SOVIET-POLISH RELATIONS, 1919-1921 BY KIRSTEEN DAVINA CROLL MA(HONS), M.PHIL SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW DEPARTMENT OF CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES SEPTEMBER 2008 2 ABSTRACT The Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1921 was a direct consequence of the ideological objectives pursued by the belligerents. Ideology shaped the political agenda and the diametrically opposed war aims of both states, and was implemented through the foreign policy, diplomatic negotiation and military engagements pursued. This proved to be the principal obstacle to the establishment of cordial relations. As western democracy and Russian Marxism battled it out, war was inevitable. Externally, the Paris Peace Conference provided the necessary conditions for the resumption of traditional Russian-Polish hostilities, whilst the Allied States consistently demonstrated their absolute inability to directly influence either the development, or outcome, of the conflict. Redressing the balance of historiography, this thesis includes a greater examination of the conflict from the perspective of the Soviet regime. This firmly controlled the Russian decision-making process. By charting the war, it becomes clear that both states deliberately pursued a dual offensive: traditional diplomatic negotiation and military campaign as conditions dictated. However, in addition, Soviet Russia developed a unique and innovative, revolutionary, agit-prop , diplomatic medium. This enabled adept Soviet diplomats to win the majority of diplomatic battles during the conflict, although often negotiating from a militarily weak position. Nevertheless, the regime ultimately failed in its objective: to ignite socialist revolution in western Europe. The mistaken Soviet decision in July 1920 to cross the ethnographic border to forcefully sovietise Poland, in opposition to Marxist doctrine, irreversibly altered the complexion of the war and proved its pivotal turning point. This culminated politically with the short-lived establishment of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee in Białystok, and militarily, with the decisive defeat of the Red Army at the Battle of Warsaw. It is now certain that the Red Army offensive into Poland in July 1920 aimed not only at the sovietisation of Poland, but at spreading the socialist revolution to Western Europe and overthrowing the Versailles settlement. The European revolutionary upsurge had largely extinguished during the previous year and in August 1920, Communist ideology ultimately failed to inspire the vast majority of the Polish population. Thus, by utilising the Soviet military to secure its war aims, Lenin and the Politburo inadvertently signed the death-warrant of socialist revolution in Poland at the beginning of the twentieth century. 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS 3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 6 AUTHOR’S DECLARATION 7 NOTE ON ORTHOGRAPHY AND DATES 8 INTRODUCTION 1. Introduction 9 2. What was the Polish-Soviet War, 1919-1921? 14 2.1 Soviet/Russian Interpretation 15 2.2 Polish Interpretation 19 2.3 Conclusion 22 3. When did the Polish-Soviet War begin? 22 3.1 Polish Interpretation 22 3.2 Soviet Interpretation 27 4. Conclusion 29 CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND 30 1. Historical Conflict and the Great War, 1914-1918 31 2. Reestablishment of Polish Independence 37 3. The Paris Peace Conference 38 3.1 Decision-Making in Paris 39 3.2 Poland and the Paris Peace Conference 40 3.3 Russia and the Paris Peace Conference 52 3.4 The Treaty of Versailles and the Outcome of the Paris Peace Conference 64 4. The Path to War 66 CHAPTER 2: POLISH-SOVIET DIPLOMACY, 1919 1. Foreign Policy and Diplomacy: 4 1.1 Soviet Russia 68 1.2 Poland 79 2. Polish-Soviet Diplomacy, 1918 82 3. Polish-Soviet Diplomacy, 1919 3.1 January-March 83 3.2 Polish-Soviet Conflict, April-August 87 3.3 Mikaszewicze Negotiations, October-December 91 3.4 The Soviet Peace Proposal of 22 December 1919 97 4. Conclusion 100 CHAPTER 3: POLISH-SOVIET DIPLOMACY, JANUARY-JULY 1920 1. The Military Situation 101 2. Polish-Soviet Diplomacy: January-March 1920 102 3. The Borisov Negotiations 3.1 Why Borisov on 10 April 1920? 113 3.2 Polish-Soviet Negotiations: 28 March-25 April 1920 115 3.3 Responsibility for the Breakdown in Diplomatic Relations, April 1920 119 4. Kiev: April-May 1920 120 5. The Soviet Counter-Offensive: May-July 1920 126 6. Conclusion 132 CHAPTER 4: THE POLISH PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE 134 1. Establishment of the Polrevkom 135 2. Aims and Objectives of the Committee 140 3. Immediate Tasks 143 4. Propaganda and the Polrevkom 151 5. The Wider Picture: Revkomy 155 6. Polish Reaction to the Committee 157 7. Conclusion 166 CHAPTER 5: POLISH-SOVIET RELATIONS, JULY-AUGUST 1920 1. Baranowicze Negotiations 170 1.1 Diplomatic Negotiation, July-August 1920 171 1.2 Soviet Peace Terms and Reaction 178 5 1.3 Failure of the Talks 181 2. The Battle of Warsaw 2.1 The Battle 182 2.2 Who was Responsible for the Polish Victory? 186 2.3 Reasons for the Soviet Defeat and Reaction 189 3. International Revolution 3.1 Was International Revolution Possible? 195 3.2 The Failure of International Revolution 197 4. Conclusion 198 CHAPTER 6: THE TREATY OF RIGA 1. Introduction 200 2. The Minsk Negotiations 2.1 Soviet Peace Terms and Reaction 202 2.2 From Minsk to Riga 206 3. The Riga Negotiations 3.1 The Riga Conference Opens 207 3.2 The Preliminary Peace Treaty, 12 October 1920 210 3.3 Riga Negotiations, October 1920-March 1921 212 4. The Treaty of Riga 4.1 The Treaty of Riga, 18 March 1921 214 4.2 Reaction to the Peace Settlement 218 5. Conclusion 219 CONCLUSION 221 APPENDICES: A. BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 236 B. VARIANT PLACE-NAMES 246 ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY 247 BIBLIOGRAPHY 249 6 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS My sincere thanks are due to my supervisor Professor Richard Berry, for his patience and support in guiding me through this work over the past few years. His professionalism, insights and stimulating discussions have helped to make this research experience all the more enjoyable. I thank you. I would also like to show my appreciation to my department, to whom I have been affiliated for many years, for its continued support. Its strong research tradition, which continues to grow from strength to strength, has provided an excellent environment in which to work. I would also like to express my sincere thanks to the staff at the various archival repositories and libraries which I visited. Their knowledge, expertise and interest in the subject were of great help. Particular mention must be made of the exceptional help provided by Mr Andrzej Suchitz at the Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, London, to Pa ń Kowalski and his enthusiastic colleagues at the Piłsudski Institute, London, and to my colleagues at Glasgow University Library. Without the support and love of my wonderful family and friends, this work would never have been completed. To my mum and dad, for their constant love, unfailing belief in me and regular babysitting offers, I cannot say a big enough thank you. To my friends, for the endless cups of coffee, late night chats and continued support, a huge thank you. You know who you are! Most of all I would like to thank Neil for his love, unflinching support and proof-reading abilities, throughout the years. Thank you for everything. I could never have done it without you. Finally, to our wonderful daughter, Caitlin, this is for you. 7 I hereby certify that the work embodied in this thesis is the result of original research and has not been submitted for a higher degree to any other university or institution. 8 Note on Orthography Polish names are given in Polish (Julian Marchlewski, Feliks Dzier Ŝyński). Russian names have been transliterated from Cyrillic into English using the Library of Congress System. Where accepted English versions of both place and peoples’ names are well established, these are used (Warsaw, Brest-Litovsk, Trotsky). For places which have been allocated a variety of names in the period 1919-1921 (e.g. Lwów, Lvov, Lviv, Lemberg; Kraków, Cracow; Wilno, Vilna, Vilnius) 1, the name most widely used in 1919-1921 has been adopted, with the exception of quotations where they appear exactly as in the original. Note on Dates Until 31 January 1918, Russia followed the Julian calendar, which ran 13 days behind the Gregorian calendar, used in Western Europe. The Soviet Government adopted the Gregorian calendar on 31 January 1918. The following day was dated 14 February. Dates concerning domestic Russian events are given in the Julian calendar until 31 January 1918 and in the Gregorian after that date. Dates relating to international events, including the Great War, are given in the Gregorian calendar. 1 For further details see, Appendix B: Variant Place-names 9 Introduction 1. Introduction The Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1921 was a direct consequence of the Soviet and Polish leaders’ ideological objectives. Soviet Russia, guided by Marxist ideology, sought to export socialist revolution to the western world, whilst rival federalist and annexationist agendas fought to become the dominant philosophy in Poland. Both states attempted to implement these ideologies through the political, diplomatic and military policies adopted during the conflict. In examining the development of Polish-Soviet relations during these crucial years, this thesis pays particular attention to the respective diplomatic and foreign policies pursued as these directly reflected the ideological and political objectives of both states. In this way, it will address the principal obstacles to the establishment of cordial relations between the neighbouring states, from the outset of the conflict in February 1919 to its conclusion at the Treaty of Riga in March 1921. Previous accounts of the war have been written primarily, from the Polish perspective. To date, the most notable works in English on the Polish-Soviet War were written by Norman Davies, Piotr Wandycz and Adam Zamoyski.