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Soviet Active Measures Focus on Forgeries Apr 1983.P65 Foreign Affairs Note United States Department of State Washington, D.C. SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES: April 1983 FOCUS ON FORGERIES For many years forgeries have been a staple of Soviet active Some forgeries are not designed for public dissemination measures. In the post-World War II period, the Soviets and their but rather are intended to circulate privately. Their purpose is to allies, especially Czechoslovakia and East Germany, have repeatedly influence individual leaders and opinionmakers. The damage is distributed false documents to mislead target audiences. In testi- harder to assess. The purported author often gets no opportunity mony before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1961, U.S. officials to set the record straight. identified 31 documents as communist forgeries.1 A former Czech Some forgeries have general themes and are recirculated intelligence officer, Ladislav Bittman, who defected in 1968, has repeatedly. Two examples, still in use in 1983, are the so-called described how forged documents are prepared and disseminated.2 holocaust documents (Fig. 1) and the false destabilization In 1980, the House Select Committee on Intelligence publicized a U.S. Army Field Manual, FM 30-31 B (Fig. 2). The first, a number of forgeries which circulated in the 1970s.3 Congressional doctored U.S. military planning document shows supposed U.S. hearings in 1982 placed additional cases of political forgeries on the nuclear targets in Western Europe. First surfacing in the record.4 This study examines communist techniques for producing Norwegian magazine Orientering in 1967, it was denounced forgeries and a number of fabrications which have come to light in then but has resurfaced more than 20 times since in various 1982. countries. Most recently, it was the basis for questions in the City Council of Graz, Austria, in December 1982. Operational Control The subject of the fake Army manual is destabilization techniques in noncommunist countries. Its purpose is to Proposals for forgeries and other active measures may originate stimulate suspicion about U.S. intentions and activities. The first either in KGB headquarters or in the KGB residency in the target mention of it was in March 1975 in the Turkish newspaper country. Whatever the source, the local residency and Moscow Baris. Later that year an attempt to circulate it within the collaborate closely. Depending on its sensitivity and importance, Philippine Government led to its exposure. It has appeared a approval for a forgery may be obtained from the KGB leadership, number of times since, most recently in a January 1982 article in the International Department of the Central Committee of the the government-affiliated Maltese newspaper Il Torca. Communist Party, or the Secretariat of the Central Committee itself. KGB specialists prepare the forgery under the supervision of the Technical Aspects active measures section of the KGBs First Chief Directorate. Although any KGB agent or asset may be used to surface the The Soviets have developed considerable technical proficiency document, the chief of the KGB residencys active measures group in fabricating U.S. Government documents, but quality varies controls the operation. greatly depending on the time devoted to preparation and the Many forgeries aim at the media. Although the fabricators are nature of the intended audience. Even the best forgeries can be aware that once a document appears in print the supposed author unmasked by expert analysis. Indicators that a document may be will promptly deny its authenticity, the Soviets calculate that a forged relate to: denial will never entirely offset the damage from news stories based on the forgery. Surfacing. The forger confronts the problem of reaching the intended audience without revealing the origin of the 1 Communist Forgeries, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, document. Mailing the fabrication without a return address or Government Printing Office, 1961. with a spurious one is the most common method. 2 Ladislav Bittman, The Deception Game, Ballantine, 1972. 3 Soviet Covert Action: The Forgery Offensive, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Government Printing Office, 1980. 4 Soviet Active Measures, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Government Printing Office, 1982. An informal research study for background information Cover Letters. Frequently, the document is transmitted with Content. Soviet forgeries tend to avoid specific allegations a covering letter which attempts to lend authenticity to the forgery. that can be disproved. (Oral disinformation is a more likely Typically, the cover letter summarizes the content of the forgery vehicle for falsehoods of this sort.) They highlight statements that and explains the authors alleged motive for transmitting it in exacerbate U.S. relations with a target country and reinforce terms of outrage over the revelations contained in the fabrication. existing tensions or anti-U.S. sentiments. An example is the The letter is always untraceable and frequently unsigned-with the Aviation Personnel International letter implying U.S. collusion in writer excusing the lack of a signature by claiming fear for his life South African plots against black African countries (Fig. 6). In the or position. An example is the unsigned cover letter used in an false Department of Defense press release on the Falklands, attempt to surface FM 30-31 B as shown in Fig. 2. Secretary of Defense Weinberger allegedly refers to Argentinas Format. The Soviets go to considerable effort to collect stubborn and selfish attitude in the conflict (Fig. 7). useful forms, letters, official signatures, and the like as models for their efforts. (Fig. 7 reproduces a forged Department of Defense Impact press release.) While the Soviets produce authentic-looking documents in many cases, there are almost always small discrep- The effectiveness of a political forgery often depends as much on ancies and mistakes. Government forms and procedures frequently the recipients mental predisposition as on the skills of the forger. change; for them to be duplicated with total accuracy, a detailed Without an inclination to accept as authentic documents which knowledge-difficult for an outsider to achieve-is required. reinforce existing beliefs and opinions, most forgeries would have Language. The texts of some forged U.S. documents little impact. The typical telltale patterns-anonymous surfacing, indicate that they are not prepared by native-born speakers of technical and linguistic aberrations, news value and timeliness, American English. Phraseology is stilted; British spellings may and contribution to Soviet policy and propaganda goals-would occur in purported American documents (British forms are widely suggest to impartial readers the need for careful investigation. taught in Soviet schools); and some expressions appear to be Behind the repeated acceptance of forgeries that already have been literally translated from the Russian. For example, the forged exposed, such as the holocaust papers or the fake field manual, lie military memo on NATO air defense exercises (Fig. 8) uses the the prejudices of the deceived. British spelling manoeuvre instead of the American maneu- Many forgeries aimed at the media never achieve uncritical ver; the Aviation Personnel International letter (Fig. 9) refers to publication or do so only in openly procommunist vehicles. But competent bodies in a direct translation of the Russian expres- the risk is low. A forgery can be denounced, but once published it sion kompetentnyye organy, a euphemism for security services but assumes a credibility of its own and can create the impression that not used in this sense in American English. While these linguistic where there is smoke, there is fire. An illustration of the flaws may not be evident to the target audience, especially in long-term, subliminal effect of calculated fabrications turned up in non-English speaking areas, they are important clues in establish- Finlands largest circulation daily, Helsingin Sanomat, in Septem- ing lack of authenticity. ber 1982. A letter to the editor, signed by three doctors with no News Value. In many cases the forger tries to influence known communist connections, indicated an acceptance of the public opinion by achieving uncritical publication of the product. holocaust documents as authentic, despite their repeated exposure. To do this, the media must be convinced not only of the documents authenticity but also of its news value. To heighten ANNEXES: Recent Forgeries interest, many forgeries bear an inflated security classification or purport to be the correspondence of high-ranking officials. Figure 1 : Holocaust Papers Timing. Political forgeries, whether targeted at public Figure 2: Destabilization Field Manual opinion or select decisionmaking groups, are often tied to current Figure 3: Greek Coup: Clark-Stearns Letter issues. The false Department of Commerce memorandum (Fig. 5) Figure 4: NATO Nuclear Deployments: Haig-Luns Letter dealing with trade issues, for example, circulated just before the Figure 5: Gas Pipeline Memo Versailles economic summit meeting of June 1982. The sudden Figure 6: South Africa: Aviation Personnel International appearance of a private or confidential document at a time of Letter political sensitivity can be a warning of possible fraud. Figure 7: The Falklands: Department of Defense Press Photo Copies. Forgeries are distributed in the form of photo Release copies. This facilitates cutting and pasting so that signatures and Figure
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