Brief Prepared for the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities of the House of Commons

Brief prepared for the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities of the House of Commons

Aviation Safety

April 2017

James Dow Air Navigation Commissioner (retired)

Summary

Global standards for international civil aviation are developed, amended and adopted continuously by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The Convention on International Civil Aviation calls on each contracting State to implement the standards so the world will have the highest practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures, and organization for civil aviation. When examining aviation matters it is important to ask whether there are global standards that apply. Today, our system of safety oversight is under stress. A study of aviation safety should take into account the global standards that apply to safety oversight to find where improvements might be made.

ICAO Standards The Convention on International Civil Aviation provides for the adoption of International Standards and Recommended Practices. These are set out in annexes to the Convention. (A Standard is a specification to which Contracting States will conform in accordance with the Convention. A Recommended Practice is a specification to which Contracting States will endeavour to conform.) There are now about 12,000 Standards and Recommended Practices for international civil aviation set out in 19 Annexes to the Convention: Annex 1 Personnel Licensing Annex 2 Rules of the Air Annex 3 Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation Annex 4 Aeronautical Charts Annex 5 Units of Measurement to be Used in Air and Ground Operations Annex 6 Operation of Aircraft Annex 7 Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks Annex 8 Airworthiness of Aircraft Annex 9 Facilitation Annex 10 Aeronautical Telecommunications Annex 11 Air Traffic Services Annex 12 Search and Rescue

1 Annex 13 Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation Annex 14 Aerodromes Annex 15 Aeronautical Information Services Annex 16 Environmental Protection Annex 17 Security Annex 18 The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air Annex 19 Safety Management

Annex 19 – Safety Management is the newest annex. It was adopted by the ICAO Council in 2013 and became applicable in November of that year. These standards are developed almost entirely by expert groups of various kinds with experts from States and from industry. Canada contributes to this work with experts from government, such as Transport Canada and the Transportation Safety Board, and from industry, such as Nav Canada. A proposal for new standards can come from many sources. Proposals can come from assemblies that are held every three years, from air navigation conferences, from States, international organizations, panels, study groups, the Council, the Secretariat, the Air Navigation Commission1. Once the proposal is accepted, the work is assigned to an expert group. Presently, there are 17 panels reporting to the Air Navigation Commission. Beyond that, there are panels, like the Aviation Security Panel, that report to the Council, and, for environmental standards, there is the Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection (CAEP), a committee of 170 experts that also reports to the Council. CAEP reached agreement last year on a new body of environmental standards for

CO2 emissions that will form a new volume of Annex 16 – Environmental Protection. There are other expert groups, such as study groups and task forces, that report to the Secretariat. Because you have been dealing recently with the question of Unmanned Air Vehicle Regulations, let me use an example of standard-setting in that technical area to illustrate the process of standard-setting at ICAO. ICAO now uses the term Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) and the Second High Level Safety Conference in February 2015 recommended that ICAO expedite the development of provisions to be used by States to regulate remotely piloted aircraft system operations within their airspace. The expert group developing standards in this area is the Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems Panel (RPASP). At their sixth meeting, held from 31 October to 4 November 2016, there were 109 experts. This included 29 members nominated by 19 Member States and 10 international organizations as well as 78 advisers. The panel met again last month and the eighth meeting will take place in June. Final drafts of new global standards for remotely piloted aircraft systems will be discussed by the panel in November of this year and brought back for endorsement by the tenth meeting in March 2018. After that, the new standards will be presented to the Air Navigation Commission at ICAO in a preliminary review, probably in the fall session of 2018. If the Commission agrees, the new standards will be sent out to all 191 member States for comment. A final review will take place in the fall of 2019 and the

1 The Council is the governing body of ICAO with 36 State representatives. The Air Navigation Commission is a group of 19 experts nominated by 19 States. They are appointed by the Council to serve as experts, not as representatives of their countries, to review all new Standards and Recommended Practices and Procedures for Air Navigation Services and to recommend them to the Council for adoption. The Secretariat is the permanent staff of ICAO, headed by the Secretary General.

2 schedule calls for the standards to be presented to the ICAO Council for adoption in March 2020.2 Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) The ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) was launched in January 1999, pursuant to a resolution by the ICAO Assembly. The objective was to promote global aviation safety by regularly auditing ICAO Member States to determine their capability for effective safety oversight. Canada was the first country to sign the Memorandum of Understanding, letting ICAO test their new procedures on us. The scope of the audits was expanded in 2004 and again Canada was the first to sign the MOU and be audited under the Comprehensive Systems Approach. When ICAO adopted the Continuous Monitoring Approach in 2012, Canada did not step forward and by 2015 we still hadn’t signed the memorandum. Finally, when only Canada and a couple of Pacific island States remained, Canada signed the MOU in August 2015. This was certainly noticed at ICAO but Canada is now on board. As you might expect for a developed country, the host country of ICAO and one of the States of chief importance in aviation on the Council of ICAO, the view of Canada from ICAO is generally positive. (Although at the 39th Assembly last year Canada garnered the least number of votes among the States in the first tier, being ranked last after the Russian Federation.) In some respects, such as the manner in which Nav Canada has been established, we are seen as a model for the world. This doesn’t mean that we shouldn't be concerned. Critical Elements of State Safety Oversight ICAO has identified and defined the critical elements of a State’s safety oversight system in Annex 19 – Safety Management. Critical elements are essentially the safety defence tools of a safety oversight system and are required for the effective implementation of safety-related policy and associated procedures. States are expected to implement safety oversight critical elements in a way that assumes the shared responsibility of the State and the aviation community. These elements encompass the whole spectrum of civil aviation activities, including areas such as aerodromes, air traffic control, communications, personnel licensing, flight operations, airworthiness of aircraft, accident/incident investigation, and transport of dangerous goods by air. The effective implementation of the Critical Elements is an indication of a State's capability for safety oversight. CE-1. Primary aviation legislation. The provision of a comprehensive and effective aviation law consistent with the environment and complexity of the State’s aviation activity and compliant with the requirements contained in the Convention on International Civil Aviation.

2 On 20 March 2017, ICAO issued a letter to all 191 member States reminding them of their obligation, under Article 8 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, to protect civil aircraft from all “pilotless” aircraft. The letter informs States of an online toolkit designed to assist States with developing national regulations for domestic operations.

3 CE-2. Specific operating regulations. The provision of adequate regulations to address, at a minimum, national requirements emanating from the primary aviation legislation and providing for standardized operational procedures, equipment and infrastructures (including safety management and training systems), in conformance with the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) contained in the Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. CE-3. State civil aviation system and safety oversight functions. The establishment of a Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and/or other relevant authorities or government agencies, headed by a Chief Executive Officer, supported by the appropriate and adequate technical and non-technical staff and provided with adequate financial resources. The State authority must have stated safety regulatory functions, objectives and safety policies. CE-4. Technical personnel qualification and training. The establishment of minimum knowledge and experience requirements for the technical personnel performing safety oversight functions and the provision of appropriate training to maintain and enhance their competence at the desired level. The training should include initial and recurrent (periodic) training. CE-5. Technical guidance, tools and the provision of safety-critical information. The provision of technical guidance (including processes and procedures), tools (including facilities and equipment) and safety-critical information, as applicable, to the technical personnel to enable them to perform their safety oversight functions in accordance with established requirements and in a standardized manner. In addition, this includes the provision of technical guidance by the oversight authority to the aviation industry on the implementation of applicable regulations and instructions. CE-6. Licensing, certification, authorization and approval obligations. The implementation of processes and procedures to ensure that personnel and organizations performing an aviation activity meet the established requirements before they are allowed to exercise the privileges of a licence, certificate, authorization and/or approval to conduct the relevant aviation activity. CE-7. Surveillance obligations. The implementation of processes, such as inspections and audits, to proactively ensure that aviation licence, certificate, authorization and/or approval holders continue to meet the established requirements and function at the level of competency and safety required by the State to undertake an aviation- related activity for which they have been licensed, certified, authorized and/or approved to perform. This includes the surveillance of designated personnel who perform safety oversight functions on behalf of the CAA. CE-8. Resolution of safety concerns. The implementation of processes and procedures to resolve identified deficiencies impacting aviation safety, which may have been residing in the aviation system and have been detected by the regulatory authority or other appropriate bodies. Note.— This would include the ability to analyse safety deficiencies, forward recommendations, support the resolution of identified deficiencies, as well as take enforcement action when appropriate.

4 Conclusion My purpose in providing this brief to the Committee is to call attention to the global standards for international civil aviation and to the critical elements of a State’s safety oversight system. The direction of my own civil aviation career after leaving the air force was influenced by two major crashes. The first was the crash, on 11 February 1978, of Pacific Western Airlines Flight 314 at Cranbrook, British Columbia, killing 42 of the 49 people on board. That led to the Royal Commission on Aviation Safety, headed by Chief Justice Charles Dubin, and its 63 recommendations, delivered in 1981, that changed the landscape of aviation safety in Canada. The second was the crash, on 10 March 1989, of Air Ontario Flight 1363 near Dryden, Ontario, killing 21 of the 65 passengers and 3 of the 4 crew members on board, including both pilots. That brought the Commission of Inquiry led by the Honourable Virgil Moshansky, who has appeared before this Committee. He delivered his final report in 1992, setting out 191 recommendations that changed how the world viewed aviation safety. The report became widely recognized as an accomplished examination of accident investigation and prevention from the systemic as well as from the organizational perspective, bringing into view the latent failures within the Canadian aviation system. The report showed us how systems can fail and organizations can drift into failure one decision at a time. We are seeing evidence that our safety oversight system is under stress. The Transportation Safety Board has put safety management and oversight on their watch list. The report of the Ornge crash in Moosonee, Ontario, in 2013, presented three recommendations pertaining to regulatory oversight. The previous government slashed funding for all safety and security programs at Transport Canada, with a significant portion coming out of safety oversight initiatives. This government has placed Transport Canada under special oversight for repeatedly missing internal financial targets. Transport Canada risks losing its place among aircraft certification authorities due to lack of resources needed for this work. The crash of Air Canada Flight 624 in Halifax two years ago was, with 138 people on board, a near disaster. We are all waiting to see the report of that accident. These are just a few indicators of stress. When I see these indicators I think of a statement in the ICAO Safety Oversight Manual: “State authorities responsible for safety oversight should be provided with the necessary resources, both human and financial, to be able to effectively carry out safety oversight obligations on behalf of the State. Without such a commitment on the part of the State, efforts put into resolving difficulties will remain simply efforts, with no significant positive effect.”3

3 ICAO Safety Oversight Manual (Doc 9734), Part A, The Establishment and Management of a State’s Safety Oversight System, 2.5.4.