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Ruth Chang Ruthechang@Gmail.Com Ruthchang.Net RUTH CHANG [email protected] RUTHCHANG.NET ACADEMIC POSITIONS Chair and Professor of Jurisprudence Professorial Fellow, University College 2019- UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Oxford, UK Professor of Philosophy 2014-19 RUTGERS UNIVERSITY New Brunswick, NJ Visiting Professor 2014 NYU ABU DHABI UNIVERSITY Abu Dhabi, UAE Visiting Research Professor, Research School of the Social Sciences 2010 AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY Canberra, Australia Associate Professor 2004-14 RUTGERS UNIVERSITY New Brunswick, NJ Assistant Professor, Philosophy Department 1998-04 RUTGERS UNIVERSITY (1/2 Law, Camden 1997-98) New Brunswick, NJ Visiting Assistant Professor 1994-95 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL Chicago, IL Visiting Assistant Professor 1993-94 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Los Angeles, CA Junior Research Fellow, Balliol College 1991-93, 1995-96 UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Oxford, UK Lecturer in Philosophy, Worcester College 1990-91 UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Oxford, UK Lecturer in Philosophy, Magdalen College 1990 UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Oxford, UK EDUCATION UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD D.Phil., Philosophy, 1998 Balliol College, Oxford, UK Junior Research Fellow P.O Box 81 University College New York, NY 10013 Oxford OX1 4BH United States United Kingdom HARVARD LAW SCHOOL J.D., cum laude, 1988 Cambridge, Massachusetts DARTMOUTH COLLEGE A.B., summa cum laude, Philosophy, 1985 Hanover, New Hampshire PUBLICATIONS Books § Making Comparisons Count (2001), New York: Routledge, Studies in Ethics, series ed. Robert Nozick, 187 pp. Also published digitally at the Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (http://ora.ox.ac.uk/). § Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason (1997), editor, with an introduction, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. § Come Prendere Decisioni Difficili (2019), Rome: Castelvecchi. (In Italian). (Based on article, ‘Hard Choices’. § The Philosophy of Practical Reason (2020), co-editor with Kurt Sylvan, commissioned by Routledge Handbook Series in Philosophy. In preparation: § Law’s Rationality (expected completion 2023-4), 3 Lectures, Oxford University Press. § Making it Matter (in progress). § Hard Choices: The Limits of Reason and the Power of Commitment (in discussion stage), trade book, agented by Tina Bennett of William Morris. Papers and other published, edited or commissioned work § ‘Three Dogmas of Normativity’, (2021) Journal of the Society for Applied Philosophy, commissioned. § How Not to Avoid the Repugnant Conclusion’, (2021) Oxford Handbook in Population Ethics, eds. Gustaf Arrhenius, Krister Byqvist, Tim Campbell, and Elizabeth Finneron-Burns, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2 P.O Box 81 University College New York, NY 10013 Oxford OX1 4BH United States United Kingdom § Parity Apologia’, (2021) in eds. Henrik Anderson and Anders Herlitz Incommensurability: Vagueness, Parity and other Non-Conventional Comparative Relations, New York: Routledge, commissioned. § ‘Talking to the Public’, (2021) in eds. Blackwell Companion to Public Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell. § ‘How to Avoid the Repugnant Conclusion’, (2020) in Jeff McMahan, Tim Campbell, James Goodrich, and Ketan Ramakrishnan, eds., Ethics and Existence: The Legacy of Derek Parfit, Oxford: Oxford University Press. § ‘What Is it To Be A Rational Agent?’ (2020) in Ruth Chang and Kurt Sylvan, eds., The Routledge Companion to Practical Reason, New York: Routledge. § ‘An Introduction to the Philosophy of Practical Reason’ (2020), with Kurt Sylvan, in Chang and Sylvan, eds., The Routledge Companion to Practical Reason, New York: Routledge. § ‘Do We Have Normative Powers?’, (2020) Aristotelian Society Supplement, July, 2020. § Edited: ‘Objectivism about Normative Reasons’, (2019) by Derek Parfit, in Sylvan and Chang, eds., The Philosophy of Practical Reason’, New York: Routledge. § Edited: ‘Normative NonNaturalism’, (2019) by Derek Parfit, in, Sylvan and Chang, eds., The Philosophy of Practical Reason’, New York: Routledge. § ‘Hard Choices’, (2016) The American Philosophical Association Journal of Philosophy, 92: 586-620. https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2017.7 § ‘Parity: An Intuitive Case’, (2016), commissioned for a special issue of Ratio 29: 395-411. § ‘Parity, Imprecise Comparability, and the Repugnant Conclusion’, (2016) Theoria, In honor of Derek Parfit’s award of the 2014 Schock Prize, Theoria 82: 183- 215. § ‘Transformative Choices,’ (2015) Res Publica, ed. Jonathan Jacobs, special issue on Transformative Experiences, 92 (2), pp. 237-282. http://dx.doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2015.92.2.14. § ‘Comparativism: The Grounds of Rational Choice,’ (2015) Weighing Reasons, eds. Barry McGuire and Errol Lord, Oxford University Press, pp. 213-240. 3 P.O Box 81 University College New York, NY 10013 Oxford OX1 4BH United States United Kingdom § ‘Value Pluralism,’ (2015) International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, editor-in-chief James Wright, 2nd edition, Vol 25, Oxford: Elsevier, pp. 21-26. § ‘Incommensurability and Incomparability,’ (2013) Oxford Handbook in Value Theory, eds. Iwao Hirose and Jonas Olson, Oxford University Press. § ‘Raz on Reasons, Reason, and Rationality,’ (2013) Jerusalem Legal Studies, ed. David Enoch, symposium on Raz’s From Normativity to Responsibility, pp. 1-21. § ‘Incommensurability (and Incomparability),’ (2013) International Encyclopedia of Ethics, series editor Hugh La Follette, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 2591-2604. § ‘Grounding Practical Normativity: Going Hybrid,’ (2013) Philosophical Studies, 164 (1), pp. 163-187, http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11098- 013-0092-z. (also translated into German and modified in application to legal reasoning) § ‘Joseph Raz,’ (2013) Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi, Cambridge University Press. § ‘Commitments, Reasons, and the Will,’ (2013) Oxford Studies in Metaethics, ed. Shafer-Landau, Vol 8, pp. 74-113. § ‘Practical Reasons: The Problem of Gridlock,’ (2013) Companion to Analytical Philosophy, London: Bloomsbury Press, pp. 474-499. § ‘Incommensurability, including incomparability,’ (2012) Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. § ‘Are Hard Choices Cases of Incomparability?’ (2012) Philosophical Issues, 22 (1), pp. 106-126. § ‘Value Pluralism,’ (2012/2001) (revised and updated article in 2015 edition) International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, eds. N.J. Smelser and P.B. Bates, philosophy editor Philip Pettit, Vol 24, Oxford: Pergamon, pp. 16139-16145. § ‘Reflections on the Reasonable and the Rational in Conflict Resolution,’ (2009) Proceeding of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 83 (1), July, pp. 133-166. § ‘Voluntarist Reasons and the Sources of Normativity,’ (2009) Reasons for Action, eds. Sobel and Wall, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 243-271. 4 P.O Box 81 University College New York, NY 10013 Oxford OX1 4BH United States United Kingdom § ‘Parity, Interval Value, and Choice,’ (2005) Ethics, 114, January, pp. 331-350. § ‘All Things Considered,’ (2004) Philosophical Perspectives, 18, December, pp. 1-22. § ‘Can Desires Provide Reasons for Action?’ (2004) Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, eds. R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 56-90. § ‘Putting Together Morality and Well-Being,’ (2004) Practical Conflicts, eds. M. Betzler and P. Baumann, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 118-158. § ‘The Possibility of Parity,’ (2002) Ethics, 112, July, pp. 659-688. § ‘Against Constitutive Incommensurability, or, Buying and Selling Friends,’ (2001) Philosophical Issues (annual special issues supplement to Nous), December, pp. 33-60. § ‘Two Conceptions of Reasons for Action,’ (2001) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2, March, pp. 447-453. § ‘Value Pluralism,’ (2001) (revised and updated article in 2012, 2015 editions) International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, eds. N.J. Smelser and P.B. Bates, philosophy editor Philip Pettit, Vol 24, Oxford: Pergamon, pp. 16139-16145. § ‘Comparison and the Justification of Choice,’ (1998) University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 146, pp. 1569-1598. § ‘Introduction,’ (1997) Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason, ed. Ruth Chang, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 1-34. Translated into Chinese and will appear in a book about incommensurability, ed. Jianmin Wu (Peoples Peking Publishing House). Reprinted and translated into Spanish, Conflictos entre Derechos: Ensayos desde la Filosofia Practica, 1st ed., Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nacion de Mexico, February 2019. § ‘Review of Christine Delphy, Close to Home: A Materialist Analysis of Women’s Oppression,’ (1988) Harvard Women’s Law Journal, pp. 268-276. Media outreach and public fora publications § Interview with Lady Day, Israeli Magazine Spring 2019. 5 P.O Box 81 University College New York, NY 10013 Oxford OX1 4BH United States United Kingdom § Interview with Gentleman’s Quarterly (GQ) Fall 2018. § Interview with The Curiosity Initiative, Merck Group, Spring 2018. § Interview with Brigitte, Germany’s oldest women’s magazine, ‘Regret and Remorse’. September 2017. § Television segment, National Geographic T.V. Channel, ‘Change and Technology’. May 2017. Rome, Italy. § Interview, live, with Radio 3 Scienza, Rome on decision-making. May 13, 2017, 3:30-4 local time. Rome, Italy. § Interview with NPR by Guy Raz with Malcolm Gladwell, Sheena Iyengar, and Dan Ariely, Spring 2017. § Interview with BSO Journal, The Swiss Professional Supervision and Organizational Journal, special issue on decision-making, by Sandro Küng,
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