Combat Stress Reaction and Morale in RFC/RAF Aircrew 1914-1918
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Combat Stress Reaction and Morale in RFC/RAF Aircrew 1914-1918 Ronald Gadd MBE RD LLB. LLM. MA. FRAeS. Barrister. A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the Requirements of the University of Wolverhampton For the degree of Doctor of Philosophy This work or any part thereof has not previously been presented in any form to the university or any other body for the purposes of assessment, publication or for any other purpose (unless otherwise indiCated) Save for any express acknowledgements, references and/or bibliographies Cited in the work, I Confirm that the intelleCtual Content of the work is the result of my own efforts and of no other person. The right of Ronald Gadd to be identified as author of this work is asserted in accordance with ss 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents ACt 1988. At this date is owned by the Author. Signature……R P Gadd……. Date……15-11-20 Contents Title Page AbstraCt Acknowledgements IntroduCtion and Historiography 1 Chapter 1: AirCrew Morale 31 Chapter 2: ReCruitment 76 Chapter 3: Training RFC/RAF 97 Chapter 4: Combat Stress and AirCrew 146 Chapter 5: War in the Air 1914-1916 190 Chapter 6: War in the Air 1917-1918 236 Chapter 7: Bombing and the Independent ForCe 288 ConClusion: 319 Bibliography: 352 AbstraCt There are many studies of the air Campaigns of the first World War: almost all have Concentrated on the strategiC and taCtiCal issues, on the teChniCal development of aircraft or the skill and daring of the aircrew concerned. The effeCts of the dangers of flying and air Combat, whiCh tested airCrew to their limits both physical and mental with Consequent psyChological disorders have been ignored. This study examined and analysed the operations of the RFC/RAF over the Western Front from 1014-1918 with the aim of establishing the incidence of aircrew failure for nervous disorders. The faCtors affeCting the psyChologiCal and psyChiatriC reaCtions of airCrew to combat have been examined. The significance of morale as a factor affecting the psyChological responses of airCrew has been assessed and the effeCts of leadership, training, fatigue and airCraft performanCe and reliability are explored in relation to airCrew failure due to psyChological disorder. The outcomes of this thesis were compared to similar studies for SeCond World War AirCrew. MediCal and Casualty reCords, offiCial histories and operational reports have been used in Conjunction with personal aCCounts and memoirs to establish the prime causal factors for psychological disorder in aircrew and its incidence in the RFC/RAF on the Western Front. The treatment and disposal of airCrew diagnosed with ‘flying siCkness’ have been desCribed and the results evaluated. The inCidenCe of breakdown has been Compared with similar studies for SeCond World War AirCrew. It ConCludes that the inCidenCe of failure due to psyChologiCal disorder for the tears 1914-1917, was low and manageable. However, in the last year of the war, the inCidenCe not only vastly inCreased but beCame a signifiCant part of the total wastage rate and seriously affeCted RAF strength on the Western Front. Acknowledgements Studying is never a solitary aCtivity and I would like to express my thanks to those who have helped to make the preparation of this thesis both enjoyable and easier. First, my Supervisor, Professor John Buckley for his Constant encouragement and his always sound adviCe and guidance. I also thank Wing Commander Jeff Jefford MBE for his interest and helpful information. Also, Dr Laura Rowe of the University of Exeter who enCouraged and supported my studies. The Administrative staff at Wolverhampton have always been extremely helpful, especially Jacqui Jones, who helped me clear several hurdles. I have also been encouraged by fellow Post Graduate Research students at Wolverhampton who have always been friendly and supportive. My partner Suzie Taylor deserves speCial thanks for her patience and her Constant encourage throughout. I would like to thank the Western Front AssoCiation for their Study Grant. Introduction and Historiography This thesis explores the extent of psychological disorders suffered by flying personnel of the Royal Flying Corps/Royal Air Force during the First World War. It responds to questions relating to aircrew stress, morale, and combat effectiveness. The objective is to establish the incidence of these disorders and to determine the main causal factors influencing aircrew breakdown in combat. Several writers have addressed this question, but always in individual cases; no one has made any attempt to establish the incidence of aircrew failure for psychological reasons, or its impact on the operational efficiency of the RFC/RAF. To meet this objective this study will examine and analyse the operations of the squadrons flying over the Western Front from 1914-1918 and identify the demands of air warfare on RFC/RAF pilots and observers and their response to combat stress. This introductory chapter will explain the context to the RFC/RAF’s operations over the Western Front and will define the medical and operational aspects of the study. The sources used will be described and the relevant literature of the air war and the psychological aspects of combat considered. The chapter will conclude with an account of the structure of the thesis and methodology 1 Background The First World War was the first in which aircraft had a significant impact on the operations of armies in the field. The early years of the twentieth century were also a time of rapid development in aviation (enhanced by the war) and aircrew had to adapt to major advances in the operational performance of aircraft. Consequently, aircrew had not only to deal with the technical challenge of the new weapon and the effects of a new and very demanding environment, but also the considerable stress of combat. Aeroplanes were first used as a weapon in the Turkish-Italy conflict of 1911-1912, when on 26th October 1911 an Italian aircraft patrol discovered and reported advancing Turkish troops. In February 1912 a Captain Piazza fitted a camera to his Bleriot aircraft and photographed enemy positions, later grenades were dropped in enemy positions.1 In Britain, military aviation was mostly concerned with balloon operations, until in 1912, partly as a response to public concern about the development of aviation in France and Germany, the Royal Flying Corps was formed with balloon and aircraft wings. At the start of the First World War the RFC had a strength of four squadrons and about 40 useful aircraft. However, like 1 M. Paris, ‘The First Air Wars-North Africa and the Balkans’ Journal of Contemporary History Vol 3 (1991) pp. 97-109. 2 all military authorities in Britain, Brigadier-General Sir David Henderson Commander RFC, believed it would be a short war and accordingly sent all four existing RFC squadrons to support the BEF in France, leaving behind only a small flying training organization.2 This tiny force was in fact the harbinger of the largest air force of the First World War. In May 1918, the British Armies in France would be supported by ninety-three squadrons engaged in reconnaissance, artillery spotting, photography, bombing, low level ground attack and all protected by hundreds of fighters.3 The first five months of war demonstrated the usefulness of the aircraft for reconnaissance to both sides. At first neither side attempted to interfere with the enemy’s aircraft, although by early 1915, aircraft were carrying not only the crew’s personal weapons, but sometimes machine guns fitted in the observer’s position. This crude ad-hoc system was not successful, and, in any case, the early aircraft could not easily carry the extra weight of weapons and ammunition. However, by early 1915 improved engines and better aircraft enabled weapons designed for aircraft to be carried and serious attempts were made to inhibit enemy air activities. The fighter aircraft was born. In 1916, the great battles of the 2 W. RaleiGh, Official History of The War: The War In The Air - Volume I (six Volumes) (HMSO, 1927-1936), pp.283-292. Only first volume by Raleigh, remainder H A Jones. (Hereafter TWITA) 3 Jones, TWITA, Appendices. Appendix XXVI p.126. The RAF also had a larGe traininG orGanization in UK toGether with the Home Defence Squadrons and 17 squadrons covering, the Middle East, Balkans and India 3 Somme and Verdun were the catalyst for intense battles in the air now involving specialist aircraft and better trained aircrew. At first casualties were light, but the bearable rates of 1915 were followed by heavy losses in 1916, (many due to operations over the Somme battlefield) becoming serious in 1917 and by mid-1918 wastage from air fighting and accidents was close to being unsustainable. Additionally. from June 1918, the bombing operations of the Independent Force, which had little effect on Germany’s war effort, added many aircrew casualties to the RAF’s total. The resultant demand for replacement aircrew, at a time when all services and all arms were desperate for manpower, produced a cycle of instability, large gaps in squadron crews were filled by inadequately trained aircrew, who soon became casualties themselves and were replaced with more inadequately trained aircrew, which resulted in casualty rates in some squadrons so heavy that they were taken out of the line for short periods. This turbulence undoubtedly had deleterious effects on the morale and fighting efficiency of the aircrew concerned. By the end of 1916, an additional factor significantly affecting squadron aircrew numbers, was the number of pilots and observers removed from flying duties because of psychological disorder. Although psychological breakdown in combatants had been recognized as an outcome of battles since at least the Napoleonic war, the British army was surprised 4 by the emergence and especially the extent, of battle neurosis which came to be called ‘shell shock’ in soldiers of the British Expeditionary Force.