United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary
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UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY “GETTING TO THE TRUTH THROUGH A NONPARTISAN COMMISSION OF INQUIRY” Wednesday, March 4, 2009 Written Testimony of Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr. Chief Counsel Supporting the establishment of a nonpartisan, independent Commission of Inquiry to examine our policies and practices in confronting terrorism and to recommend necessary reforms. Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law 161 Avenue of the Americas 12th floor - New York, NY 10013 www.brennancenter.org Testimony of Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr.1 in Support of a Nonpartisan, Independent Commission of Inquiry Throughout American history, in times of crisis, the executive branch has accumulated significant new powers, some of which have been abused. Crisis always makes it tempting to ignore the wise restraints that both keep us free and reduce the likelihood of self-defeating mistakes. This nation has, at times, admirably set about correcting its course – realizing, as the dust settles or as previously secret facts are revealed, that constitutional and legal norms have been breached. One such correction, in which I was involved, came in 1975-1976, when an investigation conducted by a Senate Select Committee – known as the “Church Committee” for its Chair, Senator Frank Church of Idaho – revealed intelligence agencies’ excesses in all administrations from Franklin D. Roosevelt’s through Richard M. Nixon’s. The Church Committee found that the intelligence agencies, including the FBI, the CIA, the NSA and other components of the Defense Department, had exceeded their authority through abusive surveillance and disruption of political activity at home (e.g., trying to provoke Martin Luther King, Jr. to commit suicide) and unwise covert action abroad (e.g., hiring the Mafia to try to assassinate Cuba’s Fidel Castro). While rank and file employees of these agencies directly committed abuses, the most serious 1 Mr. Schwarz is Chief Counsel at the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law School. He was Chief Counsel for the United States Senate’s Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, commonly known as the Church Committee. He is co-author (along with Aziz Huq) of Unchecked and Unbalanced: Presidential Power in a Time of Terror (The New Press, 2007). For many years a litigation partner in a leading New York City law firm, Mr. Schwarz’s other governmental service includes being the Corporation Counsel for New York City, and chairing the New York City Charter Revision Commission and the City’s Campaign Finance Board. Mr. Schwarz’s testimony reflects his own views as well as the views of the Brennan Center. breaches of duty were those of presidents and other senior executive branch officials who, the Committee determined, had the “responsibility for controlling intelligence activities and generally failed to assure compliance with the law.”2 The Church Committee’s investigation illustrated what had been going wrong with our intelligence agencies and led to the enactment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which brought the government’s intelligence practices back in line with our constitutional principles and ensured that intelligence resources were not wasted on inappropriate and counter-productive endeavors. Exposing the truth thus strengthened our democracy and our ability to keep the nation safe. It is time once again for such a searching assessment and self-correction. The unspeakable acts of terrorism that occurred on September 11, 2001 demanded a strong response by our government and a rethinking of our national security policies. All of us would agree that some of the government’s actions in response to 9-11 were necessary and productive. But there is evidence that some of the counter-terrorism policies and practices that were implemented after 9-11 departed from the rule of law and from our nation’s shared values. This country has three choices for how it can respond to that evidence. For the reasons set forth in this testimony, the Brennan Center believes that an independent, non-partisan commission of inquiry to examine our counter-terrorism policies is the best of these options. The first option is simply to do nothing. That approach would be ill-advised at best and dangerous at worst. As an initial matter, there is no question that this country is, 2 Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, Book II, 1 S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 137 (1976). 2 and should remain, a nation of laws. If it is true that our government has operated outside the law in any of its counter-terrorism practices, we want to make sure that these practices are brought back into line with the law and that the problem does not happen again. This process of restoration is necessary, not only to stay true to this nation’s core principles, but also to restore our standing in the eyes of the world as a champion of the rule of law. But in order to implement the changes necessary to fix our policies and guard against future abuses, we have to have all of the facts. As the Chairman of this Committee recently put it, “we must read the page before we turn it.” In addition, we need to understand the consequences of our counter-terrorism policies if we are serious about protecting this country from the threat of terrorism. Elsewhere, I have argued that some of our counter-terrorism policies, such as detaining suspects for years without charge and employing harsh interrogation techniques, have made our country less safe.3 Regardless of whether they have produced useful intelligence in specific cases, they have harmed us, on balance, by giving the Bin Ladens of the world powerful recruiting messages; alienating our allies and making their intelligence services less willing to cooperate with us; and placing our own troops at increased risk of mistreatment if they are captured abroad. We need to have a full understanding of what the effects of our policies have been in order to fix any damage that has resulted and to ensure that our policies going forward serve this nation’s security interests. 3 See Schwarz & Huq, supra n. 1. I am also appending to this testimony my testimony before the Constitution Subcommittee in its September 16, 2008 hearing on “Restoring the Rule of Law.” That testimony provides further discussion on the need for an independent commission. 3 The second option, championed by some, is to pursue criminal prosecution against those in the government who may have broken the law. This approach has superficial appeal. As Attorney General Holder has acknowledged, no one is above the law; in theory, if crimes were committed here, they should be prosecuted. The problem with this approach is that much of the conduct in question was sanctioned by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel. As a result, criminal prosecution is both unlikely to occur and, if it did occur, unlikely to succeed. It might also be unfair in some cases – namely, those in which government actors relied on the opinions and were not in a position to judge the opinions’ legal soundness.4 Even if criminal prosecutions were a desirable and viable option, they would leave important questions unanswered. When official government policies stray from the rule of law, something has gone wrong with the system, and a systemic solution is required. In addition to knowing what happened, we need to know why and how it happened, what institutional failures allowed it to happen, and what steps must be taken to correct those institutional failures. Furthermore, as I have already noted, we need to know what harms have resulted from these actions and what needs to be done to mitigate those harms. These are critical questions for our safety as well as our commitment to the rule of law, and they would not be asked in a criminal proceeding. 4 Of course, going forward, we cannot have a system in which secret and patently unsound OLC opinions are permitted to insulate unlawful conduct. OLC’s role is thus one of the issues that should be considered by the independent commission. If the commission determines that OLC opinions were misused to justify unlawful conduct or otherwise did not meet the professional obligations of the office, it should examine possible reforms to prevent a future recurrence. 4 The best way to get answers to these questions is to pursue the option that the Chairman of this Committee has proposed: an independent commission of inquiry established by Congress. A commission would shed much-needed light on exactly what our counter-terrorism policies have been, including information that even some members of Congress still do not have. To the extent any policies departed from the rule of law, the commission would examine the process by which these policies came into being, including who made the key decisions and whom they consulted – or did not consult. It would go beyond the symptoms – i.e., the policies themselves – and look for the root causes.5 Where appropriate, it would examine the effectiveness of the policies, and it would assess their impact on our national security and foreign relations. Based on what it learned, it would make informed recommendations about the reforms that may be necessary in order to ensure that our counter-terrorism policies respect the law and keep us safe. And it would do one additional thing that neither inaction nor criminal prosecution would do: Where allegations of unlawful or inappropriate conduct prove to be unsupported, it would air the facts and clear the names of those implicated. In short, a commission would enable us to learn from the past without seeking punishment.