Multilateralism in UN Peacekeeping: China’S Case

Draft Paper

Multilateralism in UN Peacekeeping: China’s case

Ioana Muresan Ph.D candidate University of Vienna

Paper for the International Studies Association (ISA) Global South Caucus 2015, Singapore

1 ABSTRACT

This paper sets out to analyze whether China’s behaviour with regard to UN peacekeeping can be defined as multilateral, with a focus on the case of the Chinese stance on the UN involvement in Libya in 2011. The paper starts by briefly describing the framework of multilateralism, given namely by John Gerard Ruggie. According to Ruggie, the concept of multilateralism is defined by three main components: generalized principles of conduct, indivisibility and diffuse reciprocity. Thereafter, the paper provides a brief overview of China’s stance on peacekeeping in general, and the main highlights of UN involvement in the Libyan crisis, focusing on the UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. China’s conduct with regard to the Libyan crisis is put forth and an analysis of how its positions measure against the three yardsticks of multilateralism chosen.

Key Words Multilateralism, UN peacekeeping, China, Libya

Acknowledgement: I would like to thank the University of Vienna and the Austrian Society for Political Science for supporting my participation at the ISA GSCIS 2015. I would also like to thank Univ. Prof. Dr. Heinz Gaertner, University of Vienna and Austrian Institute of International Affairs, the supervisor of my Ph.D thesis that will include ideas from this paper.

2 INTRODUCTION China’s conduct in the field of peacekeeping is of increased interest for the international community given its significance for China as a global actor, its stance towards issues of international peace and security and its relations with the other major actors in the international arena. A growing body of literature has taken up various facets of the Chinese involvement with peace-keeping, from its voting patterns to the numbers and types of its contribution to peacekeeping operations1.

In this context, analyzing China’s multilateralism can be a contribution to answering questions raised by its present a possibly future conduct as a major global actor, given that multilateralism aims at determining patterns of behaviour about an actor’s interests and its conduct vis-à-vis other actors, in the framework of various forms of cooperation and in relation to principles. Therefore, this paper aims at taking a qualitative look at the Chinese contribution to peacekeeping by analyzing whether its conduct in relation to UN operations at the UN Security Council can be defined as multilateral.

China’s attitude towards and subsequent involvement in peace-keeping operations underwent dramatic changes since China took up its seat as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council in October 1971. The research of China’s voting behaviour in the UNSC points to various phases before the end of the Cold War, most notably: 1971-end of 1981: a phase characterized mostly by non-participation in the decision- making and financing of peace-keeping operations. This period is also characterized, beyond the formal Chinese position expressed in the vote, by a negative attitude towards peace-keeping as an instrument for foreign intervention and control of the super-Powers2. Undoubtedly, this Chinese position was informed by its own negative direct experience with the UN peace-keeping in the Koreas war.

Starting 1982: a second phase (credited to last until 1986 according to some3 or to 1990 according to others4) that marked a departure from the non-participation policy in the votes, as well as by the start of China’s payment of its financial contributions, including to peace-keeping operations. This more cooperative attitude is attributed to China’s more prominent role as a supporter of the developing world and the importance of the UN for the Third World5.

1 See for instance: M.Taylor Fravel, “China’s attitude toward UN Peacekeeping operations since 1989”, Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No.11 (November 1996), pp.1102-1121; Michael Fullilove, “China and the United Nations: The Stakeholder Spectrum”, The Washington Quarterly, 34:3 (2011), pp. 63-85; Garrett Banning and Jonathan Adams, US-China Cooperation on the Problem of Failing States and Transnational Threats, Special Report 126, September 2004, United States Institute of Peace; Bonny Ling “China’s Peacekeeping Diplomacy”, International Relations and Institutions 47 (2007), pp. 47-49; Zhongying Pang, “China’s Non-Intervention Question”, Global Responsibility to Protect, I (2009), pp. 237-252; Simon Rabinovitch, “The Rise of an Image-Conscious China”, China Security 4 (Summer 2008), pp. 33-47. 2 Record of the 1750th meeting of the UN Security Council, S/PV.1750, 25 October 1973, pp. 7-10. 3 See Sally Morphet, China as a Permanent Member of the Security Council: October 1971-December 1999, Security Dialogue vol. 31(no.2)2000, pp. 151-166. 4 See M. Taylor Fravel, China’s attitude toward UN Peacekeeping operations since 1989, Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No.11 (November 1996), pp.1102-1121. 5 Idem.

Now, China goes through a phase not only of growing involvement in decision-making on peace-keeping operations, but also of growing participation in peace-keeping operations. China is currently the biggest contributor with troops among the P5. As of October 31, China’s contribution to UN operations with military troops and police was 2181.6

Let me clarify that, for the purposes of this study, the term peacekeeping is all encompassing, referring not only to the “classical” peacekeeping missions under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, but also to those measures taken by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In the case of Libya, the analysis will be mainly circumscribed to the two main resolutions that define UN’s involvement in the Libyan crisis: UNSCR 1970 imposing a range of sanctions and UNSCR 1973 that authorizes “all necessary measures” for the protection of civilians and the imposition of a no-fly zone that ultimately led to the NATO-led operations.

The case of Libya is chosen because of its particular significance for the recent UN involvement in solving crisis and protecting civilians, but also given the consequences its implementation seems to have had, including the reluctance of some UN Security Council members in authorizing similar operations in other crisis, most notably in Syria. Equally important for choosing the case of Libya in this study is the fact that it is for the first time that the UN Security Council authorized an operation without the consent or rather against a functional government of a UN member state. This fact carries a specific meaning also for China given its attachment to the consent of the host nation as a pre- requisite for any UN involvement and to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of states.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework used in this paper is John Gerard Ruggie’s concept of multilateralism which is defined as “an institutional form that coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct: that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence”7. This definition is meant to differentiate multilateralism from bilateralism, but also other forms of interaction between states8. Ruggie’s central endeavour in the quest to define multilateralism is to capture the qualitative dimension of multilateralism. The qualitative dimension of multilateralism is contrasted to its nominal definition. The latter one is, according to Ruggie, the “practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states”9. One of the flaws of this nominal definition is

6 Troops and police contributors, Contributors by country, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml, accessed November 30, 2014. 7 John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: the Anatomy of an Institution”, Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993, p:11. 8 Idem. 9 Op. cit., p.6.

4 considered to be, by Ruggie, the fact that it can subsume other institutional forms that are essentially bilateral.

At the core of the qualitative dimension of multilateralism lie the generalized principles of conduct which are accompanied by two corollaries. The first one of these is the indivisibility among the members of a community, understood in the sense of a social construction, not as a technical condition10. The second corollary is the one of “diffuse reciprocity”, a term first coined by Robert Keohane11 that is explained by Ruggie as the arrangement that is “expected by its members to yield a rough equivalence of benefits in the aggregate and over time” which stands in sharp contrast to the direct reciprocity that underpins bilateral relations12.

THE LIBYAN CRISIS AT THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

The unrest in Libya came against the backdrop of the Arab Spring, the ousting of the rulers in Tunisia and Egypt fueled by the call of the people for democracy and freedom. The mass demonstrations started in Libya on February 15, and triggered a violent response from the authorities, repression that resulted into many casualties and started a spiral of violence.

The first discussion in the Security Council on the situation in Libya took place behind closed doors a week after the outburst of violence in Tripoli. The highlights of this meeting were a briefing by Lynn Pascoe, Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs and a statement by the representative of Libya.13

Three days later, on the 25th of February, the Human Rights Council (HRC) had a strong reaction by adopting a resolution that established an independent international commission of inquiry into the situation in Libya and also recommended to the UN General Assembly to suspend Libya’s membership in the HRC. On this occasion, the High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, reminded states of the international community’s responsibility to protect civilians in a collective, timely and decisive manner when a state manifestly fails to protect its population from serious international crimes.

On the very same day, the Security Council had another meeting, this time an open one that, under the heading of Peace and Security in Africa, focused on the situation in Libya. In this session of the UNSC, the Secretary General painted a sobering picture of the violence in Libya, expressing “grave concerns about the nature and scale of the conflict”

10 Op.cit., p.11. 11 Robert O.Keohane, “Reciprocity in International Relations”, International Organization (Winter 1985), Volume 40. 12 Ruggie, op.cit., p.11. 13 Official communiqué of the 6486th (closed) meeting of the Security Council, S/PV.6486, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20PV%206486.pdf, accessed on September 12, 2014.

5 14and “allegations of indiscriminate killings, arbitrary arrests, the shooting of peaceful demonstrators and the detention and torture of the opposition and the use of foreign mercenaries”15. He recalled that “the first obligation of the international community is to do everything possible to ensure the immediate protection of civilians at demonstrable risk”16 and urged the Security Council to “consider a wide range of options for action”, mentioning financial and economic sanctions, travel ban, asset freeze and arms embargo17.

The UN Security Council session of the 25th of February also saw an emotional intervention from the Libyan Permanent Representative who spoke out against the Gaddafi regime.

These discussions prepared the ground for the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 197018 on February 26, 2011. The resolution was initiated/sponsored by 11(Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, France, Gabon, Germany, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, South Africa, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America) out of the 15 members of the Security Council. Significantly enough, those states that have been traditionally reluctant in using sanctions as part of the action of the international community (Brazil, China, India, Russian Federation) were not among the co-initiators of the resolution. However, this resolution that represented the first strong reaction of the international community to the Libyan crisis was voted by unanimity, which reinforced the message it sent to the Libyan regime.

In terms of content, UNSCR 1970 states clearly that “the widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity”19, which qualifies the extreme gravity of the situation in Libya and consequently imposes corresponding measures to deal with it. Furthermore, the resolution makes reference in its preamble to “the Libyan authorities to protect its population”, which goes back to the concept of the Responsibility to Protect and justifies the intervention of the international community when the state cannot or willingly does not (the latter being applicable to Libya) protect its citizens.

The measures imposed by UNSCR 1970 are circumscribed to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Art. 41, and contains a rather wide range of measures aimed at putting pressure on the Libyan regime in the hope that it would comply with the requests of the international community. UNSCR 1970t demands of the Gaddafi regime, among others:

14 Record of the 6490th meeting of the Security Council, S/PV.6490, p.3, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20PV%206490.pdf, accessed on September 21, 2014. 15 Idem. 16 Idem. 17 Idem. 18 UN Security Council Resolution 1970, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1970(2011), accessed on September 20, 2014. 19 Ibid., p.1.

6 to end the violence and “fulfill the legitimate demands of the population”20, to respect human rights and ensure access of human rights monitors, to ensure safety of foreign nationals and the passage of humanitarian aid21. UNSCR 1970 imposed a set of sanctions that are rather customarily used when the UN Security Council has the political will to impose sanctions: a travel ban against 16 persons, including Muammar al-Gaddafi and his family; freezing the assets of 6 persons; arms embargo. In addition, the UN Security Council decided the referral of the situation in Libyan starting February 15 to the International Criminal Court.

Although UNSCR 1970 was considered to be a forceful message of the international community to the Libyan regime, it turned out that it could not stem the bloodshed on the ground and the mounting hostilities as well as the violence of the regime against the civilians. Therefore, pressure increased to act more forcefully in order to put an end to the violence in Libya. As several members of the Security Council had called for an intervention in Libya, other Security Council members, traditionally reluctant when it came to authorization of military interventions by the UN, resisted such a course. Russia, for instance, submitted a draft resolution of the Security Council on March 16 that added several new elements to UNSCR 1970, such as support for the UN Secretary General Special Envoy, the Human Rights Council and the African Union and further underlined the need for a peaceful settlement of the situation in Libya22, but stopped short of any further specific action of the UN.

It is important to note that, in the beginning of March which year?, regional organizations also stepped up their involvement in the Libyan crisis: the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) had an emergency meeting that elaborated various recommendations for the OIC ministers, including the call for a no fly zone; the Peace and Security Council of the African Union established an ad-hoc High Level Committee on Libya; the Council of the League of Arab States called for the imposition of a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation and for the establishment of safe areas in order to protect Libyan civilians and foreign nationals.

At the UN level, the Secretary General appointed a Special Envoy to Libya, Mr. Abdel- Elah Mohamed Al-Khatib, a former foreign minister of Jordan.

Resolution 197323 of March 17, 2011, was tabled by France, Lebanon, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, a considerably smaller circle than the one that had initiated UNSCR 1970. In the preamble, the new resolution on Libya acknowledged the deteriorating situation in Libya, the mounting violence and the loss of civilian lives. It also reiterated the key elements that justify the forceful character of the measures in the operative part of UNSCR 1973:

20 Ibid., p. 2. 21 Idem. 22 Record of the 6498th meeting of the Security Council, S/PV.6498, p.8 23 UN Security Council Resolution 1973, S/RES/1973(2011), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973(2011), accessed on September 21, 2014.

7 qualification of the situation in Libya as threat to international peace and security24, responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect Libya’s citizens, gross and systematic violations of human rights and the fact that what was happening in Libya could amount to crimes against humanity25. It also reiterated other elements already stipulated by UNSCR 1970 – the plight of refugees and foreign nationals, the need for unimpeded humanitarian access26.

The operative part of UNSCR 1973 constitutes the backbone of the reaction of the international community to the Libyan crisis. Therefore, the resolution takes additional measures as compared to UNSCR 1970 with regard to: protection of civilians, the establishment of a no fly zone and a ban on flights. It is these three areas that constitute one of the most forceful responses of the international community to a crisis.

The provisions of paragraph 4 of UNSCR 1973 are significant in this respect, as it stipulates that the Security Council “authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures” (our highlight) […] “to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”27. The following specification is equally important as it specifically forbids a “foreign occupation force of any form on any part of the Libyan territory”28. Paragraph 4 is one of the clearest examples of the result of fierce negotiations between those members of the Security Council who advocated for the strongest involvement possible in Libya and those who were reluctant to accept it. On the one hand, paragraph 4 authorizes the military intervention in Libya, but, on the other hand, it excludes specifically a military presence on the ground from outside as a guarantee against the UN’s intervention becoming a tool for the occupation of Libya and the suspicion of an attempt to change the regime.

The role of regional security organizations is not only further acknowledged by Resolution 1973, but these are given an additional key role in the implementation of the provisions related to the protection of civilians and the no fly zone. Concretely, the Member States of the Arab League are requested to cooperate with other Member States in the measures taken to protect civilians29 and Member States participating in the intervention are requested to notify the UN Secretary General alongside the Secretary General of the Arab League when taking the measures to ensure compliance with the ban on flights and to cooperate with the Member States of the League of Arab states when implementing the measures30.

24 Ibid., p.2. 25 Ibid., p.1. 26 Ibid., p.2. 27 Ibid., p. 3. 28 Idem. 29 Idem. 30 Idem.

8 The imposition of the flight ban is also related to the protection of civilians. It also further elaborates on provisions of UNSCR 1970 in the fields of enforcement of the arms embargo and the asset freeze.

On March 19, a coalition of states began the military intervention to implement the provisions of UNSCR 1973, while starting March 23, NATO led the operation Unified Protector to enforce the no-fly zone established by UNSCR 1973.

CHINA’S CONDUCT IN THE LIBYAN CRISIS

According to its traditional stance of declared non-interference in the affairs of other states, which also has as a corollary the reluctance to resort to sanctions, China did not co-sponsor the first resolution of the UN Security Council in relation to the Libyan crisis, but voted in favour of it.

The adoption of resolution 1970 saw a delivery of the general position of China on the Libyan crisis that included: a call for an immediate end to the violence, the resolution of the crisis through peaceful means, restoration of stability and order and protection of foreign nationals31. It is important to note that the Permanent Representative of China to the UN made reference to what has come to be a key factor in UN action in crisis around the world, namely the stances of regional security organizations in these cases. In this particular case, China made specific reference to its “taking into consideration the special situation in Libya at this time and the concerns and views of the Arab and African countries”32 as relating to its favourable voting of UNSCR 1970, which hints to the fact that these two aspects were decisive in determining a positive vote from its side to a resolution that imposed significant sanctions on the regime.

It is to be noted that China’s intervention constituted a middle ground among the interventions of the delegation of the UNSC upon the adoption of UNSCR 1970, according to the record of the 6491st meeting of the UNSC33. On the one hand, the states that had co-sponsored the resolution pointed to the heinous crimes committed by the regime against civilians and the need to ensure the accountability of those responsible for the crimes, as well as a call for the international community to respond appropriately, in a decisive and forceful manner to this situation.

On the other hand, however, other Security Council members who had not co-sponsored the resolution (Brazil, India and the Russian Federation) had nuances in their intervention in an opposite sense. For instance, as a non-party to the International Criminal Court, India objected to the inclusion of Libya’s referral to the ICC among the provisions of the resolution34. Russia also chose to refer in clear terms to the need for the resolution to keep the restrictive, limited character of the sanctions against those responsible for the

31 Ibid., p.4. 32 Idem. 33 S/PV.6491, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20PV%206491.pdf, accessed on September 15, 2014. 34 Ibid., p. 2.

9 repression against the Libyan population, but also a warning of non-interference into Libya’s affairs35.

If China’s conduct in relation to UNSCR 1970 was rather neutral, its stance changed considerably when UNSCR 1973 was tabled, when it abstained from adopting UNSCR 1973 and voiced its concerns about “parts of the resolution”36, without specifying them. China’s intervention featuring in the official record of the 6498th meeting of the Security Council states its grave concern caused by the deterioration of the situation in Libya, its support for UNSC action in view of stabilizing and halting the acts of violence. China also reiterated, on the occasion of the adoption of UNSCR 1973 its key principles when it comes to UN peacekeeping operations and actions, in general: the strict observance of the UN Charter, international law, respect for the “sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Libya”. Moreover, it underlined again the need to resolve the Libyan situation through peaceful means. However, it also manifested its clear opposition to the use of force in international relations and voiced its difficulties with “some parts” of the resolution.37

China’s official position again reveals that the stance of the regional security organizations, the Arab League in this case, is one of the decisive factors in its decision not to vote against the resolution, despite the difficulties posed by some of its provisions.

Yet again, we note that China’s intervention at the Security Council is relatively toned down as compared to most of the other UNSC members who abstained – Brazil, Germany, India and Russian Federation – and who chose to refer to their concerns extensively. Russia, for instance, warned against the possibility for some provisions of the resolution to “open the door to large-scale military intervention”38 . Russia also underlined that the questions it had posed with regard to the enforcement of the no-fly zone, the rules of engagement and the limits to the use of force had not been answered39. India invoked a lack of credible information on the situation on the ground, lack of clarity with regard to the way the no-fly zone would be enforced, the negative impact of the financial measure on the trade interests of member states and on the Libyan people among the reasons for its abstention40. Brazil considered that the provisions of UNSCR 1973 went beyond the request of the Arab League to establish a no-fly zone and expressed doubts about the efficiency of the use of force in achieving an end to the violence and protection of civilians41. The German ambassador warned against the risks posed by the military intervention that could lead, in his view, to “a protracted military conflict that would affect the wider region”, as well as “the likelihood of large-scale loss of life”42.

35 Ibid., p.4. 36 S/PV.6498, p.10, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6498, accessed on September 15, 2014 37 Idem. 38 S/PV.6498, p.8 39 Idem. 40 S/PV.6498, p.6. 41 Idem. 42 S/PV.6498, p.5.

After the beginning of the airstrikes against the Libyan forces, Jiang Yu, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, declared in a press briefing: “We’ve seen reports that the use of armed force is causing civilian casualties, and we oppose the wanton use of armed force leading to more civilian casualties”43.

MULTILATERAL CHINA?

Generalized principles of conduct

The first criterion to measure multilateralism consists of the generalized principles of conduct, which essentially equates norms. In the case of UN peacekeeping operations this component refers to the principles governing them. This means mainly the core principles of the peace-keeping operations - the consent of the parties involved, the impartiality of the UNPKOs and the use of force exclusively in self-defense – but also the main development in peacekeeping doctrine, namely the Responsibility to Protect.

Let us analyze how and to what extent China’s conduct with regard to the Libyan crisis at the UN matches the generalized principles of conduct.

The Chinese position on the protection of civilians in crises reiterates the same principles at all the Security Council dedicated open debates on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. At each of these debates held twice a year during the past years, China reiterated the pre-requisites it sees when it comes to this issue: all parties to the conflict must respect their obligation to protect civilians, all UN action must comply with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and with the mandate given by the UN Security Council; the humanitarian operations must be impartial, neutral and objective; the root causes of the conflicts must be addressed44. When China speaks of the UN principles that must be respected, it underlines the respect for national sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity45, host nation consent to the peacekeeping operation46. In relation to this, it also underlines that the UN intervention must not be used for political purposes or even regime change.

Its position at the UN Security Council is, throughout the Libyan crisis, coherent and consistent with its standard position when it comes to UN interventions: the UN actions

43 Andrew Jacobs, China Urges Quick End to Airstrikes in Libya, The New York Times, March 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/23/world/asia/23beiijing.html, accessed December 29, 2014. 44 For example, Security Council 7109th meeting record (S/PV. 7109), Security Council 7019th meeting record (S/PV.7019), p.17; Security Council 6917th meeting record (S/PV.6917), p.27; S/PV.6917, p.25, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un- documents/search.php?IncludeBlogs=10&limit=15&tag="Security Council Meeting Records"+AND+"Protection of Civilians"&ctype=Protection of Civilians&rtype=Security Council Meeting Records&cbtype=protection-of-civilians, accessed on December 15, 2014. 45 Idem. 46 Security Council 6917th meeting record (S/PV.6917), p.25, on http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un- documents/search.php?IncludeBlogs=10&limit=15&tag="Security Council Meeting Records"+AND+"Protection of Civilians"&ctype=Protection of Civilians&rtype=Security Council Meeting Records&cbtype=protection-of-civilians, accessed on December 15, 2014.

11 have to be in accordance with the UN Charter, international law; the crisis must be resolved by peaceful means; respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Libya must be ensured.

One could conclude that, both at the general and the particular level of the Libyan crisis, China scores very high on the generalized principles of conduct scoreboard.

However, we see that the principles of host nation consent for the UN authorized intervention and its corollary of non-interference in internal affairs was not respected by China when it made the decision to let UNSCR 1973 pass through. Let us remember, in this context, China’s attachment to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states that is enshrined in the Preamble to its Constitution47 and is part of the foundation of the Chinese modern foreign policy, being one of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence set out in 1953 and 1954 by the Chinese Prime-minister and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai48. Again, UN’s decision to authorize an operation in Libya was, for the first time, taken against the consent of a functional government, and also one of the main principles of UN Peacekeeping and one of the core conditions that China had advocated for UN involvement throughout time.

Indivisibility

The second component, indivisibility, as mentioned before, is understood not only as a technical condition, but rather in the sense of a social construction scheme – the sense of the members of a collectivity that their actions are indivisible. In the case of the UN peacekeeping operations, the technical conditions are rather obvious, in the sense that the approval of such operations requires that none of the permanent Security Council members cast its veto and that it needs the approval of the UNSC as a whole. Moreover, given that the UN Peacekeeping Operations are the embodiment of the UNSC’s most important mandate – maintaining peace and security, all permanent members, including China, bear a responsibility in that respect. The social construction meaning of indivisibility points out to what extent China considers itself to be part of the indivisible whole of the Security Council as the authority for peacekeeping operations, for instance, it abstains from casting its veto despite the fact that some peacekeeping operations do not conform to China’s immediate interests.

The first significant factor in this case is that China voted in favour UNSCR 1970. It voted despite not only its traditionally reluctant stance to use constraining measures, including sanctions, in international relations, but also despite the potentially negative impact the ample financial and economic sanctions against could have on China’s economic interests, not to mention on China’s stand in front of the Libyan regime with

47 Preamble of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372962.htm, accessed on November 11, 2014. 48 China's Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18053.shtml

12 whom it that had lucrative businesses should Qadhafi have stayed in power. Nonetheless, China took the risk and voted in favour of the sanctions.

Furthermore, three weeks later, on March 17, China let pass, by not exercising its veto, a historic resolution that authorized a military intervention against the will of a regime that was still in power and considerably in control of Libya, in the name of protection of civilians and stemming the tide of what was suspected to amount to crimes against humanity. The significance of China’s abstention is even greater given the sanctity of non-interference in other state’s internal affairs for China as already mentioned previously. The fact that, despite its attachment to the principle of non-intervention, China allowed the intervention to go through hints at the pressure exercised on the international community to live up to its responsibilities and act decisively in order to stop the repression against the civilians and, ultimately, to China’s sense of the need to act alongside other members of the Security Council and not veto the resolution.

This factor of not singling itself out is quite important given that China only vetoed by itself three UN Security Council Resolutions, all related to Taiwan or cases of secessionism: the admission of Bangladesh in 1972 showed its support to Pakistan49, sending peacekeepers in Guatemala to observe this country’s peace process given Guatemala’s support for Taiwan50, the extension of UN observers’ mission to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia also due to this country’s recognition of Taiwan51.

Diffuse reciprocity

The third criterion is that of diffuse reciprocity which symbolizes, in a nutshell, what China expects in the long term, mainly in term of benefits, out of its position towards UN peacekeeping. Therefore, the last dimension is about interests, long-term interests of China in the field not only of peacekeeping operations, but also in terms of its wider interests as an actor of the UN Security Council. We will look at the interests of China in the Libyan crisis and what it could hope to achieve with its position in this context.

As underlined in the previous section, one of the constant issues raised by China in its statements at the UN until March 2011 was the need to protect foreign citizens, which also featured in UNSCR 1970. This was not by coincidence, given that China had more than 35,000 citizens working in Libya52 and who were in danger given the escalation of violence in the country. The situation of its citizens was serious enough to determine China to mount a large-scale operation to rescue them out of Libya on chartered flights and four military aircrafts53. The fact that China voted in favour of UNSCR 1970, despite its already mentioned reluctance to use sanctions in international relations, can be

49 Della Fok, The Emergence of a Superpower – China’s UN Policy from 1971 to Present, Duke East Asia Nexus, http://sites.duke.edu/dean/2011/05/12/the-emergence-of-a-superpower-chinas-un-policies-from- 1971-to-present/, accessed on December 11, 2014. 50 Idem. 51 Idem. 52 China’s evolving foreign policy: the Libyan dilemma, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/node/21528664, accessed on November 18, 2014. 53 Idem

13 considered to be a proof of its willingness to put pressure on the regime whose indiscriminate violence could lead to a situation where its own citizens would have been under threat. The fact that the protection of foreign citizens features prominently among the calls to the regime is further evidence that China actively promoted its interests in the Resolution, a true sample of diffuse reciprocity.

In addition, although China took the side of the sanctions at the UN level, at the bilateral level it made sure that it still maintained links with both the Gaddafi regime and the rebels: China met the rebels in Qatar in June 2011 and then in Benghazi and later the same month China’s foreign minister held talks with a senior official of the National Transition Council54. The same month, however, as part of its balancing act and not severing links with the Gaddafi regime’s foreign minister was received in Beijing. In addition, other representatives of the Libyan regime were in the Chinese capital in July on a weapons-buying mission, although China’s foreign ministry denied that that the government had knowledge of this mission and that any arms shipment took place.55 China turned out to be the very last of the UN Security Council permanent members that recognized the new government in Tripoli on September 12, 2011.

Finally, as already mentioned in the previous sub-section, China’s decision not to oppose either of the two resolutions passed by the UN Security Council in the Libyan crisis is also part of its reluctance to single itself out. This strategy, also in this specific case, can be due to the classical strategy in diplomacy of one not obstructing others’ strong interests in exchange for others not obstructing one’s own core interests so, in other words, expecting long-term benefits in exchange for silent cooperation.

CONCLUSION

The Libyan crisis constituted a watershed moment for the involvement of the international community and the UN Security Council, in particular, in maintaining international peace and security. For the first time, a military operation was authorized for the protection of civilians not only without the consent, but basically against a functional government, in the name of the responsibility to protect.

China’s conduct at the UN with regard to the Libyan crisis has been a rather constructive one, voting in favour of UNSCR 1970 that imposed a rather wide range of sanctions on the Libyan regime and not exercising its veto on UNSCR 1973 despite declared difficulties.

Analyzing its conduct through the prism of Ruggie’s concept of multilateralism, we found that China was consistent and persistent in its upholding the principles it is attached to when it comes to UN involvement/peacekeeping operations, with one important exception – the consent of the host state that China waived in the case of Libya. Therefore, one can conclude that China scores very high in relation to the generalized principles of conduct criterion of multilateralism.

54 Idem. 55 Idem.

The same can be said of the criterion of indivisibility, where evidence points into the direction of China falling into line with far-reaching actions of the UN Security Council in UNSCR 1973, despite its difficulties with provisions of the resolution and the possibility of these damaging its concrete economic interests.

Finally, the criterion of diffuse reciprocity which is, perhaps, the most difficult to analyze since one cannot ascertain 100% the true intentions and interests of China, can find convincing matches in China’s conduct in the Libyan crisis, in the promotion of its specific interests in the text of the resolutions, the search for a balancing act between the Gaddafi regime and the National transition Council.

Therefore, Ruggie’s concept of multilateralism applied to the Libyan case shows a largely multilateral conduct of China in deciding the UN involvement in the Libyan crisis.

However, one should be careful about extrapolating this conclusion mechanically to other cases. As seen in the following great crisis in the context of the Arab Spring, the case of Syria, despite a number of key factors coinciding with the Libyan crisis, the outcomes of the UN proceedings (no specific UN operation authorized), just as China’s conduct (China vetoed, alongside Russia, several UN draft resolutions proposing a UN intervention in Syria) are totally different.

Therefore, although China’s mostly multilateral conduct in the Libyan crisis can offer valuable guidance for China’s evolving position in relation to UN involvement in crisis/peacekeeping operations, it cannot be considered to be a blueprint for future situations.

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