Modern Orthodoxy: Definitions and Insights Modern Orthodoxy: Definitions and Insights By: Rabbi J. Simcha Cohen PART I. I. Introduction A popular contemporary rabbinic concern is to seek the essential quality that marks Modern Orthodoxy (MO) as a unique form of Torah Judaism. In the middle ages theologians analyzed Judaism to assess its essential nature. Their concern was to locate a quality that should it be missing, then Judaism would not exist. A modern example of such an inquiry would be to seek the essential aspect of a car. A car even without air conditioning or radio is still a car. Yet, should a vehicle not have a motor, then it would no longer be deemed a car. What is, therefore, essential to Modern Orthodoxy? Some have suggested that Chesed (kindness, charity, caring for others), may be essential to MO. That is true, but it is definitely not unique to MO. Many diverse sections of Jews and even Gentiles hold the view that kindness is essential to their way of life. Anyone hospitalized in New York City will attest to the wonderful service of Satmar women who provide kosher food to patients free of charge. I still recall one woman who travelled with two different busses for over an hour each way to bring kosher food graciously to my wife. It was the Yartzeit of her husband and she wanted to observe a Mitzvah of Chessed on the Yartzeit. I have known Gentiles who were magnificent in making kindness an integral aspect of their lifestyle. Accordingly, the inquiry should not necessarily be to seek an essential characteristic but, rather, a unique quality that marks it as different from other forms of Judaism. It is necessary, therefore, to develop a primary definition of the uniqueness of a Torah observant Jew and then note the special emphasis of the MO. II. Analysis It is well known that there is a Beracha (blessing) to be recited upon meeting a great scholar. Of interest is whether this Beracha may be recited upon meeting a Jew who, for example, has won the Noble Prize for his outstanding scholarship? This question many years ago was the subject of a Ma’amar by HaGoan HaRav Yitzchok Hutner (zt’l), the Rosh HaYeshiva of Yeshivat Rabbainu Chaim Berlin. He suggested that a careful reading of the terminology of the Shulchan Aruch indicates that it is not proper to recite this Beracha over a Jew. The Shulchan Aruch (SA) states, “Should one see wise Gentiles who are scholars in secular knowledge, one says, blessed be He… who has given from Page 1 His wisdom to human beings.” (SA, Orech Chayyim (OC) §224:7) Note the specific terminology of the SA. It specifically limits this Beracha to Gentiles who are knowledgeable in secular wisdom. Apparently, Jews who are masters of secular wisdom are not to receive this Beracha. Also, Gentiles who excel in Torah studies also would not be granted a Beracha. Why? In dealing with Berachot (blessings), there is a guiding principle of primary and secondary purpose (Ikar V’tafel). For example, a blessing for spice is only recited when the spice was originally utilized for the purpose of providing fragrance. Should the spice however have another purpose then even if it provides a pleasant fragrance, one does not recite a Beracha upon enjoying its fragrance. The fragrance that commands a Beracha must emanate from its essential purpose. (SA, OC §217:2) So too contends HaGoan HaRav Hutner relates to blessings over people. The prime purpose of the Jew is to learn Torah. This is the goal of his existence. Everything else, including secular scholarship or scientific knowledge is of a secondary value to the Jewish soul. It may be important. It may even be vital to life, but it is still secondary to Torah. As such, a Jew is not granted a Beracha unless he excels in his primary role, Torah. Likewise, the same logic compels the same response when relating to a Gentile. A Beracha is not operational should the Gentile excel in Torah for that is not his primary role in life. (Pachad Yitzchok—V’Zot Chanukah, Ma’amar 9:2 and 9:6) Thus, Torah is the distinctive character of the Jew. Not prayer, not Chessed, but Torah. This dynamically suggests that the uniqueness of MO Judaism must reside in its formulation of Torah. In other words, is the Torah of the MO Jew uniquely different from the Torah of the Yeshiva or Hassidic world? At issue is whether Halacha may be ruled differently due to distinctly different orientations? The proper response is definitely yes. In fact, MO has an approach to Halacha that differs from the approach of the Yeshiva and Hassidic world. (In reality it has more traditional roots than the orientation of the Yeshiva and Hassidic world.) Several years ago, Rabbi Shalom Klass (z’l), publisher of the Jewish Press, sent me a copy of a ruling of Rav Henkin (zt’l), former author of the Ezrat Torah Luach and a major Posek of American synagogue Jewry. The issue was in the event that the Mishna Berura and the Aruch HaShulchan differed, who should one follow; the Mishna Berura or the Aruch HaShulchan? Rav Henkin ruled that one should not follow the Mishna Berura, but, rather, the ruling of the Aruch HaShulchan. Why? The Mishna Berura, known as the Chofetz Chaim was the Tzaddik of the generation. The Tzaddik of the generation should not be the decider of Halacha for such a person will have a proclivity to be stringent. So true! In previous generation in Europe, the Rav who decided Halacha for the community at large, generally was lenient. In the Hassidic and Yeshiva spheres the custom was to be stringent. Anyone learning the Mishna Berura notes how he generally suggests a compromise solution that favors stringency. His argument generally is why be involved in a doubtful situation. Be stringent and observe all positions. The Aruch HaShulchan deals with questions on the basis of what is the realistic Halacha and generally does not suggest a compromise. Being lenient does not mean to violate Halachic standards. It is instead an orientation when ruling for the community at large. It is a recognition that a Halachic decision is not a pavlovian extremist position. It is interesting to note that our sages did not generally assume that Halacha must be ruled L’hachmir (stringently). The Talmud, for example, discusses the source for the position that women are obligated from the Torah to recite Kiddush on Friday night. It notes that there are two Biblical commands pertaining to Shabbat. “Zachor” [Remember the Shabbat, Exodus 20:8], and “Shamor” [Guard or observe the Shabbat, Deut.5:12]. The former is the Mitzvah of Kiddush and the latter relates to all the negative commands of Shabbat. The Talmud rules that “Whoever is included in the Page 2 command to “guard the Shabbat,” is also included in the command “to remember the Shabbat.” Since women are obliged to observe all the negative commands of Shabbat, they are also included in the positive command to recite Kiddush. Accordingly, even though Kiddush is a Mitzvah observed in a specific time frame and women are not obligated to observe such Mitzvot because of the special Biblical relationship of “Zachor” to “Shamor,” they are required to recite Kiddush. [Berachot 20b] Of interest is the fact that the relationship of “Zachor” to “Shamor,” could have been interpreted differently. Instead of saying that whoever was obligated in “Shamor,” was also obligated in “Zachor.” The Talmud could have said, whoever is not obliged to observe “Zachor,” was also not obliged to observe “Shamor.” Since women were not required to recite Kiddush for it was a Mitzvah occurring only in a specific time frame [Zman Gerama], they also were not obliged to observe the negative commands of Shabbat. The reason this lenient method of interpreting the relationship of the verses was not expounded was, say our commentaries, due to the general accepted rule that in a concern for a relationship of Biblical verses and Hekesh [linkage of verses], only the stringent interpretation is utilized and has Halachic merit. The following question was posed to HaRav Akiva Eiger (z’l): What is the meaning of the general rule that when interpreting Biblical verse-relationships, only the stringent position is accepted? Is it because such is the essential rule for interpreting verse relationships? Or, is it based on the general concept that in matters of doubt relating to Biblical Mitzvot one is stringent [Safek D’oraita L’chumra]. HaRav Akiva Eiger’s position was that the stringency was due to the very nature of the rule and Mesora of interpreting verse-relationships and not due to doubt. [Kovetz Responsa, Rabi Akiva Eiger, Volume II, Teshuvot V’Chidushai Rabbainu Akiva Eiger, Number 17] (According to the position that women are obligated to recite Kiddush simply because of doubt in a Biblical Mitzvah, as posed to Rav Akiva Eiger, it would not be proper for women to recite Kiddush for men who are obligated to perform the Mitzvah without any questions pertaining to the status of the obligation itself. To extent that HaRav Akiva Eiger ruled against this position, it would appear that women may recite Kiddush for men.) What is obvious is that in matters other than the tradition of a Hekesh, there is no Mesora to be stringent. Thus a penchant to be lenient for the community at large, is not a violation of Halacha nor a deviation from common practice. Yet, contrary to Hassidim and B’nai Yeshiva it is unique to present day Ashkenazi MO deciders of Halacha.