THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY FOUNDED BY JAMKS LOEB, LL.D. EDITED BY fT. E. PAGE, C.H., LITT.D. E. CAPPS, PH.D., LL.D. W. H. D. ROUSE, litt.d. LIVY XI BOOKS XXXVI II—XXXIX 'livIUl' 3/.. LIVY WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY EVAN T. SAGE, Ph.D. PROFESSOR OP LATIN AND HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CLASSICS IN THE UNIVERSITY OP PITTSBURaFI IN THIRTEEN VOLUMES XI BOOKS XXXVIII—XXXIX 3Mi'^. 3 LONDON WILLIAM HEINEiMANN LTD CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS MCM XXXVI PA PrintHl in Great Britain CONTENTS PAGE editors' note vii translator's preface ix INTRODUCTORY NOTE xi BOOK XXXVIII 1 SUMMARY OF BOOK XXXVIII . .213 BOOK XXXIX 217 SUMMARY OF BOOK XXXIX . 401 INDEX OF NAMES 405 MAPS — 1. NORTHERN ITALY At end 2. GREECE AND ASIA MINOR „ 3. SPAIN „ 4. ASIA MINOR „ EDITORS' NOTE Professor Evan T. Sage, the editor of this and the two preceding vohimes of the Loeb edition of Livy, died in the Barnes Hospital, Saint Louis, after a severe surgical operation, on May 30, 1936. He was entering upon his fifty-sixth year, having been born May 16, 1881. A native of Nebraska, his under- graduate studies were pursued at the University of Nebraska, from which he received his first degree. He then entered the University of Chicago, which conferred upon him in 1906 the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. After teaching in the State Univer- sities of Idaho and Washington he was called to the University of Pittsburgh in 1913. There he worked with marked success, both as a teacher of Latin and as the directing head of the Department of Classics. Professor Sage's scholarly pursuits lay in two dis- tinct and unrelated fields—history, particularly the constitutional and political history of the last two centuries of Republican Rome, and palaeography and textual criticism, these centring about Petronius. He had personally collated most of the manuscripts of this author and had acquired during several periods of investigation in the libraries of Europe not only a large apparatus for reconstituting the text of Petronius but also an intimate knowledge of the habits and methods of work of the classical scholars of the Renaissance. vii EDITORS' NOTE Before his death Professor Sage had read all the proofs of the present volume at least once ; he had also prepared the critical notes and a considerable portion of the translation of the rest of Livy from Book XL on. It will be the task of another editor to fill in the gap between Volume V, where Professor Foster left off, and Vol. IX, where Professor Sage began. The Editors. Sepiernber 21, 1936. vni TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE This preface should be brief. The Books contained in Volume XI deal with minor matters, and Livy feels himself more at leisure, so that he can include anecdotes and digressions. Another possible con- sequence is that Livy, having less of moment to relate, felt able to examine details more closely and to compare his sources more consciously. This may be the explanation of the appearance here of the one serious bit of historical criticism to be found in Livy (XXXIX. lii). The textual problem grows more serious in this Volume. Our best MS., B, now breaks off with inci (XXXVIII. xlvi. 4). The major difference between my text and that of the latest revision of Weissenborn— Mliller is that I have occasionally restored readings of B, and I believe that careful examination will reveal more readings which should be received into the text. But there are many indications that the consensus of the minor MSS. is of almost equal value, although we lack the precision of information that is necessary before accepting this as a principle of textual criticism in the case of Livy. It would be fortunate if this were so. But the individual minor MSS. do not always agree among themselves, and I have usually accepted and reported as the reading off the reading of the majority of the MSS., TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE so far as I could determine it from the reports accessible to me. In this part of the text I have preferred readings of M, where reported, and have restored some \nthout remark. A more difficult question is the relative authority of certain sixteenth- century editions which are presumably based, at least in part, on 3f and possibly on the lost S{jpirensis). The frequent references of Gelenius to " antiqua scriptura," " archetypa," " ex archetypis," " vetusti codices " and the like are exasperating in their sugo^estion of buried treasures M'hich seem the more valuable as they are at present lost to us. In prac- tice I have followed 3/ where it was reported, r when there was no report of M, and have furnished critical notes on passages where r was preferred to yi or the sixteenth-century editions or later conjectures were preferred to Mt- My obligations as to index, maps, incidental assistance, and editorial aid and encouragement are unchanged. No repetition of details would prove an adequate expression of my debts. New bibliography is covered in the notes, which I have tried to make useful from the historical standpoint, as before, and from the literary stand- point as well. CONSPECTUS SIGLORUM B = Codex Bambergensis M. IV. 9, s. 11. F = Codex Bambergensis Q. I\'. 27 (Theol. 99), s. 6. 3/= Codex Moguntinus deperditus, s. 9 (?). f =: Codices deteriores et editiones veteres (the most important early editions are cited by name). X INTRODUCTORY NOTE By the year 189 b.c. a Roman optimist (if such an one existed) might well have said that Rome's eastern difficulties were over : Philip had been reduced to impotence by Flamininus ; the Aetolians had been severely punished ; now Antiochus had been eliminated as a factor in Asian politics by Scipio. The only other eastern powers demanding con- sideration, Egypt, Pergamum and Rhodes, were Rome's allies and the last two were deeply in Rome's debt by reason of the projected settlement of Asia. Yet at the same moment a Roman pessimist might have argued just as insistently that her troubles in the east were just beginning, Asia, he would have admitted, presented no threatening problem. Philip had been allowed to regain some of his lost Greek possessions as compensation for his assistance against the Aetolians and Antiochus. The Aetolians had been defeated but not crushed completely, and their fundamental grievance, that they had been ill-treated after the victory over Philip, had not been removed. Perhaps most serious of all was the fact that Rome had no real base of operations east of the Adriatic : this was a theoretically laudable, but practically unfortunate, consequence of her desire to avoid assuming territorial responsibilities in the east. Within Europe there were numerous situations INTRODUCTORY NOTE any one of which might provoke a war. In the Peloponnesus there was the Achaean-Lacedae- monian problem, since Rome had never pronounced judgment on the Achaean policy after the murder of Nabis. In the north there was the constant hostility of the Aetolians, rendered for the moment more serious because of the recent Macedonian expansion. These were only the most apparent dangers. Whether Rome honestly believed that a conquered nation could remain conquered and sub- missive after the withdrawal of Roman troops is a question which we are unable to answer ; whether she honestly believed that the Greek states were capable, at this time, of self-government is also a question to which there is no answer. I fear that Roman generals, ambitious for triumphs and material rewards, were quite ^^'illing to defer as long as possible a definitive settlement in Greece for the sake of the fairly easy victories that were promised. In Asia, the withdrawal of Antiochus left a multi- tude of unsolved problems, and the solution of some of these soon appeared to be exceedingly profitable undertakings : the Galatian campaign will serve as a sufficient example. Another solution of the eastern problem might have been the enlargement of some one state, bound firmly by ties of alliance and dependence to Rome, which could have dominated the eastern Medi- terranean and by virtue of her military superiority have maintained peace there. If Rome looked for such a state she failed to find one that could be so enlarged and could still be trusted. There was nothing left for Rome, apart from the cynically brutal course of allo^^ing the eastern states to INTRODUCTORY NOTE destroy one another, except to assume the informal protectorate which she does insensibly assume in the years covered by this Volume. There seems little doubt that public sentiment would have rejected such a settlement as a formal occupation of Greece and Asia had it been proposed in Rome. But, in addition to sincere differences of opinion among Romans, there was an almost unanimous sentiment, which seems to increase in strength, that in some form or other Roman control of the east w^as necessary. But so great was the Romans' faith in Roman power that they were inclined to cut through diplomatic and political red tape and announce decisions in a form so categorically brief as to be unintelligible to others who were not Romans. One suspects that the Romans talked in riddles so frequently because they were not themselves sure of what they meant. It was easier to let time decide the exact interpretation and to punish the unfor- tunates who had in the meantime misunderstood. The Books contained in this Volume record events of a period of transition. With no major enemy to confront her, Rome turns her attention to smaller problems.