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The Cedar Stalemate: Lebanon, from Rafiq Hariri to the Brink of Civil War

by

Noah Bonsey

Professor Marc Lynch, Advisor

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honors in Political Science

WILLIAMS COLLEGE

Williamstown, Massachusetts

May 18,2007 Table of Contents

The Independence Intifada

The Lebanese System

Rafiq Hariri

The March 14~~Movement

Hizbullah

Over the Brink?

Works Cited Thanks to my family for inspiring me, My friends for diverting me, And my girlfriend for putting up with me.

Thanks to Professor Lynch, Professor Darrow, and Professor MacDonald for all their guidance. Introduction

The Independence Intifada

On March 14th,2005, nearly a quarter of Lebanon's population floodled Martyr's

Square in central Beirut. Audiences across the world looked on at what appeared to be the climax of an historic revolution. One month after the assassination of former Prime

Minister Rafiq Hariri, a million Lebanese-some in short skirts, others in hijabs, ad1 bedecked in red and white-stood together in the nation's capital, united in demanding a full and permanent Syrian withdrawal. The moment shone with dramatic symbolism; masses of Lebanese from sects that had fought each other bitterly during the country's civil war demonstrated side-by-side, proclaiming unity and independence amidst the city center that Hariri had dedicated his political and business career to rebuilding.

Hariri's assassination on February 14'" had sent a jarring wave through the

Lebanese political system. His funeral two days later drew hundreds of thousands of

Lebanese-Muslim and Christian-flooding downtown Beirut in a demonstration of grief and rage toward the neighboring regime many held responsible. The weeks that followed witnessed unprecedented displays of popular boldness and cross-confessional cooperation. Thousands of young, mostly Christian and Druze demonstrators set up camp in Martyr's Square in a bold affront to the Syrian-dominated mukhabarat (secret police) state. A coalition of Sunni, Druze and Christian politicians publicly blamed

Damascus for the killing and joined in calling for a withdrawal of the Syrian military and intelligence apparatus. The opposition's momentum appeared in danger on March gth, as half a million demonstrators-mostly Shia-attended a Hizbullah-organized rally in support of Bashar Assad's regime. On March 14~~'however, hundreds of thousands of Sunnis joined with Chnstians and Druze in direct answer to the pro-Syria ra!ly.

Hizbullah backed down in the face of this overwhelming sentiment, and weeks later

Syrian troops withdrew from a Lebanon that seemed-after 14 years of civil war followed by 14 years of Syrian hegemony-to be uniting behind its cedar flag.

And the world took notice. What Lebanese referred to as the "Independence

Intifada" became known in the United States as the "Cedar Revolution." Images of young, bright-eyed, often Gucci-wearing Lebanese demonstrators flooded C'NN. The

White House hailed the birth of a new, independent and democratic Lebanon, pointing to the Syrian withdrawal as evidence of the wisdom of aggressive American policy in the region. The wave of enthusiasm swept through much of the foreign policy establishment as well. Writing in US News and World Report, noted Lebanese political scientists

Fouad Ajami extolled the "cedar revolution of the vast majority of Lebanon's people," arguing that "no one could have foreseen the mass grief of the captive count~y.No satrap on the scene could have anticipated the coming together a fortnight ago of the largest demonstrations in Lebanon's history."' In a Wnshingtoa Post op-ed, Henry Gssinger called Syria's withdrawal one of the "extraordinary advances of democracy" that was taking place in early 2005.~As the last uniformed remnants of Damascus's hegemony crossed back into Syria in late April, Lebanon prepared for its first independent parliamentary elections since the civil war-a vote that was expected to usher the pro-

Western, "March 14'"" opposition comfortably into power.

Ajarni, Fouad. "The apparition in the Levant," US.News & World Report, April 4, 2005, http:llweb.lexis-nexis.com. 2 Kissinger, Henry. "Implementing Bush's Vision; To Effectively Spread Democracy, We Must Balance Values and Geopolitical Challenges," The Washington Post, May 16, 2005, http://web.lexis-nexis.com. Less than a year later, however, Lebanese politics lay grounded in sectarian stalemate. The enthusiasm of the Independence Intifada had all but died, and a cast of familiar figures-clan leaders, former warlords, the progeny of long established political families-argued fruitlessly over the future of the presidency and Hizbullah's weaponry, two issues deeply linked to the traditional Lebanese curses of sectarianism and foreign intrigue. Posters of the martyred Hariri and banners demanding "The Truth'' still adorned storefronts in certain neighborhoods, but, even among the young Lebanese who had fueled the movement, a sense of resigned fi-ustration prevailed. The "new" Lebanon was already beginning to look an awful lot like the old one. This political stasis would hold until July 12"', 2006-when Hizbullah's kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers plunged

Lebanon into war.

The Independence Intifada drove the Syrian military out of Lebanon, and the opposition's performance in the subsequent elections empowered a governing majority whose leadership maintained close ties with the United States and opposed Syrian meddling in Lebanese affairs. However, what began with a popular, multi-confessional uprising reverted quickly to the traditional post-mandate Lebanese model of governance: a ruling coalition of sectarian leaders, united to the exclusion of other confessionali

(namely Shia) parties. Weak, divided, and without a common steward, factions within the new government looked to opposing foreign powers for support-just as they have throughout Lebanon's history. Why, less than two years after the March 14~" movement's success in installing a more autonomous, pro-Western government, does

Lebanon once again sit at the brink of civil war? In a country as diverse, divided and prone to international meddling as Lebanon, an investigation into the country's failure to progress toward stable independence reveals no shortage of suspects. Among the prevailing explanations for the failure of March 14", the most fundamental points to the role of sectarianism in the country, both in political structure and popular psyche. From this perspective, the concept of an independent

Lebanese nation is a post-colonial fantasy, doomed in practice by centuries of history and the continuing competition between Lebanon's eighteen officially recognized sects, the largest of which are the Shia (estimated at 35% of the population), Sunnis (roughly 27%),

Christians (mostly Maronites with an array of smaller sects, together adding up to around

3 I%), and Druze (7%) communities. In such a country, there is no prospect for liberal democracy. Lebanon, writes Israeli leftist journalist Uri Avnery, is "a large number of big and small communities, ready to spring to arms at any moment. At best, Lebanon is a loose federation of mutually suspicious communities, at worst a battlefield of feuding groups who hate each other's guts."3 While this view is convenient in explaining the reemergence of sectarian tension, however, it ignores and foreign interference and cannot account for the cross-confessional outpouring of Lebanese nationalism during the Beirut

Spring. .

A more sophisticated argument assigns blame not to sectarianism itself, but to the imbalanced, confession-based structure of Lebanese governance. Since gaining independence from France in 1943, Lebanon's government has embodied compromise

3Avnery, Uri. "A Primer in Lebanese Politics," Syria Comment, December 1, 2006, http://joshualandis.com/blog/?p=106 between in its sects. The president must be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister must be a Sunni, and the speaker of parliament a Shia. Seats in the legislature, ministries in the cabinet, and important civil service positions are apportioned on a confessional basis according to a given ratio. Until the civil war, this ratio was six Chstians to five

Muslims-a reflection of Lebanon's last national census, taken in 1932, which showed a slim Christian majority. Perceptions of the inequity of this distribution-particularly given demographic shifts that increased the Muslim proportion of the population- contributed to the outbreak of civil war in 1975. Since the Taif Accords that concluded the war, government positions have been evenly (though not equitably) distributed between Christians and Muslims, and the prime minister and speaker have been strengthened vis a vis the previously dominant president. Despite the adjustment, however, the Shia-by most accounts Lebanon's current (and growing) plurality- remain underrepresented in government office.

In identifying this confessional structure as the source of Lebanon's dysfunctional politics, many observers criticize not only the unfair distribution of power, but also the brand of sectarian, clientalist politics that the system encourages. For Lebanese politicians, family background, confessional identity and the provision of services to a narrow constituency often trump ideology and the national interest. From this perspective, neither the Syrian occupation nor the intifada that ended it altered the underlying political structures of the country. So long as Lebanon is governed according to a system that enshrines confessional imbalances and discourages candidates from appealing to diverse constituencies, Lebanese politics will be characterized by corruption and shallow, ad hoc electoral alliances. As Sateh Noureddine, an editor at the Beiiut daily As-SaJiv, and Laurie King-Irani explain,

"Lebanon. . . remains a country whose political system lacks formal definition, whose cosmopolitan politicians are rooted in a feudal era despite speaking a post- modem language, and whose great problems emanate not from exteriial enemies but rather from chronic internal structural imbalance^."^

Nowcddine and King-Irani published this argument in May 2005, and events since then suggest that they are correct in emphasizing the structural nature of Lebanon's predicament. This point of view understates the importance of external actors in

Lebanon's affairs, but it is an argument to which this thesis will return in evaluating the underlying causes of conflict within the Lebanese arena.

Other observers, including journalist Nicholas Blandford and much of the pro-

Independence Intifada Lebanese milieu, identify Rafiq Hariri as a uniquely dynamic figure in post-civil war Lebanon, and suggest that Lebanon's current crisis grows from failures in leadership since the former prime minister's death. Though a loyal ally to

Damascus for more than a decade, this argument suggests, Hariri turned strongly against

Syrian interference late in his career. In the final months of his life, Hariri gravitated towards the anti-Syrian opposition, and he began negotiating an unprecedented electoral alliance that included Druze, Christian and Sunni opposition MPs.

With his sudden death, Rafiq Hariri became a symbol for the popular uprising in

Lebanon. Lost in the euphoria of March 14~~and the rapid Syrian withdrawal, however, was the fact that Lebanon would be recovering from nearly three decades of foreign domination without the help of its most important leader. Hariri, the argument follows, was the most popular politician in the country, as the cross-sectarian reaction to his death

4 Noureddine, Sateh and Laurie King-Irani. "Elections Pose Lebanon's Old Questions Anew," Middle East Report, May 31, 2005,http://www.merip.org/mero/mero05310S.htrnl made clear. And he enjoyed strong relationships with other confessional leaders-most notably Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah. As Blandford has noted, a tacit agreement between the men that Hizbullah would maintain its weapons while remaining tactically restrained perished with Rafiq Hariri. Hariri's domestic clout, leverage in foreign capitals and hard-earned trust had provided the foundation necessary for such an agreement. No March 14~l'leader emerged as a similarly reliable negotiating partner, and some within the movement-notably Walid Jumblatteschewed compromise with their political rivals and adopted positions openly hostile to Hizbullah. A February 9th,2006 editorial in Beirut's English-language newspaper, the Daily Star, provides the essence of this argument:

When the majority came to power, many had hoped that they would carry the late Hariri's legacy forward. Hariri was a man of action who worked tirelessly for the good of his country's citizens. But Jumblatt, Future Movement leader Saad Hariri, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea have not yet taken action to improve the situation in the country.5

Though widely held, this perspective elevates Rafiq Hariri's premiership in a manner not justified by his actual political record. Hariri may have been more personally dynamic than any of March 14'"'s leaders, but he shared many of their weaknesses, and there is no reason to believe that he would have proven any more successful in navigating entry into the post-Syrian era.

Most observers view Lebanon's political stalemate and subsequent crisis as the result of international meddling. The simplest of these explanations focuses attention on

Syria. Ultimate power in Lebanon lay in Damascus during the fifteen years following the civil war, and many prominent voices-particularly prior to the outbreak of war with

' "The Aoun-Nasrallah initiative is a wake up call for March 14 forces," The Daily Star, February 9,2006, http:/lwww.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition~ID=lO&article-ID=22087&categPid=l7 Israel in July-argue that Lebanon's continuing difficulties are the legacy of a crippling

Syrian occupation that lives on in the form of intimidation and assassination. Speaking in

September 2006, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Beirut Daily Star editor- in-chief Jamil Mroue attributed the current government's difficulties to the fact that Syria had not allowed Lebanon to rebuild and reform the institutions of state following the civil war. 6 Writing the day after the fateful July kidnappings, Robert Fisk extended the argument, holding Damascus responsible for Hizbullah's actions: "Fouad Siniora.. .may have thought he was running the country but it is President Bashar Assad in Damascus who can still bring life or death" to ~ebanon.~

Other observers point to Lebanon's vulnerability to foreign influence itself, rather than assign blame to a specific outside force. In what has emerged as the most popular explanation for Lebanon's difficulties, the country is portrayed as the unfortunate victim of a larger struggle. Writing in the Independent, Charles Glass comments that "Lebanon is one piece on a chess board - and its fate cannot be decided in isolation from the rest.

Syrian and Israeli policies have more impact than the decisions of Lebanon's elected

~eaders."~Other observers paint a more global picture. Lebanon, whose small size, deep divisions, and conflicted identity doomed it to serve as an arena for the Arab,-Israeli conflict during its fifteen year civil war, now finds itself as the field for a larger tug-of- war between two international axes. The United States and France, along with the Saudi regime, provide support and apply pressure to their allies in the March 14~~movement,

6 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "Conference Keynotes: Lebanon, Before and After the Israel-Hizballah War," September 16,2006, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateCO7.php?CID=310. Fisk, Robert. "What I am watchmg in Lebanon each day is an outrage," The Independent, July 15,2006, http://news.independent.co.uk/world/fisWiclel178636.ece. Glass, Charles. "Another casualty of the Syrian-Israeli war," The Independent, November 23,2006, http://comment.independent.co.ukicommentators/aicle200744 1.ece. pulling West in the name of democracy. The rejectionist axis of Syria, Iran and their allies in Hizbullah pull back in the name of Palestine and freedom from American imperialism, mocking March 14"' as a pawn of the US ambassador in Beirut. From this perspective, Hizbullah's efforts to weaken or overthrow March 14" are a hnction of Iran and Syria's increasing power vis a vis the United States.

While acknowledging the international nature of the struggle, many adherents to the "playing field" perspective assign blame specifically to the Damascus-Tehran axis.

Druze leader Walid Jumblatt has been a particularly vociferous advocate of this point of view, frequently attacking Hizbullah as an agent of Iranian and Syrian interest. Jurnblatt has found an enthusiastic audience in Washington, and his views are echoed by the Bush administration and some of its intellectual allies. In November 2006, White House spokesman Tony Snow stated that the administration was growing "increasingly concerned by mounting evidence that the Syrian and Iranian governments, Hezbollah, and their Lebanese allies are preparing plans to topple Lebanon's democratically-elected goven~rnent."9As with the arguments blaming Syria specifically or international competition in general, however, these charges understate the agency of Lebanese political actors on both sides of the March divide. Jumblatt, for instance, may complain of a difficult regional situation, but his own actions and statements-particularly a

January 2006 interview with the Washington Post in which he suggested the White

House pursue regime change in Syria-have contributed greatly to the tension in

~eirut." Moreover, as this thesis argues in chapter five, with its massive regional

9 "US issues Lebanon 'plot' warning," BBC News, November 1,2006, http:/lnews.bbc.co.uk/2/hiiamericas/6107224.stm. 'O Blanford, Nicholas. Killing Mr Lebanon: The Assassination of RaJik Hariri and its Impact on the Middle East, (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2006), 186. appeal, the unwavering support of the Shia community in Lebanon, and the veapons already under its operational control, Hizbullah cannot be accurately described as an

Iranian and Syrian client. The alliance is more of a partnership than a patron-client relationship, particularly since withdrawing from Lebanon has weakened Syria's position on the rejectionist axis.

Finally, a few commentators account for Hizbullah's agency. Michael Young, the opinions editor at the Daily Star who has published articles in the New York Times and

Wall Street Journal, argues that "a combination of traditional sectarian tensions, audacious political opportunism and the sheer unmovable force of Hezbollah's state within a state [contributed] to defeating the hopes of the Independence ~ntifada.""

Central to this explanation is Hizbullah's unrivaled role in the Shia commun~ty;the Shia benefited from Syria's support of the resistance and the extensive patronage Damascus provided to both Hizbullah and Arnal. Historically, the Shia have also felt slighted by

Christian and Sunni hegemony in Lebanon. In this context, Hizbullah's continuing support of Syria is not only an effort to defend its ally, but also a reflection of a prevailing view among its core constituency.

Moreover, with Syria no longer in control in Beirut, Hizbullah found itself with disproportionately low leverage in government just as international and domestic forces began to increase pressure on the party to disarm. Hizbullah's weapons serve as a pillar of its popular and financial support, and the party thus found it necessary to strengthen itself vis a vis the anti-Syrian movement so as to better protect its arms. By obstructing

"national dialog" talks, and later through the kidnapping operation on July 12~"'Nasrallah ground Lebanese government to a halt, strengthening his party's position alongside that

'' Young, Michael. "Hezbollah's Other War," The New Yol-k Times, August 13,2006, web.lexis-nexis.com.

10 of its allies. This argument is correct in identifying Hizbullah as the leading player in post-withdrawal Lebanon, but it fails to address role of the Lebanese system itself in encouraging political confrontation.

****

This thesis will examine the failure of the Independence Intifada and analyze the causes of Lebanon's uneasy post-withdrawal stalemate. In so doing, this thesis will evaluate the structure of the Lebanese political system and determine to what extent, if at all, Lebanon's three leading political actors since the civil war-Rafiq Hariri, the March

14~~movement, and Hizbullah-have succeeded in transcending the fundamental weaknesses of that system: sectarianism and external interference. Chapter Two will provide an overview of the Lebanese system, and demonstrate how these two malign mainstays of Lebanese politics have served as the most potent contributors to the country's repeated slides toward civil strife. Chapter Two will also define sectarianism and external interference within the context of the Lebanese arena, and outline ways in which political actors could succeed in transcending these weaknesses of the system.

Chapters Three, Four, and Five will discuss Rafiq Hariri, March 14th,and Hizbullah, respectively, and determine whether any actor has made progress in overcoming either of the traditional pitfalls of Lebanese governance. Taken together, this evaluation will determine whether or not the Lebanese have effected fundamental change in their political system since the Span withdrawal and why, in either case, the enthusiasm of spring 2005 gave way so quickly to fear of civil war. Ultimately, as the following pages will demonstrate, none of the three actors has succeeded in reducing the potency of the two issues that have plagued Lebanese governance since independence, sectarianism and external interference. Rafiq Hariri' s name became associated after his death with the prospect of independence and cross- confessional cooperation. As prime minister, however, the billionaire derived his power from Saudi, Syrian and Western supporters, while adopting policies that, however unintentionally, served to widen the rift between the country's Sunni and Shia communities.

In the wake of Hariri's assassination, March 14throlled into the first post- withdrawal elections as the most promising multi-confessional alliance in Lebanese history. However, the movement made no progress in extending its popular base to the

Shia community, and its leadership's self-interested electoral maneuvering cost March

14thmuch of its Christian support, paving the way for popular Maronite General Michel

Aoun's alliance with Hizbullah. Meanwhile, March 14"'s increasingly close cooperation with Washington added to growing international pressure on Hizbullah, encouraging the

Shia party to act aggressively in defense of its status as armed resistance.

Hizbullah's efforts to strengthen its role in governance and secure its weapons have been hampered by the organization's own failures to overcome the traditional weaknesses of Lebanese government. Through confronting March 14thand doggedly protecting the interests of its Syrian ally, Hizbullah has enflamed fears among many

Lebanese that its military capabilities and political advances pose a direct threat to the interests of other confessions. Though Hizbullah's unprecedented alliance with Aoun's

Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) provides substantial (if temporary) Christian backing, and its victory in the July War earned the Shia party a brief rise in cross-confessional popularity, Hizbullah has done little to win meaningful Sunni (or Druze) support. This failure has ensured that the sectarian rift that widened under Rafiq Hariri now serves as the fundamental political divide in Lebanon. Indeed, Hizbullah's use of the FPM as non-

Shia political cover for its aggressive domestic strategy has ushered Lebanon to the brink of a civil war whose sectarian fault line would at once reflect and exacerbate the growing regional tension between Sunnis and Shiites.

Though Hizbullah stands out as the most dynamic player in post-withdrawal

Lebanon, the failure of each actor to diminish the roles of sectarianism and external interference in Lebanese politics has contributed to the country's latest slide toward civil strife. After the Independence Intifada, with Syria out but the basic structure of the arena unchanged, March 14'~and Hizbullah clashed according to the traditional rules of the

Lebanese game, leading to the unstable deadlock that now prevails. In the final analysis, however, one question remains: to what extent should individual failures of leadership be held responsible for the long-standing problems of sectarianism and foreign interference in Lebanese affairs? In conclusion, this thesis will argue that the structure of the

Lebanese system, through providing powerful incentives for actors to develop confessional power bases and seek external support, serves as the fundamental source of crisis in Lebanon. Chapter One The Lebanese System

Lebanon's colonial history, combustible diversity, and precarious geopolitical position contribute to a political system that has repeatedly fallen victim to intractable stalemate and civil war. This chapter explains the structure of the Lebanese system, and describes how and why this structure and the actors within it have generally failed to provide post-independence Lebanon with stable governance. The chapter concludes with questions that will provide the basis for evaluating the extent to which Rafiq Hariri, the

March 14~~movement, and Hizbullah have each transcended the Lebanese system. In this thesis' final analysis, an examination of each actor's successes and failures in transcending the system will prove crucial in explaining Lebanon's rapid descent into stalemate since the Independence Intifada. As the first half-century of Lebanon's independence demonstrates, the sources of conflict in Lebanon are rooted in sectarianism and foreign interference.

Lebanese governance is based on the unwritten National Pact, a "gentlemen's agreement" reached in 1943 between independent Lebanon's first president and prime minister. At the broadest level, the pact is a compromise of mutual renunciation. The

Christians, led by a Maronite community that had gained power as the darling of French colonial stewardship, promised not to seek protection from the West. The M-uslims, represented in the pact by a Sunni leadership that hoped to regain some of the influence afforded to it under Ottoman rule, agreed that Lebanon would remain independent of Syria and other Arab states.12 In agreeing to the National Pact, Maronite President

Beshara al-Khoury and Sunni Prime Minster Riad Solh at once acknowledged and pledged to work around the conflicting identities of their respective communities, establishing the founding principle upon which Lebanese governance is based.

In seeking to implement their commitment to insulate the national identity and foreign policy from sectarianism, the founders of the National Pact established a political structure based on the principle of confessional compromise. A 1943 amendment to the

Lebanese constitution states that "as a provisional measure, and in keeping with the desire for justice and harmony, the religious communities shall be adequately represented in the civil service and in cabinet, provided that this does not harm the interests of the state."" In practice, this "provisional measure" continues to serve as a pillar of Lebanese governance. As established in the pact and modified in the 1989 Taif Accord that concluded the civil war, positions in governrnent-at the cabinet, legislative, and senior civil service levels-are to be distributed equitably to each of Lebanon's sects, according to their proportion within the national population.'4 The president must be a Maronite

Christian, the prime minister must be Sunni, and the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies

(the Lebanese parliament) must be Shia. Until the Taif Accord, this system was based on the national census of 1932 and favored the Maronites, the largest Christian sect in

Lebanon. The President exercised unrivaled executive power, and parliament was split by a 6:5 ratio of Christians to Muslims. Though the Taif Accord evened this ratio to 1: 1, no census has been taken in Lebanon since 1932, and disagreements over the distribution of

l2 Had, Coexistence in Wartinie Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation, (London: I.B. Taurus & Co Ltd, 1993), 72. l3 ibid l4 U.S. Department of State. "Lebanon: International Religious Freedom Report 2006," September 15, 2006, http://www.state.gov/g/drllrlslirf/2006/71426.htm government power and spoils among the confessions have served as a primazy source of tension in the country since the pact's inception.

Political scientists refer to Lebanon's confession-based system as a

"consociational democracy." As Michael Hudson explains, "consociationalism involves government by a cartel of ethnosectarian elites, which can manage their respective

'flocks7and get along with each other."15 In practice, this involves a form of clientelism; political notables (known as zuama, the plural of zaim) court the support of "key voters,"-generally the heads of families or clans within a politician's respective sect- who can deliver parcels of votes in exchange for access to government jobs and

service^.'^ This tradition is solidified by Lebanon's malleable electoral laws, which allow for gerrymandering to protect established zuama and require citizens to vote in their ancestral hometown. Needless to say, the direct connection between voting habits, sect and patronage in Lebanon has resulted in profoundly corrupt governance. It also, however, ensures that all confessions own a share of state power, and encourages elected representatives to work together in national government so as to secure gains for the clients who compose their respective constituencies. During the two decades following independence, the system experienced periods of relative success, earning Lebanon a reputation as an example of liberal governance and communal cooperation in the Middle

East. However, while the governing notables bargained over local policy and competed for state resources, they generally avoided deeper long-term issues, allowing underlying

l5 Hudson, Michael, "Power-Sharing in Post-Civil War Lebanon," International Negotiation, January 1997, 105, http://fid.galegroup.com. l6 Hanf 79 conflicts concerning foreign policy and the distribution of confessional power to remain unresolved. ' ***

While the Lebanese system showed signs of promise in its early years, tension over the country's inequitable distribution of power and geopolitical alignment led to independent Lebanon's first spurt of violent civil strife. President Khoury and Prime

Minister Riad Solh nlled cooperatively through the 1940's, but Solh's assassination in

1951 and Khoury's clumsy extra-constitutional attempts to augment his own power shook the stability of the nascent order. In 1952, a rebellion of Sunni ministers and a corresponding general strike pushed Khoury out of office. Tensions would continue to rise during the presidency of Khoury's successor, Camille Chamoun, as Muslim opposition to the political status quo grew bolder. An influential polemic, "Muslim

Lebanon Today," captured this frustration, alleging that Christians were no longer the confessional majority, that the president unjustly held the overwhelming share of power, and that Muslims were underrepresented in the civil service.18

It was within this domestic context that Lebanon's leadership found itself in its first foreign policy crisis. As Game1 Abdel Nasser's star rose in region, Chamoun, reflecting broader Christian unease toward the Arab nationalist movement, acted to ally

Lebanon closer to the West. In 1957, Chamoun embraced the Eisenhower Doctrine, which provided American support in resisting leftist subversion, and gerrymandered parliamentary elections to defeat leading Muslim MPs and provide additional support for his foreign policy. In so doing, Chamoun, to borrow the words of Theodor Hanf,

l7 Hudson, "Power-Sharing," 109 Is ~anf115 "offended against the insight [set forth in the National Pact] that a country like Lebanon cannot be governed with the support of only one half of the population."19 Months later, to general Muslim applause and Christian consternation, Nasser declared the creation of the United Arab Republic with Syria. The announcement lit a match to the Lebanese tinderbox, and the country descended into low-level civil war along largely sectarian lines. Chamoun called for and received military support from the United States; the

Americans stayed out of the intra-Lebanese violence, but they did play a discrete role in mediating a resolution to the conflict. All told, the crisis left 2,500 dead and set a precedent for the confession-based foreign policy clashes and external entanglements that were soon to become defining characteristics of the modern Lebanese state. 20

Lebanese leadership responded to the 1958 crisis by strengthening the premiership and reforming the civil service, but this progress did not solve the overarching issues of inequity and disagreement over foreign policy. President Fouad

Chehab committed himself to building an independent civil service with equitable confessional distribution, and he-unlike Chamoun-was careful to choose a prime minister with strong standing in the Sunni community (and thus an independent power base).21 Indeed, under Chehab and his two immediate successors, the influence of the prime minister rose considerably, creating an effective duurnvirate. 22 Progress for Sunni leadership, however, meant little to other, underrepresented, non-Maronite goups. The

Shia-who, according to one credible estimate, had become the largest confessional community by 1973-remained tied to the substantially less powerful parliamentary

-- l9 ibid 118 *' ibid 117 *'ibid 119 22 ibid 9 1 speaker post, and members of Lebanon's fifteen smaller sects-including the Dmze- were (and still are) completely barred from the highest echelon of government.23

Unsurprisingly, leaders within these communities began to agitate for change. In southern

Lebanon, hamMusa al-Sadr organized the Movement of the Deprived, the first mobilization of the Shia masses in Lebanon. Meanwhile, Druze leader Kamal Jurnblatt, among the most influential figures in the country, began advocating for the abolishment of confessional power-allotment. During the civil war, these men and their political offspring-not the traditionally dominant (and relatively affluent) Sunnis-would serve as the backbone of the Lebanese Muslim militia forces.

Only a decade after the eruption of 1958, Lebanon again found itself splitting into opposing sectarian alliances over questions of relative confessional power and foreign policy. This time around, Palestinian resistance (rather than Nasser's pan-Arabism of the

1950's) sewed as the regional source of tension. In 1968, Palestinian guerilla forces began mounting cross-border operations into Israel fiom bases in Lebanon, drawing increasingly agressive Israeli counter-attacks into Lebanese territory. In late December,

Israel responded to a Palestinian hijacking of an El A1 jet by destroying thirteen Middle

East Airlines (Lebanon's national carrier) planes in a commando raid. The action aimed to force Lebanon's government to take responsibility for reigning in the milirias; in practice, however, Israeli incursions encouraged a widening divide between Lebanon's

Christian and Muslim leaders. Christian leaders viewed the Palestinian guerillas as an affront to Lebanese sovereignty and a threat to Maronite hegemony in Lebanon.

Meanwhile, in direct opposition to Christian leadership, Kamal Jumblatt combined support for the Palestinian cause with calls for a new, secular Lebanese order. He

23 ibid 87 established the Lebanese National Movement, a broad coalition of predominantly

Muslim, mostly leftist parties with strong relationships with the ~alestinians.~~In so doing, Jumblatt forced the hand of Sunni notables, who could not afford to be outflanked in support of a Palestinian cause with which most of their constituents strongly

The sectarian rift widened as Palestinian forces in Lebanon grew stronger, leaving a pit of division that would play host to fourteen years of bloody civil war. fight-wing

Christian parties formed militias to confront the guerillas, leading to clashes between

Christians and Palestinians in 1969, 1973 and 1975. The third period of clashes proved most fateful; the failure of a national political dialogue that ensued led to a descent into

Eull confrontation between Lebanese militias.26 The years of war that followed witnessed shocking sectarian massacres; rapidly shifting alliances; intra-confessional violence; a massive Israeli invasion; and a Syrian occupation that supported diametrically opposed factions as the conflict wore on, during which time Damascus ultimately emerged as the country's powerbroker.

For most of the war, however, the fault that first emerged between Christian leaders and Jumblatt served as the fundamental dividing line between Lebanese. Not for the first or last time in Lebanon, this division was strengthened by an array of foreign powers. Christians, led at the political level by the right-wing Kata'ib (Phalange) party and on the street by the Lebanese Forces militia coalition, sought to protect their sectarian hegemony in Lebanon. These forces identified with the West, and enlisted Israeli and, to a far lesser and briefer extent, American support in seeking to protect their vision of

" ibid 188 " ibid 172 " ibid 208 Maronite-led Lebanon. Meanwhile, Lebanese Muslim forces-led by Jumblatt's well- armed Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), the Shia Arnal and (after 1982) Hizbullah militias, and smaller Sunni and leftist militias-fought for greater influence in the country, allied themselves with the Palestinians, and received support from Arab powers and (in Hizbullah's case) Iran. The conflict raged in fits and starts until the November

1989 signing of the Taif Accord, in which the living remnants of parliament (elected in

1972) agreed to a cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a newly-balanced confessional democracy under initial Syrian stewardship. Within a year, fighting concluded as the Syrian military joined Maronite militiamen to defeat forces under the command of Maronite General Michel Aoun.

The Taif Accord paid lip service to the goal of eliminating sectarianism fi-om politics, but ultimately the document paved the way for a Syrian hegemony that played upon confessional divisions to its own advantage. The agreement increased the powers of the prime minister and speaker relative to the president, creating what formally amounted to a troika. In practice, however, the Sunni, Shia and Druze leaderships benefited from Syrian tutelage at the expense of the Maronites, many of whose most prominent figures were excluded from Meanwhile, Damascus reaped economic benefits and enjoyed additional leverage vis a vis Israel through dominating its neighbor; during its stewardship, the Syrian regime thus pursued a balance of stability and sectarian tension in Lebanon that allowed it to justify its occupation without risking the resumption of violent strife. Lebanon's confessional-clientelist system provided an ideal playing field for such a strategy. As the ultimate powerbroker in Lebanon, Syria

27 Hudson, Michael. "Lebanon after Taif: Another Reform Opportunity lost?" Arab Studies Quarterly, Winter, 1999, http:/lfind.galegroup.com. rewarded its Lebanese clients with influential positions in Beirut in exchange for their loyalty. In the traditional notables, ascendant businessmen, and newly powerful warlords who composed the post-war Lebanese political scene, Damascus found no shortage of politicians willing to cooperate. Each key Syrian ally gained a lucrative channel for patronage: Rafiq Hariri, as the leading Sunni figure, took control of the Committee on

Development and Reconstruction; Arnal leader Nabih Berri ran the Council for the

South; and Walid Jumblatt-heir to Kamal, who was assassinated in 1977-gained control of the Fund for Displaced

The Syrian regime strengthened its hand through an effective game of divide-and- conquer. Damascus took advantage of divisions within Maronite leadership that had developed during the civil war, further weakening the traditionally most powerful sect.

The regime developed a close relationship with Amal and Hizbullah, supporting the latter's insurgency against Israel and strengthening the historically underrepresented Shia within the Lebanese system. Both Hafiz al-Assad and his son, Bashar, maneuvered to ensure that no single politician-particularly Hariri, who first became prime minister in

1992-gained unrivaled influence in Beirut. Syria and it allies extended their domination through the media and civil society, leaving the political field "to the 'non-civil' (or at best semi-civil) institutions of religion, sect, clan, patriarchy, and plutocracy."29

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia (through the al-Saud regime's close relationship with Hariri) and Iran (through its support of Hizbullah) expanded their influence within Lebanon, strengthening a collective role of external actors that had grown substantially during the

28 ibid 29 ibid civil war. In sum, Syrian hegemony provided peace at the expense of sovereignty, while ensuring that sectarian tensions remained at a low boil. ***

Through the six decades that followed the establishment of the National Pact,

Lebanon could not overcome the pair of fundamental weaknesses in its political system: sectarianism and external alliances. Together, these factors have stunted Lebanon's development and contributed toward two civil wars, one brief and one devastating; if political forces are ever to transcend the Lebanese system and build a stronger Lebanon, they will have to make progress in resolving each issue. Thus, in evaluating Lebanon's most recent descent toward civil strife, this paper will examine how Rafiq Hariri, the

March 14" movement, and Hizbullah each addressed these traditional shortcomings of

Lebanese governance.

Sectarianism, according to Princeton University's WordNet dictionary, is "a narrow-mind adherence to a particular sect or party or den~mination."'~In the Lebanese political context, it is necessary to distinguish between sectarianism and consociationalism, the system of government that seeks to protect confessional interests by distributing the powers of state among a country's sects. Consociationalism itself is not necessarily the problem. If Lebanon's leaders could cooperate in the national interest, the fact that they were elected in part to represent the interests of their respective sects would not constitute a problem. Rather than fostering peaceful accommodation, however, Lebanese consociational government has been violently afflicted by the

"narrow-minded adherence" to confessional loyalties in the nation's politics. While

30 "WordNet Search - 3.0" WorclNet:An Electronic Lexical Database, Princeton University, h~:llwordnet.princeton.eddperl/webwn?s=sectarianism differences of policy and ideology have contributed toward political tension in Lebanon, sect serves as the salient line of division in national politics, and sectarianism mobilizes the popular sentiment that perpetuates political stalemates and fuels civil wars.

Two mainstays of Lebanese political practice combine to keep sectarianism at the core of national governance: single-confession electoral bases, and alliances struck at the expense of one or more of the three largest sects. The first of these factors ensures that no leader is responsible to citizens outside his respective sect. Politicians and political parties build their bases on sectarian and clientelist loyalties, and broker ad hoc alliances with other politicians to win whatever electoral support they need from outside their confessional community. h theory, a consociational system could compensate for this lack of incentive to appeal to broad electoral audiences. In Lebanon, however, the practice of limited coalitions among confessional leaders prevents politicians from working together effectively.

Exclusive strategic alliances between two or more confessional leaderships that come at the expense of other sects have defined Lebanese governance since independence. The National Pact cemented Maronite and Sunni power at the expense of the Shia, Druze, and smaller sects; Kamal Jumblatt united Muslim parties behind a political platform that most Christians viewed as anathema; and under Syrian stewardship, long-overdue increases in Muslim power were accompanied by unbalanced

Syrian action to limit Maronite influence. All of these alliances involved motivating factors beyond confessional interest, but in each case the exclusion of one or more of the leading confessions had the effect of strengthening sect as the fundamental dividing line in national politics. As tensions rise, the fact that one alliance is (for example) leftist while another leans to the right will prove less of a mobilizing factor than the fact that the first is Muslim while the other is Chnstian. In Lebanon, the confluence of sect and patronage is more powerful than ideology. In order to replace religious affiliation with a less potent set of political identifiers, leaders must either extend their support bases outside their individual communities, or build political coalitions with meaningful representation from each leading sect.

For Hariri, March 14~~and Hizbullah, success in addressing either of these elements of sectarianism would indicate progress in transcending the Lebanese system.

In evaluating each actor, two general questions will thus prove helpful. At the electoral level, to what extent did each actor succeed in winning support from outside its confessional base? On the policy level, to what extent did each actor work cooperatively with leaders from across the confessional spectrum? Reducing the role of sect as a political fault line would prove essential in an effort to improve or reshape Lebanese governance-particularly since sectarianism is closely linked to the second source of the country's instability, the role of external actors in domestic politics.

In seeking to strengthen their domestic political weight, Lebanese leaders have repeatedly forged competing alliances with foreign powers. At the root of this problem sits the unresolved issue of identity at the core of the National Pact: whether Lebanon should lean toward the West or remain firmly grounded in the Arab Muslim world (an ambiguous construction that, to some, includes post-Islamic Revolution Iran). This question rested near the heart of both the 1958 civil violence and the country's long civil war and, in tandem with sectarian alliances, it has encouraged in Lebanese actors the tendency to internationalize their disagreements. In 1958, President Chamoun requested American military assistance to defend against what he perceived as the growing regional threat of Nasser's pan-Arabism. Little more than a decade later, Jumblatt and other

Muslim leaders began building ties with Palestinian guerillas, thus strengthening their collective hand vis a vis the Maronites. Chstian leaders responded to the coalition by seeking support form Israel and, at times, Syria; meanwhile, Muslim and leftist parties gained further backing from Libya, Iraq, Iran and, at times, Syria as well. Time and again, Lebanese parties have sought external support to counter opposing alliances and break political or military stalemate. Often this support has come from ideological allies, while in other cases it has simply flowed from whom ever was willing to provide it.

Almost always, however, this external support has served to exacerbate existing tensions and discourage compromise, as foreign powers maneuver to pursue their own opposing interests in Lebanese affairs. If Lebanon is ever to coalesce as a truly sovereign nation, its leaders will have to address questions of identity and policy without growing beholden to external allies.

For Hariri, March 14~~and Hizbullah, progress in restricting the role of foreign meddling could take one of two forms: the encouragement of a national foreign policy that embodies the country's blend of identities, or, less ambitiously, a combination of accepting the country's divisions over identity while refusing deep external support.

Regarding the first form of progress, did Hariri, March 14'~or Hizbullah develop relations (or the lack thereof) with the United States, France, Israel, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran in a manner tolerable to Lebanese from across the confessional spectrum? Or, regarding the second form, did any of the three actors manage to steer attention away from foreign policy while developing political legitimacy and a domestic program that did not depend upon controversial external backing? Movement on either front would mark a success in protecting Lebanon from the vicious cycle of domestic fmstration and foreign intervention that renders effective governance nearly impossible.

Issues of sectarianism and external alliances have grown more explosive for

Lebanon in the post-September 11"' regional context, but avoiding divisions like those of

1958 and 1975 is crucial to steering the country clear of civil strife. So long as Lebanese politicians depend on external support and fail to cooperate broadly across confessional lines, Lebanon will forever remain precariously near to the precipice of sectarian stalemate and, ultimately, civil war. In the three chapters that follow, this paper will examine how Rafiq Hariri, the March 14~~movement, and Hizbullah acted within the

Lebanese system, and discuss the extent to which each succeeded in transcending the inherent weaknesses that have crippled the Lebanese system since the National Pact. Chapter Two

Rafiq Hariri

In life and in death, Rafiq Hariri has stood at the center of post-civil war politics in Lebanon. Hariri served as prime minister for ten years between 1992 and 2004 and as the catalyst, symbol and rallying cry of the March 14"' movement after his death; in evaluating all that has happened in Lebanon since the spring of 2005, an understanding of

Hariri's legacy will thus prove essential. In discussing the prime minister's career, this chapter examines the extent to which Hariri himself succeeded in transcending the

Lebanese tradition of sectarianism and dependence on foreign support, and in so doing provides the background and context that will prove necessary in examining March 14~~

and Hizbullah. As the following pages demonstrate, Hariri as prime minister was not nearly as independent or unifying a figure as his posthumous image would suggest.

Rafiq Hariri's political career was born of his relationship with the Saudi regime.

Hariri moved to Saudi Arabia in 1964, searching-like countless Lebanese before and

after him-for better paying work in the oil-rich Gulf. Over the course of the next twenty

years, he developed deep relations with the Saudi royal family, amassed a multi-billion

dollar fortune as a construction mogul, and won Saudi citizenship. 31 Hariri used his

wealth and royal support to propel himself into the war-tattered Lebanese political arena.

Saudi King Fahd appointed the construction mogul as his envoy to Lebanon, and Hariri-

who, by this point, had already developed a scale model of his reconstruction plan for

central Beirut-immediately began establishing relationships with Lebanese and Syrian

leaders across the sectarian and political spectrums. From 1983 until the signing of the

31 Blandford 17-25 Taif accord in 1989, Hariri sewed as the point man for the continuing Saudi effort to mediate an end to the civil war.32

In shuttling across the Lebanese and front lines and between international capitals,

Hariri developed a modus operandi that would serve him well throughout his political career. Hariri utilized his Saudi support and personal fortune in establishing strong working relationships with the warring militia leaders and cultivated valuable alliances with key figures in the Syrian regime. As Elie Salem, the Lebanese foreign minister under President Amine Gemayel, recalls:

When Hariri was talking it was King Fahd talking. He would come up with ideas that were very forceful and say that this is what King Fahd wants. And what Fahd wants is what Hariri tells him.. .Hariri was a catalyst in Lebanese politics. He befriended everybody, through me Gemeyel, Berri, Jumblatt. He was very close to the Syrians. He was always playing the role of conciliator to bring consensus.33

These friendships, however, did not come cheap. As Abdoullah Bouhabib, Lebanon's ambassador to Washington during the early 19807s,explains, to buy into the upper echelon of Lebanese power, "you had to pay Berri, Jumblatt, the Lebanese Forces, everybody. Hariri couldn't come to Lebanon without paying everyone."34 With his own billions and funding from King Fahd at his disposal, Hariri used money as a key enticement to draw militia leaders to the negotiating table. The future prime minister also attempted to win Hafez al-Assad's support through constructing him a new palace, and paid a network of informants to maintain what Amine Gemayel later referred to as "a one man mukhabarat."'"ariri's well-funded mediation efforts may have helped pave the way for the Taif Accord; indeed, much of the agreement is reportedly based on a

32 ibid 25-27 33 Quoted in Blandford 28 34 Quoted in Blandord 32 35 Quoted in Blandford 3 1 document that Hariri helped draft in 1987.~~It is important to note, however, that Hariri repeatedly provided financial incentives to militia leaders to reach agreements that generally broke down within weeks. With the agreements no longer relevant, it follows, militias could use the money that Hariri had given them to support their continuing military action. This practice led future political foes, including Prime Minister Salem

Hoss, to accuse Hariri of funding rival militias for his own eventual financial benefit.

Hariri's Vision for Lebanon

As prime minister, Rafiq Hariri worked within the Lebanese political system in an ambitious effort to reconstruct central Beirut and transform the Lebanese economy. With the country struggling to regain its feet after the civil war, Hafez al-Assad welcomed

Hariri to the premiership in 1992, seeing the billionaire's Saudi backing and international business ties as assets in the effort to revamp the Lebanese economy. Prior to the outbreak of civil war, Lebanon's regional dominance of the service sector-banking in particular-earned it a reputation as "the Switzerland of the Middle East." Hariri saw a return to that regional role as the key to Lebanon's post-war recovery, and he initially focused his energy as prime mister into stabilizing the national currency (Lebanon's dangerously high inflation rate plummeted within months of Hariri's taking office) and establishing the inhastructure necessary to rejuvenate the banking industry.37 Though he owed his premiership to Damascus and cooperated with the Assad regime throughout most of his political career, Hariri saw Lebanon's salvation in a free and open (though not necessarily transparent) market.

36 Blandford 43 37 Denouex, Guilan and Robert Springborg, "Hariri's Lebanon: Singapore of the Middle East or Sanaa of the Levant?" Middle East Policy, October 1998, http:llfind.galegroup.com. Hariri envisioned a renewed downtown Beirut as both a symbol of the country's rebirth and the foundation of Lebanon's financial sector. His government, however- through the Council for the Development and Reconstruction of Lebanon, which the Taif

Accord effectively handed to the prime minister-awarded construction rights for the district to Solidere, a company in which Hariri himself controlled the major interest.38

Hariri dismissed criticism of this obvious conflict of interest, and defended his focus on the financial district-rather than the poor, primarily Shia areas south of the capital-by arguing that wealth created downtown would inevitably trickle down to the less fortunate masses. 39 Within a few years, Solidere had restored much of downtown in irnpressive (if somewhat soulless) fashion, and investment poured in-primarily from Saud.i Arabia-to build extravagant hotels that once again attracted wealthy businessmen and royalty from the Gulf. The extensive reconstruction, however, plunged Lebanon from $2 billion in debt in 1992 to $1 5 billion-more than 100% of GDP-by 1998.40 By some accounts,

Hariri had banked his ambitious programs on the assumption that the promising peace processes-beginning with the Madrid talks in 1991-would result in a regional settlement, which in turn would encourage international and expatriate investment in

Taken together, Hariri's mediation efforts, economic policy and reco~istruction planning demonstrate an effort to transcend the historic Lebanese divide between Muslim and Christian, East and West. The Saudi-brokered, Hariri-influenced Taif Accord

38 ibid 39 Fisk, Robert. "Please spare me the word 'terrorist," The Independenf, February 3,2007, http:/lnews.independent.co.uMworld/fisWarticle221 1576.ece 40 Denouex and Springborg 4' Blandford 47; Norton, Augustus Richard. "Lebanon's Malaise: Lebanon's poor economy and its relations w~thSyria," Survival,Winter 2001, http:/lfmd.galegroup.com. acknowledges in its opening section the territorial integrity of Lebanon, its fundamentally

Arab nature, and the country's role as a "final homeland for all its citizens."42 These emphases touched on core identity issues that had contributed toward the civil war, including Muslim concerns over Christian separatism and ties to the West, and Christian wariness regarding Muslim and leftist calls for pan-Arab (or Greater Syrian) union. As

Sami Ofeish notes, the strong support for Taif among Lebanese Muslim leaders suggested that "the new Muslim bourgeoisie (like Rafiq al-Hariri and Nabih Berri) were openly signaling their acceptance and advancement of a "Lebanese nation," a concept that the Muslim middle class had historically rejected.43

Hariri's efforts to transcend sectarianism reflected his own personality and biography. With deep ties to the Saudi regime, strong allies in Damascus, a close friend in Jacques Chirac, and a healthy relationship with Washington, Hariri did not view the world with the sectarian or rigid ideological mindset to which many of Lebanon's other politicians and militia leaders have historically fallen sway. Hariri ran his fief in government-the economic sector-as he did his businesses. The Saudi citizen turned a blind eye to corruption and routinely circumvented other government institutions in executing his policies. Unusually for a Lebanese politician, however, Hariri also appointed top advisors and upper-echelon government managers from across the confessional spectrum.44 As Lebanese professor Tala1 Nizameddin explains, "whether it was the opening of McDonald's restaurants.. .or promoting Lebanon to the West as a

42 "A1 Takff Agreement," The Daily Star, htip:/lwww.dailystar.com.lb/researcha~id=54. 43 Ofeish, Sami. "Lebanon's Second Republic: Secular Talk, Sectarian Application," Arab Studies Quarterly, Winter 1999, htip:llfind.galegroup.com. 44 ibid tolerant tourist destination in the Middle East, the Hariri government relegated politics and religion to a position subservient to economic prosperity."45

In implementing policy, however, Hariri's vision of a prosperous, united Lebanon was belied by his own dependence on foreign support, lack of concern for the disenfranchised, and willingness to use sectarianism for tactical political aims. As the rest of this chapter will demonstrate, the heroic image of Rafiq Hariri that has prevailed in much of Lebanon and the West since the premier's death may reflect the premier's personal vision, but does not do justice to the decidedly mixed legacy of his actual leadership.

Working within the System: External Support, Meddling, and Profiteering

With his close, often contradictory relations with foreign powers, Rafiq Hariri embodied the Lebanese system's dependence on external support. Hariri owed his wealth to the opportunities provided by the Saudi royals, and he continued to rely on

Saudi investment and clout in engineering his political ascendancy in Lebanon. Hafez al-

Assad may have recognized Hariri7spersonal potential to revive the Lebanese economy, but the deal elevating Hariri to the premiership in 1992 was sealed by a Saudi promise of official state-to-state aid to the Syrian regime.46Once Hariri took office, he based his reconstruction plans, currency stabilization, and economic liberalization policies on a foundation of Saudi support. The House of Saud stood strongly behind Harilri7s economic policies, providing an effective loan guarantee that strengthened the financial sector and encouraged investment. Saudi Arabia provided "an economic safety net for

45 Nizameddin, Tilal. "The Political Economy of Lebanon Under Rafiq Hariri: an Interpretation," The Middle East Journal, Winter 2006, http://find.galegroup.com. 46 ibid Lebanon's government, as highlighted by the Kingdom's $700 million aid package at the

Paris I1 conference" in 2002." Saudi citizens also invested heavily in Hariri's development of central ~eirut.~~Most of this support remained tied to Hariri personally; during Hariri's brief exile in parliamentary opposition (1998-2000), Saudi investment slowed and the Lebanese government plunged further into debt.

Hariri used his Saudi ties and personal wealth to curry favor with the ultimate guarantors of his political influence in Lebanon, the power brokers in Damascus. Well before the end of the civil war, Hariri recognized that the Syrian regime would likely play a decisive role in whatever political order ultimately emerged in Lebanon. During the early 19807s,Hariri's construction company, Oger, used Saudi funding to build a new palace for Hafez al-Assad (the Syrian ruler, apparently already satisfied with his current palace, converted the massive new building into a hotel and conference center)." Hariri also developed strong working relationships with Abd' al-Halim Khaddam and Hikmat

Shehabi, two senior Sunni officials in the predominately Alawite Syrian regime. Both

Shehabi, who served as Army chief of staff, and Khaddam, Hafez al-Assad's foreign minister and eventual vice president, controlled key elements of the regime's Lebanese portfolio.50 Hariri also found an ally in Ghazi Kanaan, the Alawite brigadier general who sewed as the head of Syrian intelligence (and thus effective pro-consul) in Lebanon until

2004.~~Hariri reportedly cemented his relationships with Syrian officials through strong financial ties, and upper-echelon regime figures enjoyed major, often shadowy interests

47 Ministry of Finance, Republic of Lebanon, "Paris I1 Conference FAQs," h~:l/www.finance.gov.lblFrequently+Asked+Questions/Ministry+FAQs/Paris+II+Conference+FAQs/. 48 Nizarneddin 49 Blanford 3 1 50 ibid 5' Blanford 203 in key sectors of the Lebanese economy. Hariri appears to have gone to considerable lengths to protect the holdings of his allies in Damascus; during his final term as prime minister, Hariri ground much of Lebanese governance to a halt in resisting President

Emile Lahoud's attempt to nationalize the cellular phone industry. At the time, Khaddam reportedly held a major stake in one of the two companies that controlled the sector.52

Lebanese officials served at the pleasure of Damascus, and Rafiq Hariri's position and personal influence remained dependent on his ties to the Syrian regime. As dynamics within the regime shifted, however, Hariri found his influence curtailed and his role as premier threatened. As Bashar al-Assad prepared to assume power from his ageing father, he began to view Hariri-with his international support and ties to senior figures

(and thus potential rivals) within the regime-as a threat to his own influence in

Lebanon. Bashar took over Khaddam's role as the senior Syrian official in charge of

Lebanon in 1998, and he immediately moved to appoint his loyal Lebanese ally, Army

Commander General Emile Lahoud, to the presidency. Hariri and Lahoud had been embroiled in a bitter rivalry for several years, intensified both by disagreements over the military budget and mutual personal distaste. Lahoud's deep ties to Bashar and the

Syrian heir apparent desire to weaken Khaddam plunged Hariri into a power struggle he could not win. Hariri hoped that the elder Assad would intervene on his behalf, but no such help was forthcoming. Power in Damascus was shifting, and Hafez saw an advantage in allowing his son to install his own allies in Beirut. Furthermore, as a prominent Sunni with phenomenal wealth, international support, and ties to key figures in the old guard, Hariri posed a dual threat to the emerging Syrian regime: he might become difficult to control from Damascus, and he could prove dangerously influential with the

52 Nizameddin Sunni majority in Syria during a vulnerable period for the regime.'' As Lahoud moved to stack the cabinet with prominent Hariri opponents and signaled that he would move to appoint a new premier, Hariri resigned his position.54

Domestic Politics

Though his status as a self-made businessman and his efforts at mediation during the civil war set Hariri apart from the militia leaders and scion of notable families who dominated the Lebanese political scene, the prime minister did not expand his political base beyond the Sunni community. As an architect and ultimate beneficiary of the Taif

Agreement, Hariri could not win the trust of most Christians. The Maronites in particular felt disenfranchised in the post-Taif order, and they viewed Hariri as a Syrian stooge.

Moreover, the Taif Agreement strengthened the prime minister and, to a lesser extent, the parliamentary speaker at the expense of the Maronite president. Whatever this may have accomplished in leveling the consociational playing field, it encouraged the popular perception that each position within the troika served as the direct representation of its respective sectarian community. Within this context, Hariri's frequent, often public jousts with Nabih Berri, the parliameiltary speaker and leader of the Shia Amal party, fed the "frequently suggested notion" that the tension between the two men "was an indicator of the competition over the 'representation' and leadership of Muslims between their two larger respective sectarian comm~nities."'~The fact that Hariri received much of his support from Saudi Arabia deepened suspicions within the Shia community.56

53 Blanford 70 54 Ziade, Mona. "3 1 Reasons why PM threw in the towel," The Daily Star, December 1, 1998, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/a~icle.asp?edition~ID=l&article~ID=34949&categ~id=2. 55 Ofeish 56 Blanford 46 Hariri's reconstruction efforts did little to ingratiate him with most Lebanese. The prime minister's deep financial ties to Solidere represented an obvious conflict of interest, inspiring a popular reticence that was strengthened by the company's bullying tactics obtaining property rights and clearing land downtown. Moreover, the Hariri- controlled Council for Development and Reconstruction poured money into rebuilding

(predominantly Sunni) West Beirut and the (Sunni and Christian-dominated) city center, but put little effort into developing poorer, largely Shia areas in Beirut's southern suburbs

(known as the Dahiya), the Bekaa Valley and southern Lebanon. Nor did Hariri's rebuilding of a highly Westernized downtown reassure the Christian communities, who viewed the colossal new Mohammed al-Amine mosque on Martyr's Square-whose massive blue dome towers over a nearby Maronite cathedral-as evidence of a creeping

Islamization of the

Hariri's narrow-focused reconstruction efforts added to widespread, sectarian- tinged anger concerning his economic policies. Despite Hariri's success in stabilizing the

Lebanese Lira and attracting limited foreign investment, disparities between the country's rich and poor grew conspicuously during the 1990's. Hariri's efforts to attract investment and establish the banking sector as the engine for national economic growth led to a shifting of the tax burden toward lower-income segments of the population. The government substantially lowered tax rates within the top personal and corporate income brackets, while raising duties and fees across the board and imposing a highly unpopular value-added tax.58 Hariri's efforts to privatize, encourage investment and cut public expenditure generally met with international approval, and the prime minister maintained

57 Blanford 45 58 Denoeux and Springborg that wealth accrued at the top of Lebanon's socioeconomic ladder would trickle down;59 nevertheless, the standard of living for most Lebanese declined substantially during his

tenure.

In addition to a general lack of concern for the poor, Hariri's economic policies

were based on an optimistic forecast that proved devastatingly naYve. The regional peace

that Hariri hoped would follow the Oslo accords never arrived, and international

investors remained wary of Lebanese instability. The Israeli Operation Grapes of Wrath

in 1996 proved particularly damaging to Lebanon's infrastructure and reputation with

foreign investors, and Hariri did not shy from implying that Hizbullah's attacks on Israel

were ultimately undermining his policies.60 Moreover, the drains of clientalism and

Syrian stewardship, combined with Hariri's own emphasis on high interest rates to

maintain the strength of the national currency, compounded the debt problems created by

the reconstruction. 6 1 Thus, even as a gleaming downtown arose from the civil war

rubble, ordinary Lebanese-particularly in the rural areas of the North, the Bekaa Valley

and the South-received neither government support nor the advantages of a successful

economy. As Augustus Richard Norton noted in 2001, "Lebanon may have its charms,

but the government has no social conscience and provides no safety net for the poor. One

turns to the family and a variety of sectarian charities for assistance."" 2 the poor and

predominantly-Shia Dahiya, Bekaa Valley and southern Lebanon, Hizbullah moved to fill

the void as the main provider of social services, thus strengthening its already impressive

political position within the Shia community.

59 Nizameddin ibid 6' Blanford 48 62 Norton, "Lebanon's Malaise." The 2000 Election: A Case Study

Hariri's successful campaign to retake the premiership in 2000 embodied the strengths, shortcomings, contradictions and compromises that characterized most of his political career. After being pushed out of his position as prime minister by Emile

Lahoud in 1998, Hariri spent a reported $50-$150 million in support of his own alliance of candidates. In the absence of independent and non-sectarian civil society (particularly media), this money amounted to a one man propaganda machine. Hariri's face gleamed down upon streets all over the country, and his newspaper and television station fought the state-controlled (and thus pro-Lahoud) media in an epic battle of mud slinging.

Salem Hoss, the incumbent PM who had replaced Hariri in 1998, enjoyed the support of

Damascus (and all the unfair play that came with it), but his reelection campaign was hampered by his government's failure to improve on Hariri's economic record and his own personal lack of charisma. Taking advantage of popular Sunni unease with growing

Shia power in Lebanon, Hariri's allies charged that Hoss's tenure had weakened the role of prime minister-and thus, by implied extension, the Sunni community. Hariri, in contrast, succeeded in portraying himself as the "Gamal Abd al-Nasser of Lebanon's

~unnis."" Although the billionaire advertised himself as an economic savior, his pivotal support came primarily from his own confessional community. As Lebanese academic

Nawwaf Kabbara explained in the Lebanese daily an-Nahar following the elections, "the votes [Hariri] got throughout the country were Sunnite votes. His economic program did

63 Matar, Joseph. "The Merchant of Dreams," The Jerusalem Report, October 10,2000, http:liweb.lexis- nexis.com. not make breakthroughs into other sects.. .voters exhibited sectarian and regional insularity."64

Hariri's support, however sectarian, succeeded in overwhelming Syrian attempts to manage the election results through extensive gerrymandering. All 32 candidates

allied with the billionaire won spots in parliament-including 18 of the 19 seats allocated to the various districts of ~eirut.~~Hariri's domination of the Sunni political field proved

especially impressive. Hariri-allied candidates defeated Prime Minister Hoss and MP

Tamrnam Salam-both members of the established Sunni elite--despite the fact that

Damascus had specifically redrawn the districts in Beirut to protect their positions.66

In his efforts to regain the premiership, however, Hariri did not seek to shake the

Damascus-dominated Lebanese political order. Rather, with his personal funding and

aggressive campaign tactics, the billionaire sought merely to amass enough popular and

parliamentary support to compel Damascus to support his re-ascension to the

premiership. Moreover, alongside his electoral efforts, Hariri facilitated $400 million in joint Saudi construction projects in ~yria.~~As the campaign wound to a close, interior

minister (and strong ally to Damascus) Michel Murr dismissed speculation that Hariri

would return to power, commenting that "Even the support of 70 [out of a total of 1281

Parliament members will not be enough to get Hariri the prime ministry slot, because

everyone knows how a prime minister is manufactured in ~ebanon."~'To Murr's

surprise and Lahoud's chagrin, Hariri's electoral wave and Saudi-sponsored quid pro quo

64 "Where do the General Elections Leave Lebanon?" Mideast Mirror, September 11,2000, http:/lweb.lexis-nexis.com. 65 Matar 66 ibid 67 Kifner, John. "Lebanese Surprise: Syria's Man Loses by a Landslide," The New York Times, September 5, 2000, http://web.lexis-nexis.com. 68 Quoted in Kiher, John. "Lebanon Challenger Takes on Syria, Too," The New York Times, September 3, 2000, http://web.lexis-nexis.com provided the necessary combination of pressure and incentive. In October 2000, Hariri returned as prime minister with the understanding that he was to focus his efforts strictly on the economic sector.69

2000-2005: A New Hariri?

Hariri returned as prime minister amid great fanfare within the Sunni community, but his government quickly found itself mired in familiar stalemate. In exchange for

Syria allowing him to retake the premiership, Hariri agreed to include key Lahoud allies within his cabinet. However, rather than foster cooperation between the prime minister and the president, the appointment of pro-Lahoud ministers ensured that the cabinet would reflect the considerable political and personal rifts that had widened between the two men. In the ongoing feud, Bashar al-Assad's regime consistently sided with its loyal

Maronite ally. As Marwan Iskandar, a fonner economic advisor to Hariri, explains, the new Syrian president "did not like Hariri and did not feel indebted to him."70 Under

Bashar, Hariri proved unable to buy the support he had grown accustomed to receiving from Syria, namely from Khaddam and Kanaan but also from Hafez al-Assad himself.

With Hafez dead, Bashar pushed Khaddam to the periphery of the Damascus inner circle, and replaced Kanaan as intelligence chief with Major General Rustom Ghazaleh.

According to pro-Syrian Druze politician Wiam Wahhab, "when Rustom Ghazaleh took over from Kanaan it severed the link between Hariri and his Syrian fi-~ends."~~

Without support from the powerbrokers in Damascus, Hariri could make little progress in implementing his economic policies. Public debt continued to grow (reaching

69 y.~zameddin 'O Iskandar, Manvan. Rajiq Hariri and the Fate ofLebanon (London: Saqi Books, 2006), 107 7 1 Quoted in Blanford 88 $3 1 billion by the end of 2002), and progress slowed in redeveloping downtown. Hariri

and his allies assigned blame to the PM's operational constraints, with some justification.

The breakdown of peace talks between Hafez al-Assad and Israeli PM Ehud Barak once

again scuttled hopes for an influx of foreign investment and movement toward a normalization of political life in Lebanon. So long as Tel Aviv and Damascus remained

at loggerheads, Syria would have little incentive to ease its control of Lebanon and

support for Hizbullah. Despite the continuing conflict with Israel and growing concerns

over potential American action in Iraq, Hariri succeeded in winning $1.3 billion in

foreign aid-most of it from Saudi Arabia and France-at the November 2002 Paris I1

donor conference.

This victory, however, was dampened by President Lahoud's ceaseless efforts to

delay reconstruction downtown and obstruct implementation of the economic reforms

Hariri had promised his foreign economic backers. Throughout Hariri's second tenure,

the government repeatedly descended into ineffectual stalemate as the prime minister, the

president, and their respective allies engaged in public spats. The situation worsened in

April 2003, when the Assad regime restructured Hariri's cabinet, adding pro-Syrian

ministers who would ensure that the government remained tilted strongly toward

~amascus." During May and June 2003, disputes over the official agenda prevented the

government from holding regular meetings.73 Several months later, a clash between

Hariri and Lahoud over the latter's plan to nationalize the cellular phone sector ground

Lebanese governance to a halt for weeks at a time.74

72 Blanford 87 73 ibid 90 7%izameddin After four frustrating years, Hariri finally broke with Damascus after Bashar al-

Assad decision to extend Lahoud's presidency shook the Lebanese arena. For the international community, the extension represented one Syrian strong-arm tactic too many. On the eve of the September 2004 parliamentary vote to approve the constitutional amendment that allowed the extension, the UN Security Council passed

Resolution 1559. Sponsored by the United States and France, the resolution called for an end to Syria's meddling in Lebanon, a full withdrawal of Syrian troops, and the disarmament of all militias in the country-a clear reference to Hizbullah and, to a lesser extent, armed Palestinian factions within the country's refugee camps. The Lebanese parliament-including, under intense Syrian pressure, Rafiq Hariri's bloc-voted in favor of the amendment. However, the combination of the unpopular extension and the intense Western response that accompanied it proved a catalyst in uniting a growing opposition to Syrian hegemony, led by prominent Druze MP Walid Jumblatt and members of the Qomet Shehwan Gathering, an alliance of anti-Syrian Christian figures.

In early December, the emboldened opposition-consisting mostly of Druze and

Christian figures, with limited Sunni representation and virtually no Shia involvement- met in the Bristol Hotel in ~eirut.~"n December 13th,the nascent "Bristol Gathering" released a joint paper calling for an end to interference by the "Syrian and Lebanese intelligence apparatus" in national

Hariri's maneuvering within this broader political context reflected both his frustration with Syrian hegemony and his reluctance to completely alienate himself fiom

Damascus. As prime minister, Hariri had maintained neutrality amid rising calls within

75 Blanford 117 76 Raad, Nada. "Multi-sect but unified opposition declares itself," The Daily Star, December 14, 2005, http:l/www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition~~=l&article~ID=l0982&categ~id=2 the Lebanese political establishment for an end to Syrian domination; amid the controversy of the Lahoud extension, however, he began to roll the dice. According to figures within the Syrian regime, Hariri used his close relationship with President Chirac to secure strong French support for the res~lution.~~Although Hariri's allies generally denied that he played a role in drafting the resolution, one longtime friend notes that

Hariri did use his influence with the French president to "put pressure on Syria not to extend Lahoud's mandate."78

Whatever the extent of his complicity in the resolution, however, Hariri was careful not to burn his ties with Damascus. Hariri's striking success in the 2000 election had forced Syria's hand in allowing him to return as prime minister, and Hariri viewed the upcoming spring 2005 election as an opportunity to win back the power that had steadily flowed to Lahoud. Hariri remained in office for a month to help Damascus withstand the initial diplomatic storm that followed the resolution; Syria finally pushed him from the premiership as the intensity of international pressure diminished, but even then Hariri shied from joining the Druze and Christian-led opposition. Hariri sent trusted associates to the first two meetings of the "Bristol Gathering" and moved to ally himself with the movement in the election, but he stopped short of publicly joining its ranks. 79

Indeed, even as Hariri flirted with the opposition, he held regular secret meetings with Hassan Nasrallah, secretary general of Hizbullah and the most influential pro-Syrian figure in Lebanon. Hariri reportedly assured Nasrallah that his issues with Damascus did not extend to Hizbullah's role in Lebanon, even going so far as to persuade Jacques

Chirac not to support adding Hizbullah to the European Union's list of terrorist

77 Blandford 104 78 Johnny Abdo, quoted in Blanford 104 79 Blanford 108 organi~ations.~~According to Nicholas Blandford, Hariri's emphasis on building his relationship with Nasrallah embodied the Sunni leader's desire to remain on good terms with the Shia community, as well as an attempt at rapprochement with ~ssad.~'Hariri planned to overcome any and every Syrian attempt to prevent his return to the premiership, but he continued to work under the assumption that his political career in

Lebanon would always depend on a healthy relationship with power brokers in

Damascus.

However powerful the effects of his death, in life Rafiq Hariri failed to improve on either of the two fundamental weaknesses of the Lebanese system. Operating under

Syrian hegemony, I-Iariri had no power to design foreign policy and only li~~itedfreedom to broker his own political alliances; nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence with which to find him unsuccessful in both remaining independent of external powers and transcending confessional divisions. On the first count, the verdict is simple: Hariri twice used Saudi funding to help convince Syria to allow him to serve as prime minister, and Saudi aid and investment were instrumental in supporting his economic and reconstruction programs. Hariri could not help the initial fact that his political power depended on Damascus, but his reluctance to join the anti-Syrian opposition toward the end of his life indicates that his tension and ultimate break with Assad had more to do with his desire to win power from Lahoud than any urge to free Lebanon from Syria's embrace. Meanwhile, regarding sectarianism, Hariri never attempted to build a political base outside of his confession. Moreover, Hariri pursued reconstruction and economic programs that strengthened the downtown service sector while showing little concern for

80 Blanford 125 8 1 Blanford 118 underdeveloped Shia regions and the plight of average Lebanese. Such policies alienated the Shia community and allowed Hizbullah to gain political capital (through its own provision of social services) at the expense of the state. After Hariri's death, as his supporters joined the Dmze and Christian opposition to fonn what became known as the

March 14'~movement, this latest legacy of Shia disenfranchisement in Lebanon would prove difficult to overcome. Chapter Four

The March 14" Movement

If Rafiq Hariri's assassins sought to discourage Lebanese leaders from turning against Syria, they could hardly have failed more completely. Though Hariri himself had remained cautious toward the anti-syrian opposition up to the very moment of his death, the Sunni leaders who composed his Future Movement wasted no time in joining with the

Druze and Christians of the Bristol Gathering in condemning Syria's role in the killing.

These men-led, ultimately, by Druze chieftain Walid Jumblatt, former president Arnine

Gemayal, Maronite militia leader Samir Geagea, Fouad Siniora, and Hariri's political heir, Saad-built a coalition that took both its name and legitimacy from the massive anti-Syrian demonstration on March 14~~.As a multi-confessional alliance whose rnison d 'etre was the demand for independence fiom Syria, the March 14"' movement seemed to transcend the Lebanese system by its very existence. The months that followed, however, would demonstrate the resilience of sectarianism and external alliances in

Lebanese politics.

The Valentine's Day bomb that ended Rafiq Hariri's life sent a shockwave through the Lebanese political arena. Four days after the assassination, the opposition called for an "independence uprising," and demanded the resignation of the cabinet and-ultimately-a fill Syrian withdrawal from ~ebanon.~~In the weeks that followed, continuing street demonstrations and intensified international pressure compelled Bashar al-Assad to withdraw the political heavy machinery of his hegemony in Lebanon. On

82 "Pressure grows on Syria to quit Lebanon with new challenge from opposition," Agence France Presse, February 18, 2005, http://web. lexis-nexis.com. February 28", Omar Karami, the Sunni notable that Damascus had appointed to replace

Hariri, resigned his premiership.s3 A week later, Bashar al-Assad announced that Syria's

14,000 troops would redeploy to the Bekaa Valley before eventually withdrawing to the

Syrian-Lebanese border.84 he 500,000-strong, Hizbullah-organized rally on March gth in support of Syria's role in Lebanon may have briefly raised spirits in Damascus; any hope of avoiding the international demand for withdrawal, however, faded when the opposition responded on March 14th with approximately one million demonstrators of its own. By the end of April, the Syrian military had left Lebanon, along with-and perhaps more importantly-Rustom Ghazaleh, head of Syria's intelligence apparatus in

~ebanon.~'Though Emile Lahoud and the head of his Presidential Guard remained in office, most of Syria's top Lebanese allies in the rnukhabamt were dismissed.86Under the leadership of a newly appointed interim cabinet, Lebanon prepared for its first independent election since the outbreak of the civil war.

For all its popular courage and photogenic qualities, the stirring reaction to the assassination of Rafiq Hariri revealed the threatening rift confronting Lebanon in the aftermath of the Syrian withdrawal. As it turned out, the boisterous, hndamentally separate crowds that flooded downtown Beirut on March 8thand March 14~~would come to define the Lebanese political landscape in the following months. The stark demographic differences apparent at the respective demonstrations underscored the emerging fault line-at once sectarian, geopolitical, cultural, and socio-economic-

83 International Crisis Group. "Lebanon: Managing the Gathering Storm," December 5, 2005, http:/lwww.crisisgroup.orgilibraryldocuments/middle~east~north~ahica/arab~israeli~co~ictllebanonl48

-lebanon-managing-the-gathering-storm.pdf, 15. 84 Bassem Mroue, "Syria Will Withdraw to Lebanese Borders," The Independent, March 3,2005, http://web.lexis-nexis.com. 85 Blanford, 163 86 ibid 165 within Lebanon. As a reporter for the Guardian noted, "Armani sweaters and flashy sunglasses were not to be seen" among the overwhelmingly Shia, visibly poorer masses who cursed Israeli and American influence on March 8th.87Meanwhile, images of well- heeled opposition supporters splashed across the Western news. As the Economist wrote shortly after March 14"',

Where demonstrations elsewhere in the Arab world are guided by men with beards, in Beirut the front lines are still being manned by fashion queens with Pekinese dogs wrapped in Lebanon's flag, along with suave bankers accompanied by Sri Lankan maids.88

More foreboding than differences in attire, however, was the apparent causal link between the March gthdemonstration and the sectarian composition of the opposition's popular base. Following the initial cross-confessional outpouring at Hariri's funeral, the anti-Syrian rallies in Martyr's Square had consisted primarily of Christian and Druze demonstrators. On March 14th,however, tens of thousands of Sunnis flocked to join the throngs downtown, and the community has remained the primary pillar of the opposition- cum-government majority ever since. Some of this shift can be attributed to an intensification of effort and organization among opposition leadership in response to the massive pro-Syrian demonstration. The sudden flood of Sunni support for the movement, however, should also be viewed-at least in part-as a reaction to the mobilization of several hundred thousand pro-Syrian Shia into historically Sunni West Beirut.

The 2005 Election

'' Whitaker, Brian. "500,000 mass for Hizbullah," The Guardian, March 9, 2005, http://web.lexis- nexis.com. '' "Fill that vacuum," Tlze Economist, March 26, 2005, http://web.lexis-nexis.com. Sectarianism would continue to rear its head during the political wheeling and dealing that preceded the parliamentary elections later that spring. The constitution stipulated (and the United States and France encouraged) that the election be held by the end of May; this left only weeks for the cabinet to approve an electoral law and for candidates to organize themselves into electoral lists. The 2000 electoral law (written by

Syrian pro-consul Ghazi Kanaan) effectively weakened Christian representation by dividing districts so that a disproportionate number of Christian candidates depended primarily on non-Christian votes to win election. With support from Maronite patriarch

Nasrallah Sfeir, Christian candidates within the opposition lobbied for a new electoral law that would split the electorate into smaller districts, allowing Christian candidates to campaign primarily amongst their co-religionists.89However fair the suggestion, the effort's focus on relative confessional strength and the involvement of the Maronite patriarch-who had been a prominent voice in the Independence Intifada-quickly introduced a tinge of sectarianism into the first post-withdrawal campaign. Inevitably, the tepid non-Christian response would be seen in kind. Key political figures on both sides of the oppositiodpro-Syrian divide-notably Walid Jumblatt and Nabih Berri, leader of the pro-Syrian Amal movement- favored keeping the 2000 law for their own electoral gain, and the Syrian-authored gerrymandering was ultimately chosen as the basis for the 2005 elections.90

Just as the electoral law remained, so too did the Lebanese political practice of ad hoc alliances across ideological lines. With the Syrian army withdrawn, the established politicians who composed the leadership of March 14th abandoned their revolutionary

89 Noureddine and Irani 90 ibid zeal and-in some cases-their cooperation. The return of exiled General Michel Aoun, whose dedicated supporters had participated vociferously in the anti-Syrian demonstrations, stirred nerves within opposition leadership. Aoun held strong anti-

Syrian credentials (he led a "war of liberation" against Syrian forces during the final throes of the civil war) and a reputation for non-sectarian (at least by Lebanese standards) populism. Leading politicians within the March 14th camp viewed him as a threat to their own influence within the movement and-somewhat contradictorily-wondered whether he had cut a deal with Damascus to ensure his safety in Lebanon.

Walid Jumblatt felt particularly wary. As the leading figure of a small confessional community-the Druze make up about 7% of the population-Jurnblatt's substantial domestic power derives from his outspoken leadership and knack for radically shifting his political allegiances at opportune moments. Aoun thus presented a dual challenge. If the general allied himself with March 14th, his presence would erode

Jumblatt's disproportionate influence within a movement that had thus far lacked any single Christian or Sunni leader with both political experience and broad popular appeal.

Alternatively, if Aoun remained outside the March 14th camp, his candidates would prove serious competitors in districts of the Chouf that Jumblatt considered his own stronghold.91

Ever a cunning tactician, Jumblatt responded by convincing Saad Hariri-Rafiq's political heir-to ally his list (which included significant Christian parties, most notably the Lebanese Forces and the Qumet Shehwan coalition) with those of Hizbullah and

Arnal in certain districts. Far from a bridge between the anti-Syrian opposition and the

Shia, the alliance, sometimes referred to as the "quartet agreement," would come to mean

Young, Michael. "Hezbollah's Other War," The New Yol-k Times, August 13, 2006, web.lexis-nexis.com. starkly different things to opposing parties.92 As will be discussed in the next chapter,

Hizbullah would later claim that the agreement traded the Shia parties' electoral support for Jumblatt and Hariri's acceptance of Hizbullah's right to remain armed. For Jumblatt, however, the agreement was simply a means through which to protect his own influence, largely at Michel Aoun's expense. Though the March 14~~-ledcabinet that formed after the elections would officially recognize Hizbullah as the national resistance (rather than a militia that should be disarmed), there is no indication that Jumblatt felt himself bound by the terms of the quartet agreement. Meanwhile, the agreement struck at the popular unity of the anti-Syrian forces. For many Maronites-including Patriarch Sfeir-the agreement served to render most (i.e. non-Aounist) Christian candidates "effectively dependent for their seats on the whims of Hariri, Jumblatt and the Shiite parties."93 The resulting wedge ran deep into the Maronite community, even leading to a spike in support for the universally unpopular Emile Lahoud as Christians chafed at Jumblatt's vociferous demands for the president's re~ignation.~~

Christian unease manifested itself in what became a strikingly sectarian election campaign. The first two round of voting-the election was held on four Sundays in May and June-resulted in predictable clean sweeps of Beirut and the South for the joint lists drawn up by Hariri, Jumblatt, Hassan Nasrallah and Nabih Berri. During the third round, however, voters in the Maronite heartland of Mount Lebanon delivered a striking rebuke to Hariri, Jurnblatt and their Christian allies. In an unexpected landslide, General Aoun's list-which, in a quintessentially Lebanese marriage of convenience, included several

9' Ottaway qtd. in Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal. "In Their Own Words," the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://www.camegieendowment.org/files/saadghorayebhbollahfina.pdf, 2 93 ibid 94 Blandford 169 prominent pro-Syrian politicians-won all fourteen of the region's seats.95 Aoun' s triumph set the stage for a showdown with Saad Hariri in the final round of elections in the north of the country. In a campaign that centered around the Sunni stronghold of

Tripoli, Hariri played to his confessional base, just as Aoun--despite his secular sensibilities-had to Maronites during the third round. Sunni clerics-including, some charge, the Mufti of Tripoli-reportedly used Friday sermons to urge worshipers to vote for Hariri's list.96 ~aririalso allied with less-than-moderate Islamists, going so far as to pay $48,000 in bail for the release of four members of the Dinniyeh Group-which had launched a bloody attempt to form an Islamic mini state in 2000 and whose membership included many al-Qaeda-trained insurgents-in an effort to maximize his list's support within the Sunni community.97 The campaign, according to Robert Fisk, "was regarded by many in Tripoli as an appeal to Muslims rather than the whole electorate." 98 The strategy worked, as candidates on Hariri7slist won every seat contested in the region, providing the March 14th coalition with a parliamentary majority.

Arriving on the heels of the euphoria of the Beirut Spring, the 2005 election revealed the depth of the Lebanese system's foundation. While several prominent pro-

Syrian MPs had lost their seats and prominent anti-syrian figures (notably Aoun and

Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea) had reemerged on the political scene, the new

Lebanese parliament did not represent a radical departure from its predecessors. The voice of the people may have proven instrumental in driving Syria out of Lebanon, but in the election that followed, overwhelming power rested with alliance-builders among the

95 International Crisis Group, "Managing the Gathering Storm," 3. 96 Ibid 4 97 ibid 3 98 Fisk, Robert. "Lebanon Wounded by Personal Ambition," The Independent, June 21,2005, http://web.lexis-nexis.com elite. Voters played into the hands of the zuuama, once again limiting their votes to wholesale endorsements of a particular leader's electoral list. Indeed, according to the

Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, roughly 80 percent of voters submitted their choices without altering the pre-printed candidate lists-meaning, for example, that the overwhelming majority of Sunni voters in the North simply voted for the precise set of candidates chosen by Saad Hariri. Unsurprisingly, the resulting parliament contained many familiar clan leaders and former warlords, but precious few of the younger activists who had emerged during the Independence Intifada. Moreover, Aoun's success in Mount

Lebanon had prevented the March 14th coalition from amassing the two-thirds of parliament necessary to begin any effort to oust Emile Lahoud (and thus his allies in the security apparatus). While candidates claiming the legacy of Rafiq Hariri had won a parliamentary majority (72 of 128 seats) and the opportunity to choose the next prime minister, the electoral success of the HizbullaWAmal alliance (30 seats) and pro-Syrian candidates allied with Michel Aoun (whose coalition won 21 seats) would prove a substantial obstacle to any effort to pull Lebanon further from Syria's embrace.99

The Brief and Ineffectual Era of March 14~~

Having taken the reigns of government, March 14'~faced an arduous road in its efforts to address its two main priorities: the removal of Emile Lahoud, and the establishment of an international court to charge those responsible for Rafiq Hariri's assassination. The cabinet that took office under Fouad Siniora included six Shia ministers loyal to Hizbullah or Amal (among them, for the first time, an acknowledged

99 "Hezbollah joins Lebanon cabinet for fxst time," Agence France Presse, July 19, 2005, http://web.lexis- nexis.com. member of Hizbul1ah)-a balance that, while necessary for legitimacy's sake, rendered coherent government action at Syria's expense particularly difficult. In the months following the government's formation in July 2005, Shia cabinet members would repeatedly boycott cabinet sessions that they deemed hostile to the interests of Syria or

Hizbullah. Indeed, the ultimate resignation of the entire Shia representation in November

2006 would serve as the first major escalation of Hizbullah's post-July War bid to reshape the Lebanese political landscape. Notably, the cabinet Siniora appointed did not include any representatives from Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement. The exclusion reflected a continuation of Jurnblatt and Hariri's strategy of isolating the general;

Jumblatt himself reportedly went several months without direct contact with ~oun.'OO

With its first post-Syrian government in place, the Lebanese political establishment awaited the first UN report on Hariri's killing from German investigator

Detlev Mehlis. For the March 14~"movement in particular, this proved a period of great anticipation. Having failed to win a sufficient share in parliament to pursue their top political priorities and placed in fear for their lives by continuing threats of assassination,

March 14~"leaders hoped the Mehlis report could provide pivotal momentum toward further freeing Lebanon of Syrian meddling.

Mehlis, for his part, did not disappoint. On October 19'" the UN released the report to the international media. Though it stopped short of directly assigning blame, the report emphasized in bold type, the likelihood of Syrian complicity:

There is probable cause to believe that the decision to assassinate former prime Minister Rafik Hariri could not have been taken without the approval of top-Ranked Syrian security officials and could not have been further

'0° ''Shte ministers continue Lebanon cabinet boycott," Agence France Presse, December 22,2005, http:llweb.lexis-nexis.com. organized without the collusion of their counterparts in the Lebanese security sew ice^.'^'

Mehlis did not suggest that Bashar al-Assad had ordered the assassination, but the report did highlight the growing tension between Assad and Hariri. The version of the report provided to the press also named (through Microsoft Word "track changes" that revealed text deleted prior to the final draft) specific senior Lebanese and Syrian officials whom one witness claimed had organized the crime; among these men were Bashar's brother and brother-in-law, Maher Assad and Assef Shawkat (powerful regime figures who are sometimes described as rivals to Bashar), and Mustapha Hamdan, the head of Emile

Lahoud's presidential guard.'02

The report added considerably to international pressure on the Assad regime.

Syria's most powerful critic, the Bush administration, had pursued a hardline toward

Damascus ever since the regime had allowed insurgents to use its territory as a conduit into Iraq. After Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon, the White House had continued to demand the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559, namely a complete end to Syrian meddling in Lebanon and the disarmament of its most powerful

Lebanese ally, Hizbullah. In suggesting Syria's responsibility in Hariri's killing, the

Mehlis investigation strengthened Washington's hand by providing an opportunity to rally the international community to take bolder action against Assad's regime. Indeed, following the release of the report President Bush wasted little time in reminding

Damascus of the need to change its behavior. In an interview with al-Arabiya, a popular lo' Mehlis, Detlev. Report of the International Independent Investigafion Commission establishedpursuant to Security Coulzcil resolution 1595, October 19,2005, final version, http:/!daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN~,paragraph 124. 102 Mehlis, Detlev. Report of the International Independent Investigation Commission Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1595, October 18,2005, leaked version, paragraph 96, hrcp://www.was~ngtonpost.comlwp-srv/worldsyria/mehlis.report.doc. pan-Arab satellite news network, Bush warned: "this report, as I say, had serious implications for Syria, and the Syrian government must take the demands of the free world very seriously. " '03

Within the Lebanese domestic arena, however, the report did not serve as the catalyst for which March 14'~had hoped. The release of the document did nothing to narrow the Lebanese political divide over Syria; March 14~~forces claimed the report damned Syrian meddling in Lebanon beyond doubt, while Hizbullah and other parties rallied to Assad7sdefense. Moreover, though the report detailed the role played by

Lahoud's personal chief of security, it did not personally implicate the Lebanese president. Together, these developments left Lebanon's government in much the state it had occupied since the elections: sliding toward political impasse. Moreover, even as

March 14~~applauded the findings of the investigation, its leaders proved unable to unite in charting a way forward. While the movement's Sunni leadership sought to capitalize on the report by intensifying demands for Lahoud's resignation-seeing the replacement of the president as the key to overcoming the political stalemate-Druze and Christian leaders within the alliance remained more reserved.lo4 or Jumblatt, immediately replacing Lahoud could mean opening the doors of the presidential palace to his popular political foe, Michel Aoun. Meanwhile, Patriarch Sfeir worried about the precedent that would be set by a Sunni-led campaign to replace the Maronite president. Though he remained an outspoken opponent of Syrian meddling, the Patriarch announced in

November that the decision to resign rested with Lahoud himself, declaring that "we must

'03 Quoted in "UPDATE 2-Bush says military action against Syria 'last resort'," Reuters, October 25 2005, h~://today.reuters.com/news/articlebusiness.aspx?teusinessNews&stoID=25462517&pageNu mber=0&imageid=&cap=&sz=13&WTModLoc=BizA-C 1-ArticlePage2. '04 ~nternationalCrisis Group, "Managing the Gather Storm," 13 show more respect toward the presidential post."'05 Thus, even as the Mehlis report damaged their common Syrian enemy, March 14~~could not overcome personal ambition and confessional concerns in maintaining a united front.

March 14'" leaders exacerbated their difficulties on the domestic scene by pursuing political goals increasingly similar to those of Washington, thus pushing

Hizbullah into staunch opposition to the government's program. To a certain extent, this was unavoidable. The March 14~"movement defined itself by its opposition to Syrian hegemony in Lebanon and its pursuit of justice for Rafiq Hariri7skillers. The fact that the

Bush administration shared those goals did not, in and of itself, make them less legitimate. Moreover, as March 14'" figures continued to find themselves targeted for assassination, it was natural that they cooperate with the international community in seeking to defend themselves and, by extension, Lebanon's sovereignty from what most observers believed to be Syrian attacks. On December 12"', the latest in a series of assassination attempts killed March 14'" MP and an-Nahar editor-in-chief Gibran Tueni.

Hours later, Siniora's cabinet passed a resolution calling for the establishment of an international tribunal to judge Hariri's killers and for a widening of "the mission of the

U.N. investigative team to cover all the assassinations that took place since October

2004".lo6 Hizbullah, however, could not accept a cabinet measure so clearly and potently directed toward Damascus. The five Shia ministers immediately suspended their

'05 Quoted in Ciezadlo, Annia. "Cedar Bluffs," The New Republic, November 14, 2005, http:llweb.lexis- nexis.com. '06 "ROUNDUP: Lebanese cabinet decides to seek U.N. probe into killings," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, December 12, 2005, http:/lweb.lexis-nexis.com. participation in cabinet, announcing that the international court would only work to serve

U.S. interests.lo7

March 14~~'scollaboration with American foreign policy, however, began to expand far beyond the UN investigation. The key to this development was the complete breakdown of the "quartet agreement" between Jumblatt, Hariri, and the Shia parties.

The agreement had alienated Christians-inside and outside the March 14'~movement- from its very inception. Following the December Shia withdrawal from cabinet (they had staged a walkout in November as well), however, Christians within March 14'~leadership began giving voice to their fi-ustration; cabinet members, led in this effort by right-wing

Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, leveled criticism at Hizbullah and publicly demanded that any further compromises with the organization involve Christian leaders within March 14~~.The Christian ministers received support in this tack from Walid

Jurnblatt, who added his voice to a growing chorus chiding Hizbullah for dragging

Lebanon into conflict with the international

The behavior of March 14~~leadership during the Shia boycott of cabinet set a pattern that would hold over the months that followed. Speaking with the Washington

Post's David Ignatius in January 2006, Jumblatt emphasized Iran's role in his government's crisis with Hizbullah and Syria. When asked what the United States could do to help, the Druze leader replied: ""You came to Iraq in the name of majority rule.

You can do the same thing in Syria.""' This bold comment, in threatening both Syria and

lo' "Lebanon mourns as country faces new political turmoil," Deutsche Pvesse-Agentur, December 13, 2005, http:/lweb.lexis-nexis.com. 108 "Christian revolution topples agreement between Shiites and majority," As-SaJir, December 28,2005, http://www mideastwire .com/index.php?action=timesearch&newsday=29&news-month=l2&news-year= 2005&x=36&y-11#4864. 109 Quoted in Ignatius, David. "Mob War in the Middle East," The Washington Post, January 1, 2006, http://web.lexis-nexis.com Hizbullah, serves as a particularly prominent example of a broader gravitation within

March 14th toward Washington's policy in Lebanon. Later that January, Saad Hariri met

with President Bush, Vice President Cheney, and Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice,

among others, during a high profile visit to washington."' Hariri took a softer line than

Jurnblatt or Geagea-as discussed in the next chapter, reports that he asked Bush to limit

direct pressure on Hizbullah helped convince Shia ministers to rejoin the cabinet in

February-but his access to the White House sent disturbing signals to Damascus and the

Dahiya, Beirut's southern suburbs that play host to Hizbullah's leadership. Saad Hariri

had maintained his father's close relationships with Paris and Riyadh, but neither he nor

Fouad Siniora possessed the charisma and independent streak that had made Rafiq Hariri

a political force unto himself. In viewing March 14~~'spolicy toward Syria and

Hizbullah, then, Bashar Assad and Hassan Nasrallah not only feared the coalition's close

relationship with Washington, but also the influence of increasingly confrontational

figures within the movement.

Seeking to build a broader alliance against the Westem-supported coalition,

Hassan Nasrallah allied his party with Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement. The

agreement between the two popular leaders-announced just days after Hariri's meetings

in Washington and discussed further in the following chapter-brought much of the

Christian community to Hizbullah's side, creating a formidable "opposition" to the

Siniora government. This alliance between the Shia Islamist party and the country's most

popular Christian leader immediately distinguished itself from its Sunni, Dmze and

Christian rivals. As the Daily Star noted in an editorial on February 9th,while Hizbullah

- -- - l lo Boustany, Nora. "Son of a Slain Leader Fears for Lebanon," The Washington Post, January, 27, 2006. http:l/web.lexis-nexis.com and the FPM had built their alliance through months of unprecedented contacts and released a joint document of understanding addressing many of Lebanon's most contentious issues, "the March 14 Forces have not yet produced any concrete plans to move the country forward" and have "yet to engage in serious dialogue with parties outside their alliance."" '

Such a dialogue finally commenced later that spring, just as tensions between

March 14th and Hizbullah reached new heights. By May 2006, March 14'~'s"majority" in government had added the disarmament of Hizbullah-never a priority under Rafiq

Hariri and a secondary issue during the Independence Intifada-to the top of its agenda.

Jumblatt and Samir Geagea, among others, called unequivocally for the party to abandon its arms or incorporate them into the Lebanese military.112Fouad Siniora took a more moderate tack-encouraging the U.S. to help resolve the Shebaa Farms border dispute with Israel so that Hizbullah could, he implied, be co~npelledto abandon its autonomous weaponry.' ' Siniora's indirect approach notwitlzstanding, the prioritizatiotz of the arnis issue added considerably to tensions that had developed over Lahoud's presidency and the potential establishltzent of an iltternational criminal court. From Hizb~illaTz's perspective, defending Lahoud's position and preventing the international tribunal in the

Hariri probe were strategic priorities; protectittg its weapons, however, was a matter of existential importance. In the National Dialog talks that took place through May and

J~lne,the opposing coalitions made some mi~iirnalprogress in addressing the presidency

11 1 "The Aoun-Nasrallah initiative is a wake-up call for March 14 forces," The Daily Star,, February 9, 2006, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/archives.asp. I" Khalaf, Roula. "Anti-Syrian Lebanese ready for new showdown," The Firzancial Times, March 2,2006, http://web.lexis-nexis.com; "Lebanese leaders resume talks on Hezbollah arms," Agence France Presse, June 8, 2006, http://web.lexis- nexis.com. 'I3 "Hezbollah should disarm: Jumblatt," Agence France Presse, May 7,2006, http://web.lexis-nexis.com. and the tribunal; when the parties convened on June 2gth to discuss Hizbullah7sweapons, lsowe~rer,they agreed on littlc beyond scheduling another meeting for late-July. That round of talks, however, was never to take place.

Tile March 14"' moveinent burst onto the international scene proclaiming unity and independence, but in truth its leadership accomplished littlc in pursuit of citlier.

Though a cross-confessional coalition, March 14'~did not transcend sectarianism as it is embodied in the Lebanese system. Rather than developirig a political platfornl to appeal to a wide spectrum of voters, the lnoverncnt built its election efforts on tlie traditional pillars of Lebanese campaigns: the independent confessional and clientelist electoral bases of its individual leaders, and ad Iioc electoral alliai~ceswith opposing parties. The first elenicnt of this strategy forfeited hope of winning electoral support outside of the cor~fessionalcontext; the second ultiinately cost March 14'" n~ucl~of its Christian backing and internal nnity. Defenders of March 14:" could, with justification, blame the movement's lack of popular Sliia support on Rafiq Hariri's divisive legacy. Even at tlie policy level, hoxvever, the movement niade little effort to work with Sliia parties. Neither

Jumblatt nor Hariri intended for the quartet agreeinelit to lead to nieanii~gfulcooperation with Hizbullali or Amal-instead, they were content wit11 the same type of exclusive coalitioti that had alienated Shia and Dnrze leaderships before the civil war, and Maronite leadership after the Taif Accord.

Most impostantly, however, the March 14Ih movement failed to transcc~sdthc historical Lebanese problem of external alliances. By allo~vingits objectives to become synoi~yniounx~itlithose of Washington, March 14'" encouraged Ilizbullah to view strengtl~cningitself \is a vis tl~eSiniora government as a strategic objective with existential implications. In so doing, March 14""s leaders u~~knowinglye~~sured that

Hizbullah's weapons -not clcctoral rcfonn, justice for Hariri's killers, or rclations wit11

Syria-~vould beconle the defining issue of post-withdrawal Lebanon. Havin~helped put

HizbuIla1-1on the defensive, March 14"' could only watch as the more powerful Sliia party began to set the country's political agenda. Chapter Five

Hizbullah

Hizbullah is a political party, a provider of social welfare, a regional phenomenon, and a militia with a history of terrorist activity. Since its inception, it has transcended borders and defied labeling. Though deeply connected with the Iranian theocracy and closely allied with Syria, Hizbullah is rooted more firmly in Lebanese society than any other political movement. It's social services-including hospitals, schools, and a rebuilding team known as Jzhad al-Bina (Construction Jihad)-have long outperformed those of the Lebanese state. Hizbullah won an unprecedented Arab victory with the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon in 2000. With the enemy no longer occupying Lebanese land, however, Hizbullah has struggled to convince non-Shia

Lebanese of the necessity of its role as the Resistance. Indeed, as international pressure has risen since the Syrian withdrawal, Hizbullah has found it increasingly difficult to balance its alliances and regional aspirations with the demands and interests of the

Lebanese population as a whole.

Hizbullah's Founding and Foreign Support

Hizbullah was born of the same confluence of international and confessional forces that continue to serve as its lifeblood. Beginning in the late 1960's and until his disappearance in 1978 (most likely at the hands of the Libyan mukhabarat), Imam Musa al-Sadr led an unprecedented politicization of the historically disenfranchised Shia community. The charismatic al-Sadr succeeded in mobilizing a massive Shia political front, embodied during the opening stages of the civil war as the Amal militia. With the

Imam's disappearance, however, the movement began to fracture. The 1979 Islamic

Revolution in Iran served as a powerful inspiration to the more militant clerics among

Amal's emerging leadership, and Israel's bloody invasion and subsequent occupation in

1982 served to radicalize a Shia community that had previously proven reluctant to join with the Palestinians in resisting the Jewish state. It was within this political climate that a group of Lebanese Shia ulema met in Tehran with Ayatollah Ruhallah Khomeini in

August 1982. According to Lebanese Hizbullah expert Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh,

Khomeini "urged the 'ulema' to go back home and mobilize the people to fight the Israeli occupation and to turn the mosques into bases for their jihad activities." Within months, several of these clerics had joined in the Bekaa with hundreds of other Lebanese Shia to pledge allegiance to Khomeini and train for jihad under the instruction of fifteen hundred

Iranian Revolutionary Guards. With Khomeni's guidance, the militants adopted the name

Hizbullah, or Party of ~0d.l'~

Iran's entrance into the Lebanese arena presented an opportunity for the Syrian regime. With Israel occupying much of Lebanon-in cooperation with the Phalange, the leading Maronite militia-and the United States participating in an international force that backed Israeli-installed President Arnine Gemayal, Hafez al-Assad feared the regional isolation that would follow from a potential peace treaty between Lebanon and its southern neighbor.'I5

Assad encouraged Iranian activity in the Bekaa, giving rise to the strategic resistance alliance that continues to this day. Iran provides spiritual leadership, funding

114 Harnzeh, Ahrnad Nizar. In the Path of HizbulIah (Syracuse University Press, 2004), 25. 'I5 ibid 26 (approximately $100 million a year), weaponry and expertise to Hizbullah, whose leaders

adhere to the Khomeinist ideology of Wilayet al-Faqih-guardianship of the jurisconsult-and hold the Iranian Grand Ayatollah as their ultimate authority."6 Syria,

for its part, enables arms shipments from the Iranian regime to the Shia militia and, until

its withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, provided logistical support through its military and

intelligence apparatus in Lebanon. Hizbullah thus serves as the embodiment of the

notably resilient alliance between the secular, Alawite Syrian regime and Shia Islamist

Iran. For their substantial support, each state holds in Hizbullah a critical tool of its

respective foreign policy. For Syria, influence within Hizbullah provides leverage in the

effort to negotiate a peace with Israel that would return the Golan Heights. For Iran, the

organization's domestic political power, militant threat to Israel, and global network of

operatives serves to bolster the regime's regional profile and deter its enemies in

Washington and Jerusalem.

Within this alliance, Hizbullah coordinates strategy with Tehran and Damascus

while maintaining tactical independence. Khomeini's doctrine of wilayat al-faqih-

which, it bears restating, sits at the core of Hizbullah's ideology-establishes the supreme

jurisconsult of the Islamic Republic as the leader of the entire Shia ummah (community

of believers).l l7 Thus, though most of Hizbullah's supporters follow the religious

guidance of Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah-a Lebanese cleric whose

independent influence has created tension with ~izbullah'~~brIraqi Ayatollah Ali al-

Sistani, Hizbullah's Lebanese leadership operates in cooperation with ~ehran.~l9

'I6 ibid 32-33 "'ibid 31 'I8 Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton University Press, 2007), 118. 'I9 ibid 101 Hizbullah's political head, the secretary general, is elected by a seven member Shura

council in close consultation with the Iranian Ayatollah. Moreover, the party's entire

Lebanese leadership pledges loyalty to current Iranian Ayatollah Ali Khameni, just as

they did to his revolutionary predecessor. As Hassan Nasrallah puts it:

Where is the force in us? What is Hizbullah's secret? The power is in the obedience to Khamenei's wilayat. The secret of our strength, growth, unity, struggle, and martyrdom is wilayat al-faqih, the spinal cord of ~izbullah.'~~

In practice, Hizbullah coordinates its foreign policy-including its overseas terrorist

activity and rules of engagement with Israel-with both its foreign allies while generally

acting pragmatically and of its own accord within the Lebanese political arena. As

Lebanese analyst Amal Saad-Ghorayeb notes, "the generality of the Faqih's proposals

leaves the party with a wide space for decision-making. His authority is confined to

strategic issues such as jihad, political rule and the classification of 'friends and

enemies '. ,7121 Hizbullah's decision to participate in elections in 1992 provides an

example of this cooperation; Ayatollah Khameni played a mediating role in the party's

deliberations on the subject, but apparently only after Hizbullah's Lebanese leaders failed

to reach a consensus on their own.'22

Though it shares no ideological ties with Hizbullah, Syria's role as weapons

conduit and-at least until 2005-its intelligence apparatus in Lebanon appears to have

provided the regime with substantial leverage over the movement's military activity. As

former CIA analyst Flynt Leverett noted in early 2005, while Iran provides most of the

movement's foreign funding and holds "usually determinative influence" over the

group's international terrorist operations, it is Syria that exercises "almost always

I2O ibid 34 121 Quoted in Saad-Ghorayeb, Arnal. Hizbullah: Politics and Religion (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 67 '" Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, 118 decisive influence regarding the timing, geographic scope, and physical scale of

Hizbullah's anti-Israeli operation^."'^^ From 2000 until Israel's invasion in 2006, this influence contributed toward an unwritten "rules of the game" between Syria, Hizbullah and Israel in which the latter two pledged not to target civilians. During this period,

Hizbullah generally limited its attacks to Israeli military installments in the Shebaa

~artns.'~~

Support and influence, however, do not amount to control. The alliance between

Iran, Syria and Hizbullah remains close not because the regimes control the organization-again, to emphasize, they do not- but because the strategic interests of all three coincide. Hizbullah's leaders and core constituents see the world in much the same way as the Ayatollahs and, to a lesser extent, the Assads: Israel must be fought, its

American backers must be opposed, and Lebanon's Arab and Islamic identity must be protected from Western influence. Hizbullah views Lebanon not as a liberal entrepot allied with Saudi Arabia and the West, but as the frontline of a pan-Islamic resistance against Israel and the United States. Moreover, Hizbullah's success in fighting Israel has earned it tremendous popularity across the region (at least until late-2006; more on that below), helping the organization to transcend its role as a Lebanese militia and political party-and thus raising its profile within the Tehran-Damascus "resistance axis". Indeed, if the streets of Damascus are any indication, Syria's relationship with Hizbullah has become a pillar of legitimacy for the otherwise unpopular regime; long before

Hizbullah's success in the July War, pictures of Bashar al-Assad alongside Hassan

Nasrallah adorned countless storefronts and car windows. For Tehran, meanwhile,

123 Leverett, Flynt. Inheriting Syria: Bnshar's Trial by Fire (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2005), 244 124 ibid 116 Hizbullah's success and regional popularity allow the regime to trumpet its support for the Palestinian cause to an Arab audience that at times appears wary of the Persian Shia

state. As a general rule, one can assume that Iran and, to a lesser extent, Syria cooperate with Hizbullah's Lebanese leadership in shaping the party's broader regional strategy,

and that both countries would hold a veto over any potential military escalation that went

beyond the "rules of the game."

However, in designing and implementing a domestic political platform, Hizbullah

is probably as free as any other Lebanese political party. Hizbullah's combination of

military success and efficient social services has helped it win the loyal backing of an

overwhelming majority of Lebanon's Shia community. Iranian and Syrian support have

thus proven instrumental in helping Hizbullah secure its political base-just as Saudi and

Syrian support did for Rafiq Hariri, and Saudi and Western support have done for the

March 14~~movement. In evaluating foreign support for Hizbullah-r, for that matter,

Hariri and March 14~~-itis important to keep one general rule in mind: given the

strength of the party's base, external allies can influence its leadership's decision making,

but will never convince it to take action that run's counter to what the party perceives as

its own, individual strategic interests.

National Resistance, Pan-Arab Vanguard

Though loyal to its Islamist ideology and a fierce defender of its underprivileged

Shia political base, Hizbullah has sought to win support across sectarian lines and to

transcend Lebanon's system of corrupt confessional governance. With the conclusion of

the civil war and Hizbullah's decision to participate in Lebanese politics, the organization began emphasizing its Lebanese identity and downplaying its goal of establishing an

Islamic state. As Saad-Ghorayeb explains, while Hizbullah initially "distinguished itself from Amal solely on the basis of its Islamic identity and Amal's Lebanese identity," the organization has since reversed its emphasis. Now, unlike Amal, "which pursues Shi'ite interests exclusively, as a Lebanese party, Hizbullah seeks to realize the interests of "all

Lebanese citizens, . m125

The beginnings of this rhetorical realignment can be seen in the electoral platform

Hizbullah issued in advance of its first election campaign, for national parliament seats in

1992. In the platform, the party describes its war with Israel as a national struggle and declares "Guaranteeing freedom of creed and religious expression" among its

objective^.'^^ he platform makes no mention of establishing an Islamic state, a reflection of a broader pragmatism within the organization: so long as Lebanese public opinion remains opposed to the establishment of an Islamic state, Hizbullah will not actively pursue its Islamist goals, instead "leaving it up to the people to choose their governing system and bear the responsibility for such choice,, .127 This acknowledgement of Lebanon's religious diversity is particularly important given another plank of

Hizbullah's 1992 platform: the abolishment of confession-based governance.128Though it has toned down this demand at times, as the most powerful Shia party, Hizbullah must always contend with the fact that countless Lebanese of other confessions-particularly

Sunnis and Maronites- view its advocacy of a new political order as a direct threat to their role in Lebanese society.

'25 Saad-Ghorayeb 84 126 Reprinted in Qassaim, Nairn. Hizbullnh: The Sto~yfrom Within (London: Saqi, 2005), 275 12' Qassem 3 1 '28 ibid 273 Hizbullah has tried to further assuage public wariness through direct outreach to non-Shia Lebanese. Shortly after the 1992 elections, Hizbullah sent a high-level delegation to visit Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir. The meeting, initiated by

Hizbullah, represented unprecedented contact between the Islamist party and Lebanon's most influential Chnstian cleric. Sfeir reciprocated by sending a delegation to meet with

Hassan Nasrallah several weeks later. Hizbullah Deputy Secretary General Naim

Qassem quotes the Patriarch as stating that, "unlike other political powers which say what

they do not do, Hizbullah's words are not any different fiom its deeds."I2' That

description, however accurately attributed, reflects a broader feeling within Lebanese

society. Though many outside south Lebanon object to Hizbullah's political platform

and unrivaled military power, the party's ever-charismatic Secretary General holds a

reputation for "telling it like it is," and has generally earned substantial respect across

sectarian lines. This image of integrity extends beyond Nasrallah himself. Since 1992

Hizbullah, alone among major Lebanese political parties, has maintained a reputation for

abstaining fi-om corruption. I3O

In seeking to win Sunni support, Hizbullah has promoted its role as vanguard of

the Arab-Islamic resistance. The organization stood strongly against Rafiq Hariri's

political agenda, and the Prime Minister publicly criticized the timing and negative

economic impact of Hizbullah's attacks. At the same time, however, Hizbullah worked

to increase its appeal within the broader Sunni Arab world, perhaps assuming that

Lebanese Sunnis would follow. Naim Qassem declares that "Achieving Islamic unity

between the Sunnis and Shi'is in different countries and at all levels is one of Hizbullah's

'29 ibid 207 Deeb, Lara. "Hizbullah: A Primer," Middle East Report, July 31,2006, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero073106.html fundamental goals." Hizbullah's emphasis in this regard is not ideological or religious unity, but rather cooperation in meeting common threats and attaining common goals.'31

In practice, this means resisting Israel. Indeed, even as it has promoted its national identity, Hizbullah "has positioned its Islamic Resistance at the forefront, as a role model, fighting the Israeli occupation for the Arab-Islamic The

organization's military role in south Lebanon and active support for Palestinian

insurgents may not have won the party many of Rafiq Hariri's votes, but they did appear

to win Sunni respect and acceptance. In a poll taken just days before the massive pro-

Syrian demonstration on March 8'", 2005, 88% of Sunni respondents declared their

support for Hizbullah's right to maintain its weaPons.l3'

Hizbullah under Syrian Hegemony

The Taif period witnessed an extraordinary evolution on the part of Hizbullah.

By the end of the civil war, Hizbullah-through suicide attacks on foreign forces,

impressive resistance against Israel and its Lebanese allies, internecine clashes with its

rival Arnal, and a forceful takeover and Islamization of state institutions-liad established

itself as a formidable power within Lebanon's Shia areas.134The end of the civil war and

the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, however, encouraged new strategic thinking

among Hizbullah's Lebanese leadership. As revolutionary zeal waned in Iran and Syria

established its brand of divide-and-conquer in Lebanon, Hizbullah set aside its goal of

131 Qassem 225 '32 Hamzeh 99 '33 Beirut Center for Research, As-SaJir, March 16,2005, http:/lwww.beirutcenter.info/default.asp?ContentID=640&menuID=46 134 Hamzeh 102 establishing Islamist governance in ~eban0n.l~'With Khamenei's blessing, ilasrallah and his predecessor as secretary general, Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi, led an internal movement that steered the organization toward political participation within the Lebanese system. 136

In entering politics, Hizbullah capitalized on the popularity it had gained through its extensive social welfare network and its continuing war with Israel and its proxy, the

Southern Lebanese Army. Hizbullah began competing for parliamentary seats in 1992, and by its third election (in 2000) the organization had emerged as the strongest Shia party, winning nine of the 27 Shia seats, three more than its rival hmal."7

Hizbullah's electoral participation provides some indication of Syria's influence

on the party's political behavior during the Taif period. Throughout its stewardship in

Lebanon, Damascus protected its unrivaled role in the country by maneuvering to ensure

that no single Lebanese party or coalition of parties gained too much influence within the

arena. In managing Hizbullah, then, Syria had to balance its preference toward limiting

Hizbullah's domestic power with its desire to remain on good terms with Tehran. The

Syrian regime's behavior in the 1996 parliamentary elections is instructive, a classic

example of Hafez al-Assad's sophisticated, manipulative style. With Hizbullah riding a

wave of popularity after its perfomance during the Israeli invasion that spring (Operation

Grapes of Wrath), Syria and its clients in the Lebanese administration maneuvered to

ensure that Hizbullah would fare weakly in the first round of e1e~tions.I~~Amid swirling

rumors that Damascus had cut a deal with Washington to curtail Hizbullah, the regime

swiftly changed tack before the second round of polling, engineering a coalition between

135 Ghorayeb 50 136 Harnzeh 110 137 ibid 113 13' Malik, Habib. "Parliamentary Elections in Lebanon: An Early Assessment," September 6, 1996, http://www.washingtoninstitute.orgitemplateCO5.php?CID=1095 Amal and Hizbullah that favored the latter and placated its Iranian supporters.'39

Hizbullah's members took seven seats in parliament while Amal won eight-numbers that did not reflect the pair's relative popularities.

With Israel's unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000,

Hizbullah further shifted its efforts toward domestic political participation. Yizbullah's victory, the first of any Arab force against Israel since the creation of the Jewish state, provided the organization with a tremendous boost in domestic (and regional) popularity,

even outside its Shia base. In the parliamentary elections that followed later that year,

Hizbullah again, just as it had in 1992 and 1996, agreed to a shared electoral list with

(notably weaker) Amal. While analysts disagree over whether Syria or Iran took the lead

in brokering the agreement, the effect was a compromise that served Syria's interest of

containing its allies' domestic power; Hizbullah agreed to contest only nine seats-all

preordained victories-thus gaining two seats at the expense of its rival.l4' Speculation

swirled over whether the party would take a position in the new cabinet, but, with its

weapons safely protected under Syrian hegemony, Hizbullah decided that it had little to

gain from participating in a Hariri-government whose economic policies the party

strongly opposed.'" Instead, with Syrian approval, the party focused its domestic efforts

on reconstruction and expanding its already impressive social service network, thus

rurther strengthening its support within the Shia community.'" Meanwhile, Hizbullah

continued its resistance against Israel in the name of gaining the release of Lebanese

139 Malik, Habib. "Parliamentary Elections in Lebanon: A Final Assessment," May 4, 1996, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1100; Hamzeh 114 140 Hamzeh 113 ; Leverett 260 14' Hamzeh 12 1 14' Leverett 109 prisoners and liberating the Shebaa Farms; for the most part, Syria ensured that these

attacks remained low-intensity, thus applying limited pressure to the Israeli government without risking massive retaliation.

Hizbullah under Threat

For Hizbullah as for Lebanon, it was Bashar al-Assad7sdecision to extend the

presidency of Emile Lahoud that began to destabilize the post-Taif status quo. The

extra-constitutional intervention provided the catalyst for deeper cooperation between

Paris and Washington in the Syrian-Lebanese arena, and on September 2nd2005, just

hours before the parliament voted to approve the extension, the UN Security Council

passed the American and French-backed Resolution 1559. The resolution called for free

presidential elections, the withdrawal of foreign (i.e. Syrian) forces, and the "the

disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias"-a clear

reference to ~izbullah.'~~With its military in Iraq and strong French support on the

issue, Washington could press Syria on the resolution from a position of strength. For

Hizbullah, this posed an obvious potential threat. So long as Damascus remained in

charge in Lebanon, the organization's weapons would remain safe. Without Syrian

strategic support and weapons shipments, however, Hizbullah would be more vulnerable

to international and domestic pressure to disarm---or, perhaps more importantly, an

Israeli invasion to accomplish the same goal. As Deputy Secretary General Qassem

wrote prior to Hariri's assassination: "Given that Syria is the constituent that provides the

143 United Nations Security Council. "Press Release SC 91 8 1," September 2, 2004, http:l/www.un.orglNewslPress/docs/2004lsc818 1.doc.htm political cover and catalyst for Hizbullah's continuity, lifting such cover would expose

the Party, isolate it, and render the Resistance vulnerable when atta~ked."'~~It is within

this context that Nasrallah began developing a stronger relationship with Rafiq Hariri, a

longtime rival whose economic policies and relationship with the West were anathema to

Hizbullah. According to Mustafa Nasr, the intermediary who participated in a series of

late night meetings between the leaders, Hariri assured Nasrallah that he did not support

the resolution, and used his influence with Jacques Chirac to take pressure off the

organization by opposing its addition to the European Union's list of terrorist

organizations. 145

The Syrian withdrawal in the months following Hariri's assassination left

Hizbullah exposed to international and domestic demands for its disarmament. The party

had toed a fine line during the Independence Intifada, holding its massive March 8th rally

to thank Syria for its fhendship, but stopping short of calling for Syrian troops to remain

in Lebanon. Now, with Damascus no longer calling the shots and with the anti-Syrian

parties expected to sweep to power in the June 2005 elections, Hizbullah moved to

strengthen its own hand. Rather than battle Nabih Berri's Arnal Movement for Shia

support, Hizbullah allied with its longtime rival-just as it had in previous elections at

Syria's behest-thus ensuring that any debate over Hizbullah's weapons would only take

place across sectarian lines.146AS the election approached, the two pro-Syrian Shia

parties joined in a surprising coalition with March 14~~leaders Walid Jumblatt and Saad

Hariri. While Jumblatt had his own personal reasons for brokering the agreement

(discussed in the previous chapter), the benefit for Hizbullah was simple and substantial.

144 Qassem 264 '" Blandford 125 '" ibid 168 According to Marina Ottaway, a scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace, the terms of the "quartet agreement" called for the March 14thcamp to protect

Hizbullah7s"resistance" from external pressure in exchange for Shia support at the polls.'47 The coalition's exclusion of Michel Aoun hurt Hariri and Jumblatt dearly in the

Maronite heartland, but March 14"', with the help of its ad hoc alliance, won a majority in the new parliament, Together with their smaller pro-Syrian allies, the Hizbullah and

Arnal list gained 35 seats, providing the parties with substantial leverage in the 128- member 1egi~lature.l~~

Following the elections, Hizbullah, for the first time in its history, decided to take seats in Lebanon's cabinet. Without Syria to protect its weapons (and prevent it from playing a more influential role in governance), Hizbullah's leadership recognized that it could no longer afford to disassociate itself from government policy-particularly given

Washington's strong support for the parliamentary majority. As Naim Qassem put it in an interview, "What has changed [after the Syrian withdrawal] are issues related to

Lebanese developments, which made us directly responsible for providing the domestic protection in a better way than before."'49 With international pressure for disarmament rising, Hizbullah could not depend upon March 14th,a movement whose supporters and leadership had long been wary of Hizbullah's military strength, to defend the party's right to armed resistance. After failing to have one of its members named as Minister of

Foreign Affairs, Hizbullah agreed to take the Ministry of Energy and Water. Muhammad

147 Ottaway quoted in Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal. "In Their Own Words: Hizbullah's Strategy in the Current Confrontation," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2007, http:llwww.carnegieendo~ment.org/fileslsaadghorayebbollahnal.pdf,2 148 Angus Reid Global Monitor."Angus Reid Global Monitor: Lebanon," June 19, 2005, http://www.angus- reid.comitrackerlindex.cfm?fuseaction=viewItem&itemID=6962 149 Leenders, Reinoud. "How UN Pressure on Hizballah Impedes Lebanese Reform," Middle East Report, May 23,2006, http:/lwww.merip.orgimero/mero052306.htm Fneish, who had served in parliament since 1992, thus became the first member of

Hizbullah in the cabinet."' An independent Shia (sympathetic to Amal and Hizbullah) took the Foreign Affairs position, but Hizbullah ally Tarrad Hamadeh was named

Minister of Labor, and Amal took two other positions in the 24-seat cabinet under Prime

Minister Fouad siniora.151 As the first post-Syrian cabinet took office, Hizbullah's decisions to ally with Hariri and Jumblatt in the elections and join the March 14~~-led government appeared to be paying off. On July 28"', Siniora read the new cabinet's policy statement, including this line: "The government considers the resistance a natural and honest expression of the Lebanese people's national rights to liberate their land and defend their honor against Israeli aggression and threats."152

But cooperation between the Shia parties and March 14th did not last long.

Between October and December 2005, a series of events concerning the security of the

Syrian regime and the protection of Hizbullah's arms rattled and ultimately ruptured the awkward agreement that Jumblatt, Hariri and Nasrallah had reached to on the eve of the elections. On October 2oth,Detlev Mehlis released the report on his investigation into the assassination of Rafiq Hariri; the report suggested that senior Syrian and Lebanese officials had been behind the killing, and a leaked version of the report named senior figures in the Syrian regime. A week later, UN envoy Terje Roed-Larsen released his semiannual report on the implementation of Resolution 1559. In a prominent speech on

Al-Quds (Jerusalem) Day, Hassan Nasrallah addressed both reports at length, defending

150 "Lineup of Lebanon's New Cabinet," Ya Libnan, htt.p://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2005/07/~lineup~of~leba.php 15' Nazernroaya, Mahdi Darius. "Lebanese Political Crisis Mounting: Sixth Minister Quits Cabinet," Centre for Research on Globalization, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context;viewArticle&code=%2ONA20061113&articleId=3844 Hatoum, Majdoline. "Lebanese Cabinet faces House debate" The Daily Star, July 29,2005,http://emperors-clothes.com/06war/29july.htm Syria against unjust American aggression and addressing Larson's claim that "The

Government of Lebanon has assured me [Larson] that it remains committed to the implementation of all provisions of resolution 1559 (2004), but that it requires time."'53

Responding directly to this assertion, Nasrallah noted in his speech:

Pay attention to this. Larsen says that the Lebanese government has confirmed to him that it is committed to the implementation of all the provisions. Which provisions? There are only two provisions left, the provision on the weapons of the resistance and the provision on the Palestinian weapons . . . I would like to ask Mr. Larsen: Which Lebanese government has confirmed this to you? Is it the government of Prime Minister Mikati or the government of Prime Minister Siniora, for there was nothing of the sort in the two ministerial statements? Which government made this ~ornmitment?'~~

Nasrallah phrased his remarks so as to ridicule the credibility of Larson's investigation, but the above statement nevertheless reveals a growing uneasiness regarding March 14's commitment to the quartet agreement and, more importantly, the Resistance itself.

Hizbullah used its representation in cabinet to respond to rising pressure on its weapons and Syrian ally. Hizbullah and Arnal ministers walked out of a cabinet meeting on November 10" after March 14" members insisted on discussing an antagonistic speech that Bashar al-Assad had given earlier that day.155The Shia ministers would return, but not for long. On December 12"', the blast that killed March 14'~MP Gibran

Tueni again directed Lebanese and international attention toward Syria's shadowy hand in Lebanon. It was the fifteenth explosion targeting anti-Syrian politicians and journalists since Rafiq Hariri7sdeath, and March 14~"'spolitical leadership reacted at once with a

153 Roed-Larsen, Terje. "Second Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution (2004)," October 25, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition id=l&categ-id=2&article-id=19629 154 Nasrallah, Hassan. Speech on Al-Quds ~ay,-0ctober28,2005, http://www.mideastwire.com/index.php?action=timesearch&news~da~31&news-month-1 O&news-year= 2005&x=l l&y=14 L'Leban~n'~Shiite Ministers in Cabinet Walkout," Agence France Press, November 10, 2005, http://web.lexis-nexis.com resolution calling for the establishment of an international tribunal and for a widening the scope of the UN investigation to include all assassinations in Lebanon since 2004.'~~For

Hizbullah, the resolution-directed squarely at Assad's regime-crossed a red line. The five Shia ministers promptly suspended their participation in cabinet, denouncing the tribunal as a tool of Western interests. As one Hizbullah MP put it, "Having the

Americans controlling our country and decisions will not bring unity to this country.rr 157

Though the Shia parties walked out of the cabinet in response to action aimed at

Syria, Hizbullah's handling of the ensuing standoff confirmed that the party's weapons stood as the central concern of the Shia alliance. The Shia parties' decision to withhold their participation in cabinet reflected a growing concern within Hizbullah that the terms of the quartet agreement with Siniora and Jumblatt no longer applied. Hizbullah made clear that it would only return to the cabinet upon the fulfillment of two conditions: first, that Siniora (or the March movement itself) declare that Hizbullah was "resistance" and not a militia; second, that all topics of discussion in cabinet be pre-approved by the

Shia parties.158The latter condition aimed at protecting Syria from further March 14~~- led measures, but it appears that the first condition was Hizbullah's top priority. The stalemate continued for weeks, and the Shia parties did not hint at an imminent resolution until reports emerged from Washington that Saad Hariri had convinced the White House to relent its pressure on Hizbullah and allow for internal Lebanese dialogue on

'56 "ROUNDUP: Lebanese cabinet decides to seek U.N. probe into lullings," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, December 12, 2005, http://web.lexis-nexis.com 15' 15' "Lebanon mourns as country faces new political turmoil," Deutsche Presse-Agentur December 13, 2005, http:l/web.lexis-nexis.corn/universe 158 Nassif, Nicholas. "Nasrallah's two conditions lead to other problems; Rariri's skill missed," An-Nahar, January 20,2006, http://~~~.mideastwire.com/index.php?action=timesearch&news~day=22&news~month=l&news_year=2 006&x=33&y=5#5321 di~armament.'~~On February 2nd-five days after Hariri's meetings in Washington-

Fouad Siniora, echoing the terms of the quartet agreement, announced in a speech before parliament that "we have never and will never call [Hizbullah] anything but a resistance."

Satisfied that Siniora's statement affirmed Hizbullah's status as a legitimate national force rather than a militia, the Shia ministers announced a decision to resume their participation in government several hours later.16' For its months of stubbornness, however, Hizbullah paid a dear political price. As Sateh Noureddine noted in the

independent daily As-Safir, during the crisis Hizbullah's "internal popularity plummeted

to its lowest levels while its sectarian role and responsibilities" grew more aPparent.l6'

For a party under growing political pressure and at pains to portray itself as a protector of

national-rather than Syrian, Iranian or confessional-interests, this served as a point of

concern.

Immediately after returning to cabinet, Hizbullah struck a political alliance that at

once established a new precedent in cross-sectarian cooperation and set the dividing line

for Lebanon's eventual descent into civil strife. On February 6th,Hassan Nasrallah and

General Michel Aoun announced a new alliance between Hizbullah and the Free Patriotic

Movement. The agreement followed a meeting-the first ever between the two leaders-

in a church in a Shia neighborhood south of Beirut, and was notable both for its

symbolism and comprehensiveness. The parties accompanied the announcement with a

159 Noureddine, Sateh. "~ea~into the unknown," January 3 1, 2006, http:/lwww.mideastwire.co~index.php?action=timesearch&news~da~3l&news~month=l&news~year=2 006&x=37&y=16#5524 16' Abbas, Thaer. "A verbal exit returns the Shiite ministers to the Lebanese government," As-Sharq Al- Awsat, February 3,2006, http://www.mideastwire.comiindex.php?action~mesearch&news~day=4&news~month=2&news~year=20 06&x= 14&y=9 161 Noureddine, Sateh. "Resistance and Negotiations," As-Safir, February 4, 2006, http://www.mideastwire.comiindex.php?action=timesearch&news~day=6&news~month2&news~year=20 06&x=3 1 &y=4#5647 joint statement addressing several of Lebanon's most contentious and divisive political

issues; the document distinguished the Hizbullah-Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) pact

from typical ad hoc Lebanese alliance-making and, more pointedly, the March 14~~

coalition, which had never released a coherent political program of its own.'62 The

document addressed, among other things, replacing the electoral law, returning Lebanese

citizens imprisoned in Syria, combating corruption, and allowing the members of the

South Lebanese Army (Israel's Christian proxy militia during its occupation of southern

Lebanon) to return to Lebanon. Most notably, however, the FPM offered immediate-if

temporary-support for Hizbullah's arms. The memorandum of understanding called for

maintaining the party's weapons in order to liberate the Shebaa Farms and Lebanese

prisoners in Israeli prisons, and for a national dialogue to discuss Hizbullah's weapons

within the context of a broader defense strategy to protect Lebanon from Israeli threats.I6'

In allying with the FPM, Hizbullah provided itself with immense political cover.

Christians had always been less likely than other confessions to support the Resistance,

and while in exile Aoun had been one of the most vocal critics of Syria and Hizbullah-

he once referred to the organization as a terrorist group on Pat Robertson's 700 ~lub'".

In allying with the FPM and supporting Aoun's bid for the presidency, Hizbullah could

count on sympathy from the general's extraordinarily loyal political base. Aoun enjoys

support from nearly half the Christian population; as debate over the Hizbullah 's arms

"Nasrallah and Aoun show that a little bit of work makes a world of difference," The Daily Star, February 8, 2006, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition~ID=10&article~ID=22040&categ~id=17 163 "Full English Text of Aoun-Narallah Agreement," Translated by Joseph Hitti, Ya Libnan, http:/lyalibnan.com/site/archives/2006/02/full~english~te.php 164 "Aoun: Hezbollah is a Terrorist Group," Campaign for Good Governance in Lebanon, September 12, 2002, http://www.cggl.org/scripts/document.asp?id=46256 continued to rage and political confrontation escalated, this backing would substantially

strengthen Nasrallah's hand.

Even as Hizbullah allied with the FPM, however, the party fell victim to the same

aspect of sectarianism that has afflicted Lebanon since the National Pact.

Groundbreaking though the alliance was, Nasrallah and Aoun's agreement, like decades

of Lebanese coalitions before it, implicitly defined itself in opposition to confessional

leaderships representing a substantial portion of Lebanese. In the days that followed the

February meeting, observers suggested that the agreement effectively divided the

Lebanese into two competing alliances: on one side the Shia, a group of Christians and a

small contingent of Druze (led by pro-Syrian former MP Tala1 Arslan); on the other, the

Sunnis, another group of Christians, and the overwhelming majority of the Druze. This

analysis, though a generalization, would prove largely correct. Though Lebanese of all

confessions professed support for Hizbullah during its July War with Israel, the months

that followed would witness intractable political stalemate and threatening civil strife

along those precise fault lines. The Nasrallah-Aoun agreement, in short, had produced a

shift within the Lebanese system, but no meaningful structural change. With Hizbullah

and the FPM strongly allied and unable to reach accommodation with March 14th,Sunni-

Shia had replaced Chnstian-Muslim as the fundamental sectarian divide in Lebanese

politics.

From Stalemate, through War, to the Brink

The National Dialogue talks that Aoun and Nasrallah endorsed in their meeting,

ultimately failed to bring rival camps toward meaningful cooperation. From early March through the end of June, the leaders of Lebanon's various political factions met to discuss the disagreements that had grounded governance to a halt in the preceding months.

Though the "opposition" (led by Nasrallah and Aoun) and March 14~~'s"majority" (led by Saad Hariri, Jumblatt, and Samir Geagea) reached tentative and shallow agreements related to Syria, Palestinian militant groups, and the investigation into Rafiq Hariri's assassination, no progress was made on resolving the most contentious issue: Hizbullah's weapons. On June 29"', the leaders finally met to discuss creating a "national defense strategy;" in the words of a Daily Star article the following day, participants "failed to solve any of their own country's problems" in this ninth session of dialogue, "but they did manage to agree that the international community should step in to halt Israel's offensive in the Gaza Strip." The obstacle to consensus was no mystery: the March 141h delegation, in agreement with their international backers, sought to end Hizbullah's role as an autonomous armed force; Hizbullah, in agreement with its international backers, refused. In a press conference after the meeting, Speaker Nabih Berri, the sponsor of the talks, offered little beyond the official condemnation of Israeli aggression and an announcement that the dialogue on Hizbullah's arms would continue in lateJuly. 165

Hizbullah's kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers, however, brought an unceremonious end to the ineffectual series of meetings. On July 12th,Hizbullah fighters skillfully executed a raid along the Lebanon-Israel border, kidnapping two Israeli soldiers and killing another three. The operation took advantage of a well-scouted "chink in

Israel's armor along the Lebanese border" near the village of Ayta ash Shab, out of view

165 Bakri, Nada. "Lebanese leaders fail to resolve domestic disputes but agree on need for intervention in Gaza Strip," The Daily Star, June 30, 2006, http:l/www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition~ID=l&article~ID=7359O&categ~id=2 of nearby Israeli cameras and troop positions.'66 As Israel's response in the war that ensued devastated southern Lebanon and the Dahiya (Beirut's southern suburbs), many observers inside and outside of Lebanon traced the decision to mount the attack to one or both of Hizbullah's foreign allies. These suggestions, however, carry little weight. In fact, the July 12~~kidnappings represented the fruition of a slight shift in Hizbullah's strategy that appears to have originated sometime in the summer or fall of 2005-just as demands for disamament were intensifying.

Under increasing pressure to justify the continuance of the Resistance to its domestic audience, Hizbullah-months before the July War-promised to win the return of three Lebanese detainees who had remained for years in Israeli custody, going so far as to declare 2006 "the year of the prisoners."'67 Thus, beginning in November 2005,

Hizbullah mounted several attempts to seize Israeli soldiers that could serve as bargaining chips in a negotiated prisoner release similar to those the organization had arranged with

Israel in the past.'68 For Hizbullah, kidnapping raids carried great potential benefit with only marginal apparent risk. support for hostage exchanges extended beyond Hizbullah's

Shia political base and, since 1996, Israel's responses to cross-border raids and rocket attacks had been limited in scope. The domestic political context in July 2006 was thus particularly favorable for such an operation. A successful raid would not only demonstrate the utility of the Resistance amid National Dialogue talks on the future of

Hizbullah's arms, but also demonstrate actionable support for the Palestinian cause-

'66 Exum, Andrew. "Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy," December 2006, http:/lwww.washingtoninstitute.org/templateCO4.php?CID=260 167 Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal. "Hizbollah's Outlook in the Current Conflict, Part One: Motives, Strategies and Objectives," August 2006,http://www.carnegieendowment.orglfiles/saad~ghorayebfinal.pdf Schiff, Ze'ev. "Kidnap of soldiers in July was Hezbollah's fifth attempt," Haaretz September 19, 2006, http:/lwww.haaretz.comlhasenlspagesl76445O.html generally popular among Sunnis-as Israeli troops occupied Gaza in response to a

Hamas-led kidnapping earlier that summer. Nasrallah has since stated that Hizbullah would not have conducted the attack if it anticipated the massive Israeli response that followed. This being said, the tactical success of the raid and, more importantly,

Hizbullah's impressive resilience in withstanding the Israeli onslaught that ensued strengthened the party's domestic political hand. Polls conducted by the Beirut Center for Research & Information show that 70% of Lebanese (including 73.1% of Sunnis) supported the kidnapping operation, and 87% (including at least 79% from each major sect) supported "the resistance" in confronting the subsequent Israeli invasion. Perhaps most importantly, as the dust cleared in late August, 72% of Lebanese believed Hizbullah had won, and a full 77% agreed with the (somewhat ambiguous) statement that Hizbullah

"should support the Lebanese army" in the event of future "Israeli aggression."'69

The July War demonstrated-at least to the Lebanese-both the danger of Israeli aggression and Hizbullah's effectiveness in combating it, providing the party with an apparent windfall in domestic political capital. The Siniora government's impotence amid Hizbullah's initial attack and Israel's response-devastating air attacks and an invasion approved by Siniora's supporters in Washington--dealt a blow to the March

14" movement. Hizbullah's gain in relative domestic political power, however, was accompanied by the renewal of an international threat. The UN agreement that ended the

July War, Security Council Resolution 1701, reiterated the call to disarm non-state actors

169 Beirut Center for Research and Information. "Poll finds support for Hizbullah's retaliation," July 29, 2006, http:!!www.beirutcenter.info/Default.asp?ContentID=692&menuID=46; "Majority of Lebanese believe Hizbullah won war," August 26,2006, http:!lwww.beirutcenter.info!Default.asp?ContentID=699&menuID=46 in Lebanon and authorized the deployment of up to 15,000 UN troops to ~eban0n.l~'

Though none of the countries contributing to this force (known as UNIFIL) have expressed any intention to forcibly disarm Hizbullah, the party is wary of the potential for cooperation between the government and UNTFIL at Hizbullah's expense.l7l As it surveyed the domestic scene after the war, Hizbullah thus saw several advantages in moving to consolidate its political gains. Winning more control in government could allow the party to: protect its weapons &om government collusion with the international community; protect Syria from an international tribunal into Hariri's murder; counter growing Western (particularly American) influence in Lebanon; and win additional influence for its Shia constituency. The party wasted little in announcing its new strategy. In an interview with al-Jazeera on September 14"', Nasrallah called for the establishment of a "government of national unity" that would provide the party and its allies with "a hindering [blocking] third"-that is, a third of the seats in cabinet, plus one additional seat. 172 Under the terms of Lebanon's constitution, the resignation of more than a third of cabinet automatically dissolves the government. Hizbullah, in effect, seeks veto power over government decision making.

In its pursuit of greater influence in government, however, Hizbullah has squandered much of the cross-confessional respect that it has historically enjoyed.

Perhaps blinded by success in strengthening its Shia support base after the war, Hizbullah adopted public and aggressive tactics in confkonting Siniora's government, alienating the

I7O United Nations Security Council. "Resolution 1701," August 1 1, 2006, http:/lnews.bbc.co.uki2/hl/middle-east/4785963.stm 171 Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal and Marina Ottaway. "Hizbollah and its Changing Identities," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2007, http:/lwww.carnegieendowment.org/files/ottaway~ghorayeb~fmal.pdf,2 172 "The Interview of Al-Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah with Al-Jazeera (Part I)," September 14, 2006, posted by Promise: For the Support of the Resistance Movement, http:l/english.wa3ad.orglindex.php?show-aews&action=article&id=34 1 Sunnis, Druze and Christians loyal to March 14'~. As political tensions rose, a Zogby

International poll conducted in early November revealed how starkly popular opinion had shifted from Hizbullah since the end of the war; in contrast to the aforementioned August poll, more than 40% of Sunni, Christian, and Druze Lebanese said their opinions of

Hizbullah had grown more negative since the outbreak of the July war, while no more than 26% of either sect said they held more positive opinions of the In the months following this poll, tensions would only sharpen. On November 1lth, the five

Shia ministers and another minister loyal to President Lahoud resigned from cabinet after failing to win March 14~'"sagreement to form a unity government. When this move failed to end the stalemate, the Hizbullah-led opposition-including Aoun, most of whose Christian supporters have remained loyal through the war and subsequent political conflict-took its cause to the streets. In early December, thousands of opposition supporters streamed into downtown Beirut, setting up a tent-city of protestors similar to that with which March 14~~entered the global consciousness nearly two years earlier. On

December 1oth, their ranks swelled to more than a million as opposition supporters joined in a massive rally against the Western-supported March 14~~government. From a podium not far from Rafiq Hariri's gravesite, Hizbullah deputy chairmen Naim Qassem led the crowd in chants of "Death to America, Death to Israel," and declared to the Arab leaders who supported Siniora's government: "We are in the hearts of the Sunnis of the

Arab world-not you!

'73 Telhami, Shibley. "Lebanese Identity and Israeli Security in the Shadows of the 2006 War, Current Histoiy, January 2007,http:l/find.galegroup.com; The same poll revealed that nearly 70% of Shia had more positive views of Hizbullah, while less than 5% held more negative views Fisk, Robert. "Revolution in the air as Lebanon's rift widens," The Independent, December 11,2006, http://news.independent.co.uklworldlfisWarticle2064767.ece Yet this was untrue. Despite substantial Christian participation and a smattering of Druze and Sunni supporters, many Lebanese viewed the opposition's demonstrations as a Shia invasion of downtown Beirut, the heart Sunni and Christian influence in the country. Moreover, as Saad-Ghorayeb explained in January 2007,

Today, in the region and above all in Lebanon, most Sunnis interpret Hizbullah's vitriolic criticism of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora as an attack against all Sunnis and conclude that Hizbullah is a sectarian movement, playing Iran's game and pitting Shiites against ~unnis.'~~

This perception had been strengthened by a shift in Hizbullah's rhetoric that had grown more prominent since July 12"', with the party increasingly adopting the Iranian practice of blaming America-rather than Israel-for all that is ill in Lebanon and the Middle

~ast.'~'While this shift is motivated in part by the war in Iraq and the White House's strong support of Israel during its invasion, it has been employed repeatedly by the party to discredit and attack the Washington-backed Siniora government. March 14~~has met

Hizbullah's charges with equally caustic accusations that the opposition is a stooge of

Iran and Syria, contributing toward the growing popular divide between supporters of the competing movements.

It was within this threateningly tense political context that Hizbullah called for a

"general strike," bringing the country to the brink of civil war. On January 23rd, thousands of opposition supporters took to the streets, enforcing their "strike" with burning tires and hooded young men armed with identical canes. Though Hizbullab members appeared to remain disciplined, Shia loyal to Amal clashed violently with Sunni supporters of Hariri's Future Movement, and Christian Aounists fought coreligionists loyal to Geagea's Lebanese Forces. As Robert Fisk wrote the following day, "the worst

'75 Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal and Marina Ottaway, "Hizbollah and Its Changing Identities," 3 '76 ibid 2 nightmare years may have begun again.. . The mobs were in their thousands, chorusing their hatred for those who lived across the other side of the bo~levard."'~~Nasrallah continued to stress the importance of national unity and the avoidance of civil war, but his actions in leading the opposition contributed toward a political and sectarian divide unseen in Lebanon since 1989.

Though a Shia Islamist party with deep links to Iran and a strategic alliance with

Syria, Hizbullah proved relatively successful in winning cross-confessional respect during the years of Syrian hegemony. Since the Syrian withdrawal, however,

Hizbullah-mirroring March 14'"-has effectively alienated half the country' s population. On one level this is a failure of the movement's foreign relations; with both its weapons and its invaluable Syrian ally under threat from March 14~~and Western powers, Hizbullah has marched in step with Damascus, matched its rhetoric with Iran, and, at least until July 2006, acted dangerously rash along the border with Israel. For the hundreds of thousands of non-Shia Lebanese who view Syria with anger, Iran with suspicion, and war with Israel as pointlessly devastating, this platform is unacceptable.

Hizbullah's failure in transcending sectarianism has also mirrored that of its political opponent. Hizbullah, like March 14~",has not attempted to extend its own electoral base outside the Shia community. The alliance between Aoun and Nasrallah-like that between Geagea, Jurnblatt and Hariri-is unprecedented on both the personal and confessional levels, but does not transcend the sectarian component of the Lebanese system. One can argue that the fact that Hizbullah is Shia Islamist and the FPM is predominantly Maronite makes the alliance particularly groundbreaking; this, however, is

Fisk, Robert. "Opposition demonstrations turn Beirut into a violent sectarian battleground." The Independerzt, January 24, 2007, http:llnews.independent.co.ukiworld~fisMarticle2180764.ece beside the point. The problem with cross-sectarian alliances in Lebanon is not that they do not exist-they always have-but rather that they fail (or do not attempt) to win meaningful support from within each of the country's three largest sects. In allying with the FPM, Hizbullah appears to have completed a shift within the Lebanese system that began during Rafiq Hariri's premiership: the divide between Sunni and Shia has replaced that between Muslim and Christian as the most prominent rift in Lebanese politics. The

structural characteristic of sharp division along sectarian lines, however, remains firmly

in place. Conclusion Over the Brink?

Today, two years after Hariri's death, Lebanon sits in what one of its former presidents has aptly called a "cold civil war.""8 The hope and exuberance of the "Beirut

Spring" are but a distant memory. The new political fault line that emerged in the aftermath of Hariri's death has grown into a chasm, and two opposing political alliances have dragged their followers to its brink. On one side stand the factions of the March 14~~ movement; most of the Sunnis, most of the Druze and nearly half of the Christians, loyally backing a leadership that has linked its political and economic platforms to the interests of Western powers. On the other side of the divide stand Hizbullah and its allies; most of the Shia and the other near-half of the Chstians, united in their opposition to March 14""s leadership. Hizbullah and its weaker Shia partner, Amal, seek to defend

Hizbullah's weapons and its Syrian ally while keeping Lebanon out of the Western orbit.

Michel Aoun trumpets a populist, anti-corruption message, but cannot escape charges that he simply wants to become president. Leaders on each side accuse their opponent of

sewing the objectives of its foreign backers, even as they hold regular meetings with

delegations fkom their own respective international allies. Various domestic and regional

attempts to mediate the crisis have produced little progress.

Much has shifted within the Lebanese system in the last several years, but no

political actor has managed to effect meaningful structural change. The "cedar revolution

of the vast majority of Lebanon's people," praised from the streets of Beirut to the steps

of the White House and the pages of Foreign Affairs, never served as the advance of

Amine Gemayal, Quoted at "The Beirut Spring: Cold Civil War," Beirut Spring. h~:iibeirutspring.b1ogspot.com/2007/02i~01d-~ivi1-~ar.htm1 independence and democracy that optimistic observers praised at the time. Today, just as in the 1950's and 1970's, Lebanon is divided between political alliances that each exclude any meaningful leadership from at least one of the country's three leading sects, and that each maintain relationships with foreign powers that the other side views as unacceptable. In short, Syria has withdrawn, but there is little fundamentally "new" about this Lebanon. Since the end of Lebanon's last civil war, three dynamic Lebanese actors, Rafiq Hariri, the March 14" movement, and Hizbullah have each sought to mold post-Taif governance to fit their respective political visions. The late prime minister and

March 14~"have already failed; Hizbullah, with its efforts to gain greater influence in

government mired in sectarian and geopolitical stalemate, will likely soon meet with

similar disappointment.

In outlining the prevailing explanations for Lebanon's most recent descent into

crisis, the introduction of this thesis discussed sectarianism, the structure of confessional

governance, March 14""s failures of leadership, the legacy of Syrian interference,

geopolitical wrangling between Washington and the Tehran-Damascus resistance axis,

and Hizbullah itself as potential culprits in Lebanon's slide toward the brink. Each of

these factors has played a role in the development of the crisis; sectarianism, confessional

governance, and foreign interference and competition together contribute toward the

fundamental shortcomings of the Lebanese system, and March 14'"'s leadership, like that

of Hariri and the Shia resistance, failed to transcend these structural weaknesses. Among

the political actors involved, it is clear that Hizbullah has played the most effectual role in

post-withdrawal Lebanon. In adopting the defense of its weapons as a matter of

existential importance, Hizbullah prioritized the maintenance of its external alliances (particularly, in this case, with Syria) as an element of its domestic political agenda and paved the way for inevitable clash with the international community. March 14" leaders exacerbated tensions by making little effort to cooperate with Hizbullah and, ultimately, by allying themselves closely with the United States. That being said, it is unclear whether any action (or lack thereof) on behalf of March 14'~could have induced

Hizbullah to maintain a more moderate tack. With Washington waving a UN Resolution calling for the its disarmament, its Syrian arms conduit threatened by an international tribunal, and Israel reportedly spoiling for a fight, Hizbullah may have felt it necessary to assert as much control over governance as possible as soon as the domestic climate following Hariri's death allowed.

With the successive failures of Hariri, March 14~~and Hizbullah, however, arises a deeper question: given the structure of Lebanese government, could any political actor succeed in transcending sectarianism and foreign interference? In rising to the heights of their respective influences, each actor flirted with the promise of transformative change.

Ultimately, however, the political advantages afforded through utilizing sectarianism and external alliances have proven too compelling to forego. In short, the source of

Lebanon's continuing vulnerability to civil strife is not a failure of leadership, but rather a fiunction of the Lebanese system itself.

At the heart of this predicament sits the weakness of the Lebanese state.

Lebanon's consociational government was designed to protect the individual interests of the country's various confessions. Sectarian strife has loomed as a threat in Lebanon since well before independence, and both the National Pact and the Taif Accord sought to provide the leading sects with a stake (however inequitable) in governance while ensuring that confessional leaders would have access to the resources necessary to take care of their flocks. This point bears emphasis: confession-based clientelist networks, rather than state institutions themselves, serve as the pillars of Lebanon's government.

Indeed, insofar as official institutions do play a role in governance, they are often little more than conduits of state funding for leading politicians (as in Walid Jumblatt's Fund for Displaced People, or Nabih Berri's Council of the South). Thus, for example, a

Druze living in the Chouf need not depend on Maronite or Sunni politicians to safeguard his livelihood; should he need access to state services, he can simply request them by paying a visit to the Jumblatt family castle. This system has the benefit of protecting

Lebanese from the tyranny of one powerful sect or alliance of sects. It also, however, strengthens the role of confessional elites in national politics, and provides politicians with both incentive and means to focus their efforts on maintaining support from their local, confessional base. This, in turn, leads citizens to confine their political identity and loyalty to their owl sect and, more specifically, to their local zaim. This loyalty carries established politicians to smooth reelection, and, just as importantly, allows them to maneuver aggressively without fear of losing electoral support.

The dangers inherent in this system become evident whenever political tensions rise. The Lebanese state is not strong enough to maintain the confidence of its politicians or private citizens; nor can it prevent either from resorting to self-help during periods of instability. Given the system's failure to account for shifts in the relative weights of

confessional populations, such instability looms as an ever-present threat. When political

conflict intensifies, leaders look in two directions to strengthen their positions: toward their respective political base, the loyalty of which allows each to adopt an aggressive tack; and toward external powers, whose support can provide political leverage and, should violence erupt, material and strategic depth. Meanwhile, citizens, wary of the risk of civil war and cognizant of the institutional weaknesses of the security forces and the army, look to their local patrons for protection. Thus the dangerous paradox of Lebanese politics: as deadlock commences and the threat of violence escalates, politicians are likely to feel increasingly emboldened by domestic and international support. When the stakes are high, the Lebanese system encourages confrontation rather than compromise.

This unfortunate fact served as the fundamental source of strife in 1957 and 1975, and it now perpetuates political stalemate in 2007.

The Immediate Outlook

Having discussed the failure of individual actors to transcend the Lebanese system, and having identified the systemic factors that discourage them from doing so, this thesis will address the potential for Lebanon to overcome its traditional weaknesses.

In the short term, prospects are not encouraging. More than four months have passed since Hizbullah escalated its demands for greater influence in government, taking to the streets and grinding what little work was still being accomplished in Lebanese government to a complete halt. The rest of the country's economy has followed suit. As a Daily Star editorial noted on April 12"',

The economies of the Gulf are acting like sponges, sapping up the best and the brightest Lebanese graduates who are all too eager to leave; investors are showing reluctance to launch new projects in Lebanon; and tourists are holding off before booking their airline tickets to Beirut.179

179" The Battle over the Hariri court threatens to tear Lebanon apart," The Daily Star, April 12, 2000, h~:iiwww.dailystar.com.lbiarticle.asp?edition~id=lO&categ~id=l7&article~id=81348 And yet, political resolution appears no closer today than it did in early

December. Hizbullah and its "opposition" still demand a "blocking third" (1 1 of 30 seats) of cabinet, which would allow them to use the threat of bringing down the government as leverage to protect Syria from a tribunal in the Hariri assassination case, to defend Hizbullah's arms from international pressure, and to hold greater influence in the selection of the next Lebanese president. The March 14~~"majority" will not accept a blocking third, but would agree to name a neutral minister to the pivotal 1lth seat-if the opposition approves the international tribunal beforehand. Hizbullah will not accept that condition. Meanwhile, though tensions in the street appear to have eased since the violent clashes of January, numerous reports suggest that factions on both sides of the

divide are arming themselves in case of an escalation. The risk of violent confrontation

will grow as Emile Lahoud's presidential term expires this fall. Parliament is scheduled

to convene in September 2007 to vote on his replacement, but the Lebanese constitution

stipulates that a candidate can only be elected with the support of at least two-thirds of

the legislature.'80 The election of the next president, like everything else in Lebanese

politics, is contingent on a resolution to the stalemate.

In the short tern, there are four ways out of this political deadlock: compromise

on the domestic level, civil war, compromise on the geopolitical level, or simply waiting

two years for a new round of parliamentary elections. Intuitively, the first would appear

the easiest and most likely. After all, isn't one side bound to ease its stance if the

cumbersome and threatening stalemate lasts much longer? Not necessarily. Hizbullah

views the protection of its arms as an existential matter, and defending the Assad regime

Moubayed, Sami. "In Lebanon, it is a question of choice," GulfNews, May 1, 2007, http://www.gulfnews.com/opinion/columns/regionJlO 122096.html is crucial to that protection. So long as Damascus sees the international tribunal as an unacceptable threat to regime security, Hizbullah will not bend in its domestic stance. On the other side of the divide, March lCh-with strong American support-has clearly drawn a red line on both the blocking third and tribunal issues. Both March 14~~and

Washington view the blocking third as providing Hizbullah and its international allies with a;~unacceptable level of power in government, and neither has shown any willingness to forego the leverage over Syria that the international tribunal would presumably provide.

Indeed, the most relevant question on the domestic front may not be whether either side will give in, but whether both sides can maintain internal unity in their uncompromising positions. There is no possibility of a shift in alliances that would transcend the conflict's primary sectarian fault line; Nabih Berri's Shia Amal party would never turn on Syria, and there is no Sunni party (or leader) to rival Hariri's Future

Movement (a fact for which Saad has his father to thank). There is, however, a small chance that Michel Aoun could distance himself from the opposition, thus removing the non-Shia political cover that Hizbullah has enjoyed in taking its aggressive political tack.

Should this occur, Nasrallah might feel it necessary to soften his demands; in order to woo Aoun from Hizbullah's embrace, however, March 14'~leaders would almost certainly have to promise him the presidency. If the last two years are any indication, this is a price that neither Jumblatt nor his Christian allies are willing to pay.

With the sides unlikely to peacefully resolve their differences among themselves, how great is the danger of civil war? As of this writing, it appears to be diminishing.

Hizbullah brought the country to the precipice with its strike in January, but the party recognizes that its role as the pan-Arab symbol of resistance would be among the first casualties of a sectarian civil war. Moreover-and ironically-some of the same international forces that discourage domestic actors fi-om reaching compromise also make civil war less likely. While Damascus would likely welcome an outbreak in violence that convinced the international community to allow the Syrian army to return to Lebanon as a peacemaker, Iran, Hariri's backers in Saudi Arabia, and the United States are all likely to steer their Lebanese allies clear of civil war. With tensions between Sunnis and Shia alarmingly high across the Middle East, Iran and Saudi Arabia, each with restive minority populations, and the TJnited States share an interest in avoiding further risk of regional sectarian bloodbath. Nevertheless, Lebanon remains dangerously unstable. Should either side escalate tactics and bring its supporters back into the streets, even a small outbreak of violence among undisciplined youth could open a cycle of tit-for-tat clashes that ultimately descended into civil war. Indeed, the instigators need not be supporters of either camp; should a Salafi terror group-several of which are reported to be establishing themselves within Lebanon-so choose, it could mount a couple of attacks on each opposing side, then sit back and watch as the camps retaliated against each other.

The most likely end to the stalemate, however, is a multi-tiered compromise among Lebanese actors and their foreign backers. There is no way to reverse the internationalization of the deadlock-Hizbullah and March 14~"each allied itself closely with its external allies in the months following Hariri's death, and now, unable to resolve their domestic differences, both sides find themselves, to a certain extent, at the mercy of the power struggle between the Tehran-Damascus axis and the alliance of Washington and Riyadh. Ultimately, the most likely outcome to the Lebanese chapter of this larger saga appears to be a compromise involving Syria and the United States. For instance, if the US agreed to, through the framework of the UN Security Council, provide immunity to senior figures in the Assad regime, Hizbullah would likely soften its demands toward

March 14~~.The geo--strategicand diplomatic issues involved in such a process extend beyond the scope of this paper. Before closing, however, a word of caution warrants mention. Should Hizbullah, March 14th,and their foreign allies fail to reach an agreement, the fourth option outlined above-allowing the stalemate to continue until the next parliamentary election-would prove a dangerous de facto choice. Given the state of sectarian tension in Lebanon and the likelihood of a growing Salafi terrorist presence on Lebanese soil, the country may not be able to stand on the brink for long.

After the Deadlock

Regardless of when and how Lebanon emerges from its current stalemate, another political crisis will eventually follow if the country fails to address the systemic forces that encourage sectarianism and external interference. In order to avoid this fate, the

Lebanese must strengthen their state at the expense of the confessional elite. Over the course of sixty years, the Lebanese brand of consociationalism has failed to provide stable and effective governance. Rather than discard the concept entirely, however,

Lebanon should uphold the principle of confessional power-sharing while reshaping the system to establish non-sectarian government institutions and encourage a higher level of democratic accountability. Through comprehensive electoral reform, Lebanon could weaken the role of sect in politics without exposing individual confessions to the prospect of losses in a zero-sum game. Electoral reform serves as the bridge between protecting confessional interests and increasing the power of the state. If citizens are given meaningful choices in electing a national government, their faith in the state will grow, encouraging public support for a transfer of power and services from the confessional elite to official, non-sectarian institutions. At the same time, if electoral districts are enlarged and redrawn to force candidates to compete outside their local confessional constituency, loyal support from the beneficiaries of spoils would cease to provide a guarantee of electoral success.

Politicians would no longer have incentive to depend on single-confession clientelist bases, and candidates would thus gain an interest in developing coherent, non-sectarian political platforms. Together, these reforms would weaken the independent power of confessional leaders while consolidating the resources of the state. With less electoral security and more reason to respect the power and resilience of state institutions,

Lebanese politicians would have incentive to work together to resolve issues, rather than adopt hard-line platforms buttressed by foreign support.

The Lebanese need not look far to find a promising new electoral law. In June

2006, the National Commission on electoral reform, established by Fouad Siniora, submitted a comprehensive proposal that addresses the intertwined problems of sectarianism and clientelism. The report's key suggestion: to adopt a parallel electoral system in which 5 1 of the country's 128 parliamentary seats would be elected on a proportional basis from six large electoral regions (the remaining 77 seats would be elected by majority vote within smaller, local districts). The election would be held throughout the country over the course of a single day, and parties would have to submit their electoral lists well in advance of the electi~n.'~'The law would still distribute seats according to the existing formula of confessional representation, but the adoption of larger electoral districts would weaken the collective role of traditional zuuama and encourage cross-confessional campaigning. Perhaps as importantly, holding the election on one day and forcing parties to submit their lists in advance would end the practice of ad hoc alliances that shift between rounds of voting; candidates would be bound by their decision to join a list, and thus might be more likely to build their alliances on ideological grounds.

As of May 2007, the National Commission's reform proposal remains confined to the realm of intellectual debate, a progressive suggestion that appears quaint in light of the current domestic and geopolitical circumstances. Ultimately, however, it is only through the adoption of new ideas that Lebanon can emerge from its cycle of periodic stalemate and civil strife. So long as the same names and faces operate with the same incentives to utilize sectarianism and external support, Lebanon is destined to remain a state on the verge of political crisis.

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