Planning for States and Nation/States: A TransAtlantic Exploration

th th 15 - 16 October 2012 UCD Newman House, St Stephen’s Green, Dublin 2

Jean Peyrony, October 2012 Comments to The French case, by Anna Geppert

French “aménagement du territoire” is not limited to spatial planning Anna’s paper is well written and documented, and most of my comments will be related, not to the core of her paper, but rather to issues linked with policy contexts and concepts, borders between different policy fields, that are understood differently in diverse national traditions of European countries. This may be relevant to underline in this both intra European and transatlantic discussion. I have a preliminary difficulty about the concept of planning itself. My legitimacy to comment a paper about French planning is rooted into my professional practice: urban development in various contexts; regional planning for the Paris region; European territorial co-operation in diverse positions: Datar (French national administration), DG REGIO of the European Commission; and at present Mission opérationnelle transfrontalière, a public agency devoted to facilitation of cross border cooperation. In French, I assume that my professional field can be defined as “aménagement du territoire”, which is translated by Datar itself as “spatial planning”. Anna equates as well the 2 concepts on p.4 of her paper. So this makes sense…but I doubt “planning” is really the good translation. “Aménagement du territoire” is understood in as a multi level, and cross sectoral policy; to give a general picture of it, I propose to refer to a scheme, attached to this paper1. The issue of level is crucial; there is no doubt that urban planning is part of the picture, and that in France (as in most countries), even if the legal framework remains national, local authorities have the leading role in urban planning since 1982, as Anna clearly explains. But I wouldn’t deduce that “the French State no longer plays a leading role in spatial planning” (as Anna says from the start), at least if understood as “aménagement du territoire”. This for 2 reasons: “aménagement du territoire” is not only urban/local planning ; State, and in particular Datar, has still a role in it.

Datar‘s national action is not based on master plans Datar never produced a binding master plan; its role consists of horizontal and vertical coordination. It is an “administration de mission”. Endless fight with sectoral ministries, are certainly not always won, I wouldn’t say that “national policies have lost the spatial dimension” (p23) The move “back to sectoral policies” is not that clear. One of Datar’s first mission when it was created in 1963, was to organize the redistribution of activities from Paris to French regions, and this was not only a public process (with the tool of agreement,see p. ); it was also based on economic trends, on what Aydalot called peripheral exploitation; public policies accompanied the trend, rather than they created it. Pôles de compétitivité launched in 2003 are presented by Anna as “not as much as spatial planning as an industrial policy under a territorial disguise” (p22). Indeed Datar has always been as much a tool of regional policy as of “spatial planning”, but this is what “aménagement du territoire” has always been about. Planning (understood as drawing soft or hard plans) is a tool among other tools, not an end in itself.

1 For a complete reference, see J.Peyrony, O Denert, RuR; this scheme is influenced by ESDP, see p. of the EN edition

1 It is clear that the “planning” activities of Datar, in the – to my point of view - narrow meaning of production of master plans, cannot be considered as a success. Anna conveniently tells the story of the SNADT (p9); but SNADT was put on the tracks, and then abandoned, for contingent reasons that have nothing to see with substantial considerations. The Grand Débat in 1993/1994 was part of the campaign for 1995 elections where the Prime Minister E Balladur was at the end defeated by J Chirac (belonging to the same party); and the SNADT was finally the victim of the hazardous “dissolution” of national assembly in 1997 by Chirac, that lead to his “cohabitation” with the socialist government of L Jospin, where green Minister D Voynet (close to the present Minister Cecile Duflot) replaced SNADT by “Schémas de services collectifs”. This approach was more modest indeed, acknowledging that spatial planning was at first for local and regional authorities, but I wouldn’t say that they were pure “sectoral guidelines”. They were produced by Datar in interaction with sectoral ministries, after all the day-to-day work of Datar, which is, I recall, a service of the Prime Minister2. In fact, depending on periods, the stress has been put or not on “schémas” or on softer tools such as “prospective”; such documents may be no more than “paper-tigers”, but they are part of the picture, a tool to influence a decision process. I would say that at national level, planning in France is more “procedural” than “substantial”. Let us consider the story of train infrastructures in France, -that are generally considered as “structuring” for territorial patterns. Cities that have been left aside of initial railway development in the 19th century, such as Albi, have developed less, and this story may go on. One example is the way Pierre Mauroy obtained HST to stop in the centre of Lille, allowing to make Lille a central node of the emerging European HST network connecting London, Paris, and Amsterdam, which is for sure part of the revival of Lille and its region. In the French system, such decisions are the result of different factors: the commitment of a politician strongly devoted to its city and region, here Pierre Mauroy, Mayor of Lille; his role in national politics- he was, at the time, Prime minister3; and negotiations between diverse national administrations (sectoral ministers and agencies (in that case: ministry of transport, SNCF), ministry of finance…). There Datar has a significant role, based as well on substantial input (be it schemas or prospective) and procedures, such as “CIADT”, or, more day to day “RIM” (réunions interministérielles, that is to say: meetings between cabinets that prepare government decisions). More recently, projects such as HST infrastructure “Lyon Turin” owe their survival so far (even if the end of the story is not written) more to political bargaining, supported by the influence of Datar at national level, and politicians at local level, than by any binding master plan4.5 Anna’s paper is a clear and true picture of progresses and limits of French legislation in the field; but sometimes it may miss things going on outside planning laws and documents; perhaps because it focuses more on powerless “villes moyennes” than on bigger metropolises

2 even if it has a double “tutelle” from another ministry 3 and one of the fathers of decentralization and European aggiornamento towards the European construction, together with Jacques Delors ; later Mauroy was also one of the most influent promoters of cross border local integration, launching in 2008 the 1st EGTC in Europe to support the “Eurométropole Lille Kortrijk-Tournai”, and as president of MOT 4 this can be analysed, according to Boltanski and Thévenot as « compromis civique-industriel », and on going dialectic between politicians and engineers, this duet having been created, inter allii, by…Louis XIV and Vauban themselves, see Peyrony, ... 5 the same could be said about the European Commission, where the power is distributed between sectoral DGs and cross cutting DG REGIO with its Cohesion policy, even if, compared to France, substance is more developed by sectoral DGs. See the TEN-T core network processed by DG MOVE, which shouldn’t be considered as a pure « sectoral » plan, as it refers to –and indeed implements- « territorial cohesion », DG REGIO,’s legitimacy in the process being more linked to procedure (the decentralized approach advocated by F Barca).

2 such as Lille (see before), , Marseille, Lyon, Strasbourg, Nantes, Toulouse, where since 30 years many things have changed, impulsed by combinations of factors close to the example of Lille above: commitment of major national politicians developing a local career, and building new local consensus on urban renewal; big infrastructure decisions (local urban transport such as tramways; coming of HST lines etc…) Planning tools such as SCOT played certainly a big role, but among other resources such as: planning agencies like Agences d’urbanisme (part of the planning they produce being “soft”); new institutions such as “communautés urbaines” with their powerful technical staff; political influence of leaders sharing their time between Paris and their city etc…

France slowly moves towards more decentralization; but beneath the change there is some continuity I fully agree with Anna’ statement that to understand French spatial policies, one has to relate it to a vision where “the unity of territory appears an integral part of the nation-state”. The debate between Girondins and Jacobins is still going on at the moment, with Alain Rousset, socialist president of Region and of “Association of French Regions”, as the leader of Girondins, at present lobbying hard to convince President Hollande to give a leading role to regions in “aménagement du territoire. One of the issues is the status of SRADDT; contrary to what Anna says on p.12 and 18, there is no legal link between SRADDT and SCOT (neither compatibility, nor opposability to tiers). This is true only for the very specific case of SDRIF (Ile de France, Paris region); clearly Datar’s designers of Voynet law wanted SRADDT to build on SDRIF’s model, but the government decided otherwise. The present government may re-open this discussion, and devolve to the regions the responsibility of regional plans that would be “opposable to tiers”6, management of EU structural funds etc…. But, even if the French government has committed itself to an “Act 3 of decentralisation”, and to a reform of State territorial action, it is not at all obvious that the “girondins” view will fully prevail. As this discussion is active at the moment, it would not be cautious to conclude right now; but considering more ancient history (1982: cf p.6) I think it is necessary to nuance a little Anna’s vision. I see more continuity than her. As regards “Act 1 of decentralisation” in 1982, sociologists generally underline that the game between French préfets (representing State at the level of departments and regions) and local politicians have not changed as much as one may think at first glance; before 1982, Préfets’ main preoccupation was already not to frustrate local politicians, as they might complain to Paris, and préfets may be sacked ‘ad nutum” every Wednesday, during the “Conseil des Ministres”. When Anna says that “after devolution, “the préfet has its say but final decisions belong to local representatives- vice versa to the former situation”: it is right from the point of view of law, but slightly different in the real world. In ay case, as for devolution to regions and development of a local “aménagement du territoire”, Datar played a major role in it. With “contrats de projet Etat-région” since the 1980s, and the policy of “agglomerations” and “pays” (see p9) Datar has accompanied decentralisation. “Pays” are a good example: Datar launched this policy, questioning from a functional point of view, and also a logic of community led development, the relevance of administration patterns

6 But, as Anna explains p.6, SDAU 1965 was never legally approved, and new towns, an efficient public transport network, were nevertheless successfully developed, even if the risk is always there that integrated vision doesn’t prevail against sectoral logics; this has been true in the 1990s, when Eole and Meteor were developed as the result of a sterile competition between rival operators (SNCF and RATP); the same may happen with the Grand Paris and its “grand 8”, developed by the transport engineers , and not yet integrated in SDRIF.

3 dated from the beginning of 19th century. Pays have experimented softer planning and governance. But France is, and will most probably remain, a unitary state. This is not only about ideology (French discourse about diversity and unity), but also about economic, social and geographical reality (role of Paris region as the main pump of various flows: political decisions, interregional migrations, financial flows of the welfare state etc) ….Aménagement du territoire has always been a dialectic between equity and efficiency. The rhetoric of equality has always been there (see p 22). But as regards spatial policies, De Gaulle had 2 hands: Datar, to develop regions outside Paris, métropoles d’équilibre and so on; but also Delouvrier’s SDAURIF for Paris Region. Now, Cécile Duflot is Minister of “Egalité des territoires”, but also of “Grand Paris”. Of course you may say that the State had much more room of manoeuvre at De Gaulle’s time than it has now; but this is true for public action in general , due to the issue of public debt, ; and this is not primarily the issue of State vs local authorities. I wouldn’t conclude too negatively, with the idea that change is impossible. Perhaps one of the real challenges, beyond decentralisation, is to move from “négociation implicite” to “négociation explicite”, as Crozier and Friedberg7 explain in their theory of change within the administration. Evidence basis, explicitation of facts, diverse technical solutions, is certainly better for efficiency, responsabilization of citizens and political accountability. This requires technical objects such as “observatoires”, “prospective”, and plans…So planning is certainly still worth the discussion!

7 L’acteur et le système

4 Sectoral funding tools; Government / Technical tools for Spatial planning Sectoral planning territorial funding tools Governance government/governance (regional policy)

Internal Cooperation Internal Cooperation Internal Cooperation Internal Cooperation Internal Cooperation

JTS of EU networks Interact Sectoral Policies ESPON (ex TEN) Council of Europe European Interreg 4C ESDP Sectoral Cohesion Policy European Intergovernmental (no competence) coordination Cohesion Policy European Union administrations Urbact Territorial Agenda regulations Objective 3 OPs Objectives 1 and EU stakeholders 2 OPs (CPMR, AEBR, EuroMOT…) Transnational commissions ( Agencies Nordic Council, JTS of OPs Alpine Convention, national technical committees national laws and coordination of Laws; sectoral national budgets mutual funding National States …) coordination administrations (CRFG,…groupe plans laws and plans regulations agreements Cross border parlementaire franco Commissions belge) (France Italie, …)

regional coordination of Regions cross border sectoral regional cross border Regional Euro-regions, EGTC administrations regional plans plans; mutual coordination regional budgets Departements,,, agencies plans development fund and agencies information

Municipalities / cross border local coordination of Intermunicipalities intermunicipal administrations ; cross border plans ; mutual sectoral plans cross border Local urban plans coordination local budgets agglomerations, authorities, EGTC, development or agencies information and development fund metropoles… Eurodistricts,,, planning agencies participation

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