The Dynamics of Demographic Decline

THE DYNAMICS OF DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE Camilia Bruil Patrick van Schie Mark van de Velde (editors) The Hague, 2011 Published by the European Liberal Forum asbl, with the support of the Prof. mr. B.M. Teldersstichting (Dutch liberal think tank), VšĮ ‘Atvira visuomenė ir jos draugai’ (Lithuanian think tank) and Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung für die Frei- heit (German political foundation). Funded by the European Parliament. The European Parliament is not responsible for the content of the publication. The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Liberal Forum asbl. copyright © 2011 European Liberal Forum asbl, Brussels, Belgium This publication may only be reproduced stored or transmitted in any form or by any means, with the prior permission in writing of the publisher. Enquiries con- cerning reproduction outside these terms should be sent to the European Liberal Forum. The photo on the cover of this book is calledWooden nesting dolls and displays five wooden babushka dolls, originated from Russia. For further information and distribution: Prof.mr. B.M. Teldersstichting Koninginnegracht 55a 2514 AE The Hague The Netherlands +31 (0)703631948 www.teldersstichting.nl [email protected] Printed in the Netherlands by Oranje/Van Loon B.V. The Hague ISBN/EAN: 978-90-73896-00-0 Keywords: European Union, demography, decline, ageing, migration Contents Preface. V Alexander Graf Lambsdorff General background I. Introduction. 1 An introduction to demographic decline Camilia Bruil and Patrick van Schie II. Liberal politics and demographic decline 9 Martin van Hees Case Studies III. ‘The Netherlands fallacy’. 23 Demographic decline and the Dutch housing market Camilia Bruil IV. Against the tide. 37 Demographic trends in Ireland Mark van de Velde V. The localist revolution. 55 Demographic decline in Great Britain Tristan Duchenne VI. The oldest of the old world. 67 The process of demographic change in Germany Csilla Hatvany VII. Transformation and cooperation. 89 The Meuse-Rhine Euregion Jan Lambooy VIII. The dynamics of demographic decline and its consequences 105 for Lithuania. Viewpoints from a liberal perspective Remigijus Civinskas, Dainius Genys, Daiva Kuzmickaitė and Vaida Tretjakova III Future IX. Conclusion. 119 A dynamic liberal state of mind Camilia Bruil and Patrick van Schie List of contributors 123 IV Preface Europe faces a time bomb – no other region in the world has fewer childbirths than the European Union today. This will unavoidably lead to a substantial decline in Europe’s population. Indeed, for some European countries and regions population decline is already today’s reality. Others will have to address it in the near or distant future. Demographic change does not only affect the economic outlook for Europe, it also changes the way we organise social life today. Examples of this are the housing market, the labour market, or institutions and practices such as care, education, and culture. How should liberal politicians deal with these developments? Influ- encing the number of births would amount to social engineering, a nightmare for liberals. It is also exceedingly difficult to achieve as the state has almost no influence over what is and must remain one of the most intimate and important decisions in the individual life of men and women anywhere. The freedom of the individual should always be the point of departure for any liberal politician and the government should intervene only when it is proven to be truly necessary and unavoidable. But what does this mean in the case of demographic change? Should ‘nature’ take its course or is demographic decline a problem that needs to be ad- dressed more thoroughly? And what can liberalism offer in all this? These demographic developments are one of the biggest challenges of this century and therefore ‘demographic change’ is analysed and debated extensively among liberals. I am very pleased that the Telders Foundation (the Netherlands), the Open Society and its Friends (Lithuania), and the Friedrich Naumann Founda- tion for Freedom (Germany) are engaged in the ELF project ‘The dynamics of demographic decline’. The project consists of a seminar and a book containing case studies of different regions within the European Union that, in one way or another, have to cope with demographic change. The aim of this project is to pro- vide a liberal vision for problems related to these changes. Liberals (and everyone else) are encouraged to use this fountain of research and knowledge to identify the challenges and opportunities demographic change offers to policy-makers all over Europe. Alexander Graf Lambsdorff President of ELF V General background I. Introduction An introduction to demographic decline Camilia Bruil and Patrick van Schie Detroit (Michigan, USA) was once called the ‘Motor City’ and viewed as a model city for the rest of the modern world. Major car manufacturers such as General Motors and Chrysler settled here and brought considerable prosperity with them. From the early twentieth century onwards, the number of inhabitants therefore increased from 250,000 to 1.8 million in 1950. However, the introduction of automation from the mid-1950s onwards meant that more and more employees were replaced by machines and the number of jobs at Chrysler – the largest em- ployer in the region at that time – fell from 130,000 to 50,000 within a few years. Unemployment in Detroit increased rapidly and people who had the opportunity to leave the city did so. Since then, the city’s population has halved and is now just shy of one million. Detroit changed from ‘Motor City’ into ‘Murder Capital’, the most dangerous city in the USA. Entire neighbourhoods were deserted and many skyscrapers stood empty: ‘Skyscraper Graveyard’ was another commonly used nickname for Detroit.1 Examples of demographic change can be found in cities as well as outlying regions. Consider, for example, the adventures of Lucky Luke, who travelled across the American Wild West as a lonesome cowboy and passed through many a ghost town, where banging saloon doors were often the only reminder of the life that inhabited the streets once upon a time. In the nineteenth century, this decline in population was caused primarily by ever-diminishing gold deposits in outlying regions. More and more initiatives – mainly from citizens and local companies – are being taken nowadays to make Detroit liveable again, thereby allowing the city to slowly recover and ensuring that Lucky Luke merely remains a cartoon charac- ter. However, the spectre of Detroit with its deserted train station, buildings and streets, and the abandoned towns in the nineteenth-century Wild West is still vivid among many people when they think about demographic decline. Prognoses from the United Nations2 (UN) reveal that the global population will continue to grow more slowly and will even shrink in due course; women are 1 T. Ronse, ‘Detroit is dood, leve Detroit’, De Groene Amsterdammer, 26 August 2009; ‘Michigan: Decline in Detroit’, Time, 27 October 1961. 2 The United Nations Statistics Division formulates demographic prognoses every two years on a national and global scale. 1 bruil and van schie having fewer and fewer children on average. A woman had five children on average around 1950, but that number has halved in the meantime. Europe will be the first continent required to deal with a dwindling population.3 This idea of a shrinking population often evokes fear. Images of Detroit, for example, are used as a possible doom scenario for the entire European Union, but developments in Eu- ropean counties also fuel these fears. In eastern Germany, for example, people are leaving peripheral areas and the region has many abandoned mines and rows of boarded-up houses. These areas are now being ‘occupied’ by packs of wolves from neighbouring Polish and Czech regions, who can live here untroubled thanks to the absence of natural enemies and abundance of food. Demographic decline is enabling these wolves to return to these areas after an enforced absence spanning over one hundred years.4 This development is typical of the new situation and the changing landscape on a regional level. However, no decline in population is expected on a European level during the decades ahead. The European5 population will continue growing as a whole, although the rate of growth will slow even further. Europe will have an ageing population and a low fertility rate – the average number of children per woman. According to ESPON,6 however, there will be significant differences on a national and regional level in developments relating to the demographic profile: some regions will experience a growth in population while others will experience a decline. But the change in population size is not only significant for the demographic profile; related processes such as the ageing population, a decline in the number of young people, and urbanisation must be included in the analysis. All of these specific developments will entail different consequences on a national and regional level. The whole of Europe will have to contend with an ageing population and a decrease in the potential working population – the number of people aged between 15 and 64. This will have implications for the tenability of the social security system – such as the pension system – and the labour market on a national level, but may also have far-reaching consequences for regional economies. Since the expected demographic trends within the European Union are so dynamic, this collection will focus on the decline (or growth) in population among five different European countries and one Euregion. With the help of case studies, we will endeavour to discuss the problems from as many sides as possible in order 3 G. Beets, ‘Demografische ontwikkelingen in de wereld en Europa’, in: N. van Nim- wegen and L.

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