Investigating the Syntax of Speech Acts: Embedding Illocutionary Force

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Investigating the Syntax of Speech Acts: Embedding Illocutionary Force View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by White Rose E-theses Online Investigating the syntax of speech acts: Embedding illocutionary force Rebecca Louise Woods Doctor of Philosophy University of York Language and Linguistic Science February 2016 Abstract This dissertation examines the notion of illocutionary force and whether it is embeddable by examining the syntax, semantics and pragmatic effects of a range of root-like embedded constructions. Though illocutionary force has long been considered a property exclusive to root clauses, the examination and analysis of English embedded inverted questions and other quasi-quotational constructions cross-linguistically show that this is not the case. The contributions of this dissertation are three-fold: a refined definition of independent illocutionary force; a syntax for non-root complement clauses that carry independent illo- cutionary force; and a model for the discourse that captures the effects of these clauses. I also work towards understanding how the instantiation of independent illocutionary force in such constructions leads to their restricted distribution. Illocutionary force may be represented both lexically and through syntactic processes such as verb movement. I argue that verb movement to Forceo is an interface operation| it occurs in syntax but is directly linked to a specific discourse interpretation. Building on Krifka (2014), illocutionary force is the expression of who takes responsibility for as- serting or responding to a proposition or set of propositions, according to a given modal base. When illocutionary force is independently expressed on an embedded clause, the perspective holder and responsibility taker(s) are unambiguous and not mixed. In con- trast, standard embedded clauses may be ambiguous as to who takes responsibility and may contain multiple perspectives. Clauses with independent illocutionary force have an expanded C-layer that is nonethe- less smaller than that in true root clauses. An Illocutionary Act head selects for the em- bedded ForceP, determines illocutionary force and, obliquely, determines the restricted dis- tribution of quasi-quotational constructions. A range of facts show that quasi-quotational constructions are truly embedded but are not direct objects of the matrix verb. Instead, they are in close apposition with a nominal direct object. This structure accounts for the properties of quasi-quotational constructions as entities that refer to a conversational move proffered in the relevant discourse, following Roberts's (1996, 2012) Question Under Discussion framework. 2 Contents Abstract 2 Contents 3 List of Tables 7 Acknowledgements 9 Author's Declaration 13 1 Introduction 15 2 Representing Discourse Participants: The History of an Idea 18 2.1 Introduction . 18 2.2 Early speech act theory: the philosophers . 21 2.3 Linguists on speech acts and representing speech . 34 2.3.1 Ross (1970) and Fillmore (1975) . 34 2.3.2 Considering quotation: Partee (1973) and others . 38 2.3.3 Returning to Ross? Banfield (1982) and Giorgi (2010) . 41 2.3.4 Speech acts in syntax: the revival . 46 2.3.4.1 Discourse particles as speech act heads . 49 2.3.4.2 Speech act projections: part of the clause . 53 2.4 Root phenomena and illocutionary force . 55 2.4.1 Hooper and Thompson (1973) . 55 2.4.2 Splitting hairs? Split CP hypotheses and splitting Force from Type 57 3 2.4.3 Taking responsibility: Krifka (2014) . 60 2.5 Conclusion . 62 3 Embedded Inverted Questions as Embedded Illocutionary Acts 64 3.1 Introduction . 64 3.2 Key facts on EIQs . 64 3.3 Characteristics shared with indirect speech . 69 3.4 Characteristics shared with direct speech: syntax . 77 3.5 Characteristics shared with direct speech: semantics and pragmatics . 81 3.5.1 The Question Under Discussion framework . 84 3.5.2 Perspectives . 90 3.6 Characteristics of EIQs only: syntax . 93 3.7 Characteristics of EIQs only: semantics and pragmatics . 97 3.8 Summary: EIQs as quasi-quotational structures . 101 3.9 Conclusion . 106 4 Analysis Part I: the Illocutionary Act Phrase 108 4.1 Introduction . 108 4.2 Motivations for extra structure . 109 4.2.1 Refining and extending past analyses . 109 4.2.2 Directly representing independent illocutionary force . 113 4.2.3 Roadmap for this chapter . 116 4.3 Structure and representation . 117 4.3.1 V-like structure . 118 4.3.1.1 EIQs: covert QUESTION or REQUEST operators . 121 4.3.1.2 EV2: a covert ASSERT operator . 125 4.3.2 N-like behaviour . 126 4.3.2.1 Embedded clauses as referring expressions . 126 4.3.2.2 Determiner-like properties of the IA head . 131 4.3.3 Interim summary . 134 4.4 Licensing embedded V-to-Force . 134 4 4.4.1 The IA head as Phase head . 134 4.4.2 What does it mean to represent illocutionary force syntactically? . 136 4.4.2.1 Tense and Assertion: not one but two clause-medial positions137 4.4.2.2 Splitting Tense and Assertion in child language . 139 4.4.3 V-to-Force: illocutionary, my dear Watson . 143 4.5 Summary . 153 5 Analysis Part II: the Perspectival Monster 154 5.1 Introduction . 154 5.2 Evidence for a Perspectival Monster . 155 5.2.1 Shifty predicates: a case of \coming" and \going" . 155 5.2.2 Embedded imperatives . 157 5.2.3 Reason clauses . 162 5.2.4 Summary: a Monstrous path awaits . 163 5.3 The Perspectival Monster . 167 5.3.1 In English and Spanish . 169 5.3.2 In German . 173 5.3.3 In Mainland Scandinavian . 177 5.4 Contexts and Conversational Moves . 181 5.4.1 EIQs in conversation . 187 5.4.2 German-type EV2 in conversation . 193 5.5 Summary . 193 6 Interfacing with the Matrix (Clause) 196 6.1 Introduction . 196 6.2 EIQ syntax is a matter of modification . 196 6.2.1 Introduction . 196 6.2.2 Coordination . 197 6.2.3 Restrictive relative clauses . 198 6.2.4 Apposition . 199 6.2.5 Equation/identification . 202 5 6.2.6 A return to apposition . 215 6.2.7 More on the EIQ as a definite description . 224 6.2.8 Reason clauses (again) . 231 6.2.9 Comparison with factive complements . 234 6.3 Thinking crosslinguistically . 242 6.3.1 Distributional differences . 242 6.3.2 More on the nominal complement . 249 6.3.2.1 A role for cognate nouns? . 249 6.3.2.2 Illocutionary force is in the embedded clause . 254 6.3.3 Languages that don't embed speech act phenomena . 257 6.4 Conclusions and wider consequences for linguistic theory . 259 7 Conclusion 262 8 Appendix 266 8.1 Study 1: question-answer task I . 266 8.1.1 Participants and items . 266 8.1.2 Results . 267 8.1.3 Discussion . 268 8.2 Study 2: question-answer task II . 269 8.2.1 Improvements on question-answer task I . 269 8.2.2 Participants and dissemination . 270 8.2.3 Results . 271 8.2.4 Discussion . 271 8.2.5 Extension to question-answer task II . 273 8.3 Study 2: grammaticality judgement task . 274 Abbreviations 277 Bibliography 280 6 List of Tables Table 2.1: Categories in Austin's Speech Act Theory (based on Austin 1962) Table 2.2: Classes of illocutionary acts (Austin 1962) Table 2.3: Categories in Searle's Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts (1979) Table 2.4: Hooper and Thompson's (1973) classes of verbs Table 2.5: Clause types and basic force (Portner 2004, p.238) Table 4.1: Working definitions of illocutionary forces Table 5.1: Distribution of EV2 in German and Mainland Scandinavian Table 5.2:K 1: Initial context state Table 5.3:K 2: A asserts \Sam is home" relative to K1 Table 5.4:K 3: B agrees to commit to p (Canonical move) Table 5.5:K 4: The CG is updated with p (Canonical move) Table 5.6:K 3': B denies p (Non-canonical move) Table 5.7:K 4': A and B agree to disagree relative to K3' Table 5.8:K 5: A asks \Is Sam home?" relative to the initial input context K1 Table 5.9:K 6: B confirms p in input context K5 (Canonical move) Table 5.10:K 6': B denies p in input context K5 (Canonical move) Table 5.11:K 3": B denies p in input context K2 (Canonical move) Table 5.12:K 7: A asserts \John said that phases were introduced in Chomsky 1995" relative to initial input state K1 Table 5.13:K 8: A asserts \Mary asked if Sam is home" relative to the initial input context K1 Table 5.14:K 9: A asserts \Mary asked if Sam is home" relative to the initial input context K1 Table 5.15:K 10: A asserts \Jane asked me would I visit her" relative to initial input state K1 7 Table 5.16:K 12: A asks \Do you know is Mary coming?" relative to the initial input context K1 Table 5.17:K 13: A says \Marga sagte, Peter ist gl¨ucklich" relative to the initial input context K1 Table 8.1: Total long-distance answers (long-distance + `both' answers) by Question Type x Inversion (%) Table 8.2: Answers to the question: \What region are you from?" Table 8.3: Total long-distance answers by Question Type x Inversion in Belfast speakers (%) Table 8.4: Total long-distance answers by Question Type x Inversion in non-Belfast speakers (%) Table 8.5: Long- and short-distance answers by Matrix wh-word x Inversion in all survey re- spondents (%) Table 8.6: Grammaticality judgements on extractability of arguments from different types of speech report (7-point Likert scale) Table 8.7: Acceptability judgments on Extractability of Arguments from Different Types of Speech Report x Dialect Table 8.8: Mean rating of sentences by Matrix Predicate x Inversion x Question Type x Inversion in all speakers 8 Acknowledgements Before I throw myself into the (copious, copious) thanks, a note for the PhD students who may read this (or prefer reading acknowledgements to the thesis itself).
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