“A small but dedicated and resourceful terrorist group could very plausibly design and build at least a crude nuclear bomb. And the danger that they could get the nuclear material needed to do so is very real.”

The Seven Myths of Nuclear MATTHEW BUNN AND ANTHONY WIER

n early 2003, sought and material and the ability to steal it—is difficult. Even received from a radical Saudi cleric a religious after acquiring nuclear material, building a nuclear Iruling, or fatwa, that the use of a nuclear bomb bomb, or setting off a stolen bomb, would be a great against US civilians would be permissible under challenge. Islamic —indeed mandatory—if it were the only Many policy makers and analysts appear to means to stop US actions against Muslims. “If a believe that these difficulties are so great that the bomb that killed 10 million of them and burned as danger of terrorists carrying out a nuclear attack is much of their land as they have burned Muslims’ vanishingly small—unless, perhaps, they were land were dropped on them, it would be permissi- sponsored by a state with nuclear capabilities. As ble,” the ruling held. Also in 2003, proceedings in a Karl-Heinz Kamp, a noted European security ana- Russian criminal case revealed that a Russian busi- lyst put it, “religious zealots or political extremists nessman had been offering $750,000 for stolen may present many dangers, but wielding nuclear -grade and had made contact bombs and killing hundreds of thousands of inno- with residents of the closed city of Sarov, home of cent people is not one of them.” one of ’s premier nuclear laborato- Unfortunately, this view is profoundly wrong. ries, to try to arrange a deal. While a nuclear attack would by no means be easy The terrorists are racing to get a nuclear bomb— for terrorists to carry out, the probability that ter- and the removal of their sanctuary in Afghanistan rorists could succeed in doing so is large enough to has not stopped their efforts. What is needed now justify doing “everything in our power,” in Presi- is a fast-paced global effort to lock down every dent Bush’s words, to prevent it. and every kilogram of plutonium If world leaders were convinced that the risk of and highly (HEU) before - a terrorist nuclear attack on a major city is sub- ists and criminals can get to them. The agreement stantial, and that there are actions they could take on securing nuclear stockpiles reached at the Bush- that would dramatically reduce that risk, they pre- Putin summit in February 2005 represents a sumably would act, and act swiftly, to diminish this promising first step—but sustained and energetic deadly threat. Therefore, dispelling the key myths follow-through from the highest levels will be that lead officials and policy elites to downplay the needed for President George W. Bush and Russian danger is crucial to building momentum for an President Vladimir Putin to seize the opportunity effective response. Each of these myths, like all to leave, as a lasting legacy, a world with a greatly myths, contains an element of truth, but each is a reduced danger of nuclear terrorism. dangerously weak proposition on which to rest the The use of an actual nuclear bomb would be world’s security against nuclear attack. among the most difficult types of attack for terror- ists to accomplish. Getting a nuclear bomb or the WHAT TERRORISTS WANT nuclear material to make one—particularly making The first myth is that terrorists are not especially the connection with people with access to such interested in staging a nuclear catastrophe. Before the 9-11 attacks, it was often said that “terrorists want a lot of people watching, but not a lot of peo- MATTHEW BUNN and ANTHONY WIER, on the staff of the Man- ple dead.” Many argued that terrorists would aging the Atom Project at ’s Kennedy School of Government, are the coauthors of Securing the Bomb: An remain focused on violence at relatively modest Agenda for Action (2004). scales, and would be highly unlikely to pursue the 153 154 • CURRENT HISTORY • April 2005 incineration of an entire city in a nuclear blast. A Qaeda camps in Afghanistan make clear the group’s large number of security experts outside the United continuing desire for a nuclear capability. States still appear to believe that a serious terrorist effort to inflict destruction far beyond the scale of GETTING THE BOMB the World Trade Center or Pentagon attacks is A second myth, apparently believed by many highly unlikely. officials, is that the nuclear materials required to This conclusion is correct for the vast majority make a bomb are nearly impossible for terrorists to of the world’s terrorist groups. But Al Qaeda and the obtain. Former Undersecretary of State John Bolton, global jihadist network it has spawned are different. for example, told the Washington Post that there had They are focused on a global struggle, for which the been no “significant risk of a Russian nuclear immense power of nuclear weapons might be seen weapon getting into terrorist hands” for “some as necessary, not a local battle for which such number of years,” because of both Russia’s own weapons are unneeded. They have gone to consid- efforts to upgrade nuclear security and US assis- erable lengths to justify to their supporters and tance. Similarly, in December 2003, Russian Deputy audiences the use of mass violence, including the Minister of Atomic Energy Sergei Antipov argued mass killing of innocent civilians. And they have that “the nuclear thief does not stand a chance in explicitly set inflicting the maximum possible dam- Russia: it is nearly impossible to steal nuclear mate- age on the and its allies as one of their rials, let alone of weapons grade, such as plutonium organizational goals. or enriched uranium.” Al Qaeda’s followers believe that they, in effect, The reality, however, is that not only do nuclear brought down the —that the thieves stand a chance in Russia (and elsewhere), mujahideen’s success in forcing the Soviet Union they have repeatedly been successful, stealing from Afghanistan was a key factor leading to the weapons-usable nuclear material without setting off Soviet collapse. And they appear to believe that the any alarm or detector. The International Atomic United States, too, is a “paper tiger” that can be Energy Agency database of illicit trafficking incidents driven to collapse—that the 9-11 attacks inflicted includes 18 cases of seizure of stolen HEU or pluto- grievous damage on US economic power, and that nium confirmed by the states involved, and more still larger blows are needed to bring the United cases are known to have occurred that the relevant States down. As bin Laden put it in a message to his states have not been willing to confirm. In one case followers in December 2001, “America is in retreat in 1992, for example, a worker at a facility manufac- by the grace of God Almighty and economic attri- turing fuel from 90 percent-enriched uranium tion is continuing up to today. But it needs further exploited an accounting system designed to write off blows. The young men need to seek out the nodes missing material as normal waste, stealing 1.5 kilo- of the American economy and strike the enemy’s grams (3.3 pounds) of HEU in a series of small, unno- nodes.” The notion that major blows could cause ticed thefts. the collapse of the United States is, in essence, Al Unfortunately, around the world stocks of poten- Qaeda’s idea of how it will achieve victory. A tial bomb material are dangerously insecure. In Rus- nuclear blast incinerating an American city would sia, security for the many thousands of nuclear be exactly the kind of blow Al Qaeda wants. weapons and hundreds of tons of potential bomb From long before the 2003 fatwa, bin Laden and material left over from the has improved the global jihadist network have made their desire significantly, but tight budgets still mean broken for nuclear weapons for use against the United alarms that do not get fixed and security forces States and its allies explicit, by both word and deed. without adequate body armor and communications Bin Laden has called the acquisition of weapons of equipment. Security culture remains a difficult mass destruction (WMD) a “religious duty.” Inter- problem, not only in Russia but around the world, cepted Al Qaeda communications reportedly have with employees propping open security doors for referred to inflicting a “Hiroshima” on the United convenience, and guards patrolling without ammu- States. Al Qaeda operatives have made repeated nition in their guns to avoid accidental firing inci- attempts to buy stolen nuclear material from which dents. Yet these systems must defeat outsider and to make a nuclear bomb. They have tried to recruit insider threats that are frighteningly high. nuclear weapon scientists to help them. The exten- Elsewhere, some 130 civilian research reactors in sive downloaded materials on nuclear weapons more than 40 countries still use HEU as their fuel. (and crude bomb design drawings) found in Al Many have no more security than a night watch- The Seven Myths of Nuclear Terrorism • 155 man and a chain-link fence. The nuclear stockpile ficulty of making a bomb once the material is in in is heavily guarded, but faces deadly hand. (The CIA, for example, has estimated that threats from armed remnants of Al Qaeda in the obtaining stolen nuclear material from abroad would country and senior nuclear insiders who have mar- have cut the time Iraq required to make a bomb keted nuclear bomb technology around the globe. from years to months.) In short, the problem of insecure nuclear stockpiles The argument also misses the crucial distinction is not just a Russia problem, it is a global problem. between making a safe, reliable, and efficient Making connections between the terrorists or hos- nuclear weapon suitable for delivery by a missile or tile states that might want stolen nuclear materials a fighter aircraft—that is, the kind of nuclear and the insiders in a position to steal them—or to weapon that a typical state would want for its arse- provide information that would help outsiders steal nal, the design and construction of which would them—seems to have been difficult in the past. require substantial scientific and technical exper- Thieves who have stolen nuclear material have often tise—and the far simpler task of making a crude, had no particular buyer in mind, and have been unsafe, unreliable terrorist nuclear explosive that caught as a result of their clumsy efforts to find a might be delivered by truck or boat. buyer. But the world cannot rely on criminals and If enough HEU is gathered in the same place at terrorists failing to figure out how to make these con- the same time, a nuclear chain reaction will occur. nections. Given the case of the Russian businessman Indeed, considerable care has to be taken to prevent offering hundreds of thousands of dollars to anyone this from happening accidentally. The only trick to who could steal making this nu- weapons-grade plu- clear chain reac- tonium for sale to a The belief that terrorists would need the help of a tion a nuclear foreign client, as explosion is getting well as cases of ter- state to gain a nuclear capability is simply wrong. the material to- rorist scouts suc- gether fast enough. ceeding in finding The atomic bomb out where Russian nuclear warhead storage sites that obliterated the Japanese city of Hiroshima at were and where and when nuclear warhead transport the end of World War II was a cannon that fired a trains were moving, critical linkages already appear projectile of HEU into rings of HEU—a “gun-type” to be occurring. bomb. The basic principles that need to be under- Moreover, substantial smuggling networks are stood to make this kind of bomb are widely avail- shipping a wide variety of contraband back and able in the open literature. forth across Russia’s borders to the Central Asian It is impossible to make an effective gun-type states and beyond; for example, much of the bur- bomb with plutonium. Hence, if the terrorists had geoning Afghan heroin crop is believed to be plutonium, or if the amount of HEU they had avail- shipped through Central Asia and Russia to mar- able was too small for a gun-type weapon, they kets in Europe. If even one of the cross-border would have to build an “implosion type” weapon. An criminal connections made by such means were implosion weapon uses a set of precisely shaped successfully used to market stolen nuclear material explosives arranged around a less-than-critical mass to the terrorists seeking to get it, the world could of HEU or plutonium to crush the atoms of material face a devastating catastrophe. closer together, thereby setting off the nuclear chain reaction. MAKING THE BOMB Designing and building an implosion bomb Kamp, the European security analyst, has argued would be a significantly greater challenge for a ter- that “actually building [a crude nuclear weapon] is rorist group. But the possibility that terrorists could extremely difficult. A number of countries with vast make at least a crude implosion bomb is very real— resources and expertise, such as Iraq, have struggled particularly if they obtained knowledgeable help, unsuccessfully to produce one. It is difficult to imag- which they have been actively trying to do. ine that a small terrorist group would find bomb- Repeated examinations of the question, “Could building any easier.” This third myth about nuclear resourceful terrorists design and build a crude terrorism conflates the difficulty of producing the nuclear bomb if they had the needed nuclear mate- nuclear material needed for a bomb—the key area rial?” by nuclear weapons experts in the United on which Iraq spent billions of dollars—with the dif- States and elsewhere have concluded that the answer 156 • CURRENT HISTORY • April 2005 is “yes”—for either type of nuclear bomb. These con- actively attempted to recruit such help. For example, clusions were drawn before the 9-11 attacks demon- bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, met at strated the sophistication and careful planning and length with two senior Pakistani nuclear weapons intelligence gathering of which Al Qaeda is capable. experts, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudari A detailed examination in 1977 by the US Office Abdul Majeed—both Taliban sympathizers with of Technology Assessment, drawing on all the rele- extreme Islamic views—and pressed them for infor- vant classified information, summed up the situa- mation on making nuclear weapons. Similarly, in tion: “A small group of people, none of whom have 2000, an official of Russia’s National Security Coun- ever had access to the classified literature, could cil reported that the Taliban regime had attempted to possibly design and build a crude nuclear explosive recruit a nuclear expert from a Russian facility. device. They would not necessarily require a great The world has also seen confirmed an extraordi- deal of technological equipment or have to under- nary leakage of from Pakistan, take any experiments. Only modest machine-shop including designs for uranium-enrichment cen- facilities that could be contracted for without arous- trifuges, components for such centrifuges, complete ing suspicion would be required. The financial centrifuges apparently taken from Pakistan’s own resources for the acquisition of necessary equip- enrichment plant, consulting services for any prob- ment on open markets need not exceed a fraction lems the buyers might have, and even actual nuclear of a million dollars. The group would have to weapon blueprints. The leakers were apparently include, at a minimum, a person capable of motivated both by money and by Islamic fervor. researching and under- Extreme Islamic views, standing the literature in including sympathy for several fields and a jack- Al Qaeda and the Tal- Some have said that the easiest way to bring of-all trades technician.” iban, appear to be com- Given the importance nuclear material into the United States monplace in Pakistan’s of the question of would be to hide it in a bale of marijuana. military and nuclear whether terrorists could establishment, as they design and make a are in broader Pakistani nuclear explosive, the answer has not been left to society. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the former head of Pak- analysis alone, but has been subjected to “experi- istan’s nuclear weapons program who confessed to ment” as well. In the 1960s, in an experiment spon- leading this clandestine nuclear network, is a strident sored by the Atomic Energy Commission, three nationalist prone to harsh Islamic rhetoric. In 1984, recent physics graduates with no prior knowledge of Khan spoke of his opposition to “all the Western nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, or explosives, countries” as “enemies of Islam.” He discussed the and no access to classified information, successfully possibility that nuclear technology might be shared designed a workable implosion bomb. More recently, among Islamic countries, specifically mentioning Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE), when serving as chair- Iraq, Libya, and Iran. man of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, The possibility that Al Qaeda has access to com- asked the three US nuclear weapons laboratories plete blueprints for an implosion-type nuclear whether terrorists, if they had the nuclear material, explosive—or may soon obtain such access—is could make a crude but workable nuclear bomb. very real. Of course, even with a working design, They answered “yes.” Senator Biden reports that and even if the nuclear material could be acquired, within a few months after he asked the question, the manufacturing a weapon to the specifications called laboratories had actually built a gun-type device, for in the design would not be a trivial task. But the using only components that, except for the nuclear potential availability of a nuclear bomb recipe rein- material itself, were off the shelf and commercially forces the urgency of keeping the ingredients available without breaking any . The device was needed to make that recipe out of terrorist hands. brought into a secure Senate hearing room to demon- strate the gravity of the threat. STEALING THE BOMB Having help from someone familiar with nuclear A terrorist group that gained receipt of a stolen weapon design and construction would certainly be nuclear weapon would face somewhat different chal- useful to terrorists trying to build a bomb—as would lenges. The difficulty of setting off a stolen weapon having actual bomb blueprints—though neither would depend substantially on the specifics of the would be essential. Al Qaeda and its allies have weapon’s design. Many US nuclear weapons are The Seven Myths of Nuclear Terrorism • 157 equipped with “permissive action links” (PALs), THE SEARCH FOR SPONSORS which are effectively electronic locks, intended to A fourth myth is that the only plausible way that make it difficult to detonate the weapon without first terrorists could get a nuclear bomb or the ability to inserting an authorized code. Modern versions also make one is from a state. Richard Butler, the Aus- have “limited try” features that will permanently dis- tralian diplomat who once headed the United able the weapon if the wrong code is entered too Nations inspectors in Iraq, put this belief simply: many times, or if attempts are made to tamper with “It is virtually certain that any acquisition by a ter- or bypass the lock. Older versions do not have all of rorist group of nuclear explosive capability could these features, and therefore would provide some- be achieved only through the assistance of a state what less of an obstacle to a terrorist group attempt- in possession of that capability—either given ing to detonate a stolen weapon it had acquired. directly or provided by individuals within that state Unfortunately, what little information is publicly who have slipped out of its legal control.” available suggests that earlier Soviet-designed This belief appears to be widespread within the weapons, especially older tactical weapons, may not Bush administration, and it determines the policy be equipped with modern versions of safeguards prescription: if the principal danger of terrorists’ against unauthorized use. In both the United States acquiring weapons of mass destruction is that hos- and Russia, thousands of nuclear weapons, particu- tile states might provide them, then the key element larly older varieties, have been dismantled in recent of the solution is to take on those hostile states and years, and it is likely that the bulk of the most dan- make sure that they do not provide them. This is gerous weapons lacking modern safeguards have the idea that animates the preemptive doctrine laid been destroyed. But neither country has made any out in the administration’s National Security Strat- commitment to destroy all of these weapons. Nuclear egy, and it was fundamental to the argument for powers such as Pakistan, India, and China are not going to war with Iraq. believed to incorporate equivalents to modern PALs Indeed, although the president has warned again in their weapons, although many of these weapons and again of the danger that terrorists might get are probably stored in partly disassembled form. weapons of mass destruction, the key policy pre- Perhaps even more than in building a crude scription he draws in speech after speech is that the nuclear device of their own, terrorists seeking to United States must take on hostile states before they detonate a stolen weapon would benefit greatly provide such weapons to terrorists. It is this myth— from the help of a knowledgeable insider, if such the supposed need of state sponsorship—that above help could be procured. It may well be that an all others has led many of the most senior officials insider willing to help in stealing a weapon in the of the US government to place only modest priority first place might also be willing to help in provid- on securing the world’s stockpiles of nuclear ing important information related to setting the weapons and materials. weapon off. In the case of a weapon equipped with In fact, the belief that terrorists would need the a modern PAL, without the actual use codes most help of a state to gain a nuclear capability is simply insiders, too, would not be able to provide ready wrong. As has been shown, even without any help means to overcome the lock and use the weapon. from a state, without access to the classified litera- But if they could not figure out how to detonate ture, and potentially without any detailed knowl- a stolen weapon, terrorists might still remove the edge of the relevant technical fields before they nuclear material from it and seek to fashion it into a began their research, a small but dedicated and bomb. If the weapon were a modern, highly effi- resourceful terrorist group could very plausibly cient design using a modest amount of nuclear design and build at least a crude nuclear bomb. And material, the material contained in it might not be the danger that they could get the nuclear material enough for a crude, inefficient terrorist bomb. In needed to do so is very real. any case, terrorists who had a stolen nuclear Whatever measures are taken to reduce the weapon would be in a position to make fearsome already low chance that hostile states will actively threats—for no one would know for sure whether decide to give nuclear weapons or the materials and they could set it off or not. The bottom line is that expertise to make them to terrorists, such steps will if a sophisticated terrorist group gained control of do nothing to address the dozens of other terrorist a stolen nuclear bomb or enough nuclear material pathways to the bomb around the world. These to make one, there would be little grounds for con- other pathways are opened by inadvertence rather fidence that they would be unable to use it. than by conscious hostile acts by foreign powers— 158 • CURRENT HISTORY • April 2005 and they can only be successfully addressed by America’s borders stretch for thousands of miles, cooperation on a global scale. Wherever there is a and millions of trucks, trains, ships, and airplanes cache of unsecured nuclear material, there is a vul- in which nuclear material might be hidden cross nerability that an effective war on catastrophic ter- them every year. Hundreds of thousands of illegal rorism must address—and quickly. immigrants and thousands of tons of illegal drugs cross US borders every year, despite billions of dol- THE DEFENSE OF BORDERS lars of investment in trying to stop them. (Some A fifth mistaken belief is that it is possible to put have said that the easiest way to bring nuclear mate- in place around the United States and other major rial into the United States would be to hide it in a countries a security cordon that can reduce to a low bale of marijuana.) Every nation’s border is vulner- level the risk that nuclear weapons and materials able to various types of illicit movement, be it might be smuggled in. Customs and Border Protec- drugs, terrorists, or the material needed to unleash tion Commissioner Robert C. Bonner, for example, nuclear terror. was already arguing in mid-2002 that the measures The radiation from plutonium, and especially the US Customs Service had taken since the 9-11 from HEU, is weak and difficult to detect at any sig- attacks had made it “much, much, much less likely” nificant distance, particularly if the material is sur- that “an international terrorist organization could rounded with shielding. Technology does exist, and smuggle in . . . any kind of radiological material or is being further developed, to make it possible to any kind of nuclear device.” detect HEU or plutonium in objects right in front of Putting radiation detectors in place at US ports the detectors (as might be possible at controlled and airports, and at facilities that ship to the United border crossings), including finding hidden nuclear States, has been the subject of substantial invest- material in everything from airline baggage to cargo ment since 9-11 containers. Programs (though far less invest- are now under way to ment than would be put these kinds of needed to have a good The good news is that nuclear terrorism detection capabilities chance of detecting is a largely solvable problem. into place at an increas- even those things ing number of sites. brought in by the most But these capabilities obvious routes). The millions of cargo containers should not be exaggerated. While US Customs offi- that carry a large fraction of US imports every year cers have been equipped with “radiation pagers,” have been a particular focus of such efforts. these would have essentially no chance of detecting While some investment in improving border HEU with even minor shielding, even if it were in a detection capabilities is certainly worthwhile, this last bag directly in front of the inspector. More sophis- line of defense will always be a very porous one. The ticated equipment that can detect both HEU and plu- physics of nuclear materials and nuclear weapons, tonium is being purchased—but it will be years the geography of the huge and complex American before such equipment is installed and in use at all borders, and the economics of the global flow of peo- the major ports and border crossings into the ple and goods conspire to make the terrorists’ job United States. easy and the defenders’ job very difficult. Once Two points are crucial to understand. First, stolen, the nuclear material for a bomb could be any- inspecting cargo as it arrives in the United States is where, and it is very difficult to detect, especially if not good enough: if a bomb were on a boat sailing shielding is used to limit radiation emissions. into a major US harbor, it could wreak horrible dev- Typical nuclear weapons are not large, and could astation before the ship ever pulled up to the dock readily be smuggled across America’s or other to be inspected. That is why many of the new ini- nations’ borders. The nuclear material needed for a tiatives after the 9-11 attacks involve putting detec- bomb could easily fit in a suitcase. Even an assem- tors in place at foreign ports that ship to the United bled bomb could fit in a van, a cargo container, or States. But it will take an immense and continuing a yacht sailed into a US harbor. Or the materials effort to ensure that detection at these ports is effec- could be smuggled in and the bomb built at the site tive, that there are no ready possibilities for bribing of its intended use. Terrorists have routinely used a customs official to let a container through unin- truck bombs that were physically larger than even spected and that already inspected containers can- a crude terrorist nuclear bomb would need to be. not be tampered with. The Seven Myths of Nuclear Terrorism • 159

Second, and more fundamentally, the number of strikes. There is little prospect that US intelligence possible pathways to smuggle a nuclear bomb or its on terrorist cells and their operations will ever be ingredients into the United States is immense, and good enough to be confident that the terrorist oper- intelligent adversaries will choose whichever path- ation required to assemble a crude nuclear device— way remains undefended. If an effective system perhaps only a cell of a few resourceful people, a were put in place to make it very difficult to get machine shop, and off-the-shelf parts, other than nuclear material into the country in a cargo con- the nuclear material itself—would be detected and tainer without detection—and the country is a long destroyed before it could finish its deadly work. way from that point today—then terrorists would A strong offense against terrorist groups with bring their bomb in on a yacht, a fishing boat, or by nuclear ambitions must be a critical part of the some other means. world’s toolbox in reducing the danger of nuclear None of this is to say that the United States and terrorism. But without a greatly increased effort to other countries should not invest in attempting to keep nuclear weapons and materials out of terror- make the nuclear smuggler’s job as difficult as pos- ists’ hands in the first place, offensive action cannot sible; they should. But it will never be possible to be reduce the threat to an acceptable level. confident in this last-ditch line of defense: the length of borders, the diversity of means of transport, and WHAT STATES WANT the ease of shielding radiation from plutonium or The seventh myth applies to states, rather than HEU all improve the odds too much for the terrorists. terrorist groups. A number of analysts argue that All that realistically can be hoped for is to make the states would not be especially interested in a stolen easiest paths for terrorists more difficult. Primary nuclear weapon or stolen material to make one, reliance will still have to be placed on the first line because what they want is an indigenous capability of defense: keeping nuclear weapons and materials to produce the material for as many nuclear from being stolen in the first place. weapons as they think they need. Like the other myths, this myth leads those who believe it to THE MILITARY OPTION downplay the importance of securing nuclear President Bush and the senior officials of his weapons and materials so that they cannot be stolen. administration repeatedly focus on maintaining the There is little doubt that states would prefer to offensive against terrorist groups with global reach have indigenous nuclear material production capa- as the key to preventing catastrophic terrorism. As bilities. But such capabilities are expensive and dif- the president put it in his 2004 State of the Union ficult to acquire. History demonstrates that states address: “America is on the offensive against the do indeed consider buying a bomb or the materials terrorists. . . . As part of the offensive against terror, to make one if they believe they can avoid the cost we are also confronting the regimes that harbor and and difficulty of putting together their own nuclear support terrorists, and could supply them with material production facilities; if they see an urgent nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. The need to establish a nuclear deterrent before their United States and our allies are determined: We own nuclear material production succeeds; or if refuse to live in the shadow of this ultimate danger.” they face an international nonproliferation effort The notion that such an offensive alone will be that is making it very difficult to establish their own able to dispel this shadow of danger is the sixth myth production facilities. of nuclear terrorism. Certainly it is crucial for the The case of Iraq is illustrative. Baghdad repeat- United States and its allies to do everything they can edly sought to purchase weapons-usable nuclear to destroy terrorist groups that have nuclear ambi- material from sources with connections in the for- tions. A successful offensive, keeping these groups mer Soviet Union. When Iraq realized, after its inva- constantly on the run and off balance, can greatly sion of Kuwait, that the United States and an reduce the likelihood that they would succeed in car- international coalition would respond, it launched a rying out a nuclear attack. Indeed, the war on these “crash program” to build one bomb quickly, using groups launched since 9-11 has undoubtedly led to the HEU it already had from its research reactors; it substantial disruptions in their ability to manage and certainly would have been desperately eager to carry out large and complex operations. receive stolen HEU at that time. But as attack after attack around the world has Iran, too, has sought to purchase nuclear mate- demonstrated, Al Qaeda and a range of loosely affil- rial. Iran put together a substantial procurement iated groups retain the ability to carry out deadly network to acquire a wide range of technologies 160 • CURRENT HISTORY • April 2005 and materials related to weapons of mass destruc- world security. Enough material for thousands of tion, including from the former Soviet Union. nuclear weapons has been permanently destroyed. Unclassified US intelligence assessments have Security for scores of vulnerable nuclear sites has repeatedly reported that Iran was also seeking to been demonstrably improved. At least temporary purchase stolen for a nuclear bomb. civilian employment has been provided for thou- Nor were these unique cases. Australia wanted to sands of nuclear weapons scientists and workers purchase a nuclear bomb when it was considering the who might otherwise have been driven by desper- nuclear weapons option. Egypt explored the possibil- ation to seek to sell their knowledge or the materi- ity of a purchase when it was pursuing a nuclear als to which they had access. weapons program. Libya, realizing the weakness of its Yet, in virtually every aspect of these efforts, much own indigenous science and technology base, report- more remains to be done. While US-funded security edly made repeated attempts to buy a nuclear weapon, upgrades have been completed at some 70 percent including an unsuccessful approach to China. The of the sites where potential nuclear bomb material more that nonproliferation efforts focus on limiting is located in the former Soviet Union, most of that states’ ability to build their own enrichment and repro- material is in the remaining buildings where even cessing facilities, the more likely it is that additional the first round of initial upgrades has not yet been states will pursue the purchase alternative. completed. Less than a fifth of Russia’s stockpile of Ultimately, if worldwide efforts to secure nuclear bomb uranium has been destroyed, and the process weapons and the materials needed to make them of destroying excess bomb plutonium has not even fail—creating a situation in which any dictator or begun. Only a tiny fraction of Russia’s excess nuclear terrorist who wanted a nuclear bomb could buy its weapons experts have yet received self-supporting essential ingredients on a nuclear — civilian jobs (as opposed to short-term subsidized nothing else the world does to stem the spread of grants). Beyond the former Soviet Union, coopera- nuclear weapons is likely to work. tive security upgrades are only just beginning, leav- ing many sites dangerously vulnerable. REDUCING THE THREAT Current US spending on all cooperative programs The good news is that nuclear terrorism is a to secure and dismantle stockpiles of weapons of largely solvable problem. Plutonium and HEU—the mass destruction around the world is in the range essential ingredients of nuclear bombs—do not of $1 billion per year, supplemented to some degree exist in nature, and are too difficult for terrorist by contributions from Europe and Japan. While groups to plausibly produce themselves. Hence, if that amounts to less than one-quarter of one per- nuclear bombs and bomb materials can be kept out cent of the US defense budget, the current obstacles of terrorist hands, nuclear terrorism can be reliably to faster progress are more political and bureau- prevented: no material, no bomb. cratic than budgetary. Disputes over access to sen- A comprehensive, multifaceted approach is sitive sites, tax exemptions for threat reduction needed to block the terrorist pathway to the bomb. assistance, who pays in the event of an accident, Offensive action against terrorist groups and defen- and a number of other issues have been allowed to sive steps such as nuclear material detection at bor- fester unresolved. As a result, dozens of sets of ders have their place in such an effort, but because equipment for a “quick fix” of security at Russia’s nuclear materials and the activities needed to turn nuclear warhead bunkers are still sitting in ware- them into a bomb may be difficult to detect, both are houses, uninstalled, more than four years after the weak reeds to rely on. The greatest leverage in reduc- United States delivered them. ing this threat is in preventing nuclear material from At their February 2005 summit, Presidents Bush leaving the sites where it is supposed to be in the first and Putin issued a promising statement calling for place. Once it is out the door, the difficulty of find- expanded and accelerated cooperation to secure ing and recovering it increases enormously. nuclear stockpiles, warning that nuclear terrorism The United States, other countries, and the Inter- was “one of the gravest threats our two countries national Atomic Energy Agency have a wide range face.” As the leaders of the two countries that pos- of efforts under way to secure, monitor, and reduce sess the vast majority of the world’s nuclear stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials in the weapons and weapons-usable nuclear material, former Soviet Union and around the world. These Bush and Putin have a historic opportunity, build- efforts have had real, demonstrable successes, rep- ing on the February 2005 accord, to lead a global resenting an excellent investment in American and partnership to lock down the world’s nuclear stock- The Seven Myths of Nuclear Terrorism • 161 piles, a step that would dramatically reduce the Putin needs to allocate the necessary resources to danger of nuclear terrorism. But because the sum- ensure strong security for Russia’s nuclear stockpiles; mit statement did not resolve any of the key imped- give his nuclear agencies the mission, authority, and iments to progress, sustained and energetic resources to set and enforce effective nuclear security presidential leadership on both sides will be needed rules; direct that nuclear weapons and materials be to translate the statement’s words into effective consolidated in far fewer buildings and sites, which action. Many of the needed programs are already in will achieve more security at lower cost; and pledge to place, and the necessary technology largely already sustain effective security and accounting for all of Rus- exists. The key is mustering the political will to sia’s nuclear stockpiles after international assistance overcome the obstacles to progress. comes to an end. The high-level US-Russian group Three steps are urgently needed if the world is to established at the February 2005 summit should pro- win the race to lock down these stockpiles before vide a venue for pursuing all these critical steps. the terrorists and criminals get to them. First, the Third, the United States, Russia, and other coun- administration’s new Global Threat Reduction Ini- tries must lead a global effort to lock down all the tiative (GTRI), focused on removing potential bomb vulnerable nuclear caches worldwide that cannot material entirely from facilities around the world, simply be removed or eliminated, as quickly as pos- must be implemented as quickly, flexibly, and com- sible—and to secure it to standards that ensure that prehensively as possible. It should have as its target these caches are safeguarded against the threats that the removal of potential bomb material from the terrorists and criminals have demonstrated they can world’s highest-risk facilities within four years. In pose. Considerable creativity and perseverance will the fall of 2004, the US Congress gave the adminis- be required to ensure that effective security mea- tration both explicit, flexible authority and some sures are taken in countries such as Pakistan, India, additional funding for the GTRI to offer targeted , or even China, where it is not likely that for- incentives to convince facilities around the world eign experts will be allowed to visit the key facili- to give up their weapons-usable material. The ties to review security or help to improve it. administration must now apply these tools quickly Making all this happen will require sustained and creatively. At the same time, Congress should White House leadership. A full-time senior official act to broaden the authority provided in 2004, and is needed, with the president’s ear, to lead the myr- further boost the available funds. iad efforts in the many agencies that are working on Second, the United States and Russia must acceler- pieces of the job of blocking the terrorist pathway ate and strengthen their efforts to secure Russia’s stock- to the bomb, and to keep this issue on the front piles. Putin should offer expanded access to all but the burner at the White House day-in and day-out. most sensitive areas of nuclear facilities to allow this cooperation to proceed, and Bush should offer recip- THE DAY AFTER rocal access to comparable areas of US facilities, as he In hearings held after a terrorist nuclear attack to pledged to do in his end-of-year press conference in determine who was responsible for allowing this 2004. The two sides should also quickly agree on event to occur and what should be done to prevent it approaches to carry out needed security upgrades for from happening again, what would government offi- those areas that genuinely are too sensitive for either cials and policy makers want to be able to say they side to allow the other’s experts to visit, such as using had done to forestall such a horrible catastrophe? photographs and videotapes to confirm that work has The terrorists have made clear that they want been done as agreed. The two countries need to com- nuclear weapons, and are working to get them. A promise on the problem of liability in the event of an continuing stream of attacks and intelligence anal- accident (the United States has been insisting that Rus- yses makes clear that Al Qaeda is regrouping, sia accept 100 percent of the liability even in the event recruiting and training new operatives, and still of intentional sabotage by US personnel). The liability seeking to carry out catastrophic attacks on the issue has already delayed efforts to destroy thousands United States and other countries. President Bush of bombs’ worth of plutonium by several years, and has eloquently warned that “history will judge could bring the entire edifice of cooperation to secure harshly those who saw this coming danger but and dismantle cold war stockpiles crashing down if failed to act.” The question remains: on the day not resolved soon: the overall agreement that governs after a terrorist nuclear attack, what will we wish this work expires in June 2006, and will not be we had done to prevent it? And why are we not extended unless a compromise is reached. doing that now?