DOCSLIB.ORG

Curriculum Vitae Amia Srinivasan

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Curriculum Vitae Amia Srinivasan Curriculum Vitae http://users.ox.ac.uk/~corp1468 Amia Srinivasan ACADEMIC POSITIONS Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory, All Souls College, Oxford 2020 - Associate Professor of Philosophy, St John’s College, Oxford 2018-2019 Lecturer (permanent), University College London 2015-2018 Fifty-pound Fellow, All Souls College, Oxford 2017-2018 Prize Fellow, All Souls College, Oxford 2009-2016 VISITING POSITIONS Townsend Visitor in Philosophy, UC Berkeley spring 2024 Visiting Fellow, UCLA Philosophy summer 2017 Visiting Fellow, Yale Philosophy spring 2017 Visiting Fellow, New York Institute of Philosophy, NYU autumn 2012 EDUCATION DPhil, Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford 2014 Dissertation: The Fragile Estate: Essays on luminosity, normativity and metaphilosophy Supervisors: John Hawthorne and Timothy Williamson BPhil in Philosophy, Corpus Christi College, Oxford 2009 With distinction. Thesis: Armchair Philosophy & Experimental Philosophy. Supervisor: John Hawthorne. Supported by a Rhodes Scholarship. BA in Philosophy, Yale University 2007 With distinction and summa cum laude. SELECTED HONOURS 2024 Townsend Visitor, Berkeley. 2022 Carl G. Hempel Lectures, Princeton (declined). 2018 Marc Sanders Public Philosophy Award. 2016 Leverhulme Research Fellowship. 2009 Prize Fellowship (Fellowship by Examination), All Souls College, Oxford. 2009 Joint Philosophy Faculty and Christ Church Doctoral Fellowship, Oxford (declined). 2007 Rhodes Scholarship, Oxford. 2005 Phi Beta Kappa, Yale. 2005 The John Hubbard Curtis Prize for Excellence in English, Yale. 2005 ‘Why Literature Matters’ essay prize winner, Yale Humanities. 2004 The James E. Ashmun Prize for ‘the best creative writing by an undergraduate’, Yale. 2004 The E. Francis Riggs Prize for ‘the greatest academic achievement in the Humanities’, Yale. 2003 National Merit Scholarship. AMIA SRINIVASAN • CURRICULUM VITAE BOOKS (as author) The Right to Sex: Feminism in the Twenty-first Century (2021), with Bloomsbury (UK) and FSG (USA). In translation with De Geus (Netherlands), Temas e Debates (Portugal), Klett-Cotta (Germany), Capitana (Norway), Changbi (Korea), Anagrama (Spain), Todavia (Brazil), Rizzoli Libri (Italy), AST (Russia), Presses Universitaires de France (France), Can Yayinlari (Turkey), Gutkind (Denmark). The Contingent World: Genealogy, Epistemology, Politics (in progress): on the epistemology, history and politics of critical genealogies. Supported by a Leverhulme Research Fellowship. A two-day workshop on the manuscript was held at University of Basel in June 2018. BOOKS (as editor) New Conversations in Philosophy, Politics and Law, with Ruth Chang, under contract with OUP. JOURNAL ARTICLES 1. “Radical Externalism” (2020), The Philosophical Review 129 (3): 395–431. 2. “Sex as a Pedagogical Failure” (2020), Yale Law Journal 129(4): 1100-1146. 3. “Genealogy, Epistemology and Worldmaking” (2019), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119(2): 127-156. Selected for the ‘Best of Philosophy’ 2019 by Oxford University Press. 4. “The Aptness of Anger” (2018), Journal of Political Philosophy 26(2): 123-144. Selected as one of the ten best philosophy papers of 2018 by the Philosopher’s Annual. Excerpted and reprinted in the Edward Elgar Research Handbook on Law and Emotion (eds. Susan Bandes, Jody Madeira, Kathryn Temple, & Emily Kidd White). Forthcoming. 5. “The Ineffable and the Ethical” (2018), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96(1), 215-223. 6. “How to do things with philosophy” (2018), European Journal of Philosophy 26: 1410-1416. 7. “Philosophy and Ideology” (2016), Theoria 31(3), 371-380. 8. “The Archimedean Urge” (2015), Philosophical Perspectives 29(1), 325-362. 9. “Normativity without Cartesian Privilege” (2015), Philosophical Issues 25(1), 273-299. 10. “Are We Luminous?” (2013), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90(2): 294 – 319. PAPERS IN EDITED VOLUMES AND HANDBOOKS 1. ‘The Politics of Compassion’ (forthcoming), in Political Emotions: Towards a Decent Public Sphere (Palgrave). 2. “Effective Altruism and its Limits” (forthcoming), in The Norton Introduction to Ethics (Norton). 3. ‘The Limits of Conversation’ (2021), in Philip Kitcher: Moral Progress (OUP). 4. “No Platforming” (2018), in J. Lackey (ed.) Academic Freedom (OUP) (with Robert Simpson). Page 2 of 10 AMIA SRINIVASAN • CURRICULUM VITAE 5. “Feminism and Metaethics” (2017), in The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics (Routledge). 6. “Disagreement Without Transparency: Some Bleak Thoughts” (2013), in The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays (OUP) (with John Hawthorne). ESSAYS AND CRITICISM (selected; full list on website) 1. ‘Who Won the Sex Wars?’, The New Yorker (6 September 2021). 2. ‘What’s Wrong With Sex Between Professors and Students? It’s Not What You Think.’ The New York Times, 3 September 2021 (online), 5 September 2021 (print). 3. ‘The Politics of Safety’, Financial Times Weekend, 13 August 2021. 4. ‘Celia Hempton: On Attention’ (forthcoming), Celia Hempton, London: Southard Reid. 5. “F Letter Footnotes” (October/November 2020), Foreword for Galina Rymbu, Eugene Ostashevsky, and Ainsley Morse (eds), F LETTER: NEW RUSSIAN FEMINIST POETRY, New York: Isolarii. Reprinted in TANK Magazine online, November 2020 6. “Belly of the Beast”, on Rebecca Giggs’ Fathoms, The New Yorker (August 24, 2020). Selected for ‘The Best Environmental Journalism of 2020’, Unearthed 7. “He, She, One, They, Ho, Hus, Hum, Ita”, on Dennis Baron’s What’s Your Pronoun? Beyond He and She, London Review of Books, Vol. 42, No. 13, 2 July 2020. 8. “Busy Bodies: What termites are teaching us”, The New Yorker (September 17, 2018). On the official reading list of the Milan Triennale 2019, ‘Broken Nature’, curated by Paola Antonelli. Translated and reprinted in BoOks (French). 9. “More Equal Than Others”, on Jeremy Waldron’s One Another’s Equals, The New York Review of Books (April 19, 2018). 10. “The Right to Sex”, London Review of Books, Vol 40, No. 6, 22 March 2018. Winner of the 2018 Marc Sanders Public Philosophy Award, the 2019 APA Op-Ed Contest, and shortlisted for the BBC’s 2018 Russell Prize. Translated and reprinted in Internazionale (Italian) and WOZ - Die Wochenzeitung (German). Excerpted in the programme for the National Theatre production of Martin Crimp’s When We Have Sufficiently Tortured Each Other, directed by Katie Mitchell. 11. “Silent Treatment”, on The Incest Diary, Harper’s, March 2018. 12. “The Sucker, The Sucker!: What’s it like to be an Octopus”, on Peter Godfrey-Smith’s Other Minds, London Review of Books, Vol. 39, No. 17, 7 September 2017, pp 23-25. Winner of the New York Times Sidney Award for the best essays published in 2017. Reprinted in The Week and translated and reprinted in Politiken (Danish). The essay was used in an artists’ workshop at Artschool Krabbesholm, Denmark; the text of the essay was transcribed in full, by hand, overnight, in large-format Roman square capitals. 13. “Remembering Derek Parfit”, London Review of Books, Vol. 39, No. 2, 19 January 2017. Page 3 of 10 AMIA SRINIVASAN • CURRICULUM VITAE 14.“A Righteous Fury”, on Martha Nussbaum’s Anger and Forgiveness, The Nation, December 19/26, 2016. Reprinted in The Aspen Institute. 15. “Under Rhodes”, on Rhodes Must Fall. London Review of Books, Vol. 38, No. 7, 31 March 2016. 16. “This Won’t Hurt”, on Simon Critchley’s Notes On Suicide. Times Literary Supplement, 19 February 2016. 17. “Stop the Robot Apocalypse: the New Utilitarians”, on William MacAskill’s Doing Good Better, London Review of Books, Vol. 37 No. 18, 24 September 2015. 18. “All the Same”, on L.A. Paul’s Transformative Experience, Times Literary Supplement, 10 June 2015. 19. “After the Meteor Strike: Death”, on Samuel Scheffler’s Death and the Afterlife, London Review of Books, Vol. 35, No 18, 25 September 2014. 20. “In the Long Cool Hour: Pragmatic Naturalism”, on Philip Kitcher’s The Ethical Project, London Review of Books, Vol. 34 No. 23, 6 December 2012. 21. “Armchair v. Laboratory”, on Tamar Szabo Gendler’s Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology, London Review of Books Vol. 33 No. 18, 22 September 2011. NAMED LECTURES TBD, Quain Lectures in Jurisprudence, UCL (2024). TBD, the Jacobsen Lecture, Institute of Philosophy, London (2023). TBD, Dudley Knowles Memorial Lecture in Political Philosophy, University of Glasgow (2023). TBD, The Linda Singer Memorial Lecture, Miami University (2023). ‘The Right to Sex’, The Wessen Lecture, Stanford University (2021). ‘Sexual Politics After #MeToo’, Jemison Visiting Lectureship in the Humanities (2021), The University of Alabama at Birmingham. ‘Sexual Politics After #MeToo’, The Aaron Lecture, the Rockefeller Center for Public Policy, Dartmouth (2021). ‘Sex as a Pedagogical Failure’, Harriet and Helen Memorial Lecture in Philosophy, UCL (2020). INVITED TALKS, WORKSHOPS & SEMINARS ‘The Right to Sex’ • Oxford Political Thought Seminar (2021). • Contemporary Feminist Philosophy seminar, Prof Judith Butler, The New School (2021). • Yale Law School (2021). Prof Gregory Radick’s Visions of Humanity Seminar, Leeds, online (2021). “Sex as a Pedagogical Failure”: • Schmilosophy Seminar, Cambridge, online (2020). • Yale Political Theory Workshop (2020). • Wesleyan Center for the Humanities, online (2021). Page 4 of 10 AMIA SRINIVASAN • CURRICULUM VITAE “On Genealogy” • The Aristotelian Society (2019) • University of Chicago Practical Philosophy Workshop (2018) • NYU Colloquium in Legal, Political and Social Philosophy (2018) “Genealogy, Politics and Worldmaking” • Yale Legal Theory Workshop (2018) • Yale Humanities
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Disagreement Without Transparency: Some Bleak Thoughts 11 Entailed by That Set
    PART I The Debate between Conciliatory and Steadfast Theorists A. Steadfastness 1 Disagreement Without Transparency Some Bleak Thoughts 1 J o h n H a w t h o r n e a n d A m i a S r i n i v a s a n 1 Dashed hopes The question at the centre of this volume is: what ought one to do, epistemically speaking, when faced with a disagreement? Faced with this question, one naturally hopes for an answer that is principled, general, and intuitively satisfying. We want to argue that this is a vain hope. Our claim is that a satisfying answer will prove elusive because of non-transparency : that there is no condition such that we are always in a position to know whether it obtains. When we take seriously that there is nothing, including our own minds, to which we have assured access, the familiar project of formulating epistemic norms is destabilized. In this paper, we will show how this plays out in the special case of disagreement. But we believe that a larger lesson can ultimately be extracted from our discussion: namely, that non-transparency threatens our hope for fully satisfying epistemic norms in general. To explore how non-transparency limits our prospects for formulating a satisfying disagreement norm, we will put forward what we call the Knowledge Disagreement Norm (KDN). This norm falls out of a broadly knowledge-centric epistemology: that is, an epistemology that maintains that knowledge is the telos of our epistemic activity. We will then explore the ways in which KDN might be thought to be defective.
    [Show full text]
  • STEPHANIE LEARY CURRICULUM VITAE DEPARTMENT of PHILOSOPHY MCGILL UNIVERSITY Leacock Building, Room 942 855 Sherbrooke Street West Montreal, Quebec H3A 2T7
    STEPHANIE LEARY CURRICULUM VITAE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY MCGILL UNIVERSITY Leacock Building, Room 942 855 Sherbrooke Street West Montreal, Quebec H3A 2T7 www.stephanie-leary.com [email protected] AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION Metaethics, Metaphysics AREAS OF COMPETENCE Normative Ethics, Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Moral Psychology EDUCATION Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 2010-2016 Ph.D. Philosophy (October 2016) Dissertation Title: On the Grounds of Normativity University of Washington, Seattle, WA 2006-2009 B.A. Philosophy with honors, Magna Cum Laude Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 2004-2005 EMPLOYMENT Assistant Professor August 2018- McGill University present Oscar R. Ewing Visiting Assistant Professor 2016 – 2018 Indiana University, Bloomington TEACHING INDIANA UNIVERSITY, BLOOMINGTON Phil 740: Graduate Seminar in Metaethics Spring 2018 Phil 140: Moral Theory and Contemporary Issues F2017/S2018 Phil 140: Morality and Reality: An Intro to Ethics Spring 2017 Hon 237: Honors Law and Society: Current Moral Fall 2016 and Social Issues RUTGERS UNIVERSITY Phil 108: Introduction to Ethics (partially online) Summer 2015 Phil 215: Introduction to Metaphysics Fall 2013 Phil 103: Introduction to Philosophy Summer 2013 T.A. for Holly Smith's Phil 108: Introduction to Ethics Spring 2013 T.A. for Martin Lin’s Phil 104: Introduction to Philosophy Fall 2012 Last updated 6/7/2018 1 PUBLICATIONS “Non-naturalism and Normative Necessities” (2017) Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 12: 76-105. “In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief” (2017) Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95(3): 529-542. “Defending Internalists from Acquired Sociopaths” (2017) Philosophical Psychology 30 (7):878-895. “Choosing Normative Properties: A Reply to Eklund’s Choosing Normative Concepts” forthcoming in Inquiry “Grounding and Normativity” forthcoming in Michael Raven (ed.), Routledge Handbook for Metaphysical Grounding PRESENTATIONS “What is Moorean Non-naturalism?” Feb 2018 (*=refereed) Central APA Symposium on Metaphysics and Normativity “Grounding the Domains of Reasons” 1.
    [Show full text]
  • RUTH CHANG Department of Philosophy Rutgers University 1 Seminary Place New Brunswick, NJ 08901 Email: [email protected] Tel: 732 932 9861 Fax: 732 932 8617
    1 RUTH CHANG Department of Philosophy Rutgers University 1 Seminary Place New Brunswick, NJ 08901 Email: [email protected] Tel: 732 932 9861 Fax: 732 932 8617 CURRENT EMPLOYMENT Associate Professor (with tenure) Philosophy Department RUTGERS UNIVERSITY, New Brunswick, New Jersey EDUCATION UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, Balliol College, Oxford, England D.Phil., Philosophy, Junior Research Fellow HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, Cambridge, Massachusetts J.D., cum laude DARTMOUTH COLLEGE, Hanover, New Hampshire A.B., summa cum laude ACADEMIC POSITIONS Associate Professor of Philosophy (with tenure), RUTGERS UNIVERSITY, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 2004- Assistant Professor, Philosophy Department, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1998-2004 Assistant Professor, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, Camden, New Jersey (half-time with philosophy 1997-98) Visiting Assistant Professor, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL, Chicago, Illinois, 1995-96 Visiting Assistant Professor, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, Philosophy Department, Los Angeles, California, 1993-94 Junior Research Fellow, BALLIOL COLLEGE, Oxford University, Oxford, England, 1991-96 Lecturer in Philosophy, WORCESTER COLLEGE, Oxford University, Oxford, England, 1990-91 Lecturer in Philosophy, MAGDALEN COLLEGE, Oxford University, Oxford, England, 1990 2 PUBLICATIONS (i) Book: Making Comparisons Count (New York: Routledge, 2001), Studies in Ethics, series editor, Robert Nozick, 187pp. Also published in digital form at the Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (http://ora.ox.ac.uk/). (ii) Edited Book: Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997) (iii) Articles and work in progress: 22. ‘Normativity’, Symposium on Raz’s From Normativity to Responsibility, ed., David Enoch, Jerusalem Legal Studies, ms 21. ‘In Defense of Weighing Reasons’, eds., Barry McGuire and Errol Lord, Weighing Reasons, Oxford University Press, ms 20.
    [Show full text]
  • The Archimedean Urge Amia Srinivasan University College London
    The Archimedean Urge Amia Srinivasan University College London 1. Genealogical Scepticism In Aristophanes’ The Clouds, Socrates orders his hapless student Strepsiades to lie down on a couch to make him more receptive to philosophical inspiration. Instead he catches Strepsiades masturbating under the bedclothes. Aristophanes’ suggestion is that it amounts to much the same thing. Like philosophy, scepticism about philosophy has its modes and fashions. Sometimes the accusation, as with Aristophanes, is that a seemingly lofty activity is in fact chicanery, nonsense in the service of all too human desire. According to the sort of diagnostic scepticism associated with the later Wittgenstein, philosophy is a symptom of pathology or confusion. Scientistic scepticism impugns philosophy for falling short of some putative standard met by all respectable – that is, empirical – modes of enquiry. What we might call ‘genealogical’ scepticism complains that the building blocks of philosophy – the judgments and concepts on which it all hangs – are contingent features of whoever it is who is doing the philosophising: her or his particular history, culture, language, education, gender, character. The Archimedean Urge Coming to terms with the genealogical contingency of thought has been a preoccupation of the European intellectual tradition since the mid-18th century. German historicists like Herder and Humboldt taught Europeans to think historically about thought itself, to see historical inquiry as a historically circumscribed endeavour rather than an unencumbered encounter with the hard facts of the past. Hegel applied this historicist lesson to philosophy: as “each child is in any case a child of his time…thus, philosophy, too, is its own time comprehended in thoughts” (1820/1991, 21).
    [Show full text]
  • Ethics at Harvard 1987–2007 Edmond J
    Designed by Ciano Design Photography by Harvard News Office, Carol Maglitta, Stu Rosner and Martha Stewart Printed by Kirkwood Printing Ethics at Harvard 1987–2007 Edmond J. Safra Foundation Center for Ethics Designed by Ciano Design Photography by Harvard News Office, Carol Maglitta, Stu Rosner and Martha Stewart Printed by Kirkwood Printing Ethics at Harvard 1987–2007 Edmond J. Safra Foundation Center for Ethics Ethics at Harvard 1987–2007 Edmond J. Safra Foundation Center for Ethics Dennis F. Thompson University Faculty Committee Christine M. Korsgaard Director Arthur I. Applbaum Philosophy Arthur I. Applbaum Government-KSG Lisa Lehmann Director of Graduate Fellowships Joseph L. Badaracco, Jr. Medicine Jane Mansbridge Staff Business Martha Minow Government-KSG Jean McVeigh Law Frank Michelman Administrative Director Michael J. Sandel Law Shelly Coulter Government Mark H. Moore Financial Consultant Thomas M. Scanlon Government-KSG Stephanie Dant Philosophy Lynn Sharp Paine Assistant to the Director Dennis F. Thompson Business Erica Jaffe Government Thomas R. Piper Assistant to Professor Applbaum Robert D. Truog Business Melissa Towne Medicine Mathias Risse Staff and Research Assistant Government-KSG Kimberly Tseko Faculty Associates Marc J. Roberts Publications and Derek Bok Special Events Coordinator Public Health Interim President Nancy Rosenblum Allan M. Brandt Government Deborah E. Blagg History of Science James Sabin Dan W. Brock Writer, Ethics at Harvard 1987-2007 Medicine Medicine Elaine Scarry Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. English Business Frederick Schauer Norman Daniels Government-KSG Public Health Amartya Sen Leon Eisenberg Economics and Philosophy Medicine Tommie Shelby Catherine Z. Elgin Philosophy and African Education American Studies Einer R. Elhauge Carol Steiker Law Law Richard H.
    [Show full text]
  • Ruth Chang [email protected] Ruthchang.Net
    RUTH CHANG [email protected] RUTHCHANG.NET ACADEMIC POSITIONS Chair and Professor of Jurisprudence Professorial Fellow, University College 2019- UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Oxford, UK Professor of Philosophy 2014-19 RUTGERS UNIVERSITY New Brunswick, NJ Visiting Professor 2014 NYU ABU DHABI UNIVERSITY Abu Dhabi, UAE Visiting Research Professor, Research School of the Social Sciences 2010 AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY Canberra, Australia Associate Professor 2004-14 RUTGERS UNIVERSITY New Brunswick, NJ Assistant Professor, Philosophy Department 1998-04 RUTGERS UNIVERSITY (1/2 Law, Camden 1997-98) New Brunswick, NJ Visiting Assistant Professor 1994-95 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL Chicago, IL Visiting Assistant Professor 1993-94 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Los Angeles, CA Junior Research Fellow, Balliol College 1991-93, 1995-96 UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Oxford, UK Lecturer in Philosophy, Worcester College 1990-91 UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Oxford, UK Lecturer in Philosophy, Magdalen College 1990 UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Oxford, UK EDUCATION UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD D.Phil., Philosophy, 1998 Balliol College, Oxford, UK Junior Research Fellow P.O Box 81 University College New York, NY 10013 Oxford OX1 4BH United States United Kingdom HARVARD LAW SCHOOL J.D., cum laude, 1988 Cambridge, Massachusetts DARTMOUTH COLLEGE A.B., summa cum laude, Philosophy, 1985 Hanover, New Hampshire PUBLICATIONS Books § Making Comparisons Count (2001), New York: Routledge, Studies in Ethics, series ed. Robert Nozick, 187 pp. Also published digitally at the Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (http://ora.ox.ac.uk/). § Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason (1997), editor, with an introduction, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. § Come Prendere Decisioni Difficili (2019), Rome: Castelvecchi. (In Italian). (Based on article, ‘Hard Choices’.
    [Show full text]
  • Are We Luminous?
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Philosophy and Phenomenological Research doi: 10.1111/phpr.12067 © 2013 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC Are We Luminous? AMIA SRINIVASAN All Souls College, University of Oxford Since its appearance over a decade ago, Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argu- ment has come under sustained attack. Defenders of the luminous overwhelmingly object to the argument’s use of a certain margin-for-error premise. Williamson him- self claims that the premise follows easily from a safety condition on knowledge together with his description of the thought experiment. But luminists argue that this is not so: the margin-for-error premise either requires an implausible interpretation of the safety requirement on knowledge, or it requires other equally implausible (and soritical) assumptions. In this paper I bolster the margin-for-error premise against these attacks by recasting Williamson’s own two-part defence, the first part intended to work on the assumption that there is no constitutive connection between the phe- nomenal and the doxastic, and the second intended to work without this assumption. Pace various luminists, I argue that the appeals to safety needed for Williamson’s two-part defence (the first in terms of outright belief, the second in terms of degrees of confidence) are plausible. I also argue that all that is needed to generate the margin-for-error premise from these safety conditions is an empirical assumption about the kinds of creatures we are: that is, creatures whose beliefs are structured by certain dispositions. By recasting the anti-luminosity argument in this way, we can understand what is really at stake in the debate about luminosity: that is, whether we are luminous.
    [Show full text]
  • Report on Activities
    Report on Activities 2015-16 On the cover (clockwise): Liav Orgad (photo by Gerard Vong); Calvin Lai; Madeline Hung; Charles Payne; Natalia Gutkowski; Ruth Chang; Rohini Somanathan (photo by Gerard Vong); Joseph Hollow (photo by Gerard Vong); Danielle Allen EDMOND J. SAFRA CENTER FOR ETHICS 2015-16 REPORT ON ACTIVITIES Contents 4 Report of the Director 7 Undergraduate Fellowships in Ethics 10 Graduate Fellowships in Ethics 12 Fellows-in-Residence 17 New Research and Curricular Programming 20 Appendix I: 2015-16 Edmond J. Safra Fellows 20 Reports of the Fellows-in-Residence 27 Reports of the Graduate Fellows 34 Reports of the Undergraduate Fellows 40 Appendix II: Public Lectures and Events 40 Past Events 2015-16 41 Upcoming Events 2016-17 42 Appendix III: New Fellows 42 2016-17 Edmond J. Safra Fellows 43 Masthead: Faculty Committee, Faculty Associates, Leadership & Staff REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR Danielle Allen Director, Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics To be a part of Harvard’s Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics “Over the course of the academic year, is an extraordinary privilege. I must begin, first, simply by thanking all those who gave me such a warm welcome— our chosen theme, Diversity, Justice, and my predecessors Dennis Thompson and Larry Lessig, the Democracy, grew only more urgent.” Center staff, and especially our outgoing Administrator, Stephanie Dant, the members of our Faculty Committee and Our traditional venues for deepening collective reflection on all our Faculty Associates, and the awe-inspiring members urgent matters of individual, institutional, and public ethics of our three 2015-16 fellowship cohorts: the Fellows-in-Resi- continue to be our Thursday evening public lecture series dence, Graduate Fellows, and Undergraduate Fellows.
    [Show full text]
  • TAMAR SCHAPIRO Curriculum Vitae
    TAMAR SCHAPIRO Curriculum Vitae Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy Massachusetts Institute of Technology [email protected] 77 Massachusetts Avenue, Building 32-D808 https://philpapers.org/s/Tamar%20Schapiro Cambridge, MA 02139 ACADEMIC EMPLOYMENT 2016- Associate Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2015-2016 Visiting Associate Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2009-2015 Associate Professor (w/tenure), Stanford University 2011-2012 Fellow, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Harvard University 2000-2009 Assistant Professor, Stanford University 2006-2007 Visiting Assistant Professor, Harvard University 1997-2000 Junior Fellow, Society of Fellows, Harvard University EDUCATION 1997 Ph.D. in Philosophy Harvard University 1986 B.A. in Philosophy, Yale University Summa Cum Laude, Distinction in the Major BOOKS Feeling Like It: A Theory of Inclination and Will, manuscript currently under agreement with Oxford University Press. ARTICLES Forthcoming “Kant’s Philosophical Method and Motivational Psychology,” in The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason, Ruth Chang and Kurt Sylvan, eds. 2015 “Let’s J! On the Practical Character of Shared Agency,” Symposium on Michael Bratman’s Shared Agency, Philosophical Studies, 172 (12): 3399- 3407 (Published online first, Sept. 10, 2015). 2015 “On Christine Korsgaard’s, ‘Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value,’” Ethics, 125 (4): 1123-1126. (Selected for discussion forum on philosophy blog PEA Soup: http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2015/08/final-ethics- retrospectivediscussion-with-christine-korsgaard-and-tamar-schapiro.html.) 2014 “Velleman on the Work of Human Agency,” Abstracta Journal (2014 Special Issue), 7: 17-21. 2014 “What are Theories of Desire Theories of?” Analytic Philosophy, 55 (2): 131- 150. 2012 “On the Relation Between Wanting and Willing,” Philosophical Issues, 22 (1): 334-350.
    [Show full text]
  • Elizabeth Harman
    Elizabeth Harman Department of Philosophy [email protected] Princeton University www.princeton.edu/~eharman 1879 Hall Princeton, NJ 08544 Area of Specialization: Ethics Areas of Competence: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Political Philosophy Employment Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Philosophy and Human Values, Princeton University, July 2016-present Associate Professor of Philosophy and Human Values, Princeton University, July 2010-June 2016 Laurance S. Rockefeller Preceptor, Princeton University, July 2009-June 2012 Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Human Values, Princeton University, July 2006-June 2010 Laurance S. Rockefeller Fellow, Center for Human Values, Princeton University, 2006-2007 Assistant Professor of Philosophy, New York University, September 2003-June 2006 Education Massachusetts Institute of Technology, PhD in Philosophy, September 2003 Harvard University, AB summa cum laude in Philosophy, June 1997 Publications Co-editor, Norton Introduction to Ethics. Ed. Alexander Guerrero and Elizabeth Harman. Norton (forthcoming in 2020). “Moral Testimony Goes Only So Far” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility (forthcoming). “Ethics is Hard! What Follows?” in Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. Ed. Dana Nelkin and Derk Pereboom. Oxford University Press (forthcoming). “Gamete Donation as a Laudable Moral Mistake,” in Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics. Ed. Gustaf Arrhenius, Krister Bykvist, Tim Campbell, and Elizabeth Finneron-Burns. Oxford University Press (forthcoming). “There is No Moral Ought and No Prudential Ought” in Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason. Ed. Ruth Chang and Kurt Sylvan. Routledge (forthcoming). Co-editor, Norton Introduction to Philosophy. Ed. Gideon Rosen, Alex Byrne, Joshua Cohen, Elizabeth Harman, and Seana Shiffrin. Norton (forthcoming). “When is Failure to Realize Something Exculpatory?” in Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition. Ed.
    [Show full text]
  • Genealogy, Epistemology and Worldmaking 129
    Meeting of the Aristotelian Society held at UCL Institute of Education, on 4 February 2019 at 5:30 p.m. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/aristotelian/article-abstract/119/2/127/5526905 by guest on 06 August 2019 VII — GENEALOGY,EPISTEMOLOGY AND WORLDMAKING AMIA SRINIVASAN We suffer from genealogical anxiety when we worry that the contingent origins of our representations, once revealed, will somehow undermine or cast doubt on those representations. Is such anxiety ever rational? Many have apparently thought so, from pre-Socratic critics of Greek theology to contemporary evolutionary debunkers of morality. One strategy for vindi- cating critical genealogies is to see them as undermining the epistemic standing of our representations—the justification of our beliefs, the apt- ness of our concepts, and so on. I argue that this strategy is not as promis- ing as it might first seem. Instead, I suggest that critical genealogies can wield a sort of meta-epistemic power; in so far as we wish to resist the ge- nealogical critic, we are under pressure to see ourselves as the beneficiaries of a certain kind of good luck: what I call genealogical luck. But there is also a resolutely non-epistemic way of understanding the power of critical genealogies, one that is essential, I argue, for understanding the genealogi- cal projects of various theorists, including Nietzsche and Catharine MacKinnon. For critical genealogies can reveal what it is that our repre- sentations do—and what we, in turn, might do with them. Happy is he who is able to know the causes of things.
    [Show full text]
  • Hard Choices
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association, page 1 of 21 © American Philosophical Association doi: 10.1017/apa.2017.7 Hard Choices abstract: What makes a choice hard? I discuss and criticize three common answers and then make a proposal of my own. Paradigmatic hard choices are not hard because of our ignorance, the incommensurability of values, or the incomparability of the alternatives. They are hard because the alternatives are on a par; they are comparable, but one is not better than the other, and yet nor are they equally good. So understood, hard choices open up a new way of thinking about what it is to be a rational agent. keywords: parity, hard choices, incommensurability, incomparability, practical reason, choice, commitment, Hybrid Voluntarism, agency, rationality, self. If you are reading this paper, you are probably someone who made a hard choice to pursue philosophy. Maybe you chose to major in philosophy rather than computer science. Or to do graduate work in philosophy instead of going to law school. Or to take a philosophy job rather than work for a non-profit. Should you have chosen as you did? More on this question in due course. This paper takes as its focus a more basic question. Why are some choices hard? Or,moreprecisely,whatmakes a choice hard? Once we understand what makes choices hard, we can better understand how we should choose in the face of such choices. We can gloss the phenomenon of interest—hard choices—as follows. In a hard choice, an agent must decide between two alternatives (two, for simplicity) when (1) one alternative is better in some relevant respects, (2) the other alternative is better in other relevant respects, and yet (3) neither seems to be at least as good as the other overall, that is, in all relevant respects.
    [Show full text]