01 March 2021 Mr Aidan O'driscoll Chairman Commission on Defence
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01 March 2021 Mr Aidan O’Driscoll Chairman Commission on Defence Forces Dear Chairman, The Defence Forces are at a crossroads so I welcome this commission and wish you and the members well in your deliberations. Today, ironically while we do know better and have made many advances, the inability to retain our people, among other things, has led to the current crisis which is an existential threat to the Defence Forces. There isn’t as much cohesion, humour or morale and there is a danger that a less capable or attractive Defence Forces will not represent Ireland in the way it always has, with effective units, professionalism and pride. What’s more it will not be able to defend Ireland in any meaningful way, a sad and shameful reflection of a sovereign state. I regret that the Civilian Military i.e. Department of Defence Forces Defence Forces relationship, interphase or ‘nexus’ was not part of your remit. I do try to be balanced. Finally, I would hope that your recommendations in whatever form they are approved, are subject to independent government oversight in their implementation. CAPABILITIES – In this regard, you may wish to consider future integrated capability development and the planning and delivery requirements to support a joint force approach in new equipment, professional military education and training, maintenance and development of infrastructure, developments in military doctrine, and transformative concepts, including specialist capabilities, that prepare and support the Defence Forces. References: A: Defence White Paper (2015) and White Paper on Defence Update (2019). B: Fine Gael’s Ireland and the EU: Defending Our Common European Home (2018). C: DFAT’s Global Ireland, Ireland’s Global Footprint to 2025 (2019). D: Sharing the Burden: Lessons from the European Return to Multidimensional Peacekeeping, Arthur Boutellis and (Maj Gen) Michael Beary (Jan 2020). E: EU’s Global Strategy, CFSP and CSDP publications. F: Climate change a new enemy, NATO Review (Dec 2019). G: EU Institute of Strategic Studies’ Yearbook of European Security (2019). H: A strategy for Europe’s neighbourhood: keep resilient and carry on Biscop, S (2017). I: UK Ministry of Defence’s ‘How Defence Works’ (Sep 2020). J: New Zealand’s Strategic Defence Policy Statement (2018), K: New Zealand’s Defence Capability Plan (2019). L. Defence Forces Leadership Doctrine (2016). M. Leading change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail, Kotter, J.P (2007). N. The Economics of Belonging, Sandbu, M (2020). O. Army Order 1/11 Transformation Agenda (2011). P. National Census 2016. INTRODUCTION This Commission offers an opportunity to review the White Paper (2015) and White Paper Update (2019) in a time of challenges to Ireland’s Defence, Security and Defence Forces. This Commission’s tasks nest conveniently within the Government’s intent to establish a national security strategy and architecture and comes after 30 years of reorganisation and transformation. While there is a sense of déjà vu when one recollects the ‘Gleeson Commission’ this Commission’s Terms of Reference are encouraging because in addressing the Defence Forces we do need to address organisation, capabilities, structures and staffing and by implication the human resources function, pay, pensions and resourcing as we look forward. There are three (3) themes in this submission 1) defining and implementing a Defence vision where a Defence Forces has a clear identity or fit in modern Ireland; 2) rebuilding ‘unit cohesion’ the building block of any military organisation and 3) developing future capacity and capability out to 2030 for a ‘complex, connected, confused, congested and contested’ security environment. My analysis is compiled through an experiential, organisational, change and systems lens. This submission is along the following lines of: 1) painting a picture of the last 10 years of change, 2) the facts on the ground – leadership challenges in the Army, 3) our security environment and contemporary operating environment 4) a Defence Forces fit in Ireland 5) a Defence Forces fit in the world, and recommendations under 6) Capabilities, 7) Structures and 8) Staffing. At the outset the Defence Forces is an excellent organisation rich in history, heritage, culture and values, with great soldiers (sailors, aircrews) and veterans that mirror the Irish citizen in his or her determination, courage, pride in country, humour, devilment and all their glory and imperfection, and is best observed today in the leadership, management and cohesiveness of an overseas unit, well trained, prepared and resourced. Our senior military leaders are experienced, educated in defence, thoughtful and caring, and for the most part our Defence colleagues are the same. The Defence Forces is like Carlsberg, ‘probably’ the best in Ireland in educating and developing young leaders to its own detriment! I recognise the achievement of a Minister, Defence colleagues and diplomats in engaging in Europe’s security and defence policies and architectures as part of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) Implementation Plan1, when easier to walk away. This is our future. THE LAST 10 YEARS OF CHANGE The last 10 years have been dominated by the Army and Reserve Defence Force reorganisations and a Second White Paper where: the reorganisations, though successful in part, were implemented to a fault, where certain 2nd and 3rd order effects (some predictable, some unintended) should have been revisited (as in any change programme); an ambitious and thoughtful White Paper characterised by at best a slow ‘a la carte’ implementation ‘process’ overseen by a senior management and leadership in a ‘Defence Organisation2’ with different and competing cultural perspectives short on organisational empathy in complex times; and ultimately Government indifference. These processes, along with changes in pay and pensions, have impacted on the culture and climate3, cohesion and morale of the force, partly pre-empting a Human Resources crisis and ‘capability fade’ that requires immediate intervention. THE FACTS ON THE GROUND – CHALLENGES IN LEADERSHIP As a former Unit Commander at home and overseas, a Director of Operations and Plans (Army representative on the White Paper), Brigade Commander, Military Representative to the EU’s Military Committee and NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP), I often found myself powerless, sometimes at fault, in a system of administrative, educational, training and operational ‘people multi systems’ in perpetual motion, overloaded and ‘out of sync’ in Ireland and overseas, and increasingly ‘family unfriendly’ amid falling numbers; where the ‘can do’ culture mitigated against listening, saying stop, revisiting, simplifying and redirecting in an integrated way. My first thoughts from an operational point of view are of: our capitals Dublin and ‘Cork’, the biggest recruitment areas, short on units and personnel; a Defence Forces that has 8% of its strength overseas in “14 missions in 15 countries and one sea” at any time, and where specialised subunits for EU Battlegroups meant assembling and training from scratch and then disassembling them; from an Army Brigade perspective: of Commanding Officers with 12 to 18 months in appointments, 40% officer strengths in units, the slow death of a core of officers in the regions – Cork, Limerick, Galway, units and staffs that functioned because of a ‘few good women’ and officers commissioned from the ranks, officer and NCO promotion systems with wholescale movement around the country, officers of the same rank with different tiers of pay and pensions, newly trained soldiers dispersed in Brigades with little accommodation or money, no armour and new equipment, an Artillery 1 The drivers within the EUGS’ Implementation Plan are the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD); Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO); Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC); EU Battlegroups, and the Commission’s European Defence Action Plan (EDAP) incorporating a European Defence Fund (EDF); and a European Peace Facility (EPF). CARD identifies capability gaps; PESCO will fill them; MPCC and Battlegroups operate them, and EDF and EPF will fund them. 2 Informal and not universally ‘accepted’ language for the Department of Defence and Defence Forces. 3 Culture is defined as the values shared by the organisation’s members and the assumptions or unspoken rules which may only be evident to those who are serving in the organisation the longest. Climate is the perception among the members of a unit about how they will be treated by their leaders and what professional opportunities they see within the unit (Ref L). Regiment that could not fire a gun because it has the largest operational area in the country and staffs a Brigade HQ and Barracks, the disbandment of civilian maintenance staffs in a ‘crumbling’ Barracks network, a broken ‘Reserve’, units as ‘feeder units’ for tech multinationals, and a young educated, ambitious, overworked and ironically ‘bored’ workforce ‘churned up’ by a stressed HR system. These factors will consistently undermine the leadership and cohesion of a military unit4. Conversely there were very many regional Infantry units that benefitted from the Army Reorganisation, where bigger units mean bigger establishments, promotion, courses and overseas As a ‘Learning Organisation’ with change management systems, and with a functioning devolved command authority, the ‘right things’ could have been done, the ‘unintended consequences' addressed, and naively, ‘politics aside’, units realigned. In consolidating