Multilateralism: Variants, Potential, Constraints and Conditions For

NO. 9 MARCH 2020 Introduction

Multilateralism Variants, Potential, Constraints and Conditions for Success Hanns W. Maull

In view of the current challenges facing world politics and its specific structural conditions (national sovereignty, power diffusion), multilateralism appears to be an almost indispensable form of international diplomacy. Nevertheless, it seems controversial: multilateralism is currently under fire, particularly from the White House and the State Department, whilst both China’s President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin pose as advocates and defenders of multilateralism. On closer inspection, however, the controversy is not about multilateralism as a diplomatic procedure, but essentially about the question of which principles, values and organizations should determine the international order and thus shape international politics. At the same time, the inherent difficulties and limitations of multilateralism are often underestimated, and its potential overestimated. In order to make multilateralism as effective as possible, a realistic assessment of its preconditions and a wise understanding of the peculiarities of multilateral politics are therefore essential.

“Multilateralism” is axiomatic for German “Multilateralism”: foreign policy. The same applies to the a clarification of terms Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy of Furthermore, outside the EU, governments the European Union (Article 21 EU-Treaty). appear firmly committed to multilateral- It is in this spirit that the Foreign Office ism, at least if we are to believe the ringing (together with the French Foreign Ministry) endorsements offered by China’s President launched the “Alliance for Multilateralism” Xi Jinping, his Russian counterpart Vladi- in September 2019. But what exactly does it mir Putin, or the Indian President Narendra mean when the Federal Foreign Office on Modi. Yet it is questionable that they all its homepage describes “the commitment to mean the same thing when they express multilateralism” as one of the “guard rails their support for multilateralism. of German foreign policy”? So: what is multilateralism? First, it simply means the coordinated diplomatic interaction of three or more states (or other

actors) in international politics. According although it would also be promoted “multi- to this definition, the term is not contro- laterally”, i.e. together with others. versial; “multilateral” foreign and security It is this meaning of the term that seems policy stands in contrast to bilateral or uni- to prevail in international politics today. In lateral action. This understanding of multi- this sense, the notion of “multilateralism” lateralism (“Multilateralism I”) is therefore a contains, conveys and transports norms and purely formal category: multilateral policy values; it identifies the ends and the appro- is about the “how” not the “what”, about priate means to conduct foreign policy; the conduct rather than the substance and and it concerns the international order con- goals of international politics. In short, this sidered desirable and the regulatory policies version of multilateralism is a diplomatic considered conducive to it by a specific approach to achieving certain unspecified actor. These ideas will often not be made ends. explicit, however, and even be deliberately German foreign policy uses the concept disguised. Multilateralism in this sense is of multilateralism with a different, rather therefore no longer primarily about acting more exigent interpretation (“Multilateral- together with others, but rather about ism II”). This combines coordinated diplo- securing certain objectives and interests matic interactions of more than two actors that are closely linked to highly specific with action within the framework of inter- (and possibly controversial) ideas of international organizations, oriented towards national order. Multilateralism II a priori the principles and norms and carried out in does not say anything about which princi- accordance with the rules and regulations ples, values, norms, rules, organizations that underlie those organizations (such as, and procedures (should) be followed in for example, the United Nations Charter). the conduct of international affairs. But if In this version, a multilateral foreign policy “multilateralism” is elevated into a prin- stands not only for a specific diplomatic ciple (as in the case of German foreign approach, but also for a commitment to policy), or (more precisely) if it is freighted certain principles, substantive goals and with certain principles and values, then we methods of foreign policy – and for an are in fact dealing with several, possibly underlying set of values. very different and even controversial notions Multilateralism thus comes to stand for of multilateralism, with – as is currently foreign policy action within the normative the case – the views of important actors framework of a system of ideas about what differing about the desirable ideological diplomacy should strive for, and by what and normative foundations of the inter- means it should pursue its goals. Occasion- national order. ally there is talk of a “multilateral system” The fact that there is no broad consensus that must be preserved (as, for example, in in world politics today on the principles the Norwegian Foreign Ministry’s White and norms of the international order is Paper on multilateralism). This “system” ignored by the third meaning of the term is in fact the liberal, Western-style inter- multilateralism (“Multilateralism III”). Here, national order of 1945 in its renewed “multilateralism” refers to the “right” and version of 1990. “appropriate” answers to the current prob- “Multilateralism II” refers to foreign lems of world politics and thus stands for and security policies that seek to establish, effective world governance. The European maintain and further develop a specific, Union’s first Security Strategy of 2003 spe- normative international order through cifically used this understanding when it specific forms of international diplomacy. developed the notion of “effective multi- The order may be the currently disintegrat- lateralism” as its guiding concept; today, ing liberal international order, but it could however, the word “multilateralism” often also be another, quite different order that seems to be equated with “effective global would be based on a different ideology, governance”.

SWP Comment 9 March 2020

2 If “Multilateralism II” stands for (various ogies to the danger of nuclear war. At the and controversial) regulatory ideas about same time, according to assessments by world politics, “Multilateralism III” ex- the respective expert communities, many presses the principle of hope. In order to of those challenges place extraordinarily fulfil this hope and to exploit the potential high demands on the performance of inter- of effective multilateralism, however, two national politics in terms of global gov- types of hurdles would need to be over- ernance: decisive progress often appears come. First, there must be consensus about possible only when many actors work the normative foundations and the concrete together in broad coalitions bringing to- contents of multilateral diplomacy: what is gether not only states, but also non-state at stake, what ends are to be achieved, what actors such as international organizations, interests and values are to be accommodated civil society actors or companies. The influ- and how – and what concepts of inter- ence of even the largest powers (such as national order will thereby be promoted. the USA or the People’s Republic of China) None of this can be contested or contro- alone would not be sufficient. versial. Diffuse distribution of power and the principle The second hurdle on the road to effec- of sovereignty. International politics will tive multilateralism concerns its organiza- continue to be determined by the absence tion and implementation. Even where there of hierarchy and a broad distribution of is broad agreement on principles, values power. This is due on the one hand to gen- and goals, we have necessary but not yet erally accepted principles of the current sufficient preconditions for effective multi- world order, in particular the principles lateralism. Multilateral cooperation within of territoriality and sovereignty of nation the framework of the Paris Convention on states, and on the other hand to the large Climate Policy demonstrates this: it is based number of state and non-state actors that on common principles, standards and pro- influence the course of world politics. The cedures. Yet multilateral climate policy is United Nations is now approaching 200 far from slowing global warming to the state members, and there is also a rapidly, desired and necessary extent. The specific sometimes exponentially growing universe problems and limitations of multilateral of governmental and non-governmental action are the crux here. international organizations, civil society actors and transnational corporations. The potential for shaping multilateralism. It is Why do we need “multilateral” often assumed that if international coopera- foreign policy? tion were sufficiently broad, it would be possible to develop options on a global scale Anyone who argues in favour of multilater- that would be analogous to those available alism (i.e. for all three meanings of the term) to the nation state within its own territory, generally relates it to three contextual as- as the term “global governance” suggests. sumptions – assumptions about the mag- Science and technology and the organisa- nitude of upcoming global challenges, tional resources of governments and non- about the realities of power distribution in state actors can and should indeed provide international relations, and about the enor- the necessary problem-solving potential. mous potential of cooperative strategies. This could be mobilized effectively if the The dimensions of the challenges ahead. Some (theoretically extensive) problem-solving of the global challenges currently facing capacities of the nation state were effectively international politics may be of existential coordinated through international coopera- importance for the future of humankind – tion. In practice, however, the state’s mo- from climate change to the manifold nopoly on the use of force and its (ideal destructions in our ecosphere, from the or typical) extensive possibilities to shape opportunities and risks of new technol- politics within its own borders are often far

SWP Comment 9 March 2020

3 less comprehensive and far less powerful temporal dimension: negotiation outcomes than is assumed. These empirical deficien- that reflect broad-based multilateral partici- cies in statehood can – to a degree – be pation may take longer, but they will prob- compensated by new forms of interaction ably last longer and thus be more sustain- between state and non-state actors and in- able. Conversely, urgent problems requiring ternational organizations. Overall, however, rapid action can be better tackled by a small the problem-solving capacity of multilater- number of actors who are willing and able alism seems quite uncertain. Its potential to move forward. Multilateral diplomacy is for realising effective world governance will indispensable when fundamental issues of depend considerably on favourable con- international governance have to be resolved. ditions. In acute crises and in specific problem con- texts, on the other hand, the disadvantages of multilateralism are more significant. Multilateral diplomacy: Other inherent difficulties with multi- advantages and problems lateralism are the well-known problems of collective action. These include situations The strengths and weaknesses of multilateral resembling the classic game theory pris- diplomacy in dealing with global challenges oner’s dilemma, in which the best solution seem obvious. Multilateral diplomacy not to a conflict for all involved cannot be only offers better opportunities for dealing realized due to the absence of trust. An- with complex tasks, it is also better able other problem is free riding and its weaker to legitimise the results achieved and thus variant, in which the commitment to par- tends to make them more sustainable, since ticipate in collective action is half-hearted: they emerge from joint efforts. This is par- after all, others are already taking care of ticularly true if the participation is con- the problem, so one’s own efforts can be sidered representative, i.e. if all important reduced if not stopped (which would be interests and positions were represented. full free riding). In the worst case scenario, So “together we are strong”. Yes – but multilateralism can nurture illusions – strength can show itself as stubborn per- such as the illusion that the world is mak- sistence, but also as flexibility, adaptability ing progress on military disarmament and assertiveness. What kind of strength because multinational negotiations are is required depends on the context. Multi- dealing with it. In some cases, this has been lateral negotiations tend to broaden their the situation for decades, as with the Geneva agenda in order to take better account of Conference on Disarmament, which has not the different objectives and interests of the produced any significant results for over parties involved. This makes it difficult to twenty years. set clear priorities. Multilateralism is more Thirdly, the implementation of multi- protracted and costly than bilateral agree- lateral agreements is generally left to the ments or a unilateral oktroi. While the parties involved. In general, it is difficult to results of multilateral agreements are gen- sanction violations of international agree- erally broad and weighty, they may not be ments. Nevertheless, observation, monitor- very effective in responding to the problem ing and review mechanisms can be set up at hand because they are characterised by to improve the chances of successful imple- compromises and lowest common denomi- mentation. International assistance can also nators. In principle, there is an inversely be provided for corresponding national im- proportional relationship between legiti- plementation measures where such possi- macy and effectiveness, which usually re- bilities exist and the support is accepted. quires trade-offs. More legitimacy may have to be bought at the price of reduced effectiveness, more effectiveness at the price of reduced legitimacy. The same applies to the

SWP Comment 9 March 2020

4 Conditions for structuring and advancing the agenda with effective multilateralism a view to achieving effective results; ensur- ing that deadlines are met and that progress Effective multilateralism therefore depends is made as quickly as possible; and breaking on a number of prerequisites. The most down blockades in the negotiations. In this important concern the parties involved and context, it becomes clear that even a for- their attitude. First, do they share a genuine eign policy that is consistently multilateral interest in sustainable results, or does their in orientation must also at times incorpo- participation in the multilateral negotia- rate unilateral action and, above all, inten- tions merely serve tactical goals? Secondly, sive bilateral diplomacy in order to make is there willingness to compromise, i.e. are effective multilateralism possible. The im- the demands and expectations that have portance of bilateral relations for the effec- been made by the parties negotiable? Thirdly, tiveness of multilateral diplomacy is illus- is there willingness to act on the basis of trated – both positively and negatively – “diffuse reciprocity” (Robert O. Keohane), by the role of the Franco-German tandem i.e. to practise solidarity in the expectation in the history and development of Euro- that in the long run its benefits will out- pean integration. In general, it is difficult to weigh immediate short-term disadvantages? imagine how coalitions could be successfully Further prerequisites concern the (domestic) forged or crises overcome in negotiation legitimacy of the negotiators and their processes without intensive bilateral diplo- ability to make binding commitments on macy. However, bilateralism is certainly behalf of those they represent, as well as problematic for multilateral diplomacy organisational arrangements for the suc- when it is not treated as a component of cessful implementation of commitments good multilateralism but rather as an alter- made. If these conditions are not met, there native to it. is a risk that multilateral diplomacy will be unable to achieve anything positive and may even be harmful. Risks include agree- The “Alliance for Multilateralism” ments that prove unworkable (such as the UN protection zones in the former Yugo- With the “Alliance for Multilateralism”, slavia in the early 1990s) or are irrelevant German foreign policy – in close coopera- because they ignore the real problems (such tion with France – initiated an “informal as the Munich Agreement of 1938, which alliance” that aims to give multilateralism did nothing to stop Hitler’s war prepara- new momentum. Functioning segments tions). Such agreements risk damaging the of the current international order are to perception, reputation and credibility of be preserved, fragile areas renewed and multilateralism, and contribute to the ero- strengthened, and hitherto inadequately sion or creeping reinterpretation of the regulated parts are to be drawn into the underlying international order. In the worst multilateral order. At a meeting of the case scenario, multilateral negotiations can Alliance on the margins of the UN General be tactically misused as smoke screens to Assembly in September 2019, some fifty conceal unilateral power politics. states signalled their interest in participat- In principle, the disadvantages of multi- ing. lateralism can be mitigated and perhaps The initiative builds on the strengths of even eliminated by appropriate procedures, German diplomacy. It persuaded France to as long as the parties involved behave con- serve as co-organizer of the New York meet- structively and are willing to compromise. ing and then took on board five more states Essential for getting there, however, is wise (Canada, Mexico, Chile, Ghana and Singa- and effective political leadership, either by pore), which demonstrated Germany’s one actor alone or by a core group in the ability to forge coalitions. However, the negotiations. Their leadership tasks include composition of the group – the Freedom

SWP Comment 9 March 2020

5 House Index of 2019, which measures the climate change is confronting foreign and degree of democracy and freedom in a security policy with completely new chal- country on a scale of 1 (most free) to 7 (least lenges, as one of the six initiatives of the free), classifies Mexico and Singapore as Alliance for Multilateralism indicates. But “partly free”, while Canada, Chile and what impact would the proposed referral of Ghana are “free” – indicates that different these issues to the United Nations have on ideological and regulatory ideas can come the Paris Climate Convention? What added together in this informal alliance. What value would envisaged monitoring by the united the group under the perspective of United Nations have compared to the cor- “Multilateralism II” is therefore not neces- responding efforts within the framework sarily principled multilateralism in the of UN climate policy? There is a danger that sense of German and European foreign the effectiveness of climate policy will be policy. Indeed, there may not be a shared impaired rather than enhanced by its link understanding of principles at all. Rather, to security policy. Similarly, the support the Alliance is about pragmatic agreements of the Alliance for Women’s Rights, which on specific issues. Although this is under- focuses on the increased promotion of girls standable, it is not without its problems. in educational systems in Africa, takes The Alliance concentrates on appeals in up existing initiatives of UNESCO and the areas where agreements are relatively easy G7 – but why? If the activities taking place to reach because the interests of the parties within those frameworks are inadequate, involved are aligned (as in the case of the the Alliance would need to explain how envisaged regime for lethal autonomous it can make those efforts more effective. weapons systems of the future, in which Otherwise, there is a risk that existing those states that are primarily involved in efforts will be diluted. such systems do not participate). It also Thus, the loose structure of the Alliance helps that (as in the case of the appeal for and its variable geometry harbours the humanitarian aid) agreements are of a non- danger that fundamental regulatory prin- binding nature. The Alliance thus focuses ciples and norms of the existing inter- on secondary issues in international poli- national order could be gradually weakened tics, which either avoid subjects where or even redefined. Chinese diplomacy in fundamental regulatory differences make particular is endeavouring to introduce its agreements hard, or exclude these differ- view of the international order into multi- ences (and their protagonists) and thus lateral politics and thus to reshape it – for arrive at agreements with limited relevance. example, by strengthening the principle of However, the threat to the multilateral non-interference in relation to universally order manifests itself most immediately in valid human rights, or by measuring de- its core areas, such as international trade, mocracy in international politics by the par- non-proliferation or human rights and ticipation rights of states (and thus of their international law. Agreements on subordi- respective rulers), but not those of the nate issues may, of course, still contribute people in the states. to securing the international order, if they Strategically, a foreign policy that is con- work well and circumstances are favour- sistently multilateral in the sense of Ger- able. Yet they could also become part of man and European principles and premises the erosion of the regulatory foundations should seek solutions to specific problems of international order, for example by per- only where this would not imply damage mitting the weakening of links between to, or risks for, the future development of specific arrangements and the fundamental the international order. The Alliance’s ini- elements of the old, liberal international tiative to protect humanitarian aid organi- order, or by entering into agreements that sations and their programmes for alleviat- implicitly or explicitly embody other, revi- ing acute needs, for example, calls on states sionist principles. It is certainly true that to disseminate knowledge of international

SWP Comment 9 March 2020

6 humanitarian law and international hu- However, these critically important leader- manitarian principles, to support aid ship responsibilities – in the sense of organisations that are negotiating access focusing the agenda, tight time manage- to people in need, and to ensure “better” ment, exploring possibilities for compro- protection for aid workers. However, it is mise, and the effective implementation of doubtful what added value this appeal agreements reached – demand intensive could bring about: right-minded states will bilateral diplomacy, and occasionally also heed these demands anyway, while those unilateral initiatives. that are less well-intentioned will either not The principles and normative orienta- heed them at all or fulfil their obligations tions of German and European foreign at their own discretion. At the same time, policy, and also a realistic assessment of however, the appeal helps to shift the focus power relations, suggest that German and of human rights policies towards “humani- European leadership in multilateral con- tarian disasters” – and thus away from texts must rely primarily on persuasion and the domestic political conditions of human incentives. This is less problematic than it rights within states, to the detriment of may at first seem in view of current trends the worldwide observance of these rights. in world politics: the shifts in power towards authoritarian or neo-totalitarian political systems often obscure the impact Strategies and tactics for of power diffusion that tends to limit the effective multilateralism influence of such systems. In this respect, Germany and the European Union are not Activity for activity’s sake therefore in- in a particularly bad position in terms of volves risks; less can be more. On the other power politics. Doubts remain, however, as hand, the ambition level of the alliance to whether German and European foreign should be raised, even if this increases the policy are adequately mobilizing and utiliz- risk of failure. In order to make progress ing their power potential. The most impor- in key areas, coalitions with partners are tant cause for this weakness can be found needed (these can be sub-state or non-state in domestic political circumstances: up actors, in addition to states and inter- until now, European societies could not national organisations). And these partners be persuaded to give foreign and security should not only be able and willing to com- policies the importance they deserve and promise on concrete issues, but also share the resources they need. fundamental normative and regulatory To close this gap, or at least to reduce it, convictions. In the case of agreements in would require strategies aimed at streng- secondary areas, care must be taken to thening Germany’s and Europe’s own power ensure that they do not have any indirect base. Two factors are particularly important negative effects on the core areas of the in this respect: the enormous destructive international order. potential of technological innovation for Tactically, German and European foreign the future of our civilization, and the deep policy should make a vigorous effort to interdependencies between countries and make multilateral processes as efficient as societies, which are usually reciprocal but possible. Here, a distinction must be made also asymmetrical: all parties concerned between the output (the formal results of depend on each other, though not neces- multilateral processes), their outcomes sarily equally. The first factor suggests that (i.e., their implementation) and finally their military and economic deterrence will play impact (the actual effects on the problem a greater role in the future than has been context). Advancing the negotiation pro- the case over the last thirty years. With cesses will require persistent and resolute regard to the second factor, ways of instru- leadership. Of course, Germany does not mentalising asymmetrical interdependence necessarily have to provide this on its own. politically will assume even greater political

SWP Comment 9 March 2020

7 importance in international affairs. How- ever, the metaphor of “weaponized interdependence”, developed in this context, is as misleading as it is telling: analogous to the arguments by the arms lobby, it excludes the unintended, unexpected repercussions of using weapons on third parties and ultimately on the person who uses the weapon. (Note that the metaphor admits that it relates to interdependence and © Stiftung Wissenschaft thus implicitly recognizes potentially nega- und Politik, 2020 tive effects on the actor herself!). All rights reserved The power potential arising from asym- metric interdependence is therefore more This Comment reflects difficult to actualize effectively and pre- the author’s views. cisely than is usually recognized. Never- The online version of theless, it must be taken seriously. Yet the this publication contains possibilities for influencing other actors are functioning links to other not based on dependence per se, but on the SWP texts and other relevant vulnerability of the target to the threat or sources. actual interruption of exchanges (or, alter- SWP Comments are subject natively, on the corruptibility of the ad- to internal peer review, fact- dressee, i.e. his receptiveness to rewards checking and copy-editing. and incentives, if these are brought into For further information on play with the aim of influencing inter- our quality control pro- dependence relationships). A wise foreign cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- policy of principled multilateralism there- berlin.org/en/about-swp/ fore needs well-founded analyses of one’s quality-management-for- own vulnerabilities and those of one’s swp-publications/ partners and adversaries, as well as policies and programmes that reduce one’s own SWP vulnerabilities and target those of adver- Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik saries. The former will have to include German Institute for educating one’s own population about International and the opportunities and risks, the benefits Security Affairs and costs of multilateralism.

Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 www.swp-berlin.org [email protected]

ISSN 1861-1761 doi: 10.18449/2020C09

(Revised English version of SWP-Aktuell 11/2020)

Prof. Dr. Hanns W. Maull is a Senior Distinguished Fellow and a Visiting Fellow with the Executive Board of SWP.

SWP Comment 9 March 2020