Foreign Affairs Note

United States Department of State Washington, D.C.

SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES: April 1983 FOCUS ON FORGERIES

For many years forgeries have been a staple of Soviet “active Some forgeries are not designed for public dissemination measures.” In the post-World War II period, the Soviets and their but rather are intended to circulate privately. Their purpose is to allies, especially Czechoslovakia and East Germany, have repeatedly influence individual leaders and opinionmakers. The damage is distributed false documents to mislead target audiences. In testi- harder to assess. The purported author often gets no opportunity mony before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1961, U.S. officials to set the record straight. identified 31 documents as communist forgeries.1 A former Czech Some forgeries have general themes and are recirculated intelligence officer, Ladislav Bittman, who defected in 1968, has repeatedly. Two examples, still in use in 1983, are the so-called described how forged documents are prepared and disseminated.2 “holocaust” documents (Fig. 1) and the false “destabilization” In 1980, the House Select Committee on Intelligence publicized a U.S. Army Field Manual, FM 30-31 B (Fig. 2). The first, a number of forgeries which circulated in the 1970s.3 Congressional doctored U.S. military planning document shows supposed U.S. hearings in 1982 placed additional cases of political forgeries on the nuclear targets in Western Europe. First surfacing in the record.4 This study examines communist techniques for producing Norwegian magazine Orientering in 1967, it was denounced forgeries and a number of fabrications which have come to light in then but has resurfaced more than 20 times since in various 1982. countries. Most recently, it was the basis for questions in the City Council of Graz, Austria, in December 1982. Operational Control The subject of the fake Army manual is “destabilization techniques” in noncommunist countries. Its purpose is to Proposals for forgeries and other active measures may originate stimulate suspicion about U.S. intentions and activities. The first either in KGB headquarters or in the KGB residency in the target mention of it was in March 1975 in the Turkish newspaper country. Whatever the source, the local residency and Moscow Baris. Later that year an attempt to circulate it within the collaborate closely. Depending on its sensitivity and importance, Philippine Government led to its exposure. It has appeared a approval for a forgery may be obtained from the KGB leadership, number of times since, most recently in a January 1982 article in the International Department of the Central Committee of the the government-affiliated Maltese newspaper Il Torca. Communist Party, or the Secretariat of the Central Committee itself. KGB specialists prepare the forgery under the supervision of the Technical Aspects active measures section of the KGB’s First Chief Directorate. Although any KGB agent or asset may be used to surface the The Soviets have developed considerable technical proficiency document, the chief of the KGB residency’s active measures group in fabricating U.S. Government documents, but quality varies controls the operation. greatly depending on the time devoted to preparation and the Many forgeries aim at the media. Although the fabricators are nature of the intended audience. Even the best forgeries can be aware that once a document appears in print the supposed author unmasked by expert analysis. Indicators that a document may be will promptly deny its authenticity, the Soviets calculate that a forged relate to: denial will never entirely offset the damage from news stories based on the forgery. Surfacing. The forger confronts the problem of reaching the intended audience without revealing the origin of the 1 Communist Forgeries, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, document. Mailing the fabrication without a return address or Government Printing Office, 1961. with a spurious one is the most common method. 2 Ladislav Bittman, The Deception Game, Ballantine, 1972. 3 Soviet Covert Action: The Forgery Offensive, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Government Printing Office, 1980. 4 Soviet Active Measures, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Government Printing Office, 1982.

An informal research study for background information Cover Letters. Frequently, the document is transmitted with Content. Soviet forgeries tend to avoid specific allegations a covering letter which attempts to lend authenticity to the forgery. that can be disproved. (Oral disinformation is a more likely Typically, the cover letter summarizes the content of the forgery vehicle for falsehoods of this sort.) They highlight statements that and explains the author’s alleged motive for transmitting it in exacerbate U.S. relations with a target country and reinforce terms of outrage over the revelations contained in the fabrication. existing tensions or anti-U.S. sentiments. An example is the The letter is always untraceable and frequently unsigned-with the Aviation Personnel International letter implying U.S. collusion in writer excusing the lack of a signature by claiming fear for his life South African plots against black African countries (Fig. 6). In the or position. An example is the unsigned cover letter used in an false Department of Defense press release on the Falklands, attempt to surface FM 30-31 B as shown in Fig. 2. Secretary of Defense Weinberger allegedly refers to “Argentina’s Format. The Soviets go to considerable effort to collect stubborn and selfish attitude” in the conflict (Fig. 7). useful forms, letters, official signatures, and the like as models for their efforts. (Fig. 7 reproduces a forged Department of Defense Impact press release.) While the Soviets produce authentic-looking documents in many cases, there are almost always small discrep- The effectiveness of a political forgery often depends as much on ancies and mistakes. Government forms and procedures frequently the recipient’s mental predisposition as on the skills of the forger. change; for them to be duplicated with total accuracy, a detailed Without an inclination to accept as authentic documents which knowledge-difficult for an outsider to achieve-is required. reinforce existing beliefs and opinions, most forgeries would have Language. The texts of some forged U.S. documents little impact. The typical telltale patterns-anonymous surfacing, indicate that they are not prepared by native-born speakers of technical and linguistic aberrations, news value and timeliness, American English. Phraseology is stilted; British spellings may and contribution to Soviet policy and propaganda goals-would occur in purported American documents (British forms are widely suggest to impartial readers the need for careful investigation. taught in Soviet schools); and some expressions appear to be Behind the repeated acceptance of forgeries that already have been literally translated from the Russian. For example, the forged exposed, such as the holocaust papers or the fake field manual, lie military memo on NATO air defense exercises (Fig. 8) uses the the prejudices of the deceived. British spelling “manoeuvre” instead of the American “maneu- Many forgeries aimed at the media never achieve uncritical ver”; the Aviation Personnel International letter (Fig. 9) refers to publication or do so only in openly procommunist vehicles. But “competent bodies” in a direct translation of the Russian expres- the risk is low. A forgery can be denounced, but once published it sion kompetentnyye organy, a euphemism for security services but assumes a credibility of its own and can create the impression that not used in this sense in American English. While these linguistic “where there is smoke, there is fire.” An illustration of the flaws may not be evident to the target audience, especially in long-term, subliminal effect of calculated fabrications turned up in non-English speaking areas, they are important clues in establish- Finland’s largest circulation daily, Helsingin Sanomat, in Septem- ing lack of authenticity. ber 1982. A letter to the editor, signed by three doctors with no News Value. In many cases the forger tries to influence known communist connections, indicated an acceptance of the public opinion by achieving uncritical publication of the product. holocaust documents as authentic, despite their repeated exposure. To do this, the media must be convinced not only of the document’s authenticity but also of its news value. To heighten ANNEXES: Recent Forgeries interest, many forgeries bear an inflated security classification or purport to be the correspondence of high-ranking officials. Figure 1 : Holocaust Papers Timing. Political forgeries, whether targeted at public Figure 2: Destabilization Field Manual opinion or select decisionmaking groups, are often tied to current Figure 3: Greek Coup: Clark-Stearns Letter issues. The false Department of Commerce memorandum (Fig. 5) Figure 4: NATO Nuclear Deployments: Haig-Luns Letter dealing with trade issues, for example, circulated just before the Figure 5: Gas Pipeline Memo Versailles economic summit meeting of June 1982. The sudden Figure 6: South Africa: Aviation Personnel International appearance of a “private” or “confidential” document at a time of Letter political sensitivity can be a warning of possible fraud. Figure 7: The Falklands: Department of Defense Press Photo Copies. Forgeries are distributed in the form of photo Release copies. This facilitates “cutting and pasting” so that signatures and Figure 8: Mediterranean Air Safety: U.S. Military Memo on letterheads from authentic documents can be combined with a NATO Exercises fabricated text. The letter supposedly sent from Aviation Personnel Figure 9: F-5 Offer to South Africa: Northrop Sales Letter International to the South African Air Force (Fig. 6) was prepared Figure 10: Downstream Operations this way; the model was a circular business letter from the company offering its placement services to prospective customers.

FIGURE 3 Greek Coup: Clark-Stearns Letter

Description: The forgery purports to be a letter from William Clark, then Deputy Secretary of State, to the U.S. Ambassador to Greece, Monteagle Stearns, and an accompany- ing one-page intelligence study. Purpose: This forgery is intended to harm U.S. relations with the Greek Government of Andreas Papandreou. It is dated shortly before his election and alludes to a possible military coup in the event of a Papandreou victory. Surfacing: In January 1982, several months after the elections, unsuccessful attempts were made to have the letter published in Athens. A few weeks later, after copies were circulated at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Madrid, the Athens daily Vrathini published a story casting doubt on the letter’s authenticity and described it as probably the work of a “third-country intelligence service.” Copies of the forgery were mailed to Athens newspa- pers in plain envelopes without return address.

FIGURE 4 NATO Nuclear Deployments: Haig-Luns Letter

Description: This letter, dated just before Gen. Haig left his position as NATO commander in 1979, concerns nuclear policy. It discusses a possible nuclear first strike and calls for “action of a sensitive nature” to “jolt the faint hearted” in Europe. Technically, the quality is professional, but it includes mistakes-such as “Dear Joseph” instead of the “Dear Joe” used habitually by Gen. Haig. Purpose: The letter is intended to stimulate the nuclear disarmament campaign by suggesting a Haig-Luns collusion against opponents to the modernization of nuclear forces in Europe. Surfacing: The forgery was first published in the April 22, 1982, edition of the Belgium leftist weekly De Nieuwe. It was also reported on Belgian television and radio. In May the forgery was reprinted in the newspaper of the Communist Party of Luxembourg, despite its having been branded a forgery. Its appearance coincided with numerous antinuclear demonstrations in the spring of 1982. FIGURE 5 Gas Pipeline Memo

Description: This forgery purports to be a Department of Commerce memorandum dated February 18, 1982, which. records the recommendations of an alleged “Special Presidential Working Group on Strategic Economic Policy.” It discusses the effects of abrogating the gas pipeline arrangement between the U.S.S.R. and some West European countries. While the technical quality is high, it contains some lapses, including the misspelling of the name of the Secretary of Commerce in a memo supposedly signed by the Secretary and intended for the President’s attention. Purpose: The forgery distorts U.S. economic policy and is intended to add to frictions between the United States and its West European allies over the gas pipeline issue. Surfacing: The document was mailed in plain envelopes to newsmen and officials of the European Economic Community in late May 1982 just before the Versailles economic summit.

FIGURE 6 South Africa: Aviation Personnel International Letter

Description: This fabricated letter is addressed to Lt. Gen. Muller of the South African Air Force and uses the letterhead of a New Orleans-based company specializing in the placement of aviation personnel. It refers to the recruitment of combat-trained helicopter pilots with U.S. Government encouragement and implies U.S. complicity in the failed coup attempt of November 1981 in the Seychelles Islands. The language is somewhat stilted. Letterhead and signature come from an Aviation Personnel International form letter addressed to prospective jobseekers in which the forged text and address have been substituted. Aviation Personnel International has exposed the forgery in a sworn affidavit before the U.S. District Court of New Orleans. Purpose: The text lends spurious evidence to support a number of Soviet disinformation themes: covert U.S.-South African military arrangements; U.S.-sponsored efforts to overthrow black African governments; and U.S. responsibility for the Seychelles coup attempt of November 1981. Surfacing: The forged letter appeared in several African newspapers in June 1982. FIGURE 7 The Falklands: Department of Defense Press Release

Description: The purported press release attributes provocative comments to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger regarding the Falklands crisis. It contains a number of awkward phrases and misusages. For example there is a reference to “the stubborn policy of Argentina, Peru, Venezuela and Brazilia.” In Russian, “Brazilia” is the word for “Brazil”. The real Department of Defense press release No. 217-82 concerned contract awards by the Defense Communi- cations Agency. Purpose: The undiplomatic nature of these fabricated comments was intended to impair U.S. relations not only with Latin America but also with Great Britain-there is an implica- tion of a U.S. intrusion into British domestic politics. Specific themes parallel those of Soviet propaganda at the time: the press release states, for example, that U.S. support for Great Britain will lead to the establishment of a U.S. military base “from which we will assert our control of the whole of Latin American Continent.” Surfacing: This forgery was probably not intended for publication. Copies circulated in Washington, D.C. among diplomats accredited to the Organization of American States. It may have been reported to Latin American capitals through diplomatic channels.

FIGURE 8 Mediterranean Air Safety: Military Memo on NATO Exercises

Description: This forgery consists of a photo copy of the cover page of a classified military handbook and an unrelated one-page forged document on allied training exercises originating from “Headquarters, Support Opera- tions, Task Force Europe.’’ It implies that NATO exercises have been responsible for civil aviation accidents in Italy in 1980 and 1982. The forgery contains a number of errors. For example, the address is given as “APO 163, U.S. Forces”; all Army Post Offices are designated by a five-number series. Purpose: The Italian leftwing press has been speculating that crashes of civilian aircraft, attributed to pilot error, in fact may have been downed during NATO training exercises. The forgery was intended to supply “evidence” to bolster this disinformation effort. Surfacing: in July the forgery was mailed to several news agencies in Italy. The envelopes had no return address. On July 23, a number of Italian newspapers carried an ANSA news agency story identifying the document as fraudulent. FIGURE 9 F-5 Offer to South Africa: Northrop Sales Letter

Description: In the fall of 1982 the Northrop Corporation sent letters to prospective customers inviting them to observe flight tests of the company’s F-5F “Tiger Shark” aircraft. The forgery substituted a false addressee, the commander of the South African Air Force, an alteration easily done with repro- duction equipment. The addressee, Lt. Gen. A.M. Muller, is the same as on the Aviation Personnel International forgery. Purpose: The letter is intended to show that Northrop, presumably with the blessing of the U.S. Government, is violating the embargo on arms sales to South Africa. Surfacing: The letter was published as authentic in Jeune Afrique, a newsweekly published in Paris in its November 17, 1982 edition. In its January 19, 1983 edition, Jeune Afrique published photocopies of the forgery, along with a letter from Northrop denying its authenticity, but the story declined to pass on the question of validity. The forgery also appeared in the Times of Zambia on January 10, 1983. In both cases the photo copy of the envelope allegedly mailed from Northrop’s head- quarters in Hawthorne, California, showed a 20 cent stamp, not the correct international postage.

FIGURE 10 Downstream Operations

Description: This forgery is a fabricated Department of Defense document dated February 8, 1982, entitled “Related Missions’ Directives.” The letterhead bears an outsized Defense Department seal and the ZIP code (20402) of the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office. It contains many grammatical errors, misspellings, and other telltale indications of its spurious nature. Purpose: It is intended as “evidence” of U.S.-Israeli collaboration in planning the invasion of Lebanon. This assertion coincides with Soviet propaganda charges. Surfacing: It was apparently not intended for publication but circulated in a number of Arab countries and among Arab communities in Europe in the fall of 1982. Bureau of Public Affairs Postage and Fees Paid United States Department of State Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520 STA-501

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