Bradshaw, G and Haines, R 2014 After Marikana: Rethinking Conflict stability Resolution in Africa: The South African Case. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 4(1): 5, pp. 1-16, DOI: http://dx.doi. org/10.5334/sta.eb

RESEARCH ARTICLE After Marikana: Rethinking Conflict Resolution in Africa: The South African Case Gavin Bradshaw* and Richard Haines*

This paper applies the Analytical Conflict Resolution School approach to achieve a deeper understanding of South Africa’s post-apartheid era. It argues that South Africa is an example of ‘protracted social conflict,’ because it displays a fundamental communal aspect, evinces a strong ‘human needs’ element, its pre- settlement condition had resulted in strongly authoritarian government, and it displayed a dependency in its foreign relations. While South Africa transcended traditional conflict resolution methodology with its National Peace Accord and Truth and Reconciliation Commission, neither of these processes was seen through to its end and, as a result, the South African conflict resolution process remains in limbo. This is coupled with a rising internal level of strain expressed in racial tension, violence, migration and economic frustration. A way out of this current malaise is the institutionalization of conflict management through its inclusion in the school curricula, the establishment of conflict management systems to deal with lower-level conflicts, and the building of needs-satisfying institutional arrangements throughout the society, enabling government to be more sensitive to the needs of the people.

Introduction at supra-national, national and sub-national Despite numerous recent transitions to levels. According to Richard Cornwell, con- democracy in Africa (prompting references flict might well be the ‘default setting’ for to an ‘African Renaissance,’ and a ‘New many African countries and regions.1 African Century’), poorly managed con- South Africa, despite its problems in terms flict continues to haunt the continent, and of high crime levels and lack of government defy development initiatives and projects service delivery, has long been seen as some- promoting good governance (Dejo 2003; thing of a success story in terms of the man- Makgoba 1999). Would-be democratic fac- agement of multi-ethnic conflict and the tions throughout the continent find it diffi- deployment of coherent interventions which cult to meaningfully express their demands, seem to constitute substantive policy lessons at times resorting to violence as a means of to Africa and other transitional societies. The highlighting their concerns. Such calcula- main driver behind this perception is the role tions feed into the perpetuation of conflict of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation process. Despite this, however, we argue that the interventions associated with the tran- * Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, South Africa sition are also problematic. In retrospect, [email protected], [email protected] they appear to be ad hoc and fail to take full Art. 5, page 2 of 16 Bradshaw and Haines: After Marikana: Rethinking Conflict Resolution in Africa account of the depth and dynamics of social in conflict (1990). Marikana should not come conflict. There is much evidence that conflict as a surprise, because it is the result of struc- in South Africa is still deeply-rooted, notably, tural, as well as attitudinal factors; of ulti- the August 2012 events at Marikana. This is mate causes as much as proximate causes. not to say that conflict is wholly intractable The massacre represents the confluence in South Africa, but that more integrated of a number of the fault lines that we have and systemic sets of measures should have mentioned above. It is a direct outflow of been put in place. Such measures would be frustrations within the labor movement, and informed by the schools of thought linked within the governing alliance more generally, with the writings of Burton and his col- with increasing worker dissatisfaction with leagues in the Analytical Conflict Resolution COSATU, the major alliance partner, and the perspective (Bradshaw 2007). shocking conditions, and poor salaries that still prevail within the industry. A seemingly The Events at Marikana uncaring and disengaged mine management On 16 August 2012, after some days of labor exacerbated the situation still further. unrest precipitated by wage demands, police Perceived linkages between senior govern- action at the Lonmin Platinum mine at ment figures and the mine management Marikana resulted in the deaths of 34 protest- seemed to add fuel to the fire post-incident. ing miners. In that troubled week, total deaths Cyril Ramaphosa, a former Labour leader numbered 43, with many others injured. in his own right, was at the time a member The incident seemed to shock the country, of the Lonmin Board. He is alleged to have and many parallels have been drawn to some urged a strong response to the miners by of the worst atrocities of the apartheid era. the police. According to Khadija Patel (Daily Indeed this was the single worst incidence of Maverick: 2013), the transcript of a meeting public violence since the advent of democ- that was held between the South African racy in South Africa in 1994. Some have Police Service and Lonmin management two called it ‘The ANC’s Sharpeville.’ In fact, the days before the massacre explicitly mentions events at Marikana should not have come Ramaphosa ‘pressuring’ Police Minister Nathi as a shock at all. According to Frankel (21 Mthethwa, indicating that Ramaphosa’s call October 2012): for appropriate action was not an isolated act of political interference. He also used inflam- ‘The irony, of course, is that Marikana matory language, referred to the miners as is more than just an unfortunate ‘dastardly criminal’(SABC News Online 2014). event. It is, in fact, the result of a pro- With respect to the ultimate and ongoing cess of degenerative civil society in causes of the disaster, high levels of inequal- the North West and other provinces ity and continuing failures of service delivery that back-dates to 1994.’ contribute to the miserable conditions in the Marikana community. This is amply borne Conflict theory makes a distinction between out by Philip Frankel’s graphic depictions of what are called proximate and ultimate the degraded environment at Marikana: causes of conflict episodes (Mayer 2000). Ultimate causes refer to the underlying, The whole area… is profoundly pol- longer-term conditions that give rise to overt luted and both unliveable and unmi- conflict. Proximate causes, on the other nable in many places. This is the direct hand, refer to those specific incidents that result of ecologically destructive poli- provide the proverbial spark to the powder cies by companies like Lonmin whose keg. Johan Galtung captures these distinc- activities impact negatively on water, tions in his own differentiation between air quality and ultimately on people. conflict behaviour, attitudes and structures The role of the state in all of this is Bradshaw and Haines: After Marikana: Rethinking Conflict Resolution in Africa Art. 5,page 3 of 16

highly salient and reflects problems Accord (NPA), which produced guidelines of local government and the justice for political engagement and established system, which reflect poorly on a a conflict management system across the country that claims to be stable, effec- entire nation. Despite numerous challenges, tive and democratic twenty years after the NPA succeeded in keeping violence 1994. Local government …is notori- down to manageable levels, and an over- ously corrupt, overtly murderous and, whelmingly peaceful first election was held. much like local government nation- Unfortunately, the Accord and its structures wide, almost totally incapacitated were hastily dissolved by the new govern- (Frankel 2012). ment, in spite of the very useful range of roles that it might have potentially played in A proximate cause was the poor response the rebuilding of the country3 (McCall and by police officers who, according to many Duncan 2000; Collin Marks 2000). eye-witnesses, and expert commentary, was Most of South Africa’s political leadership designed to maximize, rather than mini- understood very clearly the need to address mize loss of life and injury among the mine- the longer-term, and more deeply-rooted workers. Fallout after the incident included aspects of the South African conflict, and hurtful comments from the new police com- supported the establishment of a Truth and missioner (Sowetan 2013), and a low-key, Reconciliation Commission (TRC) modeled seemingly unsympathetic response from after an approach already used in some post- government, which allowed space for divi- conflict Latin American countries (Campbell sive, populist leaders, such as Julius Malema 2000). Everyone, from journalists to aca- to fill that leadership vacuum. demics; from psychologists to the human Marikana represents a ‘perfect storm’ of rights and legal communities, had their own ingredients for conflagration in the South take on the TRC. Much of the commentary African body politic, but it should be seen as was from a religious, Christian perspective. possibly presaging future events, rather than Disappointingly, the TRC never delivered as an anomaly. reparations at the intended scale, or within the established timeframe. Government has Shortcomings of the South African come in for much criticism with respect to its Peace Process inability to take the TRC process to its logical In the 1980s, as historical contradictions conclusion, and a sense of injustice is perhaps mounted, and as the international context the lasting legacy (Bradshaw 2007; Campbell became more favorable toward a settlement 2000; Doxtader et al 2004). Also, like the NPA, in South Africa, a number of initiatives were the opportunity of institutionalizing the TRC launched to prepare the way for a constitu- as a permanent feature of the South African tional negotiation process. While the ANC landscape was missed. leadership covertly met with prominent Afrikaner intellectuals, a ‘back channel’ of Rage at the End of the Rainbow communications was opened up with Nelson On the one hand, the achievement of the so- Mandela, with a view to his eventual release.2 called miracle of transition provides cause All this activity conforms quite closely with for celebration. Like many other countries the recommended strategy of the conflict in the grip of deeply-rooted social conflict, resolution school, but its development was South Africa might easily have fallen into a uncoordinated and ad hoc (Bradshaw 2007; cycle of interethnic violence and precipitous Lieberfeld 2005; Kruger 1998). As violence economic decline. Although that never hap- escalated, threatening the constitutional pened, there are a number of surprising con- negotiation process, organized business and tinuities with the ethnic-separatist project of the church facilitated the National Peace the apartheid state, along with continuing Art. 5, page 4 of 16 Bradshaw and Haines: After Marikana: Rethinking Conflict Resolution in Africa manifestations of a conflict as yet unre- South Africans, including housing and social solved. There are a number of indicators of grants, may have had a somewhat sympa- such incomplete resolution. These include thetic response, South African society as a economic policies that do not address, and whole continues to evince a bias toward the even exacerbate, rampant unemployment, wealthy, as well as a seeming preference for high levels of violence and violent policing, organized (especially large) capital in con- high levels of political intolerance, the con- testations with private citizens (Bond 2005; tinued construction of political and racial 2006). This bias is perhaps best illustrated by difference, failures to address important the growing number of millionaires in the issues such as the unresolved land ques- country. City Press (2014) reports that the tion, and attacks on political freedoms; all number of millionaires in South Africa has of which collectively threaten such peace as grown by 106 per cent—faster than anywhere does exist. else in the world—over the past decade, to At an economic level, the country has not over 49,000. The continued flight of human managed to realize a ‘peace dividend’ as a capital, especially of whites, suggests that the result of its negotiated settlement. Despite link between broad economic development its re-integration into the global economy, and social peace has not been fully internal- the terms of that reintegration are skewed ized by the governing alliance. According in favor of the ruling elite and the previ- to one estimate, more than a million white ously wealthy (Klein 2007). South Africa’s South Africans—that is, fully twenty percent economic inequality, as indicated by its of the pre-1994 total—are living abroad.6 Gini coeffient, remains the greatest in the Some use the fact of ever-present poverty world, along with that of Brazil.4 A range in South Africa to explain the waves of crime of scholars and civil society activists would that sweep the country. However, an analy- see merit in Patrick Bond’s argument that sis of that crime exposes behavior designed, post-Apartheid South Africa constitutes ‘… not so much to redistribute wealth to the an unstable elite transition from racial to country’s poorest. Rather, because it is often class apartheid’ (Bond 2005: 308)–a situa- highly-organized, with international link- tion that has left massive unemployment ages, it serves to further enrich the wealthy. in its wake (McGreal 2006). The unemploy- This crime wave supports violence by increas- ment rate in South Africa is still unaccept- ing poverty in a fragile, fledgling democracy ably high, particularly among youth (51 per through corrupt activity and indicates not cent unemployment rate). This differential transitional justice, but transitional injustice impact leads to increased racial tensions, (Gready 2010). In this regard, others have with many pointing to the fact that for many, pointed to the fact that the crime has less ‘nothing has changed’ since the inception of to do with materialist considerations, than democracy (Pillay 2014; Bundy 2014: 157). with the ‘…structure of overt political con- The South African Institute of Race Relations flict preceding the inauguration of democ- quotes Minister of Higher Education Blade racy, and the nature of the transition from Nzimande calling the unemployment situ- that conflict’ (du Toit 2001: 127). Indeed, ation a ‘ticking time bomb’ (Holborn 2011). violent, rural crime is a major fault line in Furthermore, the events and revelations the country, where perceptions among the around the arms deal5 point to continui- minority white landowners are that there is ties between apartheid and post-apartheid an attempt to remove them from the land. elite wealth-accumulation strategies, and Du Toit has made the telling point that this is an accompanying pressure on democratic not ordinary crime, ‘…but rather crime which and judicial structures to accommodate serves as a public statement of anger and such processes (Haines 2007; Holden 2009). resentment which has its roots in the denial While issues relevant to indigent black of dignity, in the attempt to regain such Bradshaw and Haines: After Marikana: Rethinking Conflict Resolution in Africa Art. 5,page 5 of 16 dignity, and in the disillusionment of finding rise to episodes of violence in Gauteng and in that the promised liberation failed to deliver the Western and Eastern Cape, present scenes either material or symbolic goods able to sat- reminiscent of the apartheid era, and result isfy this need’ (2001: 127). in international opprobrium (Katerere 2010; The state response to such crime is reac- City Press 2013; ENCA 2013; Powell 2013). tive, rather than proactive, and suggests Violence also remains a regular theme in that it has more in common with the heavy- schools, where government is struggling to handedness of apartheid policing than a deliver a decent standard of education to genuinely democratic rule of law. Repeated the youth of South Africa, leading to a disil- failures of leadership at the top echelons of lusioned youth with limited future options. the South African Police Service, involving This is also linked to a high incidence of three consecutive national police commis- rape within the country which, inter alia, is sioners—Selebi, Cele and Phiyega—suggest a indicative of entrenched patriarchal views of certain reluctance to combat crime as a man- women, and efforts to impede the socio-eco- ifestation of social conflict (McGreal 2006). nomic mobility of women (van Donk 2004: Surveys7 indicate very high levels of intoler- 10). It has been argued that the generalized ance in South African society. Political activity fear of rape affects all women and acts to remains racially-based, with political parties curtail their social mobility (Vogelman and formed largely along racial lines. Observers Eagle 1991). note the ongoing construction of racial dif- In recent years, South Africa has witnessed ference, and the recurring themes of superior- a number of attempts on the part of govern- ity and inferiority among the different racial ment to limit freedoms associated with a groupings in the country (Mayer 2005). We culture of human rights and due democratic find echoes of this in statements by govern- process. Attacks on the freedoms of infor- ment spokesman, Jimmy Manyi concerning mation and the independent status of the an ‘over-supply’ of ‘Coloured People’ in the judiciary, as well as an attempt to negate the Western Cape (Sapa 2011). Further evidence of power of the opposition in local government, continued construction of political differences were a recurring theme in 2005 and 2006 along racial lines can be found in the recently (Bradshaw 2007).8 Government’s determina- enacted Employment Equity Amendment Act tion to pass the far-reaching Protection of (2013), which formally refers to African, White, State Information Bill threatens the very core Black, and Indian population groups (The of a democratic media dispensation (Hartley Citizen, 8 April 2014). It is further evidenced 2011). Although the Bill has taken almost by the ruling party’s reaction to attempts by three years to pass, and will in all probabil- the Democratic Alliance to recruit Agang ity still be challenged in the Constitutional Leader Mamphele Ramphele as their presi- Court, it is, in the final analysis, almost cer- dential candidate, in which it implies that no tain to be passed. The ongoing tensions self-respecting black person would ever sup- within the criminal justice system, including port a ‘white’ party (News 24 2014). the National Prosecutions Authority, and the Conditions are compounded by the resur- bench itself, components of which support gence of a ‘politics of ethnicity’ that has different political leaders, and whose opera- emerged in the post-Polokwane period. tions seem affected by their allegiances, Increased tensions within the governing seem particularly troubling.9 alliance spill over into society, and dislocate Land reform in South Africa is also stalling, efforts to build national identity and social and very little land has been transferred on peace (for instance, the racial video publicized the basis of the ‘willing seller – willing buyer’ by students at the University of the Orange principle. The government has lost patience Free State (Clayton 2008)). The recurrence with the process, having sent white farmers in of widespread xenophobic outbursts, giving the Waterberg area notices of expropriation Art. 5, page 6 of 16 Bradshaw and Haines: After Marikana: Rethinking Conflict Resolution in Africa of their land, for instance. The International political structures. What is also evident is Crisis Group (2004) has linked the process of the extent of the interplay of the causes and land reform with the risk of rural violence, effects of these narratives of conflict. Less unless the government manages to increase obvious perhaps, but of distinct importance, the pace of its process. Most recently, calls by is how the ruling party and ruling alliance the leadership of the ANCYL for land nation- has been affected by higher levels of conflict alization without compensation, and nation- within the country as a whole. There are a alization of the mines reflect the growing number of developments to suggest this impatience of many South Africans with this state of affairs. In the first place, one notices state of affairs (Grobler 2011). Support for increased competition for scarce resources nationalization has become a central plank by elites within party and alliance structures. in the policy platform of Julius Malema’s A recent tendency in this regard has been newly registered Economic Freedom Fighters the heightened confrontation and/or dis- (City Press 2013), which significantly held its ruption of tender processes and decisions by launching function at Marikana (Business emerging businesses. Secondly, the decision Day Live 2013). of NUMSA (National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa) to distance itself from the Analyses of Crime and Conflict in ANC (and, to an extent, COSATU) and build South Africa up an independent and more left-oriented One can try to understand South Africa as political constituency, is adding to the frac- a traumatized or battered society given the turing within the ruling alliance. The breaka- conflict and psychological damage caused by way of a substantial component of the ANC decades of the dehumanizing apartheid sys- youth wing and associated supporters in the tem. The liberation movements also resorted form of the EFF (Economic Freedom Party) to violence against both whites and blacks. is a further manifestation. The physically An emerging corpus of work attempts to confrontationist style the EFF has shown explain the prevalence of violence in terms since its arrival at the national and provin- of the impact of neo-liberal practices and cial parliaments may well have more than a discourses, which emphasize accumulation symbolic impact on future party politics and and the depersonalization of life experiences parliamentary life. Thirdly, the escalation of (Olivier 2007a and Olivier 2007b; Roussouw attacks on ANC councilors at the local gov- 2007). Another school of thought considers ernment level, often with regard to housing the prevalence of patriarchal and tradition- allocation and service delivery demands, is alist views on women (Meintjies et al 2001) a further area of concern. The response of as a significant contributory factor in the the current Zuma administration to these play of violence and conflict. In the related developments may prove to be reactive and debate about the nature of the state in South authoritarian rather than a re-articulation of Africa and the conditions for achieving a participatory and decentralized politics. ‘developmental state,’ the institutional con- Our argument is that (a) the depth of con- straints to social peace and the persistence flict is more structurally profound than is of the ‘economy of affection’ are beginning often assumed; but (b) that there is scope to attract distinct yet modest critical scru- for reasoned diagnosis and (c) that there tiny (du Plooy 2007). These approaches are are possibilities for remedial intervention. also conditioned by work on other states and Notwithstanding the debate regarding the regions in Africa. shortcomings of knowledgeable action, we The preceding discussion indicates the would contend that the use of the theory of depth and complexity of conflict within deeply-rooted, or protracted social conflict South African society and its economic and provides useful analytical tools and insights. Bradshaw and Haines: After Marikana: Rethinking Conflict Resolution in Africa Art. 5,page 7 of 16

This approach can also work in conjunction Contemporary conflict is particularly com- with a robust political economy viewpoint in mon in sub-Saharan Africa. In this regard, terms of the analysis of the problem. their model closely aligns with the model Post-structural and post-modern analyses of Protracted Social Conflict proposed by of conflict and violence tend to emphasize Edward Azar (1990), John Burton and the the problematic nature of reasoned inter- Analytical Conflict Resolution School.10 Azar ventions to remedy and address the state writes that: ‘…many conflicts currently active of affairs. However, the work of Giddens in the underdeveloped parts of the world and Beck (1994) and others on the ques- are characterized by a blurred demarcation tion of ‘reflexive modernity,’ suggests that between internal and external sources and there is epistemological and methodologi- actors. Moreover, there are multiple causal cal support for relatively knowledgeable and factors and dynamics, reflected in changing bounded interventions predicated on a con- goals, actions and targets. Finally, these con- sistent body of theory. However, finding the flicts do not show clear starting and termi- requisite time and space for self-conscious, nating points’ (1990: 6). reflective and meaningful analysis and inter- Azar identifies four ‘clusters of variables’ vention in the South African context pre- that comprise the background conditions of sents distinct challenges for the actors and societies beset by protracted social conflict. agencies involved. Such exercises are usually These clusters relate to a communal context, conditioned by a range of practices, institu- frustrated human needs, authoritarian gov- tions and alliances of interest in the inter- ernment and international dependency. Azar stices between state and community, which believes protracted social conflicts are most Goran Hyden refers to as the ‘economy of likely to arise where societies are character- affection’ (Hyden 2006; du Plooy 2007). ized by a multi-communal composition. The In these circumstances it is tempting to take second cluster of variables identified by Azar a cynical or technically positivist approach. is a denial of basic human needs. According But there are possibilities for praxis. We must to basic human needs theorists, such as John acknowledge that we are dealing at a macro- Burton and his colleagues, the survival of level with a deeply traumatized or ‘battered’ human beings and communities of human society, a product not only of the apartheid beings depends on their ability to satisfy era but also of the immediate post-apart- their material and psychological needs.11 heid period (du Plooy 2007). Violence both The deprivation of physical needs and the impacts upon and is created and sustained denial of access to political institutions are by a range of sites such as schools, homes, often rooted in the ‘…refusal to recognise or transport routes, ghettoized areas, and more. accept the communal identity of the other Interventions at the macro to micro levels groups’ (Azar 1990). Azar actually uses the must proceed systematically from a diagno- historical South African example to illustrate sis of the multi-faceted nature of conflict and the point and writes as follows: violence in South African society. Blacks are denied access to social Toward a Reflexive Conflict Resolution institutions precisely on the basis of (RCR) Approach their racial identity. A claim of supe- In their book, Contemporary Conflict rior identity (i.e. white supremacy), Resolution (2000), Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom rather than objective conditions (eg. Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall identify a spe- economic or political motives), largely cific form of conflict that they simply call determines the nature and scope of ‘contemporary conflict,’ which challenges the denial of security and identity post-cold war peacemakers around the world. needs of blacks. Such denial fosters Art. 5, page 8 of 16 Bradshaw and Haines: After Marikana: Rethinking Conflict Resolution in Africa

greater cohesion within victimized elements that are presented as the necessary communal groups, and may work to conditions of conflict resolution. Seven key promote collective violence and pro- propositions about the nature of a resolved tract the conflict if no other means conflict are listed as follows: of satisfaction is available (Azar 1990: 9–10). • There is a procedural element, in terms of when the conflict is resolved accord- Central to the concept of needs-based con- ing to a certain, highly prescriptive flict is that, according to John Burton, needs process (e.g. the facilitated analytical cannot be sacrificed or compromised, and problem-solving workshop). are therefore not amenable to negotiation- • A resolved conflict would present evi- based conflict management approaches. dence of restored relationships, and Azar’s third cluster of background vari- also be characterized by the presence of ables are related to the role of the state. He Burton’s notion of ‘valued relationships.’ writes that, whether basic human needs are • A high level of identity, and related satis- ultimately satisfied or frustrated depends on faction of needs, through maximization the mediating role of the state. A state, char- of autonomy and self-determination of acterized by a fair and just mode of govern- groups would be evident. ance should be able to satisfy human needs, • There would be a high degree of distrib- regardless of any communal or identity dif- utive justice characterized by increasing ferences, and provide communal peace and equality and decreasing poverty. social stability. As Azar (1989) observes, how- • Ongoing analytical ‘provention’ prob- ever, ‘in actuality… this is rare. Most states lem-solving processes, designed to bring which experience protracted social conflict about basic human needs satisfaction tend to be characterized by incompetent, through the continual adjustment of parochial, fragile and authoritarian govern- social institutions to meet the needs of ments that fail to satisfy basic human needs.’ individuals and groups, would continue. A fourth cluster of variables is associated • Related to the above, but deserving spe- with the foreign relations of the conflict- cial mention, Burton has indicated that ridden state. Here, one of the contributing special constitutional provisions should factors is to be found in foreign relationships be provided for minority groups in characterized by economic dependency and/ deeply-rooted conflict. or political or military cliency. Economic • A resolved conflict does not imply a dependency ‘... not only limits the autonomy future without any form of conflict of the state, but also distorts the pattern of (Bradshaw 2007). economic development impeding the satis- faction of security needs’ (Azar 1990: 11). There is, upon examination of the list above, Azar also presents three clusters of varia- implicit in the work of the analytical conflict bles that contribute to the process dynamics resolution school, two levels of conflict reso- of Protracted Social Conflict. He singles out lution. The first level is the hoped for results communal actions and strategies, the state’s of the pre-negotiation interventions—the actions and strategies, and what he calls the classical problem-solving workshops, that ‘built-in’ mechanisms of conflict that inter- will enable a negotiated settlement to take act to reinforce an escalation process, based place. This first level is the result of epi- on negative mirror images and ‘groupthink’ sodic problem-solving intervention. Beyond (1990: 12–15). A close examination of the this, however, is the second level—the level corpus of literature produced by the analyti- of conflict transformed in the long term— cal conflict resolution school reveals various the result of ongoing, institutionalized Bradshaw and Haines: After Marikana: Rethinking Conflict Resolution in Africa Art. 5,page 9 of 16 problem-solving, with the ultimate goal of Next, the TRC determined to meet the restored and valued relationships.12 long-term, deeply-rooted aspects of the South African conflict, but was disadvan- Why the South African Example taged by a lack of a coherent vision of what it Constitutes ‘Protracted Social was to accomplish (Gready 2010). Informed Conflict’ by a potpourri of ideas, ranging from reli- Bradshaw (2007: 144–163) has shown how gious forgiveness and redemption to notions the macro-political conflict in South Africa of post-traumatic stress counseling, and conforms to the protracted social conflict fueling a veritable growth industry of writ- model in almost every respect. It displays a ing on alternative notions of justice (e.g. fundamental communal aspect, it evinces a restorative justice, transitional justice, etc.), strong human needs element, it resulted in the TRC never met the goals that would strongly authoritarian government, and dis- have satisfied, not only the victims of apart- plays a dependency in its foreign relations. heid, but even its own proponents15 (Gready Communal actions, and state actions and 2010). Lack of coherence and theoretical strategies all conformed closely with the clarity were its chief impediments. Again, paradigm presented by Edward Azar. The it suffered from a lack of funding from the conflict took on a cyclical character, with central government, which undermined the attempts to win the conflict simply resulting possibility of meaningful reparation for the in the beginning of new phases of struggle. victims of apartheid. In the cases of both the Though, in the South African case, impor- NPA, and TRC, the government balked at the tant interventions, specifically intended to go comparatively insignificant costs involved in beyond the ‘traditional’ conflict management these exercises, affecting attempts at socio- techniques of negotiation and mediation did economic reconstruction, and levels of repa- take place, these never went the full distance. rations, respectively. There was never a full commitment to long- In an evaluation of the shortcomings of the term conflict management in South Africa,13 interventions into the South African conflict, and the interventions mainly occurred on an Bradshaw (2007: 312) Table 1 has provided a ad hoc basis, rather than as a part of a larger critique of South African practice, against the strategy, which would have been a health- theoretical requirements of the Analytical ier basis for their implementation. So, for Conflict Resolution school as follows: instance, though exploratory, pre-negotiation workshops did take place between the two The Way Forward: Best Practice for major communal protagonists,14 they were South Africa and Africa never conceived within a larger theoretical What is required is continuing vigilance with framework. They occurred on an ad hoc basis, regard to conflict management in South and never specifically followed the model pro- Africa. In particular, the authors are calling vided by the Analytical Conflict Resolution for the institutionalization of conflict man- School, nor any other within the conflict reso- agement, through its inclusion in school lution literature for that matter. As regards the curricula; the establishment of conflict man- South African National Peace Accord, though agement systems to deal with lower-level quite spectacularly successful in bringing conflicts, thus preventing them from esca- South Africans together in problem-solving lating; and the building of needs-satisfying at middle and lower-level leadership, it was institutional arrangements throughout the wound up after the multi-party negotiation society, enabling government to be more sen- process. The notion, shared by some, that it sitive to the needs of the people, with a more would play a role in socio-economic develop- focused emphasis on service delivery and less ment was never realized. divisive statements and polarizing economic Art. 5, page 10 of 16 Bradshaw and Haines: After Marikana: Rethinking Conflict Resolution in Africa

Conflict Resolution Theory South African Practice Procedurally - the conflict is resolved Analytical workshops were used, between 1985 and according to analytical problem-solving 1990, though not always in accordance with Burton’s workshop process, which make negotia- prescriptions. There were very good transfer mecha- tion possible. nisms, however, that might be said to offset this weak- ness. It is felt that the pre-negotiation interventions were an important factor in enabling negotiations. Evidence of restored relationships, and Evidence collected in opinion surveys, during 2004, ‘valued relationships’ exists. 2005 and the outcome of elections since 1994 indi- cates that there is a lack of trust, especially with regard to interracial, political collaboration. Social distance is high, and Government is seen as ‘distant.’ High level of identity needs satisfac- Clearly, a lack of needs satisfaction in South Africa tion, maximization of autonomy and remains a cause for concern, especially as far as self-determination physical needs are concerned. The fact that govern- ment is perceived as not heeding the demands of the people for services, etc. is also problematic from an identity and control needs, and valued relationships perspective. A high degree of distributive justice. Distributive justice was compromised in the TRC process, and in the country generally, with regard to human rights abuses and oppression of the past. Gross economic inequality is still the order of the day in South Africa. A high degree of security needs fulfilment In South Africa, security remains problematic. High levels of violent crime, and violent means of conflict settlement in schools persist. Farm killings continue. Ongoing analytical ‘provention’ processes, There is a serious lack of attention to ongoing conflict to bring about basic human needs satisfac- resolution processes of any kind, in the country, by tion continue. A problem-solving decision- the government, and perhaps insufficient interest in making framework predominates. conflict resolution shown by strategic sectors within South African society. The NPA was discontinued. There is a need for institution-building in the conflict trans- formation management and resolution field in South Africa. A ‘power’ or ‘deterrence’ framework still persists. Political Institutions need to be structured There is very little evidence of such restructuring to give protection to minorities. in South Africa. It is essentially a unitary state. The first five years saw an accommodation of opposition interests in a Government of National Unity, but subsequently, minorities have not received special protection, except through respect for the equal status of languages. Resolved conflict does not imply a future Current levels of conflict behaviour in South Africa without any form of conflict seem to be sustainable, although certain areas, men- tioned above, give cause for great concern, and may deteriorate if not specifically addressed.

Table 1: Critique of the South African conflict resolution process measured against the ana- lytical conflict resolution school (Bradshaw 2007). Bradshaw and Haines: After Marikana: Rethinking Conflict Resolution in Africa Art. 5,page 11 of 16 policies. Leadership needs to emphasize and peace missions.’ This is an argument for inte- model social cohesion, and avoid disintegra- grated, longer term, and human-centered tive discourses. We argue, therefore, for the approaches. Such interventions should also application of a more nuanced version of the be aligned to economic initiatives designed to BHN approach, reflecting more of the trans- satisfy human needs and improve quality of formative elements of Burton’s later work life, such as those recommended by Chilean (Burton 2001). development economist, Manfred Max Neef Moreover, drawing on Burton’s Social cri- (1991). Barbanti (2004) also makes the same tique evident in Deviance, Terrorism and War point: ‘Clearly, development is at the core of (1979), and Violence Explained (1997), we post-conflict interventions, where the physi- would like to see more concerted efforts to cal and social landscape has been damaged.’ It build peace-building capacity into the fab- is quite clear that governments need to skew ric of civil society in Africa. These efforts their economic policies towards greater inclu- should parallel the peacemaking initiatives sion, less inequality, poverty reduction and by individual African leaders responding to nation-building, in very explicit ways, if they conflict episodes on the continent. Conflict are to effectively support human needs ful- management needs to be institutionalized. fillment, and achieve social peace as a result There should be more emphasis on peace (Barbanti 2006). and conflict management in African uni- versities and school curricula. Institutes for From Rage to New Rainbows: peace should be established to promote Conclusion and Policy Implications the ideals of ongoing conflict transforma- The authors are not pessimistic about the tion, and advance the promotion of human implications for South Africa, nor for the rights-based and democratic initiatives. This continent more generally. We argue instead would give effect to Burton’s second level that the challenges of Africa present special of conflict resolution: the level of conflict cases, that need not be met with despair, but transformed in the long term; the result of which also will not be remedied by a simple ongoing, institutionalized problem-solving, ‘politics as usual’ approach. We believe that with the ultimate goal of restored and valued the basic human needs approach offers the relationships. In a sense, this is what Fanie basis for the recognition of a form of conflict du Toit (2008), of the Institute for Justice that, because it is deeply-rooted in its origins, and Reconciliation, is calling for when he requires an approach that goes to the heart writes that, ‘An urgent national conversation of the human needs for identity and valued of the kind that set up the political transition relationships; that is long-term in its vision; is needed to overcome the current impasse. that does not end at the borders of the state, When state institutions take political sides, or after an election; that does not satisfy frightening prospects emerge.’16 itself with peacekeeping, but that takes the The basic human needs of all identity challenges of peace-building seriously; that groups must be attended to in equal meas- couples the imperative for conflict resolu- ure. Azar’s notion of ‘development diplomacy’ tion with the necessity of development; that implies that development initiatives need to replaces simple Eurocentric formulae with be built into peacekeeping and peacemaking grounded African practice. across the continent, and need to have conflict Burton and the basic human needs school, management and transformation elements do offer an alternative model for the South included (Azar 1990, Azar and Burton 1986). African case, which is supported by critical This argument is supported by the later work development economy. It has its shortcom- of Liebenberg and Gueli (2005), who have ings, but, if adapted in the ways suggested by put forward the concept of ‘developmental Bradshaw (2007), it is more promising than Art. 5, page 12 of 16 Bradshaw and Haines: After Marikana: Rethinking Conflict Resolution in Africa the approach followed to date. In its finest on earth. See for instance the comments hour, delivering its first democratic election, of Vice Chancellor of the University of the South Africa has shown an ability to change Witwatersrand on 29 April, 2014 (Habib what appeared to be its ineluctable destiny. 2014). Whether we have the ability to institutionalize 5 The South African arms deal is the short- that achievement however, remains in doubt hand reference to the Special Defence unless our leaders, pressured by civil society, Procurement (SDP) programme that was adopt a coherent strategy and move beyond mooted in the mid-1990s and imple- fatal ‘short-termism’ and narrow interests. mented from 1998 onwards. This $6bn Twenty years on from South Africa’s his- exercise entailed the procurement of toric TRC, it is appropriate to reflect on a range of UK and European defence which elements of the transition worked equipment (aircraft, frigates and subma- well, including mechanisms such as the rines) with a high level of promised off- National Peace Accord and the widely lauded sets (industrial cooperation), investment, Truth and Reconciliation process, and what and job creation primarily in regard to did not. The early years of democracy held the industrial economy. The corruption out great promise, but subsequently, we are surrounding the procurement and imple- less secure in our relationships, and less con- mentation of the offset programmes in fident in our collective future. Considering the civilian and defence industrial fields the principles of analytical conflict resolu- was subject to formal commission of tion theory may help us understand why. inquiry by the Auditor General in 2001, and to the current Seriti Commission. Notes 6 See for instance reports in The Herald, (5 1 Personal Communication, Richard Cornwell, April 2006), in Rapport (24 September ISS, 16 November 2007. 2006), quoting Macfarlane of the SAIRR 2 In this regard, South African business- in this regard. It is particularly difficult to men met with Thabo Mbeki and Oliver find accurate figures in this regard, Stats Tambo in Zambia, in a meeting facilitated SA having stopped collecting data on the by President Kaunda. The much-publi- outflow, and with flawed census figures cized meeting of Afrikaner intellectuals in certain years. Politicsweb (2012) offers with the ANC leadership took place in a much lower, but still very significant Dakar, Senegal, and a series of second- estimate figure of around 600 000, by track meetings between individuals close using the aggregated data of receiving to the South African government took countries, between 2006 and 2010. place in the United Kingdom. 7 The works of Gibson (2004), Gibson and 3 There were very important roles that the Gouws (2003), Lombard (2004), and NPA might have fulfilled in respect of Hofmeyer, (2005, 2007), all provide sup- the facilitation of the establishment of port for this assertion. community policing, and the facilitation 8 South African Constitutional Court Judge, of the land reform process, to name but Richard Goldstone, quoted by Rickard in two. The structures of the national Peace Sunday Times (23 April 2006), has made a Secretariat would also have fulfilled an similar point. early warning and monitoring role that 9 In this regard, see for instance Institute was sorely missed in the xenophobic out- for Justice and Reconciliation executive breaks of 2008. director, Fanie du Toit’s article in the Cape 4 In fact, The South African level of inequal- Times of 16 January 2008. The contention ity surpassed that of Brazil, which had surrounding Cape High Court Justice John formerly been the most unequal society Hlophe is another case in point. Bradshaw and Haines: After Marikana: Rethinking Conflict Resolution in Africa Art. 5,page 13 of 16

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How to cite this article: Bradshaw, G and Haines, R 2014 After Marikana: Rethinking Conflict Resolution in Africa: The South African Case. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 4(1): 5, pp. 1-16, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.eb

Published: 10 February 2015

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