CEE INGS Twenty-sixth Annual Meeting

Theme: "Markets and Management in an Era of Deregulation"

November 13-15, 1985 Amelia Island Plantation Jacksonville, Florida

Volume XXVI Number 1 1985

TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH FORUM In conjunction with

4CANADIAN TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH FORM 327

Deregulation of Intercity Bus Service: An U.S. and U.K. Comparison By Wayne K. Talley* and Russell P. Kilvington**

I. INTRODUCTION petitions for regulatory reform, and in response to economic deregulation of U.S. transport in general. In recent years, two significant pieces of legisla- Specifically, from 1980 to 1982, the net operating tion with respect to intercity bus passenger service in income of all intercity bus carriers declined by 56.8 the United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom percent, falling from $132 to $57 million annually (U.K.) have been passed. Both pieces of legislation (OTA, 1984, p.4). One reason for this decline was deregulated intercity bus passenger service in their competition from alternative modes of travel. Since respective countries. Specifically, the Bus Reg- 1945, intercity bus carriage's share of total U.S. ulatory Reform Act of 1982 deregulated U.S. inter- intercity passenger traffic dropped steadily (i.e., city bus passenger service; the 1980 Transport Act measured in passenger-miles) from 7.9 percent in deregulated u.K. express coach service. The purpose 1984 to 1.8 percent in 1980 (Talley, 1983, p. 251). of this paper is to compare deregulation of intercity Alternatively, private automobile travel increased bus passenger service in the U.S. with that in the from 63.8 percent of total 1 intercity passenger traf- U.K. The results of such a comparison will not only fic in 1945 to 83.3 percent by 1980; the airline share be useful information to intercity bus policy makers increased from 1.2 percent of the total in 1945 to in both countries but will also be useful to policy 14.2 percent by 1980. Since 1945, an interstate makers concerned with transport deregulation in highway system has been built and 84 percent of all general. U.S. households now own automobiles(OTA, 1984, p. 27). Also, the once competitive edge traditionally held by intercity bus carriers, low fares, has been II. THE PREDEREGULATION PERIOD eroded to a great extent with the stabilization of gasoline prices and increased price competition from A. The U.S. Experience deregulated airlines.

With the passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, U.S. intercity bus carriers engaged in inter- B. The U.K. Experience state commerce became subject to federal economic regulation and were placed under the jurisdiction of Rather than referring to bus services as intercity the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). The and local bus services, these services in the U.K. are legislation gave the ICC the authority to regulate referred to as express and stage carriage services entry, exit, fares, financial activities, and service respectively. The express coach system in the U.K. levels. By encouraging mergers and purchases of began in the 1920s when improvements in vehicle existing route authority, the ICC and state regulatory design and the road network allowed long-distance agencies fostered the development of a highly con- scheduled bus services to become practicable. How- centrated intercity bus carrier industry (MCRSC, ever, growth of the U.K. express coach network was 1984, p. 25). Specifically, such encouragement re- constrained by the passage of the 1930 Road Traffic sulted in the development of two national competing Act. This act introduced economic regulation by systems—Greyhound Lines and Trailways. means of quantity and quality controls. The former Greyhound grew primarily by absorbing existing bus was done through a system of route licensing. These carriers and by acquiring operating bus-route au- regulations were applied to all types of bus and thorities from railroad subsidiaries (Farris and coach services other than contract and private hire Daniel, 1983, p.4). Greyhound developed from a operation. The act also defined express and stage holding company established in 1926. In 1936, a bus services in terms of a minimum fare criterion number of independent bus carriers organized the (i.e., standing as a proxy for distance travelled). To National Trailways Bus System. One firm, Trail- clarify, an express coach service was defined as a ways, has grown to dominate the system. service not charging a fare below a stated minimum By the late 1970s, a movement was under way for amount. In addition to the above quantity regula- federal economic deregulation of the intercity bus tions, the act also provided for such quality regula- carrier industry. This movement was in response to tions as design, safety, and fitness of vehicles as well the downward trend in the industry's financial per- as the licensing of drivers and conductors. formance, in response to industry proposals and The introduction of route licensing under the 1930 Act had similar effects to the 1935 legislation in the U.S. It fostered the development of service provi- * Research Professor of Economics, Old Dominion sion by large companies, developing a semi-monop- University. olistic role, by often taking over smaller independent ** Assistant Director, Transport Studies Unit, Ox- operators. By 1980, the main characteristics of ex- ford University. press services were: 1) dominance of year round 328 TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH FORUM

services by publicly owned operators, National Ex- as the base rates for the upper limit, the upper limit press and the Scottish Bus Group; no major network of the zone during the first year of the act was 10 of services by any independent operator, although percent over the base rate; in each of the following these operators did retain a major share of seasonal two years, the upper limit is to increase by another 5 services and unscheduled (excursion and tour) oper- percent over the initial base to a cumulative effect of ations; b) extensive network of places served; a large 20 percent. The base rates for the lower limit are the number of pick up and set down points (far more rates in effect on the date of the act or the rates in than British Rail) leading to generally slow operat- effect one year prior to the effective date of the ing speeds and indirect routing; in particular, the proposed rate changes, whichever are the lesser. The licensing system had prevented direct competition lower limits for rates may be 20 percent below the with intercity rail services to any significant degree; base rates in the first year with an additional 5 c) relatively low fare levels; in general these were percent in each of the next two years or a possible around 50-70 percent of the normal rail tariff; 3) cumulative reduction of 30 percent in the first three low market share; the 1979/1980 Long Distance years. Within this rate zone, rates may not be inves- Travel Surveys credited (ordinary or express bus" tigated, suspended, modified, or revoked by the ICC with 2 percent of journeys within Great Britain in unless the rates are found to be discriminatory or excess of 25 miles; excursions and tours, separately predatory. After November 19, 1985, the ICC will defined, had the same share; by contrast, rail had 14 have no authority to regulate rates of intercity bus percent, an auto 78 percent; and 3) a declining carriers that are set independently (i.e., that are not market; National Express alone lost 20 percent of its set collectively as by rate bureaus) and which are not passengers between 1975-79. deemed by the ICC to be discriminatory or preda- tory. Rates for special or charter services by intercity bus carriers are not subject to ICC regulation unless III. DEREGULATION ACTS the rates are predatory. As indicated above, the regulation of U.S. inter- A. The U.S. Bus Regulatory Reform Act city bus service has been conducted at the federal and state levels. At the state level, intrastate portions The Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982(BRRA) of interstate routes have been the regulatory respon- represented the first significant change in 1 intercity sibility of state commissions. Historically, state bus regulation since passage of the Motor Carrier commissions have enforced a lower price structure Act of 1935. The objective of the act was to deregu- for intrastate bus service than the price structure late intercity bus transportation so that competitive enforced by the ICC for interstate bus service. Also, market forces would be substituted for regulatory state commission have been less willing to approve decree in the determination of fares and schedules. requests to abandon unprofitable service than the The major provisions of the act are entry policy, exit ICC. As a result, it has been advocated that the policy, pricing policy, and discriminatory state reg- higher fares on interstate bus routes have often cross- ulation. subsidized non-profitable local (or intrastate) bus The BRRA substantially reduced both entry and routes or service (OTA, 1984, p. 71). As a conse- exit controls by the federal government as well as by quence, the BRRA gave the ICC the power to pre- state governments. The BRRA provided for a "pub- empt state regulatory commission decisions which lic interest" entry standard for certain types of entry deny higher fare requests or requests to abandon requests. However, the burden for demonstrating unprofitable intrastate intercity bus routes.(The pre- that the granting of new operating authority is not emption concerning abandonment of intrastate serv- consistent with the public interest rests upon those ice was discussed previously.) If fares on intrastate who would protest such a granting. There are three portions of interstate routes are determined to be exceptions for which the public interest standard lower than comparable interstate fares, the ICC may would not apply and the "fitness only" standard rule that the lower fares impose a burden on inter- instead would be used for entry petitions (see state commerce and therefore must be brought up to MCRSC, 1984). parity. These preemptions apply to all intrastate, Prior to the BRRA, intercity bus carriers were intercity bus services except where the services are relatively free to adjust their level of interstate serv- purely intrastate services provided by purely intras- ice and in some cases to discontinue service com- tate bus carriers. pletely to a given community. The BRRA provided for greater exit freedom by establishing conditions and procedures that permit interstate (intercity) bus B. The U.K. Transport Act carriers to discontinue intrastate regular-route serv- ices despite the objections of state authorities. For The Transport Act of 1980 marked the first depar- example, in cases involving ICC intercity bus serv- ture of substance from the regulatory framework of ice authorized prior to August 2, 1982, the ICC was the 1930 Road Traffic Act. Specifically, the Trans- empowered to pre-empt state denials of request to port Act of 1980 deregulated (economically) the abandon intrastate service that is part of an interstate U.K. express coach market. Similar proposals to route if the ICC determines that the variable costs of deregulate local (or stage carriage) services are the providing such service exceed corresponding reve- subject of a current parliamentary bill, expected to nues (assuming that interstate and intrastate fares are be passed in Autumn 1985. The main aims of the determined by reasonable practices). 1980 Act were: a) the removal of bureaucratic re- The BRRA provided for major changes in price strictions; b) the need to ensure better access to regulation of intercity bus carriers. Specifically, the public transport; and c)the provision of choice to the deregulation of prices is to be phased in over a user, by facilitating competition (Kilvington and period of time by employing a "zone of rate free- Cross, 1985). dom." With rates as of November 19, 1981 serving Under the 1980 Act, route licensing of express DEREGULATIONS OF INTERCITY BUS SERVICE: AN U.S. AND U.K. COMPARISON 329

coach services is abolished. Any coach firm is now approach to operation under deregulation. Many of permitted to enter into direct competition with pre- the new entrants developed services from their own existing firms on any route or introduce new routes regional base to and from London. Furthermore, the at whatever fare and frequency of service they de- focus of attention to London was further intensified sire. As stated previously, the 1930 Road Traffic Act by increased service to London by National Express defined express coach service in terms of a minimum and the Scottish Bus Group. Also, the lower fares of fare criterion. Alternatively, the 1980 Act defined the independents and especially those of British express coach service as a service where passengers Coachways were matched by National Express in the are set down 30 miles or more from the place where majority of cases. they are taken up (measured in a straight line), or Given the response of National Express, in partic- where some location on the route is 30 miles or more ular, the intense competition on trunk lines was short from the origin or destination of the passenger. lived. Beginning in April, 1981, members of the There are three types of express coach service: (1) British Coachways consortium began to withdraw scheduled express service; (2) unscheduled express from the consortium. In July, 1981, Grey-Green the service (such as excursions and tours) offered to the only London based operator in the group withdrew public at return fares and where all passengers travel from the consortium. As a consequence, the concept together for the entire trip; and (3)commuter express of an independent network of intercity coach routes service (specializing in journey to work services). disappeared and few of the October, 1980 consor- For the former type of express coach service, the tium services now remain. There are a number of express coach firm is required to notify the Traffic possible reasons for the failure of the consortium:(1) Commissioners of their intent to start a service 21 the response by National Express,(2) the inability of days before its inauguration. However, there is no British Coachways to make themselves known to the obligation of notification for the latter types of ex- public (Wilson, 1982), (3) lower frequency of sery press coach service. ice provided by British Coachways,(4) better termi- Although the 1980 Act provided for economic nals and service of established carriers, and (5) price deregulation of express coach service, it also pro- competition alone as the primary means of competi- vided for greater safety regulation of express coach tion by British Coachways. Although the consortium service. Specifically, such safety controls as the failed, some smaller independents that entered the introduction of operator licensing and stricter stan- market since deregulation have prospered. These dards with respect to vehicle inspection and mainte- independents have attempted to provide service on nance were specified in the act. one or two routes, either inadequately or not served by existing carriers. For National Express, patronage increased by 75 percent from 1980 to 1982, an IV. DEREGULATION IMPACTS increase of 6 million passenger journeys (Birks, 1983). The independent operators which survived A. Entry have a total patronnage of about 1 million passenger journeys. The U.S. 1982 BRRA has had a significant im- The 1980 Transport Act has also had a significant pact on the entry of intercity bus carriers into the impact on other areas of express operations such as industry. From the effective date of the act (i.e., unscheduled express service (or excursions and November 19, 1982) until October 10, 1983, 1706 tours) and commuter coach express operations. The applications for charter authority and 225 applica- act has allowed operators to provide a wide quality tions for regular-route authority were filed with the range for such services. This has, in part, been ICC (MCRSC, 1984, p. 327). For charter authority, influenced by the wide range of new luxury coach 764 applications were filed by existing firms and 942 vehicles on the market and, in part, by the profit by first time applicants. For regular-route authority, potential of such services. From 1980 to 1982, the 46 applications were filed by Greyhound and Trail- total number of coach excursion and tour passengers ways; 143 were filed by carriers not affiliated with increased from 25 million to 34 million. Alter- the Greyhound and Trailways systems. The above natively for this time period, the number of coach charter and regular-route applications represent in- excursion and tour passengers for independent oper- crease of 511 percent and 275 percent respectively ators increased from 18 to 26 million; the number over the corresponding averages of the five previous for National Express. remained basically he same; years(MCRSC, 1984, p. 327). The predominance of and the number for other public sector operators charter applications is due, in part, to the higher increased from 1 to 2 million (DOT, 1983). Com- profitability of charter services. With the significant muter coach express operations specialize in the increase in intercity bus service, competition in the provision of journey to work services. Whilst some intercity bus industry has subsequently increased. operators offer nothing beyond journeys in the peak The 1980 Transport Act initially had a major (mainly associated with private sector operators), impact on the U.K. scheduled interregional express others maintain a lower frequency throughout the bus service. Specifically, in response to the act, day. Given the requirement that passengers must British Coachways, a consortium of the country's six travel beyond 30 miles, commuter coaching has been major independent coach companies, was created. almost entirely confined to the Greater London area. By the end of 1980, the consortium was "to estab- lish a nationwide network of trunk routes between the major cities, traveling at high speeds and utiliz- B. Exit ing the motorway network wherever possible" (Kilvington and Cross, 1985). A major feature of Between 1972 and 1980, approximately 1800 British Coachways was its relatively low fare struc- U.S. communities lost all intercity bus service; in ture. In addition to British Coachways, other inde- one year after the enactment of BRRA, 1,322 com- pendent but smaller coach operators held a similar munities had been eliminated from intercity bus time 330 TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH FORUM schedules(OTA, 1984, P. 80). Of the 1,322 commu- position (Gorman, 1982, p. 4). However, the estab- nities losing service, 1,100 had been receiving serv- lished operators lowered their fares to the levels of ice from Greyhound. Another 82 discontinuances British Coachways and in some cases even lower. were attributed to service cancellations by Trailways With this strategy of at least matching the lower fare and its affiliate carriers, and only 125 discontinu- levels of British Coachways, National Express and ances were reported by all other carriers. Appar- the Scottish Bus Group were able to eliminate Brit- ently, the major intercity bus carriers are attempting ish Coachways as a major force in the scheduled to consolidate most of their activity along trunk lines express coach market as well as to squeeze out a between major population centers leaving smaller number of smaller independents. As a consequence, communities to be either serviced by smaller or no National Express and the Scottish Bus Group were intercity bus carriers at all. According to the simply confirmed to their position as the traditional MCRSC (1984) study, 80.7 percent of communities market leaders in the industry. Since fares during the losing intercity bus service have a population of less first phase of competition were generally un than 2,500. Hence, the obvious implication is that economic (i.e., losses were incurred on some indi- low population density communities are bearing the vidual routes), fares for scheduled express coach brunt of deregulation. service have subsequently risen. However, fares re- Since deregulation, the U.K. dominant express main generally below the levels set prior to October, coach firm, National Express, has adopted an oper- 1980 in real terms as well as in money terms in some ating strategy similar to that of the U.S. dominant cases—although the introduction of market pricing intercity bus firm, Greyhound. Specifically, opera- since 1980 has resulted in considerable price varia- tions have moved away from the concept of serving tions among different routes. the maximum number of communities possible to the concentration and promotion of traffic on pri- mary inter-urban flows. As a consequence, National D. Service Express has reduced the frequency on many lower population density routes and in some cases with- One concern of the opposition to the enactment of drawn services from smaller intermediate commu- the BRRA was that the service to smaller U.S. nities. communities would be negatively affected. As stated previously, a number of smaller communities have lost intercity bus service since the effective C. Pricing date of the BRRA. However, except in a few cases, these discontinuances were attributed to service can- Deregulation has had and will have a major im- cellations by the two major carriers, Greyhound and pact on the fare structure of U.S. intercity bus car- Trailways. Hence, a question has arisen whether riers. This follows, since the BRRA has given service to smaller communities abandoned by the carriers greater freedom to raise nonremunerative two major carriers will be replaced. In an investiga- fares to more compensatory levels, greater freedom tion by the MCRSC (1984), it was concluded that to abandon unprofitable services, and greater free- smaller intercity bus firms are in a position to con- dom of entry. As stated previously, the BRRA gives tinue such service, since they have the advantage of the ICC the power to pre-empt state regulatory com- lower costs which will allow them to continue small- mission decisions which deny higher fare requests community service for which there is little competi- on intrastate intercity bus routes. As of November, tion from the larger firms (MCRSC, 1984, P. 331). 1983, 23 petitions had been filed with the ICC for However, the extent to which this has occurred is not review of state refusals to allow intrastate rate in- clear at this time. creases; 19 of these petitions were decided and Based upon an analysis of complaints by the ICC, granted (MCRSC, 1984, p. 332). Hence, it appears it appears that the quality of service (as measured by that intrastate fares will be rising and approaching the extent of smoking, driver and equipment related the level of interstate fares for comparable services. problems, and failure to keep to schedules) of U.S. Alternatively, interstate fares are expected to sta- intercity bus service has improved since the effec- bilize, fall in some cases, or rise at a slower pace tive date of the BRRA (OTA, 1984, p. 91). Specifi- than if they had continued to subsidize intrastate cally, a year prior to the effective date of the BRRA, fares. Furthermore, fare restructuring proposals by the ICC received a total of 296 complaints about Greyhound and Trailways suggest that short-distance intercity bus service; in eight months after the effec- fares will tend to rise and long-distance fares will tive date, the ICC had received 18 complaints of the tend to fall(MCRSC, 1984, p. 334). Since there has above types. At the state level, the complaints have been a major increase in charter applications under been primarily concerned with service reductions. the BRRA, the resulting increase in charter service The number of complaints to states concerning ac- competition is likely to produce lower charter fares tual or proposed service reductions rose from 407 in in the new future. the 12 months preceding the BRRA, to 5,052 in the It appears that deregulation initially has had a eight months after the effective date of the BRRA greater impact on the pricing of coach services in the (OTA, 1984, p. 91). U.K. than in the U.S. This impact was precipitated As previously stated, deregulation of U.K. sched- by British Coachways attempt to compete with Na- uled express coach service has resulted in the major tional Express and the Scottish Bus Group by means carriers moving away from the strategy of maximiz- of price competition. The consequence was a rapid ing the possible number of communities served. The downward trend in fares for scheduled express coach consequence has been a higher quality of service for service. British Coachways' strategy was to reduce major population centers, i.e., the service has be fares to a level that the above nationalized bus come a more direct, faster motorway service. How- groups would be unable to match and thus place ever, service by the major carriers in a number of British Coachways in a position to sustain a market smaller communities has either been withdrawn or DEREGULATIONS OF INTERCITY BUS SERVICE: AN U.S. AND U.K. COMPARISON 331

its frequency reduced with other operators not com- previously been available to senior citizens, students ing in to fill the gap. and families. However, the prices for such cards (in Another aspect of service change in the U.K. response to lower coach fares) were reduced. Family express coach service has been an increase in the railcards, for example, were reduced in price by 33 quality of coaches used in such service. A leader in percent. The logic of such price reductions was to the introduction of higher quality coaches in non- offer cheap travel to price sensitive travelers (as the scheduled express coach service is Cotter Tours. young, the elderly, and the group) in order to dis- Cotter Tours introduced their Anglo-Scottish serv- suade them from seeking alternative modes of trans- ices in December, 1980. Whereas British Coach- port (Kilvington and Cross, 1985). The Supersaver ways attempted to compete within the express coach ticket provided substantial savings on the existing market by means of price competition, Cotter Tours day return rail fare at off-peak times when space attempted to widen the market appeal of the express capacity exists. However, even with the fare cuts, coach by means of a vastly improved product. Spe- British Rail's share of the intercity coach-rail market cifically, a higher quality type of coach has been has slipped from 90 to 80 percent (Kilvington and utilized by Cotter Tours, i.e., an air-suspension Cross, 1985). Also, it has been estimated that British Volvo-Van Hool. Also, Cotter has offered a wide Rail lost 12 million pounds in 1981 and 15 million range of services not previously provided by express pounds in 1982 (some 3 percent of intercity route coach firms. For example, food and refreshments turnover) as a consequence of express coach de- have been made available on board, hostess service regulation (Bleasdale, 1983). has been provided, and video televisions have been used to show films on trips with the sound being fed through individual headphones. Following Cotter V. SUMMARY Tours lead, a number of other express coach firms have also provided similar types of coach services. The objectives in deregulating (economically) in- On the Glasgow-London route, reclining seats and a tercity bus service in the U.S. in 1982 and express toilet on coaches have been taken for granted by the coach service in the U.K. in 1980 were basically the public. same, i.e., to substitute competitive market forces for regulatory decree in the determination of fares and schedules in the intercity bus (or express coach) E. Intermodal Competition industry. There have been similarities as well as dissimilarities in both countries in terms of the im- Prior to the effective date of the BRRA, the U.S. pacts from the deregulation acts. intercity bus industry faced major competition from In both countries, deregulation has resulted in the automobile in the private sector and from deregu- significant increases in nonscheduled intercity bus lated airlines and Amtrak (the U.S. passenger rail (or express coach) services such as charter, tour, and system) in the commercial sector. Air fare reductions excursion. Also, new scheduled intercity bus (or following the economic deregulation of U.S. domes- express coach) service has increased, but no where tic air passenger service in 1978 drew passengers near the extent to which new nonscheduled service away from intercity bus carriers on some routes. has increased. In both countries, the two major inter- Specifically, the fares on some routes were identical; city bus or express coach firms (that existed prior to hence, given the speed advantage of air service, air deregulation) still remain as the major firms in the service on these routes generally became the chosen industry. Furthermore, these major firms have at- service mode. Given that Amtrak receives federal tempted to consolidate most of their activity along operating subsidies, it has been able to increase trunk lines between major population centers, leav- service and lower fares on many routes. Although ing smaller communities to be either serviced by U.S. intercity bus carriers have been more suc- smaller or no intercity bus (or express coach) firms cessful in price competition with rail service than at all. In both countries, a higher quality of intercity with air service, intercity bus carriers have still lost bus (or express coach) service to larger population ridership to Amtrak (especially in the northwestern centers has resulted; alternatively, the quality of sections of the U.S.). service to smaller communities appears to have dete- Since the effective date of the BRRA, it appears riorated. Also, in both countries, fares for long- that the above intermodal competitive trend has ei- distance intercity bus (or express coach) services ther not been reversed or has stabilized. Although have fallen since deregulation. there is little information available to support this In addition to the similarities of the impacts in the statement, one study does conclude that the U.S. U.S. and in the U.K. from deregulating intercity bus intercity bus industry "will face considerable price (or express coach) service, there have also been competition from Amtrak and low-cost airlines for many dissimilarities. For example, in the U.K., the forseeable future" (Babcock and German, 1984, there was the attempt to establish another major p. 192). express coach firm, i.e., British Coachways, to In the U.K., the deregulation of express coach compete with the two presently established major service has had a detrimental impact on British Rail. firms; alternatively, no such attempt was made in the Specifically, the major growth routes for express U.S. In the U.K., an increase in the quality of coach service have also been routes where British coaches has occurred since deregulation; alter- Rail had already been providing a high frequency natively, no general increase in the quality of inter- and high quality of service. Especially on trunk city buses has occurred in the U.S. since deregula- routes to and from London, there has been a diver- tion. The latter is, in part, explained by the fact that sion of traffic from rail to coach, due primarily to intercity buses in the U.S. were generally of a higher lower coach fares. In order to compete with lower quality prior to deregulation than coaches in the express coach fares, British Rail responded with the U.K. Specifically, prior to deregulation, U.S. inter- railcard and the Supersaver ticket. Railcards had city buses were expected to have reclining seats and 332 TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH FORUM toilets aboard. A significant dissimilarity between Department of Transport (1981, 1982, 1983). Trans- the two countries is that deregulation of express port Statistics Great Britain, HMSO. coach in the U.K. has had a significant impact on Douglas, N. J. (1984). "An Econometric Investiga- another mode; alternatively, this has not been the tion into the Demand Function for U.K. Ex-- case in the U.S. Specifically, the deregulation of press Coach Travel During a Period of De-- express coach service in the U.K. has had a detri- regulation." Annual Proceedings of the Trans- mental impact on British Rail; alternatively, the de- portation Research Forum, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. regulation of U.S. intercity bus service has not had a 194-203. detrimental impact on Amtrak (the U.S. counterpart Farris, Martin T., and Norman E. Daniel (1983). to British Rail). However, the U.S. deregulation of "Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982." Trans- other modes such as airlines has had a detrimental portation Journal, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 4-15. impact on U.S. intercity bus service. Gorman, Brian (1982). "Effects of the Deregulation of Express Services." Paper presented at the BCC/UTSG Joint Seminar, Manchester, Eng- land. Kilvington, Russell and Tony Cross (1985). De- REFERENCES regulation of Express Coach Services in Brit- ain. Aldershot, England: Gower Press. Babcock, Michael W., and H. Wade German Motor Carrier Ratemaking Study Commission (1984). 'A Model for the Demand for Intercity (1984). A Report to the president and the Con- Bus Travel." Annual Proceedings of the Trans- gress of the United States. Washington, D.C.: portation Research Forum, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. U.S. Government Printing Office. 187-193. Office of Transportation Analysis, Interstate Com- Barton, A. J. and J. T. Everest (1984). "Express merce Commission (1984). The Intercity Bus Coach Services in the Three Years Following Industry. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government the 1980 Act." Transport and Road Research Printing Office. Laboratory Report LR1 12T, TRRL, Talley, Wayne K. (1983). Introduction to Transpor- Crowthorne, England. tation. Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western Pub- Birks, J. (1983). "The Effects of Deregulation on lishing Company. National Express." PTRC Summer Meeting, White, Peter R. (1983). "How Far Can Commuter Vol. L. Coaching Grow?" Coaching Journal. Bleasdale, C. (1983). "The Effects of Deregulation Wilson, J. (1982). "Deregulation of Express Serv- on Intercity Rail Services." PTRC Summer ices." Paper presented at the BCC/UTSG Joint Meeting, Vol. L. Seminar, Manchester, England.