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The Faculty Advisor to the Student Writing the Thesis Wishes to Claim Joint Authorship Inthis Work Your unpublished thesis, submitted for a degree at Williams College and administered by the Williams College Libraries, will be made available for research use. You may, through this form, provide instructions regarding copyright, access, dissemination and reproduction of your thesis. The faculty advisor to the student writing the thesis wishes to claim joint authorship inthis work. In each section, please check the ONE statement that reflects your wishes. I. PUBLICATIONAND QUOTATION: LITERARYPROPERTY RIGHTS A student author automatically owns the copyright to hisfher work, whether or not a copyright symbol and date are placed on the piece. The duration of U.S. copyright on a manuscript--and Williams theses are considered manuscripts--is the life of the author plus 70 years. JVwe do not choose to retain literary property rights to the thesis, and I wish to assign them immediately to Williams College. Seiecting ttnii oi~ricir?nil1 :icii;;n c'i.q?j.r.igl-itti) the folfegr. This it? no \\-a!- p~~i:lz!ciesa student n~~tt~or Ickier ptd>YS~.!~ingiiii;:lrcr iror%r:tire .:ruciel~t x~011'id.hon-rrer. rreeii to .c~orrr;rcrtile ,-\rclli~.lisf(>r ;I per~nissionfern. Tf~c.Arci~i:-es n-o:~ld tie f1.c.c in tiiir case to also y~antperrl>i~:iiorr to nnotIrer reccnr~iltx-to plti.ilish crnnIl :;eciions 14-0112 the iltcris. Rarely n-ouid tf~rrebe :in?; re:&on for the Arri.ii.-cs ti! grant perriri~sionti-) another parry to ptrl?lisli t11r ti~esisin its t-nti~.eiy:if sr~cba sitrtniir.~narose; tile :'irchi\:.cs \\-otilti be ill tnociz witkt the 3iitl1<:\1.to let ~!XZITII<;II~)V- tliar suck1 a reqt~estItnd ileerl rnacic. -Ilwe wish to retain literary property rights to the thesis for a period of three years, at which time the literary property rights shall be assigned to Williams College. l;i.l?t-rrng thl- option yr: il- il~c,rutl~~r n fen 1~31~a,) 11?,h,i. z\,ci~is~,l:e nw ot tl~ctileus it* up-co~run~z I'":j?rtr, ,\Itrdc-s !n!ii r i.:6-rtii-i~ er;c -Vwe wish to retain literary property rights to the thesis for a period of years, c~r until my death, whichever is the later, at which time the literary property rights shall be assigned to Williams College. Seicctln- tilt5 q?tlori nTloir .- riri- :arrti~t.rrgreat tleiib~lti! 10 t-~ftsndiitgor <l~>~~e~'"tngGle tirnc nt h:.;41cr :rizrorn,rlic copxr-i~htperiod Some sluiicnrs are intcresicd in uqing tlxir Ilit3qte In graduate irhnc4 \T i,rk 1 I? iiii5 c:isz it n c.rrld rn,:ke i.tail\il fnr t17eli1 10 enfer 3 ~~tiinberr~~clr ZLS ..1O y;115' 111 tiit- l.lnnL ~rndlirrtb c3~1triir .ii.cids -or rrnt~lin;. death n t~riiiex ~~ric the liiier ' In any z::rni it 1s ertcrcr fir riir 'i~iitr.ii-sttr ,iiiit~in~t,tet~iip~ri:yht orr .i mrtnrikcript ifthe priind ttrld.; nrti~tiit. 1nilE7 ~cil~ni'.ilentti ?.riir >t,til ori't !la\ e scarcl? till z~t,tIeP\ZCXLIO~\ Iri (111- <'a\t:--but 13115 IS ~lir1rt4>II~ 10 cneti cttident 11. ACCESS The Williams College are investigating the posting of theses online, as well as their retention in hardcopy. /Williams College is granted permission to maintain and provide access to my lhesis lnhardcopy and via the Web both on and off campus. "ialccrln~illis oj?tioi~'tiion .; 1e~zarcI3~~1r ,t10irt121 tilt ii(?!kI 10 :tiiixt7.q Cfi:? (hg~f~ll:21-wn JOUI L~OI~ The Cedar Stalemate: Lebanon, from Rafiq Hariri to the Brink of Civil War by Noah Bonsey Professor Marc Lynch, Advisor A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honors in Political Science WILLIAMS COLLEGE Williamstown, Massachusetts May 18,2007 Table of Contents The Independence Intifada The Lebanese System Rafiq Hariri The March 14~~Movement Hizbullah Over the Brink? Works Cited Thanks to my family for inspiring me, My friends for diverting me, And my girlfriend for putting up with me. Thanks to Professor Lynch, Professor Darrow, and Professor MacDonald for all their guidance. Introduction The Independence Intifada On March 14th,2005, nearly a quarter of Lebanon's population floodled Martyr's Square in central Beirut. Audiences across the world looked on at what appeared to be the climax of an historic revolution. One month after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, a million Lebanese-some in short skirts, others in hijabs, ad1 bedecked in red and white-stood together in the nation's capital, united in demanding a full and permanent Syrian withdrawal. The moment shone with dramatic symbolism; masses of Lebanese from sects that had fought each other bitterly during the country's civil war demonstrated side-by-side, proclaiming unity and independence amidst the city center that Hariri had dedicated his political and business career to rebuilding. Hariri's assassination on February 14'" had sent a jarring wave through the Lebanese political system. His funeral two days later drew hundreds of thousands of Lebanese-Muslim and Christian-flooding downtown Beirut in a demonstration of grief and rage toward the neighboring regime many held responsible. The weeks that followed witnessed unprecedented displays of popular boldness and cross-confessional cooperation. Thousands of young, mostly Christian and Druze demonstrators set up camp in Martyr's Square in a bold affront to the Syrian-dominated mukhabarat (secret police) state. A coalition of Sunni, Druze and Christian politicians publicly blamed Damascus for the killing and joined in calling for a withdrawal of the Syrian military and intelligence apparatus. The opposition's momentum appeared in danger on March gth, as half a million demonstrators-mostly Shia-attended a Hizbullah-organized rally in support of Bashar Assad's regime. On March 14~~'however, hundreds of thousands of Sunnis joined with Chnstians and Druze in direct answer to the pro-Syria ra!ly. Hizbullah backed down in the face of this overwhelming sentiment, and weeks later Syrian troops withdrew from a Lebanon that seemed-after 14 years of civil war followed by 14 years of Syrian hegemony-to be uniting behind its cedar flag. And the world took notice. What Lebanese referred to as the "Independence Intifada" became known in the United States as the "Cedar Revolution." Images of young, bright-eyed, often Gucci-wearing Lebanese demonstrators flooded C'NN. The White House hailed the birth of a new, independent and democratic Lebanon, pointing to the Syrian withdrawal as evidence of the wisdom of aggressive American policy in the region. The wave of enthusiasm swept through much of the foreign policy establishment as well. Writing in US News and World Report, noted Lebanese political scientists Fouad Ajami extolled the "cedar revolution of the vast majority of Lebanon's people," arguing that "no one could have foreseen the mass grief of the captive count~y.No satrap on the scene could have anticipated the coming together a fortnight ago of the largest demonstrations in Lebanon's history."' In a Wnshingtoa Post op-ed, Henry Gssinger called Syria's withdrawal one of the "extraordinary advances of democracy" that was taking place in early 2005.~As the last uniformed remnants of Damascus's hegemony crossed back into Syria in late April, Lebanon prepared for its first independent parliamentary elections since the civil war-a vote that was expected to usher the pro- Western, "March 14'"" opposition comfortably into power. Ajarni, Fouad. "The apparition in the Levant," US.News & World Report, April 4, 2005, http:llweb.lexis-nexis.com. 2 Kissinger, Henry. "Implementing Bush's Vision; To Effectively Spread Democracy, We Must Balance Values and Geopolitical Challenges," The Washington Post, May 16, 2005, http://web.lexis-nexis.com. Less than a year later, however, Lebanese politics lay grounded in sectarian stalemate. The enthusiasm of the Independence Intifada had all but died, and a cast of familiar figures-clan leaders, former warlords, the progeny of long established political families-argued fruitlessly over the future of the presidency and Hizbullah's weaponry, two issues deeply linked to the traditional Lebanese curses of sectarianism and foreign intrigue. Posters of the martyred Hariri and banners demanding "The Truth'' still adorned storefronts in certain neighborhoods, but, even among the young Lebanese who had fueled the movement, a sense of resigned fi-ustration prevailed. The "new" Lebanon was already beginning to look an awful lot like the old one. This political stasis would hold until July 12"', 2006-when Hizbullah's kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers plunged Lebanon into war. The Independence Intifada drove the Syrian military out of Lebanon, and the opposition's performance in the subsequent elections empowered a governing majority whose leadership maintained close ties with the United States and opposed Syrian meddling in Lebanese affairs. However, what began with a popular, multi-confessional uprising reverted quickly to the traditional post-mandate Lebanese model of governance: a ruling coalition of sectarian leaders, united to the exclusion of other confessionali (namely Shia) parties. Weak, divided, and without a common steward, factions within the new government looked to opposing foreign powers for support-just as they have throughout Lebanon's history. Why, less than two years after the March 14~" movement's success in installing a more autonomous, pro-Western government, does Lebanon once again sit at the brink of civil war? In a country as diverse, divided and prone to international meddling as Lebanon, an investigation into the country's failure to progress toward stable independence reveals no shortage of suspects.
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