Multilateralism and Regional Security: Can the ASEAN Regional Forum Really Make a Difference?

G.V.C. NAIDU AsiaPacific ISSUES

Analysis from the East-West Center SUMMARY Continuing political uncertainty in the Asia Pacific region No. 45 August 2000 following the end of the Cold War led to the formation, in 1993, of the The U.S. Congress established the East-West Center in 1960 to ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The first security institution created just for foster mutual understanding and cooperation among the govern- the region, the Forum’s original aim was to facilitate constructive dialogue ments and peoples of the Asia Pacific region, including the United among its members. But it soon elevated its goals and now, despite formida- States. Funding for the Center comes from the U.S. government ble obstacles, the Forum aspires to resolve regional conflicts. Chief among the with additional support provided by private agencies, individuals, obstacles it faces are addressing the divergent expectations of its members, corporations, and Asian and Pacific governments. reconciling the perceived tensions between multilateral and bilateral relation-

The AsiaPacific Issues series contributes to the Center’s role as ships, assuring that the interests of weak as well as strong states are repre- a neutral forum for discussion of issues of regional concern. The sented, balancing the agendas of its great power members, and becoming a views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those relevant player in Northeast Asian regional politics—all while operating in of the Center. the “ASEAN way” of consensus politics. Most recently, the Forum’s failure to

respond to regional crises has dulled enthusiasm for the ARF, though many

of its critics and supporters alike hope that more substantial and effective

actions are in its future. 2

Analysis from the East-West Center

The end of the Cold War brought political uncer- superpower military disengagement grew more pal- tainties to the Asia Pacific that today continue to pable, the strategic debate was dominated by fears trouble analysts and policymakers alike. Concerns in- of a possible power vacuum and resulting competi- clude tensions in the Taiwan Straits, uncertainty on tion and clashes among the regional powers. These the Korean Peninsula, confrontations in the South concerns were compounded by the reemergence of a China Sea, and hostility in South Asia, as well as number of long-dormant territorial disputes. ongoing territorial and maritime disputes, armed Eventually, the very complexity and seriousness insurgencies, and ethnic strife. The already volatile of these issues led to a growing recognition of the situation is complicated by historical animosities, need for an intraregional institution to deal with mutual distrust, economic inequality, pressures of security matters, or at least a regional forum where modernization, multiethnic tensions, and a shortage views could be exchanged and differences discussed, of strong democratic institutions. In the short-term, reducing the chances of open conflict. Although the territorial problems may prove to be the most deli- Asia Pacific had no previous experience with such The continuing cate, but the rise of new power centers with clash- region-wide institutions, and despite apprehensions search for a ing interests will likely become the greater concern and doubts, support for the basic concept increased. suitable security of the future. There are still no effectual alternative Proponents of multilateral institutions argued that structures through which to deal with Asia Pacific Asia Pacific nations shared certain common, neutral architecture is problems, and the continuing search for a suitable interests, particularly the pursuit of economic de- indicative of the and sustainable security architecture is indicative of velopment, which would be major incentives for region’s great the region’s great complexity. cooperation. The rationale was that, as economic in- complexity In 1993, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was terdependence grew, webs of overlapping institutions founded as the first intraregional security institution would gradually emerge that would motivate nations encompassing the Asia Pacific region. Initially envi- to maintain peace and stability, would generate com- sioned as a forum for constructive dialogue between mon security concerns, and help build confidence. nations, the ARF has since elevated its stated goals— A regional security institution, they reasoned, would the organization now aspires to be an active force in advance this processes by promoting greater trans- the resolution of regional conflicts. However, if the parency and more predictable patterns of relation- ARF is to fill this expanded role, it will have to ad- ships, thus deterring nations from resorting to force. dress a number of issues and practical dilemmas in Opponents of this approach contended that there the region’s security landscape. was no evidence to suggest that regional institutions could either stop conflicts from breaking out or re- The Emergence of the ARF solve them. They argued that such institutions are It was a decade ago that Australia and Canada first afflicted from the start by the question of who gains advocated a multilateral institutional structure in the greater benefit from them, and ultimately depend Asia Pacific along the lines of those in Europe.i At upon the support of the great powers, which gener- that time most countries—including the Association ally act toward their own interests rather than the of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the United common good. Finally, they pointed out that the de- States and China—were skeptical about multilater- terrence and balance of power approach had a rela- alism’s viability in the Asian context. The closure of tively good track record of maintaining peace and America’s largest overseas bases in the Philippines in stability. In this view, the key determinants of re- 1992 raised new concerns about the future of U.S. gional security would be the balance of power and involvement in the region. Regional powers such as nature of the relations between the great powers, China, India, and Japan, which had remained on rather than any regional institutions that might exist. the margins of the bipolar Cold War security order, When a regional security institution finally mate- were becoming stronger and more assertive. As rialized in 1993 in the form of the ARF, there was 3

Analysis from the East-West Center

no common understanding among participants as to was laid down for this evolution). The ARF must what its actual role would be, except that it could overcome a number of complexities and practical create a congenial atmosphere through regular mul- dilemmas if it is to progress toward these more tilateral interactions. Expectations clearly varied from ambitious objectives. country to country. China’s support was probably based on the assumption that multilateralism would Bilateral-Multilateral Tensions undercut the U.S.-led alliance system and enhance Substantial American military engagement, premised its own importance, whereas the United States saw on balance of power and deterrence, has been the multilateralism as a complement to its time-tested linchpin of Asia Pacific security since the end of the strategy of forward deployment and bilateral security Second World War. The backbone of the successful arrangements. Japan perceived an opportunity to in- U.S. dominance is its forward deployed military and crease its political profile in the region without jeop- a network of bilateral alliances. This policy does not ardizing its links with the United States, while South seem likely to undergo significant change. Korea’s interest focused on enticing North Korea to Since the Clinton administration first gave a green the negotiating table. As for the other regional pow- light to the creation of new multilateral institutions, ers, Russia had ceased to be a major factor in Asia it has made clear again and again that multilateral- Pacific security, and India was neither an initial mem- ism would supplement basic U.S. policy and not ber nor involved in the deliberations. ASEAN, for supplant it.iii The conditional U.S. support for mul- its part, sponsored the ARF to ensure that its own tilateralism was a response to changed political con- position in the region would not be diminished by ditions. In the absence of the global threat posed the establishment of a security institution, and be- by the former Soviet Union, the U.S. government cause the ARF offered opportunities to advance the faced domestic pressures to delegate more of the se- Multilateralism interests of the smaller powers. curity burden to its allies and to reduce the chance is meant to supple- Thus, from the start, the ARF had to take into of American military involvement where American ment U.S. policy, account diverse interests and varied expectations interests were not critically at stake (such as the ter- while simultaneously attempting to produce dis- ritorial disputes in the South China Sea). But it is not supplant it cernible, positive results. This backdrop of the cir- important to recognize that this did not constitute a cumstances in which the ARF came into existence fundamental shift in strategy. should be kept clearly in mind when assessing its U.S. commitment to its bilateral relationships progress, limitations, and prospects for the future. could present problems for the development of mul- At its first meeting, the ARF’s objectives were tilateral security arrangements in the region, because stated as being “to foster the habit of constructive alliance systems are not necessarily compatible with dialogue and consultation on political and security multilateral approaches. In the post-Cold War peri- issues of common interest and concern”ii leading to od, U.S. officials have argued that alliances can be predictable patterns of relations in the region. By the interest-based rather than threat-based, and thus can second ARF meeting in Brunei in 1995, a more am- continue to have utility in promoting general stabil- bitious Concept Paper set out a three-staged approach ity rather than deterring specific opponents. In this to enhancing regional security: Confidence-Building view, alliances and multilateral institutions can be Measures, Preventive Diplomacy, and, finally, Con- mutually supportive. However, to some degree this flict Resolution mechanisms. (At China’s insistence, is an argument of convenience, justifying the con- the last stage was renamed “Approaches to Conflict tinuation of arrangements whose original reason for Resolution.”) Thus, within two years of its inception, existence has disappeared. The more traditional view the declared goals of the ARF had evolved from be- of alliances is that the “target of an alliance’s atten- ing merely a consultative forum to an institution fa- tion is an outside state or coalition of states, which cilitating conflict resolution (although no timetable the alliance aims to deter, coerce, or defeat in war.”iv 4

Analysis from the East-West Center

Thus a traditional alliance is externally oriented, to- expansion will only aggravate distrust among na- ward a threat, while an institution such as the ARF tions, bring about new instabilities, and even gen- is internally oriented, striving to forge security co- erate confrontation.”vii China’s support for the ARF operation among its members. Therefore, there is presumably is based at least in part on the calcula- at least a theoretical conflict between the two ap- tion that the U.S.-led alliance system is primarily proaches, and it has yet to be proven that they can aimed at China, and that the best way to reduce the What China successfully coexist. significance of American bilateral arrangements is to expects from One means by which this contradiction could be promote multilateralism as an alternative. multilateralism reconciled would be if the American security com- The ARF is also useful to China as a conduit mitment to the Asia Pacific were to progressively di- for improving China’s relations with the states of may be quite dif- minish. However, evidence suggests that American Southeast Asia. From a Chinese perspective, ASEAN’s ferent from what interests are growing more rapidly in Asia than in any leadership is also a stabilizing force in the China- the region expects other region, and that the U.S.-led alliance system is Japan-U.S. triangular relationship. By the same to- from Chinese being strengthened. Moreover, the U.S. is seen as a ken, most observers assume that if China does not participation in major stabilizing factor in the region’s security due to support the Forum, it stands to lose a great deal. multilateralism its dominant position and its general reputation as a In addition to possible erosion in its relations with benign hegemon. For these reasons, the United States neighbors, especially in ASEAN, a major setback and some others in the region would likely resist any in Asia Pacific regional development would hurt evolution in regional multilateral institutions that ap- China’s economic interests. This in turn could lead peared to threaten the alliance system. Thus, the more to domestic challenges to the government’s market- successful the ARF is in pursuing its more ambitious oriented economic program. goals, the more tension it may generate between China’s attitude toward the ARF has come a long multilateralism and the alliance system. This could way, from total reluctance to cautious support. This pose a major obstacle to the Forum’s success. evolution has been especially noticeable since the March 1996 Taiwan incident. Apprehensions per- The China Factor sist, however, concerning China’s commitment to From any perspective, the ARF’s fate is critically de- multilateralism. China’s participation has been con- pendent on the attitude and behavior of China, a ris- ditioned on the assurance that Taiwan will not be- ing power whose interests are not clearly defined and come a member of the ARF and that Taiwan will whose longer-term ambitions remain vague. What be treated as an internal Chinese matter. Likewise, China expects from multilateralism may be quite dif- regarding disputes in the South China Sea, Beijing ferent from what the rest of the region expects from has maintained since the first ARF meeting in 1994 Chinese participation in multilateralism. One Chi- that these should not be part of the Forum’s agen- nese scholar has expressed the view that the “Cold da. China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea is War mentality” and military alliances are the biggest bound to remain a sore point with other ARF mem- obstacles to building a genuine cooperative security bers. China’s growing military capability—especially framework in a multipolar world.v At the 1999 ARF its navy and ballistic missiles—coupled with its in- meeting China’s Foreign Minister explicitly stated termittent saber-rattling and threats to use force if that: “The tendencies of strengthening military alli- necessary to establish its sovereignty over disputed ances and stressing intervention that go against the territories, have disquieted many in the region. historical trend are growing...”vi While emphasizing From the beginning it has been clear that China the significance of a cooperative framework to the “did not want the ARF to evolve into a conflict res- peaceful resolution of disputes, he pointed to the de- olution mechanism.”viii China has expressed strong stabilizing nature of the U.S.-led alliance system: “To reservations about the Forum moving on to the next strengthen military alliances and engage in armament stage—preventive diplomacy—on the stated grounds 5

Analysis from the East-West Center

that the Confidence-Building Measures process is aversion to “hegemonic and splittist forces” and their still incomplete. At the most fundamental level, if “neo-interventionist” policies—which is essentially the ARF aim is to create certain basic rules of the aimed at Washington, can whip up nationalist senti- game, and if China perceives that its freedom of ac- ments and could spin out of control.ix tion to defend its interests is constrained by multi- China is acutely aware that in its current engage- lateralism, this could lead to serious problems. China ment with the United States it is very much the could refuse to conform to the new norms, or it could “junior partner” and that the dialogue is between even stall the progress of multilateralism altogether. two unequal powers. The United States is equally China’s support is almost a prerequisite to the ad- conscious of China’s ability to undermine American vancement of the ARF. interests, for instance in containing the spread of The ASEAN approach to this has been to pursue an nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and ensuring The Forum is in “enmeshing” strategy, constructively engaging China stability in the Asia Pacific. Beijing obviously con- in various multilateral mechanisms. Examples are siders a number of recent American actions as pri- constant danger the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences (ASEAN- marily aimed at the containment of China. These of becoming PMCs), the ASEAN+3 meetings (annual informal include the development of Theater Missile Defense, hostage to major summits of ASEAN, China, Japan, and South Korea), the enhanced security role of Japan under the Revised party rivalries ASEAN-China dialogues, APEC, and the ARF. Si- Defense Guidelines, the Visiting Forces Agreement multaneously, most ASEAN nations are beefing up between the United States and the Philippines, en- their defense forces and are strengthening their ex- hanced U.S. security relations with Australia, U.S. isting security arrangements or have entered into new plans to merge four bilateral exercises in the Asia arrangements: the Philippines and Singapore with Pacific into one (Team Challenge) in 2001, and the the United States, Indonesia with Australia (before U.S. initiation of a dialogue with India concerning the East Timor crisis), and Singapore, Malaysia, and Asian security. The United States asserts that these Vietnam with India. ASEAN is playing a crucial and are reasonable steps taken to protect its interests as delicate role here, attempting to facilitate dialogue well as those of its allies, but Beijing is clearly un- and prevent misunderstandings while preserving and convinced. enhancing a tacit balance of power to reinforce its Problems involving the other major regional pow- overall strategy. ers can also affect the ARF. A resurgent India, with nuclear weapons and a formidable conventional mil- Great Power Relations itary prowess, has emerged as very important in the Asia Pacific security and the future of multilateral- Asia Pacific balance. India’s strategic interests in the ism continue to depend fundamentally on relations region are growing, and suspicions linger that China among the major powers—United States, China, might undermine those interests. It is also widely re- Japan, Russia, and India—and the dynamics of power cognized that Japan is striving to become a “normal” politics among these states. The bilateral relationship state and is building its capability to protect its grow- between China and the United States is probably the ing economic and strategic interests in the region. most critical. Since the 1989 Tiananmen Square inci- However, any efforts by Tokyo to strengthen its de- dent, and especially after the dissolution of the former fense capability inevitably ring alarm bells in the rest Soviet Union, Sino-U.S. relations have been rough, of the region. Thus, the ARF is in constant danger and a series of recent events have made them quite of becoming hostage to major power rivalries and volatile. The differences are not confined to the Tai- actions on various fronts. wan issue. The United States has a vested interest in the promotion of democracy and human rights, while Dangers in Northeast Asia China considers this to be interference in China’s in- A quick look at the Asia Pacific reveals that the great- ternal affairs. From the other side, China’s rhetoric— est potential dangers are in Northeast Asia, especial- 6

Analysis from the East-West Center

ly those surrounding the Taiwan issue and the Korean Fundamental differences have always existed among Peninsula. However, the ARF framework appears un- the member states over how to deal with the great suitable for addressing these problems. Since Taiwan powers, especially with China’s growing military pow- is not a member, the Forum’s ability to deal with the er; approaches ranged from Singapore’s pragmatic Taiwan issue is very limited. While the recent North- balance of power policy to Vietnam’s commitment South Korean summit and Pyongyang’s desire to join to containment. Serious differences have appeared the ARF have created propitious conditions for the in recent years even among the original five mem- reduction of tensions there, the Forum played no role bers about the proper operation of the so-called in this. “ASEAN way.” Northeast Asia is where the interests of major Even more fundamental questions have been powers are likely to clash most sharply. Thus, crea- raised about ASEAN’s cohesion following its expan- tion of a separate forum or dialogue for this region sion to include all ten Southeast Asian states. These may be more appropriate than relying on the ARF. are mostly weak states, many of which face enormous And yet a separate dialogue in Northeast Asia would domestic problems and continue to be vulnerable to surely erode the ARF’s importance. Because there are external pressures, and ASEAN must overcome a Is the so many linkages between Northeast and Southeast number of challenges before it can emerge as a co- ‘ASEAN way’ Asian security issues, the ARF will have to develop hesive power center. The earlier advantage of having of consensus suitable inter-institutional mechanisms if it hopes to a small core group steering ASEAN politically is be- deal with them. It is another major challenge. ing lost. Periodic outbursts of nationalistic feelings, politics still continued mutual suspicions, and numerous unre- effective? Can ASEAN Run the ARF? solved maritime boundary and territorial problems ASEAN’s decision to be the leading force in organ- within ASEAN have been exacerbated by events such izing and running the ARF was generally welcomed. as the financial crisis. Indonesia, the linchpin of ASEAN had ample experience in multilateralism, not ASEAN and its success, is struggling against possible only among its member states but also with outside political and social collapse. powers through its Dialogue Partnership meetings. Not surprisingly then, questions are being raised Moreover, only an ASEAN-led initiative could have about ASEAN’s ability to maintain itself as a united ensured China’s active participation. ASEAN’s leader- entity, much less to lead the ARF. Consolidation of ship in the ARF and its consensus-oriented approach ASEAN can be considered another requirement for to conducting business were politically convenient. the ARF to succeed. This will probably necessitate a However, ASEAN’s leading role is not without serious reexamination of the ASEAN way and its problems. The ASEAN approach is not necessarily applicability to the conduct of ARF business. the most suitable one for dealing with some complex issues. Itself a product of the Cold War, ASEAN Confidence-Building Measures and Preventive until recently confined its membership to a limited Diplomacy geographic area within Southeast Asia, and its mem- The Chairman’s Statement at the first ARF meeting ber states generally have shared common interests declared that the principal objective of the Forum was and concerns. The only major diplomatic initiative to “foster constructive dialogue and consultation on ASEAN has undertaken to date is with regard to political and security issues of common interest and Cambodia, and even there ASEAN found itself in- concern and to make significant contributions to ef- sufficiently equipped—in order to achieve a settle- forts towards confidence-building and preventive di- ment, it had to obtain assistance from the major plomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.” As previously powers and the UN. indicated, the statement at the second meeting set Further, threat perceptions vary among ASEAN out ARF objectives more explicitly and added the members, and defense policies are not coordinated. concept of conflict resolution. However, the ARF’s 7

Analysis from the East-West Center

record of practical achievements in these areas is a precedent and foundation for further such activities quite patchy. The much-talked-about transparency in in the future. However, the opportunity was missed, defense matters has yet to emerge. Many members to the disappointment of many ARF supporters. do not publish Defense White Papers and those who Besides the definitional problems involved in both do reveal little that is unknown. The official defense- preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, practi- spending figures presented by certain members are cal efforts in these areas require that certain basic in- simply not trusted by others.x struments be in place. Examples are early-warning The earlier plan to create a regional “Arms Register” procedures, good offices or fact-finding arrangements, for conventional arms transfer had to be watered and possibly even procedures for preventive deploy- down to encourage members to actively participate ments in the early stages of potential emergencies. in the UN Arms Register. There is no agreement on But to make any such measures possible, an appro- advanced notification of joint exercises conducted by priately institutionalized normative structure is essen- member states outside of their home territory. Con- tial. One means of working toward both objectives tacts among senior defense officials of the member is the establishment of a peacekeeping training cen- states have been sketchy and irregular. Accepting that ter. This would serve the dual function of building there are practical limitations to military Confidence- trust and interactive experience among the trainees, Building Measures, the ARF could at least have un- and would also provide a pool of available personnel dertaken constructive initiatives in less sensitive areas familiar with regional conditions for potential de- of confidence building and cooperation. But it has ployment in future crises. The ARF has so far been not done so. ARF has no concerted plan either to unable to make any moves in this direction. curb drug trafficking or to curtail the rapid spread of light weapons to the region’s various criminal and Conclusion rebel groups. Similarly, no coordinated activity has Confronted with post-Cold War strategic uncertain- been initiated around the issue of piracy, which is a ty, it was anticipated that a less legalistic and more major menace in the region. Only outside the ARF flexible multilateral security venture might be best The ARF missed are some ARF members attempting to harmonize suited to building a new era of cooperation in the its chance to play patrolling activities, and they do so in the face of Asia Pacific region. Admittedly, institution building even a small role Chinese reluctance. is neither a rapid nor a straightforward phenome- One means for the ARF to enhance its credibili- non, and it is particularly a challenging task in the in the East Timor ty would be to seize whatever opportunities present Asia Pacific given the widely differing characteristics crisis, disappoint- themselves for cooperative action, much as ASEAN and interests, and even potentially incompatible ob- ing many of its enhanced its standing by taking the initiative on Cam- jectives, of its constituent states. Nonetheless, the supporters bodia. However, in the one major regional security failure to respond to crisis situations such as the re- crisis since the formation of the ARF, the 1999 East cent violence in East Timor or the earlier Asian eco- Timor crisis, the ARF played no role. The ASEAN nomic crisis, inevitably dampens confidence and members looked on the East Timor situation as the enthusiasm in institutions such as the ARF or APEC. internal problem of a fellow member, and ASEAN’s These developments have sharpened the debate about longstanding operating principles proscribed inter- the role of regional multilateral institutions and their ference. Yet this situation did offer opportunities for future. Alternative ideas such as the creation of a the ARF to take constructive initiatives, at a minimum concert of great powers in Asia or building a classic through convening informal meetings to facilitate robust balance of power reflect disenchantment with dialogue between Indonesia and the ARF members the performance of regional institutions, and are supporting the UN intervention. Had the ARF been beginning to attract more serious discussion. able to play some role relating to the peacekeeping Soon after the ARF was established, it emerged operations in East Timor, this could have established that the Forum needed to move beyond the earlier 8

Analysis from the East-West Center

role of a dialogue facilitator. We have seen that even It also appears that the ARF framework is un- as the ARF embarks on a more ambitious agenda, suitable for addressing security issues in Northeast there are a number of challenges it will have to ad- Asia, and hence these will need to be dealt with out- dress in order to realize its ambitions. The great pow- side the ARF. It may help the cause of institutional- To be a credible ers, which continue to be the key players in shaping ism if a separate forum for Northeast Asia is created, forum, the ARF regional security in the Asia Pacific, have divergent with institutional linkages to the ARF. The Forum’s will have to show expectations from the ARF. China has already ques- failure to take timely action when warranted has tioned the viability of multilateralism in an environ- contributed to growing skepticism about its future. tangible progress ment dominated by the U.S.-led alliance system, but The ARF cannot be realistically expected to play the United States is most unlikely to radically change a pivotal role in shaping a new regional order if it its basic policy. While it was convenient to employ remains merely a consultative forum. To be a credi- the “ASEAN way” in the beginning, there are in- ble forum, it will need to show tangible progress creasing questions about its adequacy as an instru- and begin addressing the challenges it faces. Only ment for bringing about a new regional security then will it be able to carry the process forward and architecture in the vast Asia Pacific. rebuild faith in multilateral institutions.

Notes vi See The Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan’s address to the ARF on 26 July 1999. i For instance, Australia proposed a Conference on Security vii Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) akin to CSCE in Europe. Ibid. viii ii Chairman’s Statement at the end of the First ARF Meeting, Stephen Wrage, “Asia, Help Thyself,” Asian Wall Street Bangkok, 25 July 1994. Journal, 4 May 1995. ix iii See U.S. strategy documents, such as The United States For instance, the violent demonstrations at the U.S. Embassy Security Strategy for the East Asia and Pacific Region, 1998, and in Beijing after an accidental American bombing of the Chinese official testimonies to the Congress. Embassy in Belgrade in 1999. x iv John J. Mearsheimer, “A Realist Reply,” International Security, To what extent the proposed voluntary Security Outline docu- Summer 1995, p. 83. ments to be published from this year by the member states will be transparent is yet to be seen. v Zhu Liqun, “Cooperative Security and China’s Stand,” Foreign Affairs Journal (Beijing), December 1999, pp. 33–43.

About this Publication Recent AsiaPacific Issues About the Author

The AsiaPacific Issues series reports on No. 44 “Natural Gas: The Fuel of the Future G.V.C. Naidu was a Visiting Fellow at the topics of regional concern. in Asia” by Fereidun Fesharaki, Kang Wu, East-West Center in Summer 2000. He is a and Sara Banaszak. June 2000. Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence The contents of this paper may be repro- Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, special- duced for personal use. Single copies may No. 43 “Domestic Politics Fuels Northeast izing in Asia Pacific security issues. He is be downloaded from the Center’s website. Asian Maritime Disputes” by Mark J. author of Indian Navy and Southeast Asia Copies are also available for $2.50 plus Valencia. April 2000. (New Delhi: IDSA-Knowledge World, 2000), shipping. For information or to order copies, No. 42 “Potential Partners: India and the and has to his credit two monographs and please contact the Publications Office, United States” by Mohammed Ayoob. many articles. East-West Center, 1601 East-West Road, December 1999. He can be reached at: Burns Hall Rm. 1079, Honolulu, Hawaii No. 41 “Japan at the Crossroads” by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses 96848-1601. Gerald L. Curtis. September 1999. Block 3, Old J N U Campus Telephone: (808) 944-7145 No. 40 “The Struggle for Free Trade” by New Delhi 110 067 Facsimile: (808) 944-7376 Michael J. Delaney. June 1999. India Email: [email protected] No. 39 “Strapped for Cash, Asians Plunder Website: www.EastWestCenter.org Tel: 91-11-617-0515 their Forests and Endanger their Future” by Fax: 91-11-618-9023 ISSN: 1522-0966 Deanna G. Donovan. April 1999. Email: [email protected] Series Editor: Elisa W. Johnston