Fake News in British Politics

Name: Chris Ruiter Stud. No.: 10463054 Date: 19-07-2018 Research project: European Politics & Policy in Times of Crisis Supervisor: Rosa Sanchez Salgado Second Reader: Dimitris Bouris Institution: University of Amsterdam

Thesis is written for the degree of Master of Science (MSc) In political Science: Political Theory (Political Science)

Acknowledgements

Over the course of my academic career, there have been many people who helped me get to where I am today. First I would like to thank Rosa Sanchez Salgado for supervising this thesis and helping me get to the finish line. The second person I would like to thank Dimitris Bouris, for taking the time to be the second reader of this thesis. Furthermore, I would like to thank all the teachers who helped me gain the knowledge I have today. And last but not least, I would like to thank my friends and family who convinced me to continue working on this project and hopefully bring it to a good end.

Table of Content

Acknowledgements ...... 2 List of Abbreviations ...... 5 Part 1: Introduction ...... 6 1.2: Relevance ...... 7 1.3 Structure of thesis ...... 7 Part 2: Literature review ...... 8 2.1: Misinformation and deliberative democracy ...... 8 2.2: The fake news research agenda ...... 10 2.3 Misinformation, beliefs, politician’s incentives ...... 13 2.4 Fake news & Misinformation as discourse ...... 15 Part 3: theoretical framework & sub questions ...... 18 3.1 assumptions and conceptualizations used ...... 18 3.2 Research questions ...... 19 3.3 Methods...... 20 Part 4: Fake news over the years ...... 23 4.1 Fake News in the Media ...... 23 4.2 Quantitative use of fake news in the House of Commons ...... 26 4.3 Chapter conclusion...... 27 Part 5: Fake news discourses in the House of Commons ...... 28 5.1 Debates, codes and discourses ...... 28 5.2 Fake news as debate strategy ...... 30 5.3 Fake news and normative values ...... 32 5.4 Fake news as a narrative ...... 33 5.5Fake news & frames ...... 33 5.6 Chapter Conclusion ...... 36 Part 6: The case of the 350 million pounds a week for the NHS ...... 37 6.1 Case background ...... 37 6.2 Connection to Theory ...... 38 6.3 Strategic action in Britain ...... 39 6.4 Chapter conclusion ...... 39 Part 7: Conclusion ...... 40 Bibliography ...... 43 Appendix ...... 54

List of Tables...... 54 List of Figures ...... 55 Analyzed Debates ...... 57

List of Abbreviations

EU: European Union

HOC: House of Commons

MP: Member of Parliament

UK: United Kingdom

US: United States of America

Part 1: Introduction

For many, the year 2016 will enter the history books as the beginning of the ‘post-truth’ era of politics. (Drezner, 2016). First on June the 23rd, the people in the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union. In doing so, many opponents of the Brexit challenged the claims made during the campaign of the referendum for their factual content (ibid). In the same year, on November the 8th, the US voted Donald Trump into office. Trump, a controversial figure, has a track record of openly claiming that the former US president Obama wasn’t born in America and believing that the birth certificate Obama provided was False (New York Times, 2016). Apart from being a ‘birther’, Trump routinely criticizes news and media outlets, who are critical of him, for spreading misinformation by calling them ‘fake news’. Even going as far as to hand out ‘fake news awards’ with the winners being CNN, the New York Times, ABC news, Washington post, Newsweek and Time respectively (New York Times, 2018). A new phenomenon during the 2016 US presidential elections is that 60% of adults got their primary source of news from the internet and social media. However, the stories circulated through social media seemed to favor Donald Trump over the other candidate, Hillary Clinton (Allcot & Gentzkow, 2017: 211-212). Many believe that the Russian government interfered in the Brexit referendum and US presidential elections, by creating fake news articles and posting them through social media (Persily, 2017: 70-71). Increasingly, fake news is getting its meaning mixed up and is becoming part of a discourse with its meaning not only referring to news that is fake or misinformation, but also in the way Donald Trump uses fake news. For instance, Jeremy Corbyn, leader of the Labour party in Britain, used the words fake news to accuse the BBC of altering a photo of him, by making him wear a hat that would make him look more Russian. However, the hat wasn’t photoshopped on (BBC.co.uk, 2018). The convolution of the meaning of fake news and its spread, either by Russians or the press in general garners the attention for more research into fake news. In Britain, many of the prerequisites of what happened in America can be found here. Politicians like Corbyn use the words fake news in a discourse (BBC.co.uk, 2018). Russia is said to have interfered in the Brexit vote, making misinformation a highly salient issue for debate (the Times, 2018). Furthermore, Britain has a large tradition of tabloid journalism, in which newspapers use sensational headlines and reporting to gather a greater reader base (Esser, 1999: 294). These tabloids also have their own political preferences, which in turn shapes what news they

6 emphasize, and what news they play down (Schudson, 1989: 263). These events are bound to have an effect on the deliberation in British politics. Furthermore, groups within the UK will have their own preferences, uses and solutions for fake news. These translate into different discourses that renegotiate what the meaning of the problem is. Thereby constructing a discourse (Torfing, 1999: 86). As the meaning of fake news changes, the role of fake news in the deliberation changes as well. This gives rise to the research question of this thesis: “What is the role of fake news in British politics?”

1.2: Relevance Each piece of academia needs to be socially and scientifically relevant in order to justify the time and effort spend into getting knowledge. There are multiple ways in which this thesis gains social relevance. First, many justifications why fake news is a problem traces its roots to democratic theory. Properly informed people will ideally form their opinion to form policy that is in all of their interest, which people can accept (Lewandowsky et al., 2012: 107). Furthermore, a more rudimentary way of gauging interest is by searching fake news in the online newspaper databank LexisNexis. The newspaper the Guardian alone published 1611 newspaper articles containing the words ‘fake news’, 578 of those are indexed as relevant for Europe.

The scientific relevance for this thesis is that the literature for fake news covers many different elements, whilst the political uses and meaning given to fake news deserves more attention. Fake news has drawn attention from people who want to research how fake news spreads, is electronically spotted and countered (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017: 5; Lazer et al., 2018: 1094). Others are more interested in how information affects the forming opinions (Lewandowsky et al., 2012: 107). There is literature about why misinformation is politically salient (Hochschild & Levine: 2015: 6-10). In this thesis, an insight is given in the deliberation about fake news and the role it plays in British politics. With extra attention given to the political meaning of fake news.

1.3 Structure of thesis In order to answer the research question: “What is the role of fake news in British politics?”, the structure of the thesis is as follows. First, in part 2, the literature review, the relevant theories and interesting schools of thought about misinformation and fake news are examined. Then the

7 theoretic framework, sub-questions and methods are detailed in part 3. Following this, the start of the analyses is situated in part 4, where a timeline of the saliency of fake news is given. This is followed by part 5 where a qualitative analyses about fake news usage in the House of Commons is performed. Following this, a small case study is conducted about strategic action in British politics. The research question is answered in the conclusion which is situated in part 7.

Part 2: Literature review

Fake News is the talk of the town ever since the election of Donald Trump. Some even call it a buzzword with a lot of angles being researched or discussed (Edson et al, 2018: 137). In this literature review, the connection between concepts will showed in order to give an accurate picture about fake news and misinformation in British politics. The literature analyses will start off by analyzing why fake news is a studied and how it harms the deliberative ideal. In turn, the focus lies on the literature surrounding fake news. Following this, the literature of misinformation is reviewed. Afterwards postmodern views on misinformation and fake news are given.

2.1: Misinformation and deliberative democracy Studies about fake news and misinformation derive their social and scientific relevance form theories about the function of democracy. For instance, Lewandowsky et al. write: “It is a truism that a functioning democracy relies on an educated and well-informed populace” (Lewandowsky et al., 2012: 107). When looking deeper into this claim the causal mechanism is that information is needed by voters to form their opinion. Factual information then provides the basis of the deliberation that needs to happen for voters to judge what is fair (Kuklinski et al., 2000:791). Yet the democracy itself needs two conditions to make things work: the first is that the citizens of a democracy need to have access the factual information that in turn helps them to evaluate policy. Secondly, the citizens need to use the facts to, not only form their opinion, but also correct them when the right information is presented and absorbed by them. Information is in this view the currency for citizenship (ibid). This view is primarily from the perspective of voting because it focusses on how a constituent shapes his preferences, which in turn is important for deliberation.

Factual information is important for deliberation. But why is deliberation itself important? Variants of democracy always differs on two main subjects. Firstly, it differs who is included or excluded from decision making. Secondly it differs on what is needed for citizens to make a decision as a collective body (Cohen, 2007: 407). For deliberative democracy, power is used as a collective. The use of that power is justified by reasoning within the collective as equals (Cohen, 2007: 412). However people are bound to have different opinions and beliefs, this is called the fact of reasonable pluralism (Bell, 2007: 184). In a deliberative democracy, participants, viewing each other as equals, criticize and defend institutions based on arguments and considerations that the other can accept. Participants are willing to cooperate and the results of the deliberation are considered to have authority, with people willing to act in accordance with it (Cohen, 2007: 413). Simply put: the use of power is collective and accepted by those who are affected by it because of a process of deliberation. In order to justify policy then, participants need equal opportunity to participate. This means that people must have the right to vote, associate, express their opinion, be politically active and have an equal opportunity for effective influence (Cohen, 2007: 422). The deliberation can be on the level of the elites or populace, depending on the institutional arrangements (ibid).

Now that it is clear that deliberation serves as a justification mechanism, it is time to engage how the media operates within this ideal. Before this is sketched, it must be noted that deliberative democracy theories usually have a liberal background (see Rawls, 1997). The role of the media in the deliberative democracy ideal is drawn from the critical theory school. Specifically the work of Habermas. The role of the media within deliberative democracy is in the public sphere. The public sphere is where the public debate is held and acts as an intermediary between state and society (Habermas, 2006: 412-415). In this view, each branch of the government is a specialized deliberative arena. The output of these arenas are policies, verdicts, political programs and so on. The role of the public sphere is to feed published opinions from civil society or politicians to the center of the deliberating arrangements. Media and journalists here are important in the public sphere to shape and pick published opinions and spread them amongst the people and the political arena (Habermas, 2006:415-416).

Therefore, fake news and misinformation undermine the deliberative process in multiple ways. First when false information is used by a person to evaluate policies, the resulting evaluation can be against the interest of the person (Lewandowsky et al., 2012: 107). Furthermore, it is also not clear if people will correct their earlier preference if corrected by real information (Kuklinski et al., 2000:8 09) but more on that later in part 2.3. An even bigger problem is that

9 the deliberations, that are based on misinformation, can hamper the outcomes of the deliberation process. People have the right to access the deliberative arena (Habermas, 2006:415-416). Yet if they deliberate based on false information, the outcome can be changed.

2.2: The fake news research agenda Now that the normative roots of the studies about misinformation have been discussed, the attention focusses on fake news. More precisely, the empirical research agenda and the overlap of fake news with the studies about misinformation. In the literature about fake news, they differentiate between misinformation, mal-information and disinformation. There is misinformation, where the information is false but not deliberately intended to cause harm or deceive. Disinformation on the other hand is false information that is deliberately spread to cause harm or deceive. The last type here is mal-information. Mal-information is when the information is real, but the intend of the spreader is to harm the person, organization or country (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017: 20). However, it depends on the study and author if a distinction is made at all (see Skinner & Martin, 2000: 262). In this study, misinformation encompasses all false information or possibly untrue as the point of interest is the political meaning of fake news and misinformation, but more on that later on in part 2.3.

The concept of fake news on its own has an extensive literature. A quick look at the history of fake news shows that it was first used in the context of satire where shows as ‘The Daily Show’, feature comedians reporting real news yet satirizing the media and political landscape. In this context the concept of fake news referred to the question about whether or not the entertainment shows had the legitimacy and authenticity of news show where the focus was not on entertainment (Baym, 2005: 260-261). A similar, but slightly different way academics referred to fake news was as news parody where the news itself is fake, and the parody emulates news shows for the sole purpose of entertainment (Borden & Tew, 2007: 306). Examples would include ‘the Onion’ or the Dutch parody news website ‘de Speld’. Another way fake news was looked at is through commercial eyes as using journalists for promotional ends like product placement, commercials or sponsored content (Tandoc et al., 2018: 145). One of the oldest points in discussing fake news is the role of propaganda. Where the goal is to persuade or brainwash people for political reasons (Tandoc et al., 2018: 146-147). Modern uses of fake news focus on the fabrication of fake news. Here one actor spreads news that is purposefully misinforming or disinforming others. These news stories are usually spread through social media (Tandoc et al., 2018: 138-140). Bakir & McStay define fake news “Either wholly false

10 or containing deliberately misleading elements incorporated within its content or context” (Bakir & McStay, 2017: 154).

A recent influential typology of fake news is the typology by Wardle. Wardle distinguishes 7 types of fake news and are ranked from low intent to deceive to high intent to deceive. Each category and the meaning of it is shown in figure 1. Within this typology it is easy to see how categorizing types of misinformation, disinformation or even mal-information can be murky. For instance, the difference between false context and manipulated content is easy to spot if the source Is reputable, but if it is shared by someone else, the intent is not easy to prove. Those who spread fake news often use real societal debates, problems or events and repackage them for their own intent (Wardle, 2017).

Figure 1 (Source: Wardle, 2017)

Tandoc et al. (2018) propose a typology based with a more heavy focus on the facticity. Fake news is then distinguished based on intent to deceive but also the amount of facts that they use. Low intent to deceive and a high use of facts would point to satire. A parody would use little facts and have a low intent to deceive. Whilst on the other hand propaganda would use many information with a high intent to deceive and fabrication would use little facts with a high intent to deceive (Tandoc et al., 2018: 148).

Typology of fake news definitions Author’s intention to deceive Level of facticity High low High Native advertising News satire Propaganda Manipulation Low Fabrication News parody Table 1 (Source Tandoc et al., 2018:148)

These typologies all share a focus on the media and how the types of false information spread. When holding this focus, the fabrication of false/misleading information always involves the creator or ‘agent’ who is responsible for the creation and spread of the message. The message itself can differ in the level of facts and intent. When the message is spread, the interpreter is the receiving party. Within the production of the false/misleading information, three stages are involved. The production involves the creation; product and distribution (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017: 22-23).

Since intend is an important factor in the typologies, the reasons why they spread fake news is important. The reasons why actors spread fake news in this view is political, financial and psychological. Political reasons mentioned here are Russian, or other actors, who try to expand social divides within countries. Financial reasons are gaining as much clicks for stories for advertisement revenue. Psychological reasons are that the spreader of fake news is joking or believes in conspiracy theories (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017: 33-35).

However useful these conceptions are for assessing fake content in the media, the focus of these research types is somewhat limiting. The focus of the research agenda on fake news lies very much on the mediated part of misinformation with an emphasis intentional misleading and the internet. The politics of misinformation, in a broad sense, is extensive and predates the Brexit and election of Trump (see Gaines et al, 2007) Reasons why people base their beliefs on misinformation have been thoroughly examined (See Thorson et al, 2016). It has also been examined how people adapt their viewpoints, or fail to do so (Kuklinski et al., 2000). The misinformation, disinformation and mal-information distinction has two problems:

12 intentionality is hard to prove. Secondly, it engages in the realm of what is the truth, what is a lie, and what is contested.

2.3 Misinformation, beliefs, politician’s incentives As mentioned before, the study of misinformation has a long history (Lewandowsky et al., 2012: 107). Earlier, the current research agenda on fake news, has been sketched. However, before the broader literature about misinformation can be sketched, the concept of misinformation itself needs to be closer examined. Earlier, a distinction was made between misinformation, mal-information and disinformation (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017: 20) These distinctions trace their origin in security studies (Kates, 1998: 1873-1874). As mentioned before, various authors differ the use of the distinction. Some view misinformation as misleading information in general (Kuklinski et al., 2000: 792). Others use misinformation as all the overarching concept but also distinguish disinformation as the intentional form (Fetzer, 2004: 231). And lastly, the earlier mentioned groups, who use misinformation as unintentional forms and disinformation as intentional form of misleading information (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017: 20). In this thesis, misinformation is conceptualized as the overarching concept of misleading information. The distinction between misinformation and disinformation does not play a big role when people decide to adopt a belief (Berinsky, 2016). Furthermore, the choice is based on some postmodern assumptions in this thesis, which will be addressed in part 2.4 and part 3.1.

A large part of the literature about misinformation stems from political psychology. Within political psychology a large body of literature is researching why people hold the beliefs hold (Orive, 1988: 573). Likewise, a body of literature is dedicated to why people hold beliefs when those beliefs are based on misleading or false information (Mazzoni & Vannucci, 2007: 203). Naturally there is a lot of overlap between these studies as their aim is similar. First off it is important to note that information does affect what kinds of beliefs a person holds (Hochschild & Levine, 2015: 17). Yet there are also other factors for these kinds of beliefs that come into play when a person holds a belief. These factors not only shape the belief but also determine if the belief is stable, i.e. if it differs after certain stimuli. For instance, if a person holds a belief based on misinformation, then stability of his belief refers to the willingness to change his belief (Rokeach, 1989: 776). Beliefs are formed and held in through group identity; their own identity (Kinder & Sanders, 1996); partisanship (Brader & Tucker, 2012); faith in a leader (Druckman et al, 2013); material interests (Marsh, 1999); their own perception (Kinder &

Kiewiet, 1981); emotions (Brader et al., 2011) and the list goes on. What is relevant for this thesis is how people stay firm in their belief. Once people already hold a belief or preference, it is very difficult to persuade them to revisit their beliefs (Kuklinski et al., 2000: 793). This effect persists even as people have access to accurate information, with the result that people hold on to their previous preferences (ibid). People tend to measure and balance their opinion on the opinions of those around them and those who agree with them (ibid). This includes partisan lines or leaders (Druckman et al, 2013). People also have a tendency to like having consistency in their preferences. A change in one’s belief can cause dissonance, with his other preferences or beliefs and those of others. People in general find dissonance to be unpleasant, causing them to reaffirm their held beliefs (Kuklinski et al., 2000: 793-794). Beliefs are also a source of where people render judgements, causing one to be overconfident their belief (ibid). In sum, the environment, drive for consistency and using prolonged beliefs as base for their judgments, makes people attached to their beliefs. Therefore, getting people to change their beliefs and preferences is not easy and bears significant costs (Hochschild & Levine,2015: 56).

People are not easily nudged to change their beliefs, even when it is based on misinformation. Politically, this is bound to have consequences. In practice, this can lead to distinct relations between politicians and the constituency of a democracy. Naturally people can be politically active, or inactive (Hochschild & Levine, 2015: 10). Yet the basis for their participation can be misinformation. With the former, and latter in mind, four groups can be distinguished in amongst the constituency (ibid). One group of people can be politically active, but that activity is also based on factual information. People can also be politically inactive, but have their opinion and beliefs based on factual information. On the other end of the scale, people can be politically inactive, but also base their beliefs on misinformation. The fourth group is a group of the population who are politically active, but the reasons why they are active is based on misleading or false information (Hochschild & Levine, 2015: 6-10).

Each of the groups need as an equal opportunity to participate and if the beliefs are on misinformed terms, the relevant facts need to be presented to them. Yet the costs of getting them to participate and to inform them differ (Hochschild & Levine, 2015: 89) Here, power asymmetries are in play. For starters, from the point of view of a politician, mobilizing politically inactive people to participate in deliberation resource intensive (Hochschild & Levine, 2015: 87). If one looks at the politically inactive, but informed people and politically active but misinformed people, another power symmetry is at play. As it is resource intensive to mobilize people for your cause if they are not politically active (Hochschild & Levine, 2015:

103-106). Politically active misinformed people are easy to motivate because they are already politically active. It is easy to encourage people to retain their political beliefs (Hochschild & Levine, 2015: 87; Kuklinski et al., 2000: 793). Actors who target misinformed people then have an easier job into mobilizing them than actors who aim to mobilize the inactive informed (Hochschild & Levine, 2015: 103-106). Seeing these asymmetries, politicians whose goals are more in line with the active misinformed group, have incentives and an easier time keeping them in the misinformed groups. Going against the grain could cause dissonance (Kuklinski et al., 2000: 793). An example would be the birth certificate of the former US president Obama. Politicians who gained from the perception that Obama was born in Kenya, had an easier time using mobilizing the opinions of the misinformed groups than Obama had when he aimed to disprove the critics about his birth certificate (Hochschild & Levine, 2015: 94).

To take away from the psychological/empirical studies on misinformation is that getting people to change their beliefs, even when based on misinformation, is a costly affair (Hochschild & Levine, 2015: 87; Kuklinski et al., 2000: 793). People also act on the misinformation, which means that politicians have key incentives to keep people misinformed (Hochschild & Levine, 2015: 103-106). Keeping them misinformed can be easier than it is for the opposing prove their side of the story, and changing the minds of the active misinformed people, to stop holding their misinformed beliefs (ibid).

2.4 Fake news & Misinformation as discourse Alternative ways of viewing fake news and misinformation comes from postmodern thinking, namely the critical theory school and post-Marxism. These views tie in through the deliberation ideal sketched in section 2.1 and further engage in the meaning of misinformation and fake news. Different schools would have different opinions on how, and even if, misinformation affects the deliberation process. First, a look at how the truth is agreed upon. In a Foucauldian view, the truth is a fluid concept. What is accepted as the truth is based upon regimes of truth. These regimes of truth are statements of what is considered true and acceptable, constituted through power relationships. However, this relation works both ways as the truth can also change power relations (Stahl, 2006: 86; Foucault, 1980: 131).

A closer, more useful view on the truth is the Habermasian view. Here each person has their own view on the world, their lifeworld (Habermas, 1987: 114-116; Stahl, 2006: 89). A lifeworld is one’s attitudes, practices and general environment. The lifeworld is upheld socialization and communication with one’s peers in the collective realm (Habermas, 1987:

114-116). For Habermas, the truth is more like a realization of consensus (Stahl, 2006: 89). A statement is true if it is accepted by the community of discourse (Stahl, 2006: 87). The discourse goes through speech acts (Habermas, 1984: 275). Speech acts are usages of speech that accomplish more than just the pronunciation of the speech itself (Ambroise, 2010: 2). For Habermas, every utterance has their validity claims. These are truth, normative rightness and sincerity (Edgar, 2005: 147-148). If these conditions are not met, there will be no room for communication, or the deliberation of information between the conversing parties (Stahl, 2006: 89). This ties into misinformation through the truth claims. Actors will seek out what they can accept as the truth because the one uttering the misinformation will be subject to validity claims (Stahl, 2006: 87). This is the theory of communicative action. Yet if disinformation is at play, then one party treats the other as object. This situation is called strategic action (Edgar, 2005: 155-156). Political power, hierarchy, antagonism and half-truths are all undermining the communicative action and reinforcing strategic action (Edelman, 2001: 96-98). When deliberation is consistently undermined, Habermas speaks of systematically distorted communication (Edgar, 2005: 157).

In post-Marxist literature, contestation of the meaning is put at the center. Fake news and misinformation here also have other meanings (Farkas & Schou: 2017: 5). What those meanings are exactly, is in itself the goal of this struggle. Fake news here is a floating signifier (Farkas & Schou: 2017: 5). A floating signifier is when a concept is used by opposing political (hegemonic) projects to build identity, meaning, antagonism or conflict (Laclau, 2014: 15-16; Farkas & Schou: 2017: 5). An attempt to challenge dominant terms of discourse and order what grievance is included/excluded is called an hegemonic project (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001: xviii). This is opposed to an empty signifier, in which signifies the antagonism in a singular chain of equivalence (Laclau, 2014: 15-16; Farkas & Schou: 2017: 9). In this view, what is considered to be necessary or objective is the result of hegemony, brought forth by a hegemonic project. Floating signifiers then signify a organic crisis, a period in which the hegemony is challenged by competing hegemonic projects for dominance (Laclau, 1990: 28-29). Farkas & Schou argue that fake news is becoming a floating signifier. The organic crisis it signifies is between the political realm and media (Farkas & Schou, 2017: 21). They highlight that fake news is used in three different ways. The first is to critique digital capitalism. Fake news the discourse there focusses on clickbait and low production value, whilst yielding high profits (Farkas & Shou, 2017: 11). The second is to critique right-wing media. Here right-wing media and voters are deemed more susceptible and open to fake news (Farkas & Schou, 2017: 14) The third is to

16 critique mainstream media and liberal journalism. In this category, politicians, for example Trump, deem news that is unfavorable to them as fake news (Farkas & Schou, 2017: 16). The float in fake news comes from the attempt to hegemonize on the basis of normative grounds, the discursive struggle for what is right or wrong (Farkas & Schou, 2017: 18).

Another post-modern view is that language can be used to slightly change or muddle information, thereby manipulating the deliberation, or even misinforming the audience (Eeleman, 2001: 86-87). Rituals and ritualistic language can be used, not to attack the arguments in the deliberation, but to hinder any discussion from taking place in meaningful terms. Ritualistic language shifts the focus from the problem to the ideology or emotions (Eeleman, 2001: 86-87). Likewise, a focus on individuals or specific groups clan manipulate the content of the deliberation. Acts like delegitimizing the messenger fall under this category but also more nefarious acts. Words can be used to invoke inequalities between the corresponding parties. Pejorative terms, or claims that groups cause harm to society is used to undermine their access to deliberation and sway public opinion against marginalized groups (Edelman, 2001: 90-92). Politicians will try to use evocation to try and get people in a certain state of mind. An appeal by a politician can use different discourses to reach different groups. What is considered Identity, hostility and friendship differs per social group, different words will evocate different states of minds (Edelman, 2001: 99-101).

Part 3: theoretical framework & sub questions With the literature presented, the theoretical framework needs to be examined. Here the aim is to explain how the literature translates into sub-questions and methodology for answering the main question which is: What is the role of fake news in British politics? With special emphasis on the role of fake news and the consequences for political deliberation. First the conceptualizations and assumptions used in this thesis will be discussed. Afterwards the concepts and literature are used to form sub-questions which in turn will answer the main research question. Following this the methods which will be used are discussed.

3.1 assumptions and conceptualizations used The very first problems about studying misinformation and fake news from a more postmodern views is that to know what can be counted as misinformation, one needs to know what ‘the truth’ is. In a more Foucauldian view, knowing the truth would presuppose that an universal truth would exist, a claim this school of thought is usually critical about (Stahl, 2006: 91). Searching for the truth would also be rather impractical in for this thesis as misinformation and fake news often operate in a grey area (Wardle, 2017). Instead, the Habermasian view is used where the truth is not seen as a universal and tangible but instead an agreed upon by communication. The acceptance of the community as marking one thing as true, but each statement is subject to validity claims Edgar, 2005: 147-148, making the truth more fluid as the consensus changes.

Within this thesis, it has been mentioned many times before that misinformation, disinformation and mal-information is seen as synonymous. This view might seem closer to Foucault than to the Habermasian view. In the view of Habermas, disinformation and misinformation are very different things because the actor will be strategic, instead of communicative (Edgar, 2005: 155-156). However, since Habermas puts communication at the center, the way how people shape their view comes into play. There, people change their views if they are willing to accept the considerations of the other. Putting the argument on how people hold and form their beliefs. Thus, the distinction between misinformation, disinformation and mal-information becomes less relevant (Berinsky, 2016). Plus, to prove and research intent in practice will be rather muddy. Misinformation can be spread without the spreader knowing it is disinformation/misinformation (Flynn et al., 2016: 128). For this thesis, misinformation is therefore conceptualized as the overarching concept of misleading information.

All people should have equal opportunity to participate in a deliberative democracy (Cohen, 2007: 422). Yet those people need information to form their opinion and evaluate the output in a democracy. Misinformation and fake news play a role in the public sphere, where the policy output is connected to the people, and published opinion is connected to the political centre (Habermas, 2006:415-416). Therefore, in order to know what the role of misinformation and fake news in British politics is, one needs to look at the what the media bring to the discourse and how politicians react and frame fake news.

3.2 Research questions In the literature review, it has been established that fake news can mean multiple different things and can be used in different ways. In order to research the main question, various sub- questions are formed, each highlighting a different part of the aspects surrounding fake news. The main question of this thesis is: What is the role of fake news in British politics? In this thesis, it is not the aim to discover what news article is fake news, or which sentence uttered by a politician is considered misinformation. Instead how people shape the meaning of fake news and how it impacts deliberation are key for this thesis.

Earlier, in part 2.1, it is highlighted how a substantial part of the literature traced its problematization of fake news and misinformation as affecting the deliberative democracy. Within a deliberative democracy, the media connects published opinions to the deliberative arena. The deliberative arena in this thesis is the House of Commons (HOC), as the main deliberation within British politics takes place in the HOC. In part 2.2 the research agenda and the ever changing meaning of fake news was highlighted. We know that the meaning of fake news has changed over time and the usage of fake news has changed too. To know the role of fake news in British politics, it is interesting to highlight how often fake news is used and how the meaning with it. The first sub-question is:

1: “How often is fake news being used in the media and HOC and how did this usage evolve over time?”

In order to answer this question, newspapers and tabloids starting from 1-1-2012 until 1-5-2018 will be briefly examined on how much the word fake news appears each year. This will indicate the increase and decrease of the saliency of fake news each year. Furthermore, the amount of utterances of fake news within the HOC will be examined. The differences each year will then be explained by events, like for instance the US elections, taking place that year.

The second sub-question will connect to section 2.4 about fake news as a discourse. Actors may attach different problems and interpretations to the concept thereby forming its use and meaning. By highlighting different things about fake news, the perceived consequences on deliberation shifts as well. The second sub-question is:

2: “What are the discourses about fake news and how do politicians use them in the House of Commons?”

For this sub-question, 81 debates will be analyzed. The debates are chosen because the words ‘fake news’ has been uttered in the debate. Each speech where the words fake news has been uttered will be qualitatively examined. The speech that lead to the utterance and the answer to the speech will be analyzed as well. This gives an insight in about how discourses and frames are shaped within the HOC.

The last sub-question is connected to part 2.3 where the literature suggested that politicians may have incentives to keep groups misinformed, or to mobilize voters through information which they know may be inaccurate (Hochschild & Levine, 2015: 103-106). Furthermore, it connects to part 2.4 through the use of strategic action. Half-truths, antagonism and hierarchy can distort the deliberation in a Habermasian view (Edgar, 2005: 155-156). Therefore, the third and last sub-question is:

3: In what manner is the use of fake news strategic?

In order to answer this sub-question, a small case is used to highlight the causal mechanisms of strategic action. The case used is the claim the Brexit campaign group vote leave made about 350 million pounds a week being available for the NHS after a Brexit. The third sub-question is separate from the second sub-question because it focusses more on the truth contestation instead of creating a discourse.

3.3 Methods In this part, the methods used in this thesis will be outlined. The case of the entire thesis will be British politics, with news articles, the HOC and the NHS claim used to answer the main question. The limitation of this is that causal mechanisms and discourses found in this thesis may not be as applicable on other cases. The analyses consists of three part. First, the database LexisNexis will be used to answer the first sub-question of “How often is fake news being used in the media and HOC and how did the usage evolve over time?” LexisNexis is a database of news articles from various countries. For this research only British newspapers and tabloids

20 are used to show the saliency of fake news within British politics. The newspapers selected for analyses are: The Daily Mail & Mail on Sunday; The Daily Telegraph; The Financial Times; The guardian & The Guardian Weekly; The Mirror & The Sunday Mirror; The Observer ;The Sun & The Sunday Sun and the last newspaper is The Times. The results of the search will be based on the news sorting algorithms of LexisNexis and filtered for being relevant for the European continent, excluding Eastern Europe. The exclusion of Eastern Europe is to make sure the search queries are focused on British politics for as much as possible. The results may be biased in some way due to the algorithms of LexisNexis. However, the results are only used to construct a timeframe for the use saliency of fake news, indicating when it became more common. With no quantitative analyses being done and the results of the searches only being used as a timeframe and indicator, the bias in the results should not affect the results of the thesis in any major way. Furthermore a quick overview of the years and number of utterances of ‘fake news’ within the HOC will be given to cross-examine the saliency of the concept.

The second part of the analyses will set out to answer second sub-question, which was 2: “What are the discourses about fake news and how do politicians use them in the House of Commons?” The concept of discourse comes into play. The term has been used multiple times in this thesis. Discourse is often defined as: “an ensemble of ideas concepts and categories which are produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practitioners” (Hajer, 2006: 67). Central to this is the idea that speech acts, like encountered in part 2.4, and interpretations shape the meaning of objects through language (Edgar, 2005: 149-150). With discourses, the physical objects themselves will not be questioned if they really do exist, rather how they are interpreted and meaning is given to them (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016: 15). A more post-Marxist view on discourse is that it is “an differential ensemble of signifying sequences in which meaning is constantly renegotiated” (Torfing, 1999: 86). The overlap between the views is that meaning is being given to objects through ideas and concepts. Hajer’s view places discourses to be pronounced through an identifiable set of practitioners. Whilst the other definition emphasizes that the meaning given is negotiated with other groups too. What is important here is that discourses can exists outside of one’s group, and that they can coexist next to each other trying to gain dominance.

Meaning is given in discourses through frames. A general conceptualization of frames is that it is a formulation that orders, knowledge, events, experiences and new information about an issue (Gray, 2003: 13). Framing is defined as: “the process of discriminating between competing frames” (Kohler-Koch, 2000: 515). It has its origins in communication studies and

21 has since been used in multiple disciplines (Druckman, 2001: 227). Frames help to include, exclude, select and interpret phenomena, consciously or unconsciously to their belief system (Entman, 1993: 52). To highlight what the problem is, what could be done about it, what constitutes as a part of it and what to think of it can all be included in a frame. Therefore, they can be considered part of a broader discourse that seeks to gain dominance.

In order to research the discourses used in the HOC, transcripts from the debate are collected from the Hansard. The online search tool is used to search for each reference to fake news, which are 130 times divided over 80 debates. Each debate is analyzed in atlas.ti. Following the literature analyses in part 2.4, actors can have different uses for fake news, as well as having different views on what the meaning of fake news is. Therefore, the debates are analyzed using two different groups of codes. One group of codes analyses what the purpose of the utterance of fake news is, how it is used and why it is used in the form. The second group of highlight what the problems are according to that politician and who is responsible for it.

The third part will house a small case study within the case of Britain. Here an answer will be given to the third sub-question: In what manner is the use of fake news strategic? The question is answered through a closer look at the NHS claim and how it is used in the Brexit campaign. The reason for separating the sub-question and using a case is because the case illustrates how politicians use information when the truth is contested, outside of parliamentary rules and procedures. The NHS Brexit claim is used as a case because the validity claims, made by those who made the claim, are being contested by other groups (bbc.co.uk, 2018). Thereby being an example of using information which may be untrue for their own end.

Part 4: Fake news over the years Now that the methods and sub-questions have been explained, it is time to move over to the analytical parts of the thesis. In this chapter, the first sub-question will be answered. This sub-question is: “How often is fake news being used in the media and HOC and how did the usage has evolve over time?” In order to answer that sub-question a timeline is made using the LexisNexis database in order to show the saliency and evolution of the concept in the media, which in turn gives insight into the role of fake news in British politics. The chapter will be structured as follows. First the saliency of fake news within in the media will be presented and a connection between the literature is made to show how the concept changed over the years. Following the literature connection, the timeline of fake news within the HOC is examined. There the peaks in the references of fake news in the HOC debates is compared to the timeline in the media. At the end of the chapter, the sub-question will be answered in a preliminary conclusion.

4.1 Fake News in the Media In order to show exactly how fake news has become the trending topic it is today, a timeline will be sketched indicating how often newspapers wrote about fake news each year. The newspapers used for this are a mix of tabloid and broadsheet newspapers which are the most read in the country. These newspapers are The Sun & the Sunday Sun; The Times; The mirror & the Sunday Mirror; The Guardian & the Guardian Weekly; the Financial Times; The Daily Telegraph; he Daily Mail & the Mail on Sunday and the Observer. The results are filtered based on the Geography of the content to be relevant for the Continent of Europe, in order to filter out the publications about America. Furthermore, the results about Eastern Europe are filtered out in order for the results to be as much about the British politics as possible. The starting point of 2010 is chosen in order to give a good impression of the evolution the attention to fake news has gotten over the years. The cut-off point of the first of May 2018 is chosen in order to get the most up to date data about fake news, whilst still making an analysis possible. Fake news is a subject newspapers still write about, but it’s not feasible to analyze data which is only a week old. When put into a table, the results are shown in Table 2.

Articles about fake news per year year Articles about fake news 2010 27 2011 32 2012 20 2013 36 2014 18 2015 48 2016 158 2017 1797 2018 (until May) 900 Table 2 Source: LexisNexis

The results show that in the period from 2010 until the 2015, not a lot of articles were written about fake news. Earlier, in part 2.2, it was established that before the rise of the fake news as a societal issue, fake news often described satire, parody or accounts of propaganda (Baym, 2005: 260-261; Borden & Tew, 2007: 306). When one looks more closely into the results for each, the articles generally follow the same pattern. For instance in 2012, most of the results are articles like in the Observer using the words ‘fake news’ to talk about the Daily Show being rebroadcasted on British television or about other satirical shows like Have I Got News for You (Lynsky, 2012).Yet the first signs of the shift to modern uses were there as hackers hacked the website of The Sun in 2011 and planted false stories claiming that Rupert Murdoch was found dead (The Guardian, 2011). Furthermore, newspapers report about hoaxes and misleading information like for instance about a Scottish student who posed as a Syrian activist in Damascus (Christie-Miller, 2011). One interesting side not is that the 2014 Scottish referendum doesn’t show up in the articles about fake news in 2014, yet later on in 2017 allegations fake news in the referendum are made (the Guardian, 2017c). However starting around 2015, fake news became more reported upon. When put into a timeline the results are presented in figure 2.

Articles about fake news 2000 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 (until May)

Articles about fake news

Figure 2 Source: LexisNexis

There are a couple of events starting in 2015 up which lead up to the main bulk of press reports on fake news. In 2015, in October 2015, reporting about, American politics, Hilary Clinton reported that Russian hackers tried to access her email (the Guardian, 2015). Events in America would normally not be included in this thesis, however, multiple newspapers report on it. Indicating that it is significant to the formation of the debate within Britain about fake news.

2016 was home to two important events where the context of fake news changed from being about satire and parody to being about hacking and misinformation. These events are the referendum about the Brexit and the election of Donald Trump. Fake news, became increasingly about misinformation as more newspapers reported on the spread of fake news articles through algorithms, favoring one political party over the other and influencing the elections (The Guardian, 2016). Newspapers categorized 2016 as the year of the Post-Truth politics where elections were influenced by bots and where the truth became less important for politicians (The Daily Telegraph, 2016; Financial Times, 2016). Furthermore, the use of fake news as a way to dismiss or contest claims is also used, not only by Trump. In relation to the Brexit, claims of either side are dismissed as being false, in conjunction with dismissing it as fake news (Daily Mail, 2016).

The real bulk of the articles from LexisNexis are written in 2017. Between the first of January 2017 and 31st of December, 1797 articles were written about fake news. The difference between

2015 and before is that the link between fake news and parody/satire is gone. Opinions start to differ on what the problem about fake news is. In line with the theory in section 2.4, fake news started to become more than just about bots. Farkas & Schou argued that fake news was used as a critique on capitalism, critique on right wing movements and as a way to discredit opposing journalism (Farkas & Schou, 2017) Deliberation can also be hampered by discrediting the opponent (Edelman, 2001: 90-92). These positions are traceable in the media as newspapers argue that social media companies have an unfair advantage over traditional media (the Sun, 2017). Fake news is also positioned as a tool used by far rights movements (the Guardian, 2017). Yet the last category, fake news being used as a mode of discrediting opposing views is particularly interesting. Many newspaper articles using fake news in order to reject claims are related to the Brexit or the process of the Brexit, with newspapers from both sides rejecting claims (Maguire, 2017; Daily Mail, 2017). However, fake news is also a major topic in UK- Russian relations. Connected to the debates around the Brexit, Russian involvement in the Brexit referendum is taken seriously by newspapers and politicians alike (the Guardian, 2017b; Rifkind, 2017). Opening up the possibility of fake news being a matter of national security, opening up securitization frames.

At the time of writing this thesis, 2018 is still ongoing. However, in the period between the first of January and the first of May, 900 articles about fake news have been written. In 2018, three subject of fake news are mainly reported upon. First is the English-Russian relations. With the poisoning of Sergei Skripal, a former Russian spy in service of the UK, was poisoned in the UK (The Times, 2018). The relation between fake news and the poisoning is that misinformation and fake news is often mentioned in tandem with the poisoning to indicate the poor relations (The Times, 2018; the Guardian, 2018). The other group of topics mentioned is the criticism on social media companies. In march 2018 a British-American company, Cambridge Analytica, used the data of millions of Facebook users to influence the American election . The press raised questions about the degree in which Facebook facilitated the use of data. Prompting criticism from media and a ongoing government inquiry (The Times, 2018b).

4.2 Quantitative use of fake news in the House of Commons

With the global timeline of fake news in the British media outlined, attention must be given to the qualitative use of fake news in the HOC. In this part, the timeline of the use of fake news in the HOC is sketched. The in-depth qualitative analyses is given in part 5. The data and graph of the HOC is from the Hansard, which is the collection of transcripts of debates and parliamentary votes in Britain. Each utterance of the words fake news is indexed by the search tool of the Hansard website. Any mistakes or

26 edits in the Hansard might not be too impacting on the thesis since the quantitative data is used to make a rudimentary timeline, and not for in-depth analysis.

As mentioned before, there are 130 references to fake news divided over 80 debates within the HOC. The earliest reference is from 2016. Figure 3 comes from the Hansard website and shows the references to fake news per day. The most times a reference to fake news has been made is 7 times on the 30st of March 2017. The table starts on the first of January 2015 and ends on the first of May.

Figure 3 Source: hansard.parliament.uk

The scale in figure 3 goes from 0 to 10, with each stripe being a day. No references to fake news have been made in the HOC prior to 2016, which is in accordance with the expectation from the rudimentary timeline from section 4.1. The Brexit was in June 2016, the graph shows that little fake news was barely mentioned during that time. Only to be mentioned more after the election of Donald Trump in November, sometimes before the first of January 2017. As mentioned before, an in-depth analyses of the debates themselves is given in part 5. However figure 3 shows that, once fake news was on the social agenda during 2017, the HOC continued to reference to fake news throughout the year. Yet the amount of references during the day never exceeded 7. The peaks are, with around March the 30th 2017, the 21st of December 2017 and the 26th of March 2018. The latest peak at March the 26th 2018 coincides with the Cambridge Analytica scandal and the poisoning of Skripal.

4.3 Chapter conclusion. This chapter set out to sketch the quantitative context of fake news in Britain. In doing so, answering the sub-question “How often is fake news being used in the media and HOC and how did this usage evolve over time? In table 2 and figure 2 and 3 it becomes clear that the main saliency of fake news in its current form stems from halfway through 2016 after the Brexit and election of Donald Trump. The evolution of fake news is that up until around 2015, fake news was mostly referring to satire and parody. The gradual change of fake news stared around 2015 when the first articles about Russian hacking started to surface in 2015. After the Brexit referendum and election of Trump, the role of social media

27 became more scrutinized, but the other uses, such as discrediting other the views of other people and critique on right wing politicians are visible too. One important factor is the securitization element of fake news, but more on that in part 5.

Part 5: Fake news discourses in the House of Commons Earlier in part 4, a time line has been established about fake news in the media and in the house of commons. It showed that the concept and saliency of fake news evolved in its current form after 2015 with the Brexit, US presidential elections and, within the British case, UK-Russian relations. In this chapter a qualitative analyses of the discourses about fake news will be conducted. The analyses is conducted in order to answer the sub-question: “What are the discourses about fake news and how do politicians use them in the House of Commons?” This sub-question in turn highlights the deliberation about fake news in the policy arena. Answering a part of the main question about the role of fake news in British politics. In the first part of this chapter, the sections data that hasn’t been described in part 3.3 and 4.2 will be accounted for. Here the codes and way of analyses will be expanded upon. Afterwards, the chapter continues by analyzing what the problems definitions of fake news are within the deliberation of the HOC. In turn, special attention will be given to fake news as a discussion strategy. Then the focus shifts slowly to the problem defining side of the discourses as it is shown how fake news is used to signal norms. This is followed by the use of fake news as a narrative for the times, or other problems. Following the use of fake news as a narrative, the analyses is continued by highlighting how discourses and frames on fake news differ. At the end of the chapter, the sub-question is answered in the chapter conclusion.

5.1 Debates, codes and discourses In this thesis, 130 references over 80 debates are qualitatively analyzed. The analyses includes the section before and after the reference to include the context in which the reference has been spoken. Furthermore, the reaction and provocation to reference fake news is also included in this way, which gives an insight in how a frame is constructed, shared or opposed. For this analyses, the codes have been grouped in two major groups, and various smaller groups. Following part 2.4, each speech act has a validity claim, which can be based on normative rightness, an appeal to the truth or sincerity. From these validity claims, the first group of codes is the purpose of utterance of fake news. Here various smaller codes like the claim for the truth, or narrative are part of the code group, which in turn gives an insight into the reason and

28 justification of the utterance of the words fake news. What each code means specifically will be explained by the sub section which they are relevant for. The second group of codes is the problem definition pared with the utterance of fake news. Farkas & Schou argued that fake news was used as a critique on capitalism, critique on right wing movements and as a way to discredit opposing media (Farkas & Schou, 2017). Furthermore, using language to discredit opposing views is also a way to hamper the deliberation (Edelman, 2001: 90-92). In section 4.1, the timeline has shown that Russian involvement in British politics can also be a part of the problem definition of fake news as the source of misinformation is often said to be from Russian bot accounts. Codes like, Securitization, Right-wing are part of the second group group, but also codes like social media critique and ‘signaling problem’ for specific issues. In table 3 below, the smaller codes, and the number of times they appear are show

Code Group Code Appearences Purpose of utterance Normative 33 Antagonism 11 Truth claim 15 Truth contestation 23 Narrative 17 Problem definition Right Wing 5 Social media critique 23 Media critique 6 Security 25 Further inquiry 4 Child protection 3 Signaling problem 16 Traditional Media 20 difficulties Total: 201 Table 3: Code book and appearance

In table 3, there are more codes appearances than references to fake news. The reason is that the reaction and provocation of uttering fake news is also included in the analyses. Furthermore, some codes overlapped, like for instance a member of the HOP criticizing social

29 media, whilst arguing that traditional media are struggling. Or members of the HOC problematizing fake news on social media, arguing that the exposure also affects children.

5.2 Fake news as debate strategy Following the literature. Within the deliberation, speech acts have meaning that are more than the mere literal meaning itself (Ambroise, 2010: 2). In this part, the first group of codes are analyzed. The first group of codes are the ones indicating the purpose why fake news has been said in the HOC three different types of uses stand out. These are antagonism, truth claim and truth contestation.

The first code to be analyzed is antagonism. Here, fake news is used as a way to attack the an opponent or the opposing political party, whilst not being about the literal meaning of fake news. “An example is: I am afraid that perpetrating fake news is in the DNA, and Labour does not like to have lost successive elections. I am sorry that she has had to tolerate that, but I am even more sorry that her constituents have had to.” (HOC debate, 2017-09). Within the HOC, it is forbidden for a member to call another person a liar (parliament.co.uk, 2018). Here, accusing someone of perpetrating fake news has essentially serves the same role as accusing someone to be a liar, thereby delegitimizing the other’s position, without being in direct breach of the rules. Another example is the answer of the Lord Chancellor David Gauke to coment during a topical questions session. When asked what he thought about a former SNP member working for Russia Today he said: “We sometimes hear enough fake news in this Chamber, but it is disappointing to see the former leader of the SNP employed by a purveyor of fake news, even if we welcome employment opportunities in the round” (HOC debate, 2017-11). Here, fake news is used as a debate technique instead of a problem definitions because although Russia Today is the one perpetrating fake news, the antagonism is directed towards the former SNP leader as he associates with Russia Today. The association with fake news, or the associate with a perpetrator of fake news, is used to discredit the other.

However, fake news can also be used not to discredit another but as a mechanism to claim what is true an what isn’t. Here fake news is used to argue that one is right, whilst the claims of the other groups are wrong. Yet the difference between antagonism and a claim to the truth is that the person itself isn’t being discredited, but rather the that it is used to highlight ones own argument. An example by conservative member Vicy Ford to the Prime Minister is: “Does my right hon. Friend agree that it is right that this country is governed by the true facts and not by fake news, and that this Government are committed to building a strong economy for all?”

(HOC debate, 2017-7). Here the intent of fake news isn’t to discredit the Prime Minister or other groups but to support the Prime Minister. The claim here is that the government of Theresa May is doing good things for the economy, opinions and claims to the contrary are considered fake news here. The response of the Prime Minister was: “Let me start by welcoming my hon. Friend to the Chamber. She is absolutely right: we owe it to our constituents—we owe it to the public—to ensure that when we debate these issues we debate them on the basis of the facts, and not on the basis of the sort of fake news that we hear all too often in the Chamber.” Here, her validity claim is based on that she is telling the truth, whilst other in the chamber are prone to being wrong, or tell misinformation. The other validity claim in this exchange is the normative rightness. Here, fake news also used to argue on the basis of norms, saying that telling the truth is something the HOC owes to the constituency and the public.

The third group of debate strategies in the HOC is the contestation of truth. Contestation of the truth is similar to the first two groups, yet slightly different as it is often used as a counter claim. It has the elements of discrediting opponents and claiming the truth, yet used more defensively, after being criticized. An example uttered by Tommy Sheppard of SNP: “That entire Girl Effect project was described in the Daily Mail as the British Government funding the equivalent of the Spice Girls. The implication was quite clear: millions of pounds of our taxpayers’ money was being used not to feed the poor, the starving or the illiterate, but to fund five young women and turn them into rich pop stars. That was not true. The reporting was a good example of what we might call fake news—I believe that that is the term used these days.” The MP is talking about a government foreign aid project about empowering Ethiopian children through music lessons at school. The MP uses fake news to dismiss the reading of events by the Daily Mail, and thus having elements of the antagonism code. The validity claim made by the MP rests on that he is telling the truth and that the Daily Mail has twisted the truth to fit their narrative. Hence elements of a truth claim can be found here. What merits the distinction from the other two debate strategies is that it the truth is claimed, or ‘corrected’ in response to the claims made by others. Another example by member Peter Bone: “ One of the great disappointments on both sides of the House is the fact that we have never had a woman leader of the Labour party, although the shadow Leader of the House made a clear bid for the position today. I will do anything I can to help her in that regard, but can she please resist spreading fake news? The suggestion that Mrs Thatcher would have been a remainer is absolutely outrageous. May we have a debate next week on fake news?” (HC Debate, 2017-3). Here there is a mild antagonism by implying that shadow Leader of the House was lying. However, the

31 claim came in response to something that he deemed untrue. By branding the claim fake news he not only claimed the truth, but contested the claim of the other party as well. Hence the truth contestation, instead of merely claiming it.

Fake news can therefore be considered to be used as a speech act in debates with the intent to discredit, claim or contest the truth. The literal meaning of fake news, which can be considered misleading or false news articles (Bakir & McStay, 2017: 154), is less important as members of parliament use the words not in the terms of problematizing certain issues in order to make policy, but instead use it as a way to change discussions, or highlight what they think is true and what they think is false.

5.3 Fake news and normative values Earlier it is shown that fake news is used as a mechanism to claim the truth, contest it, or as a way of discrediting the other. Related to this how fake news is used normatively as a way to construct normative consensus. Other than the truth claim, fake news can be used partially as a catalyst for other more serious problems, but also to highlight the ‘us’ in a debate. The focus is more on the common points. The difference between the truth claiming category is that the normative uses shift more towards the defining a problem and relying on (or building) consensus based on normative claims. The difference between the normative values and the problem definition later on is that the normativity and consensus are more important. Thus the category partially overlaps between the groups. One example is a reference to fake news made by Tulip Siddiq in the HOC. She said: The situation is so disgraceful because this is not fake news; it is real human suffering. I will be going to the Rohingya camps in December, but I do not need to go there to know what is happening on the ground. We need to speak up for the most vulnerable people in the world right now (HC debate 2017-10). Here, fake news is not the problem. The truth is also contested as she goes against the reading of another government that the events surrounding the Rohingya are fake news. Here bipartisan consensus is built in the HOC that normative arguments that the suffering of the Rohingya is wrong. Another example from Andrea Leadsom who was asked if see agreed that fake news was a big problem. She said: “The hon. Lady is absolutely right to raise this very concerning issue. The Government recognizes the need to protect the reliability and objectivity of information—it is an essential component of our democracy” (HC debate 2017-11). Here, the reference of fake news isn’t to ‘other’ people within the HOC but instead focus on common grounds.

5.4 Fake news as a narrative The last more common discursive use of fake news is using fake news as a narrative. Here fake news is used within the HOC to describe and capture the times we live in, whilst also highlighting other problems that do not fit in the narrative of the times of fake news. Other references use fake news to mock others, but not contest or claim any truth whilst doing so. Fake news is used to construct a narrative highlighting what the people referencing fake news find important. For example, Emma Hardy whilst arguing about drugs education said: “We should not be making our schools into learning factories that churn out compliant, unquestioning units for work. We want our children to be creative, to question, to inquire, to explore and to think independently, especially in this era of fake news. … if we only ever teach our children to obey adults unquestioningly, how can they ever understand when they should not? (HC debate 2017-7b). Again, the literal meaning of fake news isn’t the main problem she addresses. She constructs a narrative about an era in which people need to beware of what is true and false, what is right and what is wrong. She then positions here argument for more creativity in schools inside the narrative by linking it to fake news. Fake news is still seen as a problem, but takes the shape of a story. Another example is by Rupa Huq. He says: “Holocaust Memorial Day has renewed significance this year. We live in a time of post-truth politics and fake news.” (HC debate 2017-1b). the narrative is that in the times where news can be fake and the truth doesn’t matter to politics, extra saliency should go out to holocaust memorial. Capturing the saliency of fake news for topics other than a strict sense of fake news. However the narratives can also be used in combination with other discursive uses of fake news to make a point. An example is by Mims Davis who uses a narrative to critique the BBC, antagonize if you will, whilst also using a normative angle. She said : “In this era of fake news, concern has been raised that the BBC is in some way becoming about commentating—not explaining the process, but giving opinions—and when I worked at the BBC that was simply a no-no” (HC debate, 2017-11b). Here she situates the BBC in a narrative of fake news. Then she criticizes the BBC for addressing opinions, instead of just reporting on what happened. She then uses a normative argument by saying the BBC used to be neutral in some way.

5.5Fake news & frames In part 5.2 until part 5.4 the focus was primarily on discursive uses of fake news, gradually shifting to incorporate more problem definitions. These problem definitions are essentially frames and discourses as they each highlight what the problems are needs to be done about it (Torfing, 1999: 86). During the analysis, the different problems that fake news highlighted

33 were often diffuse with often different sources and solutions, and sometimes different problems entirely. The structure of this sub-part is as follows. The first group to be examined is the right wing criticisms. Afterwards social media critique group is analyzed. Then followed up by the criticisms on traditional media. In turn, the latter is followed up by an analyses of the securitization frame.

The first group of frames about fake news within the HOC focused on including right wing groups in the main problematization of fake news. It is interesting to note that referencing fake news in relation to right win groups is lower than one might expect. When an MP does problematize fake news in relation to right wing groups, it is never to problematize right wing groups on their own, but also with groups. Right wing groups then not seen as the main group who spreads fake news but rather one of the many, or the blame of spreading the right wing messages are laid on social media. For example: Labour member Graham Jones states: “Let me set the record straight. I come to this debate frustrated, because 2016 was the year of false truth, false fact and fake news. It was a terrible year for Britain and for the world, in which moderate people in a democracy lost arguments to extremists—Breitbart on one side and The Canary on the other, or the alt-right versus the hard left of the Labour party” (HC debate 2017- 1c). Jones characterizes fake news in a narrative of post truth and fake news, and by doing so criticizes extremists on both sides of the ideological spectrum. Right wing groups are problematized and associated with fake news, yet they are not the main problem in the eyes of Jones. Instead both extreme sides gain by fake news and the problem is that moderates lose out. The closest thing to fake news being in relation to a right wing group being problematized is by Mike Penning who reacts to the occasion where president Trump retweeted a tweet by the far right group Britain First. Penning states: “Is it not an irony that the President of the United States, who loves Twitter and talks about fake news, actually retweeted fake news? However, the real danger is that the vast majority of our constituents have never heard of Britain First, and this retweet has given it huge oxygen” (HC debate 2017-11c). In Penning’s view, the retweet of fake news isn’t the main concern, but rather the right wing group Britain First. Although a connection is made between fake news and right wing groups, it is not often, and when it is, the connection isn’t very strong.

A more common problematization is the rise of social media, and the perceived control on it lacking. This frame is often used in tandem with other causes of fake news. The spread of through social media is considered to be the main method of spreading. However, other causes that are framed into the problem definition differ. Social media is often used in tandem with

34 the securitization frame and being seen as a problem for traditional media. For instance Labour member Anna McMorrin wonders “We have seen various reports on the growth of fake news, and growing evidence of Russian involvement in the EU referendum and in our politics. Is it not time that we regulated the social media platforms?” (HC debate 2017-11d). Here she packages concerns about fake news in social media with the other concern of Russian involvement in the Brexit referendum. Asking for more regulation as the a cure for fake news. Similar sentiments come from conservative member Margot James who stats “As I noted earlier, high-quality journalism is under threat from the rise of clickbait and fake news, from difficulties in generating revenue online to replace the revenue that used to flow from printed sources, and from the dramatic, continued rise of largely unregulated social media.” (HC debate 2018). Yet what differs form the problematization of Anna McMorrin is that James emphasizes the fake news as being a problem for traditional media. Thereby changing the nature of the problem to a security problem to a normative one about the role of traditional media.

Yet the problems fake news give is also used as a way to criticize the traditional media, instead of defending it. Here fake news are seen as part of a larger problem affecting the media as a whole, not just social media. One instance is the earlier referenced citation of Mims Davis in part 5.4. There fake news is used as a cautionary tale, but any perceived wrongdoings of the BBC was a problem as well (HC debate, 2017-11b). However, this group is relatively small compared to the group that frames the media as being helpful against fake news.

One of the main frames about fake news is the security frame. In this frame, fake news isn’t just seen as a problem including or excluding one particular group. Instead within the securitization frame, fake news becomes a matter of national security and a danger to democracy, induced by a foreign actor. Part of the critiques about fake news in social media overlap with the framing about fake news as national security problem. For instance, Jeremy Corbyn states: “ Let me turn from the Salisbury attack to the wider security issues raised by these actions. It is striking how far we have come in the past two years, not just in understanding the threat of cyber-warfare but in experiencing its reality. In the last two years, we have seen those dangers proven. We have seen Russia, among others, using social media to disseminate fake news in this country and disrupt the democratic process” (HOC debate, 2018-3b). The quote shows that fake news no longer becomes a problem on its own, or merely from social media. Instead it is repackaged into a larger group of problems relating to the British-Russian relations and becoming a matter of national security. Fake news becomes a

35 tool of a foreign power to disrupt the normative values like the democracy and becomes part of cyber warfare. The shift of fake news into becoming part of a national threat from a foreign aggressor also changes the solutions that are being proposed. An example is from conservative member Julian Knight. He says: “ Russia is not the only country involved. As I understand it, about 25 to 28 countries are developing this type of global capability. If we all—even what we consider to be friendly nations—turn on one another and adopt these sorts of tactics, all could be lost. So we need to think about how we tackle this. The Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee is currently investigating fake news, but perhaps a bigger issue is the use of algorithms, which allow access to target those who will internalize fake news” (HOC debate (2017-12). Instead of arguing for regulation or playing blame on social media companies, Knight places fake news in a capability, a weapon possessed by other nations that forms a danger to Britain. The proposed solution is then to invest in algorithms and defense.

5.6 Chapter Conclusion This chapter set out to answer the sub-question of “What are the discourses about fake news and how do politicians use them in the House of Commons?” In order to answer that question, 80 debates have been qualitatively analyzed. The literature suggested that fake news can be used as a critique on social media, critique on right wing groups and critique on the media (Farkas & Schou, 2017). Furthermore, delegitimizing the opposing parties and politicians is said to be a tactic to hamper deliberation (Edelman, 2001: 90-92). In the qualitative analyses, two code groups emerged. The group of codes were mainly or partially discursive. Fake news was used in the HOC as a truth claiming mechanism, truth contesting mechanism or antagonistically in order to delegitimize others. Furthermore, fake news could be used as a narrative and normatively to establish common grounds. The framing of fake news overlapped in two main strains. One was that fake news was primarily a problem on social media, with repercussions for other things, like the press or democracy. The other was the securitization frame. Here fake news was part of a war with foreign powers, which used fake news as a weapon. Interestingly enough, within the HOC, fake news is less about criticizing right wing groups.

Part 6: The case of the 350 million pounds a week for the NHS In part 5 the uses and discourses for fake news were examined. Yet one piece of the puzzle in answering the main research question remains. Habermas called the use of falsehoods, disinformation and antagonism within the deliberative sphere strategic action (Edgar, 2005: 155-156). When strategic action is at play, actors are said to no longer be in deliberation about policy, but instead are trying to gain power. Furthermore, in the literature it is suggested that politicians have an electoral interest in keeping people misinformed (Hochschild & Levine, 2015: 103-106). Another lead to a possible gap in the argument is in part 4, the timeline shows that around 2016, the year of the Brexit, the year was characterized as the post-truth following the Brexit and election of Donald Trump in the US (The Daily Telegraph, 2016; Financial Times, 2016). Therefore, in order to bridge any gaps in the argument and literature about fake news, section 6 will have a small case. This case will answer the sub-question: ‘In what manner is the use of fake news strategic?’ The case selected for this sub-question is the claim made by the Vote Leave campaign that leaving the EU would net the UK 350 million pounds a week to spend on the NHS.

6.1 Case background As mentioned before, the population of the UK voted to leave the EU on the 23rd of June 2016 (Drezner, 2016). During the campaign of the Brexit vote, multiple groups were campaigning in favor or against leaving the EU (idem). One of the groups that campaigned in favor of leaving the EU was Vote Leave (Vote leave, 2018). Vote leave was chaired by Gisela Stuart, a Labour MP. However, the membership of vote leave was bipartisan as Michael Grove was Co- Convener within vote leave and active from early on. Members from vote leave came hailed form UKIP, Labour and the Conservative Party (Financial Times, 2015). On the 21st of February 2016 former London mayor Boris Johnson decided to join the Vote Leave campaign and thus campaign in favor of the Brexit (The Guardian, 2016b). Over time, Boris Johnson become one of the figureheads of the campaign along with Michael Grove and Gisela Stuart (The Telegraph, 2016b). The main focus however lies on the claim they printed on their ‘battle bus’ which said “We send the EU £350m a week. Let’s fund the NHS instead” (Metro.co.uk, 2017). The claim was first conceived by Gisela Stuart during the early stages of the campaign (Vote Leave, 2016). It was one of their main claims for endorsing the Brexit, but was contested by other parties from the start, including members from their own group (The Guardian, 2016b). During the campaign, the UK statistics authority issued a statement that the figure was a gross figure and did not include the rebate the UK received form the EU and that the claim

37 was potentially misleading (UK Statistics Authority, 2016). Furthermore, Brexit proponents and people from their own group openly questioned the facticity of the claim. Tory MP Sarah Wollaston quit vote leave over the claim saying that it was untrue (The Independent, 2016). Pro remain groups and newspapers heavily criticized the claim too and wrote multiple fact- check stories about them (The Guardian, 2016b; BBC, 2016b). A significant part of the British constituency believed the claim to be true. A survey dating form 16th of June 2016, which is before the Brexit referendum, shows that 78% of the respondents have heard the NHS claim. From those respondents, 47% believed it, whilst 39% did not (Ipsos Mori, 2016). When the Brexit referendum was over and the votes were cast, more people involved in the campaign began to turn away from the 350 million pound claim. A day after the vote was cast, on the 24th of June 2016, UKIP leader Nigel Farage came out stated that the claim was a mistake (The Telegraph, 2016c). The campaign director later referred to the Brexit as a debacle (The Independent, 2017). On the other hand, Michael Grove, Boris Johnson and Gisela Stuart have always supported the claim multiple times (BBC, 2018b; Daily Mail, 2017). The NHS claim is considered by opponents to be fake news (Daily Mirror, 201) and a step up to the post-truth era (Rose, 2017: 1).

6.2 Connection to Theory Earlier in part 2.3, the literature specified that politicians have key incentives to keep people misinformed in order to nudge them to become politically active in their favor (Hochschild & Levine, 2015: 89). The constituency could roughly be divided into four different groups. One group was the politically active, and their bases for the political activity is real information that has shaped their beliefs. Another group of people are the people who are politically inactive, but are well informed. These people have developed their belief based on real information, yet refrain from becoming politically active. The other two general groups formed their opinion based on misinformation. Some become politically active, others do not (Hochschild & Levine, 2015: 6-10). The key to these four groups is that there is a disparity in the effort required from politicians to get them politically active and vote (Hochschild & Levine, 2015: 89). Getting people who are already politically active to vote is easy because they already have an interest in politics (Hochschild & Levine, 2015: 103-106). Getting people who are politically inactive to vote is resource intensive (Hochschild & Levine, 2015: 87). Furthermore, getting the politically active people, who are misinformed the politically active and informed group is also difficult because people like to retain their political beliefs (Kuklinski et al., 2000: 793). It is easier for politicians who leaning on misinformed people to mobilize the misinformed, than it

38 is for the other group to get them to switch their source of information (Hochschild & Levine, 2015: 103-106). Politicians therefore have an advantage if they knowingly keep active misinformed people to belief their lies, which constitutes as strategic action (Edgar, 2005: 155- 156).

6.3 Strategic action in Britain The figure of the £350m a week for the NHS could is considered by opponents to be akin to the use of misinformation and fake news. Yet the pro remain groups could not stop the claim from being believed prior to the referendum (Ipsos Mori, 2016). In this case, parallels between the disparities between voter groups, and the Brexit can be drawn. Vote Leave made the claim early in the campaign, whilst multiple actors in the referendum contested the claim from the start, even the statistics authority (UK Statistics Authority, 2016; The Guardian, 2016b). It is not possible to explain the entire Brexit referendum by looking at the £350m claim. However, the theory is able to provide multiple insights. First, the dissonance caused by changing positions can be an explanation of why politicians did not back off from the claim in droves. Only one MP, Sarah Wollaston, switched sides over the claim. Nigel Farage only switched sides when the results when the votes were cast. Thus, suggesting that even though he did not believe the NHS claim, he only dropped the claim when the results were in, thus appearing to be using strategic action in the Habermasian sense. The other insight is that a question is raised of why so many pro-remain sources did not dissuade voter to believe the claim as 49% believed the claim ahead of the referendum (Ipsos Mori, 2016). Pro Brexit groups won the referendum, suggesting that the campaign that was successful mobilized its constituency. However, those who voted on the Brexit to aid the NHS, are misinformed. These results are in line with the expectations of Hochschild & Levine as dissuasion of the opposing voters by the fact-checking articles were not successful in changing the opinions, of at least the leaders of Vote Leave, and possibly the constituency.

6.4 Chapter conclusion This chapter set out to answer the sub-question “In what manner is the use of fake news strategic?” For this question, the case of the £350m a week for the NHS claim was selected. There are multiple reasons why this case is chosen. The first one is that the literature suggested that strategic action would be part of fake news and the subsequent misinformation it provides. Furthermore, the timeline in part 4 highlighted that the election of Donald Trump and the Brexit Referendum kickstarted the debates about fake news, leading some to usher in the era of post-

39 truth (Rose, 2017: 1). The failure of the pro remain groups to disprove the claim, despite it being contested from the start is one hint for the claim to be part of strategic action. Secondly, Farage switching sides shortly after the elections was also a sign of strategic action. It was therefore hinted that strategic action was at play in the Brexit case, which in turn plays a part in answering the main research question about the role of fake news in British Politics.

Part 7: Conclusion With the sub-questions answered, the concluding remarks can now be made, including the answer to the main research question. For this thesis, the research question is “What is the role of fake news in British politics?” The question was both scientifically and socially relevant. The social relevance for this thesis comes from the implications fake news has for the deliberation within a democracy. Furthermore, fake news is a topic that interests the media greatly as part 4 also shows that there has been a substantial body of newspaper articles relating to fake news. The scientific relevance for this it focusses on the political meaning given to fake news, instead. Therefore, it offers an insight in the role of fake news within the deliberation of British politics.

In the literature analyses, an oversight is made of the research agenda’s surrounding fake news and the subsequent misinformation. Fake news traces its scientific saliency to the theories about deliberative democracy. Over the years fake news has changed from being primarily about satire, to the form it has today. Furthermore, the literature suggest that there are inherent incentives for politicians to use misinformation for their own goal. Yet what was most interesting is that fake news also has uses beyond the literal meaning as discourses showed up where fake news is used to either criticize social media, right wing parties or traditional news outlets. Fake news could also be used discursively in order to delegitimize opponents. Which would indicate that politicians were engaged in strategic action, instead of communicative actions.

Three sub-questions were asked, in accordance with the literature to each highlight a different part of the literature about fake news. The first sub-question was “How often is fake news being used in the media and HOC and how did this usage evolve over time?” The answer is that first saliency started in 2015 but real increase in newspaper articles come from halfway through 2016, which coincides with the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump. With the increase in articles about fake news, the concept of fake news changed from being about parody

40 and satire, to being about bots, social media and misleading news articles. The role of social media in the electoral processes became more scrutinized. Other uses of fake news, like discrediting people and criticizing right wing politicians became more noticeable in the years 2017-2018. The securitization element of fake news. Another factor is the British-Russian relations. Russian involvement in the elections and the poisoning of Skripal changed the bilateral relations for the worst, increasing the role of securitization of fake news.

For the second sub-question, the attention shifted from the media, to the center of the UK’s deliberative arena. The timeline showed the saliency in the media about fake news only stemmed from halfway 2016 and hinted that outside events, like Russian involvement and relations mattered to the deliberation about fake news. The second sub-question was “What are the discourses about fake news and how do politicians use them in the House of Commons?” In order to answer it 80 debates of the HOC were qualitatively analyzed. Based on the literature, the expectations were to find fake news being used as a critique on right wing parties, social media and traditional media. As well as being used to discredit the other. Two groups emerged in the analyses. One being mainly discursive, the other signaling a problem. In the speech acts of the HOC, fake news was used to claim the truth, contest the truth and antagonize the other. Fake news could also be used as normative consensus building or in a narrative to highlight other problems. Two frames about fake news were most important in the HOC. The first one was the critique on social media, and the other was securitization. These frames could be co- opted into other problematizations, yet prescribed their own solution to the problem. Fake news in the security frame was a matter of national security. Prescribing countermeasures to be not mere regulation, but investing protection against cyberwar as well. Fake news as a social media problem was mainly focused on its repercussions for norms, like democracy. Interestingly enough, within the HOC, fake news is less about criticizing right wing groups.

The third sub-question was asked in order to fill any gaps left in the analyses of the role of fake news in British politics. The sub-question was “In what manner is the use of fake news strategic?” in order to answer this question, a small case study was preformed about the £350m a week for the NHS and in what manner the use of information in that case was strategic. The literature and earlier answer of the first sub question suggested that the Brexit vote was one of the reasons for the saliency of fake news. There were several signs of the strategic action in the case, yet the literature could only give suggestions for explanations.

The answer to the main question of “What is the role of fake news in British politics? is that the meaning about fake news is very diffuse, but still relatively young, with shifts in usage only happening since 2016 onwards. Within the deliberation that takes place in the HOC, fake news is seen as a security problem, as well as a normative one that damages democracy. Yet fake news is also a method of arguing in order to claim the truth, contest it of antagonize the other. Outside of the HOC, in the Brexit referendum, hints of strategic action are present, but this could not be definitively stated. Fake news is thus a subject, a tool and very diffuse.

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Newspaper Websites

Website The Daily Telegraph (2016) accessed on 19-07-2018 from: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/12/28/alt-right-zero-coal-lexicon-2016/

(2016b) accessed on 19-07-2018 from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/21/eu-debate-boris-johnson-vs-sadiq-khan-in- final-bbc-showdown-with/

(2016c) accessed on 19-07-2018 from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/24/nigel-farage-350-million-pledge-to-fund-the- nhs-was-a-mistake/

Website The Daily Mail (2016) accessed on 19-07-2018 from: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-4069558/2016-horrible-year-No-s-bonkers- glorious-regret-hideous-leopard-print-says-SARAH-VINE-aka-Mrs-Michael-Gove.html

(2017) accessed on 19-07-2018 from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4897226/Michael-Gove-backs-Boris-Johnson- 350m-NHS-storm.html

Website Daily Mirror (2018) accessed on 19-07-2018 from https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/7-times-tories-were-accused-119035243

Website The Financial times (2016) accessed on 19-07-2018 from: https://www.ft.com/content/47761ace-c394-11e6-9bca-2b93a6856354

(2015) accessed on 19-07-2018 from https://www.ft.com/content/57b74004-e91d-11e5-bb79-2303682345c8

(2016b) accessed on accessed on 19-07-2018 from https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/feb/21/boris-johnson-eu-referendum-campaign- for-brexit-david-cameron

Website the Guardian (2011) accessed on 19-07-2018 from: https://www.theguardian.com/media/2011/jul/18/sun-website-hacked-lulzsec

(2015) accessed on 19-07-2018 from https://www.theguardian.com/us- news/2015/oct/01/hackers-tried-five-times-to-break-into-hillary-clintons-private-email

(2016) accessed on 19-07-2018 from: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/25/pedlars-fake-news-corroding- democracy-social-networks

(2016b) accessed on 19-07-2018 from https://www.theguardian.com/politics/reality-check/2016/may/23/does-the-eu-really-cost-the- uk-350m-a-week

(2017) accessed on 19-07-2018 from: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/16/libel-action-nigel-farage-fake- news-hope-not-hate

(2017b) accessed on 19-07-2018 from: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/dec/22/moscow-clash-exposes-tory-dilemma- over-russian-meddling-claims

(2017c) accessed on 19-07-2018 from: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/dec/13/russian-cyber-activists-tried-to-discredit- scottish-independence-vote-says-analyst

(2018) accessed on 19-07-2018 from: Russia spread fake news via Twitter bots after Salisbury poisoning – analysis

(2018b) accessed on 19-07-2018) from ttps://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jun/17/may-gamble-brexit-dividend-nhs-raises- remain-anger

Website New York Times (2016) Accessed on 22-06-2018 from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/us/politics/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-president.html

Website New York Times (2018) Accessed on 22-06-2018 from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/17/business/media/fake-news-awards.html

Website The Sun (2017) accessed on 19-07-2018 from: https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/5228502/the-sooner-were-unshackled-from-the-eus-all- engulfing-superstate-the-better/

Website the sun, 2018. Accessed on 18-06-2018 from https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/politics/6250429/appeal-to-restrict-press-was-defeated/

Website The Times (2018) accessed on 19-07-2018 from: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/rt-s-propaganda-deserves-mockery-but-not-a-ban- pnh85vr3b

(2018b) accessed on 19-07-2018 from : https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/turn-up-or-face-summons-mps-warn-facebook-chief- mark-zuckerberg-npxlz7dj2

Website Washington Post (2016) Accessed on 22-06-2018 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/06/16/why-the-post-truth- political-era-might-be-around-for-a-while/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.d2cbf2edac25

Appendix

List of Tables.

Articles about fake news per year year Articles about fake news 2010 27 2011 32 2012 20 2013 36 2014 18 2015 48 2016 158 2017 1797 2018 (until May) 900 Table 2 Source: LexisNexis

List of Figures

Figure 2 (Source: Wardle, 2017)

Articles about fake news 2000 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 (until May)

Articles about fake news

Figure 2 Source: LexisNexis

Figure 3 Source: hansard.parliament.uk

Analyzed Debates

Advisory Committee on Business Appointments/Ministerial Code 20-03-2017 Volume 623

21st Century Fox/Sky Merger 29-6-2017 Volume 626

Armed forces (flexible working) 30-10-2017Volume 630

Animal Welfare 12-12-2017 Volume 633

Baby Leave for Members of Parliament 1-02-2018 Volume 635

BBC Licence Fee 29-06-2017 Volume 626

BBC Transparency 07-09-2017 Volume 628

Blagging Levenson inquiry 07-03-2017 Volume 637

Broadband Universal Service Obligation 15-12-2016 Volume 618

Budget resolutions 28-11-2017 Volume 632

Business of the House 12-1-2017 Volume 619

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Business of the House 16-11-2017 Volume 631

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Catalonia 2-11-2017 Volume 630

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Commonwealth Development Corporation Bill 10-01-2017 Volume 619

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Data protection bill [lords] (Eight sitting) 16-04-2018 Volume 637

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European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 04-12-2017 Volume 632

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Levenson Inquiry 01-03-2018 Volume 636

Local and Regional News 30-03-2017 Volume 624

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President Trump State Visit 20-02-2017 Volume 621

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