrent strategy. Many possess multiple MaRV’s called MIRVs which allow for multiple targeting solutions from a single missile. Due to the large size of the system they are typically launched from submarine, silo installations, and mobile overland platforms. 11 SSBNs are part of the nuclear triad’s second strike capability and designed for stealth. A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 27

foregoing relations position well in that it pronounces to the international community Beijing is

not attempting to project naval and air power beyond the second island chain (Holmes, 2010).

This “fortress fleet” of geostationary ASBM and aircraft launch facilities (Holmes, 2010) seems

to double as an effort to both assuage concerns of a future colonial China and to maximize

regional authority at a time when the United States is beginning to retract some of its power

projection in military theaters abroad both diplomatically and in permanently stationed military

forces (Kaplan, 2010). This is indicative that Beijing and the PLA-N are determined to develop

the capability to dramatically increase risk factors to American forces in the region from both

recognized sovereign mainland positions and internationally disputed islands that possess

contingents of civilian personnel liable to be gravely injured during any neutralization of an

island’s wartime efficacy (Bluestone & Mirasola, 2016). Beijing is using America’s own well-

practiced application of realpolitik and overseas power projection and which forces Washington

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider more dangerous risk calculations in the South China

Sea.

The Emergence of China’s Maritime Silk Road

China has adopted a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road foreign policy platform in order to

sustain an increasing need for industrial inputs and a geostrategic imperative to secure energy

resources. This policy is also informally called the “String of Pearls” by many western and

Indian strategists and journalists due to the ease with which China could turn these “places” into military bases utilized for hard power projection, namely directed at India which is China’s primary competitor in Asia (Dixon, 2014). The emergence of both China and India’s

industrialized economies is having the direct effect of raising hundreds of millions of people out

of abject poverty (Kaplan, 2011). These two countries, accounting for more than 2.5 billion A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 28

people, have rich cultural histories and rapidly advancing citizenry whose capital and labor markets will be integral to not only Asia, but the greater global economy (Kaplan, 2012). India is still transitioning outwards into the Indian Ocean rim (IOR) from their many land border conflicts and domestic insecurities and has only begun to strengthen cultural and diplomatic ties with the rest of the IOR (Pillalamarri, 2014). This lag time in soft and hard power projection by

India has provided China with opportunities to entrench its companies and interests in places

India purports are within their natural sphere of influence; such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives,

Burma, eastern Bangladesh, and Pakistan (Agnihotri, 2011).

The Indian Ocean Needs China More than India. While India is certainly catching up to the direct foreign investment levels China is maintaining, it has yet to overtake the stake China has in not only Africa, but the greater Indian Ocean Rim (Singh, 2015). Chinese policy objectives to follow Zheng He’s historical routes and establish linkages in resource rich Africa, oil rich Southwest Asia, and the IOR sea lanes of communication (SLOC’s) has proven to be effective for China and to contribute significantly to the regions in question (Roy, 2013). China’s explicit foreign policy directive of noninvolvement in the domestic affairs of foreign nations, as well as their realpolitik practice of overlooking the transgressions of regimes in their foreign policy, has the effect of transferring significant capital investment into the Indian Ocean rim in key locations stretching from Myanmar (Burma) and Singapore to Tanzania and the Seychelles

(Singh, 2015). Despite Beijing’s disregard for the human rights abuses, corruption, and social unrest in the regions in which they are investing, China’s physical infrastructure development programs have facilitated regional growth in the Indian Ocean rim in a way that no other player within the IOR can claim. A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 29

To understand why China is so focused on the Indian Ocean rim and the 21st Century

Maritime Road it is necessary to review their geography, recent regional developments, and the

geopolitical situation of their “places” along the route (Holslag, 2014). The Indian Ocean rim connects three continents and is critically important to the rest of the world via maritime trade through the Pacific Ocean, around the Cape of Good Hope, and the Suez Canal. The IOR is transitioning from a period of American dominated maritime authority following the end of colonialism (Bentley & Ziegler, 2011) into something new that resembles its historical monsoon driven interconnections (Kaplan, 2011). This region is becoming wealthier as a result and countries in the IOR are advancing their maritime presence to further facilitate trade and to exploit their exclusive economic zones push out 200 nautical miles from land (EEZ) (Michel &

Stricklor, 2012). Nearly every part of the region is building ports, developing maritime security

forces, and increasing interconnected diplomatic relationships (Michel & Stricklor). Prior

cultural bonds between the African littoral, the Arab world, and South Asia are being restored by

projects and interconnections such as India’s Project Mausam (Pillalamarri, 2014).

The Indian Ocean is also home to some of the world’s most robust fisheries and links important oil producers with major energy consumers. Due to its rapidly industrializing economies, booming populations, urbanization, and climate change the IOR finds itself in

desperate need of unity, leadership, and capital investment. For example, there is very little

evidence of effective fisheries management outside of Australia’s EEZ. The eastern IOR is home

to over 45% of the world’s fishers but accounts for less than 9% of total yield. Coral bleaching is rampant and widespread leading to an estimated loss of 70% of the IOR’s reef, which accounts

for 30% of the world’s coral reefs. The less developed littoral states are having to hurriedly move

to fishing grounds further offshore to support growing populations that have depleted fish stocks A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 30

near the coastlines and urbanized countries are dealing with a critical eutrophication and pollutant crisis that is broadening coastal dead zones every year (Michel & Stricklor, 2012).

Islamic extremism in the IOR region is also a major concern as impoverished youths with access to global media find themselves with more information available about their disenfranchisement relative to the rest of the world than at any other point in history. Despite these problems, the

IOR is also the last remaining region-wide low income workforce left in the world and has the fewest instances of labor laws, environmental regulations, and collective bargaining (Kaplan,

2011). These political geography features and natural resources provide not only critical growth

capabilities within the region, but ample resources and tourism capabilities to exploit by foreign

powers. These power seeks to mark claims in places at extreme risk of famine, revolution,

flooding, cyclones, tsunamis, authoritarian violence, fisheries depletion, climate change, coral

bleaching, and sectarian violence. It is in these incredibly complex and challenging issue areas

that China has emerged as a major foreign player in the IOR (Michel & Stricklor, 2012).

China has historical ties to much of the Indian Ocean rim dating back to the Ming

dynasty voyages of Zheng He in the 15th century (Bentley & Ziegler, 2011a) and is using this to

create “places not bases” and relationships all along what India and the west call the String of

Pearls, which stretches from Southeast Asia to the Red Sea (Marantidou, 2014). These locations

are regions that China has strong economic or strategic reasons for strengthening ties with, and does so by justifying linkages created centuries ago by Zheng He before China underwent a

period of isolationism in the 15th century due to domestic problems and retreated from the IOR.

The Ming dynasty then retreated further from the maritime in general and became a land based empire until its collapse due to the Shun and Manchu invasions in the 17th century. The

following Qing dynasty did little to regain the maritime glory of the earlier Ming emperors until A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 31

its dissolution in 1912 and the beginning of colonialism and the 100 Years of Shame. This period was a perpetual cycle of outside powers eroding or outright destroying Chinese sovereignty culminating in the massacres perpetrated by the Japanese in WWII (Bentley & Ziegler, 2011).

Two Great Powers and Their Trap

The Copyright for America’s Foreign Policy Playbook Has Expired. Following the

100 Years of Shame the Chinese Civil War gave rise to Mao Zedong and his people’s movement

that, after the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution, sponsored Chinese industrialization and

urbanization efforts that have led to China’s rise on a global stage. This did not come without a

cost, however, as China’s enormous population and resource insecurities have pushed the

tendrils of Chinese soft power ever further afield. Since China’s nearest viable labor, mineral,

and energy resources are in Africa, South Asia, and Southwest Asia it follows that the IOR is

vital to their geostrategic policy objectives (Kaplan, 2012). Global demand for inexpensive

products places China’s developing middle class, and it’s even higher skilled labor that demands

correspondingly higher pay, at a crossroads between industrialization and modernity. Since

China can no longer serve as the leading low-wage manufacturing plant of the world, in large

part to the other developing states in the Brazil-India-Russia-China-South Africa (BRICS)

category and the emerging cheap labor markets in the IOR and SE Asia competing with it, its

manufacturing economy must change and adapt to a future with less assured trade surpluses and

more expensive domestic labor.

As this transition within China occurs Beijing is reaching outwards along its 21st Century

Maritime Silk Road to find partners within the vacuum resulting after Britain, the last colonial

power with a dominant presence in the IOR, withdrew after WWII (Bentley & Ziegler, 2011b). A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 32

Beijing maintains a policy of non-interference in domestic affairs of foreign states, in part due to its vehement opposition to how foreigners dominated their recent history, and despite this constructs interesting and unique systems with which to create space for its own interests within other states without upending sovereign practices and procedures. The legacy of the 100 Years of

Shame illustrates a savvy international political player who understand that it must transition into a maritime power and the primary regional authority if it is to maintain growth and protect itself from the “concentration of strategic power in the Asia-Pacific region on its maritime flank” (Qi,

Erickson, & Goldstein, 2006, p. 56).

Forced Technology Transfer. China is an incredibly attentive student of the Soviet Union

(Goldstein, 2015). Whereas Russia cut itself off from global trade and insulated itself to an

ideological bloc, China is trade. China, more so

than any other nation on earth, represents trade as

a fundamental model for its nation. Since opening

up its economy Beijing has adroitly integrated

Chinese capital into just about every marketplace

on earth. So intertwined are Chinese exports and Figure 4: Chinese Foreign Capital Investment. (“China Global Investment Tracker Map,” 2017) capital investment a tenement of structural realism actually precludes war with China. The linkages China has formed in the technologically developed states has provided a pivotal resource in the cyber infrastructure and intellectual property of its competitors.

Convergence is an often bemoaned economic theory, whereby rapidly developing states can steal, borrow, license, or absorb the technologies of more advanced states until technological parity occurs. This is sometimes called reaching the bottleneck. Maintaining such exponential A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 33

convergent growth and reforming an economic system to manage its institutions is far more complicated than the simplistic nature of the theory lets on. But it is one in which China has, in many ways, written the book on. In its 12th Five-Year-Plan China gave affirmations that it intends to be a “moderately prosperous society by 2020” and a “high income country by 2030”

(The World Bank & the Development Research Center of the State Council, the People’s

Republic of China, 2012, p. 163). This is not mere rhetoric, but modeled after careful considerations of the Japanese convergence (1960’s-70’s) and the Korean case study (1980’s-

90’). Despite understanding that technological convergence and intellectual theft is a major component of Chinese growth, Beijing has shown several indicators to observers that institutional reform to avoid the bottleneck in coming decades is already underway. By 2030

China will likely have more college graduates than the entirety of the American labor market.

China is investing heavily in research and development (predicted to be over 2% of GDP) and developing its Science and Technology University programs at a more rapid rate (China currently only has 5.5% of the top ranked Universities in the world). China is developing

“sticky” cities intending to harness economic and technological spillover effects with the intention of creating global science hubs. A major detractor from China’s ability to reach and overcome convergence is certainly a less flexible system of State-owned enterprises (SOE) (The

World Bank & the Development Research Center of the State Council, the People’s Republic of

China, 2012). A point to be taken for future Sino-American foreign policy discussions is to recognize that even without China fully harnessing a robust technologically advanced self- innovating economy by 2030 they will still overtake the American one, rife as it is with decades long trade deficits, in a matter of a few years. A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 34

Energy Security. Over 70 percent

of China’s total energy supply is fueled by

coal, but its oil resources are vital (as they

largely fuel China’s manufacturing and

maritime sectors) and almost entirely travel

through a narrow international strait Figure 5: Oil and the Strait of Malacca between Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2011)

(Marantidou, 2014). The Strait of Malacca is a major security risk for every major energy

consumer and shipper in the world, but none more so than China and Japan. The latter of the two

has seen a significant rise of its oil consumption since the disaster at the TEPCO Fukushima

Daiichi nuclear power plant has shocked the Japanese citizenry and bureaucracy into shying

away from nuclear power (Vivoda, 2012). While Japan can count on allies and the prevailing

international system to assure its energy needs are met (though it remains one of their primary

national security objectives), China feels it has no such assurances and Beijing in particular

appears to view an Indian or American blockade of the Strait as a threat to its ability to maintain

its “image as a leadership that protects the country’s economic interests and its people abroad”

(Marantidou, 2014, p. 5).

As a result it is not surprising that one of the most consistent messages emanating from

Beijing in last several decades has been maintaining safe passage for Chinese shipping through the Strait is one of the PLA-N’s primary missions (Goldstein, 2015). The China-Pakistan

Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) initiative are

China’s immediate answers to the Malacca Dilemma (Marantidou, 2014). Until such time as

China can finalize its accelerating independent and sustainable energy infrastructure A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 35

developments (Dai et. all, 2016), the alternative transnational pipelines and overland routes such

as those originating in Sittwe and Gwadar, and the PLA-N’s bolstering of its capabilities to maintain free navigation under UNCLOS III in the Strait of Malacca protecting China’s SLOC’s will remain paramount to their national security (Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2010). This must be better understood outside of academia in the

West. Much of Beijing’s perceived bellicosity is the summation of strategies designed to assure its own ability to guarantee energy security for the ~20% of the world’s population in their charge.

These histories and facts on the ground can provide outside observers an understanding

of the justification for the String of Pearls. Both China’s execution of it and India’s fears and objections. The pearls, or “places”, provide the PLA-N and China’s foreign services an infrastructure with which to secure Chinese ports in Gwadar and Karachi (Pakistan) that bring oil

from the Middle East to its western frontier and rapidly urbanizing central areas like Sichuan,

Yunnan, and Guizhou. The Sri Lankan ports of Hambantota and Colombo further China’s

interconnection and serve to provide a major trading hub halfway between the Suez Canal and

Strait of Malacca. Chittagong (Bangladesh) in the Bay of Bengal serves as another western

corridor into China’s interior and yet another instance of reducing the critical insecurity of the

Strait of Malacca (Holslag, 2013). Just south of Chittagong, oil pipelines from Kyaukpyu in

Myanmar are a primary reason China supported the Junta in Burma (Kaplan, 2011). A rapidly

increasing presence in the Seychelles, the Maldives, Djibouti, the Arabian Peninsula, and eastern

Africa indicates Chinese foreign policy objectives do not simply end with the oil producers stemming from the Persian Gulf, but to resource rich Africa as well. China has stated it will not

project its PLA-N into the IOR or utilize the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road to build bases and A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 36

military outposts, but many western observers cannot help but notice the ease with which its

proposed far seas maritime forces could do so, and the danger it would pose to the status quo in

Indian waters (Qi, Erickson, & Goldstein, 2004).

China Might Understand America’s Playbook Better than America Does in 2017.

American economic recessions, slow recovery with poor growth markers, and two untenable

wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have sapped America’s ability to allocate resources effectively around the world. Focused public opinion on the Middle East and on domestic woes and social

movements have turned American attention inward and hobbled the Obama administration from effectively leading abroad in its latter years. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wound down, the Arab Spring and Syrian Civil wars slowed the American “Pivot to Asia” which was further sidelined due to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the isolationist and nationalist presidential campaigns of the 2016 general election, and an inability to push through the Trans-

Pacific Partnership (TPP). Bashar al-Assad’s relationship with Russia and Iran produced a new quagmire for the United States in Southwest Asia involving Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and much of

Europe. This quagmire prevented America from garnering public will into solutions in the region and along the IOR. Donald Trump’s election and a wave of nationalistic isolationism is taking place in America at a time when the world is looking to the United States to counter Chinese

influence and power projection, solve the crisis in Syria and Iraq, and answer Russian bellicosity.

This movement on one spectrum of American electoral politics, culminating in the Trump election, illustrates a rejection of institutionalism and of moral imperatives abroad. TPP will likely die in Congress as a result, which provides China with an opportunity to lead in the vacuum left internationally by America’s abdication. The Regional Comprehensive Economic

Partnership (RCEP) is China’s answer to TPP and consists of a multilateral agreement with A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 37

Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India. The RCEP consists of more than 1/3 of the

worlds GDP. China needs new markets which further requires that the world needs to become

richer to fund China’s growth as Europe and the United States deal with slow growth, a

shrinking middle class, and protectionist trade platforms. The RCEP is scheduled to be complete

in the next few months, long before a renegotiated TPP could even begin under President-elect

Trump (Morimoto, 2016). China will become the dominant trade block leader in East and

Southeast Asia as a result which is a boon for Beijing, who likely believed such a victory would

be far more costly and challenging, requiring intricate policy decisions in the South China Sea

and massive linkages forged abroad in anticipation of its future leadership role.

It becomes evident that for America and Europe to counterbalance Chinese developments

in the IOR, India serves as the most viable adjunct for Westphalian principles and could promote

democracy and capitalism in the region. Iran’s Chabahar port development backed by India is an

important stopgap against China and Pakistan’s Gwadar infrastructure and to lessen the

probability that Gwadar, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh could serve as conduits around Indian ports

to and from Chinese markets. The port in Chabahabar could pose significant barriers towards a

Republican dominated federal government in America, however, increasing the policy areas of concern in promoting Indian counterbalancing efforts in the IOR. Cooperation and alliances with India, a state in conflict with a geostrategic partner of the United States to their northwest, is challenging despite these new developments given the Indian reticence towards western powers and a cultural disdain for the possibility of future colonialism (Kaplan, 2011). And it seems likely that if not handled delicately, Beijing would increase its aggression and overseas hard power projection if it perceives a threat to the 21st Century Maritime Road and the destiny it represents for the Chinese. A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 38

Neutralizing the Trap from Springs to Box

Sometime between 2020 (Goldstein, 2015) and 2030 (The World Bank & the

Development Research Center of the State Council, the People’s Republic of China, 2012)

China’s economy will eclipse that of the United States. It is incredibly doubtful that the United

States could halt or even significantly delay this development. China is also inching towards military parity with the United States and its allies and might begin to threaten American Naval supremacy in the waters immediately adjacent to China sometime in the late 2030’s.

International military force projection will lag some number of years behind this active defensive posture capability pushing full Naval parity out several decades (Erickson, 2015). The American withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership multilateral trade deal has given rise to China’s

Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) which will likely solidify Goldstein’s economic predictive markers around 2020. Just as the TPP involved the vast majority of states in the Western Pacific but excluded China, so too does the RCEP endeavor to promote Chinese leadership by excluding the United States (Morimoto, 2016). The United Kingdom has joined the

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank against the opposition of the United States, indicating the rise of China has already begun a transformation of the world’s political geography (Jacques,

2017). Taiwan is shrinking on the global stage as are the quantity of protests in Chinese Tibet, although they could still be brought to bear as a potential flashpoint between these two great states. Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Indian relations are consistently worsening despite significant interdependence (Agnihotri, 2011; Holslag, 2013; Kaplan, 2014; Pant, 2012). These trends have been made all the more certain by the recent 2016 populist election in the United States that likely signals either tariffs and a withdrawal from globalization, and/or a reduced American capacity to engage in leadership on a host of issues internationally as it limits itself in scope and A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 39

long term strategies. Either of these outcomes promise to exacerbate socioeconomic conditions within the United States that are markedly similar to the examples in history of Thucydidean

Traps. While China has major threats to its internal cohesions stemming from its authoritarian regime and its monumental shift from industrializing to industrialized, its position seems less precarious than that of the United States.

Don’t Confuse Tactics for Strategy. If ever there was an existential threat to global security, it is the emergence of a Thucydidean Trap with two nuclear armed economic powerhouses whose technological power and human capital would likely dwarf the comprehension of the powers that fought in WWII. Even the Cold War, with its nuclear fallout drills and existential threats from opposing ideologies that permeated every level of both societies, did not threaten to erode American power as the Sino-American Trap does. For the preservation of global peace this Trap must not be sprung. Advocates on both sides of the Pacific that would endorse a strategy bent on crippling the supremacy of one side or the other through subterfuge or political maneuvering would be using tools and tactics from the 20th century that would fail in maintaining the security of a 21st century world. The period in which crippling the

Politburo through a successful subversion campaign has likely passed. Interdependency from the two economies preclude isolationism or a return to Cold War economic blocs as viable stratagems. Drawing lines in the world based upon ideologies would be futile as China does not export ideologies, nor prioritize partnering those with ones similar to their own. China had little input into the architecture of the current global order and likely stands the most to gain from it being altered or abandoned. Assumptions that a modified utilization of the democratic peace could be at the forefront of Sino-American diplomacy would be foolish. Trade wars and tariffs implemented by the United States and its allies would harm their economies dramatically while A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 40

China could likely reduce growth to 2-4% and shift its exports to the developing markets it is currently fostering in the absence of American foreign policy strategies in those regions. These tactics would prove counterproductive and even should a comprehensive American strategy be formed around harming the Chinese economy and political institutions in an attempt to stave off its further rise in power it would likely prove unable to simultaneously maintain American dominance.

The Thucydidean Trap Is A Set Of Conditions With A Probable Outcome, Not

Destiny. In the 5th century B.C.E. Thucydides used the Trap as a metaphor to describe the fundamental causes of the Peloponnesian War and the inevitability of total war. The conflict he observed seemed to escalate and mutually destroy power as a function of Thucydides’ perhaps inadvertent proto political science model. The fact that the geopolitical structures present in the

Peloponnesian peninsula in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C.E. have led to bloodshed time and time again in history need not imply that the Trap is anything more than an astute observation of the conditions in Athens and Sparta that led to war. Indeed it is likely, and has been borne out through recorded history, that absent certain mechanisms Allison and his team observed in four case studies the Trap will be triggered as the natural conclusion of the structural pressures and fear caused by rapid shifts in the balance of power between hegemonies and rising powers

(Allison, 2015). When mechanisms exist that can provide education, placate the fearful, mitigate economic harm, and reduce cultural friction then the Trap has demonstrably been avoided in at A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 41

least four examples as illustrated in figure 6. When this consideration is made, the four case

studies provided by the team at

the Belfer Center that avoided

the Thucydidean Trap

demonstrate that tumultuous

social forces can be placated,

just as international institutions

can mitigate the risks of

destabilizing security concerns.

Avoidable Through Action.

Some of the greatest minds in

the world have observed the Figure 6: Examples of the Trap in the Past 500 Years (Allison, 2015) conditions outlined in this paper and a flurry of academic and political arguments have entered this issue space since the financial crash of 2007-8. A significant number of cognizant and powerful actors in the global system have observed the momentum swinging these two great states towards conflict. The Sino-

American relationship is now the single greatest threat to the global peace. Working to counteract the elements that are bringing the world ever closer to conflict between China and the

United States must become one of the fundamental cornerstones of all American foreign policy moving forward. It is critical that those in power now take a moment to ponder the 35,000

Americans that died on the Korean peninsula the last time America decided not to heed clear and concise warnings from Beijing (Goldstein, 2015). Moreover, it is vital that Beijing understand the relative peace and prosperity of the global system in the past 72 years has been paid for with A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 42

the blood of over a million American service members (DeBruyne & Leland, 2015). While the quantity of those deaths may not seem enormous to a country that lost scores of thousands

(perhaps hundreds of thousands) lives in a single massacre during WWII (Wakabayashi, 2007) they are pivotal to understanding the American resolution to maintain the global status quo.

Building a Strategy. One of the only academic works available on the subject emphasizing specific public policy recommendations for multiple state actors was written two years ago by Lyle Goldstein of the American Naval War College. Goldstein uses more modern definitions and observations than Thucydides had available to him 2,500 years ago for the collision course the United States and China are on, but the mechanisms Thucydides identified resonate within a more modern analysis. Goldstein’s escalation spirals are indicative that sometimes metaphors can be powerful predictors of behavior if conditions are similar enough.

Goldstein, like Allison and many others in this issue area, argues that the existence of globalized financial interdependence, international institutions, and the threat of nuclear war are not sufficient balancers to the “intense fear and loathing that drive zero-sum mentalities in both countries and the competitive and increasingly dangerous policies that have resulted” (Goldstein,

2015, p. 2). Strategic diplomatic engagement, tactical leveraging of power (both in the political economy and in force projection), and a temperance by the established waning power rarely seen in history are all required of the United States to avoid this conflict. For Beijing’s part, it must begin to reflect in policy an understanding that America’s cultural and political edification is indicative of its philosophy, not the proverbial tip of an imperial spear seeking to colonize

Chinese minds. Both states must look to international institutions to help bridge these ideological differences, and acknowledge publicly that rhetoric and fear can be offset by careful diplomacy and diligently working to create and preserve a new balance of power just as the United States A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 43

and the Soviet Union did during the Cold War, and just as the United States and Great Britain did in the beginning of the 20th century. There will be weaker states that suffer as a result of this struggle to preserve a balance of security, but the alternative would devastate a world order billions rely on to avoid another world war.

Goldstein’s policy recommendations in Meeting china halfway: How to defuse the emerging US-china rivalry are ambitious and could be very successful within the region. They assume that the primary mechanisms needed to defuse the extant Trap are embedded in the Sino-

American-Japanese relationship. Specifically threats to East (China) Sea stability, a routinely

overhyped national security

crisis in Japan, and a

Chinese perspective that

American force projection

in the first and second

island chain are doubling

for a continuation of Cold

War containment protocols.

It is an oversimplification

to state that Goldstein’s

cooperation spiral is an

analysis that Japanese

domestic rhetoric and East

China Sea disputes are the

primary threat to future Figure 7: Cooperation Spiral (Japan, China, and America) (Goldstein, 2015) A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 44

conflict between China and America. Rather, it seems to be an astute observation that the least abrasive immediate policy solutions likely exist within that trilateral policy space. It is arguable that supporting Japan’s entrance onto the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a permanent member before the continents of Africa, South America, and Oceana are represented would even be a desirable strategic outcome of the spiral. Goldstein is likely correct, however, in determining that the five stages in his cooperation spiral would make the region significantly safer and are achievable by the three state actors even in this tense political environment. As indicative of the mind of a pragmatist, Goldstein has identified a series of linear and tactical solutions that could resolve one of the major threats to tomorrow’s global security with the limited resources available to policymakers at this time. They are tactical in that they provide tangible actions for policy makers for all three state actors to implement. When escalated to higher order actions by the partners in the spiral they naturally develop into a strategic outcome- the East China Sea and Sino-Japanese relations would no longer be a primary contributor to trigger the Trap. These recommendations are astute and ideally suited to be the first of many tactical actions taken by a systematic American foreign policy regime, but it can only be the first step in a comprehensive strategy that must be methodical in order to avoid the Trap as the U.K. once did when presented with the American Monroe Doctrine.

The 21st Century does not have Room for a Chinese Monroe Doctrine. It is a gross oversimplification to say that another pillar of the American position must be to allow China to have a more prominent seat at the conceptual table of international politics. That is not a foreign policy platform that lawmakers and strategists can enact. It is also too simplistic to say that

America must speak with one voice when dealing with China (RADM Michael McDevitt, US

Navy (Ret.), 2015). America, whether for good or ill, is a kaleidoscope of similar but conflicting A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 45

ideologies and practices that distort its ability to understand China. While American foreign policy has been largely spared from incessant partisan lane changes (as its domestic policies are wont to be) it has suffered from a lack of coherent strategy. Maintaining the status quo and deescalating or administering international conflicts from triggering major power wars is not a strategy. Those actions are merely the tools and tactics with which a larger strategic vision can be realized. As Christensen said, listening to the concerns of the Chinese are important

(Christensen, 2015). It is important to do so as a requisite step in formulating a strategic model for Sino-American relations that creates a realistic outcome. One that demands partnership with a country that will rival a downward sliding scale of relative American dominance in economics, military power, and cultural authority (when compared to other high income nations).

China cannot simply be ceded international authority comparable to the United States.

One of the tenements of any successful implementation of a Sino-American strategy to disarm the Trap is in understanding that the comparative strengths of both states will provide the backbone of a non-violent solution. Ceding power weakens these comparative strengths, and is thus counterproductive. Here is the primary deviation from three of the four case examples

(European UNSC members and Germany; the USSR and the United States, and the Soviet Union and Japan as illustrated in figure 6) provided by the Belfer team of rising powers avoiding the

Trap (Allison, 2015). In these instances the cession of power occurred or international institutions negated other elements of Thucydides’ requirements. The Sino-American Trap lacks the conditions present in three of these examples that avoided war. It is only in the early 20th century (Figure 6) case study where similar conditions of economic interdependence, rising industrial power and maritime projection from the lessor power, and fading global dominance of the established power can be observed. Understanding this case study is vital to determining why A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 46

similar power cession (exemplified best in the British adherence to the Monroe Doctrine) would not work in the Sino-American Trap of the early 21st century

Global Power Cession Is As Dangerous As It Is Unnecessary. As stated previously,

China has mastered the American playbook. Whether by design or through similar converging positions China’s current actions in the South China Sea are similar enough to America’s early

20th century assertions in North and South America (of the even earlier 19th century Monroe

Doctrine) that careful analysis is required. While there are marked differences in relative military power, prevailing international institutions, and ideologies- the examples line up well. America at the turn of the 20th century was on a path to rapidly dwarf the gross domestic product (GDP) of the entire British Empire as a result of the continuity of American coasts and massive

American infrastructure development and industrialization. The British Empire was also facing flashpoints all over the world and its resources could not sustain maintaining an overwhelmingly dominant position over the combined strength of its next two most powerful rivals, a policy known as the Two-Power Standard. The Trap then, just as now, would have been devastating to the establish power (Friedberg, 2010). As a result of this, Britain adopted the Great

Rapprochement policy and fully ceded the entirety of the Americas to the United States, far beyond their earlier tacit agreement not to practice colonialist expansion per the Monroe

Doctrine in 1823 (Orde, 1996). This is where the similarities between the current Sino-American

Trap and the one avoided by Britain become less impactful, however.

In 1914 the democratic peace theory was yet to be a well observed phenomenon, and

Great Britain certainly did not determine such a practice to be their primary cause for ceding the

Americas fully to the United States (Orde, 1996). Furthermore, China and the United States are currently inexorably linked economies despite some indications that China is preparing for a A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 47

post-Dollar dominated global economy (Jacques, 2017). Implicit bias is also a far more impactful societal effect in the Sino-American instance as the two cultures share little common heritage in history, development, ideologies, or religion. Chinese and American cultures are too dissimilar to simply supplant one another on a global stage without catastrophic friction, further diverging the two examples. International institutions and conventions were rare outside of military treaties and bilateral economic agreements in 1914, as well. Those that exist now serve as a primary mechanism, apart from American strength at arms and nuclear deterrence, in maintaining the global peace. Great Britain also lacked strategic partners in the Americas that could counter

American influence and power projection at the dawn of the 20th century. Features that America has available to it in abundance now with Japan, India, South Korea, and Australia. These examples pale in comparison to the fact that in 1914 Great Britain had no significant threats to its national security in the Americas except for becoming embroiled in a Thucydidean conflict with

America itself. America today, and the global order it leads, faces innumerable threats from the

African littoral to Indonesia and cannot cede its military capabilities and political influence in the region without leaving itself vulnerable for crippling consequences. Ceding the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean Rim to China might seem like a logical tactic to avoid the Trap, but conditions exist now that make it highly impractical if the prevailing international system were to survive.

SCS Joint Management. The stakes in the South China Sea in potential resources and territorial security are as vital to China as the Caribbean was to the United States 160 years ago and remains to this day. The rocks of the Spratly Islands are not worth the decimation of the world order or springing the Sino-American Trap (Goldstein, 2015). The rights and sovereignty of the smaller states making up the ASEAN are important if the world’s international institutions are to remain functional post-American hegemony, but they will likely be the sacrificial lambs A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 48

with which the new Sino-American relationship will be built upon. A condominium or joint management organization for the South China Sea, with China as a veto player, is a likely peaceful conclusion to the current disputes. While not ideal, America would do well to legally resolve China’s primary concerns in the region before it is done slicing the salami or a miscalculation in the South China Sea triggers Thucydides Trap. Just as with the creation of the

United Nations, UNCLOS III, and a host of practical organizations and conventions- national imperatives must be placated and idealist expectations of international law be bent or broken into useable structures to avoid war. The ASEAN can be made to accept these alternatives and the global system will not need to irreparably cede its ability to protect the territorial sovereignty of its members.

Don’t Be MAD. It seems clear that mutually assured destruction (MAD) through nuclear deterrence and second strike capabilities, as well as a new mutually assured dependence based upon financial bond markets will not be sufficient to safeguard Sino-American relations against the Trap as it has done in the three case examples since 1944 (Allison, 2015; Goldstein, 2015).

While it is true that a trilateral approach with Japan would be beneficial, that leaves the other members of ASEAN, Taiwan, India, and the rest of the Indian Ocean Rim as potential flash points that could spring the Trap. While including Japan in the UNSC could have beneficial results in international relations and the vacuum of anarchy, India would likely be a far more significant counterweight to China in the markets of the future. Japan, Germany, and South

Korea are the success stories of the end of the 20th century, but it is China, India, and the Global

South that will likely prove to be the convergent economic forces of the 21st century. Goldstein notes that competition in the developing world, environmental overlap, and a perceived cultural antithesis between China and India need to be addressed (2015). Robert Kaplan and others would A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 49

likely argue the emergence of Indo-Chinese conflicts in the Indian Ocean, the African Littoral,

Iran, Pakistan, and Burma (Myanmar) present a near equal threat to destabilizing Sino-American relations as the dilemma in the East China Sea (2010, 2011, & 2014). Beginning a similar cooperation spiral with China, India, and the United States culminating in the admission of India as a permanent member of the UNSC is just as vital. As India begins to resolve its human rights crises resulting from urbanization and internal ethnic cultural conflicts, and works to promote policies like Project Mausum (Pillalamarri, 2014), an opportunity to further entrench Sino-

American diplomacy will present itself.

Amoral Vs. Immoral Partners. Reconsidering the American relationship with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia as the world transitions away from a petroleum based economy is necessary for any grand strategy that promotes the global peace and maintains American power. These need not be an abandonment of these states. Doing so would likely exacerbate existing shatterbelts.

But military support and arms sales for oppressive regimes that sponsor terrorism abroad in a world where China offers faster infrastructure development and commitment exempt from the irrational oscillating shifts in American electoral politics seems inappropriate, both from a moral and pragmatic perspective. The world would certainly become less safe should the regimes in

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan implode or succumb to revolution, but the international system could sustain such disruption as long as the nukes don’t start flying. The current system could not withstand the collapse of China or India, however. No more so than it could a rapid collapse of

American power. A multipolar world is fast approaching. The most important strategy America can employ now is ensuring it is a multipolar world with international norms and systemic controls for nuclear proliferation, resource management of the commons, and insurances for sovereign integrity. To that end old perspectives on maintaining a global house of cards in which A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 50

each regional power is offset by an American one leveraging the full might of a global superpower is unsustainable once America faces tangible threats to its own supremacy, as it now does. America must strengthen international systems focused on promoting suffrage now, while it is still the leader of the world order, and that will require a recalibration of toxic relationships existing solely for geostrategic realpolitik balance. It will also require quietly bequeathing levels of sovereignty to its own international systems and institutions, while it can still dictate advantageous terms.

Ratify UNCLOS III. Given that cession by the international community and the United

States is not a viable option, other considerations must be added to any American strategy that overlaps with the South China Sea. The ASEAN is not a suitable counterbalance to China.

American surrogates in the region cannot risk a conflict with China for the EEZ’s and resources of the ASEAN, let alone for the PCA’s authority. If the United States remains unwilling to ratify one of the most important treaties in human history over a neorealist view of resource exploitation, then it is ceding global leadership. In that vacuum China can and will either erode or displace American leadership and international authority. Any coherent strategy in leading

Sino-American relations into a peaceful future for both powers requires the maritime to be governed under treaty to maintain the security of a global system. America must use this opportunity to radically strengthen the international institutions it brought into force through its leadership and might and expand their authority wherever practical in order to protect the future of liberal democracy from erosion in a multipolar landscape.

The IMF Must Change. As China once found itself rushing towards progress in spite of

Politburo authoritarianism, widespread censorship, communism, and a vacuous maritime presence, so too does the African Littoral in the Indian Ocean Rim find itself lurching towards A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 51

progress despite its woes. Furthermore, China is directly challenging Indian expectations of the future of the Indian Ocean rim (Singh, 2015), and having the subtle effect of contributing to the stabilization and normalization of a region as rich in culture and history as it is in resources. The

United States should encourage this process and facilitate strengthening human rights protections and cooperation between regimes as the established unilateral maritime power and global leader.

To this end the International Monetary Fund (IMF) must change its mandate and seek to create an international partnership with China at its head with the intention of developing the Indian

Ocean Rim. China’s model of emphasizing infrastructure and market development first, and morals later (if ever), is likely to be a more effective model at lifting developing countries out of poverty quickly. These changes promote additional accountability which the IMF sorely needs as well as promote an alternative to the corporate model which is adapting far too slowly to the needs of systems that do not conform to the West’s perception of an ideal democratic capitalist social contracted state.

The 21st Century Sino-American Maritime. Broadening existing preliminary security partnerships with China in global counter piracy operations is necessary to help tie together these other elements of the new Sino-American foreign policy strategy. Embracing China’s 21st

Century Maritime Silk Road and its role in developing the African littoral and Indian Ocean region is also a viable strategic component. If the latter two partnerships can become effective the security risks posed by these two regions would be radically reduced and drastically undermine American hawks at home in demanding constant operational readiness in every maritime theatre by division and brigade level forces. A more conducive model for global security in a world accepting China’s role in the 21st century might instead focus on rapid naval strike groups, relocating offshore American air wing locations (Guam and Diego Garcia rather A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 52

than Japan and Djibouti, for example), rotating United Nations maritime response regiments forwardly deployed into those recently relocated positions, and joint special operations commands that are more flexible (a broader security response mandate) and have a less aggressive peacetime footprint in military theatres that could be ideally patrolled by allies or partners.

Conclusion

It is vital that America’s new foreign relations strategic transition be peaceful, deliberate, and indicate to the global system that its policies are not a consignment of American power in the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific to China, India, and Japan. Rather, it would be a way to avoid the overreach that doomed the Soviet Union and the British Empire. It is not an acceptable strategy to assume that MAD could be enough to disrupt the norms of international relations theories and the time-tested model of the Thucydidean Trap as it did at the end of the Cold War.

It is inappropriate to assume our 21st century partners should be Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia,

Saudi Arabia, or Israel when the future system will be dominated by the economies of Brazil,

India, and China. America must stop: exporting destabilizing policies to shatterbelts to isolate their threats, developing impoverished regions through cultural conversion, undermining its own international institutions, and eroding its own moral ideals in the furtherance of corporate profits both domestically and internationally. Cultural compatibility programs must become a major effort of the American State Department to reduce the structural fears associated with the Trap.

America must begin to increase the responsibility footprint of global security to cover more states to better leverage the militaries around the world it supports, or will someday compete with, and reduce the costs of maintaining its own security (Parameswaran, 2014). The United

State should promote the joint management of a condominium in the South China Sea or an A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 53

international institution created to mitigate the loss of territory for the ASEAN while ensuring

China’s strategic interests in the region are met. China, for its part, must ratchet down its policies of confrontation over American military forces in the Philippines and South Korea during this transition. It must partner with India and America in the Indian Ocean Rim, and with America and Japan in the East China Sea. It must accept joint management and/or ownership of the South

China Sea’s resources in return for an abdication of international rights to exploit these resources without leasing them from a new regional management organization. Joint maritime security task forces in the Western Pacific answerable to the United Nations UNSC (including India and Japan under this strategy) under a rotating command from the ASEAN would also be desirable, in conjunction with the promotion and international investment in an ASEAN (or similar institution) Coast Guard. China has proven to be a reliable international partner and these efforts, when combined with significantly increasing the cross-cutting cleavages between China and the current members of the ASEAN, should prove capable of seizing the initiative emanating from

Goldstein’s trilateral East China Sea cooperation spiral (2015) and the Indo-Sino-American partnership in the Indian Ocean Rim. China must also reevaluate and reengage with the United

States and the international community on its cyberespionage and intellectual property theft policies now that it is on the cusp of technological convergence. Beijing should prove a more sympathetic partner in this regard as the above elements of cooperation are pursued or promoted by the United States and as China itself becomes the target of future cyber-attacks from a developing world that seeks its own convergence with China’s new powerful position (Gompert

& Libicki, 2014; The World Bank & the Development Research Center of the State Council, the

People’s Republic of China, 2012). A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 54

The three major cooperation cycles and components of a new American foreign policy strategy acknowledge both the limitations and practical potential of the current global system. As the individual flashpoints in the Sino-American Thucydidean Trap are slowly counteracted by increasing levels of cooperation between the United States and China it will become possible to avoid the war necessitated by the Trap and add a fifth case study to Graham Allison’s table in figure 6. These policy recommendations and their parent foreign relations strategy need not be effected simultaneously or completely to avoid a Sino-American war. At each instance of successful engagement and positive outcomes in the three cooperation spirals (the East China

Sea, the South China Sea, and the Indian Ocean) the probability of war is decreased. If the top of any of the two cooperation spirals can be reached, meaning either India or Japan joins the UNSC or that a joint management treaty for the Spratly Islands enters into force, the risk of Total War is reduced to levels similar or lower than the Belfer Center’s four departure examples in which war was avoided. A POLICY MAP TO AVOID THE SINO-AMERICAN THUCYDIDEAN TRAP 55

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