• TH.: PARTAI P":RSATUAN PEMBAN(;UNAN: the I)olitit:al Journey of Islam under Indonesia's New Order <1973·1987)
by Sudarnoto Abdul Hakim
A Thesis submitted tu the .'aculty of l;raduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts • Institute of Isla mie Studies M~ŒII University Montreal
June, 1993
©S.A. Hakim • U·M·I ~lJeJE<.T TFrM SUBJECT CODE
THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
(OMMIJ~i(ATIOH) MW HiE ARTS P",!, ""'If O~?~ PHILCSOPHY, RELIGIO~ AND AJX,ent 0579 1 T(I ,l". ).,. (JI.'? PI"! d,r 'j O~3~ THEOlOGY MP.:!,evol 0581 1,t~I"'''f (Ji!7 P, Il'J (U!o O~~'7 Ph.l",oç.!')' 0422 ""-odern 0:82 ( JI 1 !I,I) CfF 1) :"'1(>/1"'\ 0714 Blnà 0323 O)]J ppllrJ on 1. "r (J ' '~ (""'1.('.)11<1 fi (,,·,.. ,01 0318 Aff,ccn 0]1\ f (W' /,/10 f) j ~/ (,.~ '01:"" f r n'~ O~~J e L"csl ~tud el 0321 1."0 AUltroi,o and 0-",n,o 03:32 Ir 1( '." Il '."., (j/,,! 03.'0 Cc,oQ,an O::'J r, ~ ... I(J;r ~ f ct ("'rGf 0319 ), )IU ()', Ir r) j'Il ",,"""01 O~~Q H ",:', of 03;0 Ecropeon 0335 LI ('Jf ( ',t 'fi' f' (); ,ri rfil<' ~II ( Tr .. t Ir fJ O~JJ Le',n Am.,,(C'1 0:;26 0710 r~ Ilc"";-"'yol 03:':2 IhJ'\ 1 ,(1 r IJt\POt, n~ fj/I ~ T(~r.", '",( Throir_jf 0469 ~Iacle Ec."prn 03:3 ~J "" (J 11 " T,,,, .. (FI'! 'l'I''~ Jri'I·' r,t~ 0;;:>3 UndedSIC'P1 0'1-7 '''')1 l ""11'111( '(/))1 ... n(JI 0741 ,.. ,n (),1'}) Vr~(Jllr SOCIAL sm~m H,,'C-ry cl Sc'elXe 05'35 r ,-·d, f f).V,!, 1 Af'1P' Ir '")f"l ':"oId e~ 0323 U:-;'" , 0:79 LANGUAGE. llHRATURE !-HO Anlr.rnrxo'cm' PClll1tcl J P'Xe fDU(ATION LlNGUISTICS AfC~Oeo-;{)(l'I 0324 c,,'e
T:"E SC2ENC~S AND ENGINEERING
BIOlOGICAl SCIENCES C",~~l(>w 0370 ~P"<'
THB PARTAI PBRSATUAN PRMBANGUNAN (1973-1987)
•
• ABSTRACT
• Author . Sudarnoto Abdul Hakim Title : The Partal Persatuan Pembangunan the Pohtlcal Journey of Islam under Indonesla's New Order (1973-1987)
Department Islamlc Studles. McGllI Unrverslty
Degree MA
This thesis deals wlth the PPP. from ItS emergence 111 1973 untll 1987 The study
attempts to descnbe the pohtlcallourney of thls party It examines the pOSition of thn ppp III
the pohtlcal system of Indonesla's New Order as a whole Immedlately tllter the rlse of the
New Order government. a systematlc program to restructure and slmpllfy the pohtlcal r,ystnm
was launched Il almed, pnmanly. al national stablllty and the ellmlnéltlon of Ideologlcal
polltics To the New Order government, an IslamlC Ideologlcal Orientation would only lead 10
confhcts among pohtlcal forces and cause chaos, as expenerlced dunng the hberc11 dmnocrilcy
of the Old Order government The emergence of the ppp berng il consequencfl of tlle
• pohtlcal reslructurrng launched by the government. the expectatlon WdS that It would be ri
good partner of the government However. 111 the flrst flve years of Its eXlslmlCf!, the ppp
tended toward~ radical pOlttlCS opposlI1g the government on mhglous grounds Ttlls
OppoSition, whlch was agall1 manlfested towards the end of the 1970s, was SHI-Hl by ttl8
government as an attempt by Islamle pohtlcal groups to replace the Pancaslla wlth Isldm as
the natlon's ldeology Such a perception caused a lengthy Internai confllet wlttun !tIn party
itseH, particularly between the NU and MI. or between the Idealtst and malt<;t groups Tho
Internai situation of the ppp helped the government enforce the Paneaslld as Ih8 <;oln
foundatlon of ail social and pohtlcal parties The slgnrflcance of 11115 thesis Iles ln thn fact that
no attempt has so far been made to study Islam and pohtlcs under the New Ordf!r govemment
with a particular focus on the PPP • Auteur. Sudamoto Abdul Hakim Titre: Le Partal Persatuan Pembangunan: le voyage politique de l'Islam sous le nouvel ordre de l'Indonésie (1973-1987) Département: L'Institut des études islamiques, Université McGill Grade: Maîtrise es Arts
Ce mémoire traite le parti politique (le PPP) et son histoire depuis son émergence en 1975 Jusqu'à 1987. Cette étude essaie de décrire le voyage politique de l'Islam du parti. Il examine la position du PPP dans le système politique de l'Indonésie. Immédiatement après que le nouveau gouvernement avait été établ1, un programme systématlquf' de restructuration a été lancé afin de faciliter le système politique. Le but du pro~ramme était principalement la stabilité nationale ainsi que }' élimination des partis Idéologiques Le nouveau gouvernement croyait qu'une orientation
Idéolo~lqlle vers l'blam dans la politique causerait des conflits entre les forces politiques et mènerait au chaos. comm(' l'ancien gouvernement avait subi sous sa politique de démocratie libérale. L'émergence du parti ppp était une conséquence de la restructuration politique lancée par le nouveau gouvernement. en prévision d'en faire un bon partenaire pour le gouvernement Cependant, durant les premiers cinq ans de son existence, le ppp s'inclinait à une politique radicale et il opposait le
~ouvernement à cause des raisons religieuses. Cette opposition se manifestait encore une fois vers la fin des années soixante-dix, et a été vue par le gouvernement comme une tent li • ACKNOWLEOGMENTS 1 would IIke to express my gratl,tude ta Prof Issa J Boullata. Dlrector of the Mcglll !ndonesla IAIN Dev€llopment ProJect, and Prof AUner Turgay. Dlfüctor of IIHl Instltute of Islamlc Studles, McGlli Umverslty. who gave me the opportulllty to c;tudy clt the Instltutt' Prof AUner Turgay was my academlc Advl50r and Superviser. who advised me ln dph'nTlInlnqlho ultlmate direction and scope of thls thesls 1 Wish ta express my dpppest qratltudp for Ills valuable advlcp. and tus endless patience ln encouraqlng me fl11l5111ng my clCcldemlc dutll!<; Thanks are also due ta Prof Karel A Steenbnnk for hls readmec;c; and patience to rf'ad Hw first draft and dlscuss about many Issues of Islam and politlcs ln IndoneSlcl'S Nf!W Order 1 would also hke to Hxpress my gratitude to Prof Nurcholish MadJld and Prof Howcud M • Federsplel, whose lectures and semlnars dunng the wlnter and summf~r :,üSSlons of 1992 insplred me to chos€' the PPP as the main subJect of my study Thanks are alst) due ta the Canadlan International Development Agency (CIDA) for the award of a fellowshlp to study at McGlli University 1 would also hke to thank Hlfl staff of ttle McGill-lndonesla IAIN Development ProJoct both ln Jakarta and ln Montreal for thH facllillHS they provlded for me to complete my studles My gratitude also go ta Mr Adam Gacek, the Head Islamlc StudioS lIbrary and to ail tus staff, who asslsted me ln flndlng matenals 1 would also hke to express my gratltudn ta Ms Maha EI-Maraghi, Mr Bruce Fudge and Mr Floyd Mackay who patlently edlted my work, and to Ms Roxane Marcotte for her translation of the abstract Into French • My gratitude IS also expressed to H Munawlf SJadzah, M A and Dr Tarmizi Taher, the III former and present Mlnlster of Rellglous Affalrs respectlvely. who gave me the chance to • pursue my study at the Instltute of 1"lamlC Studles (liS), McGlli University. Prof Quralsh Shlhab. Rector of IAIN Syanfhldayatullah Jakarta, who gave me permission to leave my dutles at the IAIN, and ta Mr Zakana M Passe. a senior journahst of the Tempo magazine. who asslstp.d mB ln collectmg valuable sources, particularly. about the PPP Ta those who are not ment.oned by ndme, 1 Wlsh to express my thanks for ail thelr contnbutlons Wlthout such help and cooperation. th,s the SIS could hardly have been compteted 1 am also most grateful to my relatives Lastly. 1 am Indebted to my lovely wife, Nuralna. who has always patlently glven me moral support. and to my cute klds, Farah, Abi and Sarah. who wrth love, encouraged me to complete thls the SIS Montreal, June 1993 • SAH . • iv • ABBREVIA TIONS The following abbreviatlons have been used ln thls the SIS ABRI = Angkatan BersenJata Republlk IndoneSlcl (Indoneslan Repubhc Arrnüd Forces) ASPRI = Asisten Pnbadl (Pnvate Assistance) BAPILU = Badan Pengendah Pemlhhan Umum (Body for Controlhng the Gerlflrcll Election) BBI = Bansan Banteng Indonesla (Indoneslan Ox Front) BCA = Bank Central ASla (Aslan Central Bank) BPUPKI = Badan Penyelldlk USdha Perslapan Kemerdekaan Indonesla (Investlgatmq Commlttee for Indoneslan Independence) BULOG = Badan Urusal1 Loglstlk (Log.stIG Management Body) 0011 = Dewan Dakwah Islamlyah Indonesla (Councii of Indone<;lan Islarmc • Preachlng) DI = Dar al-Islâm (Islamlc state) F-OP = Fraksi Demokrasi Pembangunan (Faction of Development Democracy) F-PP = Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan (Faction of Umted Devnlopmenl) F-KP = Fraksi Karya Pembangunan (Faction of Development Functlon) GBHN = Garis-galls Besar Haluan Negara (Broad Outhne of State Pohcy) GOLKAR = Golongan Karya (Functlonal Group) GUPPI = Gabungan Usaha Perbalkan Pendldlkan Islam (ASSOCiation for the Improvernent of Islamlc Education) HMI = Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesla (Mushm Student Association) KINO = Kelompok Induk (mother group of orgamzatlon) LPU = Lembaga Pemlhhan Umurn (General Election Instltute) MALARI = Malapateka Lima belas Januan (January dlsaster) • MDI = MaJlis Dakwah Islamlyah (Councii for Islarme Propagatton) v MI = Musllmln Indonesla (Indoneslan Mushm) • MPR = Ma/hs Permusawaratan Rakyat (House of Assembly) MUI -= Ma/hs Ulama Indonesla (Indol1eslan Ulama Councll) MUNAS = Musawarah Naslonal (National C'ehberatton) NASAKOM = Naslonahs, Agama, Komunts (NatlOnahsm, ReligIon, Communlsm) NU = Nahdlatul Uldma (resurgence of Ulamâ) OPSUS = Opera SI Khu<;us (specIal operatIon) P4 :: Pedoman Penghayatan Pengamalan Pancaslla (Guidance for the Comprehension and Implementation of Pancaslla) PARMUSI = Partal Musllm Indonesla (Indoneslan Mushm Party) PBI = Partal Bangsa Indonesla (Indoneslan Nation Party) POl = Partal Demokrasllndonesla (Indoneslan Democratlc Party) PERMIKA = Persatuan MahasIswa Indonesla dl Kanada (Indoneslan Student AssocIation ln Canada) PERSIS = Persatuan Islam (Islamle Umon) • PERTI = Pergerakan Tarblyah Islam (Islamle Educational Movement). PERTAMINA = Perusahaan Tanah Mmyak Naslonal (State 011 Company) Pli = Partal Islam Indonesla (Indoneslan Islamle Party) Pli = Pela/ar Islam Indonesla (Indoneslan Musllm Student). PKI = Partal Komunls Indonesla (Indoneslan Communist Party). PMP = Pendldlkan Moral Pancaslla (Pancaslla Moral Education) PNI = Partal Naslonalls Indonesla (ndoneslan Natlonallst Party) PPP = Partal Persatuan Pembangunan (Untted Odvelopment Party). PSII = Partal Sarekat Islam Indonesla (ndoneslan Islamle League Party). PUI = Persatuan Umat Islam (Islamle Ummat Union) PWI = Persatuan Wartawan Indonesla (Indoneslan Journallst Association) RUUP = Rancangan Undang-undang Perkawinan (Marnage Bill). • SI = Sareknt Islam (Islamle League) VI SOKSI = Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Sosiahs Indonesla (Central Orgaillzation of • Indoneslan Sociahst Functlonanes) • • VII • SPELLING AND TAANSlITEAATION ln transhteratlon of the Arablc names and terms in this thesis 1 have used the transhteratlOn scheme employed at the Instllute of Islamle Studles, McGl1I University The Indoneslan names and terms are wntten based on the new Indoneslan spelhng used slnce 1972 However, cert2,n names of persons and places wntten ln the old spelhng Will appear, especlally ln quotatlon Sorne examples of the dlfferences between the old and the new Indoneslan spelhng ch, dl, /, t/ become kh, /, y, sy, c The dlfferences ln transilleration trom Arablc to Engllsh and Indonesia are Arabic Eng'lsh Indonesian Arabie Enghsh Indonesian .' U th te: if CI. dh/dl • e:- h. h 0 t th ;:) dh dz b z zh ... Cf E;h sy t if 8 sh ~ Since thls thesls has been typed using a word-proeessor, there are several technical are as whlch could not be mechanlcally resolved The ayn has been represented by reversed apostrophe () The hamza IS denoted by the apostrophe ( ) • VIII • TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT .... .1 RESUME ..... ii ACKNOWLEDGMENT Iii ABBAEVIATIONS .... v SPELLING AND TAANSLlTEAATION. ..viii TABLE OF CONTENTS. ix INTRODUCTION ...... 1·4 CHAPTER ONE: ISLAM UNDER THE OLD OROER GOVERNMENT 1 POlitical Grouplngs 5-13 • 2. The Politlclzed Islamlc Group 13-37 CHAPTER TWO: THE EMERGENCE AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE ppp 1 The Polities of Development 38-45 2 The Fusion of Islamie Parties. 46-58 3 The 1977 General Elections., 58-66 CHAPTER THREE: THE DECLINE OF THE ppp 1 Opposition to the Government , 67-76 2 Internai Confllct 76-95 3. The Sole Foundatlon 95-101 CONCLUSION 102-106 APPENDIX ...107-112 BIBLIOGRAPHY.. . .. 113-124 • ix • INTRODUCTION This thesls is a study of the pohtical JOurney of Islam ln Indonesla under the New Order government trom 1973 to 1987 focusing speciflcally on the PPP. This tOple hr.s been chosen for the followlng reasons Flrst. dunng thls penod, many Indoneslan Mushms were actlvely involved ln polrtlcs They beheved that polrtlcal power was necessary for both reltgious and h,stoncal reasons They asserted that the adoption of Islam as the state's fundamental basis was urgent However, others re)eeted th,s notion and preferred not to utlhze Islam as a formai symbol of polrtlcs Interestlngly, the tensIOn between these two groups whlch may be referred to as the Idealfst and the realls' groups coloured the pohtlcal behavlor of the PPP Second, the New Order government, the focus of thls study, is an order ln which Indoneslan pohtlcs IS more oriented towards economlc development and pohtical stabllrty. A pragmatlc attitude seem5 to be a pre reqUis rte of sustalnable development that ail social and • polrtlcal organlzahons should be able to Implement ln an attempt to resolve the Ideological and po htlca 1 eonfllcts that occurred dunng the Old Order government. the New Order government Imposed a reformatlon and simpllflcatlàn of the parties system aimed partly at inhlbrtmg Musltm pohtlcal forces Thlrd. the government launched policies between the years 1973 and 1987 whieh slgntfleantly provoked the reaetlon of the Mushm clreles. This resulted in major changes partlCularly ln the scene of Indoneslan Islamlc polrtlcs which gave blrth to the new Islamic pohtlcal trends As a party whlch was supported by the former Islamlc polrtlcal parties, the PPP had to demonstrate Its ablhty to cope wlth the new srtuatlon Fourth. there are alrnost no studles deahng spectflcally wlth the PPP pubhshed in English. Umaldl Radl's work whlch deals wlth the strategy of the PPP IS probably the only exception . • ThiS IS a case study of the Islamlc polrtlCal force ln the national level between the years 1973 2 !:. and 1982 1 There are actually sorne valuable works deahng wlth Islamlc pohtlcs under the New Order government K.E Ward,2 for example, dlscusses the foundatlon of the Pannusi. whlle M. Naslr Tamara dlscusses Islam under the New Order government from 1965 untll 3 1985 Mahrus Irsyam focuses hls work on the pohtlcal behavlor of the NU 0\ Llkü IrsYdm. Kacung ManJan tnes to trace the pohtlcal stance of the NU partlcularly aMer Its decision to return to the 1926 Khlttah r, Abdul Munir Mulkhan focuses on the chèlnges Hl the pohtlcèll behavior and the polanzatlOn of the Islamlc ummat b€tween 1965 and 1987 " Morcoller, M Sirajuddln Syamsuddm scrutlnlzes the relation between rehglon and pohtlcs ln IsiaOl by uSlIlg Muhammadlyah as hls case study 7 Muhammad Kamal Hasan studles on the response of the Indoneslan Mushm mtellectuals ta the development launched by the New Order government He speclflcally concentrates on dlscusslng Nurchohsh MadJld's Ideas Il ThiS thesis IS dlfts re nt , however, m that It focuses on the ppp trom ItS emergence ln 1973 to 1987 ThiS IS slgnlflcant since none ot the books mentloned above deals excluslvely wlth the ppp ln discusslng thls tOplC, 1 divIde the thesls Into three Chapters ln Chapter One 1 dlscuss • political groupings ln Indonesla's Old Order ln the hght of Clifford Geertz's three main types 1 Umaidi Radl, Strategl ppp 1973-1982 (Jakarta Integnta Press, 1988) 2 K.E. Ward, The FoundatlOn of the Partal Musllmm Indonesla (Ithaca Modern Indonesla Project Southeast ASla program Cornell Umverslty, 1970) 3 M. Nasir Tamara, Indonesla ln the Wake of Islam 1965-1985 (Malaysia Instltute ot Strateglc and Internattonal Studles, 1986) 4 Mahrus Irsyam, V/ama Dan Pattai Polltlk (Jakarta Yayasan Perkhldmatan, 1984) 5 Kacung f~anJan, Quo Vadls NU Setelah Kemball Ke Khlttah 1926 (Jakarta Penflrbrt Erlangga, 1992) 6 Abdul MUnir Mulkhan, Perubahan Pefllalw PoI,t,k Dan PolaflsaSI Ummat Islam 1965-1987 (Jakarta' Rajawah Pers, 1989) 7 M. SiraJuddln Syamsuddln, "Religion and Polltlcs ln Islam The Case of Muhammadlyah ln Indonesia's New Orde(' (Ph 0 dlSS, Umverslty of Callfornla, Los Angeles, 1991) 8 Muhammad Kamal Hasan, "Contemporary Mushm Rehglo-Polrtlcal Thought ln Indones.a • the Response to New Order Modernlzatlon" (Ph 0 diS, Colurrbla Unlver<;t1y, 1975) 3 (variants) of Javanese society, Pnyay/, Sant" and Abangan 9 Some argue that the se variants, whlch were Introduced by Geertz ln the 1950s, are the basls of the theory of cultural pohtics 1O • and pohtlcal grouplngs Wlth regard to the theory, Emmerson explalns that the term "cultural polltlcs" refers to what happens when cultural dlfferences are pohtlclzed and pohtlcal dlfferences are cast ln cultural terms 11 Accordlng to the theory, those three cleavages of Javanese society became Ideologlcally Incarnated as the three streams of Natlonahsm, Islam and Marxlsm (Communlsm) These were ln turn polltlcally transformed Into three polltlcal parties PNI, Masyuml and PKI However, due to some flows ln Geertz's theory, 1 Will draw upon other scholars who point out that Geertz's trlchotomy inherently conslsts of some contradictions and propose an alternative vlew that polltical grouplngs were formed ln order to fulflll pohtlcallnterests Moreover, Geertz's theory Will not be employed ln dlscusslng Islam and polltlcs under the New Order government. slnce thls Will result ln overslmpllflcatlon ln the last part of th,s Chapter, 1 Will dlscuss the so-called pohtlclzed Islamlc group 12 ThiS IS sigmflCant slnce the position of Islamlc Ideology ln the context of the relation between Islam and the state • ln Indonesla IS acute 1 Wil' try to assess the problems faced by thls group as weil as ItS polltlcal expectatlon through descnblng the Wrtttngs of some of the leaders of th,s group on Islam and pohtlcs ln Chapter Two, 1 begln by dlscussing the emergence and consolidation of the PPP. Glven that the emergence of the PPP was a consequence of the New Order government's 9 Clifford Geertz, The Rel/g/on of Java (New York The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960). 10 Donald K Emmerson, Indones/a's Elite Polit/cal Culture and Cultural Politics (Ithaca: Corne Il Unl\ ~rslty Press, 1976) 11 Emmerson, Indones/a's Elite, 24 12 Zlflrdaus Adnan tends to use the term"pro-formal hnk between Islamic ideology and the state" (abbrevlated to FLBIIS) to refer to those who struggle to have some form of formai hnk between Islamlc Ideology and the state See, Zifirdaus Adnan, "Islamie RehglOn Yes, IslamlC (PolltlCal) Ideology No! Islam and the State in Indonesia," State and Civ/I Soc/ety ln Indanes/a. Anf Budlman. ed (Victoria Centre Of Southeast Asian Studles Monash • University, 1990),441 4 polltical restructunng, rt IS wortl1whlle to dehneate the pohtlcs of development of the New Order • which put the parties and other soclo-pohtleal forces under the control of the yovernment Despite the weak position of the ppp ln the overall pohtleal system. the ppp demonstratnd Its determmatlon to eonsolldate and sohdlfy the coheslveness of ItS elements The chdllellges faeed by the ppp -- e 9 RUUP (marnage bill), the promulgation of tht> P4 and i/ltrtln Kepercayaan and the govemment's decision to Implement the Idea of floatlllg f11<1SS ,md havlng to compete wlth other contestants ln the 1977 general electlons -- ~nd tlum rcspollse to them will be dlscussed Aiso the Impact of the economlc cnsls and of the tension WltllIll the mllrtary ellte on the posrtlon of the ppp will be assessed ln the last Chapter, 1 deal wlth the decltne of the ppp ln whlch three factors Will be desenbed Flrst, the PPP's Opposition to the government as seen ln the congress cornnlltltH! dehberatlng the Issue of the altran kepercayaan and the P4 ln 1978 and Its respon-;f} to tho ratification of changes III the law on general electlons ln 1980 ThiS Opposition provoked the anger of the government and eausec1 Internai problems wlthm the ppp Second. thn internai • contllet wlthln the ppp whlch onglnated wlth the dlsappolntment of the NU wlth the If)(lderstllp of J Naro of the MI There were also the tensions among the MI and NU clrcle<; Ttllrd, tho Implementation of Pancaslla as the azas tunggal (sole foundatlon) of ail social and pohtlcal organtzatlons The wlthdrawal of the NU from the ppp as a consequence of the azas tunqgal and its decision to retum to the 1926 khlttah Will also be dlscussed The data fOf the thesls are denved from pnmary and secondary sources The pnmary sources Inelude the works wntten by those dlrectly Involved III polltlcal scene as weil as the reports of magazines and newspapers, IIke Pan)1 Masyarakat, Tempo, Far Eastern EconomIe Re VIe w, Kompas and Media Dakwah relatlng ta the tOplC The secondary sources are the materlal from other authors wlth the subJect connected wlth the Issue There are sorne referenees, though not dlreetly related to the tOplC but useful for the study of the ppp, am also • included in the at1ached blbhography CHAPTERONE • ISLAM UNDER THE OLD OROER GOVERNMENT The Old Order government led by Sukarno, was ln power from 1945 to 1965 The period was generally marked by politlcal Instabihty and economlc cnsls While sorne efforts to overcome those problems had actually been launched, the national difficultles of the young Repubhc tended to be more comphcated, especially as a consequence of the debate among Indoneslan leaders concernlng the role of Islam ln Indoneslan pohtics It IS wfthout doubt that Islam, as the principal religion adhered to by the maJontv of the Indonesian people, was treated dlfferently by the distinct polftlcal group::; whlle sorne argued that Islam was a complete religion encompasSlng ail aspects of Ilfe, and they proposed Islam as the basls of the state Others reJected the notion of rehglous authonty and control over the state ln the followlng pages an attempt Will be made to explore the Islamic polltlcallnvolvement • under the Old Older government A theoretlcal discussion on politlcal grouplngs, as weil as the trends of pohtlclzed Islamlc groups also follows. Pol"lcal Grouplng It is arguable that politlcal behaviour under the Old Order government was deeplv Influenced by the soclo-cultural complexity of t~e Indonesian society. There was a significant correlation between pohtlcs and culture. This leads Emmrrson to assert that politics itself becomes a purely Intercultural struggle 1 Therefore, ft would be no exaggeration to reason that the pohtlcal grouplng of the tlme was formed under the Influence of cultural sol.danty or aliran ln Syamsuddln's words ''the pohtlcal hlstory of Indonesla has revealed dynamlc cultural struggles between vanous groups."2 Ali thls means that leaders of ethnlc groups, religious • 1 Emmerson, Indonesla' 5 Elite, 19 6 communities. and secular aSSOciations clash. coalesce and clash agaln as they stnve to • implement thls images of the future that favor thelr respective chenteles 1 As far as the pohtlco-cul1ural approach of Indoneslan pohtlcs IS concerned some consider that Geertz's theory on the tnchotomy of the Javanese society IS slglnlfant 4 He dlstlllguishes three vanetles of Javanese Islam and correlates each wlth a partlcular social class. Flrst. the Abangan variant IS descnbed as a syncretlc blend of elements trom Anlmlsm. Hindu-Buddhlsm. In conjunctlon wlth the Islamlc element that was predominant dmong the masses of rural Java Llong refers to these practltloners as nominal Musllms " GfJertz charactenzes the core c' the Abangan rellglous variant as slametan (communal meal)," and considers rt kolot (conservatlve or old-fashloned) 7 Accordlng to Ruth T McVey, th,s variant represents the rural conservatlsm of an Islam long exposed to the Influence of pro-Mushm culture B Second, the Sant" variant These can be regarded as devout Musllms The deSCription of the Santn rehglous variant offered by Geertz may bc summanzed as follows • 2 Syamsuddln, "Religion and Polltlcs," 34 3 Emmerson, Indonesla's Ebte, 19 4 Geertz, The ReligIon, see also Clifford Geertz, "The ReligIOn Of Java" Readmgs on Islam ln Southcast ASla. ed Ahmad Ibrahim, et ail (Slngapore Instltute Of Southeast ASlan Studies, 1985) On commen~ary and crltlcal vlews to Geertz's theory see. for Instanco, Robert W. Hefner, "Islamlzlng Java? Religion and Polltlcs ln Rural East Java," Tfle Juurnal of ASlan Studles, 46 (1987), Harsja W Bachtlar, "The Religion of Java A Commentary," Readmgs on Islam ln Southeast ASla, ed Ahmad Ibrahim, et al (Slngapore Instltuto of Southeast ASlan Studles, 1985), R M Koentjaranrngrat, "Revlew of the Religion of Java," MaJalah IImu-lImu Sastra Indonesla No 2 (1963) 5 Liem Soel LIOilg, "Indoneslan Musllms and the State Accommodation or Revoir)" Thlfd World Quarterly, 10 (1988) 871 6 This slametan IS carned out to asst..re the psychologlcal state of slamet, the absence of emotlonal dlsturbance, a practlce rooted ln the alllmlstic tradition of Javanese syncretlsm 7 Geertz, "The Religion," 270-277 B Ruth T McVey's ,"troductlOn "NatlOnallsm, Islam, and Marxism The Management of Ideologlcal Confllct ln Indonesla," ln Soekarno, Natlonallsm, Islam and Marxlsm, tran!. Karel H Warouw and Peter 0 Weldon (lthaca, New York Modern Indonesla ProJect • Southeast Asia Program, 1970), 13 7 Santri is manrfested ln a careful and regular executlon of the basIc rituals of Islam, such as the frve prescrtbed dally prayers, the Fnday reltglous service ln the mosque, the fast during the • month of Ramadan, and the pllgnmage to Mecca Santn rs also manrfested ';'fj a whole complex of social, chantable, and polltlcal organtzatrons, such as the Muhammadiyah, Masyuml, Nahdatul Ulama, PSI!, PERTI, and al-Irsyad ln addrtlon to Geertz's descnptlon, It is also worthwhile mentioning that many observers dlvlde the Santn vanant Into two groups, tradlttonaltsts and moderntsts.9 These two categories "remaln usefulln observtng the nature of a movement whlch Involves the development of its ideas, rts approach to and method of problem-solvlng, and ItS organtzahonal styles "10 The tradltlonalls' Santfls were generally assoclated wlth mernbers of rural Islam who strictly adhered to the teachlng of Islam as embodied ln the four madhhabs (Islamlc le gal sChools), especlally the SMfl i madhhabs, or the Aqidah Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama ah (henceforth called the Sunnr) and were also assoclated with the Pondol< Pesantren (traditional Islamic • educatlonal tnstltutlon) ln rural areas 11 q The dlchotomy of tradltlonaltst and modernist Mushm movement is also used, for instance, by Dellar Noer See Dellar Noer, The Modermst Musflm Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942 (Oxford University Press, 1973) 10 Syamsuddln, "Religion And Polrtlcs," 34 11 R S Abd AZIZ, a sympathlzer of Nahdatul Ulama , ln a very Ideological way, explains the concept of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah as it relates to 'Aqidah and Shari'ah ln the flrst part of hls book he asserts that, etymologlcally, Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamâ ah conslsts of ahl (famlly), sunnah (way, behavior, tradition), and jama'ah (communrty) Ahl al-Sunnah, therefore, means the followers of the Prophet Muhammad's tradition, and al-Jamâ'ah as the followers of the ftlqad of the Prophet's compan/ons. Dhofler also explalns that the phrase, Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama ah, may be deflned as followers of the tradrtlOn of the Prophet Muhammad and the '1m3 (consensus) of the 'Ulamâ This conception at once sets them apart from the modernlst Mushms who, in splte of thelr clalm that they are also followers of Muhammad's tradrtlon, reJect IJm3 as one of the sources of Islamlc law. Therefore, It IS reasonable to say that, as Abdurrahman Wahid claims, modernist Muslim movements suct! as Muhammadlyah and PERSIS only accept the al-Ash'àri schoiasticism as the basls for their Sunnl falth. See. Rs. Abd Azi:, Konseps; Ahl al Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah Dalam Bldang 'Aqidah dan Shari'ah (Pekalongan CV Bahagia, 1990). 7, Zamakhsyan Dhofler, Tradlsi Pesantren (Jakarta. LP3ES, 1982), 142, and Abdurrahman Wahld, "The Nahdatul Ulama and Islam ln Present Day Indonesia," in Islam and SocIety ln Southeast ASla, ed Tauflk Abdullah (SIngapore Instltute of • Southeast ASlan Studles. 1986) 179 8 The doctrine of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama ah. as formulated by the NU. the greatest • tradrtlonalist Musltm movement ln Indonesla. IS based on the followtng essenttal polllts l,) 1. Believlng in the Tauhid (oneness of Gad) as formulated by Imâm Abû Hdsan alA~h ân, the founder of the Ash anyah, and Imam Abü Mansur al-Màtundl, the founder of the al- Mâtundïyah ThiS teachlng stresses that there IS but one God and recognlzes the messenger Muhammad 2 Adhenng to one of the four schools of thought of flqh (Mushm law). Hanafl. Maltkl, Shàfl Î. and Hanbâlt Although thase schools of IslamlC thought have spread throughout the M'Jsltm cou nt ries , ln matters of flqh, Indoneslan tradltlonaltst Musltms tend to hold fast to the Shah Î view ThiS schoolls known for ItS fleXible Vlews, tolerable and adaptable to tho local traditions and values of rural Javanese mysticism and even to (Ile demands of a modern state Tho flexlbllrty of the tradltlonahst Musltms IS also manlfested at the polrtlcallevel ln whlch. based on thelr flqh perspective, they tend to adJust to any polttlcal changes or systems ThiS IS d wason • why sorne people say that on the poltttcai level the tradltlonaltst Musltms are regarded dS OpportUOlSt Musltms 3. Followtng the mystlcal ways and orders establtshed by al-Junald al-Baghdadi Mysttclsm seems to give welght to the Intensrty of the spiritual expenence of reltglon especlally arnong the tradltlonaltst Musltm people, whose dally lives are closelv governed by flqh The tedctltng of mysticism stresses the Implementation ln one's dally Itfe of the strong doctnne concmntnq the hlerarchy of kesalehan (plety) or b::irokah (grace) whlch makes possible the Intervention ln the relatlonshlp between a servant and God and so on 11 Wahld also asserts fhat The splrrtualtty concretlzed ln the chain of Intensive rrtualtstlc actlvltles makes It possible 12 Wahld, "The Nahdatul Ulama," 178, see also KhOlrul Fathom and Muhammad Zen, NU Pasca Khltah Prospek Ukhüwah Dengan Muhammadwah (Yogyakarta Media Wldya Mandala. 1992). 11-12 • 13 Wahid. "The Nahdatul Ulama ," 179 9 for there to be a "watering down of the soul" agalnst a barrenness of spiritual experience and Intellectuahsm This Will resuh ln maintalnlng co nt mUit y between the strong flqh vlews on the one hand and the Intenslty of the refined spintual eyperience • on the other, leadlng to the creation of a feeling of hlstonclty 14 The second group of Santn vanants IS the modernlst Santns who were generally assoclated wlth the urban traders as weil as wlth the western educated people in urban areas. They called for rehglous, economlC, educatlonal, social, and pollt.cal çhanges ln Indoneslan society by employmg the Qur an and Sunnah as the most valld sources of moral and ethlcal guidance Unhke the tradrtlonahst Mushm group, they tended to propagate the punflcatlon of Islam from any other non-Islamlc elements as weil as IltlMd, the hberatlOn and IIberal/zatlon of thought -- ln which Mushms should not depend enttrely upon the Ulamâ and other past Musl/m scholars' thought (taqlid) ln addition to the" rellgious Spirit they were also realistlc ln attemptmg to understand the fundamental social, economlC, educat.onal, and polltlcal problems whlch schackled Indoneslan Musllm society and solving them by provldlng new, appropnate, and rational ways Hmdley comments • in contrast wlth the tradltlOnal/st, modern man exhiblts a quest.oning of society as presently constltuted, a dis satisfactIOn with sorne of Its parts, a rel/ance upon 'rational' and 'sclentlflc' solutIOns to what are now regarded as 'problems,' a readlness to sample and adopt some of the western cuhure /fnports "15 Geertz's thlrd variant, the pnyay" IS Identlfled as an ellte hentage strongly Influenced by the Hindu-Buddhlst values of earher Javanese courts and linked to Java's traditlonal gentry and the administratIve bureaucracy that replaced It ln the modern era 16 Geertz assumes that the Pnyayl manlfested a dlstmct rehglous traditIon deslgnated as the Pnyayl rehglous variant of the general rehglous systf'm of Java Pnyayl onglnally referred only to the heredrtary anstocracy which the Dutch pried loose 14 Ibid 15 Donald Hlndley, "Allrans and the FaU of the Old Order," Indonesia, 9 (1970): 24 • 16 Geertz. The ReligIOn. 6 10 from the Kings of the vanqUished native states and turned lOto an appolntlve. salaned civil service This white-collar ehte. Its ultlmate roots m the Hmdu-Javanese courts of pre-colonial tlmes, conserved and cultlvated a hlghly reflned court etlquette. a very • complex art of dance. drama. muSIC. and poetry. and a Hlndu-Buddhlst mystlclsm Thtly stressed nelther the antmlstlC element ln the over-all JavanesH syncretlsm as dld the abangans, nor the Islamlc as dld the santns, but the htnoulstlc 1,. Geertz's descnptlon of the Prlyayl rehglous variant IS based on the assumptlon that the Pnyayl tradition '3nd the Abangan tradition were, ln the hlstonc past. two distinct subcultures The Pnyayl tradition assoclated wlth the rulmg ellte and the P.bangan tradition assoclated wlth the ruled peasantry 18 By employing a polltlco-cultural approach. one may argue that pohhcal grouplng WolS formed under the strong mfluence of cultural sohdanty or allfan It means that the ttuee cleavages of Javanese society, Pnyay" Sant" and Abangan, assumed a domlllant public place, becomlng Ideologlcally mcarnated as the three streams of Natlonallsm, Islam, dnd Marxlsm19 (Communlsm) These also were pohtically transformed Into the three pohtlcal parties, PNI, Masyuml and PKI 20 KuntowldJoJO pomts out, however, that thls pattern of polltlcal • grouping Inherently consists of contradlctory and Inconslstent elements He proposes the two following reasons 1) There IS no sharp dlstmctlon between the Indoneslan Nattonahst Party ( PNI) and the Indoneslan Communlst Party ( PKI) ln thetr cultural onentatlOn, and them IS no consistent difference between the PriyaYI and the Abangan 2) The PKI was strong m central Java and the PM was strong 1'1 east Java, not only 17 Ibid 18 Bachtlar, "The Religion," 283-285 These assumptlons are mlsleadlng, however, Sinee Geertz mcludes the Pnyayl as a part of the Javanese rellQlOus category ln other words, the weakness of Geertz's assumptlon IS based on hls category of the tnchotomy m whlch he does not conslder the Pnyayl as a soclal-occupatlOnal class It could only be contrasted with wong clflk (Ilttle people), who represent lower-class segments of the social spectrum such as peasants Rellglously, many Pnyayls are therefore Abangan, but sorne are secular or even Santn 19 McVey, "NatlOnahsm," 10 20 For éI study of Interaction between the allran in one settlng, see Robert Jay, ReligIOn and • Polit/cs ln Rural Central Java (New Haven Yale Southeast Asla Studles, 1963) 11 because of the syncretlc onentation of the Abangans in those reglons, but also because of the hlgh quahty of capitahst penetration and exploitation in the past history • of the reglons ::>1 The Inconsistency of the approach can also be seen by observing the political constellation that developed soon after Independence ln which the young republic was governed by SJahnr (the flrst Prime Mlnlster) m 1945-1947, as a result of the change ln the cabinet system As has been noted, a few months after Independence, power shlfted from the older group of natlonahsts who had sat on BPUPKI to a younger group under the influence of two soclahst leaders. SJahnr and Amlr SJarlfuddin After the Advisory Central National Commlttee had boen transformed into a legislative body, the presldentlal cabinet under Sukarno was replaced by a parhamentary cabmet under SJahnr 22 Sjahnr's government made tremendous concessions to the Dutch by negotlatmg with them affalrs of the Indoneslan government. whlch resulted ln the re-entry of large numbers of Dutch soldiers to Indonesla. Consequently, pohtlcal opposItIOn remalned strong "ThiS came to a head ln the 'July 3rd affair of 1946 -- an abortive attempt by the Natlonal-Communlet Tan Malaka and a pohtlcally • heterogeneous group of assoclates to stage a coup d'etat "23 Masyumi -- whlch propagated unit y for ail Indoneslan people under one common government, as weil as a revolutlonary way to confront the enemy and defend the sovP.relgnty of the nation -- relected the change of the cabinet system, the negotlatton woth the Clutch, and ln turn demanded a coalition cabinet Surpnslngly. bath the congress of PNI, conducted ln January 1946, and that of PKI, ln February 1946, supported Masyuml Even more. Masyumi alhed wtth PKI and other Communlst forces of the former mernbers of the Persatuan Pe'1uangan (Unrty of Struggle), an OPPOSition front whlch was led by Tan Malaka. to form the Konsentrasi NaslOnaf (National 21 KuntowldJoJO. "Religion. State, and Social Formation in Indonesia," M/zan3 (1984) 14. 22 Herbert Feith, The DecIme of ConstltutlOnaf Democracy ln Indonesia (Ithaca. Corne Il University Press. 1962),9 23 Ibid With regards to the July 3rd affalr. see, George McT Kahln, Nat/onalism and • Revolut/on m Indones/a (Ithaca Cornell University Press, 1952), 147-195. 12 Concentration) The chairman of this front was SardJOno of the PKI and the vice cl1cllrman • was trom Masyumi Masyuml also cooperated wlth the PNI, PBI and BBI -- a nèltlonClhst stream whlch opposed the government and demanded both the dissolution of tl10 SldtJnr cabinet and the formation of the coahtlon cabinet as weil ;>4 Thus, one may argue that the pattern of polltlcal coalitions between the three distinct pohtlcal streams, Natlonahsm, Islam, and Communlsm. and thelr opposItIOn to the soclClhst government Of SJahnr, for example, support the Idea that pohtlcal analyses. bdsed rnertlly on the theory of cultural sohdarity, are questlonable It has falled to provlde Cl more comprehensive understandlng of the Indoneslan pohtlcal configuration The need for Ulllty of ail the people and among those pohtlcal streams -- whlch was based on .. more pragmatlc Interest ln strengthemng the Indoneslan pohtlcal stand agamst colomahsm - rerndlns il more acceptable reason ln explalmng the alhance among them This IS also an indication that the debate on the basls of the Indoneslan state. especlally. between the <;0 Cd lied "Islanllc Nationahst" and "Secular Natlonahst" group. for Instance. could not be seen as d hlndrance to • the effort to defend the Independence and strengthen the umty of ail Indoneslan people The abandonment of the Islamlc clause of the Plagam Jakarta (Jakarta charter) on 18 August 1945 could also be regarded as a consensus between the two groups concerrllng the urlltanan repubhc of Indone~la Therefore, 1 wouid argue that pohtlcal stream theory whlch IS based on cultural sohdarrty I!.. shown here to be weak, as the Mushm natlonahsts dld not mleet the abandonmerlt of the charter for "national umty" These also mean that cultural sohdarrty could not always be consldered as a proper approach ln deahng wrth pohtlcal matters, as weil as that Ideologlcal tles on the basls of erther culture or religion tend to be loose slnce the need for estabhshlng a modern state 15 urqent The lengthy confhet among the pohtlcal forces -- whlch resulted ln the nse and fall of cabinets -- occurred, especially. In 1950s. Sukarno's fallure to enforce hls NASAKOM ln the penod of • 24 Dehar Noer, Partal/slam DI Pentas Naslona/1945-1965 (Jakarta Grafrtlpers, 1987), 161 13 GUided Democracy,25 and hls failln 1965 also prove that pohtlcal groupmg on the basis of the • al"an was not capable creatlng a natIonal stablhty and a solld and modern state The Polltlclzed Islam le Group It has be&, l noted the so-called "Pohticized Islamlc"26 group's enthuslasm in demanding that Islam be the basls of the Indoneslan state Even though this demand was formally declared by the representatlves of IslamlC groups27 in the constrtutional debate of the BPUPKI, whlCh was neld shortly before Independence, Indoneslan Mushms had been attemptlng to make Islam a pohtlcal force wlthin Indoneslan society long before indt:pendence They had gradually spread Islam ln the archlpelago, strengthened It by establlshlng religlOus, economic, and pohtical institutions, as lNell as by creatlng intellectual netwo/t(s 28 ln addition, their obedience tl) Islam had also been an IOner motivation dnvlng them to make Islam a religion whlCh was adhered to by a maJOrity of the Indonesian people It becarne a factor of national IntegratIOn, a symbol of reslstance to cOlonlalism, and a stgntflcant eleme'1t of Indonesian • natlOnahsm Kantn points out 25 J 0 Ledge, Sukarno a Polit/cal B/Ography (Londor, Allen Lane The PengUin Press, 1972), 324 NASAKOM 15 an abbreviatlon of Nas/onal/sme, Agama, Komuntsme Sukarno saw that Indoneslan political culture was baslcally under influence of three main streams natlonahsm, reltglon and commumsm Based on these three streams Sukarno enforced his new tdeology called the NASAKOM For an analysis of the sefting of GUided Democracy pohtlCs, see Herbert Feith, "Indonesla's Pohtlcal Symbols and Thelr Wlelders," World PolIt/CS, 16,1 (October 1963) 69-97 ThiS term, used by Syamsuddln, refers to Mushms who tend to make Islam a polrtical force Meanwhtle, Endang Satfuddln Anshari uses the term "Islamlc Nattonalist" ln refernng to the same group, whlch laid clalm to Islam as the basls of the state 27 Muhammad Yamln, ed. Naskah Pers/apan Undang-undang Dasar, vol 1 (Djakarta: PrapantJa, 1959), 60-61 Sorne of them were KI Bagus Hadlkusumo (Muhammadlyah), K H Ahmad SanusI (PUI), Abdul Kahar Muzakklr (Muhammadlyah), Agus Sahm (SI Penyadar), K HA Wachld HasJlm (NU), K H Maslkur (NU), Sl.ikiman WtrjOsandlojo (Pli), Ablkusno TJokrosofosO (PSII) and K H Abdul Hahm (PUI) 28 For a comprehensIve diSCUSSIOn on the Intellectual networks created by eminent Indoneslan Ulamâ ln the 17th and 18th centuries, see Azyumardl Azra, "The TransmIssion of Islamlc Aeformlsm to Indonesla Networks of Middle Eastern and Malay Indoneslan Ulamâ ln the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries" (Ph 0 dlss , Columbia • Unlvers~y, New York, 1992) 14 One of the most Important factors contnbutmg to the grow1h of an mtegrated natlonalism was the hlgh degree of rehglous homogenetty that prevalled m Indonesia, over 90 per cent of the population bemg Mohammedan The Mohammedan religion was not Just a common bond, rt was, mdeed. a sort of Ill-group symbol as agalnst an • ahen Intruder and oppressor of a dlfferent religion 2<1 Thus, the struggle for Indoneslan natlonahsm and Independence cou Id also be recoglllzed as an Indoneslan Mushm deslre to estabhsh a sohd Islamic authonty and an umat. a community of the falthful to which every Mushm belongs wlthm Indoneslan SOCIf'ty Desplte the fact that there were some Islamlc orgalllzations focuslIlg thelr actlvltles on economlc. SOCial, rehglous, and educatlonal aspects of society. the Indoneslan umat obvlously had pohtlcal connotatIOns, for If encompassed those who accepted the WI" of God as expressed in the Shari ah or IslamlC law. and thus gave flse to the need for Institutions to enforce that law The Indoneslan umat sought to estabhsh of an Islamlc state ln whlch they could Implomont ttle Will of God through a polltlcal order Explammg the Ideology of the Indoneslan Islamlc State as beheved by Dar al-Islam (DI), as an example, Karl D Jackson remarks The Negara Islam Indonesla was the 'glft of God,' a dlvlnely revealed and hence • immutable order predetermmed by the IslamlC law as vauchsafed by the Prophet hlmseH ln the Koran and the Hadith ln thls rehglQusly preordalned pohtlcal arder. ail soverelgnty rested wlth God, and government leglslated only on matters not speclflcally dealt wlth ln the tlme of Muhammad 30 Accordlng ta the pohtlClzed Islamlc groups the Ideals of estabhshmg an Islamlc state or the reahzatlon of Islamlc prtnclples m pohtlcs IS conSiderable slllce Islam IS religion adhered ta by the maJortty of Indoneslan people. and havlng been Incorporated lOto the eXlstlng pohtlcal structure of the seventeenth century wlfhout much dlsruptton of tradltlonal practlces i1 The nature of Islam also encouraged them to propose Islam as the basis of the .,tate ln hls 29 Kahm, National/sm. 38 30 Karl D Jackson, Trad/t/onal Authoflty, Islam, and RebellIon a Study of Indoneslan Po/ttlcal BehaVlor(London UniverSIty of Cahfornla Press, 1980), 1 31 Sidney Jones, ''The Contraction and Expansion of the Umat and the Role of the Nahdatul • Ulama ln Indonesla." Indonesla, 38 (1984) 3 15 speech given at the sessions of the BPUPKI Ki Bagus Hadikusumo of the Muhammadiyah, for Instance, argued that the Independent Indonesla must be based on the Islamlc religion, as • Islam IS much concerned wlth polrtlcal and worldly matters There are only 600 verses deahng wlth the rehglOus obhgatlons and matters relatlng to the hereafter.32 However, thls notion was re,ected by the so-called seeular nationahsts33 partly because of the "specnie charaeteristics of the Indoneslan country" 34 Unhke Iraq, Iran, Egypt and Syna, Indonesla was not completely Islamie (Corpus Islamlcum) 15 Thus, the debates on the state's fundamental basis between the polltlclzed and non-pohtlclzed Islamlc groups were qu~e heated It IS also worthwhlle to point out that the Islamic groups' arguments as to the notion of the state's fundamental basis stressed the necessityof IlTlllementmg the Shari'ah rather than the fundamental reformulatlon of the Shari'ah and Ifs relation to the ethical teachlng of the Our'an. This Shari ah-mlnded thought IS qurte understandable sinee Mushm leaders wished to offlcially Inst~utionahze the Shari'ah, by whlCh pol~Ical author~y could be maintalned, and to place Islamie teachlngs whlch could be implemented and practlced by Indoneslan Mushms under • the effective control of the government. The involvement of some Muslim leaders, such as t Hadlkusumo (Muhammadlyah), Mas Haji Ichsan (Penghulu in Temanggung)36 ln the commiSSion for the reform of the Religious Courts set up by the colomalist government in 1922,37 for e)(ample, IS eVIdence of the serious efforts of Mushms to improve and impie ment 32 KI Bagus Hadlkusumo, Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara Dan Achlak Pemlmpin (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Aahayu, 1954), 15 33 Most of them were Mushms and a few were non-Mushms who tended to separate religion from the pol~Ieal matters 34 Muhammad Yamln, Naskah, 116 Ibid 36 Zalni Ahmad Noeh and Abdul Basrt Adnan, Sejar ah Smgkat Pengadilan Agama Islam di Indonesla (Surabaya' Bina IImu, 1983),35 . • 37 Daniel S Lev, Islamlc Courts ln Indonesia a Study ln the Polltical Bases of Legal 16 the Shari'ah officlally, However, they were dlsappolnted and frustrated when tlle government • made changes and insertions in the unammous decision 01 the commission and reJected the Muslim demand of Implementing the Shari ah As a resu~, the Adat Law, wlllch was totally rejected by the commission, remalned secure ,lA ln sphe of the recognition of Irlam as a comprehensive system of hIe, the secular natlonahsts, such as Supomo for Instance, were uncertam of the ablhtyof the Shari ah to fulM the needs of modern society 39 Meanwhlle, the Islar:llc groups dld not succeed ln convlncll1g the secular natlonahsts that Islam was the most approprlate Ideology on whlch to base the ethlcal system of the modern Indoneslan state The fallure of some Mushm leaders was probably due to thelr limlted pohtlcal \locabulary and thelr almost exclUSive rellance of rehglou~ terminology Refernng to the dlsappolntment of Prawoto Mangkusasrmto, a former ledder of Masyumi, Maanf, however, preff:'rs to point out that the fallure of the Islamlc groups WdS a consequence of the pohtlcal composition of the BPUPKI Only 20% of the total membershlp of the BPUPKI were supporters of an Islamic basls for the new state 40 The BPUPKI was, • basically, domlnated by the secular nationahsts,41 who held the vlew:;lat religion should be conhned to personal matters, If was up to the mdlvldual concerned to declde whethe r or not ho wanted to practlce the teachlngs of Islam These problems .. the strong opposition of the secular natlonahsts and the Imbalance of the polllicai composition among groups ln the BPUPKI .. were crucial becauso they would influence the posllton of Islam ln Indoneslan poilhes Nevertheless, a compromise was Institutions (Bef1(eley University of Cahfornia Press, 1972),18 38 Hadlkusumo, Islam, 18 39 Yamin, Naskah, 116 40 Ahmad Syafll Maanf, Studl Tentang Percaturan Dalam Konstituante Islam Dan Masalah Kenegaraan (Jakarta' LP3ES, 1987),102 41 Prawoto Mangkusasmtto, Pertumbuhan H,stOflS Rumus Dasar Negara dan Sebuah • ProJeksI (Jakarta' Hudaya, 1970), 12 17 reached by formulaflng the Muslims' minimal demand ln the so-called Plagam Jakarta (Jakarta Charter) on June 22, 1945 42 ThiS Charter was signed by nrne leaders, Sukarno. Muhammad • Hatta, A A Maramls, Ablkusno TJokrosuJoso. Abdul Kahar Muzakklr, Agus Salim. Achmad SubardJO. Wachld HasJlm and Muhammad Yamln 43 The Jakarta Charter also stlpulated that It was the "obligation for the Musllms to carry out the Shari'ah "44 ThiS was a signlficant statement one ln whlch the Mushm leaders saw that there would be a wide opportunity to constrtutlonally Implement the SharÎ ah However. the formulation of the Islamie clause was abandoned on August 18. 1945 and ultlmately resulted 10 the dlsappolntment of the Mushm leaders KI Bagus Hadlkusumo, for instance, expressed hls dlssatlsfactlon wlth the abandonment of the Islamlc clause and crrtlclzed both the secular natlonahsts and the Pamtla Perslapan Kemerdekaan (whlch was set up ln August 1945) on the Sidang Tanwir (national dehberatlon) of Muhammadlyah He also stated that the struggle of Islam must be contmued 45 Meanwhlle, Kasman SmgodlmedJo also regretted havlng persuaded KI Bagus to accept the detetlon 46 For sorne people, the deletion • was probably regarded as an Islamlc pohtlcat defeat However, an alternative view conSlders thls as an example of great sacrifice and of the tolerance of Must'm society AlamsJah Ratu Perwlranegara. when he was Mln.ster of Rehgious Affalrs, for example, asserted that "Pancaslta was a glft and a major sacnflce of the Musltm communrty 10 seeking the foundlng of the unltaflan Repubhc of Indonesla "47 Thus, accusations that the Mushm communlty was 4? Ibid. 16-18 41 For more comprehensive discussion on the Jakarta Charter, see Endang Saifuddin Anshan, The Jakarta Charter 1945' The Struggle for an Islamic Constitution ln Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur Mushm Youth Movement of Malaysia, 1970). 44 Yamln, Naskah. 276 4'1 Noer, Partal Islam, 43 46 HS Prolokusumo, "Kunci Pancasila Di Tangan Ki Bagus," Suara Muhammadiyah (1983) 24 • 4/ Peltta, 12 .June, 1978 18 opposed to Pancaslla have lost thelr effect 48 • It should also be noted that ln splte 01 the dlsappolntment 01 the Mushm leaders they were still optlmlstlc m propagatmg and malntalnmg IslamlC polltlcal Ideals Obvlously. ttmy enJoyed, at least. two Institutions as media for expresslng thelr pohtlcal oSplratlons and propaganda pohtlcal organlzatlon and publtshrng A bnef diScussion of both will be appropriate since the se Illustrate the Ideals and dynamlcs of Islamlc pohtlcal groups 1. PohtlcalOrganlzatlon The notion of a multl-party system launched by the government4 accepted by Mushm groups This acceptance 15 understandable Slnce Musltm groups considered SubardJo's des Ire to make the PNI the sole pohtlcal pdrty ln Indonesld to bo authoritanan 50 They also saw that the notion was a good opportunlty to Iflternally reconsolidate Islamlc pohtlcal forces • ln hne wlth thls opportumty, the Mushm groups conslc1ered sorne Mushm orQanlzatlom; -- such as Muhammadlyah, NU, PERSIS, Penkatan Umat Islam. Persatuan Umat Islam. Hizbullah, PERTI, PSI! -- and emotlonal tles of Mushms to the Islamlc syrnbols expre<;<;ed by these organlzatlOns as the potentlal source of the Islamlzatlon of pohtlcs This f!flcouraq(!d Mushm leaders to organlze the Muktamar Islam Indonesla (Congress of IndoneSléH1 Musltmr;) which was held ln Yogyakarta on 7 and 8 November 1945 and was attended by mdny f!mlrwnt Muslim leaders and Indoneslan Ulamâ ')1 The congress declded the foundatlon of Masyuml as the sole Islamlc polltlcal party ln Indonesla representmg the Interest,> of the Islamlc 48 Maarrf, Studf Percaturan, 110 49 Kahln, Natlonaltsm, 148 ThiS notion was flrst proposed by SJahnr who saw that the pohtlcal vacuum, as a consequence of the dissolution of the government-spon'lored PNI, was belilg filled by SubardJo's pohtlcal ambition 50 Ibid • 51 MasJumi, Int/ah Chlttahku (Djakarta Penerangan Plmptnan Partal Masjuml, 1953),3 19 communrty • Unhke the former Masyuml which was set up by the Japanese government ln 1943,52 the new Masyuml53 fully concentrated on the polttlcal struggle rather than social. educatlonal and reltglous Issues ln addition, unique among Indoneslan polltlcal parties, Masyuml had a wide range of supporters slnce If Implemented the strategy of dual membershlp, Individu al and organlzatlonal ',4 Actually, no accu rate data on the development of Inulvldual membershlp have been satlsfactonly matntalned However, the central board of Masyuml clalmed that Masyuml had 10 million members ln 1950 and 13 mlilton ln 1951 from. at least. 237 branches <;0; Meanwhlle, the polrtlcal basis of Masyuml also strongly depended on the affiliation of Muslim orgamzatlons whlch have spread wldely throughout the Indoneslan society Therefore, Masyuml attempted to attract and retaln the support of these organizatlOns wrthout compelhng them to sacnflce thelr orientation in social or educatlOnal ac1lvlties Kahin comments Because of the support by the large, non-pohtlcal Mushm organlzatlOns and partlcularly • because of ItS support by village reltgious leaders, the Masyuml was able to build up a huge, If umntegrated and unorganized, mass back,ng Almost ail Mushm rehgious leaders of Java, Madura and Sumatra supported the Masyumi, whlch also attracted most of the vestlglal Indoneslan commerCial and tndustnal mlddle class throughout that area Llkewise It attracted the majority of the larger Indonesian landowners 56 52 On the flse of thls Masyuml we can refer to Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and The Rising Sun Indoneslan Islam Under The Japanese Occupation 1942-1945 (The Hague W van Hoeve, 1958). 151-194 H M Syafaat MtntaredJa, Islam Dan Polttlk Islam Dan Negara DI Indonesla (Jakarta: Septenanus. 1976), 16 He polnted out that Masyuml was a continuation of the Majlis Islam A'la Indonesla (MIAI) However, thls IS too speculative slnce the documents relattng to the emergence of thls Islamlc pohtlcal party do not support MintaredJa's argument. Pedoman Perdjuangan Masjuml (Djakarta: Plmpman Partai Masyumi Baglan Keuangan, nd). 7, 12-13 Jusuf Wlblsono. "MasJuml Di Masa Oatang," Suara PaTtaI Masjum/, 2 (February 1951): 10-12. quoted ln Noer. Partallslam. 54 • Kahm. Natlonaltsm, 157 20 Commenting on this development. Noer cornes ta the conclusion tllat the affiliation of these • organtzations. the role of the 'Ulama' and other orgamzatlons, such as the HmlpundlJ Mahasiswa Islam (Mushm Student AssociatIOn, HMI)and the Pela/dr Islam Indoneshl (Indoneslan Mushm Student. Pli) ~7 and the eXistence of Keluarga Besar Buldn Bmtang (the big famlly of the crescent-star)~8 should be regarded as slgntflcant factors ln tlle development of Masyumi 59 It is also worthwhlle mentlonlng that the organlzatlonal structure of Masyuml, whlch consisted of Plmpman Partal (executlve courlcll) and Majlls Syuro (consultative councll). proved that the leadership of Masyuml was influenced by people whose social. rehglous and polrtlcal inclinations remalned diverse Abu Hanlfah, an emlnent member of the central board of Masyuml from 1945 untll 1954, for example, malntalned that there were thre(~ groups wlthlll Masyuml. the ConservatlVe group malnly conslsttng of Mushm rehglous leaders the Moderate group conslstlng of Mohammad Natslr, S)afruddln and Roem, and the more Western-tlllnkll1g Sociallsts such as Dr Suklman, Jusuf Wlblsono, and Abu Hanlfah {)() He further explatned that • "the Moderate group was IInked pohtlcally wlth Slahnr, whlle the Conservatlve group and the religlous Soclallsts happened to fl9ht more slde by sIde, espectally dunng the hrst verus of the Revolution "61 Apparently, Hanlfah's descnptlon of the groups wlthln Masyuml IS based on hls 57 With regards to the relation between the se two Mushm student organrzattons and Masyuml, see Nurchollsh MadJld, "The Issue of Modernlzalton Among Musllm ln Indonesla' From a Partlclpant's POint of Vlew." ln Readmgs on Islam ln Southeast As/a, ed Ahmad Ibrahim, et al (Instltute of Southeast Astan Studles, 1985) 58 Sorne organtzattons whtch were regarded as members of the Bulan Btntang famlly wem Sankat Dagang Islam Indones/a, Saflkat Tam Islam Indonesla, Sankat Nelayan Islam Indonesla and Sankat Buruh Islam Indones/a 59 Noer, Partallslam, 55-57 60 Abu Hamf ah, Tales of a Revolution (Sydney, Augus and Robertson, 1972), 161-162 • 61 Ibid, 162 ---~--- 21 questlonable categorizatlon He tended to blend two categories the pohtical and socio- rehglous as one and therefore he was not sure about the position of Natslr, SJafruddm and • Roem ln splte of the fact that these figures enJoyed western educatlon,52 Hanrfah excluded them from the reltglous soclahst group of Masyuml because thelr polltlcal inclination was regarded as closer to a 50clahst leader, SJahnr Meanwhlle, Hamfah hlmself tended to be closer wlth Suklman, Néltslr's rivai, who had pohtlcal-cum-personal relations wlth the Indoneslan Natlonaltst Party leaders and wlth Sukarno 63 ln addition, Ward's vlew was qUite simllar to that of Hamfah He also suggests that there were three main groups wlthln Masyuml The Rehglous Soc!ahsts, that 15, the generally western-educated Intellectuals such as Suklman, Natslr, Rum and Yusuf Wlblsono, who were often connected wlth the modernlst social or educatlonal organizatlons, such as Muhammadlyah or the Djamiatul AI-Wclshllyah, the NU group, con~,stlng mainly of Kijajls, led by Wachld HasJlm, a smaller group of 'Radical Fundamentahsts '64 Ward clearly Includes Natslr and Roem ln the rehglous Sociahst group because of their • western education Unhke Hanlfah, he 15 not restramed by any methodologlcal concerns from categonzlng these figures as rellglous soclahsts Explalnlng the pohtlcal attitude of the so-called Radical Fundamentalfst group, Ward asserts that "thls group was marked by ItS most outspeken advocatlon of an Islamic state, as Hantfah also recounted a very bnef story about Natslr For a more complete diSCUSSion about Natslr, see, Moch Lukman Fatahullah RaiS, ed , et al, Mohammad NatsIf Pemandu Umat (Jakarta Bulan Bmtang, 1989), Endang Salfuddln Anshan and Amlen RaiS, Pak NatsIf 80 Taf1Un (Jakarta Media Dakwah, 1988) An account concerntng Roem IS discussed by Kusmyatl Mochtar, ed, Mohammad Roem Dipiomasi Ujung Tombak PefJuangan RI (Jakarta Gramedla, 1989), and Soemarso Soernarsono, ed , Mohammad Roem 70 Tahun PeJuang Perundmg (Jakarta Bulan Blntang, 1978), whlle the work about SJafruddln IS wntten by AJlp ROSldl, SJafruddtn Prawlranegara Leblh Takut Kepada Allah SWT (Jakarta Idayu Press, 1986) 6.\ See also Fetth The Decime, 137 • 64 Ward, The Foundatlon. 10 22 weil as by a tendency ta Instantly label any Opposition ta Islamlc aspirations as CommullIst "t,l, According to Felth, thls group actually had "ItS onglns ln the antl-tradltlonahst 'Protestdllt' • movement of whlch Muhammadlyah was the ma III channel "t,t, ThiS also rt'prt~st'ntt'd .mothm more militant, antl-ilberal. and antl-seculanst current FelUl mentions thdt two I1wntor<; of tlU1 group were A Hassan, an emlnent leader of the Bandung-centered PERSIS dnd ISd Ansltary, a pohtlcal figure of the Radical Fundamentallsts III western Java loi Felth's vlew of the factlonal divIsions ln Masyuml, to a certam extent, IS dlfferent from thett of the two prevlous vlews Felth suggests that the factlonal diVIsions ln thls Islanllc party dld not follow the Ililes of reltglous cleavage only ïhls was a consequence of the nvalry .unong the group of admtnlstrators He asserts that thls group of admlnlstrators. "who led 1118 party and were modernlsts by denomlnatlonal persuasion, were dlvlded Into two mdm factions. thrlt of Mohammad Natslr and that of Dr Suklman "GA Suklman's supporters were malnly oldm persons ln the party councll, Javanese leaders and Javanese NU leaders who rTtlstrusted Natslr and tended to be conservatlve Suklman's group also had close fies Wlttl thn PNI • leaders and Sukarno Meanwhlle, Natslr was supported by mostly young men, non Javan~sf1, partlcularly Mlnangkabaunese and other non-Javanese radical fundamentallst<; He dlso had strong tles wlth the Indoneslan Soclaltst pa:1y (,', One should bear ln mlnd that the mass backlng for Masyuml Implted Its stmngth, complexlty, and weakness ail at once ïhls leads me to argue that beyond the Spirit of pohtlcal untty among Indoneslan Mushms, there were dlvlslve factors, su ch as the complex and diverse soclo-rellglous background of the supporters, and the Internai leader<;t!lp. whlch 65 Ibid 66 Faith. The Decime, 136 67 Ibid. 137 68 Ibid • 69 Ibid 23 fostered the latent internai confllct wlthln Masyumi Therefore, the capability of the Masyumi leaders to manage the dlfferences and Implement democratlc princlples coula tJ~ regarded as • the prereqUlSite for contlnued unit through Masyumi Moreover, the loyalty and commttment y of the supportlng Musllm orgamzatlons would also be a very slgntflcant factor to establish Masyuml as a powerfullslamlc party Neve rtheless , the Spirit of polttlcal umty endured for two years after the emergence of Masyuml Havlng recognlzed the weak position of the PSI! ln Masyuml, Arud)1 Kartawlnata and Wondoamlc;eno posltlvely responded to Amlr SJarifuddln's persuasion to )oln ln hls coalition cabinet They wlthdrew from the Masyuml and proclaimed the rep.stabltshment of PSU as an Islamlc party lfl Masyuml re)ected S)anfuddtn'S offer and opposed to JOlntng ln the cabinet The attitude was slgmflcant slnce SJanfuddln was a Chnstlan whose leadership, accordlng to Natslr, should be reJected by Musllms Natslr addressed a satlric question about the rise of S)anfuddln's leadership" does Islam allow the followers of Muhammad to recognize a non- Muslims, Catholtc Chnstlans, Protestant Chnstlans, Adventlst Chrtstlans, and other Christian • people, as their leaders?71 Havlng witnessed the fact that SJanfuddtn was the figure who opposed and consldered the movement of Indonesla Berpalemen (Indonesian Involvement ln the parhament) as "memantJlng dl air keruh" (ltterally, ftshmg ln the troubled water),72 Natslr categonzed hlm as nelther Islamlc nor Natlonaltst and even consldered hlm as being opposed to both 73 Natslr and Masyuml dld not trust hlm and vlewed the reestabhshment of the PSI! as a regrettable pohtlcal cholce TD Noer. Partallslam. 77, 169-170 71 M Natslr. "Matuchfl Suduru-Hum Siapa Pemimpin Kita," in M Natsir, Islam dan Kristen Dllndonesla (Bandung Pel ad jar dan Bulan Sablt, 1969),167, 7'; Ibid, 168 ThiS means maklng the best of a bad situation 73 Ibid, 167 Natslr quoted SJar~uddm's tendency "WiJ ais Christenen, moeten een achter • elgen grond hebben. met verdrongen worden door Islamleten en Nationalisten 1 24 The more serious polrtical split in Masyumi occurred ln 1952 when the NU wlthdrew trom • MasytJml and declared Itself an Islamlc pohtlcal party This meant that Masyuml was threatEmed wlth losln9 ItS major and potentlal supporters from Central Java, Edst JaVel, and South Kalimantan and would become weaker One should also note that the pohtlcal cal,trmty of Masyuml was aggravated by the Ideologlcdl and polrtlcal tensions among the parties wlllch were, in part, responslble for the rlse and fall of cabinets, the mvolvement of sorne emillent ehtes of Masyuml in regional reslstance. 74 and the eventual bannlng and dlssolullon of Masyumi, It is no exaggeration to say that the wrthdrawal of the NU trom Masyumlln 1952 was the culmination of the confhct between the NU Ulamà'. who domlnated the Majlls Syuro (consultative councll) and the polrtlclans, malnly cons~stlllg of modernlst Ir.tellectuals, who controlled the Plmpman PaTtaI (executlve councll) The dlsagreement of the NU was focused mainly on the o rgalllzatlonal aspect of tlle Masyuml The NU tended to propose Masyurm as a federatian of Mushm organlzatlons preventlng the party fram belng domrnated by ~ certain • figure However. Masyumi refused the proposai and changed even the status of Malh,> Syuro from a legislatlve body. lOto a mere advisory body7S at the congress of Masyumllrl Yogyakarta in 1949. For the NU clrcles, the new status of MaJ!ts Syuro was regarded as a SUCCfJ,>sful attempt by the madermst IIltellectuals ta push aSlde re/rgtous conSiderations ln the declslons to be taken by the party This meant that Masyuml posed as a seml-secular party The dlssatlsfactlon of the NU wlth Masyuml's attitude was understandable siller. the modernlst Intellectuals ln Masyuml alsa dlsparaged the pohtlcal strength and Influence of the 74 Jackson, Trad/tlonal Authorlty, Plnardl, Sekarmadjl Mandjan KartosuwlrjO (Djakarta Aryaguna, 1964); A Sja:'lfuddln, Klsah KartosuwlfJo dan Menjeralmja (SurabaJ<:i n p.1962); C van DIJk, Rebellton Under the Banner of Islam (Den Haag Martlnus NIJhoft. 1981); M Nur EI-Ibrahlmy. Teungku Muhammad Daud Beureuh Peranannya Dalam Pergolakan D/ Aceh (Jakarta Gunung Agung. 1982), Nazaruddln Syamsuddln, "The Acehnese Rebellion 1945-1946 A Case Study of Prablems of NatIonal IntegratIon ln Indonesia" (Ph 0 dISS, Monash UllIversrty, 1979) • 75 Noer, Partallsfam 81 25 NU Ulamâ This IS what MlntaredJa referred to as tne "arrogant attitude of some leaders of the ruhng-class "1~ HavlOg acqUired some knowledge or a university degree, the modernlst • Intellectuals .n Masyuml tended to monopohze polit.cs and mamtalned that the Santns and K.ya.s should merely operate .n surau (prayer huts) as preachers or muadhlns (persons who caUs the falthful to prayer) The hlghest pOSition of the Ulama' would only be that of MIOIster of Rehg.ous Affa.rs 1/ Mlntaredla further suggested that the weak iman (falth) of Mushm leaders, who wlthdrew trom Masyuml, could also be cons.dered as the ma.n cause of the split in Masyuml Therefore, he asserted that ail Mushm leaders were responslble Nevertheless, we must pOint out that MlntaredJa's argument IS actually debatable, since he could not prove whlCh modernlst .ntellectuals dlsparaged the pomlcal capablhty of the NU 'Ulama' and tended to malOtaln that the main task of the Ulama' was confined to surau MintaredJa too is speculative Irl observtng the pohtlcal tensions wlthin Masyum. through a theologlCal perspective It IS not the right of the pohtlc.an to judge someone else as elther a behever or an unl.ehever 78 • Others mamtaln that the appearance of Natslf79 as chairman of the party in 1949 was 76 Mlntared)a, Islam Dan Polttlk, 20 17 Ibid 7A MlntaredJa wrote th,s book when he was chalrman of the Parmusi and tirst pubhshed it a few months before the 1971 general electlons By addressmg the issue of Intemal confllet and Its pohtlcal consequences, Mintaredja scemed to attempt to show hls eoncern wlth Islamlc unit Y through Parmusi and encourage Mushm society to strengthen It by enhanclng rellglous smcenty Mohammad Nats.r was born ln 1908 ln Alahan panJang (West Sumatra) He was a member of MIAI and cha.rman of the Partal Islam Indonesla (Indonesian Islamic Party, Pli) from 1943 to 1945 ln the Pnangan branch, M Inlster of Information in three cabinets of the Olet Order government. chalrman of Masyuml from 1949 to 1958 He became Prime MIOIster from 1950 to 1951 He dlsputed wlth Sukarno on the Issue of democracy The contllct was also caused by Sukarno's close relatlonshlp wlth the CommuOlst party (PKI) NatSlr was detalned by Sukarno and he was not released untll 1966 cOlncldlng wlth the emergence ot the Aksi Angkatan 1966 (the 1966 generatlOn actIOn), whlch successfully founded the New Order government Natslr's present actlvlt.es are tocused on the dakwah through Dewan Dakwah Islamtyah Indonesla (the Councii of Indoneslan Islamlc Preachlng, DDtl) He wnte~ sorne books and IS pubhshmg seriai articles especially ln • Media Dakwah, an Islamlc magazme published by 0011 , see also 0 G Roeder and 26 also a factor of the NU's dlsappolntment and wlthdrawal Irom the Masyuml Natslr was recognlzed as a moderntst Intellectual Irom the PERSIS clrcle -- a reformlst Mushrn • organization, whlch was relatlvely more radical ln Its effort to punly the tedclllngs of 151,1111 .ts practlced by Mushm society tIlan Muhammadlyah Htl Thus, 1 would drgue tllclt tilt' ctl,lI1~W Hl the status 01 MaJI!s Syuro cauld have been part'ally related ta Natslr's convIctIon tl1,lt MclsyUIl1I was more ln need of managers and mtellectuals tllan of Ulamcl TlllS msul!pd III m!t'rtl,ll tension, not only between two modernlst groups - that of NatSlr and tllcl! of SUk1nl.l1l but also between Masyuml, as represented by Natslr's group dnd the NU Ulam,), representnd by Kiai Wahab Hasbullah, chalnnan of the Ma/Ils Syunah (rehglous counell) of tlle NU As far as the tensIOn between Masyuml and the NU IS concerned,Hl them IS no doubt that the NU demanded the post 01 Mlnlster of Rehglous Alfalrs ln the so-ealled Wllopa Cclbtnnt For Wahab, the demand was reasonable since the NU had been recaglllzed de; a rTl organizatlOn ln Indonesla Noer notes that havlng seen that the NU had hrld the posItIon of Mintster of Rehglous Affalrs three tlmes trom 1950,B? Hamka suggested the NU retrdct Its • demand and glve the Muhammadlyah an opportufllty ta holri the posItIon" 1 Tllf) NU relllch~d Hamka's demand since the NU saw sorne modermst Intellectuals 01 MasyUrTll hdd f'1l10yed thelr mtnlstenal positions ln Indoneslan cabinets and telt that the NU had dctudlly suffnwd Mahlddln Mahmud, Who's Who ln Indonesla (Slngapore Gunung Agung, MCMLXXX), 192, Anshan and RaiS, Pak Natslr, St RaiS AlamsJah, 10 Orang IndonfJSlil TEHbo<;rlr Sekarang (Djakarta Mutlara, 1952),83-102 Noer, Parfallslam, 101 103 80 For a speclflc diSCUSSion of PERSIS see Howard M Federspldl, Persatuan Islam Reform ln Twentleth Century Indonesla (Ithaca Modern Indonesla PrOI€ct CorneU UnlVfJr'>lty, 1970) 81 For greater detall on thls tension and ItS polttlcallmpltcatlons, see, Noer, Partal Islrlfn 82 The pre-1950 Mlmsters of Rehglous Affalrs from the NU were K H Fattlurrattman (1946-1947) and K H MasJkur (1947-1950) Maslkur he Id thls position ln the seGOnd Amlr Cabinet, the flrst and second Hatta Cabtnet, and tt'le CabInet of S~santo 11rtoprodJo See also Susan Flnch and Daniel S Lev, Republlc of Indonesla Cabmets 1945-1965 (lthaca Modern Indonesla ProJect Southeast ASla Program Cornell UniversIty, 1965) • 83 Noer, PaTtai Islam. 222 27 from unfalr polltlcal treatment from some modernlst Intellectuals ln splte of the Insistence of Wahab at the party's meeting. Masyuml refused the NU's demand and even gave the pOSition • of Mln/ster of Rehglous Affalrs ta Faklh Usman from Muhammadlyah 84 The wlthdrawal of the PSI! followed by the NU from the Masyumi shattered the myth of Islamlc pohtlcal unit y ln Indonesla The tlrst major problem faced by the members of Masyuml (and later on by the PPP) was pohtlcal allocation It IS obvlous that they allocated power among them dlsproportlonally They seemed to not conslder that pohtlcal loyalty and the participation of the members of the palty were not merely an expression of thelr obedience to the Islamle Ideologlcal symbols as expressed by the party, but were also means of fulfllhng thelr pragmatlc pohtlcallnterests Therefore. It IS no exaggeratlon to suggest that the declslons of the PSI! and the NU Imphed that Islamlc Ideology was not the monopoly of Masyuml The other organrzatlons. such as the PSI! and the NU. also had nghts to employ and formulate thelr own Islamlc Ideology III order to marntarn thelr own pohtlcal interests Thus, the • dependency on Masyuml and Its Ideology was not necessary Another maJor problem faced by the Masyuml was Its fallure to properly formulate the role of the Ulama and Inte"ectuals ln the party The two main institutions of Masyuml were that of the Plmpman Par1al (executlve councll). malnly conslstlng of modernlst rntellectuals and pohtlclans. and that of the MaJ/ls Syuro (consultative councll) whlch was domlnated by the Ulama . mostly from NU clrcles There was no guarantee of estabhshlng Masyuml as a sohd Islamlc party This would have sharpened the dlchotomy of th!') conservatlve Ulamâ' and the modernlst rntellectuals and a! ... o kept up the pressure to push aSlde the Ulama' from polltical maners on the pretext that the Ulama were experts ln the rehgious affalrs rather than pohtlcal ones Meanwhlle. the pohtlcal roles of the party should be the responsibihty of the modernist Intellectuals and pohtlclans • 114 Ibid, 224 28 The inappropriate formulation of the role of the Ulama and the Intellectuals resulted ln • the tension among them The flrst tlme that the NU became actlvely Involved ln parhamf'nt,uy pohtlcs and competed wlth other parties was ln the 1955 general elt>ctlon5 TIlt' 9prwral electlons resulted ln domination of the big four pohtlcal parties namely tlw PNI (57 ç~> Jtc;), thf' Masyuml (57 seats), the NU (45 seats), and the PKI (39 seats) Mt'anwllile tlle PSII became à small party slnce It won only 8 seats BC, Surpnslngly, the NU made a large gdln "Wlllctl WdS to ralse its parhamentary representatlons trom 8 to 45, and the unexpectedly smdllvote H'Ct1IVed by the Masyuml, prt~lcularly ln Central and East Java "ni, Unhke Masyuml, thn NU sp<'nt no more than three years to consohdate ItS pohtlcal sources and to estabhsh Itself ,.;ts an Influenhal Islamlc pohtlcal party The key factors m tlle NU's gains m the 1955 general electlons wme the followlng the emotlonal tles of the tradltlonahst Mushms wlth the Ulamâ or KldlS whorn tllt~y consldered to be thelr rehglous and pohtlcal leader, the gesture of Masykur, MlflIster of Rehglous Affalrs ln the tlrst Ah SastroamldloJo cabinet (1953-1955),HI to confer the tltle of Waltyul Amri Darury bl al-Shaulcatl to Sukarno as the President ,BEl the ablhty of the NU to • translate, If not exploIt, the Ideology through Its very strateglc campalgn befom tlle 1955 general electlons, and to attract ItS supporters to push as Ide Masyuml for the pohhcal vlctory of NU The pohtlcal fortunes whlch were obtalned by the NU cOInclded wlth the la st phaso m the existence of Masyuml partly because of the mvolvement of some emmünt mnmbers of the party ln the reglonal reslstance Sorne scholars have scrutlnlzed the maJor motlvl~S of the 85 Herbert Felth, The Indonl:Jslan ElectIons of 1955 (lthaca Southeast ASI3 proqram Cornell University, 1971), 58 86 Ibid,57 87 This was ultlmately accepted ln the conference of NU Ulama held ln Clpanas (west Java) from 2 to 7 of March, 1954 88 Noer, PaTtaI Islam, 343 Noer notes that thls caused crrtlclsm from other Mushm organlzatlons and leaders Thelr dlsagreement was generally based on the tact that • lndonesla was not an lslamlc state 29 reslstance. argUing that economlc Interests and the dlspanty between Java and the remaining areas of Indonesla were regarded as the main cause 89 Meanwhile. Feith suggests that thls • polltlcal dlslntegratlon onglnated from the tension between the two streams. that of the Javanese-ar/stocratlc polit/cal culture and that of Islamlc-entrepreneur/al polltlcal culture,gO or between two Ideologies, Pancaslla and Islam ln sprte of the fact that the major motive of reslstance vaned fmm reglon ta reglon, one may conclude that generally the problem of economlcs. Ideology. ethnlcrty. and reglonalrty had been sensitive Issues whlch could negatlvely affect the entlre Indoneslan society Therefore. the Involvement of eminent members ot Masyuml ln the reglonal reslstance, whatever the reason, was seen as politically unforglvable and Masyuml was consequently banned and pushed aslde tram particlpating in Indoneslan pohtlcs Consequently, the Islamlc pohtlcal force during the tlme was merely represented by the NU 2 Pubhshmg • It should be noted that rehgious pohtical tendency was also expressed and spread through publications It is certainly Impossible to dlscuss ail the brochures, articles, and books whlch were pubhshed under the Old Order government. The fc1lowlng IS merely an attempt to descnbe the works ùf three emlnent Mushms -- whose ideas represented some of Muslim's po IItlca 1 Ideals -- especlally, pubhshed ln the 1950s Indoneslan pohtlcs 91 ln Risalah Polltlk whlCh was pubhshed by the NU. K H.M Dachlan. the chairman of the executive council of the NU. wrote a short article ln 1954 entltled Nahdatul Ulama dan PerdJoangannJa 92 ln the first 89 See also Hans 0 Schmitt. "Foreign Capital and Social Conflict ln Indonesia 1950-1958," Economlc Development and Cultural Change. 3 (1962) 284-293 9ll Felth. The Decime. 31 91 1 shall slmply examine what they said. rather than attemptlng to trace the impact of their publICatIOn and Its correlatIOn with the eXlstlng polltical situation 92 K H M Dachlan. "Nahdatul Ulama dan PerdjoangannJa," in Risa/ah Polltik, 2 (1954): • 1-11. 30 part of his discussion. Dachlan referred to two Important events. that of the wlthdrawal of the NU from Masyuml and that of the estabhshment of the NU as an Istamlc pohtlcal party He q • recognized that there were certain groups of people 1 who accusf'd the NU of bOlllg problematlc for tstamlc Unit Y and Incompetent ln the pohtlcal field as weil He pOlnted out that these groups also predleted that as saon as the NU obtalned power It would np. a dlctdtonal party. Nevertheless, these accusations remarned unproven slnce the NU was able to estabhsh a partnershlp wlth other Islamlc parties to attempt to Implement tstamlc law ln Indonesla and ta cooperate wrth other parties to bUild the Indoneslan nation Dachlan also polnted out that the NU eontlnually spread throughout the Indoneslan archipelago and even successfully eneouraged some other Islamle partIes and orgamzatlons to found a new federatlon of IslamlC orgalllzations, the Llga Musllm /ndonesla (Indonesléln Muslim League) III 1952 94 ln splte of the rejeetlOn of Masyuml. the establishment of the Liga Muslim /ndonesla was weleomed positlvely by M Yamln. an omlnent natlonallst leader He even malntalned that the Llga Musllm /ndonesla emerged at the nght tlme, slnee the • Indonesian Islamlc movements were paralyzed by three fundamental problerns no clear pattern of Islamlc pohtlcs ln Indonesla, no tndoneslan Mushm orgamzatlon senousty attempting to imptement Islamle values III the International polltleal world, and the baekwardn'ess of Islam III Southeast ASla for the past 300 years Therefore, the Indoneslan people would walt for the real contnbution of the Ltga MUS/lm /ndonesla and prove the ablhty of Islamle polltlCs ln performlng ItS proper roles both natlOnally and mternatlonally Dachlan desenbed sorne of the NU's slgnifleant contnbutlons to Indoneslan pohtles He asserted that the NU trusted Its members to be aetlvely Involved ln parhamentaly pohtlcs and to hold mlntstenal positions wrthout saenflclng thelr obedience to the party ln the eyes of the ------93 Dachlan probabty referred to the moderlllst polrtlcal and tntellectual group of Masyuml 94 Dachlan, "Nahdatul Ulama,":3 The three Mushm leaders who consldered as the Inltlator ot the foundation of Ltga Musllm /ndonesla were Wahld Hasylm (NU), Siradjuddin Abbas • (PERTI), and Ablkusno TJokrosuJoso (PSII) 31 NU. the leglslatlvf.l and executlve pohtlcal counciis were merely regarded as a medium of the NU's struggle for Ideologlcal Ideals He emphaslzed that the NU. as an Islamlc party. was • "more concerned wlth Ideologlcal matters than wrth wortdly Interests."95 Wlth regard to the roles of the NU in Indoneslan pohtlcs. /ts concentration on Ideological matters and ItS efforts to fulfl" the needs of the people and the state. Dachlan tended to suggest that the pohtlcal and rehglous adroltness of the NU should undoubtedly be recogmzed Thus. he warned that the greedy party whlch gave pnonty to Its self mterest would be paralyzed and lose ItS Influence and confidence The party would be dlstrusted by society 9fi Moreover. the government's fallure to handle economlc problems97 provoked t",e reactlon of the parties and encouraged the NU to declare rts pohtlcal statement as follows. 1 The party of Nahdatul Ulama saw that the Ah SastroamidJoJo cabinet had partly implemented Its programs However. the society was still dlsapPolnted. particularly by the way the government tned to solve the economlC problems. to restore national secunty, and to organlze the state Institutions and employment 2 The mvolvement of the Nahdatul Ulama ln the cabinet of Ah Sastroamidjojo was • almed at the Implementation of the Amar Ma rut Nahy Munkar 98 3 The party of the NU could glve Ah SastroamldJoJo another chance to implement his programs proportlonally 99 Wlth regard to the eXlsting pohtlcal situation the NU stressed that the Immediate restoratlOn of the pohtlcal sphere was necessary for unlfying the cabinet and strengthenlng the government. 95 Ibld.9 Dachlan dld not further expia ln to whlch "greedy" and "paralyzed" party he referred. See also Noer. PaTtaI Islam, 228-242. Ibid. 235-236 Accordmg to Noer. the NU promlsed not to join the cabinet wlthout Masyuml However, the NU broke rts guarantee and left Masyumi behmd. NU obtamed three positions ln thls cabmet Thus. Masyuml was actually shocked by the foundation of the Ah SastroamldJoJo cabinet • 99 Dachlan, "Nahdatul Ulama." 1 0 32 Lastly, Dachlan underlined the concern of the NU on the A"ran Kepercayaan (the Javanese mystical sect) whlch was developmg and spreadmg m many reglons This would • lllil erode the punty of religion as belleved by t.he Indoneslan people M Natslr, the speaker and chalrman of Masyuml, dellvered a speech at the plenélry session of the Constituent Assembly on 12 November 1957, whlch was also pubhshed by the Masyuml faction of the Constituent Assembly 101 ln the flrst part of hls speech, he emphrlslzed the main task of the Constituent Assembly, whlch was to fmd a deflllltive constitutIOn ln an open and tolerant manner He discussed flrst tlle concept of the state, whlch, as Natslr mentloned, many scholars had actually dealt wlth He mamtamed that as an institution, the state consists of sorne bclSIC elements' terntory, populatton, government, soverelgnty, constitution, and convention This mean that state and ItS constitution should be deeply rooted ln the Idea, feeling, bellefs, dlld phllosophy of the society and the nation Wlth regard ta the Indonesléln state and Islam, hn • asserted that Islam was the religion adhered to by the malonty of the Indonesldll people dnd was also regarded as a force whlch had always effectlvely Influenced the Indoneslan pooplo's Ideas and stlmulated thelr Spirit Therefore, Islam should be the most appropnate pnnclple for the Indoneslan state Supportmg hls Idea, Natslr demonstrated the major weakness of Pancaslla by stdtlng that Pancas lia was baslcally secular III the sense that It was not denved from the rrJ\I()latlon of Allah and dld not recoglllze the soverelgnty of God The flrst pnnclple of Pancaslla, Kotuflanan Yang Maha Esa (oneness of GOd), was not even the point of reference of the four rnmalnmg 100 The Issue of ahran kepercayaan was also a target of Musllms' cnticism III the 19705 polrtlcs It was NU, as the greatest element m the PPP, whlch opposed the al/ran kepercayaan dunng the general session of the MPR The NU asserted that the altran kepercayaan would detenarate the falth 101 Mah Natslr, Islam Sebagal Dasar Negara (Plrnplnan Fraksl Masyuml Dalam • Konstltuante, 1957) 33 pnnclples and was a 100 se formulation, "cou Id be this and could be that "102 Thus. "It could not tell the rehglous people anythmg, nor could It represent what was really m the soul of • Indoneslan society "1(JI Pancaslla was a neutral and colourless notion that could not be rooted ln the heart of society He attempted to reassure the supporters of Pancaslla by assertmg that the flve pnnclples of Pancaslla had actually beel1 covered ln Islam as real values of IIfe By totally acceptlng Islam they would have a dynamlc, clear, and even salle..: phllosophy of the state It dld not mean that the state should be theocratlc The Islam-based state, whlch was proposed by Natslf, was Identlcal wlth nelther a theocratlc nor a secular state This was an Islamic democratlc state ln whlch Istamlc values hke lTlutual assistance, democracy, Integnty, Independence, antl-expIOltatlon, antl-capltahsm, and tolerance would be Implemented to promote the happlness of the people The readmess of society to accept and Implement Islamlc values ln the national hfe would • be a proof of thelr recognition to the soverelgnty of God And Natslr, enthuslastlcally, proposed Islam as the basis of the Indoneslan state based on the soverelgnty of God Nevertheless, unllke Sukdrno -- who had clearly based hls phltosophy on the flve pnnclples (Pancaslla) __ '04 Natslr dld not elaborate a precise formulation of Islam as the basls of the Indoneslan state. He merely stressed on the Illustration of the weakness of Pancaslla and the necessity of estabhshmg an Islam-based Indones,an state 1O? Ibid, 25 See also Soekarno, Lahlrnja Pantjaslla, translation (Djakarta The Mlnistry of Informat,on Republlc of IndoneSlit 1952), 28 Sukarno asserted "not only should the people of Indonesla have bellef ln God, but every Indoneslan should beheve ln h,s own part,cular God The whole people should worsh,p hls God ln the cultural way that is, wlthout 'rehglous egolsm' And the state of Indonesla should be astate Incorporatmg the bellef ln Gad 1 shall be glad Indeed If you agree that the state of free Indonesia shall be founded upon bellef ln God the Almighty " Hl;] Natslr, Islam. 25 • 1114 Soekarno, Lahlrnja 34 A clearer formulation of the basls of the slale was proposed by Ahmad 111', He dld not merely dlscuss the speclflc Issue of the state's basIc pnnclples, but dlso gave a concmt(' • descnptton of the features of the IslamlC stale Thus, Il mdY be pOillted out tlldl Ahrn,ld attempted to formulate the notion of an Islamlc stale m a more conerete W.ly by consistently USlng some techmcal concepts of the Islamlc state such as Khllafat. Dar al-lsliHT1, Uh dl Amri. Amanah, Justice, and soverelgnty Ahmad polnted out Ihat there have been two terms commonly used 10 reter 10 Mushm poht.cal Ideals, that of Khllafat and that of Dar al-Islam The flrsl lerm, Khl/Jfclt, hcld alm.ldy been used ln the penod of the prophet Muhammad and even ln the Our ân This concept acquired pohtlcal connotations ln the penod of Khu/afâ' a/ Ràshldïn (tlle nglltly gUlded suceessors),106 Abü Bakr, Umar, Uthman, AIî Ahmad asserted that, accordlng 10 tlle Prophet's leachtnys, every he ad of stale had 10 be elected by the people Nnverttlnless, Illls Islamle pohtlcal system was unexpecledly changed mto a monarchie syslem by thn Umayyads Khllâfat had no longer eXlsled ln any polltlcal arena This merely appeclmd ln thn • ph.losophlcal books wntten by both phllosophers and Mushm scholars Wlth the dlsappearance of both Khl/afat and Kha/ïfat trom pohtlCS, Mushms ln sorne parts of the world Implemented other terms such as Imam, Amir, and Mâllk whlch wem, dt; Ahmad consldered, "far from the Ideals of Islamlc Ideology and pohllcS "10/ Thus, "hlstory became very dark and black",08 because thts was marked by the excesses of these nor, Khllâfat governments 105 Z A. Ahmad, Konsepsl Negara Islam (Bandung Alma'anf, 1952) ThiS book was tlrst published ln 1949 106 For a worth diSCUSSion on this term, see W Montgomery Watt, Islamle Polit/cal Thought (Edlnburgh Edlnburgh UniversIty Press, 1987), 31-35 107 Ahmad, Konsepsl, 14 • 108 Ibid 35 Unllke Khllâfat, whlch speclflcally designated a polltlcal concept, the term Dar al-Islam was found nelther ln the Our an nor ln the Hadith This term referred to the structure of Islamlc • SOCIE'ty and malnly denoted the socIal and economlc Ideals of Muslim society Ahmad argued that. hlstoncally, the term Dar al-Islam was opposed to Dar al-Harb, a society or state whlch was commonly consldered as the enemy of the Musl/ms and, therefore, should be fought against It could be sald that the appearance of the term was a consequence of elther the wars between Mushm klngdoms and thelr enemles or the cIvil war whlch occurred in the medleval penod ThIs Inspired many Mushm scholars to scrutln/ze the so-called Ahkam al- Oltàl (the Islamlc law of war) whlch consisted of the legal cause of war, the holy purpose of war, the ethlcs of war, the peace talks, and the dut Y of every Mushm to perform Jihad ln the way of Allah lOg Hlstoncally, mdeed, the term Dar al-Islam was baslcally not an expression of the Ideals of the state Nevertheless, some Musllm scholars tned to Include Dar al-Islam in polltlcal array of concepts ln hls book, al-Farq Bayna Dar al-Islam wa Dar al-Harb, Dabüshy, for Instance, • bnefly Illustrated the main distinction of social, economlC, and polltlcal rights and granted to the cltlzens of Dar al-Islam and to those of Dar al-Harb He also underllned the Ideological and polltlcal purposes whlch should be malntalned by the cltlzens of Dar al-Islam Refernng to the terms Khllafat and Dar al-Islam, Ahmad suggested that the main ideals of the Islamlc state were estabhshmg the society of Dar al-Islam as weil as Implementlng the Khllâfat as ItS sole polltlcal and governmental system Moreover, Ahmad proposed four baSIC pnnclples for the Islamlc state. 1 e, "Amanah (trust), Kt.'adllan (Justice), Ketuhanan Yang Maha 109 The speclflc accounts about Jihad have been wldely dlscussed by, for Instance, FaraJ Muhammad Ghayth, Ghayat al-Irshàd 'lia Ahkàm a/-Jlhàd (Egypt Mustafa al-Babi, 1955). Muhammad Na'im Yâsin, Iftlrâ'at Hawla Ghâyât al-Jlhiid, (n p Dar al-Arqàm, 1984), Zaflr Oaslmi, al-Jlhâd wa al-Huqüq al-Dawltyat al-'Ammat (Belrut ' Dar al-'IIm li al-Malayin, 1982). John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, ed, Just War and Jihad Hlstoflcal and Theoretleal PerspectIves on War and Peaee m Western and Islamlc TradItion (New York Greenwood Press, 1981), Linda K Kolocotronls Jltmoud, An Intel/eetual Histofleal Study of Islamle Jlhàd Durmg the Llfe of Muhammad and m the • Twentleth Century (Ph 0 dlss .Ball State University. 1985) 36 Esa (Oneness of God), and KedauJatan Rakyat (people's soverelgnty) "11!l Ahmad's • dISCUSSion of each pnnclple was an attempt to formulate hls conceptton of the Islamlc state On the last pnnclple, for Instance, Ahmad suggested that the term 0/; a~Amr, dS used ln the Quran Implted the necesslty of establtshlng the soverelgnty of the people He argued tlldt "Uit al-Amr were the representatlves elected by the people and, ttlUS, ItS prtllClplf) Wd~ people's soverelgnty (democracy) "111 He further argued that there were four Illterpretdtlons concerlllng on Dli al-Amr O/i al-Amr could be Sultan or Head of State, elltes of mlhtary groups, UI(una, and Imam Masüm or saints Nevertheless, he supported Fakhr al-Dîn al-Râzy who relectlld these speculative interpretatIons -- and tended to malntaln that, as mentloned ln the Our an, Uli al-Amr should be "from you,'" 12 from the people and were elected by the people Endlng hls diScussion, Ahmad Illustrated the character and model of the Islamlc state He pointed out that the Islamlc state should be polttlcally, economlcally, and soclally soverelgn and Independent Reltglon Sl10uld also be an Important teature of the Islamlc state This dld not me an that the Islamlc state would be domlnated by group of c/ergy, who l1ttempted to • make the Quran and Hadith the state's constltutton 111 Indeed, thlS should be a eonstltutlonal state whlch Implemented both Hukum Abadl and Hukum Dasar Two other charactenstlc of the Islamle state Itsted by Ahmad were Musawdrafl (deliberatlon)114 under the democratlc pnnclples ln a parltamentary context He pOlnted out 110 Ahmad, Konseps1, 25 This formulation, as Ahmad explalned, denved from the 57th and 58th verse of al-Ntsà' , a chapter of the Our'an 1" Ibid"59 112 Ibid"61 113 Ibid, 92 Ahmad matntalnod that there should be two klnds of law ln the Islamlc stat8, that of Hukum Dasar (constItution) whlch was the creation of the people's representatlves and that of Hukum Abadl (etemal law) conslstlng of the Our an and Hadith 114 Ibid, 113-117 He proposed tlve klnds of Musawarah, 1 e dehberatlOns for electmg heads of state, deltberatlons for draftlng law, deltberatlons on government's poltcy, • dehberattons on securrty and mlhtary affalrs, and dehberatlons on courts and Judlclal 37 that "democracy without parhament was a counterfeit democracy."115 These features, as • Ahmad underhned, could be weil implemented in a repu~Jlican form of the state Thus, he further suggested that the "Islamlc state should be a repubhc ln whlch the head of state was elected by the people "116 • affairs 115 Ibid, 118 • 116 Ibid. 134. CHAPTERTWO • THE EMERGENCE AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE ppp 'rh. Polltles of Development Soon after the fall of Sukarno' ln 1965, Indoneslan Mushms were challenged by the politlcs of development of the New Order government Havlng expellenced Ildtlonal Instdblllty dunng the penod of Sukarno's reglme, the New Order, led by Suharto, Idullched progr,H11S aimlng at a complete reonentatlon ot Indoneslan pohtles The New Order, mdeed, "endeavors to make mast fundamental changes and to pursue a most fundamental developmünt. namely ln the field of concrete values and ln the soclo-cultural values ln a new process of enculturatlon "2 The pohtlcs of development was consldered a big challenge to the pohtlclzed Muslrm group since the New Order also re-ordered the polltlcal structure, partly all111119 at a control of Islamie polltlcal forces Before discusslI1g further the pohtlcs of development. It IS worthwhtle to mention tlrst the • concept of development as, at least. explamed by Ah Moertopo, Suharto's ddvlsor ln pohtlctll affalrs Moertopo's vlew on the Indoneslan modernlzatlon ae:; expresc,ed ln hls concept of AcceleratIon of the 25- Year /ndoneslan ModermzatlOn1 are con<;ldered ae:; colounng thn Indonesian national development programs He tlrst descnbes the foundatlon and onentatlon of the national development, suggestlng that Paneaslla and the 1945 cons.tltutlon serve as the foundation and the source, contall1l11g the authentlc values that glve oflentatlon to the development of tha state and nation He asserts that "to develop the nation and the country 15 , For more Information about Sukarno see, for Instance, Bernard Dahm, Sukarno (Ithaca Cornell University Press, 1969), MeVey, "Nattonallsm," Hal Kasut, Indonesla The Sukarno Years (New York Facts on Flle Publication, 1967), Reger Kent Paget, "Youth and the Wane of Sukarno's Government" (Ph D dISS, Cornell University, 1970) 2 Ah Moertopo, "Some BasIc ConSiderations III 25-Year Development," The Indoneslan Quarter/y, 1 (October 1972) 11 3 Ali Moertopo. Dasar-dasar Pemlktran Tentang Akselerasl ModernisaSI Pembangunan 25 • Tahun (Jakartra CSIS, 1972) 39 to 9,ve content to Natlonallndependence This means Increasing the prosperity and welfare of • the people, whleh IS ul1lmately dtrected to creatlng happlness for ail cltlzens "4 Consldenng the necesslty of development, relevant approaches to the rtght poltcy of development should be chosen approprtately Moertopo proposes two approaches to development, VIZ , secuflty approach and the prospeflty approach As Moertopo puts It The two approaches that are mutually supportmg and complementmg are to maintain the secunty of the Indoneslan people, who have achieved Independence wlth great dlfflculty (secunty approach), and to lead them to a hlgher standard of hVlng ln accordance wlth tho Ideals of Independence (prospertty approach) 5 It should al~o be mentloned that stablltty and secunty are prerequlsltes of the national development and crucial ta economlc development Moertopo pOints out that "national stabihty and Ilatlonal secunty are the flrst and taremost conditions for the contlnUity of the declSlon- maklng process ln the framework ot development in Indanesia "6 The stablltty needed IS not merely the stablhty of priees, stablhty ln the economlc fteld, but also stablllty in the polttical and • social IIfe ln general The need for pohtlcal stablltty was main reason for attempting a re- ordeflng ot pol/tlcalhte. Includtng the way of thlnktng and pohtlcal mentahty, the organlzation ot the soclo-pohtlcal forces. and the polltlcal structure This program was aimed at a simplification ln the ~ystem of pohtlcal organtzation, 50 that ln the next general election (1977) there would only be three contestants 7 Two other strategies for a re ordertng of polttlcal hfe should also be mentloned. First, IS floatlng mass alms at a distraction of the people's attention away trom pohtlcal and Ideologlcal concerns and to focus It on efforts towards national development and a limitation of the 4 Moertopo, "Some Basic," 13 5 Ibid 6 Ibid • 7 Ibid., 20 40 political parties' actlvltles to the dlstrrct level As a consequence. the Islamlc party would certainly be threatened by losrng Its potentlal supporters from among the tr ddltlonal Mushms III • rural areas Second. IS operatlng Golkar dS a modernlzlng element whlch. tllerefore. Cdn Ilot be separated from the process of pohtlcal restructure As far as Golkar IS concerned, It IS to be noted that Its emergence Cdn not be sepdrdtüd from the Indoneslan army's Intention to exert Influence on the mass organlzatlons afflhalt~d wrth the pohtlcal parties The army flrst controlled the anoU-PKI labor federdtlon of SOKSI. which conslsted of twenty-flve orgal1lzatlons representlng the workers dnd oHlclals of government-run p' ':1tatlons and industnes ln October 1964. as Masashl Nlslllhclrcl pOints out. several such occupatlonal groups. WItt SOKSI as a core, estabhshed a 10lnt <;ücmtandt undf'f army leadershIp 8 ln late 1969, 200 occupatlonal groups were affthated wlth IIllS body. ,md on November 22, 1969, they were clustered under seven parental bodIes called KINO As Nlshlhara notes, the seven Ktnos were SOkSI, Kosgoro, MKGR, Gerakan Karya Raklat (People's Wot1<.lng Movnment - cl • cluster of CIVil servrce aSSOCiatIons), Ormas Hankam (Hankam Mass Organlzatlon - il group of HANKAM-related organrzations, Includlllg an aSSOCiation of ABRI WIVtl5. ,md one for clvlhan emplcyees of the Mrnlstry of Defense and Secunty). Profnssl (a clustm of professlonal orgal1lZatlons, such as those of economlsts, doctors and ellgII1fJors). and Gerakan Pembangunan (Development Movement -- a group of bUSlrltlSS and othm development-related organrzatlons) q Indeed, Golkar was successful ln obtalnrng a broad support and becarne "a huge umbrella protecting functlonal SOCial groups, under which the II1ltlatlon of a pohtlcal renewal attractlvely look shape "10 8 Masashi Nishlhara, Golkar and the Indoneslan Elections of 1971 (Ithaca Modern Indonesia ProJect, Cornel! Universrty, 1972), 18 The secretarrat was ca lied Sekretaflat Bersama Golongan Karya or Sekber-Golkar (Jomt Secretanat of Funct/onal Group) 9 Ibid, 19 • 10 Panjt Masyarakat, 483 (October 1985).15 41 One 5hould bear ln mlnd that ln splte of the presence of some clvilran leaders such as Sumlskum and SuhStl0 11 ln the Sekber-Golkar, the Influence of the mllrtary leaders over thls • body was dominant Therefore, as Sarwono KusumaatmaJa, the General-Secretary of Golkar 1983-1988, pOints out. "there are simllanties betw3en GOlkar, ABRI and the bureaucracy"12 namely, the Ideologlcal basls, the way of percelvlng development, and the necessrty to restructure the national polrtlcal system Thus, Il 15 not an exaggeratlon to argue that the dependent attitude of Golkar toward5 ABRI and the bureaucracy IS clearly unavoldable It was Ah Moertopo, an emlnent mlhtary leader, who played hls polrtlcal game to create Golkar as the government's sohd party and weaken the other parties at once He led a Golkar apparatus called BAPILU, whlch worked to attarn a great vlCtOry for Golkar ln the next general electlons (1971) ThiS body consisted prrnclpally of the mlhtary, the Intellectuals, OPSUS, and bUSinessmen of Chlnese-descent. ail of whom supported the Idea of progress and stressed the need for Indoneslan pohtlcal modermzatlon 13 Addltlonally, teams of OPSUS were also led by Ah MoertoPQ, these almed at weakemng the pohtlcal parties and profession al • orgamzattons "They Intervened ln party caucuses and manrpulated party conventions to create a leadership crrsls,"14 so that the government would not be challenged by any force or factor ln controlling the parties The emergence of Hadlsubeno as the chairman of the PNI at the national convention ln Apnl 1970, and of B M Dlah as the top leader of the PWI at ItS Il Ward conslders these two leaders as antl-Sukarno as weil as antl-Islamlc aspiration Intenectuals, who enJoyed thelr close relation wlth Ah Moertopo Kenneth E, Ward. The 1971 Elect/on ln Indones/a An East Java Case Study (Monash Centre of Southeast ASlan Studies, 1974), 36 1? Panjl Masyarakat, 483 (October 1985) 16 1.1 Heru Cahyono, Peranan Ulama Dalam Golkar 1971-1980 Dan Pemtlu Sampai Malan (Jakarta Sinar HéJrapan, 1992), 69 Polrtlcal modernlzatlon. ac Huntington states, involves the ratlonahzatron of authorrty, the replacement of a large number of traditlonal. religlous, familial, and ethnrc pohtlcal authorrtles by a single secular. national polrtical authorrty ThiS also rnvolves the dlfferentlatlon of new pohtlcal functlons and the development of speclahzed structures to perform those functtOns Samuel P Huntlngton. Poltt/cal Orcier m Changmg Soc/et/es (New Haven Yale University Press. 1968),34 • 14 Nlshlhara, GOLKAR. 21 42 convention ln October 1970,'5 for instance, 15 clear eVldence of the government's InterventlOIl in the internai affalrs of these organlzattons The Islamlc forces, such as the GUPPI and tilt' • Parmusl, were also targets of OPSUS The GUPPI was founded on March 2. 1950, by sorne tradltlonal Uldma from Sukabunll (West Java), such as KH Sadr! SanusI and KH Mansur It almed dt dn Irnprovernrnt of Pondok Pesantren (tradlttonal Islamlc education) It was oflglnally socldl and pducatlolMI ln nature and scope However, after the effective intervention of the OPSUS. tllis orgdillzation practlcally became a Golkar apparatus whose responslblhty was to aclJl(we VlctOry for Golkclr ln the next general electlons (1971) , G Moreover, the government's Intervention ln the Islamlc polltlcal party could éllso be SfHm before the emergence of Parmusi As has becn noted. the most Important clvlhan elemont ln the antl-Communlst movement and the emergenco of New Order was the IslamlC group Therefore, It IS not an exaggeratlon ta say that, at that tlme, there were only two slgmflc aimlng at the establishment of the Ideals of pohtical Islam They expected the rehabllltation of Masyuml, whlch had been banned by the Old Order reglme However, hke Madlld has pOlflted out. Muslim leaders were actually "to be dlsillusioned by thetr own mlscalculatlofl "11 TIlH mliitary reglme, whlch was more wary of Islamlc aspirations ln the polltlcal sphem than Sukarno,1B had re/ected the polit/cal demands of the polrtlclzed-Islamlc group The rfJ/ochon was bluntly stated at a meeting between Ait Moertopo. Sud/ono Humardant and T/okropranolo, 15 Ibid. 16 On speciflc diSCUSSion about GUPPI, see Cahyono, Peranan Ulama 17 Nurchohsh Mad/Id, "Islam in Indonesla Challenges and Opportunrtlcs," Mlzan, 3 (1984) 75 1B W.F Werthelm, "Islam ln Indonesla A House Dlvlded," Ten Yea"s Mlltfary Terror ln • Indonesia, Malcolm Caldwell. ed (np Bertrand Russel Peace Foundatlon, 1975),85 43 the govemment's representatlves, and former Masyumi members led by Prawoto Mangkusasmito Il was also expressed in Suharto's letter addressed to Prawolo on January 6, • 1967 19 ThiS reglme was certamly nol ready to glve any concession that cou Id lead to any Mushm group galnlng polrtlcallnfluence ln Indonesia, and accordingly an effective control over the polltlcal groups was nec;essary It should be noted that the Parmusl, an Islamic party that was allowed to be organized as a successor to the Masyumi,20 was also under the strict control of the government This party was perrmtted to exist on condition that former Masyumi leaders would not be appolnted as members of party boards 21 Thus. the blunt refusai of the government to recognize the decisions laken by the flrst Parmusi congress ln Malang (east Java), in which Muhammad Roem and other former Masyuml leaders were appolnted as chalrman and members of the party respectlvely,?? was loglcally aimed at preventlng of polltlcal mvolvement by the former Masyumi activists The declslon provoked disappolntment among the participants of the congress and caused internai quarrels between two factions of the party, the faction of J. Naro • and Imran Kadlr was ln favour, while the faction of OJarnawi Hadlkusumo and Lukman Harun cntlclzed the government's interventIOn. Considering the need for stability in the nation, Suharto uhlmately appoented, on 20 November 1970, H M. Mintaredja, a moderate ------.--- The quotation of th,s letter could be seen in Solichin Salam, Sedjarah Partai Musllmln Indonesla (Djakarta: lembaga Penjelidikan Islam, 1970),69. (0 Wlth regard ta the struggle of Islamic leaders for the rehabilltatlon of the Masyumi and the emergence of Parmusi see, for instance. Salam, Sedjarah Panai, and Ward, The Foundatlon 21 Ernst Utrecht, "The Mllrtar)' and Elections," Indonesia After The 1971 Elections, Oey Hong Lep., cd. (London Oxford University Press, 1974),61 22 Muhammad Roern, "Roem Itu Anak Muhammadiyah," Diplomasi Ujung Tombak Perjuangan RI, Kusnlyatl Mochtar, ed. (Jakarta Gramedia, 1989, 105-106. It was Alamsjah Ratuperwiranegara, the State Secretary. who sent a radiogram to the Parmusi when its congress was almost over, statlng that the government reJected the newly elected leadership of the Parmusi Nawaz B. Mody, Indonesia UncJer Suharto (New York' Apt Books INe, 1987). 160. Nasir Tamara, "Islam under the New Order Government, a • Polrtlcal History," Pflsma. 49 (June 1990): 11. 44 Muhammadlyah memberwho had close relations wlth the government. as the chalrman of the Parmusl23 and Sulastomo. former chalrman of HM!. as Its secretary general .'1 Under • Mintared)a. the Islamlc party subsequently ISSUHd a pamphlet luStlfylllg the government's polrtics and guaranteelng the absence of any intention to revive the P,agaf71 Jdkartd (Jakcu1.1 Charter) in Indonesian pohtics We can argue that. In thls penod. the Parmusi \l'Jas oventucllly dominated by, what Allan Samson calls. an Accommodatlomsr group Whlctl tended to accommodate the ruhng elite 25 This group vlewed pohtlcs as a way of articulatlllg IIlterests through whlch they made themselves brokers between the party and the governmont ThiS political attitude of the accommodationlst can be clearly seen from the followlng statoment ot M intaredJa: Where is the proof of the struggle of the Islamlc Ummat dunng the twenty-flve years WB have been Independent? The people are already bored wlth the results of the strugglo which have been promlsed by leaders who merely consldered Ideologlcal struggle ThiS formai pohtical approach IS empty, what IS awalted by the people and Islamlc Ummat particularly are the mate rial results of the pohtlcal struggle Partal Mushmm Indonesla does not deslfe to carry out the formai pohtlcal approach as formerly Partal Mushmln Indonesia has decided (since the General Election heId on July 3, 1971) to cooperate • wlth ABRI and get in line wlth the development group (program-onented order) ?" To sorne extent, the slogan proposed on the eve of the seventles by Nurchohsh Mad/Id Islam- Yes, Islamlc Party-No and hls general Gagasan Pembaharuan (Idea of Reformation) are regarded as similar ln nature wlth Mlntaredja's accommodatlve attitude and hls notion of separation between the state and the church ln Islam 27 These Ideas provoked controverSI9S 23 Tamara, "Islam," 11. 24 Radl, Strategt, 74 25 Allan Samson, "Religious Beliet and Pohtical Action ln Indonesian Islamlc Modernlsm," '" Political PartICipation ln Modern Indonesla, R William lIddle, ed (New Haven Yale University, 1973),118. Samson mentions two other groups wrthln the Parmusl, the Fundamentaltst group and the Reform/st group 26 Mintared/a, Islam Dan Pollt'K, 65 27 Ibid., 89. Mintared)a asserts "er IS toch weil enlgzins scheldlllg tussen staat en kerk ln de • Islam" (to sorne extent, there is a separation between state and church III Islam) 45 and tension even between Nurchohsh MadJid and his supporters on one hand and the old generatlon of former Masyuml members on the other 28 However, wlthout any change in his • commltment to the Pembaharuan, he revlewed, towards the end of the seventles, hls Idea proposed ln 1970, and recognlzed It as a "tactical blunder "29 Influenced by the accommodatlontst polrtlcal attitude of sorne f'gures, the party could not consequently escape betng a subservlent party who se main task was supportlng the New Order govemment's polrtics It IS also not an exaggeratlon to argue that, unhke Masyuml, the role of the Parmusi was baslcally partlclpatory in, rather than crrtical ot, the estabhshed system Observlng Ifs strategy of development, it can be argued that the New Order government had a main perception that pohtlcal parties "constltute the source of confhct and polrt,cal Instabllrty as expenenced dunng the Liberai Democracy period "30 Therefore, the simplification of polrtlcal parties, whlch Will be discussed in the second part of thls chapter, may also be seen as a systematlc way to control the parties and inhiblt them from being pohtlcal rivais of the government and a detnmental factor to the national development The govemment's • pohcyof keeplng pohtlcal Islam ln check also reflects the mlhtary's outlook ThiS outlook, in turn, reflects the "cultural roots of ItS oftlcers, among whom orthodox Santri Mushms were underrepresented whlle, especlally at the higher levels, Javanese of Pnyayi outlook were heavlly overrepresented "31 ;:>8 A collection of articles wrrtten by Nurchohsh MadJid gives a clear picture of his C'.ore ideas on Islam and ModerntzatlOn See, Nurcholish Madjid, Islam Kemoderenan Dan Kemdones/aan (Mlzan Bandung, 1987). Nurchohsh MadJld, "The Issue of Modemizatlon among Muslims in Indonesia: From a Partlclpant's POint of Vlew," Read/ng on Islam in Southeast As/a, ed Ahmad Ibrahim, et al (Slngapore Instltute of Southeast ASla, 1985), 385 For a crrtlcal view on Nurchohsh Madjld's Pembaharuan, see, Hassan, "Contemporary Mushm" Surpristngly, in its special issue on the notion of Nurchohsh MadJld, Media Dakwah accuses hlm bluntly as a part of Jewlsh International lobby See Med/a Dakwah, 222 (December 1992) 47. 30 Syamsuddln Hans, "Party Conflicts under The New Order . Pattern and Tendencies," The '"dones/an Quarter/y. 3 (1989) 250 Harold Crouch, The Army and Polit/cs ln Indones/a (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, • 1978),36 46 The Fusion of Islamlc P-artles • It has been polnted out that the New Order govemment's mmn potlcy was the implementation of national development ln the po litlc al sphere. the government Inltlated a restructuring of the polrtlcal system and a Simplification of polrtlcal parties. as expected from the decislon of the MPRS No XXII 1966. regardlng the 1971 general electlons As far as the 1971 general electlons are concerned. It was not surpnslng tllat. supported particularly by the mllitary. the New Order governrnent had systematlcally prepared Ils stmtogy for triumphing over other pohtlcal forces as soon as the New Order omf..!rged Il IS not an exaggeration to argue that the declslon of MPRS. mentloned above. can be regarded as ct slgnificant constltutlonal step towards creatlng conditions whlch enabled the governmont to smoothly Impose ItS politlcal englneenng The same effort can also be seon on the occasion of a 1966 army semlnar held ln Bandung, statlng that the general electlons must bo cl guarantHe of the tnumph of the New Order and the Implementation of the 1945 Constitution and • Pancasila. Thus, the army, as the main supportel of the New Order, tned to strengthon Its pohtlcal functlon by faclhtatlllg the endorsement of the General Election Law I? ln addition. bath Doctrine of National Defense and Secunty, and Doctnne of Indoneslan Am1(~d Forcos j 1 also broadened the functlon of the mlhtary from holding the responslblhty for the national defense and secunty ta belng a dominant group 111 the GOLKAR whose responslblhty wa<; the determlnatlon of direction of the state's pohtlcs 14 Another considerable strategy wa<; the consolidation of the functlonal and professlonal forces whlch had been assoclated wlth Sekber-Golkar, thus maklng possible the VlctOry over other politlcal forces ln the 1971 general elections. 32 Radi, Strategi, 73 33 Doktrm Pertahanan Keamanan Naslonal Dan Doktrm PefJuangan ABRI These doctrines were endorsed and covered in SK Menu Utama HANKAM No Kep/B/177/1966 • 34 Mulkhan, Perubahan Penla/cu. 91 47 Not surpnsingly, the systematlc planning and organizatlon of Suharto resulted in the VlctOry of Golkar, the government's pohtlcal apparatus The offIcIai results, whlch were • announced on August 8, 1971 :l5 Indlcated that Golkar got 227 of the 351 avallable seats, whrle NU obtamed 58 seats, Parmusl 24 seats, PNI 20 seats, and PSII 10 seats Impressed by the results of the flrst general electlons ln the New Order era, Nlshlhara reports sorne comments on the VlctOry of GOLKAR The general chalrman of GOLKAR remarked on July 6 that GOLKAR won because the people love development. whlle the government leaders promoted the hne that GOLKAR's vlctOry was the people's VICtOry Meanwhlle, Mlntaredja, the chalrman of Parmusl, went 50 far as to state that "Golkar's VICtOry IS Parmusl's Victory "36 It seems worthwhlle to mention that, after the electlons, the MPR was ultimately domlnated by 543 government supporters, conslstlng of 236 elected GOLKAR members ln the DPR, 100 DPR members, and 207 MPR members appolnted by President Suharto from the armed forces and functlonal groups This, undoubtedly, enabled the government to simphfy further the Indoneslan pohtlcal system The tlrst step was to umte ail parties into three factions • ln the DPR Flrst. the F-PP bnnglng together the four Islamlc partIes NU, Parmusl, PSI!, and PERTI Second, the F-DP conslsttng of PNI, PARKINDO, Partal Katoltk, IPKI, and Murba. Thlfd, the F-KP conslstlng of GOLKAR and the appointed GOLKAR mernbers Yet another faction was the F-ABRI,37 a non-pohtical factIon The compoSItion of membershlp ln DPR-MPR also enabled the government to advance a step further by galnrng an endorsement for the Rancangan Undang-undang Kepartalan (Draft of Party Law), whlch was proposed by the government, wlthout any distraction As asserted by thls law, there would be only three authonzed contestants in the Indonesian general elections, 35 See also Appendlx B. ,16 Nlshlhara, Go/kar, 41 • J7 Rad!. Strategl, 77 48 two politlcal parties and one GOLKAR 38 Thus. the Idea of the fusion of parties. as a flllai • process of the simplification of parties. could not be reJected It may be noted that there were at least three obJectives of the fusion The flrst was the change of the old polltlcal Instrtutlons (parties) mto new ones Therefore, the old polltlcal parties, such as PNI. Murba, Parklndo. iPKI, Part al Katohk, were to be cllanged ,md fusp.d 11110 one common party, called POl Ailislamic parties (NU. Parmusl, PSI!. Pertl) Wt'fe to be urlltnd ln a new party called ppp Ali the organlzatlons whlch had been assocldled ln Sekber Golkar were al50 responslble for estabhshmg a new common institution, now called GOLKAR Tho second objective was a seperatlon of both pohtlcal and non-polltlcal roles The thlrd was replacement of old polltlcal values and norms by the new ones J'lit 15 IOterestmg to note that the fusion of Islamlc parties provoked debate5 among pohtlcal groups Some mernbHrs of the military group, for Instance, reJec.ted the Idea They argued that the fUSion of Islcl[TlIC forces was very nsky and would endanger and threaten the mlhtary Itself However, some ottlers tended to malntatn that the fUSion would enable them to control and weakell the Islarmc • forces 40 Meanwhlle, the responses of the 1c;larnlc parties were also vaned nIe conqress of NU held in Surabaya ln 1972, for Instance, reJected the fUSion To the NU clrcle, the Idoa of fusion wa5 a systematlc attempt to ehmlnate the strength of the NU as the blggest pohtlcal party in Indonesla after GOLKAR Indeed, the reJectlon by the NU can also bu mg ..udHd a'i effM to protect Ifs self not belng a mlnor IslamlC pohtlca! group Lrke tlle NU, ttlf) elected leader of the PSI!. M Ch Ibrahim and Bustamam, also reJected the Idea of fUSion éJnd eV(Jn instructed ail PSII members to do so ThiS dld not only provoke the government's anger4' but 38 Ibid. 39 Irsyam, Ulama, 49-50 40 Radi. Strategi, 79 41 Ibid, 81 ThiS can be seen from the threat of General Sumltro, the Commander ln Chief for Restoratlon of Securlty and Order (KASKOPKAMTlEJ), who said that "there tS a party which still ln doubt and rejecling the fUSion The government Will not hesrtate to bluntly • take drashc actions agatnst ~ " 49 also caused an internai confhct wlthm the party Supported by the government, M A. Gani and • Gobel formed Team Penyelamat PSII (Team for Rescumg PSII), aimlng to stabllize the party The miSSion of the team ultlmately resulted ln the emergence of a new leadership of the party under Anwar TJokroamlnoto as the chalfman, and the acceptance of the Idea of fUSion by the party ParrTIUSI and PERTI, for thelr part, supported the Idea Some non-pohtlcal Islamlc organlzabons also responded to the fusIon dlfferently The HMI, for Instance, whlch had nelther hlstoncal nor organlzatlonal fies wlth any Islamlc pohtical parties saw that the Ide a of fusion would not be a burden for the organlzation. As for the Muhammadwah clrcle, whose pohtlcal actlVltles were formally afflhated wlth the Parmusl, the fusion of Parmusi Into the ppp was regarded as the end of the Muhammadiyah's formai relatlo.lshlp wlth the Parmu~1 The Muhammadiyah even declded that there were no hlstoncal and organlzatlonal relations between Muhammadlyah and MI 42 The attitude of the Muhammadlyah can also be seen from the statement by A.R Fachruddln, the former General Chalrman of Muhammadlyah, who sald that "the MuhammadlYah prohlblted ItS members to • follow MI "41 Consequently, the Muhammadlyah seems to have to intenSif y efforts towards strengthentng ItS actlvlty 1", the non-pohtlcal field However, ln a meeting held in MlntaredJa's hou se on January 5,1973, allisiamic parties (NU, Parmusl, PSII, and PERTI) unammously declded to fuse Into one common party, called the ppp A declaratlon of the foundatlon of the PPP, whlch was signed by Idham Chalid (NU), HMS MlntaredJa (Parmusl), Anwar Tjokroammoto (PSI/), Rush Hahl (PERTI), and KH. Masykur (NU), was offlclally Issued 44 Irsyam, U/ama, 53, 60-61 SudardJI, the former leader of MI, claimed that MI was supported by the big famlly of the crescent-star includlng Muhammadiyah He further argued that MI was the successor of both the Parmusi and Masyuml. However, SudardJl's cla.m was reJected. for .nstance, by M Natsir and KH. Misbach, the former chairman of MaJlIs 'U/ama (Ulamâ Councll) ln East Java, who asserted that "~ is not true to say that the MilS the successor of Masyuml" Tempo (October 3, 1981) 15 • 43 Tempo (October 3. 1981).15 50 Shortly after the declaratlon of the foundatlon of ppp, a meeting, whlch was attended by • representatlves of ail the now united Islamlc parties, was held on February 13, 1973 at KH Masykur's house ThiS internai consolidation of the party resulted 111 two !>lgl1lflcant declslons, viz, Program PerJuangan and a Program Pokok PanaI Persatuan Pembdngundf1 (ProgrtlOl of Action and Mam Program of the PPP), and a composition of Executive and Consult.ltlve Councii of ppp 45 As far as the composltton IS concerned, It IS obvlous that It Illustrates the ullIquenflss of the organlzatlonal system Implemented by the PPP ln the sense that the four dlStlllCt clements (NU, Parmusl, PSII and Pertl) are comblned ln one common system It 15 also obvlous that the proportional share of power among these elements IS conslderably slgnlflcdnt HrlVtng succesnfully obtalned the greatest number of supporters ln the 1971 General Elections rltter GOLKAR, NU seemed to be dominant ln the PPP Sorne Important positions WÜrH cl1alred by the NU, such as President of the Party (Idham Challd), General Secretary of Executive Council (Jahla Ubald), General Chatrman of Central Advlsory Councii (Masykur), and General • Chairman of Consultative Gounell (Blsn SJansun) 4fi However, the top leader of Executive Councii was HM S MlntaredJa. from the MI Challenged by the government's intensive polltlcal englneenng, the PPP launehed ItS !trst main program, which focused on the Internai organtzatlonal consolldatton The program was urgent slnce the concept of fUSion could posslbly result ln the ehmll1atlon of the cultural, religious and pohtlcal character of each element of the party Therefore, the program partly almed at a preservation of the party's Identlty and a strengthenmg of the coheslvenesc; of the party's elements It IS nol an exaggeratlon to mamtam that the capablllty of the PPP to 44 Radl, Strategi,82-83 45 Anggaran Dasar Uan Anggaran Rumah Tangga ppp (Jakarta Plmplnan Pusat ppp, 1977), 45-47 With regard to the composItIOn of PPP, see Appendlx A 46 BiSri Sjansurl was also a General Chalrman of NU at that tlma Tempo (April 11, 19B7). • 16. 51 formulate ItS proper posrtlon wlthm the configuration of Indonesian pohtlcs and to manage the distinct cultural and rehglous Identltyof each element 01 the party would strengthen the party • Otherwlse, the party will lose ItS lies with ItS supporters Followlng th,s reasonrng, 1 wOt,;ld argue that the proportlonal shétre of power was an apparently sensitive Issue 47 Therefore, the compoSition of Executive and Consu~atlve Councii of the ppp. rn whlch the NU, followed by the MI, were domrnant .. may be seen as a maximum cornpromlse among the element5 prevenhng tension and creatlng a maximum degree of integration among them The MUNAS -- the second hlghest decision-makmg body aner the Muktamar (general congress) -- of the Executive Councii of the ppp held ln Jakarta Irom 6 t08 November, 1975, al50 almed at an Internai consolidation of the party Two mam declslons were made in the MUNAS Flrst, to draft and legltlmlze the AD/ART (const~utlon) of the party and strengthening the agreement whlch was made on February 13, 1973. Second, to alloeate seats ln the parhament to each element based on the resu~s of the 1971 general eleetions The decislon wa5 made that, ln the name of Unit y, the results of the next general electlons in 1977 should • be proportlonally shared arnong the elements The blggest element was not to expect a bigger number of seats 48 The results of the MUNAS, afterwards known as the 1975 consensus, would later become a source of confllet wlthrn the party 49 The deslres for Internai consolidation were encouraged by the bitter expenence the ppp had had ln the 1971 general electlons The eleetlon results gave an overwhelmmg VlctOry to the GOLKAR and the government This was also conSldered as the victory for the Ideology of development As Husnl Thamnn (the Vice General-Secretary of Executive CounCl1 of the ppp at that tlme) sald, "We were defeated, therefore, we are uniting "50 Solldarity or mutual 47 It Will be shown that thls Issue IS to be regarded as a source of the lengthy internai con'"ct wlthm the ppp 48 Radl, St, ategl. 103 • 49 Syamsuddrn Hans, "ppp and Polltlcs under the New arder," Prisma. 49 (June 1990): 39. 52 understanding among the formerly dlstmct Islamlc parties was ultlmately achleved almll1g at strengthenmg the ppp Islam was employed as a slgmflcant factor of solldanty The fuslIlg of • the Islamlc parties seemed to be an attempt to show at leasl to thelr trad,ttolldl supporters, that the ppp was Islamlc ln nature The ppp was a party atternptlng 10 repms8nl the Mushll1 Ummat pohtlcally. In seekmg IslamlC solutions to contemporary problollls The USH of • Persatuan (unit y) and Pembangunan (developmenl} was eVldence thal the ppp had cmerged to gain the support of the Musllm Ummat ln order 10 partlclpate ln ttH! natlonétl developrnent process. The manifesto of the ppp also called for creatlrlg na lust and prosperous SOCtety blessed by Allah the Almlghty, splntually and matenally based on the Pancaslla and the 1945 ConstitutIon ln the unttary state of the Republlc of Indonesla "'d AddltlOnally, the use of Islam as the pohtlcal symbol of the party was consldemd necessary since rehglous sentiment was ItS most slgmflcant Ile wlth ItS supporters Il wac; on the basis of religlous sentiment and rehglous pnnclples that the ppp faced the challengmq issue of the marnage bill, whlch was submltted by the government ln the 1973 general session • of MPR The submlsslon wa!> encouraged by the antl-Islamlc elements, becaw,H thf~ bill obviously contradlcted the teachmgs of Islam regardlng the marnage procedure Accordlng 10 Tempo, a weekly magazine, there were, at least. nme chapters cot1tradlctlng the teè)chtng of Islam Meanwhlle, research conducted by IAIN of Yogyakarta found that !ourtefJn chapters were contradlctory to Islamlc teachlngs 52 The bill reqUired that every marnage be reglstered ln order to be vahd (whlch for Mushms gave a dlstlnctly CIvil cast to a predomlnantly rehglous affalr), that a Muslim man must get permisSion from a cIvil court before taklng a sflcond wlfo, and that simllar permission must be obtalned before a divorce could be granted Mushrn cnticism of these prOVISions was that slnce they dld not hmlt the number of WIVÛS, they 50 Radl, Strategl, 85 51 Anggaran Dasar, 7-8 • 52 Rad.. Strategl, 119-121. 53 contradlcted the provisIons of IslamlC law Therefore, the role of Islamic law would be • undermlned The bIll also mentlOned that dlfferences due to natlonahty, ethnlcrty, country of ongln, religIon, bellefs, and ancestry dld not constrtute Impedlments to marnage This provision IS also contradletory to Isiamle law Islamle law regards dlfterenees of religion as an Impedlment, partlcularly for Mushm women. However, Mushm men may marry women trom among the Ahl aJ..Kltiib (VIZ ,Jews and Chnstlans) wrthout the latter adoptlng the Islamle falth ~3 The bIll also matntamed the legal nght of adopted sons or daughters to inhent from therr adopted parents Wahld notes that no rellglous law eXlsts in Islam whieh allows the nght of adopted sons or daughters The only way for the adopted parents IS to transfer a thrrd of therr property as a glft to therr adopted sons or daughters dunng thelr hfetlme, wlth the remalnrng two-thrrds of the property to be Inhented by dlfferent inheritors 54 The bItter debate on that bIll was dramatlzed by the occupatIon of the par1iament bUlldmg by Musltm youths for a few hours Moreover, other articles relatlng to engagement and premarital pregnancy ralsed equally flerce objections from Muslim groups 55 For the ppp to • vote agalnst the bill wou Id have been useless since thls party was a mlnority ln the parliament. Therefore, the ppp threatened to walk out If a vote were held !-hwever, supported by other forces, the members of the F-PP (faction of the ppp in the parliament) -- numbering only 94 out of a total of 460 members of parllament -- ultlmately succeeded in defeating the bill 56 The cntieal attitude of the ppp was supportt!d by promlnent Mushms outside the party, youth and student organrzatlons, intellectuals, and Musllm polrtlclans A huge demonstration 53 Wlth regard to the critlclsm of Mushms towards the bill, see Hasan, "Contemporary Musllm," 224-240 !i4 Abdurrahman Wahld, "Islam and Pancaslla' Deveiopment of a Aeligious Politlcal Doctnne in Indonesla," paper presented to the Assembly of the World's Religions ln Seoul on 25 August 1990 55 Sidney Jones. "It Can't Happen Here. A Post-Khomel", Look at Indoneslan Islam," Asian Survey. 20,3 (March 1980) 320 • 56 Hans. "ppp and Pohtlcs," 38. 54 was also conducted by young Muslim people demandlng annulment of the bill The bill was • regarded in the Mushm Clrcle as an attempt ta force Indoneslan Mushms ta drop Isldmlc law, especlally on marriage. and ta replace rt wrth another regulatlon The attitude of the NU, as the blggest element m the PPP. 15 dlso noteworthy Llke othm Muslim groups, the NU parhamentanans also reJected those paragraphs of the bill. wllich WtHO ln confhct wlth the shari ah, under InstructIOn of KH Sisn SJansun, ROIs Am of the NU and Majlis Syuro (consultative councll) of the ppp as weil Consldenng that the marnage bill WdS a religlous problem, SJansun declded to Invite only some Ulamâ of the MaJhs Syunah (consultative councll) of the NU dehberatlng the bill SJansun dlrec..tly submltted the results to President Suharto.57 It 15 arguable that the penod of internai consolidation could also be regarded as a challenge and an o pportunrty encouragmg the ppp to be able to formulate Its polltlcal raies appropriately As has been noted. after Golkar's VICtOry ln 1971, the governrnent began to • ratlonahze the Indoneslan pohtlcal party system Depohtlclzatlon of society and emasculahol1 of pohtical parties, as a part of the ratlonahzatlon programs, were launched by Implementlrlg the idea of floatmg masses The theoretlcal concept wa5 used by Nurchohsh MadJld. Hm general chalrman of HMI at that tlOle, who was advocattng (July 27, 1971) the closure of party branches below the second regional level This means that there was no ne ad for party organizations in the Villages, thus the villagers "cou Id then devote themsHlves singie-mindedly to the task of development"58 Implemented by the government The governmenf Justlfled the idea on the grounds that It dld not violate any constltutlonal provISions and condemned ail opposition to it. Slnce the people's real needs had nothlng to do wlth pohtlcal and Ideologlcal COnfllCt, the government and the people could concentrate on development 57 Maksoem Mahfudz, Kebangkltan Ulama Dan Bangkltnya Ulama (Surabaya Yayasan Kesatuan Ummat, 1982), 261 58 Mody, Indonesla, 312 Indeed, thls pragram was alsa atm mg ta free villagers trom the • influence of the polrtlCal parties (Bebas Parpo~ 55 Sorne may argue that the Ide a of the floating masses Will be a serious problem especlally for the ppp They also may belleve that depolrtlclzatloll, through the Implementation of the • idea of the floatlng masses, could cut off the relations of the ppp wrth rts strongest supporters malnly from the NU clrcle ln rural areas However, thls notion actually could not cut off the emotlonal Ms of the Kyal or 'Ulamâ' wrth thelr followers ln Villages and Fondok Pesantrens, The chansma of Kyal, thelr depth of religious knowledge, and thelr h'gh level of morallty had created a unique dependence and obedience of the rural Ummat towards the respected Kyai and the strong tradltlOnalleadershlp Therefore, 1 tend to argue that the notion of the floating masses, t lOugh It was challenglng, was an Ineffectlve way to erllasculate the PPP, slnee the position of the NU ln the party was strong, and also became the dependence and obedience of Ummat towards Kyai was not affected. The party was also not allenated from its strongest supporters untll the confllct between the MI and the NU happened ln the post-1977 general elections The years of the consolidation of the PPP also coincided wlth the crltical attitude of the • people outs.de the party towards the government's administration Generally, sorne economlc issues which had appeared slnce the emerQence of the New Order government were the main targets of crlticism and demonstrattons du ring the 1970s The case of Pertamma, for example, is a clear proof of the economlc cnsls whlch occured as a result of the govemment's mismanagement It has been noted that for man y years thls company had been dominated by Generallbnu Sutowo 59 He, on the basis of a "can-do entrepreneural style," produced a stnng of apparent success stones in the building of Pertamina itself, the slgning of Innovatlve 'production-sharing' contracts wlth forelgn oil companies, and a number of non-oll proJects such as construction of the President's executlve office bUilding, hotels, air transport, msurance, flce estates, fertllizer plants, industrial development of Batam Island near Singapore, and construction of Indonesia's tlrst steel manufactunng plant fiO 59 Wlth regard to the history of Ibnu Sutowo's invlovement ln the Pertamina see Hamish Mc Donald , Suharto's Indonesia (Honolulu. The University Press Of Hawaii, 1981), • 143-165 56 ln addition to the se successes, one might conSlder that Pertamlna had also opened a marvelous opportunrty for the seml-offlclal and unofflclal mlhtary business actlvrtles 1;' • Accordlng to Llddle, Pertamlna was "the Presldent's and mllltary's blggest slusll fund It was also a source of National pnde ln an era domlnated by forelgn assistance c1nd forülgn Investment led by an Indoneslan "62 However, the cnsls of Pertamlna ln 1975 could not eventually be avolded when It was unable to repay two short-terms loans from forelgn banks totalling about $ 100 million Dramatlcally. the cnsis seemed to ralse as mucll as four tlmes the amount of forelgn exchange that Indonesla had to expend to service ItS debt5 ovel the next several years 5'3 Another economlc Issue which provoked wide cnticism was forelgn Investment ln Indonesia, partlcularly from Japan It was Soedjono Hoemardam, the ASPRI of the President in economic affairs, who played a slgnlflcant role ln ~imoothlng Indoneslan-Japanese relations. 54 Under the Influence of Soedjono Hoemardam, many Japanese entrepreneurs maintalned a bureaucratlc connections to Improve thelr Investment ln Indonesla This • provoked cnticism and opposition agalnst the Japanese mvestments whlch tended to be dominant ln the Indoneslan economlc system paralyzlng the economlc IIfe of the Indoneslan comman people The PPP saw that thls would "beneflt only the capltallsts and the non- indigenous mlddle class people."65 The PPP's crrticism of thE! government's economlc pohcy, 60 R William Llddle, "Indonesla 1976 Chalenges to Suharto's," ASlan Survey, 17, 2 (February 1977) 97 61 See also David Jenklns, "The Mlhtary ln BUSiness," Far Eastern Economlc ReVlew, 99, 2 (January 13,1978).24. 62 Ibid,98 63 Ibid. 64 Michael Sean Malley, "SoedJono Hoemardalll and Indoneslan-Japanese Relations," Indonesla, 48 (October 1989), see also Michael Sean Malley, "Soedlono Hoemardam Dan Orde Baru ASPRI Presiden Bldang Ekonoml 1966-1974," Pflsma, Pnsma 20 years special editlon (1991) • 65 Radi, Strategi, 114 57 addressed in the 1973 general session of MPR, seemed to have encouraged the so-called AmerlCan Group whlch, conslstlng of sorne mlnlsters, technocrats, and the military (Sumitro, • KASKOPKAMTIB)66 was demandlng the revision of the way in whlch the process of national development was belng Implemented The situation became worse when the issue of bribery, corruption, and scandai of BULOG,67 emerged onto the Indonesian economic stage. This ultlmately culminated in the Malari,68 when antl-Japanese nots broke out when Kakuei Tanaka, the Japanese Pnme Minister, vlsrted Jakarta on January 15, 1974 The riots reflected the economic and political dissatlSfactlOn of many from among the common people, students, intellectuals, politicians, and sorne mllitary groups,6g besldes representing an Internai conflict among the military groups, partlCularly between Ah Murtopo and Sumitro. There were four main demands of Malan, VIZ., the dissolution of Aspri, the lowenng of pnces, the eradlcation of corruption, and the elimlnation of Japanese IOvestment As a result, "Sumitro was forced to resign, students ------_._-- • 66 Malley, "Soed)ono dan Orde Baru," 119 67 Many people had suspicions of SoedJono Hoemardanl's Involvement in the scandai Desplte the fact that the 1967 decision of the cabinet presidium to save Bulog's money ln the Bank Indonesla had been legally made, Soedjono Hoemardani deposited Bulog's savlngs (Ap 97 Million) ln another Bank, namely Bank Dharma Ekonomi This provoked the anger of Mmistry of Finance, Industry and Economy See, Ibid, 112 ln early 1977, the scandai of Bulog happened agaln It was BudiaJl, he ad of the East Kalimantan Bulog, and some Bulog offiCiais, who were consldered as the main actors of the scandai ln their WhIte Book, whlCh was banned by the military authorltles, students of the Bandung Institute of Technology, led by Hen Akhmadl, protested agalnst the scandai. They demanded to know "why were the manipulations of the Dolog of East Kalimantan singied out? And why dld BudlaJI do hls utmost to cover up the wrong doing of hls supertors? And how can one explain that of the Ap 7,600,000,000 'splrlted away' by BudiaJI, only Ap 3,000,000,000 have been traced"? See, Dewan Mahaslswa ITB, White Book of the 19;8 Studenfs Struggle, trans edltors (n p. Student Councii of The Bandung Illstltute of Technology, 1978), 155, see also Guy Sacerdotl, "BuJog Archipelago under Fire," Far Eastern EconomlC Revlew, 99,8 (February 24,1978) 36-38 68 Wlth regard to the Malan, see Andrew Gunawan ,"The Role of Students in the 15 January 1974 Incident," Southeast As/an Affatrs (Singapore. Instrtute Of Southeast Asian Studies, 1975) 69 Sumltro and hls fnends, Sutopo Yuwono and Sajldiman, were regarded as leading figures trom the mlhtary clrcle who opposed Aspn, Ah Moertopo and Soedjono, and therefore • supported students' demands 58 and intellectuals were arrested, and several newspapers were banned "711 The councii of Aspn • was also abohshed on 28 January 1974 Shortly after the nots. Ah Moertopo bluntly accused sorne former members of the PSI and the Masyuml of be'ng actlvely HlVolved ln Il and asserted that they attempted to change the 1945 Constitution 71 ln view of sorne events on the polltlcal stage dunng the penod of thn internai consolidation of the ppp -- the draft marnage law, the economlc cnsls (the Pertalnlna and Bulog scandais), the tension wlthm the mlhtary ehtes (between Aspn and Surnltro group). and the Malan -- the government seemed to lose Its populanty For the parties. especlally for the ppp, this accordlngly was an opportumty to strengthen sohdanty among Its components and formulate Its proper pohtical steps. The ablilty ta convlnce the people that the ppp was a pdrty attempting a struggle for the people's needs was undoubtedly necessary ln Splto of the taet that ABRI, especially the Sumltro group, had supported the ppp and the Ummat ln reJectlllg the secular marriage bill dunng the 1973 general session of MPR, the ppp should have consldered that the support of ABRI could beneftt the GOLKAR and enable It 10 gdln ItS • victory. One might argue that It was ABRI which played the declslve role ln tullllllng the demand of the Ummat and ln ehmlnatlng the Influence of Aspn Therefore, thn Ummat's suspicion and reJection of GOLKAR was unreasonable For the PPP, these were also cha"englng Issues which should had been antlclpated ln order to compete wlth Golkar ln the 1977 general electlons The 1977 General Elections Following the 1975 MUNAS, the PPP attempted ta strengthen the coheslveness among the four components of the party, almlng partlcularly ta prepare for the 1977 general eleetlons 70 Liddle, "Indonesla," 95 Sorne of the banned newspapers and magazines were Indonesla Raya, Harian Kami, Musllm Abadl Nusantara, Pedoman. Jakarta TImes, and Express, see also McDonald, Suharto, 138 • 71 Cahyono, Peranan Ulama, 144 59 It could be argued that the 1977 electlons, the flrst pesta demokrasl (festival of democracy) was a pohtlcal ex am of the ppp was the ppp capable of competlng wlth the government and • IS army-sponsored GOLKAR? This part an attempt to dlscuss the pohtlcal slgmflcance of the 1977 general electlons especlally for the ppp It IS obvlous that the ppp consistently utlhzed rehglous symbols ta gain the support of the people whose emotlonal tles to Islam and Islamlc organlzatlons remalned strong ln sprte of the tact that the government and sorne Intellectuals and technocrats were SUSplCIOUS that the Islamlc forces were strongly commltted to the Islamlc Ideology and were dlsloyal to the New Order government, the ppp tended ta malntaln and preserve ItS Islamlc commltment This can be seen, for Instance, ln the two ppp documents, the Program of Act/on, which was issued on February 13, 1973. and the Declarat/on of Polit/cal and Development Prmciples, which was declared on January 1, 1977, pnor ta the 1977 electlons 72 The Islamlc symbol was also clearly Inscnbed ln the party's objectives 73 • Moreover, a clearer ex ample of an Islamlc symbol utlhzed by the party was ItS use of the Ka'bah (the holy sanctuary of Mecca) as Its ballot symbol It was KH Sisri Sjansuri, the chalrman of the consultative councii of the NU and the PPP, who proposed the Ka bah as the emblem of the party He got the rdea through Salat Ist/kharah ( a mght prayer seeking direct gUIdance and blesslng from God), thus the PPP activists became convlnced that thelr struggle ln the PPP wou!d be blessed by God 74 On the basls of Undang-undang Pem/lu (the General Election Law), the PPP submltted the ballot symbol to the LPU (General Election Institute), However, Amlr Machmud, the Mlnlster for Home Affairs and the chalrman of the LPU, reluctantly rejected the use of the Ka'bah by the PPP as ItS ballot symbol in the 1977 general Radl, Strategl, 136-139 The declaratlon conslsted of nme major Ideas on constltutional pnnclples, pohtical parties, general electlons, welfare of people, international cooperation, detense and securrty, the young generatlon, development, and the role of religion, 73 See foot note number 51 . • 74 Ha'is. "ppp and Pohtlcs," 40. 60 elections 75 Meanwhlle, the ppp seemed to have no oblectlon to not havlng the blesslngs of the government. sinee It elalmed to be eonvlneed that It had always been eventually and would • always be blessed by God Nevertheless, aeeordlng to one source the ppp threatened to boycott the eleetlons If the proposed symbol was not allowed 7t> The splnt of Ihe ppp to advance Ils Islamle Ideals -- to create a lust and prosperous society blessed by Allah -- was fully demonstrated dunng ItS campalgn eleetlon Understandably, on the basls of rehglous law and ethles, the ppp ralsed Issues of corruption, economic dlspanty, and "seculanstlc tendencles by the government offiCiais who happennd to be Golkar's supporters "77 Moreover, prlor to the 1977 general eleetlons KH Blsn Sl8nsun declared ln the name of Islam ln order to uphold the rehglon and law of Allah, every Moslem who takes part ln the 1977 general election, whether male or female, but espeelally a member of PPP, 15 legally obhged to vote for PPP wh en the tlme cornes Any Moslem who takes part III the election but does not choose the ppp symbol, whether because of fedr of looslng income, status, or for any other reason, has therefore deserted the law of God /H • It IS reported that the PPP campalgn drew enormous and fervent crowds, desplte offiCiai obstruction, whlch became blatant ln areas remote from mdepf'ndent observation As McDonald points out, the party showed several faces One was a communal appeal to the devout It offered to the Mushm ummat under the gUidance of venerable scholars who sat on offiCiai platforms at mosl meettngs Another was the face of the pflbuml, the Indlgenous Indoneslan depnved of hls nghts by the triad of chinese, forelgners and corrupt offlclaldom, another showed the slmphclty, homehness and honesty of the Musllm ln hls dally round Islam as a force Hlat cou Id lead a corrupt Indonesla to better ways 79 75 Radl, Strategl, 135 76 Mody, Indonesla, 318 77 Syamsuddln, "Rehglon and Pohtlcs,"96 78 Clted from Hans, "PPP and Pohtlcs,"31. • 79 McDonald, Suharto, 237-238 61 Meanwhlle, Chahk Ail of the ppp also crrtlclzed the govemment du ring the campalgn. He ralsed the marnage law expenence, compared the government's polltlcal and rehgious • management tactlcs to those of the Dutch, and elalmed that 20 per cent of development funds were belng wrested because of corruption Chahk AII's cnticism was supported by Chahd Mawardl, the chief spokesman for the ppp, who went on to attack the growmg Imbalance of the economy and the decreasing self sufflclency whlch he attnbuted ln part to "perpetuation of the colonial economic structure."BD He also outhned wlth remarkable frankncss the PPP's view of Suharto's rehglous strategy He sald that the Mushm maJonty ln Indonesla felt an "1~lamophoblc" tendency among Suharto's advlsers whether or not thls was known to the President The performance of the PPP enabled it to recelve support dunng the campaign from some emlnent Mushm leaders outslde the party. Muhammad Natslr, for example, declared that he would choose the PPP's ballot symbol Nurchohsh MadJld, desplte hls controverslal • slogan "Islam-yes, Islamle party-no," actlvely eampaigned for the PPP, eneouragmg students and the youth to vote for It R1 At the university of Indonesla, Dipo Alam, the head of the student councll, urged students not ta vote for the Golkar as to achleve a restoration of political balance 8? H Rhoma Irama, a popular Mushm slnger83 -- who clalmed to have at least 15 million ardent fans and used sorne verses from the Qur an and Hadith in his Iyncs -- was also !lO Ibid ,248 81 Tamara, "Islam," 14 During a monthly discussion organized by the PERM/KA MONTREAL (Indonesian Student Association of Canada ln Montreal) on November 29, 1991, Nurchohsh MadJld asserted that he actually dld not support the PPP, but rather demoeracy He deslred the Implementation of a "balance of power" ln the Indanes/an pohtical system Thus, he compared hls task ta that of "pumplng up the fiat tyre " 1\2 McOanald. Suharto, 241 R3 Many Indoneslan consldered h,m as the Raja Dangdut (the king of dangdut, popular musIc wrth strang beat reminlscent of Hmdi and Arabie music), the Sat"a Dakwah (the kmght of Islamle preachlng), and the Raja Da" Bawah (the king from the lower class); • see also Tamara. Indonesla. 4 62 a staunch supporter of the ppp and actlvely campalgned for It A4 He commented that "1 voted • for the ppp because of my Islamlc motIvatIon and Il Allâhl Ta ala"A~ (devotlon ta Allah) Kasman SIngodimedJo,86 a former emlnent member of Masyuml, who also supported dnd campalgned for the ppp Llke Madjld. ~ asman attempted to pre'Jent the domlndtlon of certalll polrtical groups ln the Indoneslan polttlcal arena Moreover, Arnlr Macllrnud's rlccusatton against Kasman as berng actlvely IOvolved ln the PRRI also motlvated hlm ta support tlle ppp 87 For the government, the Issues of economlc cnsls. corruption, mlsuse of offiCiaI positions, inequltable distribution of Incarne, and the gap between the nch and the poor, obvlously threatened the polttlcal stablhty of the country before the 1977 electloll MOroovüf, tl10 government also saw that the opposition of many students, rntellectuals, sorne of the mllitary, spiritual and religlous leaders,BB and the PPP, were major threats ta Golkar Many observers of Indoneslan pohtlcs malntaln that Islam was a major force ln Indoneslan pOlltlCS, and thus the 1977 general electlon apparently reflected the struggle between the governrnent and • Islam 89 Therefore, the government made adequate preparations ta secum ItS position and further reduce the dWlndling power of the polltlcal parties A meetIng, conducted by Golkar ln Surabaya on the eve of the 1977 electlons, promulgated a declaration The declaration malntalned that Golkar no longer talked of 84 IbId. 85 Tempo (Aprrl 4, 1987) 14 86 SingodlmedJo, Irterally means lion on the table Many people consldered that he was a very blunt, aggl esslve and attractive when maklng a speech B7 Radl, Strategl, 140 88 With regard to the opposition of an emlnent member of the allran kebatman, see DaVId Bourchler, Dynamlcs of Dissent ln Indonesla Sawlto and the Phantom Coup (New York Cornell UllIverslty. 1984) 89 R. William Llddle, "Indonesla '1.977 The New Order's Second Parhamentary ElectIon," • ASlan Survey, 18,2 (February 1978) 180-181 63 "accelerated modernlzatlon ln twenty years" but of "more equltable dlstnbutlon of development "'JO This pohtlcal tactlc was consldered necessary since Golkar reahzed that there • was growmg dlscontent over the economlc pohcy relatmg ta Income dlstnbutlon The Idea was that Golkar could expect ta attract the people and re-estabhsh ItS pohtlcal confidence. Meanwhlle, Soedomo (the head of KOPKAMTIB) issued a IIst of four campalgn "don'ts". "don't mtlmldate your opponents, don't offend the dlgnlty of the government and Its officiais, don't dlsrupt national unt1y, and don't cntlclze the pohcles of the government "91 It IS arguable la say that, desplte Soedomo's attempt to prevent political conflict and restore securrty and arder dunng th,s partlcular penod, his don'ts were clearly not neutral Suryadlnata makes th,s pOint m notlng that "some mlhtary offlcers were said ta have Ihreatened the people that they wou Id get mto trouble If the y dld not vote f.:lr Golkar "92 They were also SUSplCIOUS of the ppp and other Mushm leaders for havlng linked thetr campalgn to flnanclal ald trom Llbya and ta Komando J/had (the command for a holy war) 93 Consequently, a number of Mushm rehglous teachers, preachers and activists ot Mushm orgamzatlons were • arrested Muhammad Natslr clalmed ln 1978 that Ismall Prélnoto, a Komando Jlhàd leader who was sentenced to hfe .mpnsonment ln September 1979, was "an agent provocateur run by Ali Murtopo "'14 Interestlngly. Natslr's clalm was supported by sorne mlhtary off!cers and two !lO Leo Suryadmata, Milttary Ascendancy and PolIt/cal Culture. a Study of /ndonesia's Go/kar (OhiO Ohio University Centre for International Studles, 1989), 76 f11 lIddle, "Indonesla 1977," 181 Suryadlnata, M/I/tary, 77 Syamsuddln, "Reh~lon and Pohtlcs," 96 Some argue that Ali Murtopo and his group were behmd the Komando Jihad When Lt Gen Sutopo Juwono, the former head of Bakin, was mtervlewed he explalned that "Ah Murtopo is belongmg to this group So, for Instance, you talk about Komando Jlhâd It's not a new issue. From the beginmng, he has had th,s oplmon 1 had ta stop that at the tlme He had the opimon that we must create Is:;ues He sald at 'one tlme we Will have to use this' and so on and on Let's say it's always ln hls mmd 1 tned to stop hlm But 1 can't stop that because he's always gomg ta the President He has hls own Opsus" See, David Jenklns, Suharto and HIS Generais /ndoneslan Mllttary Poltt/cs 1975-1983 (Ithaca Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984), • 57 64 members of Murtopo's group, Harry TJan Sllalahl and Jusuf Wanandl 95 • Moreover, many Golkar campalgners tned hard to reJect the wldespread bellef arnong Muslims tl1at Golkar was the party of the Abangan and other antl-Islamlc groups and clc\lllled that Golkar also struggled for Islam slnce ItS major supporters were Musllms Thus. thoy raised the slogan, "Islam IS my religion, Ka bah IS my klblat, and Golkar 15 my cholce "')t· Even Amir Machmud stated that he was ready ta partlclpate ln Jlflàd fi Sdbil AIIJtl (Jlhéld 111 the path of Allah) 97 I~ 15 also to be noted that Golkar had many locallslamlc teachers ln ItS camp cUld used them ta counter the ppp arguments that Musllms were obhged to choose the Ka bah 'lB The tension, pnor to the electlons, between the ppp and the government and army- supported Golkar pnor to the electlons resulted ln an Increased percentage of popular vote for the ppp As noted, the offiCiai results of Indonesla's 1977 electlons wtllch were announced by the LPU on June 8, 1977 Indlcated that Golkar recelved 62 11% of the popular vote. whlle the ppp obtalned 29 29% of the vote and the POl was the reclplent of 8 60% of the voto If WH • compare the se results wlth those of the 1971 electlons, we Will see that the PPP W POl declined by 06% and 1 41% respectlvely 99 Alflan, companng the number of seats obtalrled by the three contestants ln 1971 and 1977, notes that the Golkar obtalned 236 seats ln 1971 and 232 seats ln 1977, whlle the PPP got 94 seats in 1971 and 99 seats ln 1977 The 94 Jenkins, Suharto, 57 95 Ibid. 96 Radl, Strategl, 143 Klblat IS the direction of Mecca ln whlch every Mushm has to face when praying 97 Ibid 98 Liddle, "Indonesla 1977," 181 99 Harry Tian Sllalahi, "The 1977 General Elections The Results and the Role of Tradltlonal Authorrty Relations ln Modern Indoneslan Society," The /ndoneslan Quarter/y, 5, 3 (July • 1977) 3-4, see also Appendlx B 65 thlrd party, PDI, won only 30 seats ln 1971 and lost 1 seat ln 1977 100 • It may be pomted out that, compared with 1971, no slgmflcant changes m the poSItion of the ppp ln the DPR are observable Its positIon was still weak ln 1955, the Islamlc parties (Masyuml, NU, PSII, Pertl, PPTI and AKUI) had obtatned 43.9% of the votes (116 seats), whlle ln 1971 they dechned drastlcally The Islamlc parties only recelved 27 11% of the votes (94 seats) ln 1971, and 29 29% (99 seats) ln 1977 Wlth the 1971 general electlons, Golkar successfully obtained the support of a majortty of Indoneslan Mushms Alflan notes that the composition of the DPR ln 1971 Indlcated that 362 members (79 2%) were Mushms These consisted of 180 members from the Golkar circle and 94 from the ppp The rest were from the ABRI and the PDI101 There was no slgniflcant change of composition ln 1977 It IS therefore clear that the PPP. desplte Its Islamlc symboltsm, faced dlfflcultles ln convlnctng Indoneslan Mushms to support and vote for it. One mlght argue that the PPP (and another party) was no longer considered capable of carrying • out Its proper functlon as an Integral part of the pohtlcallnfrastructure It can also be argued that the parties seemed merely to contnbute to the compartementaltzatlon and polanzatlon of the society on the basls of Ideology and manlpulated the masses for thelr own end_s 102 Thus, the PPP and another party had dechned ln the eyes of thp. people However, observlng the Internai tensions wlthln the mlhtary, and the opposition of students, Intellectuals, and the ppp, we would argue that the results obtalned by the Golkar were questlonable These were mamfesly obtalned through unfalr means 103 It IS reported that dunng the campalgn, supporters of the ppp complalned to the local mlhtary commander at Subang (West Java), of 100 Alflan. "Ulama. Umat Islam. Dan Pemlhhan Umum," Jurnal IImu Politlk, 3 (1988): 41; see also Appendlx B 101 Ibid. 34. 40-41 102 Sllalahl. "The 1977 General Election," 5 • Hl,! See also Suryadmata. MIMary. 77. Jenkins, Suharto, 56-57. 66 harassment by a militant antl-Mushm youth group The commander reportedly shrugged 11iS • shoulders and advised the group to "Jo ln Golkar, then you'lI be safe "1114 ThiS provoked cntlclsm from Chahd Mawardl. who alleged that the 1977 electlons had not been "gf'nertll ll direct, free, and secret," especlally ln the dlstncts far trom Jakarta and outslde JélVcl l', 1he ppp would have won conslderably more than 29 29% of the vote at the national level If tlle government had been ready to treat the contestants equally The electlons Hl Jclkartd WclS probably fairer, so that the ppp won a VlctOry over other contestants ttlCre Reportedly. thls VICtOry encouraged many Golkar offiCiaIs to blame the then Jakarta govPlflor, Ah Sadlkln, for not trylng hard to win votes for the governrnent-backed contestants Sorne even clallned tlldt Sadlkln had encouraged support for the ppp 106 Accordlng to Radl, the ppp got 1,079,214 (43.77%) votes, whlle the Golkar got 961,030 (3896%) The PDI only got 425,940 (1727%) votes 107 One cou Id hope that the PPP's VICtOry ln Jakarta, the center of national administration and pohtlcal actlvlty, would bnng about slglllficant change and development ln pohtlcal or • soclo-rehgious hfe However, as Nurchohsh MadJId has predlcted, the ppp would nover bn able to contnbute sIgnlficantly to a resurgence of Islam ln Indonesla, nor Cdn ItS contnbutlon be compared to that of the pohtlcally Inactive but soclo-rehglously very active IsldrniC organtzation hke the Muhammadlyah 108 It may, however, be sald that for the ppp, the success ln Increasmg Its share of the popular vote enabled It to strengthen ItS posltton -- as a second-class pohtlcal force -- ln the parhament 104 Far Eastern Economlc Revlew, 110, 49 (November 1980) 3 105 McDonald, Suharto, 248 106 Susumu Awanohara, "More of the Same," Far Eastern Economlc Revlew, 116,20 (May 14,1982) 15 107 Radl, Strategl, 145, see also Appendlx B • 108 MadJld, "Indonesla," 82 CHAPTER THREE • THE DECLINE OF THE ppp Opposition To The Government The Vtctory of the ppp JO sorne provinces and the tncreased percentage of the popular vote of thls party would be consldered a threat to the government and a leadlng factor behind a more open opposltton to the government launched particularly by the PPP. Therefore. the government still reahzed that the pohtlcal restructunng should be proceeded wtth further ln the next terms of Suharto's presldency This should be focused on an ehmtnation of ideology- based parties, wlth the goal of the smooth implementation of the development program in a stable polttlcal enVIron ment ln another word, the election was actually the beginning of a more Intense pohtlcal restructunng. One should bear ln mlnd that the government's attempt to develop Pancaslla as a social • and pohtlcal Ideology was also consldered a signlficant policy of pohtlcal restructunng This was tlrst launched by legally maklng Pancasila as the sumber dan segala sumber hukum (the source of ail source of law),l whlle the official gUide for comprehendlng and implementing Pancastla (Pedoman Penghayatan Dan Pengamalan Pancas/la, P4) was promulgated by the MPR through Its declSlon (II/MPR/1978) On the basls of thls law, the sociahzation of the Ideology of Pancas lia as had been offlcially interpreted by the government is necessary ln other words, the P4 IS an Intensive nattonal-scale pro gram of teachlng Pancaslla. The first target of Pancastla ''teachtng'' were the bureaucrats. and the courses have now replaced the tradttlonal "hazlng" penod ln the Unlversttles and would have been ln place ln the junior and senior hlgh schools ln the 1985/1986 academlc year.2 Furthermore, ln the lower schools PMP 1 It was declded by the MPAS ln 1960 ? Donald E Weathernee, "Indonesia ln 1984 Pancaslla, POlitlCS, and Power," As/an Survey, • 25,2 (February 1985) 185 68 has become part of the standard cUrriculum J Interestmgly, by a cabinet decision III October 1984, 'Ulama', Christian Priests and Pastors, and Bahnese rehglous men have also to dttend • the Pancasila teachmg 4 Radl explams that the F-PP eventually had no objection to provldmg a gUide for comprehendmg and Implementmg Pancaslla. sinee It would not vloldte tlle Irue spirit and meaning of Pancaslla as mentloned ln the 1945 constitution dnd would nevet be declded by the MPR 5 It is also reasonable to argue that the promotion of Pancaslla slnee 1978 was probably connected wlth the fact that the Mushm OPPOsition remalned strang The Iraman Islamlc revolutlon at the end of 1978 probably also encouraged the government to IIltenslvely promote Pancasila Accordlngly, the IslamlC revolutlon III Iran resulted ln the emergence of the so- called Mushm Fundamentaltst group, who consldered that the aecommodatlve Ideas of moderntst thlnkers were a leadlng factor ln the pohtlcal defeat of Mushms III Indones,a Tiley attempted to protect Islam and Muslims from the Impact of the outgOtng pohtledl process and were tnsplred ln the establishment of a fundamentally pohtlcal Islam ln IndonesI3 Dosplte the • fact that thelr appeal was not attractive to the maJonty of Indoneslan Mushms, works by sorne tnfluential Iranlan thlnkers Itke Khomelrn, Ali Shan atl, Muttahan have been translated 'nto Indoneslan The emergence of Usrahs (hterally, famlly), exclUSive groups of the young Mushm generatlon -- partlcularly Mushm University students who enthuslastlcally studlf!d the Our ân ln study groups -- the deslres of the female members of Usrahs to wam the Jllbàb (hnad covering), and sorne events hke the not ln Tanjung Pnok (Jakarta), the exploslonG at BeA ln Jakarta and the Borobudur Buddhlst temple ln Yogyakarta, were also consldered as phenomenon of the Iranlan revolutlon-Insplred Indoneslan Musltm Fundamentaltst rnovement " 3 Since 1975 the government actually has dlrected the InclUSion of "Pancaslla Morahty" Into the school CUrriculum, see also Suryadlnata, Mllitary, 91 4 Ibid 5 Radl, Strategl. 149 • 6 Syamsuddin, "ReligIOn and Polttlcs," 102-104 69 Thus, the government was aware of the Impact of the revolutlon ln Indonesla, and by • promotlng Pancaslla, the government hoped to counterbalance such Islamle ideology Moreover, the pohtlcal restructunng was further fortlfled by maklng Pancaslla the as as tunggal (sole foundatlon) of ail social and polltlcal forces It was the MPR's decislon (II/MPR/1983) and the National Law no 8, 1985 that obllgaled ail pohtlcal parties and mass organlzatlons 10 subscnbe 10 Pancélslla as the sole founjatlOn The government's deslre to relnforce ItS interpretation of Pancaslla as the legal gUide and sole Ideology for every social and pohtlcal force apparently provoked cntlClsm Some argue that the relnforcement of Pancaslia was also seen as an attempt to revive Soekarnolsm, whlch was consldered "as aspect of Indoneslan natlonahsrn and to be used to counterbalance Islam"l ThiS was the reason why Suhalto appo:nted H Roeslan Abdulganl, a former PNI leader who used to be the spokesman of Soekarno dunng the pre-New Order penod, as the chalrma,. of a comrruttee known as Team 7 -- whlch was set up after the promulgation of P4 • almlflg at a promotion of Pancaslla 8 Furthermore, many Muslims were concerned tllat the process of Pancasllalzatlon would mean delslamlzatlon Reportedly, "many preachers used the Fnday prayers forum and other rehglous gathpnngs to ralse the Issue and evoke Mushms' rehglous sentiment to relect the Pancaslla's becommg the sole foundatlon "9 ThiS was the reason why the F-PP, led by Yusuf Syaklr, refused the P4 and walked out of the congress commlHee charged wlth resol'Jlng the Issue of P4 dUrlh:, the 1978 general session of MPR 10 The post-1977 general electlon OppOSition of t~'· ~"PP crJld also be seen when the F-PP relected the Allfan Kepercayaan dunng the 1978 generdl S?~"lon of the MPR It IS obvious Suryadmata, Milltary, 91 R Ibid n Syamsuddm, "Religion and Pohtlcs," 102 • Hl Radl, Strategl, 149 70 that the government attempted to promote the cause of kepercayaan III tlle G8t~N This provoked an immedlate debate Followers of mystlclsrn argued tllat il.t'PPrCdY • alluded to somethlllg other than religion. whlle MuslllllS -- alarrned by tllIS sugÇJestloll - countered angnly that the word bellets was slmply ilfl elaboratloll of thfl word rohÇJlofl For Mushms and the PPP. the government seemlngly trlf~d to rdlse mystlcal beht>fs 10 Ihe s,uno plane as religion, an Ide a whlch they fmd deeply dlstasteful Ttley alo;o COfl'>ldtHPd tllI' kepercayaan Issue as the flrst shot ln a new government's carnpalgn ta ulldprrnlllo ,md curb the influence of polltlcallslam Kasrnan SlI1godlmedjo's Vl8W assertlllÇJ that tho ulhrnatp dllll of the mystlc group was to be recogfllzed as rehglous sects was supported by Muhcunllilld Natslr He pOlnted out that "step by step they are trylng to ralse kepnrccwaan ta Ihn levol of religion "11 The direct consequence, Natslr told. WI" bü thal people who now fC!ÇJard themselves as Musllms. who practlced Islam and who marned and buned accordlllq 10 IslcllYlIC law, will become a special group practlclng th8lr own ceremOfllüS and IldvlIlq tlwlr OWII graveyards Moreover, If the ordlnary people were aware of Ihn c!lolcn faclIlq tlmm, IIlI! • Mushm party would not object But people at the grassroots dld not understand the <;ltUclllOIi and If the mysticism proposais went through there would be a split between the MU~:IIT1S and those practlclllg mystlc bellefs 1;.> Meanwhlle, Muhammad Hatta. IIlf) former vice Proc;ldent ,mu one of the framers of 'he 1945 Constltullon. sald ttlat the ward "kepercayaéln" Ir! Illn constitution was Intended to c;trenQthen ttle word of religion He told ppp parharnontanans that there was no place for mystlclsm or spiritual sects ln the Pancaslla 1 j Led by KH Blsn Sjansun, F-PP members walked out of thn congross commltt!lO chargüd wlth resolvmg the Issue of allran kepercayaan Nevertheless, some F-PP memberc; from the 11 David Jenkll1s. "Mlrror, Mil ror on the Wall," Far Eastern EconorTllc Revlew. 99, 13 (March 31,1978) 23 12 Ibid 26 13 David Jenkll1s, "Mushm Threat to Suharto." Far Eastern Economlc Revlew. 99,10 (Mardi • 10.1978) 26 71 MI, such as Ismall Mokobombang. Achmad Dainuri Tjokroamlnoto and Chalid Djamarin refused to walk out 14 They were urged to take part in the vote. Meanwhlle. PSII • parllamentarlans were urged to attend the seSSion, but not to 15 On the basis of Islamic vote. bellefs. NU parllamentarlans led by KH. Bisri Sjansuri conSldered that the allran kepercayaan would deterlorate Aqidah (falth). They were afrald of being shlfk (polythelst), and therefore they reJected the allran kepercayaan They saw that the incluSion of references to a/Iran kepercayaan as an "allempt to recogmze the mystical bellets and practices of many Javanese (mcludlng the President) as equivalent to adherence to Islam "16 Anwar Nurns of the PPP explalned the PPP's acliOn saymg that "if we lOin ln approving the mystlc trends, Il means thal we Muslims violate Islam, whlch is very hard for us as our party is based on Pancasila, Ihe 1945 Constitution and Islam'" 7 The cntlcal attitude of the ppp, especially by the NU segment of the party. was also seen when the government presented the electlon law amendment bill to the DPR on 8 October 1979 It is no!ed that the bill Included three slgnlflcan! points: the Increasing role of pohtical • parties and Golkar ln the electlon, the participation of East Timor province in the 1982 election, the Improvernent of varlous articles wlth regard to how the electlon would carried out. There was also a provIsion on the emblem used by pohtlcal parties and Golkar Article 18, clause 2 maintalned !hat ln the electlon the use of an emblem whlch mlght generate confllct affecting the ulllty and mtegnty of the natIOn was prohlblted 18 For the ppp, the proposed amendm"nt bill was not thorough enough l he party demanded more active and effective participation for polllicai parties ln the preparation, implementatlon, and supervislcm of the electlon The PPP ------ 14 Radl. Strategl. 149 1!i Tamara, "Islam." 5 16 Liddle. "Indonesla 1977," 184. 1 7 Jenkins. "Mlrror." 23 • 1H Suryadmala. MIMary, 93 72 even asked to be represented in the LPU (Instttute of General Election) Nevertheless, Amlr • Machmud, as the representatlve of the government. rejected the demand pointlng out that "political parties were contestants, not sponsors, and hence had 110 nght to Sit ln the institute,"19 As far as the party emblem IS concerned, the Ka bal} mlght be Interpreted clS a possible symbol in spllttmg Indonesian ulllty Therefore. the ppp was reluctant to dlscard ItS emblern If that imphed what It had to do, ln addillon, the ppp also urged that the Ka bd!1 emblom bü written Into the electlon bill but the government objected to It Ultlmately, the ppp securod 'he verbal assurance of the home affalrs mlllister, wlth the approval of the President, that the Ka' bah emblem could be used ln the 1982 electlon Although tl1ls was accepted by the representallve of the ppp on the special commlttee. the NU was dlsappOlnted because l' was not a wrHten assurance 20 1. It is not exaggerated to mentIon that the NU was dlssatlsfted wlth the result 01 the amended bill and declded to boycott the approval session The PPP's opposItion ultlmately came to the surface due to the ratification of changes ln tho law on general eloctlon 011 29 February 1980 Havlng had ItS demands reJected, the ppp dld not ratlly the new electlon law and walked out of Irom the chamber 21 The attitude of sorne hardhners of the F-PP resulted ln the disappollltrnent of the President. In hls extemporaneous speech. whlch was addressed III a meeting 01 armed forces commanders on March 27, 1980 III Pekanbaru, the President dealt wlth one of ttln most sensitive areas III government-Musllm relations offiCiai suspicions about the lack of commltment among elements of the Musllm communtty to the Pancaslla national phllosophy 19 Ibid 20 Ibld,,94 21 DaVid Jenktns, "The Aging of the New Order," Far Eastern EconomIe Revlew, 108, 27 • (June 27 1980) 25 73 He noted that after the flnahzatlon ln 1975 of a law on polhical parties and Golkar, ''there was • still a pohtical party whlch added another pnnciple to . Pancasila "22 The President warned the mihtary leaders that so long as we have not yet succeeded in bnngmg them to their senses, we must step up our vigilance, choose partners and friends who truly defend Pancaslla and have no doubts about it We do not mean to be hostile to the party or group which does not yet trust Pancasila 100%, no, but we are obliged to persuade them in such a way that ail social and pohtlcal forces Will base themselves on our national ideology, Pancaslla, wlth no addition whatsoever ?'j Three weeks after the Pekanbaru speech, ln off-the-cuff remarks dehvered at the 28th annlversary of the Kopasandha (red berets). Suharto lashed out agam The targets this time were univerSIty students The Suharto's speeches provoked crrticism from some prominent retlred mlhtary ofllcers. On April 18, retlred Lt Gen A Y. Mokoglnta -- a North Sulawesi Muslim who was chief of the Sumatran Command m 1964-1967 -- sent a nlne-page letterto Gen Muhammad Jusuf voicing • hls concern at Suharto's remarks at Pekanbaru On May 2, the FKS Puma Yudha, an associatIOn of pro minent retlred army ottlcers. sent a letter to the new army chief 01 staff, Gen. Pomman ThiS letter was slgned by retlred Lt Gen. H R Dharsono (a former commander in chief of the West Java based Slhwangl divIsion of the armed forces who went on to become secretary-general of ASEAN) and retlred Lt Gen. Sudlrman (a former commander of the East Java BrawlJaya divIsion) ?4 On May 13, a group of 50 Indonesmns presented a one-page "declaratlon of concern" to the Indoneslan parliament ThiS was signed by 50 Important members of society, later ('2 Peter Rodgers, "Indonesia's Faithful Flex Their POlrtical Muscle," Far Eastern Economie Revl8w, 10,49 (November 28. 1980) 37. ?J Clted trom Ibid • 24 Jenkins, "The Aging," 25. 74 popularly known as a group of petisi 50 (petition 01 50) 25 Some figures 01 the group were • Muhammad Natsir, Burhanuddln Harahap, Syalruddln Prawlranegara, AM Fatwa. Lt Gen Ah Sadikin (the former governor of Jakarta), Lt Gen Muhammad Jasin (deputy chlel 01 staff 01 the army ln the early 19705), Gen. AH Nasutlon, and Hugeng The names of several former cabinet ministers and vanous Mushm and student enllcs were also attactwd Interostlflgly. 17 of the 50 signatories supportlng thls reVlew happened 10 come from NU clrcle .'t. TlllS provoked cnticism from MI accommodatlonist members and eaused an Inlernal contllel wlthm Ihe ppp il SudardJi of the MI, for instance, asserted that one of the blggest faults of NU was Ils involvement m the petition of 50 However, Jusuf HasJlm of the NU reJected the accusatIon saying "there were no NU members Slgnmg the petition, but MI members really dld Sudardll was heartless in k,lIing hls own frlends "2B The petition clalmed that President Suharto had falsely interpreted Pancaslla It also charged that he had used Pancasila as a tool to attack hls pohtlcal rivai, whereas the republic's tounders had mtended It as a tool to unite the nation The petition stressed that tho • President's speeches had invlted ABRI to step aSlde, to choose fnends aceordlng to the values of those ln power and not stand above ail commumty groups, and had glven the 25 Hans, "ppp and Politlcs," 20, see also P Bambang SISWOYO, Sekltar Petisi 50 (Solo Mayasari, 1983), Jenkins, "The Aglng," 25 26 Media Dakwah, 204 (June 1991)' 16 The figures, who were Involved ln the petItion, were: H.M, Kamal, A Y. Mokoglnta; SUyltno Suklrno, M Jasln, H Ah Sadlktn, Prof Or Mr. Kasman Singodlmedlo, M RadJab Ranggasoh, Bachrun Martosukarto,SH, Abdul Mu'thi, SH; M. Amin Ely, Ir H.M SanusI, Mohammad Natslr, Ibrahim Madylao. M Ch Ibrahim, Bustaman,SH, Burhanuddln Harahap, SH. Ors S K Tnmurtl. Chns Slner Key Timu; Maqdlr Ismail, Alex Jusul Mahk, SH, JulIUS Hussen, SE, OarsJaf Rahman. Slamei Bratanata; Endy Syafruddln,Wachdlat Sukardl, Ibu 0 Walandouw, Hoegonq. M Snamm, Edl Haryono, Dr AH Nasutlon, Ors AM Fatwa, Indra K Budenam, Ors Sulalman Hamzah, Haryono S Yusuf, Ibrahim G Zaklr; Ezra Mth Shah, DJahl Laluconslana, OJodl Hippy; Bakn A.G Tlanlean, dr Yudllherry Justam, Ors Med Dodl Ch SunadlflJdja, A Shofandy Zakanya, A Cahar MU'ld, Mahyuddm Nawawl, Syafruddm Prawlranegara, SH, Manai S()phlan; Moh Nazlr, Anwar Haryono, AzIZ Saleh, dr HaJI Ah Akbar 27 Hans. "PPP and Polltlcs," 42 • 28 Tempo (October 3.1981) 16 75 impression that there were those who considered themselves the personiflcation of Pancasila, • 50 that ail oPPOsition was Interpreted as an antl-Pancaslla attitude Havmg realtzed that the opposItion of the ppp and the strong resentment of students and Musltm clrcle would endanger stablhty, Suharto tned to demonstrate hls sympathy for Islam He refused to recogntze the a"ran kepercayaan as an Independent reltglon ln February ·1~79 It was offlclally announced that the government recogmzed a"ran kepercayaan merely as an aspect of Indoneslan culture, and that its supervision WâS entrusted to Mlnlstry of Education and Culture rather than Mlnlstry of Reltglous Affatrs 2g A Dlrectorate of Kepercayaan was then formally establtshed wlth Arymurthy as ItS head 30 By dOlng thls, the mystlcal group ultimately galned a foothold ln the Mlnistry of Education and Culture whlch was then headed by Jusuf, c.onSIdered by the Islamlc group to be unsympathetlc to Islam 31 ln regard to the P4 and its relation wlth Islamlc beltefs, Suharto occasionally deltvered a speech assertlng that the P4 was not promulgated almlng at a creation of a rew religion Pancas lia would never become a rellglon;il AlamsJah also potnts out that Pancaslla 15 not contradlctory to Islam Pancaslla • wou Id never be consldered as a reltglon, and that religion would never be converted ta be subordlnated to the Pancaslla Every one who practic~s the Islamlc tenets, he/5he is consldered as havlng performed the values of Pancaslla 33 The more reltgious, the more Pancaslla'st Havlng besn convmced by both President Suharto and Alamsjah, the PPP, desplte Its demonstratlve action to walk out from the seSSion, actlvely partlclpated in promotlng the P4 34 As far as the petition of the 50 IS concerned, after some consideration, the <"l Madjld, "Islam ln Indonesla," 77 'l(l Suryadtnata, Mtlltary, 91. 31 Ibid ,12 Radl, Strategl. 152 H AlamsJah Ratuperwlranegara. Pembinaan Kehidupan Beragama Di Indonesla (Jakarta Departemen Agama Republtk Indonesia. 1982).46 • .14 Radl, Strategl, 152 76 President simply declded ta shrug off the whole affair rather than exacerbate a situation whlch. • accordlng ta the government. "does not eXlst" .15 ln addition ta the Opposition of the ppp to the government. It IS dlso worth notlng that the Untty of the ppp was apparently challenged dunng the 1978 generdl seSSIOIl of MPR It became clear that there was no consensus among the factions of the party 011 a Ilumbm of issues ppp parllamentarlans still put forward the vlews of the orgallizatiolls trom Wlllcll thl~y eame It has been r,vted, for example, that MI members. for example. were urged to take pdrt in the vote dunng the congress commlttee dehberatlng the Issue of the aI/rein kl'percdYcl the P4, while PSII parhamentanans tended to attend but not ta vote Unlike tl18 MI dlld the PSII, NU parliamentanans left the chamber ln ttle 1978 general session of the MPR élnd tho 1980-ratlflcation of changes ln the law on general electtons Therefore. It 15 Ilot exaqÇJürclted to pOint out that Opposition to the government merely came from the NU clrcle ThiS provoked the anger of the government who still realtzed the potenttal threat from any Islarme forc(!s The opPosition also encouraged the accommodatlollist MI members ta corne ta ttw redhzatlon that • the dominance of religlous authonty in the party's structure was an obstacle la bUild a modern party Internai Confllet The concept of confliet, as formulated by Eldridge, usuallv refers to the dlfferellces and eonflicts of !nterests, OpiniOnS, Ideas or perceptions, elther ln the form of Violence, or III a fesser degree, of non-violence 36 The Issue of conflrct as dlscussed here cO'Jers dlHorences and controversles whlch are of a non-violent confhct As far as the ppp 15 concerned. one Will argue thal Its hlstory, partlcularly ln the penod alter the 1977 general electlon, wa5 marked by a lengthy internai confhct between the MI and the NU as weil as among some elTllflenl figures 35 David Jenkllls. "Paneaslla Belongs to Everyone," Far Eastern Economie Rovww. 108. 23 (May 30. 1980) 24 • 36 Albert F Eldridge. Images of Confllct (New York Martln's Press. 1979). 2 77 of the MI • Arguably, the confltct had become an inseparable part of the PPP's pohtical journey. The confllct developed and had Its sources in, at least, the two following factors. 1. Difference of polltlcalldology. It could be argued that the government's pohtlcal out!ook -- whlch stressed the Implementation of development by ehmlnatmg the party's Ideologlcal basls -- could apparently be sean as a cornerstone of the rnternal confllct wlthln the ppp As noted above, the pohtlcs of the NU was essentlally part of the interpretation of a worldly stance towards religion Therefore, NU's pohtlcal goal can be found ln the alm of ItS rellglous thmkrng, and ItS organlzatlon's polltlcalldeals can only be concelved as berng a part of those rehglous Ideals.37 On the basls of rehglous Ideals, the NU -- as represented by the so-called "radical" group . cntlclzed the government whlch attempted to promote the P4, to make Pancaslla the sole Ideology and ta put aSlde rellglous and moral consideration from the government's pollcles As • mentloned above, the performance of the radical group caused confllct between the NU and the MI Unhke the radical NU group vlews. the MI and sorne "reahst" NU members even saw pohtlcs as belng reallstlc. related to nelther Ideology, the masses, nor rehglous commitment as the basls of the struggle \!.l The flrst split between two largest factions, the MI and the NU, began dunng the 1978 general session when NU parhamentanans -- on the basls of rehgious considerations - walked out of the chamber protestlng the allfan kepercayaan and the P4. Sorne argue that the spht was also hlghllghted dunng the financlal cnsis of Pt'rtamma and after the petition of the 50 affalr The NU demanded a full Investigation of ,he Pertamlna cnsls and tended to sympatllize wlth at least parts of the petition of 50 This provoked cnticism from at least the MI 37 Dhofler. Tradisi Pesantren. 70 • Hans, "Party Confhcts," 254 78 circle. Sudard)i of the PPP, for example, cnticized the 17 NU members who had questlol1ed the President about the declaratlon of conc,ern by the 50 Important membms of society. 1'1 • 111 tilt' Moreover, when the amendments to the electlon law were belng debated Idte 1979, as weil as when the amended electlon bill was belng formally approved ln parhament III 1980, NU parhamentanans also demonstrated surpnslng tntranslgence This stance may be seen dS the NU adhenng to Its polttlcalldeologlcal relation. namely that ttle general t~lectlon stlould bn Imld ln a direct, general, free and secret manner If polttlcal orgamzatlons could be Illvoived, ln at least the general comrrllttee However, unltl<.e the NU, the MI, PERTI, and PS:. ".nded to be more moderate and dld not leave the chamber 2. The Limitation of positions. As previously dlscussed the New Order government ehmtnated Ideology-based partlüs aiming at protectlng the nation trom pohtlcal and ideologlcal confhet and launehed Its economlc development. Aware of the threat from the pohtlcal parties, the government created Cl • "distance" between bureaucracy -- whose task was to service the development· and tho parties The task of the bureaucracy could only be dlscharged smoottlly If It was romoved from pohtics, partlcularly collaboration wlth pohtlcal parties 40 Not surpnstngly, opportunltlns for party members to occuPY a position, partlcularly manlstenal positions, ln the governrnent's bureaucracy was ruled out The only positions open for party members were ln Ill{! leglslatlve institutions Nevertheless, the seats ln the leglslatlve obtalnable by those !rom party clrclns were increaslngly dlmllllshtng, whlle the m;mber of seats obtalned by the government's supporters (F-KP and F-ABRI) were Increaslng 41 39 Haris, "PPP and Pohtlcs," 42, see also Su su mu Awanohara, "Trouble ln the Llsts," Far Eastern Economie Revlew, 115,8 (February 19,1982) 15. 40 See also Hans, "Party Confhct," 250 • 41 Ibid 79 The limitation of positions provided ln both the executive and the leglslative Institutions caused organrzatlonal and leadership problems wlthrn the PPP. The nvalry among polrtlcians • from the PPP Clrcle to obtarn the Irmlted seats -- which resulted ln the confllct wlthin the party -- eventually could not be avolded Tttls could be seen dUring the leadership of J Naro Irom the MI Naro -- who recelved the leadership of PPP from H M.S MrntaredJa without a party meeting ln October 1978 -- was known to be close to the government 42 HIS alliance wlth the government IS trace able since hls !nvolvement !n the ParmuSI Reportedly. wlth help trom the government. the Naro-Imron Kadlr duet took over the leadership from Djarnawi Hadlkusumo and Lukman Harun. who had tended to be cntlcal of the mlhtary government The quarrel 4:.' Wlth regard to the blography of J Naro, see 0 G Roeder and Mahlddin Mahmud, Who's Who ln Indonesla (Jakarta Gunung Agung, 1980).187 and Tempo (March 15,1980) 9 Accordlng to Roeder. Naro was born on January 3, 1926 ln Palembang (South Sumatra), wh Ile Tempo mentions that he was born in Solok (West Sumatra) His academic background shows that Naro speclallzed ln Law since he was a student of Faculty of Law of GaJah Mada Unrverslty (Yogyakarta) and of University of Indonesla (Jakarta) He recelved hls Dr He ln Law from Academy Hwa Kang Yang Mlngshan of China University • (Talpeh, Republr~ of Chrna) When he was student of the UI, he became a Pros~cutor ln Kerawang (West Java), thus many people gave hlm a nickname "the Prosecutor of Kerawang" Naro was also actlvely rnvolved in sorne professlonal organrzatlons and enJoyed Important positions, such as the Secretary of ASSOCiation of Prosecutors ln Jakarta (1959-1962) and the second Secretary of Indoneslan Lawyers ASSOCiation (1966) HIS Involvement ln polrtlCS began ln 1966 when he became a member of Jamlatul Washllyal7, an Islamlc SOCial and educatlonal organrzatlon It was he who was ln charge of the position of chalrman for polltlcal affarrs of Alwashllyah rn Jakarta Through thls organlzatron. J Naro demonstrated hls pohtlcal talent and attempted to Improve hls career by 10lnrng ln the Parmusi Reportedly. when the Parmusi was establlshed ln 1968, Uddrn Syamsuddln -- the general ctialrman of AI-Washhyah at the tlme -- was promoted to be one of chalrman of the party Nevertheless, he refused and preferred glvlng the position to J Naro The new position ln the Parmusi apparently enabled hlm to bUlld alliances and . Il pOSSible. cooperation wlth certain polltlcal lorces almlng at an advancement of hls Interest ln October 1970, for example, ln cooperation wlth Imron Kadlr of a/-Ittl/ladtyah. Naro took over the leadership lrom DJarnawl Hadlkusumo and Lukman Harun. who were consldered very cntlcal of the mlhtary authonty. Naro demonstrated hls accommodatlve tendency by conslstently ehmlnatlng and putting aSlde the party trom any Influence of radical groups It could clearly be seen when J Naro -- as the general chalrman of the ppp -- launched hls miSSion cleanslng the party of radical NU members Moreover. It IS also worth natlng that J Nara enJoyed sorne positions ln government's executlve Institution ln 1962 for Instance. he became Head of the Prosecutor Office ln SlngaraJa (Bah) Four years later. J Naro was appolrrted as General Inspector of the Department of Justice ln Jakarta. whlle ln 1971 he enjoyed hls pOSition • as a member of the Expert Staff of the Mlnlster of Justice 80 between two factions came to the surface whlch unlmately resulted ln the govemment's interventions by appOlntmg H M S Mlntaredla as the general chalrrnan of the Parmusi on 20 • November 1968 43 Therefore, It IS not exaggeraled ta argue that Naro wa~ consldemd as ttle government's bndge ln changing over the leadership of the Pdrmusi from the Masyuml insplred figures 10 the accolTlmOdatlOnist group Ten years later, Ndro beCclllltl a very Influentlal figure as the successor of HM S MlntaredJa m the ppp It seemed ~hat Naro attempted ta bUild the ppp as an accommodatlvn and, ôccordlllg to the Ideals of SudardJI, a "modern" party by putllng as Ide Ihe dominance of rehglous authonty ln the party's struclure.44 Many conslder that the flrst short-program of Naro was clilned at a cleansmg the party of any radical NU elements, whose attitude had cau<;ed bath tho government anger and the dlsappomtment 01 the accommodatlomst ppp nlPlTlbm<; It 15 obvious that the government at the tlme "was workmg wlth the MI leadership to eI1l11111al(' NU hardliners from positions of power wlthm ppp and thus Irom parhament "4', Consequently, the • confllet between the NU and the MI eventually could not be aVOIded The tension seemed to become worst when these factions were unable to agroe on the formulation of the party's IIst of candidates lor the 1982 general electlon Rf~portedly, tllH country's three approved pohtlcal groupmgs -- the PPP, the POl and the Golkar - subnllttnd a IIst of candidates for each district, whlch must be approved by the electlon Illstltute On election day voters are asked to ehoose only from among the Ihree eontüstant<; whoso emblems appeared on ballots Accordlllgly, the seats of a glven dlslnct am dlvlded proportlonally after the ballots are eounted If the PPP gels live seals ln a dlslnct, for example, the top flve seats on the PPP's IIst take the seats ln parllament Under th,s system, It 15 natural 43 Tempo (Mareh 15, 1980) 9 44 Hans, "ppp and Pohtles," 41 45 Gorden R Hem. "'ndonesla 1982 Electoral V,ctOry and Economlc AdJustment for the • New Order" As/an Survey. 23,2 (February 1983) 180 81 for the four factIons wrthrn the ppp to want to push as many of their candidates as possible on • the Irsts, and as hlgh up as possIble The NU had Invoked an agreement that the allocation of places on the Irsts should be based on the four partIes electoral perfOltllanCe ln 1971 (the 1975 consensus) The other groups, however, argued that th,s arrangement would perpetuate the dominance of the NU and that such an approach dld no! reflect the results of the 1977 electlon ln whlch the NU lost seats SudardJI, for Insta~lce, demanded more seats on the basls of the results garned by the Masyuml rn the 1955 general electlon He clalmed that the MI were the helrs of the MasyuffiI 4(, Llke SudardJI, Rush Halll (PERTI) M A Gant (SI) dlso demanded the change of allocation However, both Saduddln Zuhn and Jusuf HasJlm of NU reJeeted the demand saylng "the NU has been so tolerant It IS enough now "47 The deadlock over thls Issue was broken late 1981 when Naro presented provlslonallrsts whlch tle had worked out wlthout open consultation wlth the parties concernee! and obtalned • officiai approval on 11 November 1981 for them Naro's IIst ensured that If the ppp won the same number of parhamentary seats rn 1982 as ln the last electlon (99 of 346 elected seats) then the NU's share would be only 49, Just short of a maJonty as agarnst 56 ln 1977 ThIs meant that the MI group Intended ehmlnaflng the power of the NU This became clear when 29 promlnent figures from the NU clrcle and many of the so-called hardhners -- who were also often referred to as the Jusuf HasJlm group -- sueh as KH Maslkur, KH Salfuddm Zuhn, Rachmat Muljomlseno, Jusuf HasJlm, Challk Ah, Imron Rosyadl, and Mahbub DJunaldl were placed low clown on the IIst and pushed aSlde by Naro 48 Interestrngly, the government, whlch was dlsappornted by the OppOSition of the NU parlramentanans, supported Naro's action and 4b Sltompul, Nal7dlatul Ulama, 155 4 ' Tempo (October 3, 1981) 13 Awano lara, "Trouble" 15, see also Hans, "ppp and Pohtlcs," 42 ln regard to the hst of • NU ligUles who w~re pushed aSlde by Naro, see Apoendlx C 82 consldered that the IIst was vahd Hein comments that "the government IS qUite ple.lsed wlth • the prospect that some of ItS old NU rivais may be replaced by more amenablf' MI I11plI1bt'rs of parllament lollowlng t~e electlon ".jlJ Llke the governmellt. SOIllI) young NU figure.:;. sucl1 clS Fachrurrozi and Zamronl -- who were dlssatlsfled Wlttl the leadership of tlH' old NU UI,II11,1 and eager for sorne changes to It -- were also supportlve of Naro ln ehrnlll.lllllg tl1\' mtlu('flC() 01 the old NU Ulama co As far as the responses 01 NU to the Naro's IIst was concerned. Il 15 wortll IllCntlofllllÇJ that there were two confhctlng groups wlthm the NU '" Flrst. tlle Real/st grou,) COr1SI.:;tlr1ÇJ of Challd Mawardl. Amin Iskandar. KH Ali Jafle and :achrurrozy ThiS group mclllltcllrll'd tllcll Il was urgent for the NU to Interacl wlth other pohtlcal groups ln arder ta Iain 111 dlstnbullllq dlld sharing power The group dlso pOlnted out that Improvement would bo obtcluH'cI on condition that the NU was capable of demonstratmg ItS readmess to coopHratü Witli ot/1I)r groups "Hld governmenl Therefore. the reahst NU members seemed ta bH rnom aCCOrllmOdcltlVf' cHld supportlve even of the government and Naro. rather than to OppOSH Ihern Il wa<; Ilot Will! • surprise that though the reallsts were nol appomted by the NU as Ils c,H!dldatec;. ttwlr IldlllflS appeared ln the hst presented by J Naro Second, the Ideailst group who drgUlJrj Iflell IIIH 1975 consensus of the ppp was the valld basls for shanng proportlonal pOWfJr ,uTlonq !lH' factions wlthlll the ppp Accordmgly. Ihe NU stlould gain large')t proportion 01 powm III companng wlth the other factions ThiS group also pomted out that NU pdrl'élnwnt,lfIdw. should. In falrness. be promoled agam for tlle next flve y8dr term (1082 1087) wlthout ehmmatlng sorne new corners from the youngt::r group of NU Thu'). tlle reqf~nerdtlOn wlttlln the NU could take place smoothly wlthout sacnllcmg elther group 49 Gordon R Hem. "Intlonesla ln 1981 Countdown to the General Elections." As/an Survey. 22, 2 (February 1982) 203 50 Radl. Strateg/ 168 • 51 See also Irsyam. Ulama. 74-75 83 Huwever. havlng been ignored and dlsappointed by the accommodatlontst group of both • the MI and NU members, the central board of the NU protested "Naro's so-called dictatorst".p,"S2 A lener -- whlch was slgned by KH Ah Maksum (the ROIs Am of Syunah, the NU's hlghest decislon maklng nody conslstlng of the top scholars and teacllers), KH Idham Chalid and HM Munasir (the General Secretary of the NU)-- was sent to both the ppp and LPU condemntng Naro and questlomng the vahdlty of Naro's IIst Nevertheless, the MIIl!<;ter of Internai Affalrs pomted out that the government would not glVe the hst back because If had been valid 53 ThiS led KH Sjatfuddln Zuhn. one of the Chalrman ot the ppp, to restgn trom hls position ln the party on 19 November 1981 He also warned the accommodatlOmst group that egoism ln pohtic5 would cause social unrest and endanger untty 1)4 Moreover. KH Idham Chatid. the Pre!>ldent of the party, also threatened to do so c,', It 15 also worthwhtle mentloning that the politecal dlsappolntment of the Ideahst NU group provoked a reaction trom sorne 'Ulama of East Java who yelled and encouraged Mushms not to vote for the natlOnallevel Meanwhlle. many Influentlal campalgners who supported for the • ppp in the last 1977 general electlOn -- such as Ahoma Irama. Nurchohsh MadJld. SJafruddln Prawiranegara and Moh Natslr -- also refused to campalQn for and support the ppp ln the 1982 general electlOn. Therefore. the ppp apparently was opposed not only by the NU but was also challenged by many Musltm flQUres outslde the party Havlng reatized that the pohtlcal positIOn of NU had worsened, the MaJhs Syunah of the NU conducted a meeting on 29 January 1982 revlewlng the NU's relatIOns wtth pollhcs The Ma~ls examlned ifS positIOn wlthin the ppp as soon as It became eVldent Ihat the prlnctptes ot consultatIOn, internai soltcfanty and sound organizatlon were belng paralyzed ln the party The 52 Awanohara. "Trouble," 15. 53 Irsyam, Ulama, 65, 54 Ibid,76 • 55 Radi, Strateg;, 169, 84 MaJhs also dectded that the NU candidates should flght the electlon, rather than boycott it56 • and wanted to dispel the notion that the NU Intended to dlsrupt the electlOn Therefore, Jusuf HasJlm, even though he had been pushed aSlde Irom the Naro's hst. was actlvely Involved campalgnlllg lor the ppp However, the ppp dld not succeed ln rncreaslng its share of the popular vote Nuddtn Lubls 01 the NU commented that "It was fine that we did not win, otherwlse we would be ln trouble W~ could not keep our victory "57 Furthermore, It was also qulte senous about the Idea of pUlhng the NU out of the ppp and parhamentary polltlCS and returntng to the 1926 khittah (prowess), whlch means to sever from Its pohtlCal actlvlfles Abdurrahrnan Wahtd and lour NU pohtlclans (Satfuddtn Zuhri, Jusuf HasJlm, Chahk Ah and Imron Rosyadl) were ftgures who also demanded that the NU wlthdraw trom the ppp The Idea was ftrst declded by the Muktamar (national congress) conducted ln Semarang on 5-11 June 1979 Havlng changed tile statutes, that the NU was no longer a pohtlcal organlzatlOn, the Muktamar seemed to attempt a strengthening of the NU as an organtzatlon whlch stressed social and rehglous activltles Hayat argues that even the idea to • reMn to the 1926 Khlttah had ever been proposed in the 1959 Muktamar AeportediV. it wa~ KH Achyat Chahml trom MOJokerto (East Java) who proposed the idea saytng that "the pohtlcal role of NU has been weakened and replaced by certain figures The NU has been pohttcallV dlsfunctlOned, and thus ft should retu rn to the splnt of 1926,"58 Llke other .Ulama', KH Achyat Chah ml reasoned that hls demand was based on the fact that the NU paid too much attention to polftlcs and left ItS social and rellQlOus nature out of conSideratIOn. What really happened at the tlme. as Hayat explalns, a pohtlcal rivalry among figures who had trled to obtaln power through the NU However, both the central board of the NU and Muktamar tended to reJect the idea KH Idham Chaltd, a representatlve of the central board of the NU at Sttompul, Nahdlatul Ulama, 157, see also Tempo (February 6, 1982),14 <, • Rad., Strategl, 187 Sholeh Hayat. "Ide Kembah Ke Khinah 1926. Dliontarkan Sejak 1959," Aula"" .... (March • 1990) 84 HS the tlme, for example, asserted that desplte his agreement wlth the Ide a of returmng to the • spirit and soul of the 1926 ta abbudwyah (rehglous character). he tended 10 rnalntclill 'lor our struggle we should be ln 1959"59 (pohllcal field) Chahd Mawardl, Cl redhst NU figure. wa~ also not wlth sorne of the NU ftgures who demanded Ihat the NU wlttldraw from Ihe ppp Satirically, he addressed a question "through wh.ch social and pohhcal forCH NU members should express Ihelr pohtlcal aspIration ?"fiO The Idea of returnmg 10 the 1926 Kh.ttah was further d.scussed ln the MUNAS (national dehberalion) of the Ulama conducled on 18-21 December 1983 ln Pesdf1tmn Salaf/Yd/, Safllyah ot SukoredJO, Sllubondo (East Java) A team whlch was conslsting of seven young NU Intellectuals .. Abdurrahman Wahld, M Zamrom, M Sald Buda.ry. Mahbub DJunaldl. Fahm. 0 Satfuddln, M Damel Tanjung and A BagdJa - (,1 successfully formulated a concept of returning to the 1926 Khlttah Other Ulamà who were also consldered as havlng playf~d Cl s.gn.flcant role reestabhshing the NU as a rehglous orÇJamzatlon and reforrnulat.ng the NU's pohtical role were KH Ah Maksoem, KH Mahrus Ah, KH AS'dd Syarnsul Anfln and KH • Ahmad Siddiq 62 Desplte the opposition launched partlcularly by Ihe th.rty seVfm Ularna of Madura 10 the Idea of acceptlng Pancaslla as the sofe foundatlon of the NU/JI the Munas was 59 Ib.d,8S 60 Irsyam, Ulama, 79. 61 This team was formed by the Majlts 24, a team whlch had been estabhshed on 12 May 1983 The MaJfis 24 consl'3ted of 24 emlnent NU members who were concorned ln attempting to strengthen the rehglOus Identlty of the NU and put ft appropnately ln the national pohtical stage The figures who were Involved ln the MaJhs 24 were KH Sahal Mahfudz, Mustofa Blsn, As.p Had.pranata, Mahbub 0Junaldl, Abdurrahman Wahld, M Tolchah Hasan, M Zamront, Fahml 0 Sa~uddin, M Sald Buda.ry, Abdullah Sarwam, M Munas.r, K. Muchlth Muzad., M Saifui MudJab, Umar Basahm, Chohl Musaddad, Ghaftar Rahman, Slamet Effendy Yusuf, Muhammad Ichwan Syam, Musa AtxMlah, Mustafa Zuhad, M Damel TanJung, A BagdJa, Masdar Faned Mas'udi The Idea 10 form the MaJhs 24 came from Abdurrahman Wahtd, Fahml 0 Sa~uddm and M Zamrom A Muchlth Muzadi, "Berpollt.k Menurut Khlttah NU," Au/a, 1 (January 1993) 49, seo also Mdrl,an, Quo VadIS, 141 62 SKompul, Nahdlatul Ulama, 164 • 53 Kacung, Quo Vadls, 145. 86 consldered s.gn~ieant in demonstrating the po'llerful of the non-politieians and the young Intellectual groups of the NU ln attefTllting to reestabllsh the NU a truly rehgious organization • led by Ulamâ Therefore, it is not exaggerated to mention that the a.m of returning to the 1926 Khlttah, as deelded in both the 1979 Muktamar and the 1983 national dehberation of 'Ulama, was to withdraw trom the ppp BrUlnessen r.omments that "the NU's departure trom the ppp was phrased ln poSItive terms as a 'retum to the Khlttah (programme of actIOn) of 1926', which seemed to imply a restitutIOn of the orgaOlzatlOn to the Ulamà' "64 Accordlngly, Indlvidual NU members still could jom ln any party they liked, but board members were banned from holding positIOns ln the ppp or other parties One year ~fter the 1983 natIOnal dellberatlon of the 'Ulama', the NU conducted its Muktamar on 8-12 December 1984 ln Sltubondo The issue of the 1926 Khtttah and Paneasila as the sole foundatlon were also a prtnclpal Item on the agenda of the Mu"tamar Unhke ln the • 1983 natIOnal dehberatlon, the Idea of returntng to the 1926 Khlttah and acceptlOg Pancasila as the sole fouooat.on for ail social and pol~leal organizatlons were u~lmately accepted wlthout any Ideologlcal objectIOn The eongress has Issued sorne Important decisions which were among other th:ngs to ratum to the 1926 Khittah, for the consolidation of the role of the 'Ulama', whteh was of a collective nature ln Islam, the NU as an assoeiatlOn was nol tied-up to any SOCial or polttlCal olgamzation, ft gave Its members the freedom to determine the Ir own polltleal aspirations, if accepted Pancaslla as Its sole prtnelple ln ~s organizational IIfe,65 It is arguable that the 1984 Muktamar of NU was slgnificant for sorne reasons as tollows: (a) The Muktamar represented the cooperatIOn between the 'Ulamà' and the young NU intellectuals who attempted to return to the ldentity of the NU as a rehgious organization and 6.. Martin Van Brulnessen, "Indonesla's Ulama and Pol~lCs," Prisma. 49 (June 1990)' 57, 65 Suwardi. "Diverse IslamlC Views on Religion and Politics after the NU Congress," The • Indoneslan Quarter/y. 13.2 (Aprtl1985)' 139, 87 strengthen the authonty of the 'Ulamâ' Thus. the influence of the NU pohtlclans seemed to be • ehmmated (b) Without sacrificmg Ind.vidual polit.cal !lghts. the Muktamar declded that the NU was no longer a supporter of certain contestants It also dlfferent.ated pohtlcal cmd nOI1 pohtlcdl raies that should be played by NU members They mlght not mlx both Consequently. the relcltlons between the ppp and the NU had formally been eut Abdurrahman Wahld. thereforr.. suggests "NU should look far another more proper pohtlcal format "f r, (c) Sixe Pancas,la has been unammously accepted as the sole foundat.on. the relations between the NU and government tended to be more cooperative The Idea to retum to the 1926 Khlttah. whlch resulted .n the ehm.natlOn of the supremacy of the NU pohticians. not only cauc;ed conlhct wlthln the NU partlcutarly between the Clpete group and the Situbondo group,57 but also brought about the d.sappotntment of J Naro Ttll~. particularly, can be seen ln the Muktamar of the ppp whlch was conducted ln Jakarta .n • August 1984. It was the 1Irst Muktamar organtzed III the eleven years after Its emergence and du ring the lengthy confhct wlthin the party. BOlng pollt.cally threatened, J Nara reshuffled the party board aim.ng at an estabhshment of hls power As a consequence. 24 of the 37 were consldered Naro's Ioyahsts 68 ln addition, pnor to the Muktamar. J Naro formed a central committee without consulttng other elements ln the party The commlttee, whlch was headed by Narussamin, cansisted only of hls followers. He also selected congress delegatlons based 66 Ten.,o(December 15,1984) 17. 67 The term of Clpete refers to the residence of Idham Chaltd m South Jakarta. whllo Sltubondo refers to the name of tne city ln East Java The former group conslsted of sorne NU pallticlans led by Idham Chahd. whlle the latter conslsted of sorne sentor NU 'Ulama', such as KH R As'ad Syamsul Anfln of Pesantren Sukoredlo (Sltubondo). KH Ah Maksum and KH Machrus Ah. and young NU Intellectuals -- such as Abdurrahman Wahid and Fahmi 0 Sa.fudd.n • 68 Ten.,o (August 25. 1984): 12 88 on thelr personal loyalty ta hlm 69 The Tempo reported that rnore than one hundred delegatlons from the NU rejected 101nlng the Muktamar 70 Not surprrsrngly the Muktamar of • Nara and tliS loyahsts, whlch ran smoothly and took no more than tlve minutes, elected Naro as the General Chalrman of the party 71 The Muktamar brought about disappolntment and crrtlclsm wlthln the party Syarrfuddln Harahap of the SI and Badrut Tamam Achda of the NU, for example, asserted that many of the results of the Muktamar were contradlctory to that of the eXlstlng law Moreover, ln splte of rts declslon to accept Pancaslla as the sole foundatlon, they also tended ta prove that J Naro brought the party out of the legal national system By keeplng the Ka bah, J Nara rntended to preserve Islamlc Ideology ln the party Therefore, as many argued. J Naro's rejection of the Idea of challglng the Ka bah as the emb1em of the party72 would actually be a trouble for the party Quotlng Syarrfuddm Harahap's comment. J Naro, undoubtedly, attempted to keep the ppp as an IslamlC party He wanted to return ta the Plagam Jakarta (Jakarta Charter) 73 • Sjanfuddln Harahap asserted There were three SIUlS of J Nara First, the statutes and program of the party tended to be contradlctory ta that of the existing law Second, J Naro wanted the ppp be an Islamle party This. partlcularly, can be seen when J. Naro attempted ta keep the Ka bah as the emblem of the party during rts discussion on the general election bill. Thlrd, J Naro wanted to go back to the Piagam Jakarta. This is considered to be his biggest sin 74 Haris. "ppp and Pohtlcs," 43. 70 Tempo (March 23, 1985) 16. 71 Ibid. 17 72 Tef7lJO (August 27, 1983) 14 It was SudardJI who demanded the change of Ka'bah as the party's emblem ln 1983 He stated "atter acceptlng Pancasila as the sole foundation. the ppp should be ready wrth a ne-w emblem." Reportedly, the statement provoked the anger of J Nara 7.1 Tef1l)O (March 23, 1985)' 18 • 74 Ibid 89 ln addition to the Opposition of SJanfuddln Harahap rt IS also wOr1hwhlle to note thdt • Sjarifuddln Harahap organ/zed a meeting conducted on 10 March 1985 ln Clpayung. Bogor (West Java) The so-called 18 orang pembangkang (elghteen reactionarlPs) ". wllo attendt!d thls Clpayung meeting. unaillmously declared a statement dlstrustlng the Icadf'rstl1p of J Nctro and urglng the party board on emergency Muktamar tlltNestlllgly. M,dlbub DIUfMldl (ehalrman of NU) pomted out that the NU also demé..Jnded the ppp to conauet ail ellwrgcllCy Muktamar almlllg at a SUbSldlllg the lengthy Internai confllet Vvlthm ttle p,uty'" Hn dlso reported that ln a meeting, whlch was conducted m Pesantren Salaflyah Sydfllydll Situbondo on 20 Mareh 1985. ftve figures conslsted of KH As ad Syamsul Anfln. Zahrawi Musa (As dd's pnvate seeretary), KH Ahmad Slddlq, Syah Manaf and Mahbub Dlunaldl dedit wlth the rocent leadership of the ppp ln Ihat occasion KH As ad wanted Zamrom, chalrman of the ppp from the NU clrcle, to form a commlttee for the emergency Muktamar wlthout sacnfleulg the rules of the game of the party Furthermore, slnce Syah Manaf -- chalrman of the ppp of Jdkdrta from NU elrele at the tlme -- attended the Clpayung meeting, KH As ad trusted tllm to bc ttm • chairman of the comffilttee Kh As ad reasoned "Syah Manaf knows the reeent developrnen\ of the ppp "77 Interestlngly, KH As ad also wanted hlm to be successor of J Naro as tlle General Ct1alrman of the PPP,78 whlle some Indoneslan Journahsts mentloned J Naro, Chahd Mawardl, Soelastomo, Ismall Hasan Metareum, Mahdi Tjokroamlnoto, Yusuf Syaklr, Hartono 75 Ibid, 14 Sorne of them were Sjanfuddln Harahap, Badrut Tamam Achda, Sudardjl, SJah Manaf and Muzani Ramly (former chalrman of the ppp of Jakarta) Sometlmes, they were ca lied as Syanfuddln-SudardJI group 76 Tempo (March 30, 1985) 13 Ibid 78 Tempo (March 23,1985) 19 KH As ad's attitude was apparently based on the results of a meeting conducted on 13 Mareh 1985 ln KH Masykur's house The meeting, whlch was attended by KH Ahmad Slddlq (RoIs Am of NU), Abdurrahrnan Wahld (General Chairman of executlve board of NU), KH Masykur and Sald Budam, questlOned the Involvement of Syah Manaf III the Syartfuddln-SudardJI group U~lmately, tho<;e emlnent figures of the NU blessed Syah Manaf It 15 also reported that the NU flfst chose Zamrolll to be the suecessor of J Naro. However, Zamronl was not ready, see also Tempo • (March 30,1985)' 13 90 Mard/ono. M D/ufne and Imam Sofwan as the candidates of the general chafrman of the • ppp l'l Sorne may tliwe expected that both the step of KH As ad and the position of Syah Manaf ln the group of e/ghteen who attended the Clpayung meeting. would be sIgnlflcant ln subsldmg the cnsis of the party The government also seemed to have su ch as expectatlOn Desplte ItS support to the decisions of the t-'U to retlJrn to the 1926 Khltiah. the government still hoped the NU would not ledve the ppp The polltlcal participation of the NU ln the ppp could expectedly prevent the appearance of a radical group wlthln the ppp 80 Therefore, leallzlng the Important raies of thn NU, the government as represented by SoepardJo Roestam -- Mlnlster of Internai Affalrs -- snemed to underlfne KH As ad's responses 10 the lengthy conthct wlthm the ppp, Mahbub OJunaldl reported that the resignation of J Nara from hls position was the major concern of KH As ad He sald "Naro should go out "81 Moreover, as Mahbub DJunaldl recounted. KH As ad also gave an excuse to keep Naro on condition that a collective leadership of the party should Immedlately be estabhshed, wlth the effect that power and • Influence of J Nara would be hmlted 1nte restlngly , KH As ad also demanded that the General Secretary of the party should be from the NU clrcle 82 Followlng KH As ad's way of thlnkmg, It IS not exaggerated to argue that the NU had a slgmflcant position whlch expectedly enabled It to not only subSide the cnsls of the ppp but also to bargaln at least wlth the government ln terms of galmng power Meanwhlle. both the government and the ppp could not undermme the NU and Ignore ItS demands Slnce the government and ppp dld not senously pay attentIon 10 the cnsls of the party and posltlvely M Rush Kanm. Islam Dan KonfilK Polttlk Era Orde Baru {Yogyakarta' MW Mandala. 1992),57 Tempo (June 22. 1985)' 13 1\1 Ibid • Hl IbId 91 respond the demands of the NU. Klals of the NU will declare a fatwa Inhlbltlllg the Ulclma from campalgmng for the ppp ln the next general electlon It meant that 85"'0 of ttH' supporters • of ppp, mostly from the NI.I clrcle. would leave the ppp '" As far as the mformatlon reported by the Tempo IS concerned, If IS obvlous that. düSpltp the returnlng of the NU to the 1926 Khlttah, KH As ad's considerations were rnostly ~ohtlc\lIln nature ln cl more precise statement the considerations werf' based on the mterest ot sllanng power Therefore, unllke the splnt of meetmg of the MaJhs Syunall willeti W.lS conductt)d on 29 January 1982, the mordl recommendatlon -- as mentloned by T duflk Abdullah 114 Wd<; no longer seen dunng the Involvement of KH As ad ln the cnsis of the ppp KH As ad WclS an Ulamà of the NU who also refused the Idea of the departure of the NU from the ppp 1\" Thus. he was ready to bargaln partlcularly wlth the government concernmg on the cnsis of the ppp and the pohtlcal position of the NU One may argue that the mvolvement of KH As ad ln the cnsis eventually repre'lrnted thn • NU However, Abdurrahman Wahld dlsagrees wlth that opinion He clanflee; the pomt tlldt thf~ Involvement of KH As'ad ln the crlSIS had nothmg to do wlth the NU KH As CId dld not represent NU ThiS means that there IS no eVldence of the NU's mvolvernflnt Hl the CrI')l') of ttm ppp 86 Unhke Kacung Manjan,87 therefore. 1 tend to argue that there was no relation between the group of elghteen (Syanfuddln-Sudardjl group) and the NU. since tne latter dld not declare Its offiCiai support ta elther the group of elghteen or Syah Manaf's IIlvolvement ln It Even 83 Ibid 84 Tempo (February 6, 1982) 1a Respondlllg to the meeting of the Malh., Syunah. Tauflk Abdullah pOints out that the declSlon of Syunah to return to the 1926 Khlttah should be seen as a moral recommendatlon of the Ulama It was not a polltlcal decision Klal or 'Ulama' as the core element of the NU asse ted that the pohcles of the NU pohtlclans should be revlewed They saw that pohtlclans have falled 85 Ibid, 14 86 Tel7Jlo (June 22, 1985) 13 • 87 Manjan, Quo Vadls, 159 92 more, there was no further orgamzatlonal relation between the NU and the ppp Mahbub • DJunaldl explalns Ali members of the NU have to partlclpate m the festival of democracy ln the 1987 general electlon But they should not campalgn and vote for the ppp Once more, the NU 15 not the ppp and the ppp IS not Identlcal wlth the NU Both have thelr own world They don't have orgamzatlonal tles These have been declded by the Muktamar of both the ppp and the NU HA Furthermore, It 15 not exaggerated to say that the attitude of NU could be seen partlcularly when four promlnent leaders of the NU -- KH As ad Syamsul Anfln, KH Achmad Slddlq, Abdurrahman Wahld and M Anwar NUris -- signed and sent a letter of Instruction prlor to the 1987 general electlon to ail members of the NU They asserted that (1) It 15 Haram (forbldden) for ail members of the NU to vote for the ppp ln the 1987 general electlon (2) It 15 Haram (forbldden) for ail members of NU to be GOLPUT.a9 (3) Ali members of the NU are mstructed to express thelr pollhcal aspiration through • either the Golkar or the PDI on the basls of al-Akhlâq al-Karimah.90 They also encouraged the Ulamâ' to IInprove thelr spiritual movement through intenslfying the Sholat Halat (mght-prayer seekmg God's gUidance) and reclMg Doa (prayer) "These will not only enable us to Improve the quallty of our taqarrub (closenes5) to Allah, but Allah will also charge the antl-'Ulamâ movement wlthm the ppp "91 However, It IS obvlous that sorne ppp campmgners trom the NU clrcles refuted the polltlcal and rehglous cali of NU by assertlng that R8 Quoted from ICld The term GOLPUT IS an abbrevlatlOn of Golongan Putih (whrte group) referrmg to the people who boycotted the general electlon by refusing to vote They dld not belong to any contestant becau5e they dld not trust the contestants, see also Prayudl, "Pemllu Dan Golput," PanJl Masyarakat, 681 (AprJl1991) 28-30 90 Quoted trom Mar/Jan. Quo Vadls, 163 91 Ibid. 164 The antl- Ulama movement seems to Include both the MI and the NU polrtlclans who -- JO the name of modermzlng the party -- attempted to ehmmate the • supremacy of the Ulama by abohshtng the MaJlis Syuro of the party. 93 the ppp was the nght cholce for Mushms ln whlch they could express thtm pohtlcal • aspirations, and that the NU has had hlstoncal tles wlth ttlt) ppp Tl1pretom, KH Sansun Badawi -- a semor Ulamâ of NU -- pomted out "II IS waJlb (obhgcltOry) for MusllillS to votp for the ppp "92 Aeahzmg that the Opposition wou Id hlnder the Spirit of tlle 1926 Ktlltt.lh, somu NU activists -- such as M Yusuf Hasylm, Mahbub Dlunaldl, Safu SUIé'lIflWl KH Sotllb BI<;rr, Hasylm Latief, KH Imron Hamzah -- actlvely propagaled an action pOJJut,lIly cdl!nd Penggembosan (maklng fiat the tyres of the PPP), 1 e paralyzlng It Tilt' .letlon Wd<; dlso launched ln Central Java by tlve emlnent members of the NU Ahmad BukhcUl Masrurl, 11111011 Abu Amar, KH Hamld Baldlowl, KH Ahdlol and Mucllhsm They HlstlÇJated cl rnoverlH'nt, partlcularly wlthln the NU clrcle, agalnst votmg for the PPP ln the 1987 qenerdl eloclton Irnron Abu Amdr asserted that "the declslon to go back to the 1926 Khlttah mHcHl<; that HH! NU should sever ItS relations wlth the PPP "'lI He even encouraged NU rnembnrs 10 votn for Golkar The mission of the penggembosan could partly be read ln the $yalr P(,flq{jmnbosan • (rhyme of penggembosan) The globe IS tled wlth rope The book's funcllon IS to draw There IS NU, there 15 also Muktamar NU's support to the ppp IS over The ballot symbolls star Havlng been left by the NU, Il is now fiat NU members should be aware thal They should not vote for It94 92 Marijan, Quo Vadls, 161 93 Tempo (March 7, 1987) 13 Il IS reported that the ppp of Central Java dld not conslder the action to be Influent.al Karmanl, the General Chalrman of the ppp ln thls province, demonstrated that Imron Abu Amar and hls frlends were not acceptable muballtgll (preacher) slnce they money (two mlluon ruplahs) trom some government officIais to launch the action of weakemng the ppp However, Imron Abu Amar derued the accusatIOn 94 Ibid" 167 The composer of th,s rhyme 15 not known However, ft 15 speculated that tho rhyme was probably composed by the Badan Penggembosan ppp (councii for maklOg • fiat the lyre of the PPP) of East Java The majOr dutY of the councii was to propagale 94 Accordlngly, th,s action provoked the crrticism of KH As ad who malntalned that to make fiat the tyres of contestants IS contradlctory to the Islamle Spirit He warned that "one who IS • actlvely Involved ln the action of penggembosan should not be allowed ta be an Imam (leader) of prayer "'l', Nev~utheless, the wave of penggembosan seemed to successfully convlnce partlcularly NU members not to vote for the ppp ln the 1987 electlon The consequence of the penggombosan cou Id be cfearly seen ln the result of Indonesla's 1987 general electlons Compared to other eontestants, the ppp seemed to become weaker ln the 1982 electlons the ppp recelved 94 seats at the natlonallevel However, It only got 61 seats ln the 1987 electlons Unhke the PPP, the GOLKAR got 242 seats ln 1982 and 299 seats ln 1987, wtule the POl won 24 seats ln 1982 and 40 seats an 1987 respectlvely 96 It became clear that the PPP was unsuccessful ln malntalnlng ItS share of the popular vote It gamed ln the 1982 electlons ln 1982. the PPP of East Java, for example, obtained 35 70% of the vote ln the 1987 general electlon, thls party only recelved 2056% of the vote ln contrast, the GOLKAR and POl Increased thelf share of the vote The former recelved 5726% an 1982 • and 71 45% III 1987. whlle the latter won 703% ln 1982 and 784% ln 1987 g7 Llke 111 East Java. the PPP lost ItS staunch supporters ln Aeeh, Jakarta, West Sumatra and ln other areas 91l It IS argued that the weakness of the leadership of J Naro was the main cause of the confhet He was obvlously not able ta manage and reeonclhate the d.tfereot tendencies wrthin the party Consequently, the eoheslveness among ItS elements remamed weak and the and encourage the people ta paralyze the PPP dunng pengajlan (rehglOus lecture) and other occasions n~ Quoted from Ibid . 165 96 Kanm. Islam Dan Kont/lk. 55 ~17 Manlan. Quo Vadls, 175-176, • 91\ Kanm. Islam Dan Konflik. 55 95 Internai conflrct could not be aVOIded Ideology and the mechanlsm of sharmg poWN Wf'ffl the main Issues whlch were debated by the elements of the party The COIlSt'rvdtIVH dttltudp of .1 • Nafo when he rejected to change the Ka bail as ttle emblelll of Hle pclrty clnd tlle Naro's hst launched the debates on "Ideology" and "power" pdrtlcularly wlthlll 11111 MI. bptwt'Hn the MI and the NU and wlthln the NU clrcle Itself As far as the NU -- the greatest component wlthm the ppp - WclS cOflcerned. tht' penggembosan was a culmll1atlon of the NU's dlsappolntment whlcll roflncttld d nHW awareness among the Ulamâ and young NU Intellectuals They tned to forrnulato thH propor role of the NU as a social and rehglous organlzatlon 1118 penggtHl1bo<;an ,\Iso rt'presflntod the re-emergence of the Ulamà and the Ir cooperation wlth the young NU rntnllectutlls to reassert the rehglous raies 01 the NU and to argue that pohtlcs WrlS rnom ,Hl mdlvldu,lI cholcn rather than on organrzatlonal one Therefore, the declll18 of the ppp -- a~ c;nnn III the mc,ult 01 the 1987 general electlons -- reflected thls new awareness dnd dtte<;ted to tlw Idllurn 01 ttlo • Muslim pohtlclans ta estabhsh an acceptable polltlcalleadershlp The Sole Foundatlon Despite the OpposItion ta the Suharto government whlch conhnued after the 1977 genflral electlons, the government appeared to be III flnn control It dlso beqdn to make comprehensive preparations for the restructunng of the polrtlcal system by subrnlttlng tlUJ tlV!! draft bills ln parhament The bills -- man y of whlch dealt wlth Pancaslla consistecl ot ttlf' amendments to the electjon bill, the DPR/MPR bill, the polttlcal partlfJS and GOLKAR amendment bill, a referendum bIll, and the mass orgalllzations bIll 'j'j Durmq tlldt tlme, Hm Issue of the azas tunggal (sole toundatlon) was broadly dlscussed, beCi-lU')f! tho rnass organlzatlon and the polttlcal parties and GOLKAR amendment bill were consldfHHd co ntroversI al The main Ide a of the azas tunggal was Implementlng the Pancaslla as the sole • 99 Suryadinata, Mllitary, 101 96 Ideology for ail soclo-pohtlcal forces ln other words. the bills reqUired socio-pohtlCal forces to • have only one Ideology. that IS. Pancaslla The government was convlnced that the adoption of Pancaslla by a" polrtlCal and social groups would put an end to Ideologlcally based confllCts and susplcious among them The reactlon of the Mushm clrcles to the Issue varred Some of them were cntlcal "but under governmental pres~ure, the moderates tended to accept the government's Ide;.,; "100 A meeting conducted by the Clpete group. for example. Issued the kebulatan tekad (unanimous endorsement) -- whlch was slgned by the twenty two members of the NU -- declanng its acceptance of azas tunggal 101 Some argue that the kebulatan tekad of the CIpete group was Issued wrth the alm of obtalnrng the support of the government for the group As mentlOned above. KH Idham Chalrd. the top leader of the Clpete group, atterll)ted to reverse his deposltlon from hls position as the general chairman of the NU ThIS provoked cntlcisms and generated conflrct between hlm (and hls so-called Cipete group) and senIOr Ulamâ of the NU, By ISSUlng the kebulatan tekad. KH Idham Challd expected the support of the government • ThIS provoked the appreclation of Suharto, who inslsted on a" soclO-polrtlCal organtzatlons to be good partners of the government '" seeklng the natIonal development and stabllity The statement of acceptance of the azas tunggal was also declared by KH. As'ad who said that "the Islamic ummat was obhgated to accept Pancaslla "102 Contrary to both the ClplJte group and KH AS'ad of the NU. Dehar Noer tended to question the beneflt of the 1"1> le mentatton of the Pancas lia as the azas tunggal He asserted that the acceptance of the azas tunggal would inhlbit dlverslty in Indoneslan society, that tt was agalnst democrattc pnnciples. and that It would divorce Islam trom polttics whlCh was 100 Ibid, 102. 101 PanJl Masyarakat, 417 (December 21,1983).11. • 102 Ibid 97 against the Islamic religion Islam dld not separate religion from pohtlCs tOJ He. among others . • noted that Pancaslla Ideology would tend to push Indoneslan polltlCs towards a one party system, because there would be no substantlal distinctIOns among the parties 1tl4 ltke Delta' lIl Noer, Sjafruddtn Prawlranegara. In an open letter to Suharto. " demonstrated hls disappolntment with the government's inSistance that the SOCIO polttlcal organlzatlons accept the azas tunggal ln hls letter he qu(!stloned the attempt to enforce the sole foundcltlon dnd hoped that the President would order the cessation of these efforts ln hls opllllon. those who wish to enforce the P~ncaslla as the sole foundatlon do not properly understdnd the mal meaning of the Pancastla After brlefly traclng the hlstory of the Pancaslla, he malntalned that "Pancaslla was not Intended to become the foundatlOn of cltlzens' orgalllzations. wether of a polltical character, or of a social or other character "lOri Refernng to the Presldent's statement addressed on the occasion of NuzUl al-Quran commemoration that "Pancaslla and religion are not ln opposition to each other and must not be made to oppose each other,"H11 SJafruddln Prawlranegara complalned • Why must the Islamie basis of the remallllng Islamlc pohtlcal party, Partal Persatuan Pembangunan, be replaced by the Pancaslla? After ail, the Islamlc basls of the IslamlC polrtical parties and social organizatlons has long existed and been recoglllzed as not ln conflict, but rather ln accord, wlth the 1945 ConstitutIOn Why only now has the Islamlc foundatlon to be replaced by the Pancaslla? What crime has the Partal Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), or the HMI, or any Mushm orgalllzatlOn commltted"?lIlfl 103 Dellar Noer, Islam, Pancas/la Dan Asas Tunggal (Jakarta' Yayasan Perkhldmatan, 1983),51-61. 104 Ibid ,58 105 The letter has been translated into Engllsh and publtshed ln Indones/8, a tournai published by Corne Il Southeast ASla Program, ln 1984 My diSCUSSion of the letter IS based on the Engltsh version. 106 SJafruddln Prawiranegara, "Pancaslla as the Sole Foundation," Indones/8, 38 (October 1984).78. 107 Ibid, 79 • 108 Ibid , 79-80 98 ln the last part of hls letter, he expressed hls hope saying It would be still better If the apphcatlOtl of the sole foundatlOn idea was alsa to be • revoked for the pohtlCal parties, partlCularly the PPP, and that ail cltlzens be allowed to estabhsh any organtZatlOns whatsoever. so long as the aim of these organizations is to work for the beneflt of Indoneslan socIety, and ln pursuit of their objectives they refrain form ail Illegal actIOns. speclflcally the use of force.109 Feanng that the Pancaslla bills would deterlOrate the Islamlc identlty and further weaken the IslamlC polrtlCal strength. many Mushms were reluctant to accept the azas tunggal. As far as the responses of the ppp activists were concerned, there was much dlsagreement Sorne of them, as represented by J. Naro, for example, accepted the Idea and even demanded rts "full and coOl)lete ifT1)lementation "110 However, for fear of Ioosing the tradltlOnal supporters, J Nara still kept the Ka bah as the ballot symbol of the ppp He refused to replace rt wrth another symbol ThiS, ultlmately, provoked the cntlcism of hls colleagues Syanfuddln Harahap, for example, accused hlm of gomg back to the spirit of the Plagam Jakarta, whtle Sulastomo expressed hls surpnse at J Naro's vlew saylng that "It was • unbehevable why they (Naro's group) replaced the foundation of the party easlly, while sincerely refusmg ta change the ballot symbol The syrmol was actually a representation of the IslamlC foundatlOn, was it not?"111 Llke Sulastomo, Rldwan Saidi waS also concerned wlth what he ca lied the "de-formahzatton of Islam",112 I.e leavlng behlnd offiCiai IslamlC forms wrthout changtng Its substance He mamtamed that since the implementatlOn of the tlve laws on polltlCs. no IslamlC party has been authonzed in Indonesla. A" polltlCal organizatlOns were consldered parties of the Pancaslla in the sense that their sole Ideology was Pancasila. Ridwan Satdl asserted that the ppp should be an open party, capable of maintaining its Ibid ,82 110 Kompas, 13 July 1988. 111 Te""" (March 23, 1985) 19 11? Rldwan Satdl, "PPP: Diantara Khittah Dan Khitan," Panji Masyarakat, 517 (October, • 1986)' 28 99 confidence to attract non-Mushms to support the party KH Achmad Slddlq supported Rldwan Saidl saying tha!, ln hne wllh the princlple of openess. the ppp should be open for bath • Cathohc people and even for the POl "The PPP should not be a narrow-mmded party ''11 \ Therefore. thls party should formulate ItS programs so as to represent the needs of non Mushm people. Commentlng on the symbal of the Ka bah. Rldwan Saldl warned Its advocates against treateng Islam as a "pollllcai commodrty" or a "tIcket whlch Will bnng them to Senayarl'114 (parhament) Rldwan Saldl refuted the Idea of uSlng Islam dS an apparcltus for the fultlilment of polrtlcal purposes Islam should be slncerely Implemented He explalned "1 do not Y.ant to throw away Islam 1 Just want the Islamlc formulas of the party to be deleted so that the glory of Islam wou Id not be mlsused as a pohtlcal commodlty "11 ~ Elaboratlng on Rldwan Saldl's argument on the mlsuse of Islam for pohtlcal purposes. Yusril Ihza Mahendra asserts that "rehglOus dimensIon" of the Khlttah and of the program of the party should be preserved. Unhke J. Naro -- who tended to use Islam as the formai symbol of the party -- Mahendra • mall1talns that if Islam IS consldered the PPP's source of Inspiration and motivatIOn. thereforo the ppp should be an acceptable party. and capable of Implementlng Islam ln a ratIOnal way Accordlng to Mahendra. the tendency of some pohtlclans of the ppp to keep Islam as the formai symbol of the party would merely result ln the detenoratlon of the meamnq of Islam He points out that the people do not need the empty symbol slnce Il WIll glve them nothlng What they want i& the enforcement of the rehglous values ln the practlcal polttlcal Ilfe ThIs reqUires the intellectual contrebutIons of "party theorests" hke Rldwan Saldl ralher Ihan that of "the party activists"116 who usually tend to be pragmatlc 113 Tempo (August 25, 1984) 14. 114 Ibid ,29 115 Tempo (August 30, 1986) 12 116 Yusril Ihza Mahendra. "Khlttah PPP. Ridwan Dan Islam," PanJl Masyaral For the ppp and other Islamlc mass organtzations, the declSlon to accept the azas tunggal meant the necesstty to reformulate the relation between Islam and polit les , a • reformulatlûn whlch focuses more on the Implementation of Islamle values ln polltleal IIfe rather than on Islamlc Ideology Islam would no longer eXlst as a polrtlcal force, as long as Pancaslla beeame the most vahd reference of the Indone31an polrtlcs Islam should be vlewed as a religion whlch conMsts of moral and spIritual matters ln connectlon wtth the Pancaslla, questIons "ke "how could Islam be the moral and msplratory foundatlon of the Pancasila.eould Islam treat the Pancaslla as a creatIve paradlgm?" had to be addressed.117 It IS not an exaggeratlon to argue that ln the penod of the azas tunggal. Islam, as represented by the Ulama. became more concerned wlth the development of society rather than wlth the attempt to obtaln polltlcal power. ThiS led the Ulamà to emphaslze the need to Improve of ketakwaan (devotlon) among Musllms and to establlsh a blessed society. Therefore. by acceptlng the azas tunggal, the ppp had to dlssoclate the struggle to establlsh a blessed socIety trom the deslres to malntatn power The party had to also reconclle Itself to • the fact that the rellglous emohonal tles -- whlch had connected the elltes of the Islamlc parties wrth thelr tradrtlonal Musllm supporters -- would not be easlly preserved glven that the Indoneslan polltlcal system treated religIons only as sources of moral and of spiritual guIdance Wrthout there compromIses the ppp nsked loslng tts appeal to the people and .ts chances ln compatlng wlth other contestants Another challenge whlch was faced by the ppp and which weakened ItS poSItion also came up to the surface The ppp was unable to propose a clear formulatton of a blessed Pancaslla society as a maJOr theme of ItS campalgn ln the 1987 general electlOn. Meanwhlle the government attempted to Improve the devotlon of the Islamic ummat by establlshlng sorne Instltuttons -- such as Yayasan Amal Bhakti Mus"m Pancas/la (a charttable foundation of the 117 Tauflk Abdu "ah. "Jlhd Oua Orde Baru Islam Hanya 50al Nllal." Panji Masyarakat, 537 • (ApnI1987) 31 101 Pancasila Mushms lad by the President). MUI (Indoneslan Ulama Councll). MDI (Coulleli for • Islamic Propagation) -- and subsldlzmg Islamlc educatlOnal institutions' 111 Tl1ls led Tauflk Abdullah to suggest that the PPP should propagate the Implementation of tlH> "r(>lIgIOus ethics" ln the Pancaslla context dunng !ts campalgn ln the 1987 general electlon However. be frustrated of 10sll1g the support of artlsts, Intellectuals. Ulama alld many segments of society. J. Naro dld not embrace the Idea Dunng the campalgn for Ihe 1987 electlons, he occasslOnally sang a song entlttled PPP. Slapa Yang Punya (PPP. belongs 10 whom) and danced. In splte of the fact that Rldwan Saldl, who proposed the Idea of a "modernlzlng party", had warned the ppp activists to avold hura-hura (uproanous) launchmg a campalgn full of singlng and danclng,119 J Naro and sorne ppp campalgners seemed to flnd It dlfflcult to persuade people to support the PPP by other means Consequently, the PPP was not ablE! to avold a dramatlc decllne The PPP was obvlously not ready to anllclpate the trend of pohtlcrll restructunng and to reformulate the relation between religion and polltlcs ln Indonesla J Naro's slnglng and danCing on the stage dunng hls campalgn represented the PPP's adapt 10 • the changes ln the polltlcal perceptions and behavlour of the Islamlc ummat J Naro's performance was also a consequence of the systematlc wave of pohtlcal restructunng launched by the New Order government whlch resulted ln the weakenlng of the ppp 118 Il is also worth notlng thal the pollhcs of the New Order government on religion treats rehgion as an indlvldual variable whlch has nothlng to do wlth pohtlcs Islam 15 simultaneously feared as a potentlal source of Ideologlcal confllct and as a potontlal factor in strengthelllng national and pohtlcal stablhty Therefore, the natIOnal developmenl ln the rellglous sector IS onented towards the fulfillment of Ihe Islamlc ummat's rehglous needs by offenng ha)) faclhtles, establlshmg many ntual cüntms and, surpnsingly, less educatlonal Institutions The pohtlcal approach of the gOl/ernrnent towards Indoneslan Islam IS almed at demonstratlng the sympathy and concorn of Ih8 government to Improve rehglous actlvltles, to mamtam the full pohtlCdl support of the Islamlc ummat and to prevent the posslblhty of the nse of the Islamlc ummat as a SOCIO pohtical force, see also H Alamsjah Ratuperwlranegara, Pembmaan. 59-65, and Mulkhan, Perubahan Pefllaku, 92-111 • 119 iempo (August 16,1986) 12 • CONCLUSION The ppp IS a fusion of four Islamlc pohtlcal parties. NU, Parmusl, PSII and PERTI The emergence of the ppp was a consequence of the New Order government's propagation of a National Development program whlch focuses on both economlc development and polltlcal stablhty The systematlc program of pohtlcal restructunng whlch partly almed at the depchtlclzatlon of Islam was also an mtegral part of the national development Therefore, the emergence of the ppp was a result of the pohtlcal restructunng wh'ch was launched by the government The concept of Indoneslan development or modernlzatlon devised by western-educated technocrats was flrst supported by the government's pohtlcal apparatus called Go/kar,' and ABRI Therefore. It IS no exaggeratlon to argue that the New Order and ItS Ideology. Pembangunan (development). was a result of an alhance of sorne groups the mliitary, • western-educated technocrats and mtellectual groups 2 However, the development program provoked controverSles partlcularly between Mushm and secular mtellectuals, raismg the question of ItS onentatlon Should development be onented towards Ideological obJectives, or towards a real economlc program? The secular group suspected the Islamlc group of belng detnmental to development slnce thelr pnonty was to uphold Islamlc Ideology The mlhtary Golkar was organlzed from the top by the government It was founded as an alliance of "functlonal group" under army mfluence to oppose the Communlsts A "functlonal groups" IS one that unites people on the basls of functions rather than Ideologies See MOdy, /ndonesla For speclflc works on Golkar, see Nlshlhara, Go/kar, Cahyono, Peranan Ulamâ. Suryadmata, MtlJtary ? Hasan. "Contemporary Mushm," 10-11 Hasan specifies that there were three Intellectual groups whlch were Intenslvely mvolved ln formulatlng the concept of development Flrst, the Cathollc mtellectuals such as Llem Blan Kle, Llem Blan Khoen, Harry TJan and Moerdopo They generally tended to suspect the Islamle forces of belng a threatemng factor to national stablhty Second. the GaJah Mada group assoclated wlth the university of GaJdh Mada ThiS group -- whlch conslsted of Sumlskum, Suhstyo, Suglharto, Soekarno and Suroso -- was conSldered an antl-party, thus antl-Sukarno and anti-lslamlc aspirations. Thlrd. the Bandung group. cornposed generally of Intellectuals -- such as Rahman Tolleng • and Mldlan Sirait -- the helrs of the Sutan SJahnr-soclahst thought 103 group also consldered that there was still an effort to perpetuate the Islanllc Ideology, whlch, accordlng to both the mllitary and the government, would provoke confllct on the btlslS of • Ideology among pohtlcalforces and endanger the national stablhty The govprnnwnt's rt'fusdl to concede to the of some former Masyuml leaders ta rehablhtate Masyuml, for t'xdlTlplt' WélS a proof that the mlhtary government was conSldered the IslamlC pohtlcal IdeoloÇly to be d threat. Meanwhlle. some promlnent Mushms percelved the New Order's progr attempt to pohtlcally weaken the Mushm groups whlch were calling for an Implpmtmtatlon of Islamic teachlngs III pohtlcal hfe and for a natIon based on Islam l Concernmg national stablhty as a prereqUlslte for national developrnent, It IS worthwhllo arguing tha! the New Order government conslders pohtlcal parties to be the source of confltct and polttlcallnstablhty Therefore, ln the eyes of the government. !tle pollllcai restructunng WdS a slgnlflcant program that should be systematlcally Ifllplemented almlng, pdrtlcularly, to control the parties and Inhlblt them from belng nvals ta the government or bemg detnmelltdl fdctor ta national development One should al':>o remember that the slmphflcatlon of Indoneslan P,U1IW, • was urgent after the multl-party system dunng the hberal democracy of the Old Order government falled to protect the stablhty The government launched Its pohcy of the fusIon of the partIes, leavlng only three contestants on the scene Golkar, ppp and POl Wlthm the Mus/lm clrcles the fusIon provoked controversy Some saw It as a chance to sohdrfy the pohtlcal untty of the Islamlc ummat and to reformulate properly the Islamlc pohtlcal aspirations However, others seemed ta be pesslmlstlc about the ablhty of the Mushm pohtlcal leaders to reconclle the modernlst, tradltlonahst 4 and other Islamlc trends wlthln one common ------ 3 On the Involvement 01 Mushm groups ln the Indoneslan constltutlonal debate and durmg the Old Order government see, for Instance, Endang Salfuddln Anshan, The Jakarta Charter 1945 The Struggle for an Islamle ConstItutIon ln Indonesla (Kuala Lumpur Mushm Youth Movement of MalaYSia, 1970), Ahmad Syafll Maanl, Islam Dan PO/l"I< DI Indonesla Pada Demol party (PPP) The expenence showed that the unrtlng these Islamic groups, partlcularly during the Old Order government, was dlfflcult Disappornted wlth the Masyumi leadership, PSII, for • example, wlthdrew fram thls party ln 1947 This was followed by the Nahdlatul Ulama, the representatlve of the tradltlonallst group, whlch seceded from Masyuml ln 1952 and declared ttself as a new party As a resun, these groups became competrng parties It was generally assumed, therefore, that, IIke Masyuml, the PPP would face mtemal dtfflcultles ln allocatlng powers to each component of the party and ln copmg wlth the distinct pohhcal tendencles wlthm the party However, dunng the penod of consolidation, the ppp demonstrated ItS Unit Y m the 1977 general electlons and competed weil agamst ItS pohtlcal rivai, Golkar Moreover, If we look at ItS performance in the general sessions of the MPR, we flnd that the PPP was forceflJl ln opposlng the government's programs such as the promulgation of the P4 as the offiCiai Interpretation of the national Ideology m 1978, the 1973 RUUP (Marnage Bill), and the Allran Kepercayaan (the Syncretlc Javanese Mys1lcal Sects) in 1978 Its opposItIOn was based on the bellef that these bills contradlcted Islamlc teachings and • would detenorate the falth The PPP also cntlclzed some of the Presldent's economic pol'cies on the basls of an assessment that was shared by mtellectuals and university students Fu rthermore , It protested agarnst corruption wlthln the go'"arnment By employlng Islamlc Id,oms and symbols, the PPP could pose as the pohtical lepresentatlve of the ummat that was seeking Islamic solutions to contemporary prablems. ThiS '10rmahstlc malnstream," as Syamsuddln calls it,!', tended to sustain the pre-conceived forms of Islamlc polit Y Meanwhlle, for many students and intellectuals, the PPP should have 4 Sorne scholars have attempted to keep away trom the tradltional-modernist dlchotomous mode 1 They argue that th,s conventional approach IS no longer appropnate for understandmg the dynamlcs of contemporary Indonesian Islam For a soclo-historlcal analysis of the emergence and development of moderOist and tradrtlonallst trends ln Islamlc thought. see Fachry Ali and Bahtlar Effendy, Merambah Jalan Baru Islam (Bandung Mlzan. 1992).39-77 • 5 Syamsuddln, "Religion And PolttlCS, 200 105 played a balanclng role in the alhance of the government. ABRI and Golkar besldes belng an opposltlonal force Oe~plte ItS Impresslve success tn attracttng mdny segments of socIety. • WdS reg a polttlcal obstacle by the government and Its supportlng forces, Golkdr Clnd ABRI The government, therefore, systematlcally sougllt ta weaken ttle ppp and ottler soelcll and polttlcal organlzatlons by Imposlng polltlcal reforms 6 Slnce the target of the polttleéll reform-; was p,)rtly to slmpltfy and change the Ideological onentatlon of the partIes, the ppp Ildd to faee the challenge to reformula1e properly ItS posItIon wlthtn the new dIrection of the Indoneslan political system ThIs challenge generated tension wlthln the party The mallst poltttelans tended to be compromtSlng, whlle the Ideal/st group sought to perpetuate Islamle Idloms III the party and sometlmp.s to be crf,lcal of the government's polteles The Interndl sItuatIon of the party worsened wh en J Naro, the General Chalrman of the PPP, falled to decomrnoddte the dIstinct polttical tendencles and to manage the interactIon and confltet arnong groups wlthln the party It can be argued that the majOr problem faced by the PPP was ttw Inablltty of Its • elttes to cope wlth the government's program of polttlcal restructunng They were busy handltng the Internai confltcts regardlng the shanng of power ln the parlldment, ttm only Institution whlch provldes posItions for the pohtlcal partIes The causes of the Internai confltcts wlthtn the PPP were multIple Harts' tends to argue that there were three sources for the confltct Flrst, Itmlted positions and reGources The lesser the avallablltty of positIons and resources for members or groups of members, the kemwr the rivalry to control those positions and resources because It has been proven that the only posItions open for party polttlclans are ln the leglslatlve InstitutIon They were further 6 Claude Welch descnbes four distinct features of these polltlcal reforms the centrahzatton of the state's power, the weakentng of the sources of tradltlonal authortty, the speclaltzatlon of polrtlcal institutIons and the Improvement of mass polttlcal participatIon almed at encouraglng people to be Involl/ed ln the whole system See, Claude Welch, "Studl Perbandlngan Moderntsasl Polltlk," ln Masalah-masalah Pembangunan Po""'<, Yahya Muhalmln and Coltn Andrew, ed (Yogyakarta GaJah Mada University Press, 1978),34 • 7 Hans, "Party Confltct," 250-254 106 frustrated to flnd that the number of these positIOns was reduced Second, pohtlcal ahenation It has been noted that the Idea of fUSion onglnated from and was Imposed by the government • ln rather than belng the parties' initiative This resulted a lower degree of Integration among the elements of the party Thlrd, Ideologlcal and cultural background of the respective ex parties could only result ln dlfferent outlooks wrth regards to both the relation between Islam and polrtlcs and the polltlcal tendency of the New Order government rhe confllct between the accommodatlomst and radIcal groups or between the reallst and Ideallst groups withm the ppp Illustrates thls pattern of c.onfllct Granted, the consolidation and umty among the elements of the ppp endured for flve years from 1973 untll the 1978 general session of the MPR However, the dechne of th,s party could not be avolded, slnce the pohtlclans of the ppp pald much of thelf attention to lengthy Internai confltcts There were aetually three factors that operated ln the declme of the ppp Flrst, opposition to the government The PPP's stance m the debates dunng the 1970s leads me to argue that the OppoSition of the ppp was launehed on the basis of rehglous reasons. • For the Musltm polltlClans of the PPP, Islam was still a necessary and effective symbol of pohtlcs at should therefore be utlhzed as a foundatlon for the party Therefore, Indoneslan pohtles dunng the 1970s was also marked by the tension between /s/amle Ide%gy and Pembangunan Ideology Desplte the fact that the opposItIOn came mostly from the NU clrele, It led the government to Int€nslfy rts pohtieal restructunng partly almed of paralyzing the Islamlc pohtlcal forces Second. internai oonfltcts withm the PPP whlch ultlmately resulted in the wrthdrawal of the NU from the PPP The enforcement of the Pancaslla as the sole foundatlon for ail SOCial and polrtlcal orgamzatlons also hastened the dechne of the PPP. The 1987 general electlons clearly Indlcated how weak the PPP had become under the leadership of J Naro, an opportUnist figure of the MI. • APPENDIX ~ • Th. Compoaition of th. ppp : Th. R•• ult of th. 1973 M•• ting of th. Repr ••entatives of th. Form.r I.lamie Parti •• 1. Presldency of th", P,ut}' PresIdent DR. I\H. Idllolm ('11,111<1 Vice PresIdent HMS, Hlllt.1It-'dld, '~11 VIce PresIdent Drs. H. '1'h. (;"1,,,] Vice PresIdent Ru::d 1 Hel l 11 VIce PresIdent KH. H,l!.;yk1\1 II. Executlve ('ouncll 1. General Chalrman HM:.;. MIll roll. '<1 l d, ;; Il 2. VIce Gen. Chalrman H. Nllddlll Lill>]', 3, Chalrman Dl3 HMl\ l;"11 l, MA 4. Challman Nil 11 Id "lIl II '1111 H ol , d 1 5. Chd l rm.=ll1 KH. :-:l<1111Id<1111 ~',1111I 1 6. Chalrman DR., T, N,11 () 7. Chdllman Il. lm,un '.:, ,t \" III 8. General Secretary .T,lh1.1 (fIJolld, ~;II 9. VIce Gen. SecreL'lly Dl'" M. 1111':111 Th 18. t'lembet R\ 1 Co 11 dl,' III 19, Membet HM. n. tlil 1 1 1I01, lIt l' Ji 1 20, Memner l~,rn.ll: lIeI "III 11 .. t 011 Illm, ':11 21. Membe" l H. r ·,llolY MCil fi 22. Member MrJh. Ali Ildllolf lotit 23. Membe~ Nt. HA \ll,.hld lI'l'llffl 24. Membel Ahm,l'\ li'IIIIIIII '['l'IYI'hllfllrl"!" • 25, Memnel Dr '1. '-;lId l. r;'·nc·1 dl (~hal rman RH. Nasykul ). 'Il ( " (;I-n r.h 't lIman H. Syafel Wliakusumah , . r hd l rman OJalll AhduIlêlh • ('hel] ! rnrui Tgk. Mohammad ~:a Iph 4. c) • ('lin] rmeHI DIS. H. SJah Manaf (j • cha Il rndll KH. Acham~ Gùzall '7. ( li' 1] rman AlI Tamln, SH 8 (hdllm,'ln HM. Muna:'>lr ') . (h.l] 1 ITIdn Ismall M0kobombang Ir). Ch~lll mdli Ny. H. Mahmudah Mawardi 11. ('h'll rm,'!ll Ny. Syalk.awl Mustafa U r h.l1rman H.A. MUIZ ALI rv ((Jn:;ultrlrlV"? Counell l. ROIS Am RH. Blsrl S]anSUrl 2. VIce Rr:)] e; Am KHM. Dachlan L ROl,J KH. Balya umar 4 ROIS RH. Suhail l Chatlb S. ROIS KH. Rusl] Abdul Wachld G. ROIS KH. ALI ,Ta fI '7 • ROIS Prof. RH. Iblahlm HusseIn R. Membel KH. Ahmad Slddlq 'J. Mt-'mber RH. Zaini Mlftach j O. MI-'mber DR. H. Mahiburldin Waly 11. MI-'mbel RH. Udunq Abùurlêlchrnan L-L Memh';;'l RH. MlSbclCh Ll. Membel RHA AIn] (hat lb • 14. Mpmuel Musté'ŒI ,Ju~;uf LA 1 t; . Membel Tgk. Mohd. Saleh [ri. MI-:'mber KH. Usman Abldln • APPENDIX B • A. The Reault of the 1971 General Elections ) Katallk " PSI l 10 NU 58 PARMUSI 24 GOLKAR 227 PARKINDO 7 MUR BA 0 PNI 20 PERTI 2 l PlU 0 Total 351 B. Comparison of th. Resulta of the 1971 and 1977 General Elections 1971 l'l', 1 • Party Vote 'l; Vnr .. " Golkar 34,348,673 G2.BO E~ , '7 S 0 . ()'u, l,.:. Il PDI (5, SHi, 894) (10.09) r" r, (J 4 , '1 r, 1 fi 1,1) PNI 3,793,266 1j.94 PARKINDO 733,359 1. ~4 MUR BA 48,126 .Og IPKI 388,403 .li2 Kata] ik 603,740 1. 10 PPP (14,833,942) (27.11) 1 8 , '74 l , 4 ,) 1 t'~ () I~ ( J A. Van Marlee, "Indoneslan E],'crol,'!l r;p')'JldJ)hy '11,,1, J ',f'1.!, ,'Ild ORBA," Indonpslan Ait""l Th,-, 1971 EI",(r~, (J"j H',II" {,,,./ .. 1 (London: Oxford TJnlv81',lty 1:'11";';, 1974), 4(L Th,·':" l" 1111, "/' 11I,J,. the nlne Jeats leple'.;ent ln'J vle',t IrI,H1 t_h,1t 'tl"I'~ .1111 l" 1" contest8d FIt that tlm,,:,. HrJ'lI'"Vel, th", nITr", 'Il'·,t lIJ.r. ',1,01' ultlmat8ly went to r;ulJ.:r!l . • Llddl8, "Indonesld 1977," 182. 110 rF) )(J,2U,F,5(J IB.1S7 l'hfJ11IJ~' l ~,~n(),74" 5.31) l" r :;: l, -j(J8, 2-j7 2.39 • l'Ef-''I' 1 -~81,50~ .7U T, ,t r,l r;4,~99,509 100.0 63,998,338 100.0 C. Th. RUmb.r of s ••t. Obtained by the Thre. Contestant. in 1911 and 1977 ("nt~, ,t.lnt', 1971 1977 (;" 1).:,-11 23(-, r' [> f' (94 ) 99 III) 58 PARM1J~a 24 p~: r r 10 PEPTT l'r il ~O 29 • D. The Result of the 1977 Election in Jakarta ('''Il t '''lt cln t c-; Vot.? Seats % ['pp 1,079,214 5 43.77 l;,) \ k, li %1, ()3() 5 38.96 l'fi l 425,Q4Cl 2 17.27 • III APPENDIX 52 • Th. List of 29 NU Figures Who Were Pushed Aaide by J. Haro 1.Teuku Abd. AZIZ (the C'IV\llllklli l'[ NP l't :\.( ,'hl 3.KHM. Zahri (the Chalrman of NU of Lc1mf'\lllql 4.HM. Syah Manaf (the Chcurman of NU of ,J.1k.I1t.1) 5 .KH. Ali Slbromallsl (the ChaIrman of ;'yUlldh tlt ,1.lkdl LI) 6.H.Irnron Rosyadl (the ChaIrman of Sytllidh ot (,>lltl.t! 1"".l1d .1\ IlIl) 7.HY. Chumaldl Hasan (the VIC"=' Chdllmall of NO of W.. ,t ,lolVd) 8.KH. Sulaiman Afif 9.Ahmad Bagja (the formpl GenJ-'>lal Challnkln of tlw PMI]) lO.KH. S]aifuddll1 Zuhrl (the Challman of ;-:Yllll.lh "t tll" l "Id 1,,1 1""101 of NU) • Il.KH. Mochtar Chudiorl (the ChailmëLn of NU of E.l"t ,Id'Jol) l2.H. Zamr0l11 (the Vice General ::;pcrl:?t".uy of th .. ("'lit 1011 Hrt,tll} ,,1 11II) 13.Karmal1i (the Chailman of ppp of Centl.ll .J,Wol) 14.Abd.Hadi Sofwan l5.Musa Abdlliah (the VIce Chairmrlrl of nu of C'-"lltl 16,Rahmat Mulyomlseno 17. HM ..Jusut Has] lm (the ChallWrl.n of CJ'nt rrtl B0dl r1 fJf 11 11) la.H. HasyIm Latlef (the CoordInat01 of ppp ''jf Ed'.'"" ,1."/01) 19.Challk Al1 (the TreaSl'rer of C",ntral BO';:tl'l of 1/11) 20.M.Tolchah Hasan (the Challman of rITl of M.=tlr'ft'J) Mahfoedz, KebangJqtan~, 281. The PMII, IndoneSlêtrl Islawlc TJnl',,,,,r',lty :-~ru,j",nt I1r )",·Ht'·r,t, )' (,f.' ',1 • the NU's cadle. l12 ~1.I,rlr,htl'tl ~;~t:tr)nrJ (th~ 'lic>? Chairman of nu of East Java) • /.2 l,nd', Thr,h! l --:;jfctrrl'o'l·--jdln /.4.YHII. r'hel'nb ::::lrad] ~r;.HM. Md lJ'3ïl1 l Adnan (th8 Chalrman of NU of Kediri) I.I'J.H. Utdl Frll~3al Hamld (th8 Vlce Chail:man of NU of West Kallmantan) ,~7.I!A. 1-I, /.H .HM. ~;dlIWJ1 (t he VIC"'" Chë\llman of NU of West Nusa Tenggal-a) ,~q .Hll d,-In I~LWml] l (the Challmc1n of NU of Centrc11 Kall.rnc1ntan) • • BIBLIOGRAPHY • 1. BOOks Abdullah. Tauflk. "Jllld Oua Orde Baru Islam Hanya Soal Nllal" Pan}/ Masyarallat, 537 (Aprel 1987)' 26-31 Adnan. Firdaus "Islamlc Religion Yeso IslamlC (Pohtlcal) Ideology NO' Islam and the State ln Indoneslé: " ln State and C,vil Society m Indonesla. ed Anf Bu dllTlan , 441 477 Victoria Centre of Southeast ASlan Studles Monash University, 1990 Ahmad. Z,A, Konsepsi Negara Islam Bandung Alma'anf,1952 Akhmadl. Herl Breakmg the Chalns of Opresslon of the Indoneslan People Itllacd Cornell Modern Indonesla ProJect Southeast ASla Program Cornell Umver~:lty, 1981 Alams)ah. st. Rais 10 Orang Indonesla Terbesar Sekarang Djakarta Mutlara, 1952 AHlan "Ulama, Umat Islam, dan Pemlilhan Umum" Jurnaillmu Po"tlk. 3 (1988) 26-31 Ali. Fachrl Islam. Pancaslla dan Pergulatan Polttlk Jakarta Pustaka Antara, 1984 Mahas/swa. Sistem Polltlk dl Indonesla dan Negara Jakarta Inti Sarana Aksara, 1985, and Bahtlar Etfendy Merambah Jalan Baru Islam Bandung Mlzan. 1992 • "ppp. Pahala Pohtlk dan Semlnar Tlkus" Pan)1 Masyarakat. 416 (December Il. 1983)' 19. Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga ppp Jakarta P,mpIOan Pusat PPP, 1977 Anshari, Endang Salfuddln "Islam or the Pancaslla as the Basls of the State " ln Readmg 0" Islam ln Southeast ASIa. ed Ahmad Ibrahim. 221-228 Smgapor'e Instltutn of Southeast Asian Studles, 1985 The Jakarta Charter 1945 the Struggle for an Islamle ConstitutIon Ifl Indol/esla Kuala Lumpur Mushm Youth Movement of Malaysia. 1970 and Amin Rais Pak Natsif 80 Tahun Jakarta Media Dakwah. 1988 ArHin, K H As'ad Syamsul NU dan Tantangan Jakarta AI-Kautsar. 1989 Awanohara. Susumu "An Election-Eve Salvo" Far Eastern Economlc Revtew. 116,18 (Apnl 30, 1982) 22-23 "A Nod to Seculansm," Far Eastern EconomIe Revlew. 125.37 (September 13. 1984) 38-39 ------. "Golkar's Day of Danger" Far Eastern Economie ReVlew. 115. 13 (Mareh 26, 1982) • 10-11 114 "Islam on Hustlngs" Far Eastern EconomlC Review, 116, 17 (Apn123, 1982).24-29 • "More of the Same" Far Eastern Economlc RevJew, 116, 20 (May 14, 1982): 15-16. "Trouble ln the lIsts" Far Eastern Economlc Revlew. 115, 8 (February 19. 1982): 15-16 AZIZ, R S Abd Konsepsi AllI al-Sunnah wa al-Jama ah Dalam Bldang 'Aqidah dan shari ah Pekalongan CV Bahagla, 1990 Bachtlar. Hars)a W "The Religion of Java' a Commentary" Readmg on Islam ln Southeast ASla, ed Ahmad Ibrahim, 279-285 Slngapore Inst~ute of Southeast Asian Studles, 1985 Benda, Harry J The Cres cent and the R/slng Sun Indones/an Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945 The Hague W van Hoeve, 1958 Bocquet. Margaret & Robert Cnbb Islam and the Pancaslla Australta Centre for Southeast ASlan Studles, James Cook University of North Queensland. 1991 Bolland. BJ The Struggle of Islam m Modern Indones/a The Hague Martlnus NI)hoff. 1971 "The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesla (1950-1955)" ln Readmg on Islam ln Southeast As/a. ed Ahmad Ibrahim. 137-142. Singapore Instltute of Southeast ASlan Studles, 1985 Bourchler. DaVid Dynamlcs of DIssent ln Indonesla Saw/to and the Phantom Coup New York Cornell Umverslty. 1984 • BrUinessen. Martin Van "Indonesla's Ulamâ' and POlttICS" Prtsma. 49 (June 1990)' 52-69 Cahyono. Heru Peranan Ulamà' Dalam Golkar 1971-1980 Da" Pern/lu Sampa/ Mala" Jakarta Smar Harapan, 1992 Caldwell, Malcolm. ed Ten Years' M/lttary Terror ln Indonesia Nottingham Bertrand Russel Peace Foundatlon. 1975 Cheong, Yong Mun "The Indoneslan Army and Functional Groups, 1957-59" Journal of Southeast As/an Stud/es, 7 (1976) 92-101 Chumaldy, A Fanchm "The Jam Iyah Nahdlatul Ulama, its Rlse and Early Oevelopment, 1926-1945 "M A Thesls, McGl1i University, 1976 Crouch. Harold The Army and POlttlCS m Indones/a. Ithaca. Cornell University Press, 1978. Cruickshank. Robert B "Abangan. Santn, and PnJaJI a Critique" Journal of Southeast As/an Stud/es, 3. 1 (March 1972) 39-43 Dachlan. K HM "Nahdlatul Ulama dan PerdJoangannja" R/salah Pol/t/k.2 (1954)'1-11 Dahm. Bernard Sukarno Ithaca Cornell UniverSity Press. 1969 Dewan Mahasiswa ITB Whtte Book of the 1978 Studenfs Struggle trans. editors (n.p.: • Student Councii of the Bandung Instltute of Tectln"llogy, 1978) 115 Dijk, C. Van. "The Indonesian General Elections 1971-92" Indoneslan Clrc/t>. 58 (June 1992) 48-66 • ------. Poltt/cal Deve/opment. Stabllity and Democracy Indones/a If) the 19805 Hull University of Hull. Centre for South-East ASlan Studles. 1989 ------. Rebellion under the Banner of Islam Den Haag Martmus Nilhoff. 1981 Eldridge, Albert F Images of Conf/lct New York Martln's Press. 1979 EI-Ibrahimy Teungku Muhammad Daud Beureuh Peranannya dalam Pergolakan d/ Aceh Jakarta Gunung Agung, 1982 Emmerson, Donald K Indonesla's Elite Polit/cal Culture and Culrural Polit/cs Ithaca Cornell Untvers~y Press, 1976 ------, "Indonesla ln 1983" As/an Survey, 24, 2 (February 1984) 135 -148 ------"Understandlng the New Order Bureaucratlc Pluraltsm ln Indonesla" As/an Survey. 23, 11 (November 1983) 1220-1241 Fathoni, KhOirul and Muhammad Zen NU Pasca Kh/ttah Prospek Uklwwah dungrlll MuhammadlYah Yogyakarta Media Wldya Mandala. 1992 Federspiel, Howard M "MIliter dan Islam pada Masa Pemenntahan Sukdrno dl Indonesla .. In Islam d/ As/a Tenggara. ed Ahmad Ibrahim. 39-56 Jakarta LP3ES, 1990 ------. "The Persatuan Islam (Istamlc Union)," Ph 0 dlss, MeG//I Umvers/ty, 1966 • Persatuan Islam Reform m Twent/eth Century Indones/a Ithaca Modem Indoneslél ProJect Cornell University. 1970 Feith, Herbert The DecIme of Const/tuttonal Democracy ln Indones/a Ithaca Cornel! Umverslty Press, 1962 ------, "Indonesia's Pohtical Symbols and Thelr Wlelders" World Polit/cs. 16. 1 (October 1963) 69-97 The Indones/an Elect/on of 1955 Ithaca Southeast ASla prograrn Cornel! Unlvorslty. 1971 ------, "Suharto's Search for a Pohtlcal Format" Indones/a, 6 (October 1968) 88-105 Geertz, Clifford The Reltg/on of Java New York The Free Press of GlencofJ. 1960 ------, "The Religion of Java" In Readmg on Islam m Southeast As/a, ed Ahmad Ibrahim, 271-277 Singapore Instltute of Southeast ASlan Studles, 1985 Grant. Ronald M "Indonesia 1978 a Thlrd Term for President Suharto" As/an Survey, 19, 2 (February 1979) 141-146 Hadikusumo. Ki Bagus_ Islam Sebaga/ Dasar Negara Dan Aktllak Pemlfl1pm Yogyakarta • Pustaka Rahayu, 1954_ 116 Hanlfah, Abu Tales of a Revolut/on Sidney Augus and Robertson, 1972 Hans, Syamsuddln "Party Confllct under the New Order Pattern and Tendencles" The • Indones/an Quarterly, 17, 3 (1989) 245-262 ------"PPP and Pohtlcs under the New Order" Pnsma, 49 (June 1990) 31-51 "Nahdlatul Ulama and Pohtlcs a Search for Identlty" The IndonesJan Quarterly, 18,3 (1990) 207-222 Harun, Lukman Muhammadwah dan Asas Pancas"a Jakarta Pustaka PanJlmas, 1986 Hassan, Muhammad Kamal "Contemporary Musllm Rehglo-Polltlcal Thought ln Indonesla The Response to New Order Modermzatlon" Ph D dlss, Columbia University, 1975 Hefner, Robert W "Islamlzlng Java? Religion and Polltlcs ln Rural East Java" The Journal (If Asmn Stud/es, 46,3 (August 1987) 533-554 Hein, Gorden R "Indonesla ln 1981 Countdown to the General Elections" As/an Survey, 22, 2 (February 1982) 200-211 "Indonesla 1982 Electoral VICtOry and Economie AdJustment for the New Order" As/an Surve y, 23, 2 (February 1983) 178-190 Hlndley, Donald "Ahrans and the Fall of the Old Order" Indones/a, 9 (ApnI1970) 23-66 Huntlngton, Samuel P Polit/cal Order m Changmg Soc/et/es New Haven Yale University Press, 1968 • Irsyam, Mahrus Ulama dan Parta/ Pol/ttI( Jakarta Yayasan Perkhldmatan, 1984 Jackson, Karl D Trad/t/onal Authonty, Islam and Rebellion a Study of Indones/an Polttlcal Behav/or London University of Cahfornla Press, 1980 Jay, Robert Reltglon and Polit/cs m Rural Central Java New Haven' Yale Southeast ASlan Studles, 1963 Jones, Sidney "It Can't Happen Here a Post-Khomelnl Look at Indonesian Islam" Asian Survey, 20, 3 (March 1980) 311-323 "The Contraction and ExpanSion of the Umat and the Role of Nahdlatul Ulama ln IndoneSlcl" Indones/a, 38 (October 1984) 1-20 Jenkin, DaVid "The AgJng of the New Order" Far Eastern Economlc Re VIe w, 108, 27 (June 27, 1980) 22-24 "The Mliitary ln Business" Far Eastern Economlc Revlew, 99,2 (January 13, 1978): 24 "Mlrror, Mlrror on the Wall" Far Eastern Econom/c Rev/ew, 99, 13 (March 31,1978) 23-26 "Mushm Threat to Suharto" Far Eastern Economlc Rev/ew, 99,10 (March 10, 1978)' • 25-27 117 "Paneaslla Belongs to Everyone" Far Eastern EconOfT1lc Revlew. 108. 23 (May 30. 1980): 23-24 • Suharto and HIs Generais Indoneslan M",tary PolttJcs 1975-1983 Ithacd Comell Modern Indonesla ProJect. 1984 Jlhan, Abu PPP, NU dan MI Gelolak Wadah Pollflk Jakarta Integnta Pers. 1984 Kahln, MeT Naflonallsm and RevolutIon m IndonesléI Ithaca Cornell University Press, 1952 Kanm, M Rush Dmamlka Islam dllndonesla Yogyakarta Hantndlta. 1985 Islam dan Konfllk Polttlk Era Orde Baru Yogyakarta MW Mandala. 1992 Pefjalanan Partal Polttlk dl Indonesla Jakarta Rajawah. 1983 Kasut. Hal The Sukarno Years New Yo~ Facts on Flle Publication. 1967 Kuntowljoyo, "Rehglon, State. and SOCial Formation ln Indonesla" Mlzan, 1.3 (1984) 825 Ledge, J D Sukarno a Polltlcal Blography London Allen Lane the PengUin Press, 1972 Lee, Oey Hong Indonesla Arter the 1971 ElectIons London Oxford University Press. 1974 "Sukarno and the Pseudo-Coup of 1955 Ten Years Later" Journal of Soutlleast ASlan Studles. 7 (1976) 119-135 Lev, Daniel S Islamlc Courts ln /ndonesla a Study ln the Polltlcal Bases of Legal • Instttutions Berkeley University of Callfornla. 1972 Republlc of Indonesla Cabmets 1945-1965 Ithaca Modern Indonesla Projoct. Southeast ASla Program Corne Il University, 1965 Liddle, R William "Indonesla 1976 Challenges to Suharto's Authonty" ASlan Survey. 17. 2 (February 1977) 95-106 "Indonesla 1977 The New Order's Second Parllamentary Election" ASlan Survey, 18. 2 (February 1978) 175-185 ------, ed Polit/cal PartiCipatIon m Modern Indonesla New Haven Yale University Southnast ASla Studles, 1973 Liong, Llem Soei "Indoneslan Mushms and the State Accommodation or Revol!?" Thlfd World Quarter/y, 10.2 (ApnI1988) 869-896 Maanf, Ahmad Syafll "Islam and Natlonahsm ln Indonesla, a Histoncai Perception" MlZiln, 4, 4 (1984) 10-17 Islam dan Polttlk Pada Demokras: Terplmpm 1959-1965 Yogyakarta IAIN Sunan KahJaga Press, 1988 Studl Tentang Percaturan da/am Konstltuante Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan • Jakarta LP3ES, 1987 118 Madl,d, Nurchollsh "Islam ln Indonesla Challenges and Opportunltles." Mlzan, 1, 3 (1984). 71-85 • "The Issue of Modernlzatlon among Musllm ln Indonesla from a Partlclpant's POint of Vlew" ln Readmg on Islam m Southeast As/a, ed Ahmad Ibrahim, 379-387 Singapore Instltute of Southeast ASlan Studles, 1985 Islam Kemoderenan dan Kemdoneslaan Bandung Mlzan, 1987 Mahall, MUdJab Pokck-pokok Ajaran NU Solo CV Aamadhanl,1989 Mahendra, Yusnllhza "Khlttah PPP, Aldwan dan Islam" PanJi Masyarakat, 516 (September 1986) 66-67 Mahfudz, Maksoem Kebangk/tan Ulamà dan BangMnya Ulamà Surabaya' Yayasan Kesatuan Urnmat, 1982 Mangku<;asmlto, Prawoto Pertumbuhan H/sto"s Rumus Dasar Negara dan Sebuah ProJeks/ Jakarta Hudaya. 1970 Manlan, Kacu'lg Quo Vad/s NU Setelah Kembalt ke Kh/ttah 1926 Jakarta Penerblt Erlangga, 1992 MaSlutnl In,lah Chttahku Djakarta Penerangan Plmprnan Partal MasJuml, 1953. May, Bnan The Indoneslan Tragedy London Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978 McDonald, Hamish $uharto's Indones/a Honolulu The Unrverslty Press of Hawal, 1980 • McVey, Ruth "Natlonahsm, Islam, and Marxism the Management of Ideologlcal Confhct ln Indonesla" ln NatIonal/sm, Islam and Marx/sm, trans Karel H Warouw and Peter Weldon. 1-33 Ithaca Modern Indonesla ProJect Southeast ASla Program. 1970 Mlntaredla, HM Syafaat Islam dan Pollt/k Islam dan Negara d/ Indonesla Jakarta Septenanus. 1976 Mochtar, Kusnlyatl. ed Mohammad Roem Dlplomas/ Ujung Tombak PefJuangan RI Jakarta Gramedla, 1989 MOdy, Nawaz B Indones/a under Suharto New York Apt Books Ine, 1987. Moertopo, Ah Dasardasar Pemlk"an Tentang Akselerasi Modernisas; Pembangunan 25 Tahun Jakarta CSIS, 1972 ------"Some BasIc Considerations ln 25-Year Development" The Indoneslan Quarterly, 1, 1 (October 1972) 3-25 Mulkhan, Abdul Munrr Perubahan Penlaku Polltlk dan Polansasl Ummat Islam 1965-1987. Jakarta Ralawah Pers. 1989 Muzadl. A Muchlth "Berpohtlk Menurut Khlttah NU" Au/a, 1 (January 1992) 46-54 Natslr, M /slam Sebagal :Jasar Negara n p Plmptnan Fraksi MasJuml Dalam Konstituante, • 1957 119 ------, "Matuchfl Suduru-Hum Siapa Pemlmpm Klta" ln Islam dan Knsten dl Indones/d. M Natslr. 166-172 Bandung PeladJar dan Bulan Sablt. 1969 • "Pengorbanan Umat Islam Sanga! Besar" Panjl Masyarakat. 542 (June 11. 1987) 26-29 Nlshlhara. Masash, Golkar and the Indoneslan ElectIons of 1971 Ithaca Modern Indonesld ProJect Cornell University. 1972 Noeh. Zalni Ahmad and Abdul Baslt Adnan SejarafJ Smgkat Pengadllan Agamc/ dllndoneskl Surabaya Bina "mu. 1983 Noer. Dehar Islam. Pancaslfa dan Asas Tunggal Jakarta Yayasan Perkh,dmatan. HJ83 "Islam as a Pohtlcal Force ln Indonesla" Mlzan. 1. 3 (1984) 32 47 Partallslam dl Pentas Naslonal 1945-1965 Jakarta Grafltlpers. 1987 Paget. Reger Kent "Youth and the Wane of Sukarno's Government .. Pil 0 d1S5. Cornell University. 1970 Pedoman PerdJuangdn Masjuml Djakarta' Plmplnan Partal Masluml Baglan Keuangan. n d Pinard, Sekarmadjl Mafldjan Kartosuwlrjo Djakarta Aryaguna. 1964 Prayudi "Pemllu dan Golput" PanJl Masyarakat 681 (Apnl 1991) 28-30 Prawlranegara. SJafruddln "Pancaslla as the Sole FoundatlOn" Indonesla. 38 (October • 1984) 74-83 Radi. Umaldl Strategl ppp 1973-1982 Jakarta Integnta Press. 1988 Rahim, Rohanl Blntl Abdul Muslim m Indonesla and the NotIon of the Islamlc State Petahng Jaya, Selangor Dar Ehsan Dewan Pustaka Islam, 1991 RaiS. Moch Lukman Fatahullah, et ail, eds Moh NatsIf Pemandu Umar Jakarta Bulan Blntang, 1989 Ratuperwlranegara, H AlamsJah Pembmaan Kehldupan Beragama dl Indonesla Jakarta Departemen Agama Repubhk Indonesla. 1982 Razvl, A Syanf "Teka-tekl Muktamar NU ke 27" Pan" Masyarakat, 450 (November Hl84) 51-52 Reeve. David Golkar of Indonesla an Alternative to t'le Party System New York Oxford Unlversrty Press, 1985 Rodger, Peter "Indonesla's Falthful Flex Thelr Poht,cal Muscle" Far Eastern EconomIe Revlew, t 10.49 (November 28. 1980) 37-39 Roeder. 0 Gand Mahlddln Mahmud Who's Who 111 Indonesla Jakarta Gunung Agung, 1980 • Roem, Muhammad "Roem Itu Anak Muhammadlyah" ln Diplomasi Ujung Tombal< Perjuangan 120 RI, ed Kusniyati Mochtar, 102-122 Jakarta Gramedla, 1989 . "Tldak Ada Negara Islam" PanJl Masyarakat, 386 (February 11, 1983). 30-32 • Rosidl, AIIP SJafruddm Prawtranegara Leblh Takut Kepada Allah Jakarta' Idayu Press, Sm 1986 Sacerdotl, Guy "Bulog Archlpelago under Flre" Far Eastern Economie ReVlew, 99, 8 (February 24, 1978) 36-38 Saldl, Aldwan "Kartu As Pada Kilai As'ad" panJl Masyarakat, 524 (December 1986) 36-37 "Keterbukaan PPP" Amanah, 80 (July 28, 1989) 9 "ppp Dlantara Khlttah dan Khltan" PanJl Masyarakat, 517 (October 1986)' 28-29 Salam, Sollchm Sedjarah Parta/ Musllmm Indones/a Djakarta Lernbaga Penje ildIk an Islam, 1970 Santt, Arbl "Problemahk Pemutusan Pelaksanaan Muktamar ppp Oligarkhl atau Demokrasl" PanJl Masyarakat, 416 (December 11, 1983) 20. Sllalahl, Harry Tjan "The 1977 General Elections the Resu~s and the Role of Tradltional Authonty Relations ln Modern Indoneslan SocIety" The /ndones/an Quarter/y, S, 3 (July 1977) 3·30 SISWOyO, P Bambang Sekltar PetlSl 50 Solo Mayasan. 1983 • Sitompui. Emar Nahdlatul Ulama dan Pancas lIa Jakarta Sinar Harapan, 1989 Sjadzalt, Munawlr "Penenmaan Pancaslla Tidak Mengurangl Keutuhan 'Aqidah" panji Masyarakat, 512 (August 11, 1986) 30-33 Sjanfuddln, A Klsal1 KartosuwlfjO dan Menjerahnja Surabaja n p 1962 Soenarlo "Pancas lia Harus Dlllhat Secara Modern, Bukan Zaman Majapahlt" Panji Masyarakat, 542 (June 11, 1987) 29-31. Soeroso "The Outcome of the 1982 General Election" The Indoneslan Quarterly, 10, 3 (July 1982) 9-22 Southwood, Julhe and Patnck FlanaYdl, Indones/a Law, Propaganda and Terror London' Zed Press, 1983 SudlbjO, M "Indonesla Prepares for the 1987 General Election" The Indonesian Quarter/y, 15,1 (1990) 8-14 Suryadlnata, Leo M/Mary Ascendancy and Polit/ca/ Culture a Study of /ndonesia's Go/kar OhiO OhIO University Centre for International Studles, 1989 Suwardl "Diverse Islamlc Vlews on Religion and Polltlcs after the NU Congress." The Indoneslan Quarter/y, 13,2 (ApnI1985) 139·144 • Syamsuddln, M Siraiuddin "Rehglon and Polltlcs in Islam the Case of Muhammadlyah in 121 Indonesla's New Order "Ph D dlss . University of Cahfornla. Los AngelHs. 1991 Syamsuddln. Nazaruddln "The Acehnese Rebellion 1945-1946 a Case Study Problem5 of • National Integration ln Indonesla" Ph D dlss . Monash University. 1979 Tamara. M Naslr Indonesla ln the Wake of Islam 1965-1985 Mdlc1YSlcl Instltute of Str.ltt>glc and International Studles. 1986 ------. Islam under the New Order a Pohtlcal History" Pnsmd. 49 (1990) 6 29 Utrecht, Ernst. "The Mliitary and Elections" ln Indonesld after t'Je 1971 Elections. cd Oey Hong Lee, 76-87 London Oxforci University Press. 1974 Vatiklotls. MIchael R J Indones/an Polit/cs under Suharto London Routledgü. 1993 Wahld. Abdurrahman "Islam and Pancaslla Development of a Rehglous Polttlcal Doctnne ln Indonesla" Paper presented to the Assembly of the World's Religions 111 Seoul 011 25 August 1990 ------. "The Nahdlatul Ulama and Islam ln Present Day Indonesla .. In Islam dnd SoclPty If) Southeast As/a, ed Tauflk Abdullah. 175-186 Smgapore Instltute of Southe,lst ASldll Studles, 1966 Ward, K EThe 1971 Election ln Indones/a an East Java Case Study n p Mondsh Cnntro of Southeast Astan Studles, 1974 The Foundat/on of the Partal Musllmm Indonesla Ithaca Modern Indonesla ProJect Southeast ASla Program Cornell Umverslty. 1970 • WaH, Montgomery W Islamle Polttlcal Thought Edlnburgh Ed1nburgtl University Press. 1987 Weatherbee, Donald E "Indonesla ln 1984 Pancaslla. Pohtlcs and Power" As/an Survey. 25. 2 (February 1985) 187-197 Williams, Michael "Indonesla Suharto Steps Out" The World Today. 41. 10 (October 1985) 184-187 Yamln, Muhammad, ed Naskah Pers/apan Undang-undang Dasar Djakarta PrapantJa, 1959 2. Magazines, Journals, Newspapers Amanah, 80 (July 28,1989) 9 As/an Survey, 17,2 (February 1977) 95-106 ------, 18. 2 (February 1978) 175-185 ------, 19, 2 (February 1979) 141-146 • ------, 20.3 (March 1980) 311-323 122 ------, 22, 2 (February 1982) 200-211 • ------, 23,2 (February 1983) 178-190 ------, 23, 11 (November 1983) 1220-1241. ------, 24,2 (February 1984) 135-148 ------, 25,2 (February 1985) 187-197 Au/a, 1 (January 'r993) 46-54 ------,8 (September 1990) 16-21 ------, 3 (March 1992) 13 Economlc DeVl~/opment and Cu/tural Change, 3 (1962) 284-293 Far Eastern Economlc Revlew, 99, 2 (January 13, 1978)' 24 ------, 99, a (February 24, 1978) 36-38 ------, 99,10 (March 10,1978) 25-27 ------, 99, 13 (March 31,1978) 23-26 ------, 102, 44 (November 1978) 24 • ------, 108, 23 (May 30, 1980) 23-24 ------, 108, 27 (June 27, 1980) 22-24 ------, 110, 49 (November28, 1980) 37-39 ------, 115, 8 (February 19, 1982) 15-16 ------, 115,13 (March 26,1982) 10-11 ------, 116,17 (ApnI23, 1982) 24-29 ------, 116,18 (ApnI30, 1982) 22-23 ------,116, 20 (May 14,1982) 15-16 ------, 125, 37 (September 13, 1984).38-39. ------, 111. 4 (January 16. 1991) 24 Indonesla, 6 (October 1968) 88-105 ------, 9 (April 1970) 23-66 • ------, 38 (October 1984) 1-20,74-83. 123 Indonesian Clfcle, 58 (June 1992) 48-66 • The If/dones/an Quarter/y. 1. 1 (October 1972) 3-25 ------, 5,3 (July 1977) 3-30 ------, 10,3 (July 1982) 9-22 ------, 12,4 (October 1984) 389-391 ------, 17,3 (1989) 245-262. ------, 18,3 (1990)' 207-222 ------, 15, 1 (1990) 8-14 The Journal of As/an Stud/es, 46, 3 (August 1987) 533-554 Jurnal /lmu Pollt/k. 3 (1988) 29-57 Journal of Southeast As/an Stud/es. 3. 1 (March 1972) 39-43 ------, 7 (1976). 92-101.119·135. Kompas, July 13, 1988 Med/a Dakwah. 204 (June 1991) 15-21 • --'-----, 222 (Dee ~mber 1992) 10-13 .. -.----, 223 (January 1993) 33-40.41,4250 .... ----, 226 (ApnI1993) 24-26.30-32,33-39 M/zan, 1,3 (1984) 8-25,32-47,71-85 ----.. --, 4,4 (1984) 10-17 panJl Masyarakat, 386 (February 1983) 30-32 .------, 401 (July 11. 1983) 26-27 .----.--, 416 (December 11. 1983) 15-20 --'-----, 450 (November 1984) 51-52 ------, 417 (December 21 ,1984) 11 '--'·---,512 (August 11.1986) 30-33 -----'--, 516 (September 1986) 66-67 • _.. -·---,517 (October 1,1986) 28-29 124 ------, 524 (December 1986)' 36-37 • ------, 537 (ApnI1987) 26-31 ------, 542 (June 11, 1987) 26-29,29-31 ------, 681 (ApnI1991) 28-30 P"sma, 49 (June 1990) 52-69,31-51. Tempo (March 15,1980) 8-12 ------(October 3,1981) 12-16 ------(November7, 1981) 12-16 ------(February 0, 1982) 12-18 ------(August 27, 1983) 14 ------(August 25,1984) 12-17. ------, 450 (November 1984) 51-52 ------(December 15,1984) 17-18 ------(March 2~, 1985) 1419 • ------(March 30,1985) 13 ------(June 22,1985) 12-13. ------(May 13, 1986) 12-13 ------(August 16, 1986) 12-13 ------(August 30,1986) 12-13 ------(March 7,1987) 12-13. ------(April 4, 1987) 14 ------(April 11, 1987) 12-18 ------(May 28. 1988) 26-27 The Wor/d Today, 41,10 (October 1985),184-187 Th/rd Wor/d Quarter/y, 10, 12 (April 1988)' 869-896 . •