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5-2015 Anxiety, the Most Revelatory of Moods John T. Whalen Fordham University, [email protected]

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Recommended Citation Whalen, John T. (2015) "Anxiety, the Most Revelatory of Moods," Akadimia Filosofia: Vol. 1 : Iss. 1 , Article 8. Available at: https://fordham.bepress.com/apps/vol1/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalResearch@Fordham. It has been accepted for inclusion in Akadimia Filosofia by an authorized editor of DigitalResearch@Fordham. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Anxiety, the Most Revelatory of from guilt to being-towards-death) manifest themselves through anxiety. This paper sets Moods out to explore what, for Heidegger, gives John Thomas Whalen anxiety such revelatory power. I would like to pay close attention to Heidegger’s Abstract: This paper sets out to distinction of anxiety and fear, to further explore what, for Heidegger, gives anxiety stress anxiety’s unique revelatory power. such revelatory power. I would especially Furthermore, I will address how Heidegger’s like to pay attention to Heidegger’s analysis of anxiety and moods generally (an distinction of anxiety and fear, to further ontological endeavor) is distinct from how stress anxiety’s unique revelatory power. psychology, an empirical (and ontic) Furthermore, I will address how discipline, understand anxiety.Anxiety is the Heidegger’s analysis of anxiety and moods most important mood in transitioning Dasein generally (an ontological analysis) is from everyday fallenness to authenticity. distinct from what is understood by moods While anxiety does not fully disclose Dasein in the empirical (and ontic) discipline of in its being it is vital for allowing “adequate psychology. Heidegger’s analysis of anxiety preparations” for this full disclosure to be in Being and Time bridges the first half of done by bringing Dasein before itself. the work with the second half of the work. In Being and Time sets out to examine short, Heidegger needs a mood to allow for the question of the meaning of being by an analysis of Dasein, Heidegger’s technical explicating the being of Dasein, the very term for the kind of being that humans have, being which can make this inquiry. In in its wholeness, not simply in its Chapter Six of Being and Time, Heidegger inauthentic, everyday existence, as is establishes the problems and inquiries that examined in Division One of Being and lead to his account of anxiety. These Time. The world as a whole stands before problems surround the question: “how is the Dasein in anxiety like in no other mood, for totality of the structural whole that we all other attunements aid Dasein in its pointed out to be determined existentially engagement with the world, not in pulling and ontologically.”94 After describing away from it. The structures of Dasein Dasein in its average everdayness— Heidegger describes in the latter half of “entagled-disclosed, thrown projecting Being and Time, particularly guilt, the call being-in-the-world”—Heidegger asserts that of conscience, and resoluteness, manifest this structure is inadequate for presenting themselves through anxiety. As Heidegger Dasein “ontically and primordially for further refines and reformulates Dasein’s ontological analysis.” 95 Dasein is disclosed existential structures in the second half of to itself in existing, specifically through Being and Time, we see anxiety manifest in attunement and understanding, which are the one of Heidegger’s most well-known substructures which allow for disclosedness. concepts: being-towards-death. Attunement, or mood, is essential for Dasein in disclosing the world; mood makes

Anxiety, it becomes apparent in Heidegger’s Being and Time, has an enormous importance for understanding Dasein’s most fundamental existentials, 94 considering that that these existential Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, (New York, SUNY Press, 2010), 175. structures and characteristics (everything 95 Being and Time, 176.

29 “intentional directedness possible” 96In fact, not open Dasein’s wholeness and is yet Dasein is always mooded, whether it is another mood which aids in Dasein’s largely indifferent to its surroundings, or in concerned engagement with innerwordly love. beings. In fear, Dasein is always fearful of Heidegger’s account of moods an innerwordly being or event, whereas allows us to understand the ontological anxiety is not about any innerwordly being. significance of anxiety. Elsewhere, in the This idea contrasts greatly with how many philosophical tradition, mood is treated as psychologists have viewed anxiety. Freud, kind of “epiphenomenon” that is transitory for example believed that anxiety ultimately and which guides a subject’s apprehension stemmed from fear. While anxiety has a of the world, but is nevertheless secondary more indefinite quality to it, it is ultimately to intelligence or theoretical based on a fear—though perhaps understanding.97That moods for Heidegger, unconscious— of an innerworldly being or are not so much possessed as they are lived situation. Heidegger takes the opposite (we don’t really have a mood, but are a perspective, believing that anxiety is mood), and are responsible for making ontologically prior to fear.100 What Dreyfus engagement with the world possible at all, alludes to here is that, so often when one aids in understanding what is so significant faces anxiety, one attempts to lift the burden about anxiety for understanding Dasein. If of anxiety through fear. To avoid anxiety, moods are absolutely vital for understanding one can develop phobias; in one sense, fear Dasein’s everyday engagement with the is a more comprehensible mood, because it world, then it makes sense to question is directed at an innerworldy being. The whether there is any mood (“understanding indefinite quality of anxiety is oppressive attunement”) of the most “far reaching” and because it is impossible to flee from or “primordial sort” which discloses Dasein in conquer (at least in the way one does with a distinctive way98. Hubert Dreyfus states innerwordly beings). this concept simply and effectively: “in Others, who do not necessarily order to do fundamental ontology. . . accept Freud’s account, believe that anxiety [Heidegger] needs to find a special method and fear act more on a spectrum, and that for revealing Dasein’s total structure.” 99In they are not as clearly distinguishable as short, Heidegger needs a mood to allow for Heidegger claims they are; the mood of an analysis of Dasein in its wholeness, not anxiety cannot be fully separated (in terms simply in its inauthentic, everyday of its significance) from other moods existence. according to this viewpoint. For example, One of the earliest steps Heidegger while we might designate the mood of fear takes in his account of anxiety is to to a person who encounters a stranger on a distinguish it from the related mood of fear. street at night and call my uncertainty He will continue to contrast these moods regarding how my philosophy paper will throughout his discussion of anxiety. While turn out anxiety (because I am not so much fear is partially a revelatory mood, it does fearing the paper itself but its uncertain outcome) this difference is one of degree 96 Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A and not of kind. My anxiety regarding the Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time outcome of the paper, while not directed at (Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1999), 174. an innerworldy thing per se, is ultimately 97 Martin Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?” (New York, Harper Collins, 1993), 100. 98 Being and Time, 176. 99 Being-in-the-World, 181. 100 Being-in-the-World, 182.

30 grounded in a specific innerwordly situation. disagreement in how to examine moods. According to this line of thinking, there is This greater disagreement can, in turn, be still something—while not a substance—in expressed onto an even more general the world which is affecting my mood. stratum: Heidegger’s entire project will One reason that Heidegger avoids seem dubious (identifying structures of ontic, psychological descriptions of anxiety Dasein through an existential analytic as is that he is not exactly describing anxiety as opposed to empirical observation) to those it is commonly understood, which I claim of a naturalistic disposition. My last helps to surmount the above arguments. phrase—that naturalists are disposed (or While anxiety is often associated with attuned) to something—however, leads into darkness and morbidity, fretting and despair, an interesting counterargument. First, while this is not exactly what Heidegger means by mood manifests ontically in emotions—the anxiety, though anxiety can potentially domain of psychology—they have not been manifest itself in this way. One of the accounted for in an ontological sense, central difficulties in evaluating Heidegger’s (though this talk of moods will undoubtedly concept of anxiety is understanding exactly be viewed by a naturalist with scorn.) The what Heidegger means by this term. While very fact that the naturalist takes up in English Heidegger’s term angst is often empirical projects implies that he is mooded. translated as anxiety, some argue that dread We can call this mood a calm devotion to is a more appropriate term. As one further knowledge and progress. Thus, we need to engages with the meaning of anxiety and account for this attunement toward scientific angst, one realizes that, part of the reason examination and projects. We must ask what that so many objections could be made makes Dasein’s engagement of scientific regarding Heidegger’s conception of angst is investigation (especially regarding moods) that Heidegger has a rather technical possible. This cannot be examined through conception in mind. an empirical project, for this (Dasein’s Anxiety, for Heidegger, is an taking up empirical projects) is exactly what extremely rare phenomenon. It is likely that we are examining. The psychologist, in Heidegger would agree that much of what is looking to investigate the emotion described as anxiety is really a form of fear, empirically, already presupposes Dasein’s but this does not in any way discount the inherent attunement, which makes such phenomena that he calls anxiety. Heidegger empirical engagement possible. also admits that there are similarities For Heidegger, anxiety does not between fear and anxiety—for why then come only at life’s darkest moments. would he devote so much thought to Anxiety, in fact, occurs during Dasein’s distinguishing them?—but this does not heedful engagement with the world, when mean that “there structural characteristics Dasein is caught up in everydayness and are fused.”101 Heidegger also is aware of the acts on the prescribed meaning of the they confusion surrounding these terms—“fear, (das man). Thus, it is important when which everyday understanding mixes up discussing the entangled everydayness of with anxiety.”102 Dasein to recall that Dasein has as its The tension between the fundamental constitution being-in-the- Heidegerrian conception of anxiety and the world: concerned, practical engagement psychological is part of a greater with the world. In this absorption, Heidegger claims that Dasein is fleeing from 101 Being and Time, 327. itself, in that its possibilities (and its being- 102 Being and Time, 328.

31 in-the-world generally) do not gain their becomes insignificant106. Because all significance from itself but from the they. individual worldly things have lost Anxiety occurs often when nothing out of significance for Dasein, all that is left for the ordinary is occurring, during Dasein’s Dasein is the world as a whole. Like with everyday engagement with the world. Husserl’s phenomenological epoché—where Anxiety can manifest itself in a person when all but the thesis of the natural attitude he is sitting in his favorite chair, at a party remains in our phenomenological account of with friends, or eating in the college intentional states—the world remains cafeteria. “there” for the anxious Dasein even though As stated earlier, there is no significance has been lost.107 That the world innerwordly being that Dasein faces in is still there—not, it is important to note, as anxiety, thus, “what is threatening is an objectively present thing (the world as nowhere” and “what anxiety is about is the totality of innerworldy beings) as completely indefinite.”103 In anxiety, “no examined in the sciences—“leaves anxious way of being” has intrinsic meaning for Dasein in the face of the world as Dasein. Thus, Heidegger, formulates that such”108We see bikes to ride, and pens to “that which one has anxiety for is being-in- write with, and activities to accomplish with the-world as such.104” The meanings that the same ease as ever before but none of have been defined by the they no longer these activities now seem relevant or have significance for Dasein. Hubert important. Dreyfus interprets Heidegger’s account of This is where a central characteristic the anxiety as bearing resemblance to of anxiety occurs—uncanniness. Dasein no Heidegger’s account of the breakdown of longer dwells in the world comfortably ready-to-hand innerwordly beings. When a because the world becomes viewed “as if hammer, for example, breaks or becomes from the outside.”109 If we were to view the too heavy, it becomes obtrusive. The disclosedness of anxiety as a structural world—the system of referential whole, the understanding component of the meanings—itself can be viewed as a tool. In structure would be uncanniness (Dasein anxiety, “Dasein experiences the world as an seeing itself as not-at-home), whereas the instrument that has failed to do its job.”105 attunement is the mood of anxiety (the loss The world as a whole stands before Dasein of meaning for Dasein). Because anxiety in anxiety like in no other mood, for all deprives Dasein of understanding itself other attunements aid Dasein in its through “the public way of being engagement with the world, not in pulling interpreted,” and also from seeking comfort away from it. from (now alien) innerworldly beings, This, however, does not mean that Dasein is fundamentally alone110. This is the world loses its definition as a referential why Heidegger states that “anxiety chain of meaning; Dasein still sees individuates Dasein to its ownmost being in innerworldly beings as having inherent the world.”111 Heidegger refers to the meanings (having in-order-tos). Meaning— properly understood—has not been lost; 106 Being and Time, 180. significance has. In other words, the world 107 Bruce Ballard, The Role of Mood in Heidegger’s as “the totality of relevance” is not lost, but Ontology (Lanham, University Press of America, 1999), 52. 108 Ballard, The Role of Mood, 52. 103 Being and Time, 180. 109 Being-in-the-World, 179. 104 Ibid. 110 Being and Time, 184. 105 Being-in-the-World, 181. 111 Being and Time, 182.

32 nakedness of Dasein throughout his that it is responsible for its choices. What is examination of anxiety. It must be noted that most important to note of these structures the “existential solipsism” that Dasein for my argument is that anxiety, as it were, undergoes in anxiety—the individuation of opens up the door for them. While fear Dasein—is not the rise of a worldless allows Dasein to take a stand regarding subject totally distinct from the other; rather, innerworldly beings, this mood does not Dasein is alone because “no way of being” allow Dasein to reflect on itself as Dasein or has intrinsic meaning for Dasein anymore112. seek authenticity (to take a stand on Dasein Along with the fact that Dasein is as Dasein). anxious about being-in-the-world as such, The discussion of anxiety’s influence anxiety also discloses the various on Dasein’s understandings of its possibilities open to Dasein and even the possibilities leads to one of Heidegger’s possibility of Dasein at all. Once Dasein most important concepts, being-towards- understands that the significance of the death. Magrini observes: “When Dasein, world has been prescribed from the they, uncanny and individuated, with its worldly Dasein realizes that is has not authentically relations severed, is brought before the utter chosen its possibilities. However, this, as possibility of its no-longer-being-able-to-be, James Magrini notes, is not necessarily its ownmost potentiality for being is negative, for “anxiety frees Dasein to hold revealed as Being-towards-death.” 114Being- of its existence by throwing it back upon towards-death raises a distinction between which it is most anxious about—its own anxiety toward death and fearing toward potentiality for Being-in-the-world— death. While Being-toward-death is a unique provoking Dasein to reflect upon that which concept (which allows us to examine Dasein matters most in its existence.”113 in its wholeness), “Being-toward-death is The structures of Dasein in the latter essentially anxiety,” by which Heidegger half of Being and Time, particularly guilt, means that Being-toward-death is a the call of conscience, and resoluteness manifestation of a certain form of anxiety. manifest through anxiety. Guilt, which 115One can fear biological death— manfiests through anxiety, is Dasein’s perishing—which is a fear of an innerwordly realization that it is responsible for its occurrence. One can fear the pain that dying possible ways of being. A related concept is causes or can fear innerworldy things that the call of conscience. It is Dasein in its may kill you, but this not a comprehension uncanniness (Dasein’s not being at home of death as an existential structure. The with the they) where Dasein “hears” this indefiniteness and insuperability of death call, from no specific direction, but which only manifests through anxiety. This is summons Dasein to take hold of the because what one is anxious of in Being- grounding of its own being, actively taking toward-death is not directed at any responsibility for its projects. Heidegger innewordly phenomenon, but, rather, an then describes resoluteness, where Dasein anxiety of the nothing: “the nothing reveals embraces its guilt and takes on its itself in anxiety—but not as a being.”116In possibilities as its own; Dasein understands other words, Dasein fears the possibility of nothingness (or the possibility of

112 Ibid. 113 James Magrini, “Anxiety in Heidegger’s Being 114 Magrini, “Anxiety in Heidegger’s Being and and Time: The Harbinger of Authenticity” (2006). Time, 80. Philosophy Scholarship, no. 15, 79. 115 Being and Time, 254. 116 “Metaphysics,” 102.

33 impossibility), which cannot be, logically, apprehensive, thus falling prey to it more attributed to any being. than ever.120 All other moods “encourage” Dasein Heidegger’s claim that the mood to engage in the world in some way; as anxiety has such revelatory power—that it Bruce Ballard, observes they “show things reveals such fundamental things about us in the world in some more definite way of and our world—might seem peculiar to mattering.” 117When we pursue our various many given that anxiety is such a specific projects in everydayness we view the phenomenon. Also, the very notion that it is projects as mattering. This sense of through a mood that we can begin to “mattering” is no more the case than in fear, examine the Dasein conflicts with the giving us another reason to reject anxiety as philosophical tradition. What I can say about branching from fear. Far from innerwordly this second concern is that Heidegger’s things not mattering to Dasein in fear, and emphasis on affect is part of his general far from being-in-the-world becoming inclination to emphasize the axiological and transparent, Dasein immerses itself in the practical over the rational and cognitive. world in this mood; in fear, one sees specific Finally, Heidegger’s analysis of anxiety innerworldly beings as very much mattering. might seem strange if one does not realize One ascertains whether to flee or fight from that—complicated language aside— a threatening innerworldly being. Dasein’s Heidegger is examining a very subtle concerned engagement with the world in no phenomenon that occurs in everyday life. It sense stops in fear, but is actually is so subtle that a reader might not realize heightened. that Heidegger is describing something that We can understand this ontically by she has felt. examining that people in fear often act with a heightened, almost more automatic, circumspection. In fear, people are as engaged with the world as possible. In these situations one does not question their actions—wondering “why would anyone do that. . .”—as is very much the case with anxiety “where one stands back and looks for intrinsic reasons for one’s actions,” but finds none.118Anxiety helps to make Being- in-the-world in some sense transparent, almost, as it were, revealing the trick of the magic act, but “fear is occasioned by beings taken care of in the surrounding world.”119Heidegger explicitly supports this claim that fear is a mood that engages us in an even more circumspect way than usual with tasks at hand: “fear arises from the lost present of which fear is fearfully

117 Ballard, 51. 118 Being-in-the-World, 180. 119 Being and Time, 329. 120 Ibid.

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