Draft Paper Multilateralism in UN Peacekeeping: China’s case Ioana Muresan Ph.D candidate University of Vienna Paper for the International Studies Association (ISA) Global South Caucus 2015, Singapore 1 ABSTRACT This paper sets out to analyze whether China’s behaviour with regard to UN peacekeeping can be defined as multilateral, with a focus on the case of the Chinese stance on the UN involvement in Libya in 2011. The paper starts by briefly describing the framework of multilateralism, given namely by John Gerard Ruggie. According to Ruggie, the concept of multilateralism is defined by three main components: generalized principles of conduct, indivisibility and diffuse reciprocity. Thereafter, the paper provides a brief overview of China’s stance on peacekeeping in general, and the main highlights of UN involvement in the Libyan crisis, focusing on the UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. China’s conduct with regard to the Libyan crisis is put forth and an analysis of how its positions measure against the three yardsticks of multilateralism chosen. Key Words Multilateralism, UN peacekeeping, China, Libya Acknowledgement: I would like to thank the University of Vienna and the Austrian Society for Political Science for supporting my participation at the ISA GSCIS 2015. I would also like to thank Univ. Prof. Dr. Heinz Gaertner, University of Vienna and Austrian Institute of International Affairs, the supervisor of my Ph.D thesis that will include ideas from this paper. 2 INTRODUCTION China’s conduct in the field of peacekeeping is of increased interest for the international community given its significance for China as a global actor, its stance towards issues of international peace and security and its relations with the other major actors in the international arena. A growing body of literature has taken up various facets of the Chinese involvement with peace-keeping, from its voting patterns to the numbers and types of its contribution to peacekeeping operations1. In this context, analyzing China’s multilateralism can be a contribution to answering questions raised by its present a possibly future conduct as a major global actor, given that multilateralism aims at determining patterns of behaviour about an actor’s interests and its conduct vis-à-vis other actors, in the framework of various forms of cooperation and in relation to principles. Therefore, this paper aims at taking a qualitative look at the Chinese contribution to peacekeeping by analyzing whether its conduct in relation to UN operations at the UN Security Council can be defined as multilateral. China’s attitude towards and subsequent involvement in peace-keeping operations underwent dramatic changes since China took up its seat as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council in October 1971. The research of China’s voting behaviour in the UNSC points to various phases before the end of the Cold War, most notably: 1971-end of 1981: a phase characterized mostly by non-participation in the decision- making and financing of peace-keeping operations. This period is also characterized, beyond the formal Chinese position expressed in the vote, by a negative attitude towards peace-keeping as an instrument for foreign intervention and control of the super-Powers2. Undoubtedly, this Chinese position was informed by its own negative direct experience with the UN peace-keeping in the Koreas war. Starting 1982: a second phase (credited to last until 1986 according to some3 or to 1990 according to others4) that marked a departure from the non-participation policy in the votes, as well as by the start of China’s payment of its financial contributions, including to peace-keeping operations. This more cooperative attitude is attributed to China’s more prominent role as a supporter of the developing world and the importance of the UN for the Third World5. 1 See for instance: M.Taylor Fravel, “China’s attitude toward UN Peacekeeping operations since 1989”, Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No.11 (November 1996), pp.1102-1121; Michael Fullilove, “China and the United Nations: The Stakeholder Spectrum”, The Washington Quarterly, 34:3 (2011), pp. 63-85; Garrett Banning and Jonathan Adams, US-China Cooperation on the Problem of Failing States and Transnational Threats, Special Report 126, September 2004, United States Institute of Peace; Bonny Ling “China’s Peacekeeping Diplomacy”, International Relations and Institutions 47 (2007), pp. 47-49; Zhongying Pang, “China’s Non-Intervention Question”, Global Responsibility to Protect, I (2009), pp. 237-252; Simon Rabinovitch, “The Rise of an Image-Conscious China”, China Security 4 (Summer 2008), pp. 33-47. 2 Record of the 1750th meeting of the UN Security Council, S/PV.1750, 25 October 1973, pp. 7-10. 3 See Sally Morphet, China as a Permanent Member of the Security Council: October 1971-December 1999, Security Dialogue vol. 31(no.2)2000, pp. 151-166. 4 See M. Taylor Fravel, China’s attitude toward UN Peacekeeping operations since 1989, Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No.11 (November 1996), pp.1102-1121. 5 Idem. 3 Now, China goes through a phase not only of growing involvement in decision-making on peace-keeping operations, but also of growing participation in peace-keeping operations. China is currently the biggest contributor with troops among the P5. As of October 31, China’s contribution to UN operations with military troops and police was 2181.6 Let me clarify that, for the purposes of this study, the term peacekeeping is all encompassing, referring not only to the “classical” peacekeeping missions under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, but also to those measures taken by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In the case of Libya, the analysis will be mainly circumscribed to the two main resolutions that define UN’s involvement in the Libyan crisis: UNSCR 1970 imposing a range of sanctions and UNSCR 1973 that authorizes “all necessary measures” for the protection of civilians and the imposition of a no-fly zone that ultimately led to the NATO-led operations. The case of Libya is chosen because of its particular significance for the recent UN involvement in solving crisis and protecting civilians, but also given the consequences its implementation seems to have had, including the reluctance of some UN Security Council members in authorizing similar operations in other crisis, most notably in Syria. Equally important for choosing the case of Libya in this study is the fact that it is for the first time that the UN Security Council authorized an operation without the consent or rather against a functional government of a UN member state. This fact carries a specific meaning also for China given its attachment to the consent of the host nation as a pre- requisite for any UN involvement and to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of states. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK The theoretical framework used in this paper is John Gerard Ruggie’s concept of multilateralism which is defined as “an institutional form that coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct: that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence”7. This definition is meant to differentiate multilateralism from bilateralism, but also other forms of interaction between states8. Ruggie’s central endeavour in the quest to define multilateralism is to capture the qualitative dimension of multilateralism. The qualitative dimension of multilateralism is contrasted to its nominal definition. The latter one is, according to Ruggie, the “practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states”9. One of the flaws of this nominal definition is 6 Troops and police contributors, Contributors by country, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml, accessed November 30, 2014. 7 John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: the Anatomy of an Institution”, Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993, p:11. 8 Idem. 9 Op. cit., p.6. 4 considered to be, by Ruggie, the fact that it can subsume other institutional forms that are essentially bilateral. At the core of the qualitative dimension of multilateralism lie the generalized principles of conduct which are accompanied by two corollaries. The first one of these is the indivisibility among the members of a community, understood in the sense of a social construction, not as a technical condition10. The second corollary is the one of “diffuse reciprocity”, a term first coined by Robert Keohane11 that is explained by Ruggie as the arrangement that is “expected by its members to yield a rough equivalence of benefits in the aggregate and over time” which stands in sharp contrast to the direct reciprocity that underpins bilateral relations12. THE LIBYAN CRISIS AT THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL The unrest in Libya came against the backdrop of the Arab Spring, the ousting of the rulers in Tunisia and Egypt fueled by the call of the people for democracy and freedom. The mass demonstrations started in Libya on February 15, and triggered a violent response from the authorities, repression that resulted into many casualties and started a spiral of violence. The first discussion in the Security Council on the situation in Libya took place behind closed doors a week after the outburst of violence in Tripoli. The highlights of this meeting were a briefing by Lynn Pascoe, Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs and a statement by the representative of Libya.13 Three days later, on the 25th of February, the Human Rights Council (HRC) had a strong reaction by adopting a resolution that established an independent international commission of inquiry into the situation in Libya and also recommended to the UN General Assembly to suspend Libya’s membership in the HRC.