Rethinking Conflict Resolution in Africa: the South African Case Gavin Bradshaw* and Richard Haines*
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Bradshaw, G and Haines, R 2014 After Marikana: Rethinking Conflict stability Resolution in Africa: The South African Case. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 4(1): 5, pp. 1-16, DOI: http://dx.doi. org/10.5334/sta.eb RESEARCH ARTICLE After Marikana: Rethinking Conflict Resolution in Africa: The South African Case Gavin Bradshaw* and Richard Haines* This paper applies the Analytical Conflict Resolution School approach to achieve a deeper understanding of South Africa’s post-apartheid era. It argues that South Africa is an example of ‘protracted social conflict,’ because it displays a fundamental communal aspect, evinces a strong ‘human needs’ element, its pre- settlement condition had resulted in strongly authoritarian government, and it displayed a dependency in its foreign relations. While South Africa transcended traditional conflict resolution methodology with its National Peace Accord and Truth and Reconciliation Commission, neither of these processes was seen through to its end and, as a result, the South African conflict resolution process remains in limbo. This is coupled with a rising internal level of strain expressed in racial tension, violence, migration and economic frustration. A way out of this current malaise is the institutionalization of conflict management through its inclusion in the school curricula, the establishment of conflict management systems to deal with lower-level conflicts, and the building of needs-satisfying institutional arrangements throughout the society, enabling government to be more sensitive to the needs of the people. Introduction at supra-national, national and sub-national Despite numerous recent transitions to levels. According to Richard Cornwell, con- democracy in Africa (prompting references flict might well be the ‘default setting’ for to an ‘African Renaissance,’ and a ‘New many African countries and regions.1 African Century’), poorly managed con- South Africa, despite its problems in terms flict continues to haunt the continent, and of high crime levels and lack of government defy development initiatives and projects service delivery, has long been seen as some- promoting good governance (Dejo 2003; thing of a success story in terms of the man- Makgoba 1999). Would-be democratic fac- agement of multi-ethnic conflict and the tions throughout the continent find it diffi- deployment of coherent interventions which cult to meaningfully express their demands, seem to constitute substantive policy lessons at times resorting to violence as a means of to Africa and other transitional societies. The highlighting their concerns. Such calcula- main driver behind this perception is the role tions feed into the perpetuation of conflict of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation process. Despite this, however, we argue that the interventions associated with the tran- * Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, South Africa sition are also problematic. In retrospect, [email protected], [email protected] they appear to be ad hoc and fail to take full Art. 5, page 2 of 16 Bradshaw and Haines: After Marikana: Rethinking Conflict Resolution in Africa account of the depth and dynamics of social in conflict (1990). Marikana should not come conflict. There is much evidence that conflict as a surprise, because it is the result of struc- in South Africa is still deeply-rooted, notably, tural, as well as attitudinal factors; of ulti- the August 2012 events at Marikana. This is mate causes as much as proximate causes. not to say that conflict is wholly intractable The massacre represents the confluence in South Africa, but that more integrated of a number of the fault lines that we have and systemic sets of measures should have mentioned above. It is a direct outflow of been put in place. Such measures would be frustrations within the labor movement, and informed by the schools of thought linked within the governing alliance more generally, with the writings of Burton and his col- with increasing worker dissatisfaction with leagues in the Analytical Conflict Resolution COSATU, the major alliance partner, and the perspective (Bradshaw 2007). shocking conditions, and poor salaries that still prevail within the industry. A seemingly The Events at Marikana uncaring and disengaged mine management On 16 August 2012, after some days of labor exacerbated the situation still further. unrest precipitated by wage demands, police Perceived linkages between senior govern- action at the Lonmin Platinum mine at ment figures and the mine management Marikana resulted in the deaths of 34 protest- seemed to add fuel to the fire post-incident. ing miners. In that troubled week, total deaths Cyril Ramaphosa, a former Labour leader numbered 43, with many others injured. in his own right, was at the time a member The incident seemed to shock the country, of the Lonmin Board. He is alleged to have and many parallels have been drawn to some urged a strong response to the miners by of the worst atrocities of the apartheid era. the police. According to Khadija Patel (Daily Indeed this was the single worst incidence of Maverick: 2013), the transcript of a meeting public violence since the advent of democ- that was held between the South African racy in South Africa in 1994. Some have Police Service and Lonmin management two called it ‘The ANC’s Sharpeville.’ In fact, the days before the massacre explicitly mentions events at Marikana should not have come Ramaphosa ‘pressuring’ Police Minister Nathi as a shock at all. According to Frankel (21 Mthethwa, indicating that Ramaphosa’s call October 2012): for appropriate action was not an isolated act of political interference. He also used inflam- ‘The irony, of course, is that Marikana matory language, referred to the miners as is more than just an unfortunate ‘dastardly criminal’(SABC News Online 2014). event. It is, in fact, the result of a pro- With respect to the ultimate and ongoing cess of degenerative civil society in causes of the disaster, high levels of inequal- the North West and other provinces ity and continuing failures of service delivery that back-dates to 1994.’ contribute to the miserable conditions in the Marikana community. This is amply borne Conflict theory makes a distinction between out by Philip Frankel’s graphic depictions of what are called proximate and ultimate the degraded environment at Marikana: causes of conflict episodes (Mayer 2000). Ultimate causes refer to the underlying, The whole area… is profoundly pol- longer-term conditions that give rise to overt luted and both unliveable and unmi- conflict. Proximate causes, on the other nable in many places. This is the direct hand, refer to those specific incidents that result of ecologically destructive poli- provide the proverbial spark to the powder cies by companies like Lonmin whose keg. Johan Galtung captures these distinc- activities impact negatively on water, tions in his own differentiation between air quality and ultimately on people. conflict behaviour, attitudes and structures The role of the state in all of this is Bradshaw and Haines: After Marikana: Rethinking Conflict Resolution in Africa Art. 5,page 3 of 16 highly salient and reflects problems Accord (NPA), which produced guidelines of local government and the justice for political engagement and established system, which reflect poorly on a a conflict management system across the country that claims to be stable, effec- entire nation. Despite numerous challenges, tive and democratic twenty years after the NPA succeeded in keeping violence 1994. Local government …is notori- down to manageable levels, and an over- ously corrupt, overtly murderous and, whelmingly peaceful first election was held. much like local government nation- Unfortunately, the Accord and its structures wide, almost totally incapacitated were hastily dissolved by the new govern- (Frankel 2012). ment, in spite of the very useful range of roles that it might have potentially played in A proximate cause was the poor response the rebuilding of the country3 (McCall and by police officers who, according to many Duncan 2000; Collin Marks 2000). eye-witnesses, and expert commentary, was Most of South Africa’s political leadership designed to maximize, rather than mini- understood very clearly the need to address mize loss of life and injury among the mine- the longer-term, and more deeply-rooted workers. Fallout after the incident included aspects of the South African conflict, and hurtful comments from the new police com- supported the establishment of a Truth and missioner (Sowetan 2013), and a low-key, Reconciliation Commission (TRC) modeled seemingly unsympathetic response from after an approach already used in some post- government, which allowed space for divi- conflict Latin American countries (Campbell sive, populist leaders, such as Julius Malema 2000). Everyone, from journalists to aca- to fill that leadership vacuum. demics; from psychologists to the human Marikana represents a ‘perfect storm’ of rights and legal communities, had their own ingredients for conflagration in the South take on the TRC. Much of the commentary African body politic, but it should be seen as was from a religious, Christian perspective. possibly presaging future events, rather than Disappointingly, the TRC never delivered as an anomaly. reparations at the intended scale, or within the established timeframe. Government has Shortcomings of the South African come in for much criticism with respect to its Peace Process inability to take the TRC process to its