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Hezbollah's Syrian Quagmire
Hezbollah’s Syrian Quagmire BY MATTHEW LEVITT ezbollah – Lebanon’s Party of God – is many things. It is one of the dominant political parties in Lebanon, as well as a social and religious movement catering first and fore- Hmost (though not exclusively) to Lebanon’s Shi’a community. Hezbollah is also Lebanon’s largest militia, the only one to maintain its weapons and rebrand its armed elements as an “Islamic resistance” in response to the terms of the Taif Accord, which ended Lebanon’s civil war and called for all militias to disarm.1 While the various wings of the group are intended to complement one another, the reality is often messier. In part, that has to do with compartmen- talization of the group’s covert activities. But it is also a factor of the group’s multiple identities – Lebanese, pan-Shi’a, pro-Iranian – and the group’s multiple and sometimes competing goals tied to these different identities. Hezbollah insists that it is Lebanese first, but in fact, it is an organization that always acts out of its self-interests above its purported Lebanese interests. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, Hezbollah also has an “expansive global network” that “is sending money and operatives to carry out terrorist attacks around the world.”2 Over the past few years, a series of events has exposed some of Hezbollah’s covert and militant enterprises in the region and around the world, challenging the group’s standing at home and abroad. Hezbollah operatives have been indicted for the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri by the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) in The Hague,3 arrested on charges of plotting attacks in Nigeria,4 and convicted on similar charges in Thailand and Cyprus.5 Hezbollah’s criminal enterprises, including drug running and money laundering from South America to Africa to the Middle East, have been targeted by law enforcement and regulatory agen- cies. -
633 Squadron Battle of Britian
P3 633 squadron Battle of Britain Dam Busters Music Cardboard wings (9 boys) Each boy comes in to hall in turn and a little about each plane is read out, then they all return together. During the second world war many young men where sent to fight in the skies over Britain and France in the RAF. It was due to their bravery skill and sacrifice that Germany never felt able to invade Britain. Here at Anchors we have been looking at some of the Aircraft which they flew, contrary to popular belief they weren’t all spitfires. Planes Fighters Miles M20 Emergency fighter, designed for quick production should the RAF have a shortage of fighters. The M-20 was an all-wood monoplane with fixed landing gear, using many parts of the Master trainer. It was designed and built in only 65 days and had good performance, but the R.A.F. did not need the M.20. Later the M.20 was considered as an expendable shipboard fighter. Farley Firefly Two-seat reconaissance fighter. It was a low-wing monoplane with a wide-track undercarriage, smaller than the Fulmar that preceded it, and provided with a more powerful engine. The design was deliberately conventional, to bring it into service quickly. Early Fireflies had a deep 'beard' radiator, later models had wing leading root intakes. The concept of the two-seat fighter may have been mistaken, but the Firefly was a versatile aircraft, taking part not only in WWII but also in the Korean war. The last of the 1702 built was delivered in 1956. -
Volume 7, Issue 2, July 2021 Introduction: New Researchers and the Bright Future of Military History
www.bjmh.org.uk British Journal for Military History Volume 7, Issue 2, July 2021 Cover picture: Royal Navy destroyers visiting Derry, Northern Ireland, 11 June 1933. Photo © Imperial War Museum, HU 111339 www.bjmh.org.uk BRITISH JOURNAL FOR MILITARY HISTORY EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD The Editorial Team gratefully acknowledges the support of the British Journal for Military History’s Editorial Advisory Board the membership of which is as follows: Chair: Prof Alexander Watson (Goldsmiths, University of London, UK) Dr Laura Aguiar (Public Record Office of Northern Ireland / Nerve Centre, UK) Dr Andrew Ayton (Keele University, UK) Prof Tarak Barkawi (London School of Economics, UK) Prof Ian Beckett (University of Kent, UK) Dr Huw Bennett (University of Cardiff, UK) Prof Martyn Bennett (Nottingham Trent University, UK) Dr Matthew Bennett (University of Winchester, UK) Prof Brian Bond (King’s College London, UK) Dr Timothy Bowman (University of Kent, UK; Member BCMH, UK) Ian Brewer (Treasurer, BCMH, UK) Dr Ambrogio Caiani (University of Kent, UK) Prof Antoine Capet (University of Rouen, France) Dr Erica Charters (University of Oxford, UK) Sqn Ldr (Ret) Rana TS Chhina (United Service Institution of India, India) Dr Gemma Clark (University of Exeter, UK) Dr Marie Coleman (Queens University Belfast, UK) Prof Mark Connelly (University of Kent, UK) Seb Cox (Air Historical Branch, UK) Dr Selena Daly (Royal Holloway, University of London, UK) Dr Susan Edgington (Queen Mary University of London, UK) Prof Catharine Edwards (Birkbeck, University of London, -
Worlds Apart: Bosnian Lessons for Global Security
Worlds Apart Swanee Hunt Worlds Apart Bosnian Lessons for GLoBaL security Duke university Press Durham anD LonDon 2011 © 2011 Duke University Press All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America on acid- free paper ♾ Designed by C. H. Westmoreland Typeset in Charis by Tseng Information Systems, Inc. Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data appear on the last printed page of this book. To my partners c harLes ansBacher: “Of course you can.” and VaLerie GiLLen: “Of course we can.” and Mirsad JaceVic: “Of course you must.” Contents Author’s Note xi Map of Yugoslavia xii Prologue xiii Acknowledgments xix Context xxi Part i: War Section 1: Officialdom 3 1. insiDe: “Esteemed Mr. Carrington” 3 2. outsiDe: A Convenient Euphemism 4 3. insiDe: Angels and Animals 8 4. outsiDe: Carter and Conscience 10 5. insiDe: “If I Left, Everyone Would Flee” 12 6. outsiDe: None of Our Business 15 7. insiDe: Silajdžić 17 8. outsiDe: Unintended Consequences 18 9. insiDe: The Bread Factory 19 10. outsiDe: Elegant Tables 21 Section 2: Victims or Agents? 24 11. insiDe: The Unspeakable 24 12. outsiDe: The Politics of Rape 26 13. insiDe: An Unlikely Soldier 28 14. outsiDe: Happy Fourth of July 30 15. insiDe: Women on the Side 33 16. outsiDe: Contact Sport 35 Section 3: Deadly Stereotypes 37 17. insiDe: An Artificial War 37 18. outsiDe: Clashes 38 19. insiDe: Crossing the Fault Line 39 20. outsiDe: “The Truth about Goražde” 41 21. insiDe: Loyal 43 22. outsiDe: Pentagon Sympathies 46 23. insiDe: Family Friends 48 24. outsiDe: Extremists 50 Section 4: Fissures and Connections 55 25. -
Iran's Gray Zone Strategy
Iran’s Gray Zone Strategy Cornerstone of its Asymmetric Way of War By Michael Eisenstadt* ince the creation of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran has distinguished itself (along with Russia and China) as one of the world’s foremost “gray zone” actors.1 For nearly four decades, however, the United States has struggled to respond effectively to this asymmetric “way of war.” Washington has often Streated Tehran with caution and granted it significant leeway in the conduct of its gray zone activities due to fears that U.S. pushback would lead to “all-out” war—fears that the Islamic Republic actively encourages. Yet, the very purpose of this modus operandi is to enable Iran to pursue its interests and advance its anti-status quo agenda while avoiding escalation that could lead to a wider conflict. Because of the potentially high costs of war—especially in a proliferated world—gray zone conflicts are likely to become increasingly common in the years to come. For this reason, it is more important than ever for the United States to understand the logic underpinning these types of activities, in all their manifestations. Gray Zone, Asymmetric, and Hybrid “Ways of War” in Iran’s Strategy Gray zone warfare, asymmetric warfare, and hybrid warfare are terms that are often used interchangeably, but they refer neither to discrete forms of warfare, nor should they be used interchangeably—as they often (incor- rectly) are. Rather, these terms refer to that aspect of strategy that concerns how states employ ways and means to achieve national security policy ends.2 Means refer to the diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and cyber instruments of national power; ways describe how these means are employed to achieve the ends of strategy. -
Armed Conflicts Report - Israel
Armed Conflicts Report - Israel Armed Conflicts Report Israel-Palestine (1948 - first combat deaths) Update: February 2009 Summary Type of Conflict Parties to the Conflict Status of the Fighting Number of Deaths Political Developments Background Arms Sources Economic Factors Summary: 2008 The situation in the Gaza strip escalated throughout 2008 to reflect an increasing humanitarian crisis. The death toll reached approximately 1800 deaths by the end of January 2009, with increased conflict taking place after December 19th. The first six months of 2008 saw increased fighting between Israeli forces and Hamas rebels. A six month ceasefire was agreed upon in June of 2008, and the summer months saw increased factional violence between opposing Palestinian groups Hamas and Fatah. Israel shut down the border crossings between the Gaza strip and Israel and shut off fuel to the power plant mid-January 2008. The fuel was eventually turned on although blackouts occurred sporadically throughout the year. The blockade was opened periodically throughout the year to allow a minimum amount of humanitarian aid to pass through. However, for the majority of the year, the 1.5 million Gaza Strip inhabitants, including those needing medical aid, were trapped with few resources. At the end of January 2009, Israel agreed to the principles of a ceasefire proposal, but it is unknown whether or not both sides can come to agreeable terms and create long lasting peace in 2009. 2007 A November 2006 ceasefire was broken when opposing Palestinian groups Hamas and Fatah renewed fighting in April and May of 2007. In June, Hamas led a coup on the Gaza headquarters of Fatah giving them control of the Gaza Strip. -
Hd122-Xxx.Ps
1 108th Congress, 1st Session – – – – – – – – – – – – House Document 108–122 BLOCKING PROPERTY OF THE FORMER IRAQI RE- GIME, ITS SENIOR OFFICIALS AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS, AND TAKING CERTAIN OTHER ACTIONS COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING NOTIFICATION TO EXPAND THE SCOPE OF THE NATIONAL EMER- GENCY DECLARED IN EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 13303 OF MAY 22, 2003, WITH RESPECT TO THE BLOCKING OF PROPERTY OF THE FORMER IRAQI REGIME, ITS SENIOR OFFICIALS AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS, AND TAKING CERTAIN OTHER ACTIONS, PURSUANT TO 50 U.S.C. 1703(b) AND 50 U.S.C. 1631 SEPTEMBER 3, 2003.—Referred to the Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 19–011 WASHINGTON : 2003 VerDate jul 14 2003 06:52 Sep 06, 2003 Jkt 019011 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 4012 Sfmt 4012 E:\HR\OC\HD122.XXX HD122 E:\Seals\Congress.#13 VerDate jul 14 2003 06:52 Sep 06, 2003 Jkt 019011 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 4012 Sfmt 4012 E:\HR\OC\HD122.XXX HD122 THE WHITE HOUSE, Washington, August 28, 2003. Hon. J. DENNIS HASTERT, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Washington, DC. DEAR MR. SPEAKER: Consistent with section 204(b) of the Inter- national Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. 1703(b), and section 301 of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1631, I hereby report that I have exercised my authority to expand the scope of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13303 of May 22, 2003, to address the unusual and extraor- dinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States posed by obstacles to the orderly reconstruction of Iraq, the restoration and maintenance of peace and security in that country, and the development of political, administrative, and eco- nomic institutions, in Iraq. -
Joint Chiefs Say Invasion 'Only Way' to Totally Disarm N Korea
Joint Chiefs say invasion 'only way' to totally disarm N Korea Image copyright GETTY IMAGES Image caption US soldiers take part in "Warrior Strike" exercises in South Korea in September A Pentagon assessment has declared the only way to completely destroy all parts of North Korea's nuclear weapons programme is through a ground invasion. Rear Admiral Michael Dumont expressed the opinion on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a letter to Congressman Ted Lieu. Mr Dumont said calculating "even the roughest" potential casualty figures would be extremely difficult. He also gave some detail on what the first hours of a war would involve. "The only way to 'locate and destroy - with complete certainty - all components of North Korea's nuclear weapons programs' is through a ground invasion," he wrote in response to Congressman Lieu's questions about a potential conflict. The risks involved included a potential nuclear counter-attack by North Korea while US forces attempted to disable its "deeply buried, underground facilities", he said. "A classified briefing is the best venue for a detailed discussion," he added. The Joint Chiefs of Staff directly advise the president of the United States on military matters. Skip Twitter post by @tedlieu Ted Lieu ✔ @tedlieu Dear @realDonaldTrump: It is morning in Japan. This @washingtonpost article on grim N Korea war options is for you. https://www. washingtonpost.com/world/national -security/securing-north-korean-nuclear-sites-would-require-a- ground-invasion-pentagon-says/2017/11/04/32d5f6fa- c0cf-11e7-97d9-bdab5a0ab381_story.html? utm_term=.e8db56975149 … 3:13 PM - Nov 5, 2017 Securing North Korean nuclear sites would require a ground invasion, Pentagon says A Navy admiral sent a blunt assessment of the dangers of military action to lawmakers. -
Madeleine Albright, Gender, and Foreign Policy-Making
Journal of Political Science Volume 33 Number 1 Article 2 November 2005 Madeleine Albright, Gender, and Foreign Policy-Making Kevin J. Lasher Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Lasher, Kevin J. (2005) "Madeleine Albright, Gender, and Foreign Policy-Making," Journal of Political Science: Vol. 33 : No. 1 , Article 2. Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol33/iss1/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Politics at CCU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Political Science by an authorized editor of CCU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Madeleine Albright , Gender, and Foreign Policy-Making Kevin J. Lashe r Francis Marion University Women are finally becoming major participants in the U.S. foreign policy-making establishment . I seek to un derstand how th e arrival of women foreign policy-makers might influence the outcome of U.S. foreign polic y by fo cusi ng 011 th e activities of Mad elei n e A !bright , the first wo man to hold the position of Secretary of State . I con clude that A !bright 's gender did hav e some modest im pact. Gender helped Albright gain her position , it affected the manner in which she carried out her duties , and it facilitated her working relationship with a Repub lican Congress. But A !bright 's gender seemed to have had relatively little effect on her ideology and policy recom mendations . ver the past few decades more and more women have won election to public office and obtained high-level Oappointive positions in government, and this trend is likely to continue well into the 21st century. -
The New Frontier of Activism - a Study of the Conditioning Factors for the Role of Modern Day Activists
The new frontier of activism - a study of the conditioning factors for the role of modern day activists Master’s Thesis Andreas Holbak Espersen | MSocSc Political Communication & Management Søren Walther Bjerregård | MSc International Business & Politics Supervisor Erik Caparros Højbjerg | Departmenent of Management, Politics and Philosophy Submitted 7th November 2016 | STUs: 251.792 Table of Contents Abstract ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 Chapter 0 - Research question and literature review ....................................................................................... 6 0.1 Preface ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 7 0.2 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................................... 8 0.2.1 Research area .................................................................................................................................................................... 9 0.3 Literature review ...................................................................................................................................................................... 11 0.3.1 Activism in International -
Surprise, Intelligence Failure, and Mass Casualty Terrorism
SURPRISE, INTELLIGENCE FAILURE, AND MASS CASUALTY TERRORISM by Thomas E. Copeland B.A. Political Science, Geneva College, 1991 M.P.I.A., University of Pittsburgh, 1992 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The Graduate School of Public and International Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2006 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by Thomas E. Copeland It was defended on April 12, 2006 and approved by Davis Bobrow, Ph.D. Donald Goldstein, Ph.D. Dennis Gormley Phil Williams, Ph.D. Dissertation Director ii © 2006 Thomas E. Copeland iii SURPRISE, INTELLIGENCE FAILURE, AND MASS CASUALTY TERRORISM Thomas E. Copeland, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2006 This study aims to evaluate whether surprise and intelligence failure leading to mass casualty terrorism are inevitable. It explores the extent to which four factors – failures of public policy leadership, analytical challenges, organizational obstacles, and the inherent problems of warning information – contribute to intelligence failure. This study applies existing theories of surprise and intelligence failure to case studies of five mass casualty terrorism incidents: World Trade Center 1993; Oklahoma City 1995; Khobar Towers 1996; East African Embassies 1998; and September 11, 2001. A structured, focused comparison of the cases is made using a set of thirteen probing questions based on the factors above. The study concludes that while all four factors were influential, failures of public policy leadership contributed directly to surprise. Psychological bias and poor threat assessments prohibited policy makers from anticipating or preventing attacks. Policy makers mistakenly continued to use a law enforcement approach to handling terrorism, and failed to provide adequate funding, guidance, and oversight of the intelligence community. -
Hezbollah Leader Hassan Nasrallah Boasts of the Organization's Ability
May 28, 2006 Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S) Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah boasts of the organization’s ability to maintain a balance of deterrence with Israel. By doing that he justifies, in the internal Lebanese arena, its refusal to disarm and repels the demands of his opponents, the supporters of the “New Order” in Lebanon. Nasrallah speaking at a meeting of The Resistance Culture [i.e., terrorism] Committee: “The resistance [i.e., Hezbollah] has more than 12,000 rockets… All of northern occupied Palestine [i.e., Israel] is within range of the rockets of the resistance…” (Al- Manar TV, May 23). Overview aaa In a fiery speech on the sixth anniversary of the IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon, Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nassrallah boasted of the organization’s ability maintain a balance of deterrence with Israel. It has, he said, more than 12,000 rockets in its possession, posing a serious threat to Israel’s northern regions. He also spoke of his commitment to free Lebanese prisoners (terrorists) held in Israel and to liberate the Shebaa Farms in the near future. He thus presented himself as Lebanon’s protector and rejected demands from home and abroad that Hezbollah disarm. In an equally fiery speech he encouraged the Palestinians to continue their terrorist campaign against Israel, boasting that Hezbollah was the first to use suicide bombing attacks in the conflict with Israel. TTThhheee bbbaaaccckkkgggrrrooouuunnnddd ooofff ttthhheee tttwwwooo ssspppeeeeeeccchhheeess aaannnddd ttthhheeeiiirrr gggoooaaalllsss aaa Every year on May 25 Hezbollah celebrates Resistance [i.e., terrorism] and Liberation Day to mark the anniversary of the IDF’s withdrawal from the security zone in southern Lebanon.