Military Organizational Behaviour and Civil‑Military Relations in Indonesia
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This document is downloaded from DR‑NTU (https://dr.ntu.edu.sg) Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Spoilers, Partners and Pawns: Military Organizational Behaviour and Civil‑Military Relations in Indonesia Evan, A. Laksmana 2008 Evan, A. L. (2008). Spoilers, Partners and Pawns: Military Organizational Behaviour and Civil‑Military Relations in Indonesia. (RSIS Working Paper, No. 161). Singapore: Nanyang Technological University. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/88092 Nanyang Technological University Downloaded on 28 Sep 2021 13:21:57 SGT No. 161 Spoilers, Partners and Pawns: Military Organizational Behaviour and Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia Evan A. Laksmana S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Singapore 1 July 2008 With Compliments This Working Paper series presents papers in a preliminary form and serves to stimulate comment and discussion. The views expressed are entirely the author’s own and not that of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) was established in January 2007 as an autonomous School within the Nanyang Technological University. RSIS’s mission is to be a leading research and graduate teaching institution in strategic and international affairs in the Asia Pacific. To accomplish this mission, it will: • Provide a rigorous professional graduate education in international affairs with a strong practical and area emphasis • Conduct policy-relevant research in national security, defence and strategic studies, diplomacy and international relations • Collaborate with like-minded schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence Graduate Education in International Affairs RSIS offers an exacting graduate education in international affairs, taught by an international faculty of leading thinkers and practitioners. The teaching programme consists of the Master of Science (MSc) degrees in Strategic Studies, International Relations, International Political Economy, and Asian Studies as well as an MBA in International Studies taught jointly with the Nanyang Business School. The education provided is distinguished by its focus on the Asia Pacific, the professional practice of international affairs, and the emphasis on academic depth. Over 150 students, the majority from abroad, are enrolled with the School. A small and select Ph.D. programme caters to advanced students whose interests match those of specific faculty members. Research RSIS research is conducted by five constituent Institutes and Centres: the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS, founded 1996), the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR, 2002), the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS, 2006), the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (2008), and the soon-to-be launched Temasek Foundation Centre for Trade and Negotiations. The focus of research is on issues relating to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and their implications for Singapore and other countries in the region. The School has three professorships that bring distinguished scholars and practitioners to teach and to do research at the School. They are the S. Rajaratnam Professorship in Strategic Studies, the Ngee Ann Kongsi Professorship in International Relations, and the NTUC Professorship in International Economic Relations. International Collaboration Collaboration with other professional schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence is a RSIS priority. RSIS will initiate links with other like-minded schools so as to enrich its research and teaching activities as well as adopt the best practices of successful schools. i ABSTRACT This paper tries to explain the political behaviour of military organizations within the context of civil-military relations. The key purpose is to extract several key variables that could serve as a starting theoretical model for future research on Southeast Asian militaries and political armies in general. This would be done by analysing four distinct cases of political behaviours of the Indonesian military in its relations with the president. This paper aims to answer why these distinct behaviours occur, how they came about, and under what conditions would they be observed. This paper finds that the political behaviours of military organizations can be at least typologized into four distinct categories that depart from the traditional literature: regime spoiler, critical regime partner, uncritical regime partner, and regime pawn. This paper also finds that several variables could help explain such behaviours. First, internal military variables: the military’s self-conception and portrayal of the “national interests”; the degree of military unity and cohesion; and the institutional and individual interests of the key military leadership. Second, variables within the political leadership: the degree of civilian interference in internal military affairs, civilian strength vis-à-vis the military, and civilian handling of the domestic political condition. However, how all these variables interact, the degree of significance of each variable, and how they shape the military’s political behaviour would eventually have to depend on the national political, economic, security and social conditions of the specific time of the case at hand. ********************** Evan A. Laksmana is concurrently a research analyst at the Indonesia Programme and MSc student in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He is also affiliated with Overseas Think Tank for Indonesia as an analyst. He graduated Cum Laude with a Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science from the Department of International Relations, Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung, Indonesia. He has served as Vice President (2003-2004) and President (2004-2005) of the Students’ Study Group for International Affairs, Parahyangan Catholic University, while assisting Parahyangan Center for International Studies (PACIS). He has also been actively involved in the Harvard Project for Asian and International Relations (HPAIR), serving as a delegate to the academic conference in 2006 at Singapore, and as a paper presenter in 2008 at Harvard University. His current research interests are in military organizational behavior, civil-military relations, strategic thought, and issues relating to Indonesian military and politics. ii Spoilers, Partners and Pawns: Military Organizational Behaviour and Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia1 Although military organizations in Asia still play a key role in state and nation-building, maintaining internal order, and ensuring international security (Alagappa 2001a: 9), the theoretical study of civil-military relations in this region has not commanded much attention. Instead, the focus thus far has been on individual empirical studies on the role of the military in domestic politics throughout the region as well as on establishing civilian supremacy over the military.2 As a result, the literature has tended to analyse and measure military political behaviour in terms of “subordination” or “insubordination” to the political leadership. This is also the case with Southeast Asian militaries, especially Indonesia.3 There is little theoretical study on these militaries that could help us understand the nature of military political behaviour as well as to predict how and under what conditions the military would behave differently in the domestic political realm. This paper is a modest initial attempt to fill in this gap in the literature by utilizing the Indonesian case as a basic model. The key purpose here is to extract key variables that could serve as a starting theoretical model for future research on Southeast Asian militaries, or political armies in general. This would be done by analysing four distinct political behaviours of the Indonesian military as an organization that departs from the traditional focus of “subordination” or “insubordination”. First, there are cases of where the military opposed the government’s policies, either through outright military insubordination (e.g. in 1948 General Sudirman, then Commander- in-Chief of the Armed Forces, refused to follow the civilian leaders’ surrender to the Dutch and continued the guerrilla warfare) or through strong arm tactics short of insubordination (e.g. in the “17 October 1952” affair, the military pointed a cannon at the presidential palace to push President Soekarno to dissolve the parliament). Second, there are cases where the military, which is supposedly “controlled” by the political leadership, voiced their critical opposition to some of the regime’s practices (e.g. the Army’s Staff and Command School published a paper shortly before the 1977 general election contending, inter alia, that 1 Paper presented at the International Relations Workshop of the 2008 Harvard Project for Asian and International Relations Conference, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 3–6 April 2008. 2 A rare exception would be Alagappa (2001, 2002). 3 The most notable literature on Indonesian military politics would be: Crouch (1978), Sundhaussen (1986), Said (1991, 1998, 2006), Suryadinata (1992), MacFarling (1996), Kingsbury (2003), Honna (2003), Rinakit (2005), Hafidz (2006), Mietzner (2006). 1 political life should be based on democratic principles). Third, there are cases where the military acted as an unequivocal regime partner (e.g. in 1998 the military under General