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The Evolving Role of Sudanese Militias in Libya

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The Evolving Role of Sudanese Militias in Libya DISCUSSION PAPER Soldiers of Fortune: The Evolving Role of Sudanese Militias in Libya Abdinor Hassan Dahir DISCUSSION PAPER Soldiers of Fortune: The Evolving Role of Sudanese Militias in Libya Abdinor Hassan Dahir Soldiers of Fortune: The Evolving Role of Sudanese Militias in Libya © TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE ALL RIGHTS RESERVED WRITTEN BY Abdinor Hassan Dahir PUBLISHER TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE May 2020 TRT WORLD İSTANBUL AHMET ADNAN SAYGUN STREET NO:83 34347 ULUS, BEŞİKTAŞ İSTANBUL / TURKEY TRT WORLD LONDON PORTLAND HOUSE 4 GREAT PORTLAND STREET NO:4 LONDON / UNITED KINGDOM TRT WORLD WASHINGTON D.C. 1819 L STREET NW SUITE 700 20036 WASHINGTON DC www.trtworld.com researchcentre.trtworld.com The opinions expressed in this discussion paper represent the views of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the TRT World Research Centre. 4 Soldiers of Fortune: The Evolving Role of Sudanese Militias in Libya Summary ince the ouster of the Libyan man trafficking across the region between strong man Muammar al-Qa- Sudan and Libya. Their presence on both ddafi in 2011, outside inter- sides of the border further contributes into ventions have compounded larger criminal networks, such as groups affil- the Libyan civil conflict and iated with the Haftar’s Libyan National Army, presented a risk to regional which is also accused of killing migrants, hu- Ssecurity. Foreign militias and mercenaries, man trafficking and smuggling into Europe. especially from neighbouring Sudan and Chad, operating in Libya have proliferated. This discussion paper explores the merce- A report presented to the UN Security Coun- nary nature of the Sudanese paramilitary cil last October noted that Sudanese armed groups’ in Libya. It also looks into how the groups are flocking to Libya in support of the RSF’s involvement (i.e. the RSF commander warring Libyan parties. Furthermore, reports General Mohamed Hemedti) in the current mention that the Sudanese paramilitary Rap- transitional government in Sudan might id Support Forces (RSF) were deployed in hamper the ability of the Sudanese leader- Libya to fight alongside military strongman ship to formalise a coherent policy towards Khalifa Haftar. The involvement of the Su- the Libyan conflict. Finally, it briefly address- danese militiamen (both rebels and the RSF) es how the divisive use of trans-border mer- in the Libyan civil war does not only pose a cenaries could contribute to the further in- direct threat to the security and stability of stability in Africa, such as fragmentation of an already war-ravaged country, but also the security sector and erosion of the state’s complicate efforts to end the conflict. These authority. fighters are engaged in smuggling and hu- Sudanese demonstrators carry placards and chant slogans as they protest outside the Foreign Ministry in the capital Khartoum on January 28, 2020. - Dozens of Sudanese protested in Khartoum, alleging that their relatives had been recruited by a UAE firm as security guards but were despatched to war-zones in Libya and Yemen. (Mahmoud Hajaj - Anadolu Agency) 5 Soldiers of Fortune: The Evolving Role of Sudanese Militias in Libya Introduction Libya has been in a civil turmoil since 2011 when a In December 2019, a report by the United Nations popular revolution supported by a NATO intervention Experts on Libya accused Sudan of violating the UN toppled long-time ruler Muammar al-Qaddafi, ending arms embargo on Libya. The report documented that his over four-decade long reign. In 2014, Libya witnessed the commander of Sudan's Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a political deadlock, which divided the North African Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, country into two competing administrations, each with deployed 1,000 of his troops to Libya in support of Haftar its own parliament and government: The Tripoli-based (UN Security Council, 2019a). In December of that year, government in the west and the Tobruk-based Interim a report by the Guardian documented that as many as Government led by Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni in 3,000 armed Sudanese mercenaries, including fighters the east. At the end of 2015, Libyan factions under UN from the war-torn Darfur region, have joined the ranks mediation established a Government of National Accord of Haftar’s LNA against the internationally recognised (GNA) in Tripoli headed by Fayez al-Serraj as Chairman government in Tripoli (Burke & Salih, 2019). In January of the Presidential Council and Prime Minister (UNSMIL, 2020, Sudanese families protested in front of the 2015). The international community recognised the new United Arab Emirates embassy in the Sudanese capital, Tripoli-based GNA. However, implementation of the Khartoum following news that an Emirati company had political agreement has been frustrated by allegations of allegedly recruited hundreds of young Sudanese men illegitimacy by rival factions, most notably by the Thinni as security guards for private companies in the UAE and rival that continued to work in the east, supported subsequently sent them to fight in proxy wars in Yemen General Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the self-styled and Libya. Once they arrived in the UAE, the young men Libyan National Army (LNA). In addition to the GNA and were reportedly given military training and ordered LNA, militias control significant swaths of the country, to either fight in Libya or Yemen (Middle East Monitor, engaging in activities ranging from human trafficking to 2020). competition over state resources. In April 2019, Khalifa Haftar’s LNA forces launched an offensive to take over Tripoli, sparking clashes with the In April 2019, Khalifa forces of the internationally-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA). Since then the conflict in Haftar’s LNA forces and around the capital city Tripoli has killed more than launched an offensive to 2,000 people and displaced over 200,000 from their homes. The rival camps have been backed by a range of take over Tripoli, sparking foreign powers that further complicate the Libyan civil war with the potential to upgrade it into a full regional clashes with the forces proxy conflict. For example, While Turkey has extended of the internationally- a diplomatic and security support to UN recognised GNA, others, including the UAE, Egypt and Russia, have recognised Government lent a hand to regenerate Haftar’s assault on Tripoli. In the past few years reports have documented an influx of National Accord (GNA). of foreign fighters into Libya, allegedly contracted Since then the conflict in by the Libyan factions and their respective foreign supporters. One of the foreign interferences in Libya and around the capital that took a more direct shape is the increase of armed groups from neighbouring Sudan. Since 2017, reports city Tripoli has killed more have confirmed the presence of Sudanese mercenaries than 2,000 people and in Libya, thus fuelling the conflict and posing a direct threat to the security and stability of Libya. These displaced over 200,000 Sudanese mercenaries have been involved in looting properties owned by Libyan oil firms, which were then from their homes. smuggled to Sudan and sold in the black market.i 6 Soldiers of Fortune: The Evolving Role of Sudanese Militias in Libya Meet the Mercenaries: The Evolution of the Rapid Support Forces The most well-known Sudanese mercenary activities Darfuriansiii by attacking civilians, burning villages, are carried out by the Rapid Support Forces, which are raping women, looting economic resources and an integral part of the Sudanese security forces. The gradually destroying traditional cultural relics owned RSF is a transnational mercenary paramilitary force by the targeted peripheral communities. As a result, that seized power in Sudan following the deposal of the height of the violence that raged in the period from the long-time leader Omar al-Bashir in April 2019. More 2003 to 2005 left more than 200,000 people dead and than 15 years ago, the world became familiar with a over 2 million others displaced according to the UN and group of government-aligned militiamen, known as human rights agencies (CNN, 2008). Khartoum denied the Janjaweed, at the height of the disastrous Darfur that it used the militia in its counter-insurgency war conflict. The core of the Janjaweed militia is formed against the rebels. However, the International Criminal from the camel-herding nomads from the Mahariya Court (ICC) tracked the alliance between the militia and Mahamid offshoots of the Rizeigat Arab ethnic and the Sudanese government to the highest level of group of northern Darfur and neighbouring areas of Sudanese authorities. In 2009, the Hague-based court Chad. Earning global infamy as ‘devils on horseback’, indicted five individuals,iv including then-President al- the predominantly Arab Janjaweed acted as the Bashir, for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and main rivals of the non-Arab Darfurian rebel groupsii genocide allegedly committed in Darfur between 2003 and have been accused of significant human rights and 2008. Currently, none of the suspects are in ICC violations during the war. The allegations include that custody. the pro-government militia had systematically targeted Sudanese General and Vice President of the Sudanese Transitional Military Council, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (C) attends a signing ceremony in Khartoum on July 17, 2019. (Mahmoud Hjaj - Anadolu Agency) 7 Soldiers of Fortune: The Evolving Role of Sudanese Militias in Libya In 2006, the Janjaweed militia was absorbed into the president.
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