01 March 2021

Mr Aidan O’Driscoll Chairman Commission on Defence Forces

Dear Chairman,

The Defence Forces are at a crossroads so I welcome this commission and wish you and the members well in your deliberations.

Today, ironically while we do know better and have made many advances, the inability to retain our people, among other things, has led to the current crisis which is an existential threat to the Defence Forces. There isn’t as much cohesion, humour or morale and there is a danger that a less capable or attractive Defence Forces will not represent Ireland in the way it always has, with effective units, professionalism and pride. What’s more it will not be able to defend Ireland in any meaningful way, a sad and shameful reflection of a sovereign state.

I regret that the Civilian Military i.e. Department of Defence Forces Defence Forces relationship, interphase or ‘nexus’ was not part of your remit. I do try to be balanced.

Finally, I would hope that your recommendations in whatever form they are approved, are subject to independent government oversight in their implementation.

CAPABILITIES – In this regard, you may wish to consider future integrated capability development and the planning and delivery requirements to support a joint force approach in new equipment, professional military education and training, maintenance and development of infrastructure, developments in military doctrine, and transformative concepts, including specialist capabilities, that prepare and support the Defence Forces. References: A: Defence White Paper (2015) and White Paper on Defence Update (2019). B: Fine Gael’s Ireland and the EU: Defending Our Common European Home (2018). C: DFAT’s Global Ireland, Ireland’s Global Footprint to 2025 (2019). D: Sharing the Burden: Lessons from the European Return to Multidimensional Peacekeeping, Arthur Boutellis and (Maj Gen) Michael Beary (Jan 2020). E: EU’s Global Strategy, CFSP and CSDP publications. F: Climate change a new enemy, NATO Review (Dec 2019). G: EU Institute of Strategic Studies’ Yearbook of European Security (2019). H: A strategy for Europe’s neighbourhood: keep resilient and carry on Biscop, S (2017). I: UK Ministry of Defence’s ‘How Defence Works’ (Sep 2020). J: New Zealand’s Strategic Defence Policy Statement (2018), K: New Zealand’s Defence Capability Plan (2019). L. Defence Forces Leadership Doctrine (2016). M. Leading change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail, Kotter, J.P (2007). N. The Economics of Belonging, Sandbu, M (2020). O. Army Order 1/11 Transformation Agenda (2011). P. National Census 2016.

INTRODUCTION

This Commission offers an opportunity to review the White Paper (2015) and White Paper Update (2019) in a time of challenges to Ireland’s Defence, Security and Defence Forces.

This Commission’s tasks nest conveniently within the Government’s intent to establish a national security strategy and architecture and comes after 30 years of reorganisation and transformation. While there is a sense of déjà vu when one recollects the ‘Gleeson Commission’ this Commission’s Terms of Reference are encouraging because in addressing the Defence Forces we do need to address organisation, capabilities, structures and staffing and by implication the human resources function, pay, pensions and resourcing as we look forward.

There are three (3) themes in this submission 1) defining and implementing a Defence vision where a Defence Forces has a clear identity or fit in modern Ireland; 2) rebuilding ‘unit cohesion’ the building block of any military organisation and 3) developing future capacity and capability out to 2030 for a ‘complex, connected, confused, congested and contested’ security environment. My analysis is compiled through an experiential, organisational, change and systems lens.

This submission is along the following lines of: 1) painting a picture of the last 10 years of change, 2) the facts on the ground – leadership challenges in the Army, 3) our security environment and contemporary operating environment 4) a Defence Forces fit in Ireland 5) a Defence Forces fit in the world, and recommendations under 6) Capabilities, 7) Structures and 8) Staffing.

At the outset the Defence Forces is an excellent organisation rich in history, heritage, culture and values, with great soldiers (sailors, aircrews) and veterans that mirror the Irish citizen in his or her determination, courage, pride in country, humour, devilment and all their glory and imperfection, and is best observed today in the leadership, management and cohesiveness of an overseas unit,

well trained, prepared and resourced. Our senior military leaders are experienced, educated in defence, thoughtful and caring, and for the most part our Defence colleagues are the same. The Defence Forces is like Carlsberg, ‘probably’ the best in Ireland in educating and developing young leaders to its own detriment! I recognise the achievement of a Minister, Defence colleagues and diplomats in engaging in Europe’s security and defence policies and architectures as part of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) Implementation Plan1, when easier to walk away. This is our future.

THE LAST 10 YEARS OF CHANGE

The last 10 years have been dominated by the Army and Reserve Defence Force reorganisations and a Second White Paper where: the reorganisations, though successful in part, were implemented to a fault, where certain 2nd and 3rd order effects (some predictable, some unintended) should have been revisited (as in any change programme); an ambitious and thoughtful White Paper characterised by at best a slow ‘a la carte’ implementation ‘process’ overseen by a senior management and leadership in a ‘Defence Organisation2’ with different and competing cultural perspectives short on organisational empathy in complex times; and ultimately Government indifference. These processes, along with changes in pay and pensions, have impacted on the culture and climate3, cohesion and morale of the force, partly pre-empting a Human Resources crisis and ‘capability fade’ that requires immediate intervention.

THE FACTS ON THE GROUND – CHALLENGES IN LEADERSHIP

As a former Unit Commander at home and overseas, a Director of Operations and Plans (Army representative on the White Paper), Brigade Commander, Military Representative to the EU’s Military Committee and NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP), I often found myself powerless, sometimes at fault, in a system of administrative, educational, training and operational ‘people multi systems’ in perpetual motion, overloaded and ‘out of sync’ in Ireland and overseas, and increasingly ‘family unfriendly’ amid falling numbers; where the ‘can do’ culture mitigated against listening, saying stop, revisiting, simplifying and redirecting in an integrated way.

My first thoughts from an operational point of view are of: our capitals Dublin and ‘Cork’, the biggest recruitment areas, short on units and personnel; a Defence Forces that has 8% of its strength overseas in “14 missions in 15 countries and one sea” at any time, and where specialised subunits for EU Battlegroups meant assembling and training from scratch and then disassembling them; from an Army Brigade perspective: of Commanding Officers with 12 to 18 months in appointments, 40% officer strengths in units, the slow death of a core of officers in the regions – Cork, Limerick, Galway, units and staffs that functioned because of a ‘few good women’ and officers commissioned from the ranks, officer and NCO promotion systems with wholescale movement around the country, officers of the same rank with different tiers of pay and pensions, newly trained soldiers dispersed in Brigades with little accommodation or money, no armour and new equipment, an Artillery

1 The drivers within the EUGS’ Implementation Plan are the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD); Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO); Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC); EU Battlegroups, and the Commission’s European Defence Action Plan (EDAP) incorporating a European Defence Fund (EDF); and a European Peace Facility (EPF). CARD identifies capability gaps; PESCO will fill them; MPCC and Battlegroups operate them, and EDF and EPF will fund them.

2 Informal and not universally ‘accepted’ language for the Department of Defence and Defence Forces.

3 Culture is defined as the values shared by the organisation’s members and the assumptions or unspoken rules which may only be evident to those who are serving in the organisation the longest. Climate is the perception among the members of a unit about how they will be treated by their leaders and what professional opportunities they see within the unit (Ref L).

Regiment that could not fire a gun because it has the largest operational area in the country and staffs a Brigade HQ and Barracks, the disbandment of civilian maintenance staffs in a ‘crumbling’ Barracks network, a broken ‘Reserve’, units as ‘feeder units’ for tech multinationals, and a young educated, ambitious, overworked and ironically ‘bored’ workforce ‘churned up’ by a stressed HR system. These factors will consistently undermine the leadership and cohesion of a military unit4.

Conversely there were very many regional Infantry units that benefitted from the Army Reorganisation, where bigger units mean bigger establishments, promotion, courses and overseas As a ‘Learning Organisation’ with change management systems, and with a functioning devolved command authority, the ‘right things’ could have been done, the ‘unintended consequences' addressed, and naively, ‘politics aside’, units realigned. In consolidating we reinforced failure! This logic underpins my later recommendations vis a vis the Chief of Staff (COS) as a Chief of Defence (CHOD) and establishing a Land Component Commander, both with autonomy to do things; and the need to address deployments in Cork, Dublin and Athlone. Having said all that, it does little for a soldier to be told that he or she is among the low paid in society, when your employer, the State, ignores the fundamentals of economics: the price of labour and the laws of supply and demand.

The nub of all this is that the Defence Organisation has been embroiled in day to day ‘tactical fights’ on many issues including many relating to the 2012 Reorganisation, which took every ounce of fat out of the organisation and when finished with the ‘low hanging fruit’ the ‘process’ went at the roots. Where there should have been flexibility within the Employment Control Framework (ECF) for Junior Officers and Senior NCOs overseas5, Cadetship numbers, and with contracts, there was none. So, when the Defence Organisation should have been “cracking on” with the White Paper ‘the strategic fight’, it had lost its ‘the strategic compass’, and has today become introverted in an ever changing security and operational environment, and ‘straitjacketed’ in moving forward.

OUR SECURITY ENVIRONMENT / CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

Our security environment and our contemporary operating environment is ‘complex, congested, Diplomacy Cyber Political confused, contested and connected’! It is also characterised by some observers as the changing Information Culture character of peace. The post Cold War order is over, Social/ there is a competitiveness over status and influence in Intelligence

a merging multipolar world; we see the “dark side of Societal globalisation”, a ‘new scramble for Africa’; generation Economy Legal change, changes in the media landscape, social-media as an opinion builder and social disruptors; energy as Infrastructu Military/ a political tool; new battlespaces, hybrid, cyber-attack re Defence and defence, and influencing and interfering in peace AdministrationSpace time; a revolution in military affairs (artificial Intelligence, robotics, machine learning, remote systems, space) at hyperspeed. We have blurred conflicts: Ukraine, Crimea, the failure of multilateralism, the Sunni Shia divide, Islamic State, terrorism, populism, nationalism; BREXIT, possible Irish unification and the future security and defence ‘unknowns’ of a pandemic, all potentially impacting in Ireland and our neighborhood.

4 Gabriel and Savage in their study of the US Army and its Officer Corp post-Vietnam called this scenario a ‘crisis in command’. Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army by Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage (1979).

5 Whereas there is an ECF allowance for senior officers overseas at any point in time i.e. a surplus to the establishment required to fill vacancies left by those overseas, there is none for Junior Officers and Senior NCOs, hence no facility or numbers to replace these ranks when deployed overseas, compounding reduced officer numbers in units.

And while NATO talks of “strategic decision making at the speed of relevance”, ‘we’ struggle with the ‘near and now’, preparing to fight tomorrow’s conflicts with yesteryear’s capabilities when capability (battlespace awareness, maritime security, airspace policing, cyber defence) cannot be generated overnight. Climate change [is] a new enemy, “It has no flag, no leader, no combatants, nor a revolutionary manifesto. It is a killer of people, operating worldwide to destabilise societies” (NATO Review Dec 2019), exacerbating water shortages, border conflicts, migration, challenging states with limited food resources or weak governance. The Defence Forces are engaged in these conflicts, the ‘lessons learned’ being you need strategic autonomy in capacity and capabilities across strategic and tactical lift, soldier systems, intelligence, advanced logistics, networks, cyber, engineers, medics, policing capabilities and new skill sets – trainers, sociologists, town planners, hydrologists. And you need to mainstream climate control into military operations.

A DEFENCE FORCES FIT IN IRELAND

The Institute of International and European Affairs (IEAA) and the Fine Gael MEP’s initiative (Ref B) aside, the defence dialogue in Ireland is shallow, and where there is one on neutrality, a European Army, being ‘great peacekeepers’ or pay, it is a lazy dialogue, high on hysteria and praise but short on substance. Any dialogue to educate the Irish body politic, senior civil servants and the public, needs to go beyond the conventional (airborne troops at our airports, landing crafts on our beaches, tanks in our streets, … .) to take account of: the ‘real’ threats to a small, advanced, open, vulnerable economy and credibility among partners amid an information technology revolution; building national resilience to face climate change (we have all seen the power of the River Shannon and filling sandbags does not cut it anymore); and ‘high end’ crisis management and humanitarian operations to support dangerous UN mandated and independent Government missions.

In the absence of a real dialogue and where a professional military perceive that defence is not a Government priority or is neglected beyond repair, the biggest subplot is that personnel lose their “sense of belonging” (Ref N) and are “moving on to better things”, often to An Garda Siochana and the Prison Service, ‘the strategic competitors’, when training professionals costs real money. The irony is that in a recruitment crisis, the advertisements on Irish Sky TV on ‘Super Sunday’ are for the British Army, Royal Navy, RAF, Royal Marines and the Territorial Army, in the maelstrom of a devastating economic and unspoken social upheavals and a pandemic.

The Defence Forces and Department of Defence have been exercised about where the Defence Forces fits in Ireland. There have been many strategy statements, some compiled jointly, others separately. The COS’ Army Order 1/2011 Transformation Agenda and the current Defence Forces Strategy Statement stand out; the former because it was an excellent transformative concept and addressed issues like transformation, structures, joint capabilities and delivery systems; and the latter because it sits in the real world “Strengthen the Nation, … .” As said, oddly enough the maligned 2012 Army Reorganisation consolidated large units in many towns and cities to their mutual benefit, albeit when today the criticism of the Army is that it hides in its ‘walled gardens’. The Reserve Reorganisation failed, it took little account of the ‘local’ in Reserve or the Permanent Defence Forces’ ability to manage it; the real failing being that it closed a gateway to society.

Having said that, it stands that the Defence Forces is greatly challenged to find an image or ‘a fit’ in Ireland. This is a difficulty, an obstacle, and a challenge to the organisation’s well-being, where “strategy is a way through a difficulty, an approach to overcoming an obstacle, a response to a challenge”. The Government and Defence Organisation with the best will in the world has practised bad strategy and undermined the White Paper process where: 1) though defining the challenges of our environment (many times) has failed to address capability development (and is now firing equipment at it partly out of ‘pay savings’); 2) mistaken goals for strategy (95 in the White Paper

Implementation Plan); and 3) piled on the superficial ‘fluff’ (doing more for less, gathering the low hanging fruit … ). One has to be impressed by New Zealand’s suite of Defence Strategy Statements and Capability Development Plan (readily available on the internet) and their underpinning ‘Defence Principles’6 with their clear intent, indicative and approved budgets and phased timelines.

A DEFENCE FORCES FIT IN THE WORLD

The next iteration of the EUGS Implementation Plan will be Europe’s setting of the ‘strategic compass’. The French EU Presidency (1/2022) will drive this relentlessly (connect President Macron’s ‘strategic autonomy’). While this will challenge an Ireland that has only found a “landing space” in a Europe post Brexit, in straddling our internal external defence nexus, this strategic compass could direct Ireland in defining “what type of Defence and Security actor” we want to be! In other words there is a lot to be said for being part of a “European security and defence culture”, where our own culture is yet to be fully defined!

In building a Joint culture across the services, the Defence Forces can gain from consistent and focused staffing in the EU’s Military Staff, Voluntary National Contributions to NATO and a greater commitment to PESCO (participating in 2 projects). A cursory view of the projects7 highlights their strategic and ‘Joint’ value. The Defence Forces should continue to deliver courses for NATO Allies and Partners, currently the Counter Marauding Terrorist Attack and Sexual Gender-Based Violence courses. The Military College should establish partnerships with the IEAA, the EU’s Institute for Strategic Studies and Sweden’s Folke Bernadotte Academy. Ireland should sign up to the Helsinki based European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats and the International Military Council on Climate and Security8.

The Defence Organisation can take enormous credit for its overseas contribution. It captures the public imagination and without it recruitment would decline. And this is the nub of this issue, where numbers overseas as distinct from strategic effect, Security Council seat aside, often dictates the emphasis. As it stands, in 2018, Ireland was the 5th largest contributor of EU Member States to UN operations and with the first naval vessel deployment to EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia9 the

6 Defence is combat-capable, flexible and ready; Defence personnel are highly trained professionals; Defence has the resources to meet the Government’s operational and strategic priorities; Defence operates in ways that maintain public trust and confidence; Defence embodies and promotes New Zealand’s values: Defence is a credible trusted international partner.

7 Cyber Response Teams, Strategic Command and Control Systems for CSDP Missions, a European Medical Centre, a Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package, and a Joint EU Intelligence School.

8 Founded and administered by the Centre for Climate and Security an institute of the Council on Strategic Risks, in partnership with the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs, the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and the Planetary Security Initiative of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael).

9 EU NAVAL FORCE MEDITERRANEAN Operation Sophia - part of the EU’s response to the migration issue.

6th largest contributor to EU CSDP operations. Looking forward, the Defence Forces will have to rationalise its ‘14 missions in 15 countries and one sea’ downwards towards less missions, less ‘churn’ and more strategic effect. There will be a need too to balance the UN, EU, NATO PfP mix, with a greater emphasis on EU training missions, NATO Defence Capability Building projects and independent actions as part of the Government’s and DFAT’s Global Ireland vision. There is, for example, a case for prioritising Joint appointments in European missions over 13 Observer appointments in the UN’s Truce Supervisory Organisation (UNTSO) in the Middle East. We have seen the value of the medical support to our Embassy in Sierra Leone during the Ebola crisis. The EU’s Chad/CAR mission in 2008/2009 was the high watermark of the Army’s development. It maybe that Defence in time will have to consider deploying a Battalion Group or a Joint equivalent back to Africa to the Sahel (or Libya) with our European partners (Ref D - Sharing the Burden), with its inherent risks, rather than to our troop missions in UNIFIL and UNDOF10. Looking forward today, it is questionable whether the Army will retain the capability or the personnel to do this.

WHERE WE COME FROM ON CAPABILITY

One of the disappointing aspects of the White Paper was Chapter 6 on Capability Requirements. It is a ‘mish mash’ of sound analysis, cautious ambition, maybes, fuzzy contradictions11 and wish lists12. The White Paper however does state that “the Department of Defence develop a detailed Capability Development Plan [CDP] building on the work completed as part of the White Paper process”. My experience of the CDP process across Defence is that, while good work came out of the White Paper resulting in platform and equipment development (from both sides of the house), the Department has historically guarded ‘its’ ownership of CDP and has perhaps avoided producing one to prevent ‘letting the Genie out of the bottle’. Attitudes have matured though reinforced in part by the EUGS Implementation Plan (CARD, PESCO) and its very ‘accountable’ demands.

THE PLANNING AND DELIVERY REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT A JOINT FORCE APPROACH

So, in addressing capability development, one of the better outcomes of this Commission, would be a recommendation that the ‘Defence Organisation’ adopt best practise in defence planning (Ref I ‘How Defence Works’). A start point being a ‘realistic and genuine ambition’ out to 2030 underpinned by a fully costed and approved Department / Defence Forces Capability Development Plan, developed with other Government agencies, nested under a National Security Strategy, Defence White Paper and a Department Defence Forces Strategy ‘Statement’. The underlying ‘joint’ Doctrinal, Equipment and Workforce Plans, integrated across ‘DOTLMPFI’13 should follow.

Capabilities should be developed to future proof a conventional Joint force with ‘all hazards’ capabilities, with the capacity to respond to Government requirements from defending the State against aggression, providing Aid to the Civil Power and Civil Authorities, building National

10 UNIFIL the ‘Interim’ Force in Lebanon and UNDOF the Disengagement Observer Force on the Golan Heights.

11 “There is a balance to be struck between being overly prescriptive regarding future capability requirements and having sufficient detail in order to allow for prudential capability development, particularly for prioritisation and procurement of equipment and platform items, which can have a lead time of several years. Capabilities must therefore be developed and maintained to meet challenges of this dynamic security environment”. (Para 6.2 Key Principles, Ch 6, White Paper 2015.)

12 “In the event of additional funding becoming available, beyond that required to maintain existing capabilities, additional Armoured Personnel Carriers and variants, Light Tactical Vehicles and additional air defence capabilities are priorities for the Army”. Para 6.3 Army, Ch 6, White Paper 2015.

13 Any individual capability is developed across an integrated development package under Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Leadership, Materials, Personnel, Facilities and Information.

Resilience including to counter climate change and providing for overseas missions in support of our national interests; and for a Land Component (Army) this should include at a minimum:

• Combat ready Land Component: In recommending the establishment of a Land Component Command, one challenge of this Commission will be to identify who represents the Army today (DCOS Ops currently the senior Army officer, GOC DFTC14 or Brigade Commanders), though Army officers have almost exclusively, until recently, made up the General Staff, in an ‘Army HQ’ then Defence Force HQ, since the foundation of the State. ‘Historically’, there has been no Land Component Commander and command rests with the two (2) Army Brigade Commanders and the Brigades comprise the bulk of the Defence Forces.

There is a need to better conceptualise the Army of the White Paper that “will continue to retain all-arms conventional military capabilities, within the existing two Infantry Brigades, and Defence Forces Training Centre, including SOF”. A more relevant concept should read the Land Component needs to be transformed into two (2) robust, self-sustaining brigades, one (1) Light and one (1) Mechanised, where capability can be developed. This is modest by today’s standards, and if we don’t move forward, we will be left behind exponentially. Unit dispositions and establishment should match the operational requirements, strategic relevance, size and demography of their regions, and the potential to recruit a sustainable workforce including an integrated Reserve. Units should have specialisations (Air mobile, Mountain, Marine, Cyber, ISTAR) designed towards: building an agile, expeditionary and Joint mindset with a more decentralised Air Corp and Naval Service (Shannon Airport, Galway Port); recruiting a technical Reserve Defence Force representative of the industrial and technical nuances of their region; and developing and feeding personnel into SOF.

Army capability development should be achieved through: three (3) overarching initiatives: 1) Organising any new establishment or revisiting the current establishment (Army Reorganisation 2012 and Reserve Defence Forces Implementation Plan 2014), identifying lessons learned, addressing tempo, recruitment, retention and family friendly policies towards adapting units to reinforce leadership and ‘unit cohesion’; 2) Transforming into a modern, interoperable, agile, adaptable light combat force capable of: deploying a Joint Task Force HQ on land, a Multi Role Battalion Group overseas, and an EU Battlegroup ISTAR TF (every 4 years), and rostering and testing established units under NATO’s Operational Capability Concept Evaluation and Feedback15 program; and 3) Implementing a Network Enabled programme and acquisition plan to provide enhanced digitised command and control, surveillance and reconnaissance technology; battlefield management systems, secure satellite communications and electronic force protection.

• A Joint Intelligence Capability: Enhance the Defence Forces intelligence and hybrid capability to contribute to a future ‘National Intelligence’ by maximising the potential of our interaction with Europe16; and review the ‘Intelligence function’, organisation and HR practises including part civilianisation, towards establishing an Intelligence Corps.

14 Deputy Chief of Staff Operations (DCOS Ops), General Officer Commanding Defence Forces Training Centre (GOC DFTC).

15 The Operational Capabilities Concept – Evaluation & Feedback is a program or tool used to build, attain and verify the interoperability and operational capability of the declared units to participate in NATO-led crisis response operations.

16 The EU’s Single Intelligence Analysis Capability (SIAC) ‘programme’.

• Reserve deployable force: A Joint Reserve Directorate needs to be (re)established in a Joint HQ, where every component has a dedicated staff. Reserve capability development should facilitate: consolidating the Reserve’s integration into the Permanent Defence Forces; recruiting retired personnel of the Permanent Defence Force (1st Line Reserve); recruiting across other Government departments including Environment, Communications, Foreign Affairs, Higher Education; specialising depending on region: Cork – Cyber, Galway – Medical / Innovation, Naval Service – Dublin, Waterford and Galway, Air Corps - Limerick Shannon); deploying in operations at home and overseas; and resourcing.

A few key points across the joint environment:

• Professional military education and training. The Joint Senior Command and Staff Course would benefit from greater international integration and awareness and a Force and Capability Development block. Increase the number of service officers on joint courses abroad. A Joint Education System needs to be developed across the Defence Forces. The practise of changing officer instructor bodies every 2/3/4 years needs to be addressed; where civilians and retired officers from the services should be employed full and part time. The Junior Command and Staff course (for Captains) needs to move beyond Brigade tactics, where there is little instruction on Europe, hybrid, cyber, and where students need to be introduced to the public service at an early age.

• Maintenance and development of infrastructure. The Defence Forces capital maintenance and development is patchwork. A genuine capital investment programme is required out to 2030. The Board of Works need to be reinstated. The Curragh Camp is unacceptable by any standards across the Public Service. Lands need to be acquired for armour training.

• Developments in military doctrine. While a genuine effort was made to kickstart a Doctrinal Board and to develop doctrine from 2010, there is little doctrine. Oddly the Defence Forces has NO doctrine for Stability and Support Operations (including on Peacekeeping).

Structures – In this regard, you may wish to consider the most effective high-level Command and Control (C2) structures to ensure an agile and balanced approach that can function across all domains at home and overseas. Additionally, you may wish to address appropriate future force structures for the Army (including its brigade structure), the Air Corps, and the Naval Service, individually as component services and collectively as part of an integrated joint force approach. Furthermore, you may wish to address the changing nature of reservists, which presents an opportunity for the Reserve Defence Force to further integrate and support the Permanent Defence Force through the provision of enhanced collective and specialist capability across all domains.

Assumption: These recommendations are based on the assumption of a commitment to the White Paper, preferably a 2030 Transformation Agenda, 10 Year Capability and Workforce Plans to modernise to a joint force including a Permanent Defence Forces with a 10,500 ECF establishment; a Reserve Defence Forces of 2,500, and 250 civilians. It assumes no further barrack closures.

HIGH LEVEL COMMAND AND CONTROL:

• Implement international best practise where the senior officer in a military force is normally the CHOD, supported by the Land, Maritime and Air Component Commanders. In tandem clearly define the responsibilities and roles of the CHOD.

• Joint HQ staffs: The minimum requirement is that the General Staff, the Strategic Planning and J1 to 10 functions, J5 Plans (including a Capability Planning Cell), J Reserve and the principal educational establishments are fully Joint.

• Implement a specialised Civilian Military Human Resource function.

A COMBAT READY LAND COMPONENT:

Towards establishing a decentralised Joint force and Land Component 1) establish a Land Component HQ in Custume Barracks, Athlone and decentralise three (3) Joint Branches, one (1) each to Collins Barracks, Cork, Renmore Barracks, Galway and Custume Barracks, Athlone; 2) retain the two (2) Brigades in the same regional barracks (unless shift in political intent17) disposed according to operational requirements and recruitment potential (e.g. increase in Dublin and Cork, reduce in Galway and Limerick where demographic trends may not support recruitment – Ref P) 3) establish a training unit in Kilkenny; all towards modernising capabilities, decentralising career opportunities, reducing moving parts; and supporting recruitment, retention and the Reserve.

Starting from ‘ground zero’18 the Army Component Command will establish by 2030: an organisation comprising two (2) functioning Brigades including: a replacement fleet for the existing fleet (DFTC and Overseas); a new fleet for a mechanised Brigade; a storage infrastructure across the Mechanised barracks’; a Mechanised infantry tactics doctrine; a Workforce Plan to develop a professional and technical mechanised infantry cadre of leaders, commanders, crews, mechanics, technicians; and Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and electronic protection equipment

1 LIGHT BRIGADE: An all arms Light Brigade with specialised Light Infantry capabilities including:

Collins Barracks, Cork

• Brigade HQ, • 4 Infantry Battalion – Light Infantry with Maritime Capabilities; • 1 BAR – Light Brigade Artillery and ISTAR Regiment; • Training Institute Kilworth Camp to incorporate, Fort Davis and Bere Island. • Joint Directorate Combat Support.

Sarsfield Barracks, Limerick

• 12 Infantry Battalion – Light Infantry with Mountain Warfare Capabilities; • Air Corps Detachment.

Stephens Barracks, Kilkenny

3 Infantry Battalion – A Training Battalion with Infantry, Reconnaissance, Weapons, Crisis Management expertise, ‘Other Force’ capabilities to support DFTC and Brigades.

Renmore Barracks, Galway

• 1 Infantry Battalion – Light Infantry with Maritime Capabilities;

17 The 2012 Army Reorganisation has resulted in barracks and installations where in most cases there are at least 500 soldiers and civilians employed in a particular city or town from the outlying regions (of 3/4 counties).

18 There are approx. 20 pieces of armour in total in the two (2) Bdes.

• Naval Service Detachment; • Joint Directorate Reserve Forces.

Specialist capabilities within units will focus the operational capacity and Jointness of these units to provide ready-made expeditionary units, specialised ‘modular’ subunits (ISTAR TF and Training Teams) and ready-made recruiting pools for SOF.

2 MECHANISED BRIGADE: 2 Brigade will become an all arms Mechanised Brigade with:

Baldonnel, Dublin

• Brigade HQ; • 7 Infantry Battalion – Light Infantry with Air Mobile Capabilities; • 2 BAR – Mechanised Brigade Artillery and Air Defence Regiment;

McKee Barracks, Dublin

2 Cavalry Squadron – a Mechanised Cavalry Squadron with ceremonial functions.

Custume Barracks, Athlone

• Land Component Command; • 6 Infantry Battalion – Mechanised Infantry Battalion; • Joint Director Training and Doctrine.

Finner Camp, Donegal

28 Infantry Battalion – Mechanised Infantry Battalion.

Aiken Barracks, Dundalk

27 Infantry Battalion – a Mechanised Infantry Battalion.

Cathal Brugha Barracks should be sold to realise its value and serve the needs of Dublin City Corporation, with the money ring fenced for a purpose built barracks near Baldonnel Aerodrome. Part of the Barracks should be retained to incorporate a Museum and hotel and the accommodation of General Michael Collins, Archives and the Army School of Music.

DEFENCE FORCES TRAINING CENTRE (DFTC): The Joint DFTC will continue as the support, training and education centre for the Defence Forces. The camp should be rebuilt as a town, and the premier establishment and the face of the Defence Forces, to welcome the many Defence Forces and international students who pass through. The Armoured Squadron and APC Company should be reconstituted as the Defence Forces Reserve. The Language School should be reestablished.

Staffing – In this regard you may wish to consider the HR policies that support the requirement for an agile and adaptive modern military force. You may wish to consider the requirement for an agile and adaptive modern military force. You may wish to consider issues such as recruitment and retention, organisational culture and values, gender and diversity, career progression, and industrial relations machinery.

ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE AND VALUES:

Defence Forces culture and values19, from an army perspective, are underpinned by the cohesion of its officers, senior NCOs (the glue that keeps the unit together) and a cadre of junior NCOs and soldiers based historically in garrison barracks. They are drawn from officers commissioned into the unit, and NCOs and soldiers from that city, town and the surrounding counties, where historically many officers settled with their families, establishing a core of officers to man and operate that Brigade, Battalion, Garrison with reasonable expectations of promotion. While there was always a gravitation towards the East, Curragh and recently Newbridge for career or family reasons, this has increased in recent years. One of the unintended consequences of the 2012 Army Reorganisation was that it has become less attractive to live in the South, West, Midlands and North West, because one has to serve in DFHQ and or the DFTC if you want to progress. And while most Officers and Other Ranks initially at least do not join for “the pension” rather for the comradeship, adventure and the physical life; today, with Pay and Pension changes and retirement ages, officers, where both partners work, are faced with an earlier choice of whether to move East, stay in a ‘perceived backwater’ or leave. In other words, for the younger officer, family values will clash with an individual’s organisational values, impacting on or challenging an individual’s resilience and forcing him or her to make that early decision on his or her career. For NCOs and Privates the choices are similar and are magnified because of contracts and retirement ages. The contract soldier is a 2nd class citizen in Ireland today!

RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION:

Capability development will not work if we do not address the Human Resources dysfunction in the ‘Defence Organisation’. From a Defence Forces perspective the issue is unqualified inexperienced officers leading and managing the HR function for short periods of time; from a Department perspective, the ‘process’ does not take place ‘at the speed of relevance’, and many of their decisions and inactions and consequences have been calamitous. Too much control and little empathy. While it worked in the past, in its totality it is unfit for purpose today, strategically slow, ‘short term’ and reactionary. The HR function needs to professionalised (a combination of hiring professionals, do it jointly across the ‘Defence Organisation’, professionalise internally over time, decentralise and resource the components) and develop clear policies and workforce models. While there is nothing inherently wrong in losing personnel (good for Ireland), it is the scale of it that matters. The thoughtless ‘cutbacks’, and their repercussions are case studies in their own right. And the Defence Forces can recruit and train significant cyber specialists with industry and business.

CAREER PROGRESSION:

The Officers and NCOs promotion systems need to be reviewed to eliminate their ‘all year round bureaucracy’, and their undermining of the daily business of Defence.

Streaming or functional specialisation, in the Army, does not facilitate career progression where career progression favours Officers with command experience, particularly overseas, and a catalogue of short staff appointments preferably in operations, intelligence, HR, logistics, education and training. This mitigates against officers who may want to stream, specialise and progress, particularly those with talents or qualifications in a function, for example, in HR or advanced logistics, and who may wish to stay in an appointment or place, to benefit his or her family.

Career progression and performance appraisal should be linked to an officers measurable achievements, for example, in a Unit Commander’s case, performance indicators vis a vis the

19 Respect, Integrity, Loyalty, Selflessness, Physical and Moral Courage.

operational effectiveness of a unit including in local engagement, planning, operational effectiveness, physical fitness, health, recruitment, retention and Reserve. It should also be linked to successful project management including delivering on equipment and doctrine.

NCOs used to ‘stay in their lanes’ which underpinned specialisation, knowledge and continuity in command and staff. The senior NCO promotion system, while it has merit, has altered in that the NCO system is mirroring the officers’ system, where the successful are discommoded out of their Brigades, Units, Corps and specialisations, to the detriment of their units and unit cohesion.

MANAGING JOINT STAFFING:

The introduction of joint staffs will considerably challenge the Naval Service and Air Corps in the short term, but this can be managed across well-developed Workforce Plans towards 2030.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY:

The importance of gender and diversity is well recognised. As a Unit Commander overseas I valued the Unit’s 30+ females and their impact within the UN and Lebanese society and our LGBT personnel. It was a learning experience, reinforced by the General Staff . However female numbers remain stubbornly low, particularly in command appointments (this has to be encouraged and facilitated). In parallel there are many females and males who should be encouraged to stream in HR or Logistics. It is important that they can progress their careers in these specialisations.

The Defence Forces could expand its notion of diversity! The Defence Forces has not engaged the ‘new Irish’ or the physically challenged, where in the latter case the Israeli Defence Forces lead the way in recruiting particularly for the technical specialisations and cyber!